




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Revisiting Bréhier – Differences between Plotinus' *Enneads* and Advaita Vedānta

Abstract: Bréhier revives the possibility of Indian *Upaniṣadic* influence on Plotinus, specifically in the area of mysticism – asking what in Plotinus' philosophy is foreign with respect to the Greek philosophical tradition. After Bréhier there are vigorous defenses of Plotinus' Greek origins – not all of which respond directly to the key issues he raises, or address Plotinus' mysticism specifically. My purpose in this paper is not to answer Bréhier, but to revisit him, for the purpose of delineating paradigmatic differences between Plotinus' metaphysics and that in Advaita Vedānta. Starting with differences in their respective texts and conceptions of the Divine, I explore concrete concepts (*Māyā*, *tolma*, the forms, *guṇas*, etc.), so unique to each tradition that they comprise the heart and essence of their differences. I assert as well that their metaphysical distinctions imply dissimilarities in their modes of mysticism. In this effort I uphold numinous experience above historical influences. This paper therefore has four parts: (1) Revisiting Bréhier, Armstrong, and Others; (2) Defining Terms: Texts, Methods, and Conceptions of the Divine (Striking Similarities); (3) Contrasting Advaita Vedānta and the *Enneads* (Paradigmatic Differences); and (4) Conclusion.

Keywords: Plotinus, Bréhier, Advaita Vedānta, *Enneads*, Brahman, One, *Māyā*, *Gunas*, *Tolma*, Form, *parā* and *aparā vidyā*, Monism, Numinous, Mysticism

Plotinus (ca 204-270 A.D.), the philosopher from Lycopolis, is said by Porphyry to have been “eager to make acquaintance” with Persian and Indian philosophical disciplines.¹ Centuries later, Bréhier revives the possibility of Indian *Upaniṣadic* influence upon Plotinus – stating that “the double aspect of Plotinus' notion of Intelligence raises an extremely delicate question and one which perhaps cannot be solved completely.”² This question, which concerns “Oriental influences upon Plotinus' thought”³ is as follows:

What does the system [of Plotinus] contain which is foreign to Greek philosophy? What is the nature and the source of the ideas which in Plotinus did not originate in Greek philosophy?⁴

1 Porphyry, “On the Life of Plotinus and the Order of his Books,” in *Plotinus Ennead I*, trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 9.

2 E. Bréhier, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, trans. J. Thomas (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 106. As Armstrong points out, the suggestion that there are “Indian affinities” to the essential characteristics of Plotinus' philosophy, is not new in Bréhier. See A. H. Armstrong, “Plotinus and India,” *The Classical Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (Jan 1936): 22.

3 Bréhier, 106.

4 *Ibid.*, 108.

Bréhier speaks of such oriental (specifically Indian *Upaniṣadic*) “influences” with careful nuance. While pointing to that which is non-Hellenic in Plotinus, even as he acknowledges Plotinus’ Hellenic roots – “it is not the Plotinian conception of the world but the nature of the problems he raised which compels us to recognize in Plotinus a scheme of thought which is quite different from the Hellenic scheme”⁵ – Bréhier seeks “the source of the philosophy of Plotinus beyond the Orient close to Greece, in the religious speculations of India, which by the time of Plotinus had been founded for centuries on the *Upanishads*”⁶ – pointing specifically to the supra-moral, supra-rational character of the *Upaniṣads*.⁷ Bréhier points to this affinity between Plotinus and the *Upaniṣads* – “The real difficulty in the doctrine of the Upanishads is then the very one I pointed out in Plotinus. It consists in inquiring in what sense the self, in concentrating upon itself, finds within itself the very principle of the universe.”⁸

Like Bréhier, Sinnige too notes the “noticeable similarity” between Plotinus’ “central doctrine” of “inward meditation,” leading to union with the “universal Self” – a doctrine, he says, has “no predecessor in Greek traditions” – and the “fundamental doctrines” of the *Upaniṣads*.⁹ Likewise, Hatab too points to Plotinus’ uniqueness within western tradition:

... with the absolute transcendence of the One, and the soul’s power to ascend to union with the One, the soul ultimately relinquishes its individuality (VI.7.35). Here we are in conflict again with most of western thought, especially Christianity ... In sum, it is Plotinus’ refusal to give ultimate status to form, individuality and intelligence that radically sets him apart from the Greek tradition in which he operated.¹⁰

In this paper, my purpose is to revisit Bréhier, not so much to answer him, as to delineate paradigmatic differences between Plotinus’ metaphysics – and that in Advaita Vedānta. For the purposes of this task, instead of polarizing theism against monism (Rist),¹¹ I draw a contrast between what I would call Plotinus’ *dualistic monism* – for, Plotinus’ anti-thesis between matter and the One infuses a tincture of otherness into his *unio mystica* – and the highest monism of Advaita Vedānta – a pristine monism that brooks no converse of the Divine – whether matter, nothingness, or evil. This paper therefore has four parts: (1) Revisiting Bréhier, Armstrong, and Others; (2) Defining Terms: Texts, Methods, and Conceptions of the Divine (Striking Similarities); (3) Contrasting Advaita Vedānta and the *Enneads* (Paradigmatic Differences); and (4) Conclusion.

5 Ibid., 111.

6 Ibid., 117.

7 Ibid., 128.

8 Ibid., 125.

9 Th.G. Sinnige, *Six Lectures on Plotinus and Gnosticism* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 58–59, 104.

10 L. J. Hatab, “Plotinus and the *Upaniṣads*,” in *Neoplatonism and Indian Thought*, ed. R. B. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), 29–30.

11 J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 213–230.

1. Revisiting Bréhier, Armstrong, and Others

Bréhier points to the following aspects that distinguish Plotinus from his contemporaries and from the Hellenic tradition:

- (1) Intelligence in Plotinus' *Enneads* is twofold – (i) “an articulated system of definite notions” and (ii) the “universal being in whose bosom every difference is absorbed, in which every distinction between subject and object comes to a complete end.”¹² The first, which has Hellenic roots, expresses the notion that empirical reality can be grasped through reason. The second, which involves “the mystical ideal of the complete unification of beings in the Godhead,” does not have Hellenic roots, even though Plotinus tried to attach it to a Hellenic origin.¹³ As Bréhier adds, intelligence for Greek philosophers is not only the faculty through which we know external objects, but also that through which “we know ourselves.”¹⁴ Bréhier then distinguishes further between the self-knowing intelligence limited to rationality and that which points in the direction of mysticism, involving experience – “It is evident that we are dealing here no longer ... with a rational explanation but rather with an experience.”¹⁵ As Bréhier explains, the “true knowledge” of which Plotinus speaks is “only an immediate intuition of the unity of beings”¹⁶ – an *experiential* intuition.
- (2) Plotinus' system “differs in principle from all the philosophical systems and religions of his time because of the almost complete absence of the idea of a mediator or savior destined to bring man into relation with God.”¹⁷ Hence, the “very idea of salvation, which implies a mediator sent by God to man” – is “foreign” to Plotinus.¹⁸
- (3) Bréhier points to the trans-moral character of Plotinus' mysticism – “What relates Plotinus to Indian thought is his decided preference for contemplation, from which he derives the only true reality, his scorn for the practical moral life, and finally, the egoistic and universal character of the spiritual life as he conceived it.”¹⁹

Narrowing down the problem to comprehending – “how a distinct individuality could proceed from the universal being and how it can be reabsorbed into it”²⁰ – Bréhier is clear as to what relates Plotinus to Indian thought:

There is a double perspective in Plotinus' notion of Intelligence. On the one hand, it is the intelligible and eternal order, composed of fixed and definite relations, which serves as model to the sensible order. On the other hand, it is thought directed toward itself, in which all distinction of subject and object disappears, in which the self is merged in a universal being.

It seemed to me that the second perspective was foreign to the tradition of Greek thought. Intelligence becomes merely inward satisfaction ... of having escaped from all particular forms

¹² Bréhier, 106.

¹³ Ibid., 106.

¹⁴ Ibid., 107.

¹⁵ Ibid., 110.

¹⁶ Ibid., 110.

¹⁷ Ibid., 112.

¹⁸ Ibid., 112.

¹⁹ Ibid., 132.

²⁰ Ibid., 111.

of being. It seeks no rational explanation. All ethical and intellectual relations which constitute a thought and a person are lost in this contemplation. These are traits characteristic of the religious doctrine of the Hindus as expressed in the Upanishads. This is why it has seemed to me that the system of Plotinus must be linked to Indian thought.²¹

Here, it might profit us to apply the *Upaniṣadic* divide between higher (*parā*) and lower (*aparā*) knowledge (*vidyā*) (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* I.1.4), which, as Hatab notes, corresponds to the Plotinian distinction between a vision of unity and knowledge of multiplicity, respectively. Where *parā vidyā* (“knowledge of imperishable Being”) manifests as “vision” and “experience,” *aparā vidyā* (“knowledge of perishable beings”) “culminates in intellect.”²² Another way of describing Bréhier’s point regarding Plotinus as a mystical philosopher is to say that he infuses the possibility of *parā vidyā* into the Greek tradition. Where rational, discursive knowledge (*aparā vidyā*), “the articulated system of definite notions, the intelligible order, the fixed model of the sensible order,” is the Greek and generally the western emphasis – direct, mystical knowledge of the universal (*parā vidyā*) – or “thought directed toward itself, where subject-object distinctions disappear, and where finally intelligence is transcended and the self is merged with the universal principle” – seems, as Hatab notes, “foreign to Greek and most of western thought.”²³ The same is true of a certain strictly dualistic and theistic Christian perspective of Plotinus, for, as Mamo notes, many Christian commentators of Plotinus begin from a premise “opposed to the mystical claims.” They preserve the gap between creator and creature and reject any talk of “the creature becoming the creator” as “nonsense or heresy.”²⁴

While the relation of the individual to the universal had always been a Greek problem, what makes Plotinus unique is the fact that he sought – not a rational knowledge of the universal – but the ultimate empiricism of the mystic – “a mystical union where individual consciousness disappears,” a *unio* that entails a “withdrawal from particular forms, and all ethical and intellectual aspects of the soul, where the self is lost in contemplation.”²⁵ Like Bréhier, Hatab too concludes that it is this “emphasis on contemplation as the ultimate reality” that “most conclusively connects Plotinus with the thought of India.”²⁶ Mamo goes further and points out that it is “philosophical mysticism” – understood as philosophical interpretation of mystical experience – that characterizes Plotinus’ work, setting him apart from many mystics, *both* eastern and western.²⁷

After Bréhier there are vigorous defenses of Plotinus’ Greek origins – not all of which respond directly to the key issues he raises, or address Plotinus’ mysticism specifically. Some western views representing the myriad aspects of this controversy include those

²¹ Ibid., 132.

²² Hatab, 33.

²³ Ibid., 30.

²⁴ P. S. Mamo, “Is Plotinian Mysticism Monistic?” in *The Significance of Neoplatonism*, ed. R. B. Harris (Norfolk: International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, 1976), 200.

²⁵ Hatab, 30–31.

²⁶ Ibid., 31.

²⁷ Mamo, 199–200.

of Armstrong, Blumenthal, Schwyzer, Staal, Rist, Henry, Trouillard, and Cilento (who eschews *contamination* by “oriental influences” from Plotinus’ mysticism).²⁸

Armstrong, who acknowledges the “striking” parallels between Plotinus and the *Upaniṣads*, as also the notion that Plotinus decorates his Greek ideas with Oriental ornaments,²⁹ does not address Bréhier’s three salient points – that Plotinus reaches beyond (not against) reason, that he reaches beyond ethics, and that he does not require a savior.³⁰ Instead, Armstrong seeks the roots of the infinite self and the denial of distinction between subject and object in the western tradition itself.³¹ As Wolters reports, Armstrong concludes as well that there are “Greek antecedents” to Plotinus’ “subjective idealism” – that there was a “streak of irrationalism” in Greek thought reaching back to Heraclitus and Euripides and prominent in the *Hermetica*.³² For Armstrong, even Greek rationalism contained “seeds of Plotinian ‘pantheistic idealism’” – since the “notion of infinity in the intelligible world” is “prefigured” in Anaximander and the Stoics.³³ Moreover, the “non-distinctness of the ego” in Plotinus has roots in the Pre-Socratics and Aristotle.³⁴ Having already said that Plotinus “never reached India” through Gordian’s expedition,³⁵ Armstrong asserts in a more recent source, that Plotinus “never in fact established any sort of contact with Eastern thinkers ... there is no good evidence ... to show that he ever acquired any knowledge of Indian philosophy.”³⁶ In the cover jacket of his translation of the *Enneads*, he repudiates – this time, oriental (not Indian) influence on Plotinus – “There is no real trace of Oriental influence on his [Plotinus’] thought ...”³⁷ Armstrong, it seems to me, does not give enough credence to the difference between *parā* and *aparā vidyā* – a distinction essential in granting mysticism its full stature.

Given the sheer veracity that thrusts the mystical experience beyond the subject-object divide, I cannot help but question what strikes me as the following unwittingly cynical aspects of Bréhier and Armstrong:

²⁸ See Armstrong (1936); H. J. Blumenthal, “Platonism in Late Classical Antiquity and Some Indian Parallels,” in *Neoplatonism and Indian Philosophy*, ed. P. M. Gregorios (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 127-151; A. M. Wolters, “A Survey of Modern Scholarly Opinion on Plotinus and Indian Thought,” in *Neoplatonism and Indian Thought*, 297, 300-303.

²⁹ Armstrong (1936), 23-24.

³⁰ Armstrong (1936), 22, refers to saviors in his point that in Bréhier’s rendition of Plotinus, the notion – that all that is necessary for the ascent is the soul’s direct turning in upon itself and recognizing that it is the One Being, instead of ascent through discursive reason – “obviously excludes” not only the “normal Greek rationalism” but also the “popular Oriental religions of Plotinus’s time” – with their “saviours and mediators between man and a transcendent God.”

³¹ Armstrong (1936).

³² Wolters, 299.

³³ *Ibid.*, 299.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 299.

³⁵ Armstrong (1936), 24.

³⁶ A. H. Armstrong, *Plotinus* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1953), 13.

³⁷ See cover jacket of each volume of *Plotinus’ Enneads in Seven Volumes*, trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966-88).

- (1) They both look to influence theories to explain Plotinus – whether to root him in the Hellenic or *Upaniṣadic* traditions.³⁸ Blumenthal too uses influence theories, when he asserts the unlikelihood of historical influence in either direction (from Śaṅkara to Plotinus or vice versa).³⁹ To apply influence theories – given their inherent denial of inwardness – to mysticism – given its inherent, radical introspectiveness – becomes an oxymoron. The individuated *experiential* dimension of mysticism is wholly absent from visible historical influence, which can transmit itself only through the lower *aparā vidyā* or discursive reason – except in the case of the rare *sensitive* thinker (not a mystic) who imbibes insights directly from what he immerses himself in – namely, his contemporary historically bestowed collective consciousness. It is my conviction therefore that historical influences are largely redundant to the essentials of the numinous experience. At best, they inspire our discursive preparation for the ascent. They cannot *induce* mysticism.
- (2) Bréhier asks if Plotinus is not the first author in the west of an “irrationalistic metaphysics,”⁴⁰ and Armstrong uses “anti-rationalist” to characterize the theory of the “infinite self.”⁴¹ If we are to avoid cynicism, any numinous metaphysics that refers to the “infinite self” should be granted the stature of the *supra*-rational – not the irrational, nor the anti-rational. Equally, Plotinus’ One and Advaita Vedānta’s *Brahman* should be understood as *supra*-ethical – not anti-ethical.
- (3) Oddly enough, Bréhier considers Plotinus’ notion of the spiritual life to be “egoistic and universal” without spotting the oxymoron in this combination.⁴² If the particular cannot be universal, how can the egoistic – which is a category of the particular – ever be truly universal? Armstrong refers to the denial of any sharp distinction between “the individual ego and the universal principal of reality.”⁴³ While they may be rooted in the ego as a starting point, Plotinus’ mysticism and that in Advaita Vedānta should be understood as *ego-transcending* – not egoistic. For both aim at transcending the ego, *through* the ego. Here it may help to distinguish the ego from the *self* associated with each level of the ascent. What gets obliterated at the summit of the mystical ascent, is not the distinction between the ego and the First Principle, but that between the ultimate ego-transcending highest *Self* and the One, which Plotinus says is “primarily self and self beyond being” (VI.8(39).14).
- (4) Finally, Armstrong refers to Plotinus’ idealism as “pantheistic,” defining pantheism as “subjective idealism”⁴⁴ – but adding that Plotinus “writes as an objective rationalist in the best Platonic-Aristotelian tradition...”⁴⁵ Although Plotinus’ One is immanent *and*

³⁸ Bréhier, 106; Armstrong (1936), 23.

³⁹ Blumenthal, 129.

⁴⁰ Bréhier, 133.

⁴¹ Armstrong (1936), 25.

⁴² Bréhier, 132.

⁴³ Armstrong (1936), 27.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 22, 24, 27–28.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 26.

transcendent, as Armstrong himself acknowledges⁴⁶ – his mysticism can hardly be described as pantheistic – if by this term one means “God is all and all is God” – with the “all” defined literally as the cohort of discrete beings, each in its unvarnished, unredeemed immanence.

A thinker may be embedded within a tradition without becoming an automaton thereof. A search for intellectual roots is therefore reasonable. But Plotinus was more than an intellectual. He was also a mystic. Does it behoove the grandeur of his stature to subject him to a quibble over his intellectual roots – to the neglect of inquiry into his personal greatness? The historical approach, it seems to me, reaches a dead end when it seeks to understand something as individuated and experiential, yet universal, as mysticism. My approach therefore is radically different from those of Bréhier, Armstrong, or Blumenthal. I seek neither to prove Plotinus' intellectual roots – whether Hellenic or Indic – nor to use a historical method. Above all, I reject the notion of historical influences – when applied to mysticism. Instead, I try and show the paradigmatic metaphysical differences between Plotinus' *Enneads* and Advaita Vedānta – notwithstanding their striking parallels. I then seek to address whether or not these differences are too large to support Bréhier's thesis. What I do not address is whether Bréhier was right in pointing to Plotinus' uniqueness in and purported departure from the western tradition.

In this context, it is important to clarify that civilizations are never as insular as their votaries often make them out to be. They are interwoven at subtle levels of the collective consciousness, through the arduous ascent of each individual. Thus, regardless of whether there was any direct discursive influence of the *Upaniṣads* on Plotinus, I remain convinced that at the level of numinous experience, *all* sages uplift *all* civilizations. Through the power of their mysticism, they uplift this very earth.

2. Defining Terms:

Texts, Methods, and Conceptions of the Divine (Striking Similarities)

Before contrasting the *Enneads* and Advaita Vedānta (Section 3), it becomes imperative to first define their basic terms, beginning with literal differences in their respective text-types and methods of knowing. In this section I first present the triple basis of Advaita Vedānta, discussing its text-types, and contrasting these with the *Enneads*. I then present the conception of the Divine in each tradition, pointing to their striking similarities.

Different text-types, different methods of knowing

To understand the basic differences between the *Enneads* and Advaita Vedānta, one must begin with meaningful differences in their respective texts. Vedānta includes three standard constituent works – the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavadgītā*, and the *Brahma-Sūtras*⁴⁷ – which

⁴⁶ Ibid., 28.

⁴⁷ Regarding the *Brahma-Sūtras* or *Vedānta-Sūtras*, as Swami Vireswarananda points out, very little is known about the author, Bādarāyaṇa. While “tradition” identifies him with Vyāsa (the author of the *Gītā* and the *Mahābhārata*), Shankara, in his commentaries, distinguishes the two – referring to Vyāsa as the author of the

are therefore collectively called *prasthāna-traya* (threefold norm).⁴⁸ Advaita Vedānta is the non-dual or monistic expression of Vedānta.⁴⁹ All schools of Vedānta are grounded on this triple basis, which covers three distinct areas.⁵⁰ If the *Upaniṣads* constitute the mystical basis of Vedānta,⁵¹ and the *Brahma-sūtras* the rational, then the *Bhagavadgītā* forms the third stage of applied truths.⁵²

Dated between the fifth and second centuries B.C.,⁵³ the *Bhagavadgītā* is a metaphysical and spiritual *narrated* dialogue between Kṛṣṇa, an Incarnation (*Avatāra*) of Viṣṇu – and Arjuna, a princely warrior, *kṣatriya* by caste, who represents humankind. From the human standpoint Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna are friends, but in a “deeper sense” they are *Nara-Nārāyaṇa* (man-God) – or “two aspects of the one Reality, each incomplete without the other.”⁵⁴ The *Bhagavadgītā* dwells on the problem of applying *Upaniṣad* truths to active life.⁵⁵

The *Enneads*, *Bhagavadgītā*, *Upaniṣads*, and *Brahma-sūtras* – are very different in structure, style, tone, and truth. The *Enneads* – a set of fifty-four philosophical treatises arranged by Porphyry in six sets, nine each – have been described by Hadot as sermons or

Mahābhārata, and Bādarāyaṇa as that of the *Brahma-Sūtras*. As to the date of the *Brahma-Sūtras*, Swami Vireswarananda concludes that there are “strong grounds for believing that the Vedānta-Sūtras must have existed before Buddha and that if Bādarāyaṇa and Veda-Vyāsa are not one and the same person as tradition holds, the latter must have had a hand in the present recension of the Sūtras, though it is very difficult to say to what extent—whether it was by way of merely revising the original Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa or writing them down *in toto* after the teachings of Bādarāyaṇa.” See Swami Vireswarananda, *Brahma-Sūtras with Text, Meaning, Translation and Commentary in English* (Delhi: Bharatiya Kala Prakashan, 2007), 4, 8. Radhakrishnan holds the author of the *Brahma-Sūtra* to be Bādarāyaṇa, “sometimes said to be Vyāsa, literally the arranger.” He suggests that this work was composed about the second century B.C. See S. Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sūtra The Philosophy of Spiritual Life* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 22 and note 3.

48 Swami Satprakashananda, *The Universe, God, and God-Realization from the Viewpoint of Vedānta* (St. Louis: The Vedānta Society of St. Louis, 1977), 36.

49 Inasmuch as its radical monism is *ultimate*, the term “non-dual” (*Advaita*) perhaps fails to convey the full stature of Advaita Vedānta. Inasmuch as it is a negative appellation, it falls short of the grandeur of Advaita Vedānta. Instead, the other branches of Vedānta (*Vishishtadvaita*, or qualified non-dualism and *Dvaita* or dualism) ought perhaps to have been named as dilutions of this highest monism – or “non-*Advaita*” – that are nevertheless, equally valid.

50 Satprakashananda, 36.

51 There are a total of about three hundred extant *Upaniṣads*, of which, the hundred and eight listed in the *Muktika Upaniṣad* (1:30-40) are considered genuine. Of these, twelve are regarded as primary – *Īśa*, *Kena*, *Kaṭha*, *Praśna*, *Muṇḍaka*, *Māṇḍūkya*, *Aitareya*, *Taittirīya*, *Chāṇḍōgya*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, *Śvetāśvatara*, and *Kauṣītaki*. See Satprakashananda, 37.

52 Satprakashananda, 36.

53 The *Bhagavadgītā* has been “assigned” a date “ranging from the fifth century B.C. to the second century B.C.” The Indian “religious tradition” places this work, which belongs to the *smṛti* (remembered) tradition of Indian literature, at the end of the “third age of the present cycle of the universe” and the beginning of the fourth age (*Kali Yuga*), to which we belong. See A. H. Armstrong and R. R. Ravindra, “*Buddhi* in the *Bhagavadgītā* and *Psyché* in Plotinus,” in *Neoplatonism and Indian Thought*, 63; R. N. Minor, ed., *Modern Indian Interpreters of the Bhagavadgita* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 3.

54 *The Bhagavad Gita*, trans. Swami Nikhilananda (New York: Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, 1944), 1-2.

55 Satprakashananda, 36.

textual explanations.⁵⁶ Separated by centuries and drawing from a wholly different intellectual-spiritual tradition, the *Enneads* display an altogether different genre of philosophical technique. Where the *Bhagavadgītā* is a “sustained exposition of doctrine” – a philosophical melody ensconced within an extant theistic tradition – the exoteric treatises of the *Enneads*, a dialogical work, are written on different occasions, for varying purposes.⁵⁷ Plotinus is a meticulous and original thinker. His majestic words, one might say, are *alive* – but not always with *mantric* power. Although deemed more a “master” than a philosopher in the modern sense (Schürmann), and a “mystic philosopher” (Sharma), credited with “philosophical mysticism” (Mamo) and mystical experience (Armstrong and Ravindra) – so that he is deserving of far greater esteem than that accorded to an ordinary intellectual – Plotinus is neither an *Avatāra*, nor known to have been a spiritual preceptor – although given his personal greatness, he certainly would have qualified as the latter.⁵⁸ He therefore should not be expected to speak with the authority of Kṛṣṇa, who stands for the “infinite in the finite, the God in man concealed within the folds of flesh and the powers of sense” in the *Bhagavadgītā*.⁵⁹ Nor should it surprise us that – as Armstrong and Ravindra note – in no tradition (Christian, Muslim or later pagan Neoplatonism) did Plotinus wield “unchallenged authority.”⁶⁰ Not only do the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Enneads* derive from different intellectual heritages – they represent altogether different genres, as do their protagonists. The former is a scripture and the latter a philosophical treatise. Notwithstanding their sanctity – the *Enneads* are not scriptures. Thus it is not unreasonable to say that the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Enneads* defy comparison.

The same might be said of the *Upaniṣads* (with respect to the *Enneads*), these being inspired utterances or declarations, described by Radhakrishnan as follows:

Their truths are said to be breathed out by God or visioned by the seers. They are the utterances of the sages who speak out of the fullness of their illumined experience. They are not reached by ordinary perception, inference or reflection, but *seen* by the seers ... The truths revealed to the seers are not mere reports of introspection which are purely subjective. The inspired sages proclaim that the knowledge they communicate is not what they discover for themselves. It is revealed to them without their effort ... It is therefore said to be a direct disclosure from the ‘wholly other,’ a revelation of the Divine.⁶¹

As Radhakrishnan adds (*italics added*), “The thinkers of the *Upaniṣads* based the reality of *Brahman* on the *fact* of spiritual experience, ranging from simple prayer to illuminated ex-

⁵⁶ P. Hadot, *Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision*, trans. M. Chase (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 18.

⁵⁷ Armstrong and Ravindra, 65.

⁵⁸ R. Schürmann, “The Philosophy of Plotinus. Doctor Reiner Schürmann’s Course Lectures,” inventory established by Pierre Adler (New York: The New School for Social Research, Department of Philosophy, 1994, photocopied), 5; I. C. Sharma, “The Plotinian One and the Concept of *Parampuruṣa* in the *Bhagavadgītā*,” in *Neoplatonism and Indian Thought*, 87; Mamo, 199-200; Armstrong and Ravindra, 73.

⁵⁹ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. I (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), 521.

⁶⁰ Armstrong and Ravindra, 65.

⁶¹ S. Radhakrishnan, ed., trans., *The Principal Upaniṣads* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1978), 22-23.

perience. The distinctions which they make in the nature of the Supreme Reality are not merely logical. They are *facts of spiritual experience*.⁶² Yet, although they reach beyond reason, these “transcendental truths” “admit of rational interpretation.”⁶³ Over time the need arose to systematize the *Upaniṣadic* statements to resolve their apparent contradictions and convey, in rational terms, their import. Bādarāyaṇa a Vyāsa’s *Brahma-sūtras* – an aphoristic summary of the *Upaniṣads*⁶⁴ – forms “the basis of Vedānta as a rational philosophy.”⁶⁵

Not only are the texts different but so are their underlying epistemic methods. To the extent that Plotinus *experienced* mysticism, his depictions of mystical ascent cannot have been confined merely to the relatively superficial domain of the historically influenced discursive sources he read – as may be the case with an intellectual. Given his admission of his own numinous “identity with the divine” (IV.8(6).1) and the soulful tone underlying his descriptions of and exhortations to mysticism [(V.5(32).10), VI.7(38).31, 34-6 and VI.9(9).10-11)], we would be remiss in asserting that in his writings, Plotinus was a *stranger* to the personal experience of mysticism. VI.7(38) and VI.9(9) are chronologically posterior to IV.8(6). The possibility that his experiences *informed* his writings is therefore palpable – without implying that Plotinus necessarily saw this sequencing as part of his method. That he is said to have written out of his own “lived experience” should not surprise us.⁶⁶ Nevertheless – whether in fact Plotinus actually drew directly from his own numinous experiences when he wrote about *unio mystica* – is something we will never know. For, Plotinus was part mystic, but also part intellectual. If inspiration played a role in his writing, so did his discursive knowledge of Plato and others in the western tradition. Thus while we may be sure Plotinus knew experientially what he was speaking of regarding mysticism, we will never know if it was his conscious intent to draw from his experiences in these writings.

By contrast, the authors of Advaita Vedānta – especially the *Upaniṣads* – were more like scientists, inasmuch as they relied on direct evidence. Their writings on mysticism were not the outpourings of the intellectual, but the inspired utterances of seasoned sages. There is no secondary literature or references to antecedent thinkers underlying the *Bhagavadgītā* or the ecstatic utterances of the *Upaniṣads* – to match Plotinus’ references to Plato. In the language of *parā* and *aparā vidyā* we might say that while both the *Enneads* and the texts of Advaita Vedānta appear in the medium of *aparā vidyā* – in the latter, such discursive thinking is drenched in the scintillating light of *parā vidyā*. This is not to say that *parā vidyā* does not illumine the *Enneads*. Inasmuch as Plotinus was both sage and scholar – if nothing else, an exegete of Plato – this light is concentrated perhaps in *some* parts of the *Enneads*, even if permeating his overall voice.

Hardly confined just to the *Enneads* – this problem of the extent to which *parā vidyā* extends its direct magnifying touch – varies also among the texts comprising Advai-

62 Radhakrishnan (*Upaniṣads*, 1978) 53.

63 Satprakashananda, 36.

64 Radhakrishnan (*Upaniṣads*, 1978), 25.

65 Satprakashananda, 36.

66 Armstrong and Ravindra, 73.

ta Vedānta. Where the *Upaniṣads* – given their mystical character, and roots in the *Vedas* – are regarded as śruti (revealed literature),⁶⁷ the *Bhagavadgītā*, even though *smṛti* (that which is remembered) by nature, became a “standard authoritative text within a number of schools of Vedānta.”⁶⁸ The power of *parā vidyā* should permeate more that which is śruti, than that which is *smṛti*.

Different Conceptions of the Divine (Striking Similarities)

Plotinus' First Principle and highest ideal, the One or the Good and the two lower principles irradiated from the One – Intellect and Soul – described by Schürmann as the three “punctuations” of reality⁶⁹ – constitute the immutable metaphysical foundation of the generated worlds. Plotinus' One is simple, self-sufficient and bereft of all predications and otherness. The One surpasses Intellect and therefore being. It is an ultimate Reality that can be predicated of everything although nothing can be predicated of it, so that it is attribute-free. Plotinus is clear that the One is “one” – not in the sense of number one (essential or quantitative) (V.5(32).4) – but in a “larger sense than that in which a unity and a point are unified” (VI.9(9).6) and as a “denial of multiplicity” (V.5(32).6).

Advaita Vedānta declares that the fully transcendent, and therefore attribute-free (*Nirguṇa*) Divine (*Brahman*) is also fully immanent and therefore possesses attributes (*Saguṇa*). When *Brahman* transcends the universe and “the entire range of cause and effect,” it is *Nirguṇa*. But when viewed through time-space-causation, *Brahman* is immanent or *Saguṇa*.⁷⁰ *Nirguṇa Brahman* – experienced only in deep meditation when subject and object “coalesce” – is “known by its transcendental attributes” – *satyam* (truth), *jñanam* (knowledge), *anantam* (infinity), and *advaitam* (non-duality, oneness).⁷¹ *Saguṇa Brahman* is the same *Brahman* from the human perspective – when it comes within the “purview” of human “discussion, adoration, and dedication.”⁷² *Nirguṇa Brahman* is *Brahman* in Reality and *Saguṇa Brahman*, the same *Brahman* in relativity.⁷³ Not only Creator but also the created, *Brahman* creates, not *ex nihilo* or out of nothing, but through *Māyā*, its creative principle⁷⁴ – which, in turn, operates through *Iśvara* or *Saguṇa Brahman* or *Brahman*-as-cause – or the Divine in relation to creation. Where *Nirguṇa Brahman* or *Brahman* apart from *Māyā*, is impersonal God,⁷⁵ *Saguṇa Brahman* or *Brahman* manifested and “linked” with *Māyā* is *Iśvara* – the personal God we worship.⁷⁶ *Saguṇa Brahman* – or *Brahman* associ-

⁶⁷ Radhakrishnan (*Upaniṣads*, 1978), 22.

⁶⁸ Minor, I, 3.

⁶⁹ Schürmann, 53.

⁷⁰ Swami Tathagatananda, *Meditation on Swami Vivekananda* (New York: The Vedanta Society of New York, 1994), 27-8, 294, 296.

⁷¹ Tathagatananda, 15.

⁷² Ibid., 15.

⁷³ Ibid., 15.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 28.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 28.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 15-16.

ated with its *Māyā* – or *Brahman* manifested – is the “origin, support, and the goal of the universe.”⁷⁷ *Brahman*, being the divine substratum, cannot help but be “within” each individual being (not just human beings). This individuated, yet full *Brahman* is *Ātman*, which, as Śaṅkara says, is “birthless and deathless.”⁷⁸

Māyā or *Prakṛiti* or *Māyā-Shakti* – also called *Devatmashakti* – is God’s “self-conscious” creative power, which is the “essence of relative existence.”⁷⁹ *Māyā* is the undifferentiated power of *Brahman* as well as its limiting adjunct (*upādhi*). As Śaṅkara says, “in her potential aspect” *Māyā* is the “divine power of the Lord” – with no temporal beginning.⁸⁰ *Qua Brahman*, *Māyā* is, as Śaṅkara adds, “neither being nor non-being, nor a mixture of both.”⁸¹ *Māyā* comes with the twin contrarian powers of creating the phenomenal world and obscuring *Brahman* from it. *Qua* limiting adjunct, *Māyā* cannot really be severed from *Brahman* any more than fire can from its power of burning, milk from its whiteness, diamond from its luster, or the serpent from its undulations, to use Sri Ramakrishna’s metaphors⁸² – or heat from its fire, cold from snow, or fragrance from perfumed things, to use Plotinus’ metaphors (V.I(10).6).

Although from the *Advaitic* standpoint, *Māyā* is indistinguishable from the *Brahman* it veils, which, as Existence Absolute, transcends all otherness – a primordial essential multiplicity already enters *Māyā* without causing multiplicity, but serving rather, as a *herald* of multiplicity. For, unlike *Brahman*, *Māyā* is not simple, but characterized by three constituent *guṇas* (forces or moods) that color immanence by their presence – *sattwa* (tranquility), *rajas* (activity), and *tamas* (inertia). Characterized by these *guṇas*, which are “subtle, beyond perception,” *Māyā* “gives birth” to the whole universe.⁸³ These discrete *guṇas* affect both nature and the moods of man – without belying human free-will. Yet, this tripartite composition does not infuse otherness into *Māyā*, for, Śaṅkara, who details the moral-psychological ramifications of the three *guṇas*,⁸⁴ says, “She [*Māyā*] is neither divided nor undivided, nor a mixture of both.”⁸⁵ Thus *Māyā* garners no otherness – whether “external” (with respect to *Brahman*) or “internal” (within itself, through the three *guṇas*). Although *Māyā* veils *Brahman*, serving as its limiting adjunct, no otherness cleaves *Māyā* from *Brahman*. For, in principle, a limiting adjunct is never severed by *otherness* from that which it limits. *Māyā* comprises three *discrete guṇas* – without being tripartite. Hence, “she” is not tainted by internal multiplicity or otherness. For these *guṇas* are not constituent parts of *Māyā*, but aspects. Yet, this intactness does not make *Māyā* an “indivisible whole”

77 Ibid., 28.

78 *Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination*, trans. Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood (Hollywood: Vedanta Press, 1978), 53. This title does not use diacritical marks for Śaṅkara.

79 Tathagatananda, 15.

80 *Shankara*, 49.

81 Ibid.

82 Tathagatananda, 16.

83 *Shankara*, 49.

84 Ibid., 49-51.

85 Ibid., 49.

either – for, as Śaṅkara says, “She [*Māyā*] is neither an indivisible whole, nor composed of parts, nor a mixture of both.”⁸⁶

The broad affinities between *Brahman* of Advaita Vedānta and Plotinus' One are certainly striking. Like *Brahman*, Plotinus' One is transcendent *and* immanent. It is, as well, supra-moral. Like *Nirguṇa Brahman*, the One is attribute-free. Both conceptions treat the First Principle as the highest Reality. Both Plotinus and Advaita Vedānta enjoin upon us the urge to ascend to a union with this highest Reality. Both offer emanative cosmology rather than *ex nihilo* creationism. Radhakrishnan points to the emanative connotations of *Brahman* – “The word used in the Upaniṣads to indicate the supreme reality is *brahman*. It is derived from the root *br̥h*. ‘to grow, to burst forth.’ The derivation suggests gushing forth, bubbling over, ceaseless growth, *br̥hattvam*.”⁸⁷ Both Radhakrishnan and Hatab compare the emanative cosmology of the *Enneads* with that in Advaita Vedānta.⁸⁸ But the differences between Plotinus' One and *Brahman* perhaps outweigh these broad affinities. Even their cosmologies are different.

3. Contrasting Advaita Vedānta and the Enneads (Paradigmatic Differences)

In this section I draw contrasts between the *Enneads* and Advaita Vedānta, spelling out cardinal differences (involving *Māyā*, *tolma*, the forms, and mysticism) – which have serious implications for mysticism. The greatest distinction lies perhaps in their differing degrees of monism – with the fuller *unio* of Advaita Vedānta reflecting its greater monism. The differences between the *Enneads* and Advaita Vedānta are therefore *paradigmatic* – affecting the very architectonic scaffolding of the two traditions.

Plotinus' One and Brahman

Plotinus' One is not as monistic as *Brahman* for at least three related reasons – this being perhaps the foremost distinction between the two. First, Plotinus retains Plato's dualism, second, Plotinus opposes his One by matter, and third, Plotinus' One remains the Good – so that it is not entirely supra-moral.

Unlike the untainted monism of Advaita Vedānta, Plotinus' metaphysics retains Plato's dualism – with the phenomenal world relegated to a world of *copies* or instances of ultimate exemplars or pure Forms that are denizens of Intellect. The generated world – barring sensible matter, which is “falsity” or a “phantasm,” or a potentiality that is never actualized (II.5(25).4-5) – is therefore *less* real (not unreal) than the world of forms. Plotinus opposes the One by matter, which he defines as that which is altogether bereft of the One (I.8(51).7). Although Plotinus hoists the One above the “choir of virtues” (VI.9(9).11), he nevertheless aligns it with the Good – “... we must not even call this One good, the good which he gives, but the Good in another way beyond all goods” (VI.9(9).6). The Good

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Radhakrishnan (*Upaniṣads*, 1978), 52.

⁸⁸ S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 211; Hatab, 31-32.

therefore “does not even have good in himself” (V.5(32).13). From the *Advaitic* standpoint, Plotinus’ One is the highest trans-substantial Reality – such that it is beyond the *relative* being of Intellect. But unlike the authors of Advaita Vedānta, Plotinus does not divide being into absolute and relative. He therefore does not ascribe to the One any absolute Being.

Monism in Advaita Vedānta is *ultimate* for reasons that are interrelated. Although it transcends *everything*, *Brahman* is also absolute in its omnipresence or patently immanent. *Brahman* therefore bears no otherness with respect to all that it transcends. Given its stark simplicity, *Brahman* possesses no dualism within itself, or with respect to all that it transcends. There is here none of Plato’s copy theory. Thus, time in Advaita Vedānta is not a moving image of eternity, as it is for Plato and Plotinus (III.7(45).11). Rather *Brahman* alone is eternal – with spectral time one aspect of divine Immanence contoured by time-space-causation. *Brahman*, therefore, is ultimate in its monism, with its sublime transcendence-immanence applying also to the pairs of opposites. *Brahman* transcends all pairs of opposites – including good and evil – even as it serves as their divine substratum. By being *supra*-moral, *Brahman* is *ultimate* in its monism – for, nothing opposes it – not even *Māyā*. For the *Advaitin*, the phenomenal world is *unreal* (not less real) from the divine standpoint. Like Plotinus’ One, *Brahman* is beyond relative being. But unlike Plotinus’ trans-substantial One, *Brahman* is Being Absolute. By thus being the *sole* Reality, *Brahman* possesses a monism that is ultimate and pristine.

There are further differences in the conception of the Divine in the two works. Where Plotinus has a vertical, hierarchical trinity of divine realities – the One, Intellect and Hypostasis Soul in their emanative-contemplative contiguity, which is “as far as the divine realities extend” (V.1(10).7) – there is no real equivalent of these hypostases in Advaita Vedānta. Conversely, where *Saguṇa Brahman* appears in the *Bhagavadgītā* as *Parampuruṣa* in the form of Kṛṣṇa – an *Avatāra* or divine Incarnation (of Vṣṇu) – the *Enneads* have no place for the historical presence of an *Avatāra*. Moreover, Kṛṣṇa plays a salvific role in the *Bhagavadgītā*. As already stated, *qua* Bréhier, there is no savior in the *Enneads*.

Māyā

Given the altitude and ultimacy of its monism, *Brahman* (as the *only* Reality) brooks no antipode – whether *Māyā*, matter, evil, or nothingness.⁸⁹ *Māyā* is an indistinguishable aspect of an attribute-free *Brahman*, quite as sunlight is an undifferentiated aspect of the sun. Not only does it not oppose *Brahman* – but *Māyā* is *identical* with *Brahman* – as Sri Ramakrishna asserted – “Brahman and *Shakti* [*Māyā*] are identical.”⁹⁰ This absence of otherness between *Brahman* and *Māyā* preserves the pristine monism of Advaita Vedānta, serving as its greatest indicator. This simultaneous, total, *ultimate* monism – to the extent that *Brahman* is the *only* Reality – yet somehow reconciled with the first glimmer of *seem-*

⁸⁹ In this section, I use *Māyā* exclusively as divine power, which is why I use capital “M” for *Māyā*. As Bazán points out there is *māyā avyakta* (unmanifested) and *māyā vyakta* (manifested). See F. G. Bazán, “Matter in Plotinus and Śaṅkara,” in *Neoplatonism and Indian Thought*, 194-195.

⁹⁰ Tathagatananda, 16.

ing multiplicity ushered by the three discrete *guṇas* that comprise *Māyā* – has perhaps no equivalent in Plotinus' *Enneads*.

There are several aspects to *Māyā* in Advaita Vedānta. Not only *Brahman*'s limiting adjunct, *Māyā* possesses the contrarian powers of creating and obscuring, of which, perhaps only the latter has a place in the *Enneads* – not the former. For there is no real equivalent of the creative aspect of *Māyā* in Plotinus' thought. Nowhere in the *Enneads* do we have an analogy for the three constituent *guṇas* that comprise *Māyā*. It is tempting to compare *Māyā* with the second activity of the Plotinian One in V.4(7).2, where Plotinus tells us that while the Principle One abides, its second "coexistent activity" (not its primary activity "generated from the perfection in it," which is itself) descends into substantial existence. Like *Brahman* which exudes its *Māyā* to generate the phenomenal world, Plotinus' One exudes its secondary activity to generate Intellect. From Intellect, in emanative sequence, through Hypostasis Soul and the World Soul, the realm of multiplicity is generated – with overflowing plenitude the immediate cause of emanation and growing otherness with respect to the One, its concomitant side-effect.

But beneath this *broad* analogy, there are non-comparable and irreconcilable differences. Unlike the One's secondary activity, which, as Armstrong tells us, is *distinct* from the One⁹¹ – presumably without fracturing the One with otherness, for the One is intact – *Māyā* is identical with *Brahman*. Moreover, unlike *Māyā* veiling *Brahman* – the One's secondary activity does not have a direct obscuring impact that veils the One – except insofar as the completed procession first unleashed by it leads to the multiplicity that camouflages the One before the unredeemed human mind. Finally, there are further profound differences between *Advaitic* cosmology and that in Plotinus' *Enneads*. Where the former asserts multiple cycles of appearances, disappearances, and dormancy of the universe (*Bhagavadgītā*, Chapter VIII), the latter does not.

Māyā in its creative aspect therefore does not appear directly in the *Enneads* – nor in its aspect of directly veiling *Brahman*. But its larger obscuring impact of causing the blinding worldliness of the world that makes us forgetful of our divine origins is a central Plotinian theme, in passages like *Ennead* V.1(10).1, where Plotinus asks, "What is it, then, which has made the souls forget their father, God, and be ignorant of themselves and him, even though they are parts which come from his higher world and altogether belong to it?" The obscuring impact of *Māyā* comes across fully in these lines:

Since they do not any more see their father or themselves, they despise themselves through ignorance of their birth and honour other things, admiring everything rather than themselves, and, astonished and delighted by and dependent on these [earthly] things, they broke themselves loose as far as they could in contempt of that from which they turned away ..." (V.1(10).1).⁹²

When the self *qua* individual soul is enchanted by and dependent on "earthly" things it becomes ignorant of God (V.1(10).1). Conversely, when its propinquity to the One is

⁹¹ Plotinus *Ennead* V, trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 139.

⁹² Ibid., 11, 13.

great, it despises “things here” (VI.7(38).31). But this is where the analogy with *Māyā* ceases in the *Enneads*.

In fact, even this obscuring aspect (not its impact) is not quite the same in Advaita Vedānta and the *Enneads* – for succumbing to *Māyā* in the state of the original sin of *avidyā* (ignorance) in Advaita Vedānta, cannot be compared to the willful *tolmatic* “audacity,” which is the “beginning of evil” in V.1(10).1. *Tolma* is described varyingly as the centrifugal principle that thwarts contemplation, the apostate will to otherness, and the audacious exteriorization comparable with Augustine’s *superbia*.⁹³ In Advaita Vedānta there is no equivalent of the *tolmatic* fall of soul that Plotinus uses to explain the cosmological emanative procession below Hypostasis Soul. Thus if there is no real equivalent of the creative aspect of *Māyā* in Plotinus’ *Enneads*, then *tolma* – with its connotations of audacity, irrationality, and tendency towards otherness – has no equivalent in Advaita Vedānta. It cannot and should not be compared with *Māyā*, given the monistic absence of otherness between *Māyā* and *Brahman*. For *Māyā* is anything but the counter-*epistrophic* *tolmatic* wish for autonomy that produces otherness. Unlike *Māyā*, which is *Brahman*’s indistinguishable adjunct, and therefore *creative*, *tolma* – being inherently barren and an obstacle to contemplation – cannot beget. If anything, *tolma* reduces fecundity.

Finally, on the question of *Māyā* and Plotinian matter – since (as already stated) not even *Māyā* opposes *Brahman*, how can matter? This is what makes *Brahman Advaitic* or non-dual. Yet, Plotinian matter *has* been compared with *Māyā*. Bazán equates matter with “*ajñāna māyā*,” or *māyā* in its “deceiving” aspect, and Tripathi says they are comparable.⁹⁴ But such comparisons are untenable for the following reasons.

The basic dualism Plotinus inherits from Plato applies to matter in two ways. First, Plotinus divides matter into archetype (intelligible) and instance (sensible). Second, he opposes both to the One, through his very definition of matter – as that which is wholly bereft of the One (I.8(51).7) and therefore the formless receptacle of forms (II.4(12).1) – in opposition to the One, which transcends all forms (VI.9(9).3). The formlessness of Plotinian matter is the uncanny mirror opposite of the formlessness of the One. It is the cause of matter being “primary evil” and the “cause of evils” (I.8(51).3, 8, 10), so that it opposes the One, which is Good “beyond all goods” (VI.9(9).6). Intelligible matter, the true substantial *real* (II.4(12).16) substrate of the eternal forms, is “all things at once” (II.4(12).3) – first shapeless, then varied by true shapes (II.4(12).4-5). Matter of the sense-world is a “decorated corpse” (II.4(12).5) – defined, but neither alive nor thinking (II.4(12).5) nor real (II.4(12).16) – a potentiality that can never be actualized (II.5(25).4-5). Against Aristotle, Plotinus identifies matter in the sense-world with *privation*, so that it is “absolute negativity and evil” (II.4(12).16),⁹⁵ which is why he often reviles matter. Plotinian matter is not a creative principle, nor one that veils or obscures the One, nor a limiting adjunct of the One.

⁹³ N. J. Torchia, *Plotinus, Tolma, and the Descent of Being* (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 139-150.

⁹⁴ Bazán, 196, 201; C. L. Tripathi, “The Influence of Indian Philosophy on Neoplatonism,” in *Neoplatonism and Indian Thought*, 275.

⁹⁵ *Plotinus Ennead II*, trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 105.

In contradistinction, *Māyā* is neither bereft of *Brahman*, nor opposes *Brahman*. Not a receptacle, but a generator of shapes, *Māyā* cannot be splintered into archetype (intelligible) and instance (sensible). Despite its contrarian powers of creating the phenomenal world and obscuring it from *Brahman*, *Māyā* is not to be reviled or decried, but rather adored as an expression of and gateway to *Brahman*. Neither good, nor evil, *Māyā*, *qua Brahman*, is supra-moral. *Māyā* and Plotinian matter are therefore entirely different.

Forms

The notion of form is entirely different in Plotinus' *Enneads* compared to Advaita Vedānta. For Plotinus the forms are supreme exemplars that populate Intellect. Although Advaita Vedānta contours each denizen of the phenomenal world by name-and-form (*nāmarupā*) – form (*rupā*) here is not a noetic exemplar instantiated in the phenomenal world. What is form (*rupā*) in Advaita Vedānta, as part of the conjoint name-and-form (*nāmarupā*), is perhaps “shape” (not form) in Plotinus' *Enneads*.

Mysticism

Even in terms of mysticism, which Bréhier rightly ascribes as the focal point of possible affinity between Plotinus and the *Upaniṣads*, there are differences in the theological scaffolding of the ascent, degree, and type of union attained. However, these differences cannot take away from the glory of each numinous tradition, nor from the same solitary universality at the grand summit of each.

On the question of whether there is any true affinity between Plotinus' *Enneads* and Advaita Vedānta, it might help to distinguish between the theological scaffolding used to ascend to the Divine through the mystical experience – a mold often drawn from existing historical traditions – and the essential nature of the ineffable entity finally encountered beyond the subject-object divide. Scholars have pointed to the relevance of the former, perhaps at the expense of the latter. Thus, Katz points to the *conservative* character of the mystical experience. Applied to western mystics this means they experience what they are *educated* to experience. They “do not experience ‘God’ in ‘neutral’ or monistic ways and then *interpret* this experience for expediency's sake in theistic language, but rather, based on their prior study of canonical sources ... they have theistic and even more specifically personal, intimate, theistic experiences ...”⁹⁶ Armstrong has something slightly different to say:

Nor can they [the striking parallels between Plotinus and the *Upaniṣads*] really be adequately explained by saying that the mind of the mystic works much the same everywhere and at all times. The mystical experience is, so to speak, metaphysically colourless. It can be the basis of a vast variety of philosophical systems, often contradictory and incompatible. The explanation of his experience given by each mystic will depend on other factors than the experience itself. It is necessary, therefore, either to accept the theory of an influence, through whatever intermediaries, of the Upanishads upon Plotinus or else to find a more plausible origin for this peculiarity of his system nearer home.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ S. T. Katz, “The ‘Conservative’ Character of Mystical Experience,” in *Mysticism and Religious Traditions*, ed. S. T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 13.

⁹⁷ Armstrong (1936), 23.

Given the universal nature of the supreme entity actually experienced at the summit of the mystical encounter, I cannot help but question both Katz and Armstrong. What they say may apply to Plotinus. For, not only his conception of the world, but also the theological scaffolding he uses for the ascent to *unio mystica* is largely Hellenic. Yet, at the summit of any legitimate mystical experience, *what* (now how) the mystic recognizes beyond the subject-object divide as the ultimate entity experienced, is surely too *universal* – or “metaphysically colourless” (Armstrong) – and ineffable to be confined to any particular theological mold – whether Plotinian or *Upaniṣadic*. Moreover, given the radical individuation and intense introspective inwardness entailed in the mystical experience, surely historical influence becomes inadequate as a means to *explain* the mystic’s ineffable ecstatic experience of that which lies beyond the subject-object divide? In this special sense, historical influences, which can inspire the preparation for the ascent and even its lower aspects – are likely to be redundant to the enhanced *being* that indicates successful ascent and to the self-transcendence beyond such enhanced being that indicates the *unio* itself. At best, the mystic can use historical influence to explain the far weaker, lower *congregational* subjective aspects of his ascent – namely, the theological mold that scaffolds his ascent – not the solitary *unio*, which is an experience of universality within particularity.

On the question of Plotinus and Advaita Vedānta, I therefore distinguish between historical influence and genuine inspiration – between that which we imbibe through lower discursive activities susceptible to historical influence – and the *inspiration* that visits us through the undiluted trans-discursive experiences of contemplation and meditation. This difference between discursive and trans-discursive is revealed in Plotinus’ distinction between the scholar and the philosopher.⁹⁸ Unlike influence, inspiration, which illumines the mind, *infuses* the transcendent into the immanent, or *parā vidyā* into *aparā vidyā*. For, as Radhakrishnan says – “Inspiration is a joint activity, of which man’s contemplation and God’s revelation are two sides.”⁹⁹

Therefore, as already stated, influence theories should be wholly redundant to the experience of *unio mystica* – being relevant, at best to inspiring and informing the ascent. The key distinction should be – not that between different competing theological vestures garbing mystics of different traditions – but rather, that between the particular, subjective theological scaffolding that educates the mystic, granting her the theological vocabulary for expressing the Ineffable – and the all-transcending universality of the ineffable entity she actually encounters in the mystical experience – an entity that transcends all vestures.

The highest mystical *Brahma-nirvana* in Advaita Vedānta includes the triumphant declaration of the mystic’s self-knowledge revealing her innate divinity – or identity of Ātman with *Brahman*. As has already been pointed out by Lacombe, Plotinus’ mysticism does not include any such declaration.¹⁰⁰ Lacombe, who “affirms the doctrinal relationship” between Plotinus and Vedānta, despite differences of “emphasis,” writes – “The tri-

⁹⁸ Porphyry, 41.

⁹⁹ Radhakrishnan (*Upaniṣads*, 1978), 23.

¹⁰⁰ Bréhier, 131.

umphant expression of the delivered living ... which proclaims: I am Brahman, has no such conspicuous counterpart in the *Enneads*, in which the sentiment of the transcendence of the One appears more emphatically.”¹⁰¹ This leads us to ask – without denying the veracity and greatness of Plotinian mysticism – whether the four Vedic *mahāvākyas* (cardinal sayings) can be applied to Plotinian mysticism:

- (1) “Consciousness [manifest as the individual self] is Brahman” (*Aitareya Upaniṣad* of the *Rg-Veda*).
- (2) “I am Brahman” (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* of the Yajur-Veda).
- (3) “Thou art That” (*Chāndōgya Upaniṣad* of the Sāma-Veda).
- (4) “This ātman [the self within] is Brahman” (*Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* of the *Atharva-Veda*).¹⁰²

If not – this does not lower the value of the *Enneads*, but points rather to a different type of mysticism.

There are other differences as well. In Advaita Vedānta there is no equivalent of the medium of the hypostases, which, in the *Enneads*, an already buoyant soul uses to ascend (VI.7(38).36) – being transmitted, in the end, through the eternal *surge* of the wave of Intellect towards the One. Conversely, Plotinus' One, although immanent *and* transcendent, is not *terrible*. *Saguṇa Brahman* has a terrible, albeit transcendent aspect, which Kṛṣṇa reveals to Arjuna in the *Bhagavadgītā* (Chapter XI), when He stoops to reveal himself in his transcendent-immanent glory as that which is *terrible* (not evil) – a vision Arjuna receives with divine sight conferred by Kṛṣṇa. By contrast, in the *Enneads*, instead of the One stooping down to the pilgrim-soul, this soul ascends to a pristine formless trans-substantial *transcendent* One, in the unitive vision Plotinus describes in VI.7(38).36 and VI.9(9).11.

3. Conclusion

Bréhier compares Plotinus' *Enneads* – not to the Orient as such, not even to the entirety of Advaita Vedānta – but to Indian thought founded on the *Upaniṣads*. Nor does he compare on all grounds but more specifically on the ground of mystical return of the individual soul to its divine source – couching this in the broadest terms possible. The paradigmatic differences between Advaita Vedānta and the *Enneads* outlined in this paper should not negate Bréhier's thesis – but expand on it to make these stronger, ahistorical, spiritually cosmopolitan statements – that a return to the divine source is a fundamental feature of all legitimate *monistic* forms of mysticism – and that such a return must have been experienced by the highest mystics of all traditions, even if they couched their experiences in the theological scaffoldings they were educated in. Furthermore, one could add this even stronger *monotheistic* statement – that no matter how varied such theological vestures might be, and regardless of tradition, the One ultimately encountered is the same universal entity.

Blumenthal points to the “chronological fact” that Śaṅkara, the expounder of Advaita Vedānta, was born “about five centuries after Plotinus' death” – which therefore “rules out” the possibility of influence from Śaṅkara to Plotinus. As Blumenthal adds, there is no

¹⁰¹ Bréhier, 131.

¹⁰² Satprakashananda, 46.

evidence of influence in the opposite direction either.¹⁰³ But the principle texts that comprise Advaita Vedānta – the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavadgītā*, and the *Brahma-sūtras* – pre-date both Plotinus and Śaṅkara by centuries. The possibility of historical influence from India upon Plotinus therefore still lingers.

Yet the differences are so stark that I am inclined to point more in the direction of the essential ontological fragrance that flavors all genuine experiences of mysticism – even those draped in different theological vestures – so that they merely *appear* similar. To modern man, who projects his own cynical lack of inwardness, thereby denying inwardness to all men – this essential affinity can appear like something brought about by external historical influence. Thus, while Plotinus is indeed Hellenic in the philosophical scaffolding that articulates his metaphysics and mysticism, this does not take away from the inherent universality of his mysticism (experiential and discursive), nor from the kinship it therefore bears to the universality of the mysticism in Advaita Vedānta.

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¹⁰³ Blumenthal, 129.

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The Ruddy Boy in the Words of the Golden Mouth

Patristic Reception of the Narrative of David and Goliath in the Works of Saint John Chrysostom*

Abstract: There is almost no Christian who has never heard about John Chrysostom, one of the greatest preachers since the Apostle Paul himself. He is honored as a saint, and his Liturgy is the most celebrated one in the Byzantine Rite even today. On the other hand, the story about the Gittite Goliath and a young boy named David, the future king of Israel and the one from whose royal line Christ will be borne, is one of the most read and used biblical stories. Art, music, popular culture, even sports, and politics – all of them, in their own way, used this story to tell how a tiny ruddy boy can win the giant. But how was it in the time of Saint Chrysostom? How did he read this story? If one knows the difference between the Greek and Hebrew version, which one did John read and preach to his community? Can his approach to this biblical text help us better understand Church Fathers' exegesis and the Bible itself?

Keywords: patristic exegesis, Early Church, reception, David, Goliath, 1 Samuel, commentary, John Chrysostom

1. Introduction

In 2013 two interesting works with the same name were published – an Indian drama film by R. Nath and a book by M. Gladwell. Both of them wore the same name as the 37th season of the popular TV show *Survivor: David and Goliath*. It is astonishing how much this biblical motif is widespread in contemporary popular culture. David and Goliath found their place in the works of the famous musician Bob Dylan, who refers to them in his song *When the Ship Comes In*. However, most of these authors overstate the victory of the underdog. A bit different is *Goliath*, an American drama television series from 2016, created by D. E. Kelley and J. Shapiro.

The story of David and Goliath is a biblical narrative found in Chapter 17 of the First Book of Samuel. As shortly indicated above, it is one of the most famous stories from the Scripture, known to almost every person, even if they never opened the Bible. Thousands of pages by both, theological and non-theological literature were dedicated to it. However,

* This paper is part of the larger research on the narrative of David and Goliath, which was carried out as a part of archaeological excavations in Tel Azekah (Israel) conducted by the Universities in Heidelberg and Tel Aviv.

what was the situation when the Holy Scripture was the most important book for almost everyone in the civilized world? In the times when Christianity flourished and went from the persecuted and forbidden secret community to the state religion? Did they make plays and concerts, trying to revive this ancient story? What did the most outstanding intellectual role models, especially the theologians of that time, tell about it? Did they use it and interpreted it so passionately as the modern ones do? If they did, how did that look like?

We already showed a part of this on the example of some Church Fathers and theologians.¹ Now we want to focus on one of the greatest. On the one who deservedly gained the nickname the *Golden Mouth* and remained remembered in the Church history as one of the greatest theologians since the very Apostle Paul. How did he, a prominent bishop of the capital city, see and read the story of David and Goliath? Did he explain it in his wonderful sermons? Did he use it all? And if he did, did he see it as a historical event, or, as many modern scholars do, as a simple allegory?

The second layer of this paper will try to examine the textual tradition Chrysostom used. Did he use the longer or, the shorter version?² These results could shed more light on the question of the biblical text used in the old Church. This could also illuminate the Holy Fathers' understanding of the Scripture and bring us closer to the older textual traditions.

2. Saint John Chrysostom

Saint John Chrysostom was born in a wealthy Antiochene family in the mid-4th century. As a young man, he became a student of the famous rhetorician Libanius.³ He studied biblical exegesis and theology along with Theodore of Mopsuestia in the School of Antioch. Their teacher was Diodore, the bishop of Tarsus.⁴ After returning to the city, he was ordained deacon (381) and soon afterward presbyter (386).⁵ He gained the fame of the great preacher and orator, earning the title *Golden Mouth* (χρυσόστομος) for the brilliance of his eloquence. In Antioch, he worked intensively on taking care of the poor. Gaining a great reputation, he was elected in 397 to be the capital city's bishop – Constantinople. Chrysostom became, after only a few years, a victim of court intrigues and suffered much violence. He died in exile on 14. September 407.⁶

A few decades later, his relics were returned to Constantinople, and they were buried with full honors in the Church of Holy Apostles. The decision on his persecution made

1 A. Danilović, "The Giant and the Underdog. Patristic Reception of the Narrative of David and Goliath in the Works of Saint Hippolytus, Origen, Didymus and Theodoret," *Philotheos* 20.2 (2020): 240-259.

2 The text in MT is about 40% longer than the LXX-Version. See: Ibid. About the textual problematic of 1 Sam 17. See: B. Johnson, *Reading David and Goliath in Greek and Hebrew*, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012).

3 Libanius was a Greek teacher of rhetoric of the Sophist school. Until the end of his life, he remained unconverted, and he could be considered as a pagan Hellene. His students included both, pagans and Christians. See: S. Graham (ed.), *Dictionary of Ancient History*, (London: Blackwell, 1994), 370.

4 R. Kubat, *Tragovima Pisma II*, (Beograd: Biblijski institut, 2015), 248.

5 C. Kannengiesser, *Handbook of Patristic Exegesis, The Bible in Ancient Christianity (HPE)*, (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2004), 783.

6 Ibid.

during the Synod of the Oak in 403 was annulled, and soon, after the consensus of the Church, he was canonized, and he got the status of an *ecumenical teacher and saint*.⁷

John Chrysostom is one of the most productive writers of the Christian East. Historian Sozomenus noted that people *could not get enough of his words*.⁸ In patristic literature, one can find that Chrysostom *was not a thinker or a philosopher* or that he was *never stirred by the philosophical problems of Hellenism*.⁹ A large number of scholars present him as a simple moralist. It seems, however, that this is an absolutely arbitrary claim. If the thinking of systematic theology would be perceived as authentic and only theology (which is often characteristic for some Orthodox and Roman Catholic patrologists), then it may be possible to say the same about Chrysostom. However, from this perspective, even biblical authors are not true theologians. According to M. Mitchell, Chrysostom is in many ways similar to the biblical writers, especially to the Apostle Paul.¹⁰ However, if one observes theology from a broader perspective, he was probably the most important thinker and theologian of the Greek-speaking area. Indeed, he did not deal mainly with metaphysical topics of dogmatic theology. One of the reasons for this is the fact that in his time, all Trinitarian teachings were already defined by the Ecumenical Councils, and significant Christological disputes were yet to come.

John, as a socially engaged theologian, has dealt with other issues. In his days, the Church was no longer threatened from outside. The danger came from the inside: not so much in the form of false teachings, as in the domain of Christian morals. Christianity has become the official religion of the Roman Empire, and therefore tempting for many people who joined the Church for various reasons. A lot of them were those who sought their own and personal benefit within the Church. This has endangered the internal morality and reputation of the Christian community in many ways. This *internal evil* was incomparably more dangerous than the outer one.¹¹

Chrysostom saw clearly how much external ritualism and the hypocritical attitude towards the faith could be dangerous for the Church. For him, the faith without the deeds was practically dead. As a member of the Antiochian tradition, he emphasized the importance of moral guidance. He spent some time in a cruel desert asceticism. However, he did not associate the asceticism only with the monastic efforts. Asceticism is, for him, the way of Christian existence. That is why the poor, according to Chrysostom, are the true icons of Christ.¹² Christianity is not just a religion of holy mysteries that sees salvation in individual sepa-

⁷ R. Kubat, *Tragovima II*, 249.

⁸ See: Sozomenus: PG, 67, *Historia Ecclesiastica VIII*, 1513.

⁹ See: G. Florovsky, *Eastern Fathers of the Fourth Century*, (Belmont, Massachusetts: Notable & Academic Books, 1987), 210-212.

¹⁰ See: M. Mitchell, *The Heavenly Trumpet: John Chrysostom and the Art of Pauline Interpretation*, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 1-34.

¹¹ R. Kubat, *Tragovima II*, 249.

¹² Your Lord goes around hungry, and you live in splendor! And it's not just that weird, but also by living in splendor, you dare to despise Him. In addition, He does not ask, I do not know what, but just a piece of bread to satisfy the hunger. He goes around shivering from cold... PG 54, *In Genesim*, 448.

ration from the sinful world or in rituals that are often turned into magic. The Christian faith, above all, requires a proper attitude towards fellow humans. The *Christian Path* represents, in addition to participating in the Sacraments, the ascetic pursuit of overcoming selfishness and egotism and opening towards others. On the face of another human, God's face is revealed, especially when that other person is threatened, because, in that situation, Christ himself appears through him. He derives such explanations from biblical examples, and he associates them with real life.¹³ And that is precisely what he does when he preaches about David and Goliath.

Nevertheless, it is interesting that Chrysostom, although very often commenting on the Old Testament texts (over 150 homilies),¹⁴ does not talk explicitly about the remarkable story of David and Goliath (based on what has been preserved to this day). At least he is not interpreting it as a separate whole. However, in two works, he uses an entire narrative to clarify the other sections of Scripture more closely: for the first time in the *Homilies on Genesis* and the second time in the *Homilies on David and Saul*. In other works, he uses only some verses when he speaks about the New Testament texts.

When it comes to John's works, in 18 titles can be found a review of the events from 1 Sam 17. Complete or partial quotes and allusions of 25 verses are present. There are nine direct quotes. Interestingly, among these verses are those not included in the Greek text, i.e., in LXX^B. There are a total of 6 non LXX^B mentionings, out of which 3 are direct quotes. In other words, it seems that Chrysostom knows the whole story of the *brothers conflict* from 1 Sam 17:12-31 (according to the MT), which Hippolytus of Rome does not know.¹⁵ Chrysostom uses LXX most probably in the local Lucian version (LXX^L),¹⁶ which according to B. Johnson, tends to correct the Greek text based on the Hebrew template.¹⁷ R. Kubat notes that LXX^L corrects the text based on LXX^A and Symmachus.¹⁸ To the verse in which David kills Goliath (1 Sam 17:51), Chrysostom refers most often (13 times in 12 works). In the following pages, the mentioned works will be more carefully examined. First, the commentaries on the Old Testament Books and then commentaries on the New Testament Books will be presented. Finally, we will pay attention to his other, non-exegetical works.

2. Homilies on Genesis

Homilies on Genesis were delivered during the years of his Antiochene ministry before he moved to Constantinople. They consist of 67 homilies, with a complete comments on

¹³ R. Kubat, *Tragovima II*, 251.

¹⁴ R. Hill, *St. John Chrysostom: Homilies on Genesis 1-17*, (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2002), 3.

¹⁵ A. Danilović, *The Triumph*, _.

¹⁶ Comp. R. Hill, *St. John Chrysostom: Old Testament Homilies Volume One, Homilies on Hannah, David and Saul* (Brookline, Massachusetts: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2003), 7, and D. Garrett, *An Analysis of the Hermeneutics of John Chrysostom's Commentary on Isaiah 1-8 with an English Translation*, (Lewiston: E. Mellen Press, 1992), 17.

¹⁷ B. Johnson, *Reading David*, 185.

¹⁸ R. Kubat, *Tragovima II*, 69.

Genesis, dating from 388. There is an earlier collection of 9 homilies, focusing on Genesis 1–3, which could be dated to Lent 386.¹⁹

The homilies were connected with the reading of the biblical text during the divine worship, which Chrysostom then began to comment on, verse by verse, word by word, even taking individual syllables. And this was evidently acceptable to his Antiochene congregation, except when he had something else particular to say, such as the opening explanation of fasting in Homily 1. The congregation members were probably a typical group of laypeople from family situations, preoccupied with secular affairs, and yet prepared to assemble daily for a lengthy scriptural homily. It was presumed that they were reading Scripture at home.²⁰ So, they were not passive recipients. Their role was not only to listen but also to read and engage in spiritual discourse. He frequently encourages them to go home with their neighbors and to talk about biblical themes. According to R. Hill, *Bible discussion groups* were also part of their lifestyle.²¹ Anyhow, the congregation in Antioch led a quite intensely *scriptural* life.

To describe as exegetical these homilies on Genesis and the other parts of the Old Testament, one has to keep in mind Chrysostom's pastoral role and his congregation's needs. The congregation got what he thought they needed, even if, at times, he did not follow the stages of development of the Genesis text.²² Still, Chrysostom was a contextual exegete.

As it was stated before, Chrysostom probably used the LXX^L when he read the Old Testament. The exact determination of the text was made more difficult because Chrysostom, as well as other ecclesiastical writers, often quoted Scripture texts freely and diversely from memory. He occasionally joined similar quotations so that it is tough to say how his actual text looked like. For this reason, for R. Hill, there is a lack of an absolutely reliable biblical text that Chrysostom himself read.²³

For our topic, the center is Homily 46, which is focused on Gen 21 and the story about the birth of Isaac and the banishing of Hagar and Ishmael. Chrysostom was known to interpret Scripture with Scripture. And that can be perfectly seen in this example. First, he recounts the troubles of Hagar and Ishmael when Abraham expelled them to the wilderness. However, God did not leave them. God answered their prayers and helped them. *Whenever God wishes, even if we are utterly alone, even if we are in desperate trouble, even if we have no hope of survival, we need no other assistance, since God's grace is all we require,*²⁴ writes Chrysostom. Here, as a paradigm for God's action in history and God's tendency to help the weak ones, he resembles the efforts of young David by saying: *...let us refer to a*

¹⁹ C. Kannengiesser, *HPE*, 784.

²⁰ I recommend you to have constant recourse to this remedy, and apply yourself diligently to the reading of Sacred Scripture, not only when you come along here, but at home, taking the sacred books in your hands and earnestly absorbing the benefit of their contents. PG 54, *In Genesim*.

²¹ R. Hill, *Genesis 1-17*, 9.

²² *Ibid.*, 11.

²³ *Ibid.*, 13.

²⁴ R. Hill, *St. John Chrysostom: Homilies on Genesis 46-67*, (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 8. Comp: PG 54, *In Genesim*, 425.

*theme...so that...we may learn that nothing is stronger than the person protected by help from on high, and nothing is more vulnerable than the person deprived of this help, surrounded though he may be with countless armies.*²⁵

What comes next is the description of the *brothers conflict*, a part omitted in LXX^B, followed by three direct quotes: 1 Sam 17:28.29.26. Those are the only direct quotes in this work. Chrysostom skipped the beginning of the narrative and preached right away that David was sent by his father to observe his brothers, and when he got there, he saw Saul and his men withdrawing in fright before the foreigner Goliath (ἀλλοφύλου Γολιάθ). Since he went to see *the strange and unusual sight of one person pitted against so many thousands*, his brothers, *moved to hatred*,²⁶ said to him: *Have you come for no other reason than to see the war?*²⁷ (1 Sam 17:28). After this stern condemnation, Chrysostom describes David as one who is full of tranquility and patience, who, because he does not want to upset his brothers more, replied: *Isn't it only a word?*²⁸ (1 Sam 17:29) It was a word that showed how the young boy was braver than all of the grown-up men and the king himself. He was also, according to Chrysostom, the one who loved God, the one who trusted him, and the one who was ready to defend him in any situation. The one who said: *What will be given to the man who cuts off his head? ... After all, who is this foreigner who reproaches the ranks of the living God?*²⁹ (1 Sam 17:26). Chrysostom continues to explain the story, saying that by doing this, David showed great boldness of spirit and that he caused amazement in everyone.³⁰

After these few direct quotations, which differ from the text versions that we have today (both LXX and MT), Chrysostom continues to recount the story, describing the encounter of David and Saul. Interesting is that even though LXX (in all its traditions) in Verses 34 and 36 speaks about lions and bears (ὁ λέων καὶ ἡ ἄρκος), Chrysostom mentions here only bears.³¹ According to him, David speaks about this, not to brag himself, but to inspire the king with his courage, so he could give Saul the faith concealed with him and

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., 9.

²⁷ Δί οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἐληλήθας, ἢ ἵνα τὸν πολέμον ἴδῃς; (PG 54, In Genesim, 425). This is slightly different from what A. Rahlfs suggest as an addition: σου οτι ενεκεν του ιδειν τον πολεμον κατεβης. See: A. Rahlfs (ed.), *Septuaginta* (LXX), (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2006), 536. And that is actually a literal translation of Hebrew text that we can find in Masoretic Text:

כִּי לִמְעַן לִרְאוֹת הַמִּלְחָמָה יֵרֵד (for, in order to see the war, you have come down).

²⁸ Οὐχὶ ρῆμά ἐστι; (PG 54, In Genesim, 425). This quote is the same as one that A. Rahlfs suggests (See: A. Rahlfs, LXX, 536).

²⁹ Τί ἐστὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ τούτου τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐκτέμνοντι; ... Τίς γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλλόφυλος, ὁ ὀνειδίζων παρὰ ταξίν Θεοῦ ζώντος; (PG 54, In Genesim, 425-426). This also differs from what A. Rahlfs suggests: τι ποιηθησεται τω ανδρι ος αν παταξη τον αλλοφυλον εκεινον...οτι τις ο αλλοφυλος ο απεριτμητος ουτος ο τι ωνειδισεν παραταξιν θεου ζωντος (See: A. Rahlfs, LXX, 534). That is also a literal translation of Hebrew text that we can find in Masoretic Text:

כִּי מִי הַפְּלִשְׁתִּי הָעֵרֵל הַזֶּה כִּי חָרַף מַעֲרֻכֹת אֱלֹהִים חַיִּים ... מִהַיְעֵשָׂה לְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִכֶּה אֶת־הַפְּלִשְׁתִּי הַזֶּה (what shall be done for a man who smite this foreigner (Philistine)... for who is this uncircumcised foreigner (Philistine), that reproaches the battle lines of living God?)

³⁰ R. Hill, *Genesis* 46-67, 9.

³¹ Then he learned from him how he dealt with bears when they raided his flocks... Ibid.

the assistance from on high that made the young boy stronger than the grown-ups, who was able even to fight the wild beasts.

What comes next is a part where Chrysostom emphasizes the role and the power of God, who was all the time with the young boy, especially when he came in front of the king, and later, in front of the foreign champion:

So then, seeing his confident manner; the king wanted to arm him with his own weapons, but armed with them he wouldn't have been able even to lift them (Comp: 1Sam 17:38-39). This happened so that it might be quite clear that it was the power of God which worked in him, in case what transpired should be attributed to force of arms. That is to say, since he was handicapped after donning this armament, he set aside the weapons, took his shepherd's pouch and pebbles, and thus went off against that tower of flesh. (Comp: 1Sam 17:40) But see once again this foreigner also eyeing his puny age, mocking the good man on that account, and, as it were, doing battle in words with a mere child. You see, when he saw that he had come to do battle with him with his shepherd's pouch and carrying only pebbles, he more or less said to him, Do you think you are still among the sheep and chasing dogs, and so have come to do battle with me with those means as if driving off some dog? (Comp: 1Sam 17:42-43) Experience will now teach you that it is with no ordinary man that the war is waged.³²

For Chrysostom, Goliath is here a man who trusts in his own strength, and especially in force of his arms, and David is the one who throws away the armor and the weapons and goes to the battle with a strong faith in help from on high. The skillful preacher summarizes David's words from Verses 44-47 in one sentence: *You come against me with armor and spear and think you will prevail by your own strength, but I count on the name of the Lord God.*³³ After this, David took one stone, brought down (κατήνεγκε) the Goliath, hurried forward, drew his sword and cut off his head. This way, he ended the war. It is interesting here that actions are ordered logically. David threw a rock, he brought down the Goliath, and then he killed him. Apparently, at least here, Chrysostom is reading the text more similar to the LXX^B version because he clearly omits Verse 50. This verse could be seen as a doublet, where MT without any doubt speaks about killing the Goliath without the sword (וימיתוהו). The action is repeated in Verse 51, only this time he killed him with the sword (וימתתהו – the same verb, just slightly different form).³⁴

Through him even the king found salvation, and all his army were granted respite. These were remarkable events, strange to behold, the armed man toppled by the unarmed, the man with experience of war falling to the one unskilled in anything but shepherding. How on earth did it happen? Because, whereas one had support from on high marshaled in his favor, the other was deprived of this and fell into his hands.³⁵

³² Ibid, 10. Comp: PG 54, *In Genesim*, 426.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ In Verse 50, the verb מוֹת is in *hiphil 3rd person masculine imperfect consec. with suffix 3rd person masculine singular*, which can be simply translated *he killed him*. In Verse 51, the same verb is in *poel 3rd person masculine imperfect consec. with suffix 3rd person masculine singular*, and, according to KAHAL, it can be translated pretty much similar: *he killed him completely* or more freely, *he gave him a deadly strike*. See: "מוֹת," in: Konzise und Aktualisierte Ausgabe des Hebräischen und Aramäischen Lexikons zum Alten Testaments (KAHAL), ed. W. Dietrich and S. Arnet, (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013), 287.

³⁵ R. Hill, *Genesis 46-67*, 10. Comp: PG 54, *In Genesim*, 426.

Clearly, for Chrysostom, the importance of 1 Sam 17 in his context is God's presence and God's help to those who are in need. However, this story can also be considered as a longer introduction to what comes next. Namely, after ending with a recount of 1 Sam 17, he continues further with Chapter 18 and Saul's hatred towards David. And the story about David's glorious accomplishment only boosts Saul's evil.³⁶

He ends his sermon in the manner of one skillfully clergyman, recapitulating the things he said. He condemns the envy (Saul and Goliath) and praises those who seek for the Lord (David, Hagara, and Ishmael) because that search is the goal of our life, according to Chrysostom. All of them, Hagara, Ishmael, and David, have trusted the Lord, and He had helped them. Goliath and Saul were full of envy and rage, and the Lord had abandoned them.

Accordingly, keeping all this in mind, let us banish envy from our own souls and win favor from God. This, after all, is our invincible weapon; this, our greatest resource. Let us, therefore, I beseech you, despise this present life, long for the future life, esteem favor from God above all other things, and, through an excellent way of living, lay up for ourselves great confidence, so that we may be able to pass this present life without distress and attain those future blessings, thanks to the grace and loving kindness of our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom with the Father and the Holy Spirit be glory, power, and honor, now and forever, for ages of ages. Amen.³⁷

4. Homilies on David and Saul

Three homilies about David and Saul are given in a specific context, certainly in Antioch, probably around 387.³⁸ Namely, at that time, the statues and portraits of emperor Theodosius I and his family were destroyed because the Emperor raised the taxes. It should be kept in mind that during the reign of Emperor Theodosius, Christianity became the Roman Empire's state religion (380). After that, there was a ban on every practice of Roman pagan religion and the closure of all pagan temples and schools. It is not impossible that these events aroused the anger of the non-Christians, and that this was another reason for the destruction of emperor portraits.

Nevertheless, in the Emperor's eyes, all the inhabitants of Antioch were responsible for such deeds. To avoid the imperial punishment for all people of Antioch, Bishop Flavian went to Constantinople to mediate for the citizens. In such a situation, waiting for the bishop to return from the capital with some kind of news, Chrysostom, within the divine service, preached about the events that happened between David and Saul. He speaks about the king's persecution of young David, although he faithfully served him and did him great goods. And David, although he has been wronged, when he had a chance to take revenge on the king, he showed forbearance, gentleness, and clemency.

³⁶ The man who had won him the gift of life and had freed his whole army from the foreigner's rage he now suspected as an enemy, and, instead of the man's good deeds remaining fresh in his memory and prevailing over passion, the clarity of his thinking was dulled with envy as though by a kind of drunkenness, and he regarded his benefactor as his enemy. Ibid., 11. Comp: PG 54, *In Genesim*, 427.

³⁷ R. Hill, *Genesis 46-67*, 13. Comp: PG 54, *In Genesim*, 428.

³⁸ R. Hill, "Chrysostom's homilies on David and Saul," *SVTQ* 44, (Crestwood, NY, 2004), 123-140.

Already at the beginning of the first homily, it is clear that the preacher relies on the recent interpretation of the parable of the Merciful Master (Matt. 18:23-35). And right here, Chrysostom introduces David in the story as an example of an evangelical ideal. The words clearly show contrast: recall of wrongs committed and debts owing, resentment at injury done, vengeance taken on enemies, on the one hand, and on the other clemency, gentleness, forbearance.³⁹

Immediately the relevance of the material in the preacher's homilies to the current situation in Antioch and Constantinople is utterly clear: wrong has been committed (in the biblical story and on the local scene), debts are outstanding (both in evangelical parable and Samuel narrative, as well as in the palace's reckoning), punishment is beyond question. No one listening to the homilies in the congregation had any doubt which role was given to whom.⁴⁰

A fundamental principle in Chrysostom's approach to the current moral dilemma for the court of Constantinople was: even when the offense has been committed and retribution is not uncalled for, Christian values summon the injured party to a nobler response than what seems allowed by natural and even divine concession. David could have invoked the provision of the Law given by God and explicitly formulated in the talion law of Deuteronomy 19:21. But David forsook the concession, even when Saul tried to take his life by pinning him to the wall with a spear.⁴¹

As we can see, the story of David and Goliath from 1 Sam 17 was here also used as a help to describe the goods that David did for Saul and to show that the king had no reason to hate young boy, but the contrary. Introducing the story of the battle, the preacher says in the first homily:

So let me briefly describe the favors David conferred on Saul, and when and how. The Jews were involved in a harsh conflict at one time, remember, all were cowering and terrified, none presuming to lift their head, and instead the whole city was at its last gasp, everyone looking death in the face, the whole people daily expecting to die, living a life more wretched than people thrown into a pit (Comp: 1 Sam 17:1-3.11). This man emerged from the sheep to enter the battle line, and despite his age and inexperience in military endeavors he achieved deeds surpassing all expectation.⁴²

In all three homilies, one can find three direct quotes from the 1 Sam 17. The references, which could help solve the problem of the text that Chrysostom used, are rare. Almost all material in these homilies matches the one found in LXX^B. Only once, in Homily 1, Chrysostom mildly refers to a *brothers conflict* when saying that David had many to discourage him: *his brother upbraided him*.⁴³ Speaking about the discouragement, the preacher then describes David and Saul's meeting, quoting the scripture: *You cannot go be-*

³⁹ Ibid., 125.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 126. On the Chrysostom and his political affairs see: N. K. Gvosdev, "St. John Chrysostom and John Locke: An Orthodox Basis for the Social Contract?," *Philotheos* 3 (2003): 151-153.

⁴¹ Ibid., 129.

⁴² R. Hill, *David and Saul*, 11. Comp: PG 54, *De Dauide et Saule*, 678.

⁴³ Ibid.

cause you are a stripling, whereas he has been a man of war from his youth.⁴⁴ (1 Sam 17:33) But David was stirred up by divine zeal (θείῳ ζήλῳ) and was ready at any cost to help his king to win the battle against those who revile the God: *Let not my lord's heart fail, because your servant will go and fight with this foreigner.*⁴⁵ (1 Sam 17:32) What could be, according to Chrysostom, a greater service? The favor he offered was not money or glory but his life itself. It was thanks to David that Saul lived the day and enjoyed his rule.

In Homily 2, Chrysostom compares the two of David's accomplishments. The one where he brought down (κατήνεγκε)⁴⁶ the Goliath, cut his head and brought it to Jerusalem (1 Sam 17:47-48, 51, 54) and the one where he spared Saul's life (1 Sam 24).

It was, in fact, a more conspicuous victory than the former one, the spoils more majestic, the booty more glorious, the trophy more commendable: in the former case he needed sling, stones and battle line, whereas in this case thought counted for everything, the victory was achieved without weapons, and the trophy was erected without blood being spilled. He returned, therefore, bearing not a savage's head but resentment mortified and rage unnerved - spoils he deposited not in Jerusalem but in heaven and the city on high.⁴⁷

Explaining further the events from 1 Sam 24, Chrysostom quotes once more Verse 33, exactly like the first time,⁴⁸ when describing David's modesty in front of Saul and what all he could have said to him.

All this, in fact, and much more of greater importance he could have mentioned, but he mentioned none of it: he had no wish to throw his kindnesses in his teeth - only to persuade him that he was among the number of those who loved and cared for him, not of those who schemed and warred against him.⁴⁹

The last mention and the third direct quote from 1 Sam 17 in Chrysostom's Homilies on David and Saul is to be found in Homily 3. When talking about Verse 45, which he quotes: *You advance on me with your gods, but I advance against you in the name of the Lord of hosts, whom you have reviled today.*⁵⁰ (1 Sam 17:45). Here, he says that David's voice actually guided the stone. *Why are you surprised if a righteous person's voice represses resentment and destroys enemies when it even drives out demons?* He then, as always, gives a few

⁴⁴ Οὐ δυνήσῃ πορευθῆναι, ὅτι οὐ παιδάριον εἶ, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀνὴρ πολεμιστῆς ἐκ νεότητος αὐτοῦ. (PG 54, *De Dauide et Saule*, 678). This pretty much agrees with the text suggested by A. Rahlfs.

⁴⁵ Μὴ συμπεσέτω ἡ καρδία τοῦ κυρίου μου ἐπ' αὐτόν, ὅτι ὁ δοῦλός σου πορεύσεται καὶ πολεμήσει μετὰ τοῦ ἀλλοφύλου τούτου. (PG 54, *De Dauide et Saule*, 678). This quote is identical to the one suggested by A. Rahlfs.

⁴⁶ A repeated usage of the verb καταφέρω (to bring down) can also point to a fact that Chrysostom didn't know for Verse 50.

⁴⁷ R. Hill, *David and Saul*, 28. Comp: PG 54, *De Dauide et Saule*, 688.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 35.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Σὺ ἔρχῃ πρὸς με ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς σοθ, ἐγὼ δὲ ἔρχομαι πρὸς σὲ ἐν ὀνόματι Κυρίου Σαβαωθ, ὃν ὠνειδίσας σήμερον. (PG 54, *De Dauide et Saule*, 703). This differs a little bit from the A. Rahlfs version: σὺ ἔρχῃ πρὸς με ἐν ῥομφαίᾳ καὶ ἐν δόρατι καὶ ἐν ἀσπίδι καὶ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι πρὸς σὲ ἐν ὀνόματι κυρίου σαβαωθ θεοῦ παρατάξεως Ἰσραὴλ ἣν ὠνειδίσας σήμερον. See: A. Rahlfs, *LXX*, 536. Chrysostom here loosely recalls the first part, exchanging the *sword, spear and javelin* (ἐν ῥομφαίᾳ καὶ ἐν δόρατι καὶ ἐν ἀσπίδι) with *your gods* (ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς σοθ). In the second part, he uses a different verb for motion: ἔρχομαι instead of πορεύομαι, and omits the whole apposition θεοῦ παρατάξεως Ἰσραὴλ. It is also possible that he reads here a quite different version.

biblical examples, such as apostles, then the voice of Joshua that stopped the Sun and the Moon (Josh 10:12-13), or the voice of Moses that held the sea (Ex 14:21,26).⁵¹

As we saw, Chrysostom wants to highlight moral issues, such as gentleness and forbearance. Moreover, the story about David and Goliath is there to help him to achieve that goal. That is why he even closes his first homily by urging his listeners to take up the sacred books at home and apply the examples found there to their own lives. But also, this is the illustration of how the preacher, found himself at a critical moment in the history of his city of Antioch in 387, chooses figures from sacred history (and in so many layers), enacting a drama being played in the experience of his congregation.⁵²

5. Homilies on Psalms

Until today, 58 homilies on Psalms by John Chrysostom are preserved. They are to be dated in his last years in Antioch.⁵³ The context in which these sermons were preached is mainly unknown.⁵⁴ They were probably, as most of the other Chrysostom's sermons, spoken during the divine services. However, for R. Hill, that is still the question: were they delivered from the pulpit or composed and left on the theologian's desk?⁵⁵ B. De Montfaucon had a right when he said it is hard to imagine that such preacher would leave such work simply lying on his desk.⁵⁶ There is the testimony from Socrates Scholasticus, historian from Constantinople, that the great preacher's discourses survived to that (Socrates) time, some in the form he released them and some in the stenographic transcription of his spoken word.⁵⁷ A compromise solution suggested by R. Hill might be to see the text as preparation material for sermons that developed on the occasion as circumstances required.⁵⁸ Still, knowing his excellent oratory skills, it is not impossible to assume that the stenographers wrote down the spoken words (which the preacher had prepared before) and that those writings were later examined and shaped by Chrysostom himself (or others).

Reflections on the story of David and Goliath in his Commentary on Psalms are mostly allusions. In the interpretation of the Psalms (most probably, he attributes all of them to David himself), he mainly briefly looks at certain parts of 1 Sam 17 in order to clarify other parts of Scripture (as he did before). These allusions are present in the four psalms. Of the direct quotes, only one is present, mentioned earlier in the Homilies on David and Saul. Unlike other sermons, where Chrysostom uses, as noted, mostly LXX^L, when it comes to Commentary on the Psalms, he seems to have other Greek translations in front of him. Which translations – it is not clear, but R. Hill assumes that these are the most of-

51 R. Hill, *David and Saul*, 50. Comp: PG 54, *De Dauide et Saule*, 703.

52 Ibid., 9.

53 C. Kannengiesser, *HPE*, 784; R. Hill, *St. John Chrysostom: Commentary on the Psalms. Volume One*, (Brookline, Massachusetts: Holy Cross Orthodox Press), 1998, 4.

54 R. Hill, *Psalms I*, 4.

55 Ibid., 14.

56 C. Baur, *John Chrysostom and His Times*, (London/Glasgow: Sands, 1959), 222.

57 See: Socrates, *Historia Ecclesiastica VI*, PG 67, 672.

58 R. Hill, *Psalms I*, 17.

ten Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion (three of the six columns of Origen's Hexapla).⁵⁹ It should be implied, but it is not harmful to mention that Chrysostom follows the Greek numbering of the Psalms.

The first, very short but interesting review of the story of David and Goliath is in Homily on Psalm 44/45.⁶⁰ There is the only direct quotation, the one from 1 Sam 17:29, that is, from the part of a story that is not recorded in the LXX^B manuscript. Chrysostom quotes it identically as in Homily 46 on Genesis. This way, he concludes a brief overview of how David's brothers envied David, and how, on the other hand, David was mild, calm, and full of patience (similar to that in the aforementioned Homily 46): *The gentle David, too, laid Goliath low (κατῆνεγκε),*⁶¹ *put the army to flight and carried the day.*⁶² Here, interpreting a part of Verse 5 of Psalm 44/45,⁶³ he demonstrates David's and Moses' gentleness, or meekness, on account of the mention of one of three attributes in the Psalm. David and Moses are role models. According to R. Hill, this virtue, in particular, receives such documentation for the same reason as in Psalm 131/132. On Psalm 131/132, which in his version opens with *Remember David, o Lord, and all his gentleness*, he launches into lengthy praise of these two men in reaction against Manichean scorn.

In the Commentary on Psalm 110/111, interpreting the Verse 6: *Strength of his works he proclaimed to his people, to give them heritage of nations*, he uses again the episode about David and Goliath to explain the acting and the power of God's work in history: *a tiny youngster bringing to an end hostilities with savages (βαρβαρικούς) by a single shot from a stone.*⁶⁴ Because, as Psalm goes further: *I was pushed and driven backward to collapse, and the Lord helped me*, he says: *Consequently, it is when affairs have reached a point of despairing of human hope that God contributes assistance of his own. He did this also in the case of Goliath; likewise with the apostles as well.*⁶⁵

Psalm 143/144 is interesting in itself, because LXX text, unlike MT, where at the beginning only stands: **וַיִּלָּחֶם**, contains the following addition: *Δαυιδ πρὸς τὸν Γολιαθ.*⁶⁶ Chrysostom obviously did not overlook this. Commenting the first verse of the Psalm: *Blessed be the Lord, my God, who trains my hands for battle and my fingers for war*, he adds:

What are you saying – that God is instructor in wars, battle, and fighting? Very much so: no one who attributes victory to him even in these matters commits sin – such is the meaning of who trains my hands, that is, who causes me to prevail over the enemy, conquer, erect a trophy. When

⁵⁹ Ibid., 8.

⁶⁰ Numbering: LXX/MT.

⁶¹ Again the same verb as it was mentioned above. Comp: PG 55, *Expositiones in Psalmos*, 192.

⁶² R. Hill, *Psalms I*, 269, Compare: PG 55, *Expositiones in Psalmos*, 192.

⁶³ ...ἐνεκεν ἀληθείας καὶ πραΰτητος καὶ δικαιοσύνης... (for the sake of truth and gentleness and righteousness) – The Chrysostom's quote is the same with the LXX^B one.

⁶⁴ R. Hill, *St. John Chrysostom: Commentary on the Psalms. Volume Two*, (Brookline, Massachusetts: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1998), 49. Comp: PG 55, *Expositiones in Psalmos*, 289.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 121. Comp: PG 55, *Expositiones in Psalmos*, 333.

⁶⁶ For more about this Psalm, see: G. D. Mladenović, "The Synthesis of Royal and Messianic Verses in Psalm 143. A psalm of David [MT: Psalm 144]", *Philoteos* 16 (2016): 51-57.

he felled Goliath, after all, it was God who was responsible for the victory; and when he successfully conducted many wars, erected trophies, and captured hostile cities along with their population, God it was who caused him to prevail.⁶⁷

Bearing in mind that John belongs to the School of Antioch and that Scripture's historicity is imperative for him, it is no wonder why he speaks this way about such a topic. Nevertheless, above all, he points out the importance of deeds done in God's name, that is, the works in which God reveals himself (such as the victory of young David), even if that means war and fighting. Still, he continues in the spirit of the New Testament, and the war and the fighting turns towards Eph 6:12: *Our contest is not with flesh and blood, but with the rulers, the authorities, the cosmic lords of the darkness of this age.*⁶⁸

When it comes to his general writing on the relation between Psalms and David and Goliath story, it is interesting to point out that he does not mention (or even does not know) Psalm 151 (so-called additional LXX Psalm), which summarizes David's victory over Goliath. However, having in mind that Psalm 151 was most probably never liturgically used,⁶⁹ such omission was being expected.

6. Commentary on Isaiah

Comment on Isaiah is one of Chrysostom's best works.⁷⁰ It was most likely written at a time when he was a priest in Antioch.⁷¹ Together with commentary on Daniel, the commentary on Isaiah is the only commentary among the works of Chrysostom in a strictly exegetical sense. It includes interpretation of Is 1-8.⁷²

When it comes to the story of David and Goliath, the writer mentions it three times when interpreting Chapters 6 and 7 of the Book of Isaiah. There is one direct quote.

By interpreting Is 3:4, *And I will set up youths as their rulers*, Chrysostom tries to explain why the Prophet sees the youth here as a *punishment* for Jerusalem and Judah. In fact, according to Chrysostom, here is not a word about someone of young age, but about someone who is not strong in faith, about someone young *in faith*,⁷³ and about someone whose heart is spoiled and corrupt.⁷⁴ And that the Prophet does not simply insult youth as such, it becomes clear if one looks at biblical history, where Chrysostom lists the examples of young people who did great deeds. There is young Timothy to whom the Apostle Paul entrusts the Church in Ephesus and to whom he writes two epistles. There is also Solomon, who, at the age of twelve, comes to the throne,⁷⁵ and Jeremiah, Daniel, Josiah, young Joseph. There is also young David, who:

⁶⁷ Ibid., 321. Comp: PG 55, *Expositiones in Psalmos*, 457.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ The scientific research on this very topic is completely lacking.

⁷⁰ D. Garrett, *Isaiah*, 163.

⁷¹ Ibid., 171.

⁷² Ibid., 1.

⁷³ Ibid., 84. Comp: PG 56, *In Isaiam*, 43.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 85.

⁷⁵ It is clear that here Chrysostom uses the LXX of 1 Kings 2:12: *νιδὸς ἑτῶν δώδεκα*. This represent a minus of MT.

...committed his worst sin not when he was a boy or a young man, but when he was beyond youth. (2 Sam 11) When he was a small boy, he won a marvelous trophy and brought down (κατήνεγκε) the barbarian, and he demonstrated every manner of philosophy, and his youth was no hindrance to obtaining these successes.⁷⁶

In other words, Chrysostom again used the story of 1 Sam 17 in order to explain another part of Scripture. He actually used very often the example of David to show how God acted in history. The same is also with the Is 7:2: *His soul and the soul of his people were shaken*. When he intends to do something extraordinary, God does not immediately provide a miracle, but sometimes he allows those who need help first to experience weakness and to face their misfortunes in order that they show no ingratitude.⁷⁷ Here, 1 Sam 17 comes as an excellent example:

He has even done this in the life of the great David. When he was about to lead him into the battle line and raise up a brilliant trophy by his hands, he did not do it at the very beginning of the campaign, but allowed them to experience forty days of fear.⁷⁸ When they despaired of their own deliverance, and the barbarian had reproached them countless times because no one was brave enough to rise against him, then, when their inferiority was evident and their weakness was evident, he led a boy into battle and brought about that strange victory.⁷⁹

A few lines below, it becomes unclear whether Chrysostom uses a Hebrew text and which text he could have in front of him. Interpreting Is 7:3-4, he is returning to David again: Why does it say, "You and your son who is left, Jashub?" Jashub (יָשׁוּב), in the Hebrew language, means "to return" and "to carry out." That is why Jesse send David off with the words "And you shall receive their jashub" (1 Sam 17:18), that is, "You will tell me of their return and what they carry out."⁸⁰

The word יָשׁוּב, according to MT, does not occur in 1 Sam 17, and especially not in 1 Sam 17:18. The MT says עֲרַבְתֶּם תָּקָה (get a token). It is clear that this has nothing to do with יָשׁוּב. Otherwise, יָשׁוּב really means *to return*, if it is derived from the verb בָּשָׁב and represents its impf. cons. 3 m. Sg. form.⁸¹ Since this part of the text does not exist in LXX^B, it is clear that Chrysostom reads either a longer Greek version, complemented according to the Hebrew text (at least as far as the story of the *brothers conflict* is concerned), or some other version of the Hebrew text. But the used word Ἰασουβ, in its Greek transliteration, does not appear in LXX^L either, but instead, according to A. Rahlfs, comes the word ἐπισουβα.⁸² The question *did Chrysostom use another version of the Hebrew text* comes as a legitimate one. However, it is not impossible that he quoted the text by memory, and that he mixed the words up because of their similarity (Ἰασουβ and ἐπισουβα). D. Garrett agrees

⁷⁶ D. Garrett, *Isaiah*, 83. Comp: PG 56, *In Isaiam*, 43.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 139.

⁷⁸ Comp: 1 Sam 17:16. This also points to the fact that Chrysostom reads the text containing 1 Sam 17:12-31, because the information about *forty days* does not exist in LXX^B.

⁷⁹ D. Garrett, *Isaiah*, 140. Comp: PG 56, *In Isaiam*, 79.

⁸⁰ Ibid. 141.

⁸¹ See: "שׁוּב". In: KAHAL, 590.

⁸² A. Rahlfs, LXX, 534.

with the assumption that one could not talk about another version of the Hebrew text, but that Chrysostom makes a mistake by quoting the text by memory.⁸³ Without knowing Hebrew well enough (or not knowing it at all, as some scholars suggest),⁸⁴ he adapts the quote to his needs. Since he makes such a mistake, it is not impossible to exclude the assumption that he knows the longer version of the story only from memory.

7. Homilies on the New Testament

When it comes to the homilies on the books of the New Testament and its characters, which Chrysostom interprets more often (what is understandable, given their importance in the life of the Church),⁸⁵ the story of David and Goliath is not so exhaustively mentioned. One can talk more about allusions and casual reminders. That is why just a short overview will be given here. In just one work, he uses the whole story, similar to the Homilies to Genesis.

References to 1 Sam 17 can be found in eight homilies. Chrysostom, in his sermon *On Romans 12:20*, this time speaking of the ingenious use of Scripture by the Apostle Paul, once again complements the Apostle, repeating the story of the conflict between David and Saul briefly, and reminding that David, among other things, delivered Saul and his army from mighty Goliath.⁸⁶ He does a similar thing in his *Homily 26 on the Gospel of Matthew*, when he speaks about Matt 8:5-6. He returns to David, who always serves him as an example: first of all, of a righteous man, and then a penitent.⁸⁷

The topic most frequently mentioned by Chrysostom, when referring to 1 Sam 17, is actually God's help, without which David could not do anything. That is, all the great works, which are made in biblical history, are done in the name of God. So *David in the Name of God took down (κατέειλε) Goliath*.⁸⁸ David's faith was something that helped a young shepherd to become a marvelous hero who brought such a great victory and trophy to his king.⁸⁹ David also defeated the lions and bears in God's name (this time he mentioned lions):⁹⁰

And David said, "When the lion and the bear came, in the name of the Lord I rent them with my hands." (1 Sam 17, 34-35)⁹¹

⁸³ D. Garrett, *Isaiah*, 190.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 189. Comp: R. Hill, *Psalms* I, 1.

⁸⁵ One should be aware that at that time the Old Testament was more read than today in the liturgical life of the Church in the east. See: J. Miller, "The Prophetologion. The Old Testament of Byzantine Christianity?," in: *The Old Testament in Byzantium*, ed. P. Magdalino and R.S. Nelson (Washington D.C.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 55-76.

⁸⁶ John Chrysostom, *On the Priesthood*, in: NPNF 9, 1995. Comp: PG 54, *In illud: Si esurierit inimicus*, 183.

⁸⁷ John Chrysostom, *Homilies on the Gospel of Saint Matthew*, in: NPNF 10, 1995. Comp: PG 57, *In Mattheum homiliae XXVI*, 343.

⁸⁸ John Chrysostom, *Homilies on Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, Thessalonians, Timothy, Titus and Philemon*, in: NPNF 13, 1995. Comp: PG 62, *In epistolam ad Colossenes homiliae IX*, 363.

⁸⁹ John Chrysostom, *Homilies on the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistle to the Romans*, in: NPNF 11, 1995. Comp: PG 60, *In Acta apostolorum IV*, 44.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 55. Comp: PG 60, *In Acta apostolorum IV*, 75.

⁹¹ Οτε ἤρχετο ὁ λέων καὶ ἡ ἄρκος, ἐν ὀνόματι Κυρίου ταῖς χερσὶν αὐτοῦ διέσπων. Only the first part of the sentence is a quote. This other would rather be a free addition of Chrysostom, or simply a wrong quote from memory, combining this verse with Verse 45. The similar situation is indicated in the Homily 44 on the Acts

In homilies on the *Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, Chrysostom writes in a very similar way:

He overthrew cities by trumpets; and afterwards by a little and poor stripling, David, He turned to flight the whole array of barbarians.⁹²

In homilies on the same Epistle, he mentions two more times both undertakings of David (one regarding the Goliath and the other regarding the wild beasts). He thus emphasizes the courage and, above all, young David's skill to fight for his place in the duel.⁹³ In this way, he compares David with the Apostle and his accomplishments.

In one shorter sermon on the same Epistle, i.e., *on the first verse of Chapter 11*, Chrysostom repeats the whole story from 1 Sam 17. He uses David to confirm the Apostle's words, how one should look up to the role models. Speaking of righteousness, he says that David was such, that he constantly remembered his sin, and that he never talked about righteous deeds unless he was forced to. And here, he also mentions a story about the *brothers conflict* missing in LXX^B. In this part, he again quotes 1 Sam 17: 32-33 in the same way as in Homilies on David and Saul, and these quotes agree with LXX^B.⁹⁴ He ends the review of the story with the quotation of Verses 34-36.⁹⁵ However, this quotation varies widely from LXX^B and could represent LXX^L.⁹⁶ In Verse 35, Chrysostom leaves out one part, which is also found in LXX^L (... καὶ εἰ ἐπανάστατο ἐπ' ἐμέ ... καὶ ἐπάτασσον αὐτόν ... (1 Sam 17:35 LXX^L)),⁹⁷ and it could be concluded that he makes an error, because he quotes the text from memory.

In his laudable *sermons about the Apostle Paul*, Chrysostom again quotes David's struggle with lions and bears. Saying that the Apostle Paul was always practical and to his listeners only what was needed, without bothering them with unnecessary things, John compares him with David. The young David, not wanting to brag himself, speaks to Saul only that

of Apostles. Chrysostom once again quotes David's words from this situation, this time in a slightly different form: *David also, when disbelieved, says, "I was with the flock keeping my father's sheep: and when the bear came, I scared her away with my hands."* (1 Sam 17:34) See: Ibid., 267. Comp: PG, 60, *In Acta apostolorum* XLIV, 307.

⁹² John Chrysostom, Homilies on the Epistles of Paul to the Corinthians, in: NPNF 12, 1995, 320. Comp: PG 61, *In epistolam 2. Corinthios VIII*, 458.

⁹³ Ibid., 393, 396-397.

⁹⁴ PG 51, *In illud: Utinam sustineretis modicum* (2 Co 11,1), 307.

⁹⁵ 34. Ποιμαίνων ἤμην ὁ δούλός σου ἐν τῷ ποιμνίῳ τοῦ πατρός μου, καὶ ὅταν ἤρχετο λέων ἢ ἄρκτος, καὶ ἐλάμβανε πρόβατον ἐκ τῆς ἀγέλης,

35. ἐξηρχόμεν κατόπισθεν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐπάτασσον αὐτόν, καὶ ἐξέσπων ἐκ τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκράτουν τοῦ φάρυγγος αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐθανάτου αὐτόν.

36. καὶ τὸν λέοντα καὶ τὴν ἄρκτον ἔτυπεν ὁ δούλός σου· καὶ ἔσται ὁ ἀλλόφυλος οὗτος καὶ ἀπερίτμητος, ὡς ἐν τούτων. Comp: PG 51, 307.

34. ...ποιμαίνων ἦν ὁ δούλός σου τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ποιμνίῳ καὶ ὅταν ἤρχετο ὁ λέων καὶ ἡ ἄρκτος καὶ ἐλάμβανεν πρόβατον ἐκ τῆς ἀγέλης

35. καὶ ἐξεπορευόμεν ὀπίσω αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπάταξα αὐτόν καὶ ἐξέσπασα ἐκ τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰ ἐπανάστατο ἐπ' ἐμέ καὶ ἐκράτησα τοῦ φάρυγγος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπάταξα καὶ ἐθανάτωσα αὐτόν.

36. καὶ τὴν ἄρκον ἔτυπεν ὁ δούλός σου καὶ τὸν λέοντα καὶ ἔσται ὁ ἀλλόφυλος ὁ ἀπερίτμητος ὡς ἐν τούτων... Comp: A Rahlfs, LXX, 535.

⁹⁶ T. Kauhanen, *The Proto-Lucianic Problem in 1 Samuel*, (Göttingen; Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, 2012), 191-192.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

what could force the king to allow him to fight Goliath.⁹⁸ He does a similar thing in *homilies on the Epistle to the Romans*.⁹⁹ When it comes to the text used by Chrysostom, the Homily 26 on the Romans is interesting, for he quotes 1 Sam 17:26¹⁰⁰ – the part that belongs to the LXX^B minuses.

8. Other Homilies

Besides homilies on biblical books, John Chrysostom also spoke about many other topics that directly affected people's lives in his community. Thus, at the time of the mentioned crisis in Antioch about the *statues*, Chrysostom delivered twenty-one homilies on this subject. In Homily 17, he recounted briefly with a few words on the story of 1 Sam 17, saying that the appearance can very often deceive and that one must look in the soul of the person so that it could be judged (since David's appearance also deceived Saul).¹⁰¹ In the *Homilies on Providence*, Chrysostom, speaking of David and his patience, when, although anointed as king, he was persecuted by Saul, he mentions his great victory against Goliath.¹⁰²

In his *Homilies against the Anomoeans*, Chrysostom uses a certain kind of allegoresis. That is actually not so characteristic of him. Nevertheless, he does not reject the literal dimension of the text, but rather on a literal dimension, similar to Philo, and often also to Apostle Paul, he builds on a deeper dimension of the text. Goliath was armed with a heavy weapon, but David was armless. He was armed only with his own faith. The Goliath was protected by the heavy armor and the long shield, while David shone from within with the grace of the Spirit.

This is why a boy prevailed over a man, this is why the one wearing no armor conquered the one fully armed, this is why the shepherd struck down the soldier, this is why a stone in a shepherd's hand crushed and destroyed the bronze weapons of war.¹⁰³

If the Apostle says, alluding to the Israelites in the wilderness, that they all drink the same spiritual drink, from the spiritual stone, which is Christ (1 Cor 10:4), so we can, according to Chrysostom, also understand David's stone. David's weapons were primarily spiritual.

In the case of the Jews in the desert, it was not the nature of the visible stone but the power of the spiritual stone which sent forth those streams of water. (Ex 17, 6) So, too, in David's case, it was not the visible stone but the spiritual stone which sank into the barbarian's head... Our weapons are not merely carnal but spiritual demolishing sophistries and reasoning and every proud height that raises itself against the knowledge of God. (2 Cor 10:4-5)¹⁰⁴

⁹⁸ M. Mitchel, *Heavenly Trumpet*, 351, 437. Comp: PG 50, *De laudibus sancti Pauli V*, 502.

⁹⁹ John Chrysostom, *Homilies on the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistle to the Romans*, in: NPNF 11, 1995, 545. Comp: PG 62, *In epistulam ad Romanos homiliae XXIX*, 568.

¹⁰⁰ Τί ἔσται τῷ ἀνελόντι τὸν ἀλλόφυλον τοῦτον; (What shall be done to the one who killed this foreigner?) PG 62, 568. This quote differs from what A. Rahlfs suggests. See A. Rahlfs, *LXX*, 534.

¹⁰¹ John Chrysostom, *On the Priesthood, Ascetic Treatises, Select Homilies and Letters, Homilies on the Statues*, in: NPNF 9, 1995, 457. Comp: PG 49, *De statu XVII*, 172.

¹⁰² C. A. Hall, *John Chrysostom's On Providence: A Translation and theological Interpretation*, (Madison, New Jersey: Drew University), 1991. Comp: SC 79, *Sur la providence de Dieu*, 174.

¹⁰³ P. Harkins, *John Chrysostom: On the Incomprehensible Nature of God*, (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 272. Comp: PG 48, *Contra Anomoeos XI*, 797.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 273.

9. Conclusion

In short, as we could see, Chrysostom interprets the story of David and Goliath contextually and often typologically. It could be said that he does not raise the question of the historicity of the events. For him, this is an event that has indeed happened in the past. He focuses on the 1 Sam 17 narrative mainly through liturgical and other sermons during the divine worship. However, he uses the story of David and Goliath also in his dogmatic dispute against the Anomoeans, showing here a glimpse of alegoresis. Yet, in comparison to Saint Hippolytus, Saint Gregory of Nyssa, or even to Theodoret of Cyrus, he never interpreted 1 Sam 17 Christologically.¹⁰⁵

He definitely knows a longer version of the text. However, it remains unclear whether there is a longer text in front of him, or he knows a story about the *brothers conflict* from memory. In any case, he preaches to his community according to the longer text, but without the other MT pluses except 1 Sam 17:11-31.

John Chrysostom used the narrative of David and Goliath more than the other Church Fathers.¹⁰⁶ Knowing his style and his extraordinary oratorical talent, this could be somehow self-explanatory. However, knowing how much he wrote, it is striking that he never interpreted 1 Sam 17 directly and that, comparing to today's usage, he wrote so little about such an important biblical story (from a modern perspective). Maybe it was a story well-known to everyone, so it did not need any explanation. Maybe it was never read during the divine worship. However, in the moments where he writes about it, he emphasizes David's faith and trust in God and Goliath's doom for cursing Him. Chrysostom underlines the fact that God never leaves his people. Especially not in trouble.

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The concept of synergy in the triadology and anthropology of Saint Augustine

Abstract: In this paper, we are going to try to present the concept of synergy in the triadology and anthropology of Saint Augustine. Through the analysis of Augustine's original texts, we are putting effort to highlight the synergistic interpretation of Augustine's triadology instead of the essentialist interpretation, which is based on de Régnon's paradigm as a mainstream exegesis in Orthodox theology. After the triadology, we are making an attempt to analyse the concept of synergy in the anthropology of Saint Augustine – i.e. to interpret the relation between God's grace and man's free will in a synergistic key, criticizing the Calvinist monergistic interpretation.

Keywords: Saint Augustine, triadology, anthropology, synergy, synergism, monergism, essentialism, God's grace, man's free will

In the imposing opus of Saint Augustine, his writings against Pelagianism occupy an important place. From one point of view, Augustine of Hippo, as an ecclesiastic and theological authority contributed to the final conciliar condemnation of Pelagius' teaching or so-called Pelagianism. On the other hand, Augustine's writings against Pelagianism became the basis of later receptions and different exegesis, which have often been very questionable and problematic, regarding the issue of the relationship between God's grace (*gratia Dei*) and human freedom of deliberation (*liberum arbitrium*). That reception is polarized in two opposing interpretations – monergism and synergism.

Some Protestant theologians, primarily Calvinists, prefer the first interpretation – monergism.¹ By emphasizing the primacy of God's grace, this exegetical position almost completely dismisses the existence of man's freedom of decision. Although Calvinism does not deny the existence of freedom of decision literally, it seems that this freedom has been led to a logical absurdity, by emphasizing the primacy of God's grace. What is especially interesting – Calvinism bases its monergistic viewpoints on the authority of Saint Augustine, i. e. on the exegesis of his anti-Pelagian writings. For that reason, in this paper, we would like to explore how much such an exegesis corresponds to Augustine's viewpoints. Namely, whether Augustine supports monergism or whether he, however, promotes the concept of synergism – the answer to this question is the purpose of this paper. If this concept of syn-

1 See: Robert Charles Sproul, *Izabranici Božji* (Osijek: Kršćanski centar „Dobroga Pastira“, 2010).

ergism does exist in Augustine's thought, we would like to compare it with the concept of synergism, that exists in the Roman-catholic and Orthodox theological tradition.

The Greek συνέργεια and the Latin cooperatio

The term synergy originates from the Greek συνέργεια, which means *working with, co-operation*.² Its Latin equivalent is the term *cooperatio*, from which, of course, the English word *co-operation* is derived. In the New Testament we find the verb συνεργέω (Mk 16:20; Ro 8:28; 1 Cor 16:16; 2 Cor 6:1; Js 2:22) and the noun συνεργός (Ro 16:3,9; 1 Cor 3:9; 2 Cor 1:24; Phil 2:25; 4:3; 1 Th 3:2; Phlm 1:1; 1:24). The verb συνεργέω is translated into Latin (Vulgata) by the verb *cooperor* (to work with), or, in one of the places listed (2 Cor 6:1), by the verb *adjuvo* (to help, aid). It is similar with the noun συνεργός, which is translated into Latin by the noun *cooperator* (1 Th 3:2; Phil 2:25), or by the noun *adjutor* (Ro 16:3,9; 1 Cor 3:9; 2 Cor 1:24; Phil 4:3; Phlm 1:1; 1:24).

We also find this New Testament term in the writings of Saint Augustine. Namely, we find the concept of *cooperation* (συνέργεια), which, in an anthropological sense, also implies *helping* (*adjuvare*), i.e. *co-operation* – the joint action of individual beings. Synergy can be the joint action of divine personalities in an economic act – then we talk about the concept of synergy in the triadology, or the joint action of God and man in man's good (*pious*) action – then we talk about the concept of synergy in anthropology. That concept of synergy (triadological as well as anthropological), as we are going to see in our analysis in this paper, implies the unity of action, but at the same time, within that action what *synergy is* – *working with*, it implies the reality of an individual being and concreteness of one's own action as well.

Augustine relates the Latin expression *opero* to the Greek ἐνεργέω linguistically and conceptually, understanding it as an effective action. In his treatise *De gratia Christi*, Augustine quotes the following passage from the Epistle to the Philippians: *Deus enim est qui operatur in vobis et velle et perficere* (Phil 2:13). He adds right after: „Vel sicut in aliis et maxime graecis codicibus legitur, et velle et operari“. As we can see, in the Latin translation of the above-quoted section of the Epistle, Augustine replaces the verb *perficere* (to achieve, finish, perform, bring to an end) with the verb *operari* (to work, operate). He states that the *operari* exists „in other copies [or more precisely: in other codices]“ (in aliis... codicibus – here he thinks of the Latin ones) and, he adds and emphasizes, „especially the Greek [codices]“. Evidently, he has the Greek verb ἐνεργέω in mind, since in the Greek text of the Epistle we read: [ὁ] θεὸς γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ θέλειν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν... It is clear that the Latin verb *operari* is related to the Greek verb ἐνεργεῖν in the quoted passage. Consequently, Augustine's usage of the term *cooperatio* should be related to the Greek συνέργεια, not only in the linguistic, but also in the biblical-conceptual sense. In this paper, we want to examine the biblical concept of synergy in Augustine's writings. More precisely (and academically more correctly), we would like to look for Augustine's understanding and exegesis of that concept.

2 Geoffrey William Hugo Lamp, “συνέργεια“, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford University Press, 1961), 1323.

The concept of synergy in the triadology of Saint Augustine

In modern theological thought, there is an exegetical approach to the triadology of Saint Augustine through the so-called de Régnon's paradigm, which „has become the *sine qua non* for framing the contemporary understanding of Augustine's theology“³. The opinion that in Western theology, which is different from that of the Greek fathers, one divine essence (substance or nature) has ontological primacy (or „starting point“⁴) over divine persons, has been the key to this exegetical paradigm. Augustine is considered to be the most influential author of this direction of Western theology.

The exegetical key of de Régnon's paradigm is also visible in the interpretation of God's activity *ad extra* (i.e. in *oikonomia*). An illustrative example is LaCugna's interpretation of the triadology of St. Augustine. In her book *God for Us – the Trinity and Christian Life*, LaCugna writes:

According to the Greek theologians, God's activity (operation, energies) in creation originates with the Father, passes through the Son, and is perfected in the Spirit... The Greek formulation displays the biblical and creedal sense of the God the Father who comes to us in Christ and the Spirit.⁵

As expected, according to LaCugna, Augustine's understanding stands in another, opposite position:

In Augustine's theology, on the other hand, God's activity in creation is the work of the Trinity, that is, the one divine nature which exists in three persons. Strictly speaking, the Trinity creates, the Trinity redeems, the Trinity sanctifies. But if it is a three-personed Godhead that acts in history, how is it possible to detect what is distinctive to each divine person?⁶

LaCugna concludes, putting the stamp of de Régnon's exegetical paradigm:

Augustine's principle, which follows logically from the starting point in the divine unity instead of the economy of salvation, tends to blur real distinction among the divine persons...⁷

It is unclear where, in Augustine's writings, LaCugna and other followers of de Régnon's paradigm find that Augustine is giving priority to the divine essence over divine personalities and that he is arguing that it is divine nature that acts in the history of salvation!? We have not read that statement anywhere in Augustine's writings, not even anything remotely similar to that. It is wrong to say, as LaCugna does: „The Trinity, that is, the one divine nature which exists in three persons“ – this is not what *Trinitas* means in Augustine's triadology. *Trinitas* is not „one divine nature which exists in three persons“, but three persons, namely the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, *of one nature* – *Trinitas que Deus est*. One nature does not possess three persons, but three persons possess one nature. Three persons are a reality, and one nature apart from them is only an abstraction:

3 Michel R. Barnes, „Augustine in Contemporary Trinitarian Theology“, *Theological Studies*, no. 59, (1995): 238. See also: Georgy E. Demacopulos and Aristotel Papanikolaou, „Augustine and the Orthodox: „The West“ in the East“, in *Orthodox readings of Augustine*, ed. E. Demacopulos and Aristotel Papanikolaou (Crestwood: St Vladimir's seminary press, 2008), 27-36.

4 Catherine M. LaCugna, *God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life* (San Francisco: Harper, 1991), 99.

5 Catherine M. LaCugna, *God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life*, 97.

6 *Ibid.*

7 *Ibid.*, 99.

But now hold with unshakeable faith that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are a trinity and that there is, nonetheless, one God, not that the divinity is common to these as if it were a fourth, but that is itself the ineffably inseparable Trinity. Hold that the Father begot Son, that only the Son was begotten of the Father, and that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of both of them.⁸

How can the divine essence take precedence over divine persons in Augustine's triadology, if he says the following: ... *totius divinitatis, vel si melius dicitur deitatis, principium Pater est*⁹ (the Father is the beginning of the whole divinity, or if it is better so expressed, deity)? Therefore, it is absurd to say that one abstract divine nature acts in the history of salvation. The Trinity, that is, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, are the ones who act. The works of the Trinity *ad extra* are not One¹⁰, if that means „[blurring] any real distinction among the divine persons“. ¹¹ The works of the Trinity *ad extra* are inseparable: *Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sicut inseparabiles sunt, ita inseparabiliter operentur*.¹² *Inseparabiliter operantur* means that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit do not work separately from each other in the history of salvation, but that they work together. Salvation is one, but it contains different works of divine persons¹³, who work together:

Yet not that this Trinity was born of the Virgin Mary, and crucified under Pontius Pilate, and buried, and rose again the third day, and ascended into heaven, but only the Son. Nor, again, that this Trinity descended in the form of a dove upon Jesus when He was baptized; nor that, on the day of Pentecost, after the ascension of the Lord, when there came a sound from heaven, as of a rushing mighty wind, the same Trinity sat upon each of them with cloven tongues like as of fire, but only the Holy Spirit. Nor yet that this Trinity said from heaven, You are my Son, whether when He was baptized by John, or when the three disciples were with Him in the mount, or when the voice sounded, saying, I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again; but that it was a word of the Father only, spoken to the Son; although the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as they are indivisible, so work indivisibly. This is also my faith, since it is the Catholic faith.¹⁴

8 Augustine of Hippo, *Epistula CXX*, 3.13; PL 33, 458. „Nunc vero tene inconcussa fide, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum esse Trinitatem, et tamen unum Deum; non quod sit eorum communis quasi quarta divinitas, sed quod sit ipsa ineffabiliter inseparabilis Trinitas, Patremque solum genuisse Filium, Filiumque solum a Patre genitum, Spiritum vero sanctum et Patris et Filii esse Spiritum.“ Translated by John E. Rotelle, *Augustine of Hippo, Letters 100-152* (New York: Augustinian Heritage Institute, 2003), 136.

9 Augustine of Hippo, *De Trinitate* IV, 20.29; PL 42, 908.

10 Catherine M. LaCugna, *God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life*, 97.

11 *Ibid.*, 99.

12 Augustine of Hippo, *De Trinitate* I, 4.7; PL 42, 824.

13 See: Lewis Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 104.

14 Augustine of Hippo, *De Trinitate* I, 4.7; PL 42, 824. „Non tamen eandem Trinitatem natam de virgine Maria et sub Pontio Pilato crucifixam et sepultam tertio die resurrexisse et in caelum ascendisse, sed tantummodo Filium. Nec eandem Trinitatem descendisse in specie columbae super Iesum baptizatum, aut die Pentecostes post ascensionem Domini sonitu facto de caelo quasi ferretur flatus vehemens et linguis divisus velut ignis sedisse super unumquemque eorum, sed tantummodo Spiritum Sanctum. Nec eandem Trinitatem dixisse de caelo: Tu es Filius meus, sive cum baptizatus est a Iohanne sive in monte quando cum illo erant tres discipuli, aut quando sonuit vox dicens: Et clarificavi et iterum clarificabo, sed tantummodo Patris vocem fuisse ad Filium factam quamvis Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sicut inseparabiles sunt, ita inseparabiliter operentur. Haec et mea fides est, quando haec est catholica fides.“ Translated by Arthur West Haddan. From *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, Vol. 3. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/130101.htm>.

Inseparabiliter operantur, of course, means that „God’s activity (operation, energies) in creation originates with the Father, passes through the Son, and is perfected in the Spirit“ and this is certainly a formulation in accordance with the biblical and the creedal formulae. However, it is not only the Greek formulation, but *catholica fides*, which is also Augustine’s *fides*:

Also, when the same apostle says, But to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in Him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by Him, who can doubt that he speaks of all things which are created; as does John, when he says, All things were made by Him? I ask, therefore, of whom he speaks in another place: For of Him, and through Him, and in Him, are all things: to whom be glory forever. Amen. For if of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, so as to assign each clause severally to each person: of Him, that is to say, of the Father; through Him, that is to say, through the Son; in Him, that is to say, in the Holy Spirit — it is manifest that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit is one God, inasmuch as the words continue in the singular number, To whom be glory forever.¹⁵

The key meaning of the phrase *inseparabiliter operantur* is that there is *cooperatio* (synergy) between divine persons in their concrete works in the history of salvation. Augustine does not mention the term *cooperatio* in his *De Trinitate*, except when he is quoting the words of the Apostle Paul (Rom 8, 28).¹⁶ However, in his Sermons, we find a precise interpretation of the synergy between the divine persons, where he uses the term *cooperatio* to explain that:

And yet it is not without cause, but with reason and with truth said, that the Father, and not the Son and the Holy Spirit, said, You are My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. Nevertheless, we do not deny that the Son and the Holy Spirit co-operated in working this miracle of the voice sounding from heaven, though we know that it belongs to the Person of the Father only...

In the same way when we say most rightly, that not the Father, nor the Holy Spirit, but the Son walked upon the sea, who only had that flesh and those feet which rested on the waves; yet who would deny that the Father and the Holy Spirit co-operated in the work of so great a miracle? For so again we say most truly that the Son only took this our flesh, not the Father, nor the Holy Spirit, and yet he has no true wisdom who denies that the Father, or the Holy Spirit co-operated in the work of His Incarnation which belongs only to the Son. So also we say that neither the Father, nor the Son, but the Holy Spirit only appeared both in the form of a dove, and in tongues as it were of fire; and gave to those to whom He came the power to tell in many and various tongues the wonderful works of God; and yet from this miracle which regards the Holy Spirit only, we cannot separate the co-operation of the Father and the Only-Begotten

¹⁵ Augustine of Hippo, *De Trinitate* I, 6.12; PL 42, 827. “Item dicit idem Apostolus: *Nobis unus Deus Pater ex quo omnia, et nos in ipso; et unus Dominus Iesus Christus per quem omnia, et nos per ipsum*. Quis dubitet eum omnia “*quae creata sunt*” dicere, sicut Ioannes: *Omnia per ipsum facta sunt*? Quaero itaque de quo dicit alio loco: *Quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia; ipsi gloria in saecula saeculorum*. Si enim de Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto ut singulis personis singula tribuantur, *ex ipso*, ex Patre; *per ipsum*, per Filium; in ipso, in Spiritu Sancto; manifestum quod *Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unus Deus est*, quando singulariter intulit: *Ipsi gloria in saecula saeculorum*.” Translated by Arthur West Haddan. From *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, Vol. 3. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/130101.htm>.

¹⁶ Augustine of Hippo, *De Trinitate* VIII, 7.10; XIII, 16.20; PL 42, 956, 1030.

Word. So also the Whole Trinity work the works of each several Person in the Trinity, the Two co-operating in the work of the Other, through a perfect harmony of operation in the Three, and not through any deficiency of the power to work effectually in One.¹⁷

And again, the formulation mentioned above in the biblical and creedal sense, which is not only „the Greek formulation“, but *catholica* and Augustine's *fides*:

...it is sufficiently clear to those who have a sound faith, or who even understand as they best can, both that the words, He does the works, are spoken of the Father, in that from Him is also the first principle of the works, from whom is the existence of the Persons who co-operate in working: for that both the Son is born of Him, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him, as the First Beginning, of whom the Son is born, and with whom He has one Spirit in common...¹⁸

So, *cooperatio* or *inseparabiliter operantur* means that „God's activity (operation, energies) in creation originates with the Father, passes through the Son, and is perfected in the Spirit“.¹⁹

The concept of synergy in the anthropology of Saint Augustine

In this article, when we talk about the concept of synergy in anthropology, we mean the relationship between God's grace and man's free will or, as Augustine says it, man's freedom of deliberation [*liberum arbitrium*]²⁰. This question can be interpreted in two ways, which

¹⁷ Augustine of Hippo, *Sermo LXXI*, 16.27; PL 38, 460. Emphasizing the term *cooperatio* (italic) is ours. „Nec tamen inaniter, sed rationabiliter et veraciter dicitur Patrem dixisse, non Filium aut Spiritum Sanctum: Tu es Filius meus dilectus, in quo complacui; sed hoc miraculum de caelo sonabilis verbi quamvis ad personam Patris tantummodo pertinere, *cooperatos* esset Filium et Spiritum Sanctum non negamus...”

Eodem modo, cum rectissime dicamus non Patrem, nec Spiritum Sanctum, sed Filium super mare ambulasse, cuius unius caro erat illa et plantae fluctibus innitentes; illud tamen opus tanti miraculi Patrem et Spiritum Sanctum *cooperatos* esse quis abnuat? Sic enim et solum Filium verissime dicimus ipsam suscepisse carnem, non Patrem aut Spiritum Sanctum; et tamen hanc incarnationem ad solum Filium pertinentem quisquis negat *cooperatum* Patrem aut Spiritum Sanctum, non recte sapit. Item dicimus nec Patrem, nec Filium, sed solum Spiritum Sanctum et in columbae specie et in linguis velut igneis apparuisse et dedisse pronuntiare illis, in quos venerat, multis et variis linguis magnalia Dei; a quo tamen miraculo ad solum Spiritum Sanctum pertinente cooperationem Patris et Verbi unigeniti separare non possumus.

Ita singulorum quoque in Trinitate opera Trinitas operatur, unicuique operanti *cooperantibus* duobus, conveniente in tribus agendi concordia, non in uno deficiente efficacia peragendi.“ Translated by R.G. MacMullen. From *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, Vol. 6. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1888.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/160321.htm>.

¹⁸ Augustine of Hippo, *Sermo LXXI*, 16.26; PL 38, 459. „...satis notum est recte credentibus, vel etiam ut possunt intelligentibus, et illud ideo dictum esse de Patre: *Ipse facit opera*, quod ab illo sit origo etiam operum, a quo est existentia *cooperantium* Personarum (quia et Filius de illo natus est, et Spiritus Sanctus principaliter de illo procedit de quo natus est Filius et cum quo illi communis est idem Spiritus)...“ Translated by R.G. MacMullen. From *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, Vol. 6. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1888.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/160321.htm>.

¹⁹ Catherine M. LaCugna, *God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life*, 97.

²⁰ This syntagm of Augustine is usually translated into English as *free will*. According to Augustine's understanding, however, free will (*voluntas*) is a broader concept than freedom of deliberation (*liberum arbitrium*). Namely, freedom of deliberation is an act of free will – *liberum voluntatis arbitrium* (*De gratia et libero arbitrio*

are opposed to each other – monergism and synergism. Unlike synergism, monergism is the view that holds that God acts towards man's salvation regardless of the cooperation of man's free will.

The monergistic interpretation is most often related to Protestant Christianity, especially to Calvin and the Calvinist tradition. The Roman Catholic tradition holds a synergistic view.²¹ The same view is held by the Orthodox tradition, although it tends to attribute the alternatives of monergism and synergism to the West in general.²² This polarization, or the alternatives of monergism and synergism, really exists in the West – between the Protestant and the Roman Catholic traditions.

The monergistic interpretation is attributed to Saint Augustine, by critics – primarily from Orthodox theologians, for whom Augustine is a “teacher of the West”. Augustine's theology is, according to that view, the foundation of Western theological thought.²³ However, by the same critics, the monergistic position is attributed to Augustine – Augustine is, more or less, interpreted among Orthodox theologians as Calvin interpreted him. In other words, the Calvinist reception of Augustine is equated with Augustine himself.²⁴

It seems paradoxical that the alternatives of monergism and synergism in the Western tradition are inspired by the same authority – by Saint Augustine. Both interpretations of Augustine cannot be true. One of these two interpretations is a misunderstanding of Augustine's thought. I believe that this misunderstanding exists in the Calvinist monergistic interpretation of Augustine's writings against Pelagianism. According to our insights, Augustine, in his writings against Pelagianism, takes a synergistic view on the relationship between God's grace and human free will. We will try to show this statement in a comparative analysis of Augustine's writings and Calvin's interpretations.

2, 2). But Augustine also identifies free will with love – *voluntas, id est, caritas* (*De gratia et libero arbitrio* 17, 33; 17, 34). Therefore, it is necessary to make a distinction between the will and its concrete act.

21 „*The grace of Christ is not in slightest way a rival of our freedom* (1742). There is a kind of interplay, or synergy, between human freedom and divine grace. Freedom tests itself in order to attain what is good; grace liberates and purifies it, elevates and sanctifies it. The „interior Master“, the Spirit, is at work within us (1995). The practice of human virtues enters into this interior dynamic movement led by Holy Spirit (1810). *Moral balance*, so difficult to achieve and maintain, gains confidence in the gift of Spirit (1811)... The teachings collected in the *Catechism* have shown sufficiently that our efforts to lead a moral life need the interior co-operation of divine grace in order for us to remain faithful to the Gospel and to grow in wisdom and virtue. Faith itself is a free gift of the Lord. It needs to be affirmed by prayer and hearing the Word.“ *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (London: BURN & OATES, 1999), 766.

22 “A distinctive element in the Orthodox understanding of how the Holy Spirit works deification within us is the doctrine of “synergy” – “working together”. This working together is the collaboration of God's grace and a person's will. While Western Christianity has argued about the alternatives of “monergism” and “synergism” – that is, the question of whether salvation is accomplished only by God or by God and human beings cooperating – this issue did not become a tension within Orthodoxy.” James R. Payton Jr., *Light from the Christian East – An Introduction to the Orthodox Tradition* (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2007), 151.

23 For example, see: Јован Зизијулас, *Западна мисао* (Пожаревац: Одбор за просвету и културу Епархије пожаревачко-браничевске, 2014).

24 See: Seraphim Rose, *The Place of Blessed Augustine in the Orthodox Church* (Platina: St. Herman of Alaska Brotherhood, 1996).

Man's will before and after the original sin – symmetrical and asymmetrical synergy

In his work *De correptione et gratia* (*On Rebuke and Grace*), Saint Augustine speaks about two states of human free will. These are the wills in the First and Second Adam, that is, in man's pre-fallen and eschatological (Christological) state. Augustine defines the first state of human will as the ability not to sin (*posse non peccare*). The second one he defines as non-ability to sin (*non posse peccare*).²⁵ God's grace cooperates with human free will in both of these states – but in two different ways. Regarding the first grace, which relates to the pre-fallen state of man, he says:

The first man had not that grace by which he should never will to be evil; but assuredly he had that in which if he willed to abide he would never be evil, and without which, moreover, he could not by free will be good, but which, nevertheless, by free will he could forsake. God, therefore, did not will even him to be without His grace, which He left in his free will; because free will is sufficient for evil, but is too little for good, unless it is aided by Omnipotent Good. And if that man had not forsaken that assistance of his free will, he would always have been good; but he forsook it, and he was forsaken... At that time, therefore, God had given to man a good will, because in that will He had made him, since He had made him upright. He had given help without which he could not continue therein if he would; but that he should will, He left in his free will.²⁶

In this quote, we find something we might describe as symmetrical synergy. God's grace – to be good, is given to man. The power of his free will had the possibility to accept it (*posse non peccare*) or to reject it (*posse peccare*).²⁷ So here we have communication or potential cooperation, so to speak, of two autonomous realities – God's grace and the free decision of man's will (*liberum voluntatis arbitrium*). This state (of both free will and immortality) of the pre-fallen man, as an autonomous reality, Augustine calls small goods (*bona parva*).²⁸ Namely, these small goods are freedom of decision – *posse non peccare*, but also *posse peccare*; *posse non mori* (the ability not to die), but also *posse mori* (the ability to

²⁵ Augustine of Hippo, *De correptione et gratia* 12.33, PL 44, 936.

²⁶ *Ibid.* 11.31–32, PL 44, 935–936. "Istam gratiam non habuit homo primus, qua numquam vellet esse malus; sed sane habuit, in qua si permanere vellet, numquam malus esset, et sine qua etiam cum libero arbitrio bonus esse non posset, sed eam tamen per liberum arbitrium deserere posset. Nec ipsum ergo Deus esse voluit sine sua gratia, quam reliquit in eius libero arbitrio. Quoniam liberum arbitrium ad malum sufficit, ad bonum autem parum est, nisi adiuvetur ab omnipotenti bono. Quod adiutorium si homo ille per liberum non deseruisset arbitrium, semper esset bonus: sed deseruit, et desertus est..."

Tunc ergo dederat homini Deus bonam voluntatem: in illa quippe eum fecerat qui fecerat rectum; dederat adiutorium, sine quo in ea non posset permanere si vellet; ut autem vellet, in eius libero reliquit arbitrio..." Translated by Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, and revised by Benjamin B. Warfield. From *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, Vol. 5. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1513.htm>.

²⁷ Cf. Augustine og Hippo, *De civitate Dei* XXII, 30.3, PL 41, 802: *Primum liberum arbitrium, quod homini datum est... potuit non peccare, sed potuit et peccare...* (For the first freedom of will which man received... consisted in an ability not to sin, but also in an ability to sin...). Translated by Marcus Dods. From *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, Vol. 2. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120122.htm>.

²⁸ *De correptione et gratia* 12.33, PL 42, 936.

die). On the other hand, Augustine describes man's eschatological state as a much greater good, which is described as *non posse peccare, non posse mori* and *bonum non posse deserere*:

Therefore the first liberty of the will was to be able not to sin, the last will be much greater, not to be able to sin; the first immortality was to be able not to die, the last will be much greater, not to be able to die; the first was the power of perseverance, to be able not to forsake good — the last will be the felicity of perseverance, not to be able to forsake good.²⁹

The question is: why did Augustine say that the first human freedom is less, and the second (the eschatological one) is greater? In our understanding of Augustine's writings, the meaning of this difference could be as follows. The first human freedom, which he had in his pre-fallen existence, is less because it implies man's autonomy — the possibility of freedom as independence from the other, as freedom from the other. The second (eschatological) meaning of man's freedom is greater because it does not imply man's autonomy or independence from the other, but communion with the other — freedom as the freedom for the other.³⁰

Here it is clear why Augustine equates *voluntas* (will) and *charitas* (love). Therefore, when he says, as quoted above, that *liberum arbitrium ad malum sufficit* — it means the freedom as the freedom from other (or *amor sui* — self-love). Then, when he says that *ad bonum autem parum est, nisi adiuvetur ab omnipotenti bono* — it means freedom as freedom for the other, i.e. freedom as communion or love.³¹ Augustine also emphasizes this difference between the two freedoms, when he says:

29 *Ibid.* "Prima ergo libertas voluntatis erat, posse non peccare; novissima erit multo maior, non posse peccare. Prima immortalitas erat, posse non mori; novissima erit multo maior, non posse mori. Prima erat perseverantiae potestas, bonum posse non deserere; novissima erit felicitas perseverantiae, bonum non posse deserere." Translated by Marcus Dods. From *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, Vol. 2. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120122.htm>.

Cf. Augustine of Hippo, *Enchiridion de fide, spe et charitate* 28, 105, PL 40, 281: "Sic enim oportebat prius hominem fieri ut et bene velle posset et male, nec gratis si bene nec impune si male. Postea vero sic erit ut male velle non possit, nec ideo libero carebit arbitrio. Multo quippe liberius erit arbitrium quod omnino non poterit servire peccato. Neque enim culpanda est voluntas, aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda non est, qua beati esse sic volumus ut esse miseri non solum nolimus sed nequaquam prorsus velle possimus." (Now it was expedient that man should be at first so created, as to have it in his power both to will what was right and to will what was wrong; not without reward if he willed the former, and not without punishment if he willed the latter. But in the future life it shall not be in his power to will evil; and yet this will constitute no restriction on the freedom of his will. On the contrary, his will shall be much freer when it shall be wholly impossible for him to be the slave of sin. We should never think of blaming the will, or saying that it was no will, or that it was not to be called free, when we so desire happiness, that not only do we shrink from misery, but find it utterly impossible to do otherwise.) Translated by J.F. Shaw. From *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, Vol. 3. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1302.htm>.

See also Augustine of Hippo, *De civitate Dei* XXII, 30.3, PL 41, 802.

30 The syntagm „free from other“, as well „free for the other“ belongs to Metropolitan John Zizioulas. See: John Zizioulas, "Trinitarian Freedom: is God Free in Trinitarian Life?", in: G. Maspero, R. J. Wozniak (eds.), *Rethinking Trinitarian Theology: Disputed Questions and Contemporary Issues in Trinitarian Theology* (London–New York, 2011), 193–207.

31 Cf. Augustine of Hippo, *De civitate Dei* XIX, 5; PL 41, 632. In this passage, the life in the Kingdom of God (*vita sanctorum* — the life of the saints) is defined as community life (*socialis vita*).

Just as it is in man's power to die whenever he will (for, not to speak of other means, any one can put an end to himself by simple abstinence from food), but the mere will cannot preserve life in the absence of food and the other means of life; so man in paradise was able of his mere will, simply by abandoning righteousness, to destroy himself; but to have maintained a life of righteousness would have been too much for his will, unless it had been sustained by the Creator's power.³²

That distinction is based on the distinction between the First Adam – which is „doing his own will instead of His who created him“ and the Second Adam – which is „not doing His own will, but the will of Him who sent Him“. The first one is an example of freedom from the other – freedom as *amor sui*. The second one is an example of freedom for the other – freedom as *caritas*.

This is, however, in the matter of the two men by one of whom we are sold under sin, by the other redeemed from sins— by the one have been precipitated into death, by the other are liberated unto life; the former of whom has ruined us in himself, by doing his own will instead of His who created him; the latter has saved us in Himself, by not doing His own will, but the will of Him who sent Him (cf. John 4: 34; 5: 30): and it is in what concerns these two men that the Christian faith properly consists.³³

The will of the pre-fallen man was able to accept God. That ability belonged to man's free will, but in the presence of God's grace offered to him. However, by rejecting God, the first man decided to be alone — *deseruit, et desertus est*³⁴ (he forsook it, and he was forsaken). Now, man's free will without the presence of God's grace – i.e. man with his will as an independent being, becomes unable not only to persist in good (as it was in the pre-fallen existence), but also he becomes unable to want good. Man as an independent being (free from the Other) has a will which is sufficient only for evil – *liberum arbitrium ad malum sufficit*. Why is it so? The answer is simple: no other (God) – no good; no other – no true life; no other – no love; no love – no true freedom (*voluntas=caritas*). And what is evil? It is self-sufficiency (*amor sui*).

³² Augustine of Hippo, *Enchiridion de fide, spe et charitate* 28, 106, PL 40, 282. "Sicut enim mori est in hominis potestate cum velit, nemo est enim qui non se ipsum, ut nihil aliud dicam, vel non vescendo possit occidere; ad tenendam vero vitam voluntas non satis est si adiutoria sive alimentorum sive quorumcumque tutaminum desint; sic homo in paradiso ad se occidendum relinquendo iustitiam idoneus erat per voluntatem, ut autem ab eo teneretur vita iustitiae parum erat velle nisi ille qui eum fecerat adiuvaret." Translated by Marcus Dods. From *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, Vol. 2. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120122.htm>.

³³ Augustine of Hippo, *De gratia Christi et de peccato ori hinali* II, 24.28, PL 44, 398. "Sed in causa duorum hominum, quorum per unum venundati sumus sub peccato, per alterum redimimur a peccatis; per unum precipitati sumus in mortem, per alterum liberamur ad vitam; quoniam ille nos in se perdidit, faciendo voluntatem suam, non eius a quo factus est; iste nos in se salvos fecit, non faciendo voluntatem suam, sed eius a quo missus est: in horum ergo duorum hominum causa proprie fides christiana consistit." Translated by Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, and revised by Benjamin B. Warfield. From *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, Vol. 5. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/15062.htm>.

³⁴ Augustine of Hippo, *De correptione et gratia* 12.31, PL 44, 935.

So, we have a new state of man's free will after the original sin. That free will is both unable to will good and persist in good. Therefore, God's grace is necessary not only to aid man's free will to persist in good but also to prepare it – to make it be able to want good. Why is God's grace necessary? The answer is simple: there is no desire for good without the presence of otherness. Why? Because good is love – communion (*vita sanctorum, socialis vita*). In that new state, after the original sin, we have a new relationship between man's free will and God's grace. That relationship could be described as asymmetrical synergy.

Asymmetrical synergy

Based on Augustin's writings (first of all on the anti-Pelagian writings), it seems that we couldn't attribute monergism to Augustin's treatment of the relation between God's grace and man's free will. In the beginning of his scripture *De gratia et libero arbitrio* (On Grace and Free will), addressed to prior Valentinus and his monks of Adrumetum, Augustine announces the clear intention of the scripture:

Since there are some persons who so defend God's grace as to deny man's free will, or who suppose that free will is denied when grace is defended, I have determined to write somewhat on this point to your Love, my brother Valentinus, and the rest of you, who are serving God together under the impulse of a mutual love.³⁵

From this intention, it is clear that Augustine holds to both of the monergistic stands as to the wrong extremes. There is no *mono* that would be working alone – neither God's grace working without man's free will, nor man's free will without God's grace. In the following passage, Augustine argues, following the Scriptures, there is man's free will. Concerning God's precepts given to man, Augustine says:

There is, to begin with, the fact that God's precepts themselves would be of no use to a man unless he had free choice of will, so that by performing them he might obtain the promised rewards.³⁶

After quoting several passages from the Scriptures, in the next passage he asks:

What is the import of the fact that in so many passages God requires all His commandments to be kept and fulfilled? How does He make this requisition, if there is no free will?³⁷

³⁵ Augustine of Hippo, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 1.1. "Quoniam sunt quidam, qui sic gratiam Dei defendunt, ut negent hominis liberum arbitrium, aut quando gratia defenditur, negari existiment liberum arbitrium, hinc aliquid scribere ad vestram Caritatem, Valentine frater, et ceteri qui simul Deo servitis, compellente mutua caritate curavi." Translated by Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, and revised by Benjamin B. Warfield. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 5. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1510.htm>.

³⁶ Augustine of Hippo, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 1.1, PL 44, 881. "Primum, quia ipsa divina praecepta homini non prodescent, nisi haberet liberum voluntatis arbitrium, quo ea faciens ad promissa praemia perveniret." Translated by Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, and revised by Benjamin B. Warfield. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 5. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1510.htm>.

³⁷ Augustine of Hippo, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 2.4, PL 44, 883-884. "Quid illud, quod tam multis locis omnia mandata sua custodiri et fieri iubet Deus? quomodo iubet, si non est liberum arbitrium?" Translated by Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, and revised by Benjamin B. Warfield. From Nicene and Post-Nicene

In the same passage, Augustine concludes:

Now wherever it is said, Do not do this, and Do not do that, and wherever there is any requirement in the divine admonitions for the work of the will to do anything, or to refrain from doing anything, there is at once a sufficient proof of free will. No man, therefore, when he sins, can in his heart blame God for it, but every man must impute the fault to himself. Nor does it detract at all from a man's own will when he performs any act in accordance with God. Indeed, a work is then to be pronounced a good one when a person does it willingly; then, too, may the reward of a good work be hoped for from Him concerning whom it is written, *He shall reward every man according to his works*. (Matthew 16, 27).³⁸

Special attention should be referred to the syntagm *volens facit* (which means someone who works willingly), so that we can see the unfoundedness of Calvin's monergistic interpretation (of Augustine) and his criticism of the same syntagm of Saint John Chrysostom:

This movement of the will is not of that description which was for many ages taught and believed, viz., a movement which thereafter leaves us the choice to obey or resist it, but one which affects us efficaciously. We must, therefore, repudiate the oft-repeated sentiment of Chrysostom, "Whom he draws, he draws willingly"; insinuating that the Lord only stretches out his hand, and waits to see whether we will be pleased willing to take his aid.³⁹

Augustine's argument against Pelagianism is not to emphasize God's grace by denying human free will (as that is interpreted by Calvin). Augustine does not reject human free will, but its self-sufficiency to perform good acts (*sibi sufficere ad bene operandum putat*) – that is what is important to notice:

In order, therefore, to show that his admonition to man was not to have hope in himself, after saying, *Cursed is the man who has hope in man*, he immediately added, *And makes strong the flesh of his arm*. He used the word *arm* to designate power in operation. By the term *flesh*, however, must be understood human frailty. And therefore he makes strong the flesh of his arm who supposes that a power which is frail and weak (that is, human) is sufficient for him to perform good works, and therefore puts *not his hope in God for help*. This is the reason why he subjoined the further clause, *And whose heart departs from the Lord*. Of this character is the Pelagian heresy, which is not an ancient one, but has only lately come into existence. Against this system of error there was first a good deal of discussion; then, as the ultimate resource, it was referred to sundry episcopal

Fathers, First Series, Vol. 5. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1510.htm>.

³⁸ Augustine of Hippo, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 2.4, PL 44, 883-884. "Nempe ubi dicitur: Noli hoc, et noli illud, et ubi ad aliquid faciendum vel non faciendum in divinis monitis opus voluntatis exigitur, satis liberum demonstratur arbitrium. Nemo ergo Deum causetur in corde suo, sed sibi imputet quisque, cum peccat. Neque cum aliquid secundum Deum operatur, alienet hoc a propria voluntate. Quando enim volens facit, tunc dicendum est opus bonum, tunc speranda est boni operis merces ab eo, de quo dictum est: *Qui reddet unicuique secundum opera sua*." Translated by Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, and revised by Benjamin B. Warfield. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 5. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1510.htm>.

³⁹ John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian religion* (Christian Classics Ethereal Library, Grand Rapids, MI), 187. <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html>. Translated by Henry Beveridge.

councils, the proceedings of which, not, indeed, in every instance, but in some, I have dispatched to you for your perusal. In order, then, to our performance of good works, let us not have hope in man, making strong the flesh of our arm; nor let our heart ever depart from the Lord, but let it say to him, *Be Thou my helper; forsake me not, nor despise me, O God of my salvation.*⁴⁰

Man's free will, after the fall, is self-sufficient only for evil deeds. Men without God's grace *aut nolunt, aut non implent quod volunt*⁴¹ (they either won't or don't fulfill what they want). On the other side:

...whereas they to whom it is given so will as to accomplish what they will. In order, therefore, that this saying, which is not received by all men, may yet be received by some, there are both the gift of God and free will.⁴²

The conclusion is very clear: *et Dei donum est, et liberum arbitrium* (there are both the gift of God and free will). Augustine confirms this conclusion by quoting and exegesis of 1 Corinthians 15, 10. Let's look at that part of Saint Paul's Epistle in ancient Greek:

χάριτι δὲ θεοῦ εἰμι ὃ εἰμι, καὶ ἡ χάρις αὐτοῦ ἡ εἰς ἐμὲ οὐ κενὴ ἐγενήθη, ἀλλὰ περισσώτερον αὐτῶν πάντων ἐκοτίασα, οὐκ ἐγὼ δὲ ἀλλὰ ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ [ἡ] σὺν ἐμοί.⁴³

We see that ἡ is in the square brackets. In that context ἡ means a relative pronoun – *which* or *that*, referring to the noun ἡ χάρις [τοῦ θεοῦ]. So, the sentence can be translated as “the God's grace *which* is with me”.

The relative pronoun [ἡ] is crucial for Calvin's monergistic interpretation of that part of Saint Paul's Epistle. In his *Institutes of the Christian religion*, Calvin argues:

The Apostle says not that the grace of God labored with him so as to make him a co-partner in the labour. He rather transfers the whole merit of the labour to grace alone, by thus modifying his first expression, “It was not I”, says he, “that laboured, but the grace of God that was present with me”. Those who have adopted the erroneous interpretation have been misled by an ambiguity in the expression, or rather by a preposterous translation, in which the force of the Greek

⁴⁰ Augustine of Hippo, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 4.6, PL 44, 885. “Ut ergo ostenderet sic se admonuisse hominem, ut nec in se ipso haberet spem, propterea cum dixisset: *Maledictus homo qui spem habet in homine, mox addidit: et firmat carnem brachii sui*. Brachium pro potentia posuit operandi. In nomine autem carnis intellegenda est humana fragilitas. Ac per hoc firmat carnem brachii sui, qui potentiam fragilem atque invalidam, id est humanam, sibi sufficere ad bene operandum putat, nec adiutorium sperat a Domino. Propterea subiecit: *et a Domino discedit cor eius*. Talis est haeresis pelagiana, non antiqua, sed ante non multum tempus exorta: contra quam haeresim cum fuisset diutius disputatum, etiam ad concilia episcopalia novissima necessitate perventum est; unde vobis, non quidem omnia, sed tamen aliqua legenda direxi. Nos ergo ad bene operandum spem non habeamus in homine, firmantes carnem brachii nostri: nec a Domino discedat cor nostrum; sed ei dicat: *Adiutor meus esto, ne derelinquas me, neque despicias me, Deus salutaris meus*.” Translated by Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, and revised by Benjamin B. Warfield. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 5. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1510.htm>.

⁴¹ Augustine of Hippo, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 4.7, PL 44, 886.

⁴² *Ibid.* “...quibus autem datum est, sic volunt ut impleant quod volunt. Itaque, ut hoc verbum, quod non ab omnibus capitur, ab aliquibus capiat, et Dei donum est, et liberum arbitrium.” Translated by Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, and revised by Benjamin B. Warfield. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 5. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1510.htm>.

⁴³ *Novum Testamentum Graece*, Nestle-Aland 27th Edition, (Stuttgart: Deutsch Bibelgesellschaft, 1993).

article is overlooked. For to take the words literally, the Apostle does not say that grace was a fellow-worker with him, but that the grace which was with him was sole worker.⁴⁴

According to Calvin's understanding, the sentence can not be interpreted synergistically as "God's grace with me" that would include the cooperation of God's grace and man's free will. But God's grace is the sole worker and this is indicated by a relative pronoun [ἡ], (according to Calvin's interpretation).

This Calvin's interpretation could be disputed in several ways. First of all, by criticizing the biblical text.⁴⁵ It is a fact, that the relative pronoun [ἡ] is not contained in the two oldest manuscripts (the first half of the fourth century) *Codex Vaticanus* (B) and *Codex Sinaiticus* (Σ). However, ἡ is contained in *Codex Alexandrinus* (beginning of the fifth century). Since modern biblical science favors older manuscripts, the text versions without ἡ should be taken as more authentic: ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ σὺν ἐμοί (God's grace with me).

Nevertheless, it should not be exclusive, because we find quotations of that part of Saint Paul's Epistle with ἡ in the writings of the Fathers of the fourth century.⁴⁶ Although quoting this section of the Epistle with ἡ, the words of the Apostle Paul are interpreted synergistically by the Fathers. Of course, the latter fact would not be an argument for Calvin, who says:

This movement of the will is not of that description which was for many ages taught and believed, viz., a movement which thereafter leaves us the choice to obey or resist it, but one which affects us efficaciously. We must, therefore, repudiate the oft-repeated sentiment of Chrysostom, "Whom he draws, he draws willingly"; insinuating that the Lord only stretches out his hand, and waits to see whether we will be pleased to take his aid.⁴⁷

Calvin bases his monergistic interpretation on Augustine's authority. He puts Augustine against the Fathers and the Tradition of the Church by such an interpretation. "This movement of the will is not of that description which was for many ages taught and believed", he says. Still, let us see how Augustine interprets that part of Saint Paul's Epistle:

Nevertheless, lest the will itself should be deemed capable of doing any good thing without the grace of God, after saying, *His grace within me was not in vain, but I have laboured more abundantly than they all*, he immediately added the qualifying clause, *Yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me*. (1 Corinthians 15, 10) In other words, "Not I alone, but the grace of God with me". And thus, neither was it the grace of God alone, nor was it he himself alone, but it was the grace of God with him.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian religion*, 189.

⁴⁵ We thank our esteemed colleague Dragan Radic for his selfless help in the critical textual analysis of this New Testament section.

⁴⁶ Athanasius the Great, *Vita Antonii*, PG 28, 849; Basil the Great, *Homiliae super Psalmos*, PG 29, 397; John Chrysostom, *In epistolam ad Romanes*, PG 60, 56.

⁴⁷ John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian religion*, 187.

⁴⁸ Augustine of Hippo, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 5.12, PL 44, 888-889. "Tamen ne ipsa voluntas sine gratia Dei putetur boni aliquid posse, continuo cum dixisset: *Gratia eius in me vacua non fuit, sed plus omnibus illis laboravi*, subiunxit atque ait: *Non ego autem, sed gratia Dei mecum*: id est, „non solus, sed gratia Dei mecum“: ac per hoc nec gratia Dei sola, nec ipse solus, sed gratia Dei cum illo.“ Translated by Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, and revised by Benjamin B. Warfield. From *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series*, Vol. 5.

It's clear, there is no kind of monergism in this Augustine's interpretation of 1 Corinthians 15, 10: "*Not I alone, but the grace of God with me*". Thus, neither was it the grace of God alone, nor was it he himself alone, but it was the grace of God with him". There is not the Pelagian monergism – *nec ipse solus*. Also, there is not Calvin's monergism – *nec gratia Dei sola*. Therefore, there exist both the grace of God and man's free will – *sed gratia Dei cum illo*. I assume it is apparent that Calvin misinterpreted Augustine.

Nevertheless, Augustine identifies two phases of the action of God's grace, after the man's fall – *operatio* and *cooperatio*. *Operatio* belongs to God's grace, *cooperatio* belongs both to God's grace and man's free will. *Operatio* is the preparation of man's free will by God's grace. By that preparation man's free will becomes able to do good. *Operatio* belongs to God's grace, *cooperatio* belongs both to God's grace and man's free will. With the assistance of that preparation man's free will becomes able to do good. This is what we have called asymmetric synergy:

Lest, however, it should be thought that men themselves in this matter do nothing by free will, it is said in the Psalm, Harden not your hearts; and in Ezekiel himself, Cast away from you all your transgressions, which you have impiously committed against me; and make you a new heart and a new spirit; and keep all my commandments. For why will you die, O house of Israel, says the Lord? For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dies, says the Lord God: and turn ye, and live. (Ezekiel 18:31-32) We should remember that it is He who says, Turn ye and live, to whom it is said in prayer, Turn us again, O God. We should remember that He says, Cast away from you all your transgressions, when it is even He who justifies the ungodly. We should remember that He says, Make you a new heart and a new spirit, who also promises, I will give you a new heart, and a new spirit will I put within you. (Ezekiel 36:26) How is it, then, that He who says, Make you, also says, I will give you? Why does He command, if He is to give? Why does He give if man is to make, except it be that He gives what He commands when He helps him to obey whom He commands? There is, however, always within us a free will — but it is not always good; for it is either free from righteousness when it serves sin — and then it is evil — or else it is free from sin when it serves righteousness — and then it is good. But the grace of God is always good; and by it it comes to pass that a man is of a good will, though he was before of an evil one. By it also it comes to pass that the very good will, which has now begun to be, is enlarged, and made so great that it is able to fulfil the divine commandments which it shall wish, when it shall once firmly and perfectly wish. This is the purport of what the Scripture says: If you will, you shall keep the commandments; (Sirach 15:15) so that the man who wills but is not able knows that he does not yet fully will, and prays that he may have so great a will that it may suffice for keeping the commandments. And thus, indeed, he receives assistance to perform what he is commanded. Then is the will of use when we have ability; just as ability is also then of use when we have the will. For what does it profit us if we will what we are unable to do, or else do not will what we are able to do?⁴⁹

Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1510.htm>.

49 Augustine of Hippo, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 15,31, PL 44, 899-900. "Ne autem putetur, nihil ibi facere ipsos homines per liberum arbitrium, ideo in Psalmo dicitur: Nolite obdurare corda vestra. Et per ipsum Ezechielem: Proiicite a vobis omnes impietates vestras, quas impie egistis in me, et facite vobis cor novum et spiritum novum, et facite omnia mandata mea. Utquid moriemini, domus Israel, dicit Dominus? quia nolo mortem morientis, dicit Adonai Dominus, et convertimini et vivetis. Meminerimus eum dicere: et convertimini et vivetis, cui dicitur: Converte nos,

And below:

It is certain that it is we that will when we will, but it is He who makes us will what is good, of whom it is said (as he has just now expressed it), *The will is prepared by the Lord*. (Proverbs 8:35) Of the same Lord it is said, *The steps of a man are ordered by the Lord, and his way does He will*. Of the same Lord again it is said, *It is God who works in you, even to will!* (Philippians 2:13) It is certain that it is we that act when we act; but it is He who makes us act, by applying efficacious powers to our will, who has said, *I will make you to walk in my statutes, and to observe my judgments, and to do them*. (Ezekiel 36:27).⁵⁰

What is the goodwill prepared by God's grace? It is *divino amore ardentissima voluntas*⁵¹ (the will which is glowing with intensest divine love). So we can see those two phases of God's grace acting – *operatio* and *cooperatio*:

And who was it that had begun to give him his love, however small, but He who prepares the will, and perfects by His co-operation what He initiates by His operation? Forasmuch as in beginning He works in us that we may have the will, and in perfecting works with us when we have the will. On which account the apostle says, I am confident of this very thing, that *He which has begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ*. (Philippians 1:6) He operates, therefore, without us, in order that we may will; but when we will, and so will that we may act, He co-operates with us. We can, however, ourselves do nothing to effect good works of piety without Him either working that we may will, or co-working when we will.⁵²

Deus. Meminerimus eum dicere: *Proiicite a vobis omnes impietates vestras*: cum ipse iustificet impium. Meminerimus ipsum dicere: *Facite vobis cor novum et spiritum novum*, qui dicit: *Dabo vobis cor novum, et spiritum novum dabo in vobis*. Quomodo ergo qui dicit: *Facite vobis*, hoc dicit: *Dabo vobis*? Quare iubet, si ipse daturus est? Quare dat, si homo facturus est, nisi quia dat quod iubet, cum adiuvat ut faciat cui iubet? Semper est autem in nobis voluntas libera, sed non semper est bona. Aut enim a iustitia libera est, quando servit peccato, et tunc est mala; aut a peccato libera est, quando servit iustitiae, et tunc est bona. Gratia vero Dei semper est bona, et per hanc fit ut sit homo bonae voluntatis, qui prius fuit voluntatis malae. Per hanc etiam fit ut ipsa bona voluntas, quae iam esse coepit, augeatur, et tam magna fiat, ut possit implere divina mandata quae voluerit, cum valde perfecteque voluerit. Ad hoc enim valet quod scriptum est: *Si volueris, servabis mandata*: ut homo qui voluerit et non potuerit, nondum se plene velle cognoscat, et oret ut habeat tantam voluntatem, quanta sufficit ad implenda mandata. Sic quippe adiuvatur, ut faciat quod iubetur. Tunc enim utile est velle, cum possumus; et tunc utile est posse, cum volumus: nam quid prodest, si quod non possumus volumus, aut quod possumus nolumus?" Translated by Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, and revised by Benjamin B. Warfield. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 5. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1510.htm>.

⁵⁰ Augustine of Hippo, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 16.32. "Certum est enim nos mandata servare, si volumus; sed quia *praeeparatur voluntas a Domino*, ab illo petendum est ut tantum velimus, quantum sufficit ut volendo faciamus. Certum est nos velle, cum volumus; sed ille facit ut velimus bonum, de quo dictum est, quod paulo ante posui: *Praeparatur voluntas a Domino*; de quo dictum est: *A Domino gressus hominis diriguntur, et viam eius vult*; de quo dictum est: *Deus est qui operatur in vobis et velle*. Certum est nos facere, cum facimus; sed ille facit ut faciamus, praebendo vires efficacissimas voluntati, qui dixit: *Faciam ut in iustificationibus meis ambuletis, et iudicia mea observetis et faciati*." Translated by Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, and revised by Benjamin B. Warfield. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 5. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1510.htm>.

⁵¹ Augustine of Hippo, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 17.34. PL 44, 902.

⁵² *Ibid.* 17.33, PL 44, 901. "Et quis istam etsi parvam dare coeperat caritatem, nisi ille qui praeparat voluntatem,

At the end of his writing, Augustine concludes that *voluntas humana non tollitur, sed ex mala mutatur in bonam, et cum bona fuerit adiuuatur*⁵³ (the human will is not taken away, but changed from bad to good, and assisted when it is good) by God's grace.

Although in the first phase God's grace operates alone (without us), it can not be interpreted as a kind of monergism – because *operatio* is inseparable from *cooperatio*. God's grace has the initiative, it precedes the human will (*praeueniri voluntates hominum Dei gratia*).⁵⁴ However, this does not mean monergism but leads to synergy, giving the message that *nullum opus bonum vel incipiendum vel perficiendum sibi quemquam sufficere posse*⁵⁵ (no one can suffice to himself either for beginning or for completing any good work). This detail is very important – Augustine does not assert that *there is no* man's free will, but that *it is not sufficient by itself*. Therefore, non sufficient by itself does not indicate monergism. On the contrary, that statement indicates the rejection of the Pelagian monergism. Also, that rejection is not a replacement of one kind of monergism with another one – i.e. replacement of self-sufficient man's free will with self-sufficient God's grace. Operating of God's grace begins by that what Augustine called *operatio*, but it neither stops nor ends here. This is just the first step towards what its goal is – *cooperatio*, communion with man. The first step is faith, which is a gift from God (*fidem qua christiani sumus, donum Dei esse*).⁵⁶

Augustine makes a distinction between *posse habere fidem* (the capacity to have faith), which belongs to man's nature (*naturae est hominum*), and *habere fidem* (to have faith), which belongs to the grace of believers (*gratiae est fidelium*). Then, God's grace is not alone. It is the grace of believers. Therefore, there is a synergy between God and man. Asymmetrical synergy nonetheless, but still synergy.

Conclusion

Based on our analysis above, we hope that the existence of the concept of synergy (*cooperatio*) in Augustine's triadology and anthropology is evident. The concept of synergy in the triadology establishes a balance between one and three in God's action *ad extra* (i.e. in the

et cooperando perficit, quod operando incipit? Quoniam ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens. Propter quod ait Apostolus: *Certus sum quoniam qui operatur in vobis opus bonum, perficiet usque in diem Christi Iesu*. Ut ergo velimus, sine nobis operatur; cum autem volumus, et sic volumus ut faciamus, nobiscum cooperatur: tamen sine illo vel operante ut velimus, vel cooperante cum volumus, ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus." Translated by Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, and revised by Benjamin B. Warfield. From *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series*, Vol. 5. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1510.htm>.

53 Augustine of Hippo, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 20.41, PL 44, 905.

54 Augustine of Hippo, *De praedestinatio sanctorum* 1.2, PL 44, 961.

55 *Ibid.* Translated by Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, and revised by Benjamin B. Warfield. From *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series*, Vol. 5. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/15121.htm>.

56 *Ibid.* 2.3, PL 44, 961. „The faith by which we are Christians is the gift of God“. *Ibid.*

divine economy). The unity act of the Trinity should not be interpreted, as the followers of de R  gnon's exegetical paradigm do, in an essentialist key – as an act of one divine nature (which would have ontological primacy over divine personalities). This unity act should rather be understood as a synergy between divine personalities. In our understanding, Augustine is very clear on this issue.

The topic becomes more complicated when it comes to Augustine's anthropology. For a correct understanding, it is important to distinguish three states of man's free will in Augustine's interpretation: the free will of the pre-fallen man, of the fallen man, and of the eschatological man. The concept of synergy (between God and man) is different in these states. Freedom in the true sense is that in man's eschatological state, which Augustine calls *libertas major*. This true freedom of man's free will means: *non posse peccare, non posse mori* and *bonum non posse deserere*. Namely, the question that arises is: how can freedom imply *non posse*? This *non posse* relates to that what we have called freedom from the other. The eschatological state of man's being excludes any autonomous or independent individuality and its freedom as a freedom from the other. In the eschatological state, therefore, the will is the same as love – *voluntas, id est, caritas*. Freedom is inseparable from the community. It is that what we have called freedom for the other.

Although they are mutually different, both free will before and free will after the fall of man should not be taken as representative concepts. This is especially regarding man's free will after the fall. Fallen existence means both being separate and self-sufficient, and consequently, it means the freedom as freedom from the other. While in the eschatological state we have the full notion of synergy (which we have called symmetrical synergy), here we have that what we have called asymmetrical synergy. This means that God's grace has the initiative regarding man's free will. This initiative is that what Augustine has called *praepratio voluntas* (by God's grace). Although God's initiative is necessary, it is only the first step towards the ultimate goal – human freedom in the full sense of the word. The goal of asymmetric synergy is symmetric synergy – the common action of God and man. However, this first step (asymmetric synergy) is necessary to sanctify the fallen man's separation by divine otherness and thus to transform man's self-sufficiency into a being of the community (*vita sanctorum*, i.e. *socialis vita*). Only in this true being is true freedom – freedom as the freedom for the other.

This paper is just our humble attempt at a renewed Orthodox reading of Augustine. We do not pretend to possess definitive answers about this broad and difficult topic that we have just tried to sketch. By calling into question the Calvinist interpretation of Augustine's writings, we hope, however, that we have at least opened the door to some future analysis. First of all, it would be interesting to explore how the concept of synergy corresponds to Augustine's teaching on God's prescience and predestination. „Return to the Fathers“ could also be an encouragement to meet in person with the Fathers' writings, a meeting that would be freed of the weight of an unacceptable reception and would dare to be a new and personal reception.

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Der eigentliche Heidegger. Kontinuität statt „Kehre“: Zur Abkehr von einer Legende der Forschung

Abstract: Although it is one of the indispensable standards of relevant research that Heidegger shortly after *Being and Time* made a „turn“ („Kehre“) in the development of his thinking, it can be shown that this is merely due to a misunderstanding or misinterpretation that began in 1949/50 with an at least incorrect reading of the corresponding passage in the *Letter of Humanism*. But if this legend of research can be proven as such, the question arises as to what consequences this will have for the comprehension of Heidegger's thinking, for it is said that with the „turn“, the transcendental approach was given up in favor of an aletheiological one with which it was possible for Heidegger to overcome subjectivism. In rejection of this by now equally canonical interpretation scheme it is shown here that the aletheiological approach is merely a recourse to conceptions important to Heidegger even before *Being and Time* and that after the failure of its third section – *Time and Being* – subjectivistic features were rather transferred, partially into a being that was increasingly thought of as an active one, partially into concepts like that of the „first thinker“ („erster Denker“) or the „messenger of being“ („Botengänger des Seins“). All in all, it is argued that the paradigm of „Heidegger's turn“ should be abandoned in order to enable an unobstructed view on Heidegger's thinking.

Key words: „Heidegger's turn“, metontology, hermeneutics, history of being, subjectivism, fundamental ontology, *Letter of Humanism*

I

Nach den jahrzehntelangen und immer wieder fragwürdig bestimmenden Unternehmungen mit der Zielsetzung, in den Werken, die Heidegger vor seiner politischen Betätigung verfasste, die philosophische Grundlegung für dieselbe hinter der ihm eigenen gewundenen Kryptik zu entdecken, könnte es, frei nach Kant, vielleicht ratsamer sein, die Gestirne jener Art in Ruhe zu lassen und zu sehen, ob es nicht besser damit gelänge, das Seinsphilosophische in der politischen Tat auszumachen.¹ Denn obwohl Heidegger in Rom und in den Ruinen von Tusculum eingestanden hatte, dass sein Begriff „von der ‚Geschichtlichkeit‘ die Grundlage für seinen politischen Einsatz“² sei, übersieht die Geneigtheit der Adepten, was die Kritiker und Gegner in ihrer Zurückweisung eben so wenig in der Seinsentbergung

1 Zu diesem Ansatz von Karl Löwith siehe ders.: *Heidegger: Denker in dürftiger Zeit*. Frankfurt/Main, 1953, S. 51.

2 Karl Löwith: *Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933*. Stuttgart 2007, S. 57, anlässlich von Heideggers Besuch in Rom 1936: „Heidegger stimmte mir ohne Vorbehalten zu und führte mir aus, daß sein Begriff von der ‚Geschichtlichkeit‘ die Grundlage für seinen politischen Einsatz sei.“

verorten: das vermeintliche „Sein als das Geschick, das Wahrheit schickt“³ kündigte sich Heidegger auch in der Dämmerung des Daseins jener Macht an, zu der er bald gehörte. Es war das „gegenwärtige Geschehen“, das für Heidegger – „für mich“ – eine „ungewöhnliche sammelnde Kraft“ hatte. Das „Nichtige“ der Kultur und „sogenannter ‚Werte‘“ hatten ihn zuvor im „Dasein den neuen Boden suchen“ lassen, und im März 1933 schrieb er dazu: „Wir werden ihn u. zugleich die Berufung des Deutschen in der Geschichte des Abendlandes nur finden, wenn wir uns dem Sein selbst in neuer Weise u. Aneignung aussetzen“.⁴ Doch alle Hinweise einer Projektion des Subjektiven in ein vorgeblich passiv anzueignendes Geschehen der Wahrheit des Seins, das dem Denker, in einer Feuertaufe der Verkündung der „Seinsgeschichte“, zunächst eine Größe des nationalsozialistischen Führers entbarg, verschwinden in dem schon einheitlich zu nennenden Glauben an „Heideggers Kehre“.

Denn seit Otto Bollnow 1949/50 eine solche Wende für Heideggers philosophische Entwicklung nach *Sein und Zeit* reklamierte, sichert das Deutungsschema die Teilung in einen persönlichen, rein subjektiv zu begründenden Nationalsozialismus des politischen Akteurs und die zeitgleiche „Kehre“ der Überwindung des Subjektivismus zugunsten der Wahrheit des Seins und der Seinsentbergung im Werk des Denkers.⁵ In jedem anderen Fall wäre es jedoch schon fragwürdig genug gewesen, um skeptische Reaktionen hervorzurufen, dass der spätere Erfinder dieser „Kehre“ zur Selbstentbergung der Wahrheit bereits während der NS-Zeit, 1937, nachweisen wollte, dass „die Wahrheit“ nur auf einen bestimmten „Umkreis von Menschen eingeschränkt“ und „in letzter Zuspitzung“ auch „nur auf einen einzelnen Menschen beschränkt ist und dennoch in vollem Maße objektiv, d.h. sachangemessen“ sei und dabei das „Volkstum als Grundlage geisteswissenschaftlicher Wahrheit“ im Zentrum stehe.⁶ Einige Jahre später erklärte derselbe im selben Tenor, „Heideggers Kehre“ wende sich „zu einer unmittelbaren Erfassung des Seins“, die „des Umweges über den Menschen nicht mehr bedarf“.⁷ Doch mitsamt diesem „aletheologischen Ansatz“ des seinsgeschicht-

3 Martin Heidegger: *Gesamtausgabe* (GA). Frankfurt/M., Bd. 9 (Humanismusbrief), S. 339.

4 wie die Zitate zuvor: Brief vom 30. März 1933, Martin Heidegger; Elisabeth Blochmann: *Briefwechsel 1918–1969*. Marbach am Neckar 1989, S. 46; siehe auch Daniel Morat: *Von der Tat zur Gelassenheit*. Göttingen 2007, S. 130–131. Dass Heideggers Bemerkung „im Dasein den neuen Boden suchen“ und diesen und „die Berufung des Deutschen in der Geschichte des Abendlandes“ finden, schon im März 1933 eine Kontinuität und zudem eine für Heideggers NS-Engagement bedingende Sequenz von *Sein und Zeit* und Seinsgeschichte formuliert, wird dort nicht erfasst.

5 Otto Friedrich Bollnow: Heideggers Neue Kehre. In: *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*. 2. Jahrg. 1949/50, Heft 2, S. 113–128. Zur umfangreichen Literatur und zur Genese der „Kehre“ als Forschermeinung und den zahlreichen Deutungen seit 1949 und bis 2017 siehe Dong Yang: *Selbstbildung und Sprachwelt. Grundzüge eines abendländisch-nachmetaphysischen Denkens im Ausgang vom seinsgeschichtlichen Denken Heideggers*. Münster 2017, S. 9–19; Jean Grondin: *Le tournant dans la pensée de Martin Heidegger*. Paris 1987.

6 Otto F. Bollnow: Zur Frage nach der Objektivität der Geisteswissenschaften. In: *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*. 93, 1937, S. 335–363, hier: S. 354; in einer Neuauflage, *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 1962, 1, S. 3–25, tilgte Bollnow alle nazistischen Stellen und fügte 1966 stattdessen einen Passus ein, „in dem er den auf die Belange des eigenen Volkes reduzierten Wahrheitsbegriff des Nationalsozialismus anprangerte“, siehe Horst Junginger: *Völkerkunde und Religionswissenschaft, zwei nationalsozialistische Geisteswissenschaften?* Universität Tübingen o. Datum, S. 55, Anm. 13

7 Bollnow: *Kehre* (wie Anm. 5), S. 115

lich tätigen und sich selbst entbergenden „Wesens der Wahrheit“ als dem ontologischen Ort, zu dem sich Heideggers Denken gerade zur Zeit seines Aufbruchs in den Nationalsozialismus hingewendet haben soll, wurde Bollnows Legende in bemerkenswert unkritischer Weise und nachgerade in hypnotischer Einigkeit übernommen: Heidegger habe die „Kehre“, so heißt es, als Richtungsänderung seines Denkens vorgenommen, da er erkannt habe, dass sich für den dritten Abschnitt, *Zeit und Sein* (SZ, 1.3), die Zeit als Horizont des Seins nicht als eine Transzendenz unabhängig von der Endlichkeit des Daseins bestimmen ließ.

Die Forscherlegende der „Kehre“ zu einem Wesen der Wahrheit, das sich selbst entbirgt, und die hier als solche zu erhellen sein wird, verstellt seitdem den Blick auf eine gegenteilige Sicht, jene der Kontinuität eines Subjektivismus, der nach *Sein und Zeit* nur geschickt umgedeutet und in andere Konzeptionen verwiesen wurde. Schon der Modus jener Seinsentbergung, die seit 1930 die „Kehre“ begründen soll, der „aletheiologische Ansatz“, wurde deutlich vor *Sein und Zeit* erarbeitet, wie noch belegt wird. Leicht zu erkennen ist auch die Stetigkeit der Referenz auf den Heimatboden und der 1922 geäußerten Überzeugung, dass im „Charakter meines Volksstammes“ und der „Ursprünglichkeit ländlichen Lebens“, das „in diesem Boden verwurzelt bleibt“ die „Gesundung unseres Volkes“ zu erwarten sei⁸ – fortgesetzt mit den „Schöpferischen Landschaften“ von 1933 – „Ich höre, was die Berge und die Wälder und die Bauernhöfe sagen“⁹ – und mit dem „sprechenden Feldweg“ von 1938, bis hin zur düsteren Jovialität von 1967, dass es für ihn „heilsam“ sein könnte, dem Dichter Paul Celan – der aufgrund seiner im NS-Arbeitslager durch Typhus und Mord vernichteten Eltern und der Erlebnisse im Ghetto Czernowitz und dem Lager Tăbăraști seelisch erkrankt war –, dass es „heilsam“ wäre, Celan „den Schwarzwald zu zeigen“.¹⁰ Ob die Konzeption der Kontinuität, die in der Verwurzelung des denkenden Subjekts im Heimatboden alles Heilsame für das Dasein wie für das Volk und sogar den Quell der Wahrheit des Seins erkennt, Heideggers Leben und Werk nicht besser zu erfassen geeignet sei als die bollowsche Konstruktion der „Kehre“, ist aber eine Frage, die bisher kaum gestellt wurde.

II

Es ist einzuräumen, dass die Entstehung der Legende einer „Kehre“ wenigstens zum Teil auch auf ein Missverständnis oder eine Fehldeutung zurückgehen mag. Denn als Heidegger diesen Begriff im *Brief über den Humanismus* erwähnte, referierte er noch auf eine ganz andere Bedeutung des Sprachbilds der Kehre, und es muss hier nicht entschieden werden, ob diese, die „metabolische Kehre“, bewusst oder nur irrtümlicherweise auf Heideggers Entwicklung seit 1930 übertragen wurde. Die metabolische Kehre hatte sich dem Denker während der 1920er Jahre im Studium von Heraklit und den Vorlesungen zu Platons *So-*

⁸ Ciehe Kaveh Nassirin: Bodenlosigkeit und Uneigentlichkeit bei Heidegger. Synonyme, Antonyme – Zur Stilistik, Deutung und Übersetzung. *FORVM* 2020, Zitat 2.

⁹ GA 13, S. 12.

¹⁰ Heidegger: Brief an Gerhart Baumann v. 23. 6. 1967, in: Gerhart Baumann: *Erinnerungen an Paul Celan*. Frankfurt/Main 1986, S. 60, zit. n. Dieter Thomä: *Heidegger-Handbuch. Leben – Werk – Wirkung*. Hrsg. v. dems. Stuttgart, Weimar 2013, S. 526.

phistes und zu Aristoteles als ein „Umschlagen“ oder „Umkehren“ (*metabole*) und ein so erfolgreiches „Herausstehen“ (*ekstasis*) der Offenbarkeit des Seins dargestellt, denn was „Heraklit erstmals in seiner vollen Schärfe sieht, ist das ‚metabolische‘ Wesen des Seins, das Umschlagen (*metabole*) als solches. Dies aber ist das Wesen der Physis als aletheiologischer Aufgang alles Jeweiligen in die Unverborgenheit welthafter Anwesenheit, der Pulsschlag des Seins“.¹¹ Der griechische ontologische Metabolismus und die sich in dieser Kehre ereignende Unverborgenheit lieferten dann das Paradigma für die geplante, aber misslungene Kehre von *Sein und Zeit* zu *Zeit und Sein*.

In den Erwähnungen einer „Kehre“ spricht Heidegger zunächst von dieser Umkehr, die keinerlei Wandel seines eigenen Denkens betrifft, den der Philosoph, im Gegenteil, im *Humanismusbrief* von 1946 noch ganz ausdrücklich verneint. Dort wird erklärt, der Begriff „Entwurf“ aus *Sein und Zeit* sei nicht als ein subjektivistisches Entwerfen zu verstehen, sondern „als der ekstatische Bezug zur Lichtung des Seins“, wodurch der Subjektivismus vielmehr überwunden werde. Doch der „zureichende Nach- und Mitvollzug dieses anderen, die Subjektivität verlassenden Denkens ist allerdings dadurch erschwert, daß bei der Veröffentlichung von ‚Sein und Zeit‘ der dritte Abschnitt des ersten Teiles, ‚Zeit und Sein‘ zurückgehalten wurde (siehe ‚Sein und Zeit‘, S. 39). Hier kehrt sich das Ganze um.“ Dann fügt Heidegger hinzu: „Der fragliche Abschnitt wurde zurückgehalten, weil das Denken im zureichenden Sagen dieser Kehre versagte und so mit Hilfe der Sprache der Metaphysik nicht durchkam. Der Vortrag ‚Vom Wesen der Wahrheit‘ (...) gibt einen gewissen Einblick in das Denken der Kehre von ‚Sein und Zeit‘ zu ‚Zeit und Sein‘. Diese Kehre ist nicht eine Änderung des Standpunktes von ‚Sein und Zeit‘, sondern in ihr gelangt das versuchte Denken erst in die Ortschaft der Dimension, aus der ‚Sein und Zeit‘ erfahren ist und zwar erfahren aus der Grunderfahrung der Seinsvergessenheit.“¹² Die „Grunderfahrung“, die zum versuchten Metabolismus führte, fällt also in die erste Hälfte der 1920er Jahre.

¹¹ Rudolf Brandner: *Weltverhältnis*, Bd. II, *Aletheia und Mōsa. Zur Differenz griechischen und indischen Denkens*. Würzburg 2004, S. 309, m. Verw. a. Heraklit, DK 22 B 84 a: μεταβάλλον αναπαύεται („Umschlagend ruht es“; Diels: „Sich wandelnd ruht es aus“; Kahn: „It rests by changing“); Plat. Parm. 156 a–157 a; Brandner verweist ebd. S. 310 auf den *atopos* des Moments bei Platon (a.a.O. 156 d) aus dem „heraus ein Umschlagen in eines von beiden (Veränderung oder Verweilung) ist“, ὥς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑκάτερον; Brandner, ebd.: „Jeder Umschlag ereignet sich im Plötzlichen, dem Augenblick als Herausstand (*ekstasis*) aus dem, was es nicht mehr und noch nicht ist: ‚Zwischen‘ beiden: dem Nicht-mehr und Noch-nicht, eröffnet sich das Ortlose des Umschlages selbst“, m. Verw. auf die aristotelische Deutung dessen in Phys. 222 b 16–18. GA 19 („Platon: Sophistes“ WS 1924/25), S. 279 m. Verw. a. Plat., Soph., 219d4–d5 („Sich-geben-Lassen“); Heidegger sagt bereits 1928, wie später im *Humanismusbrief*, zu *Zeit und Sein*, GA 26 (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe), S. 201: „Da vollzieht sich das Kehren, und es kommt zum Umschlag zur Metontologie“ (μεταβολή, ebd., S. 199); die Bedeutung einer Abkehr auf dem philosophischen Weg ist so *expressis verbis* ausgeschlossen; ohne das Wort „Kehre“ schon 1927, „Umschlag“: GA 24 (*Phänomenologie des Geistes*), S. 332 mit Bezug auf Aristot., Phys., 218 b. Zu *Zeit und Sein* siehe: GA 2, Nachwort von F.-W. von Herrmann, S. 582: „erste Fassung ... bald nach ihrer Niederschrift verbrannt“; zu Widersprüchen dieser Überlieferung mit Heideggers Darstellung siehe Jean Grondin: Die Wiedererweckung der Seinsfrage auf dem Weg einer phänomenologisch-hermeneutischen Destruktion. In: Martin Heidegger: *Sein und Zeit*. Hrsg. v. Thomas Rentsch. Berlin 2007, S. 1–28, hier: S. 18.

¹² GA 9 (*Humanismusbrief*) S. 327–28; die These des Historikers Morat: *Tat zur Gelassenheit* (wie Anm. 4), S. 169–70, m. Anm. 49 u. S. 377–78, Heideggers zahlreiche Hinweise in den *Beiträgen* von 1936/38 auf eine Kont

Diese Bemerkungen aus dem *Humanismusbrief* wurden aber bald darauf in Konzeptionen wie die der „großen ‚Wende‘ im Philosophieren Martin Heideggers“¹³ und dem „alten und neuen Heidegger“¹⁴ versetzt, und in diesem doxographischen Kanon stellte Otto Bollnow wie erwähnt fest, dass Heidegger nach dem Ansatz der „Fundamentalontologie“ den „transzendentalphilosophischen Weg“ von *Sein und Zeit* „mehr und mehr verläßt und zu einer unmittelbaren Erfassung des Seins geführt wird, die des Umwegs über den Menschen nicht mehr bedarf.“¹⁵ Das Verlassen des „transzendentalphilosophischen“ Wegs zugunsten jenes anderen bedeute nun „in der Tat eine radikale Umkehr, und Heidegger spricht in diesem Sinn auch ausdrücklich von einer ‚Kehre‘, die schon in der zurückgehaltenen Fortsetzung von ‚Sein und Zeit‘ geplant gewesen wäre.“ Dieses selbst verkehrende Deutungsschema, das Bollnow in seiner Erörterung des *Humanismusbriefts* 1949/50 entwirft und das ähnlich von anderen gedacht oder wiederholt wurde, kann als die Ursache der Forscherlegende der „Kehre“ gelten.¹⁶

inuität seiner Werke der 1930er Jahre mit SZ enthielten die „implizite Aussage“, dass „seine Philosophie ... nichts mit dem Nationalsozialismus zu tun habe“, wie auch das Zitat aus dem *Humanismusbrief* aus diesem Grund dazu diene, „eine Kontinuität von ‚Sein und Zeit‘ zur Spätphilosophie zu konstruieren“, ist undurchdacht und abwegig: zur Zeit der *Beiträge* gab es für das NSDAP-Mitglied Heidegger noch keinen Grund, eine Distanz zum Nationalsozialismus zu konstruieren – in einem posthum zu publizierenden Werk und während sich derselbe in den *Schwarzen Heften* der antisemitischen Konkomitanz der geforderten Verwurzelung im Heimatboden widmete; der von Morat referenzierte Dialog zwischen Jaspers und Arendt vom 1./29. September 1949 bezieht sich auch nicht darauf (Jaspers geht es bezüglich der Kontinuität darum, dass Heidegger „mit dem Ahnungsvollen Eindruck macht“, in der Form einer „Selbstinszenierung von ‚Sein und Zeit‘“). Wenigstens hätte dargelegt werden müssen, welche Lesart welchen Werks (also vor den *Beiträgen*) Heidegger damit hätte verhindern wollen, zu schweigen von einer philosophischen Analyse, welche der zahlreichen dort erwähnten Kontinuitäten denn „konstruiert“ sei. Ohnehin sehen kritische Ansätze proto-nazistische Überzeugungen in Heideggers Frühwerk, so dass Kontinuität gerade diesbezüglich gegeben ist; siehe: „*Sein und Zeit*“ neu verhandelt. *Untersuchungen zu Heideggers Hauptwerk*. Hrsg. v. Marion Heinz; Tobias Bender. Hamburg 2019 u. Kaveh Nassirin: *Sein und Zeit und die exegetische Ergriffenheit, FORVM* 2019; auch ders.: Bodenlosigkeit (wie Anm. 8). Wenn es in der Stelle im *Humanismusbrief* eine *hidden agenda* gab, dann wird sie darin zu finden sein, das Misslingen von SZ 1.3 als eine überwundene Hürde auf einem fortgeführten Weg darzustellen, um das Scheitern der durch *Sein und Zeit* angekündigten „Fundamentalontologie“ zu marginalisieren und mithin den Tausch einer das Sein bestimmenden Zeit gegen den Modus eines sich selbst entbergenden Seins, was Heidegger bis heute gut gelungen ist. Es stellt sich zudem die Frage, wie sich die These zu der von Morat auf der Historiker Plattform *H-Soz. Kult.* 2020, geäußerten Meinung verhält, Heideggers Nazismus sei nur „struktureller Opportunismus“ gewesen.

13 A. Naber: Von der Philosophie des ‚Nichts‘ zur Philosophie des ‚Seins selbst‘. Zur großen ‚Wende‘ im Philosophieren Martin Heideggers. In: *Gregorianum* 28, 1947, S. 357–378.

14 J. L. de Azevedo: Der alte und der neue Heidegger. In: *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* (PhJb) 60, 1950, S. 161–174.

15 Bollnow: Kehre (wie Anm. 5), S. 115.

16 Die von Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann: *Die Selbstinterpretation Martin Heideggers*. Meisenheim am Glan 1964, S. 8, und lexikalisch von W. Franzen, „Kehre“. In: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, 4, 1976, S. 806–809, hier: S. 808, verbreitete Aussage, der, so Franzen, „von M. Heidegger selbst eingeführte Terminus bezeichnet eine fundamentale Wandlung in seinem Denken“, ist darin explizit unzutreffend, dass „Heidegger selbst“ den Begriff nicht bezüglich seiner philosophischen Entwicklung eingeführt hat, und implizit darin, dass er eine „fundamentale Wandlung in seinem Denken“ infolge einer „Kehre“ bestreitet. Die fälschliche Zeugenschaft Heideggers für diese Lesart der „Kehre“ dürfte durch die Autorität des Lexikalischen gefördert

Allen voran prägte so wohl diese vermeintliche Referenz auf Heideggers Selbstbeschreibung auch das Verständnis, das zwei Generationen von Forschern von dessen erstem Hauptwerk und dem Modus der Fortsetzung der seinsphilosophischen Frage entwickelten, da die im *Humanismusbrief* mit dem aus den damals noch unveröffentlichten Bänden *Zum Ereignis-Denken* und *Vom Ereignis (Beiträge)* nunmehr hinlänglich bekannten Wort „Kehre“ angezeigte Umkehr von *Sein und Zeit* in eine Abkehr davon verwandelt wurde, die nicht mehr *Zeit und Sein*, sondern unerwarteterweise Heidegger selbst betraf. Und davon hatte dieser „in diesem Sinn“ mitnichten gesprochen, weder „ausdrücklich“ noch implizit. Zwar ist bei Bollnow erwähnt, dass diese „Kehre“ bereits für *Zeit und Sein* vorgesehen war, doch der Plan sei erst durch das, was eine „radikale Umkehr“ genannt wird, mit der Heidegger diesen Weg verlassen und so jene „Kehre“ in seinem Denken vorgenommen habe, nachgeholt worden. Dagegen heißt es im *Humanismusbrief* aber ja ausdrücklich, die „Kehre“ zu *Zeit und Sein* sei keine „Änderung des Standpunktes von ‚Sein und Zeit‘“, was in Bollnows Exegese nun erstmals wegfällt.

Es ist mithin zu sehen, dass der beibehaltene Standpunkt ins Gegenteil der „radikalen Umkehr“ umgedeutet wurde. Die seit jeher geplante Kehre zu *Zeit und Sein* als metontologischer Grundgedanke der Seinserschließung durch das im Denken stattfindende Ereignis der dem sich entbergenden Sein eigenen Wendebewegung, welche im *Humanismusbrief* trotz ihrer Unsagbarkeit für *Zeit und Sein* als die auch im späteren Gedanken unverändert gebliebene Kehre des Seins dargelegt wird, stand offenbar dem eingängigeren Paradigma eines „alten und neuen Heidegger“ zu sehr entgegen.

Ogleich aber Karl Löwith den exegetischen Fehlgriff von Bollnow rasch korrigierte und dagegen die Kontinuität in Heideggers Gedanken bekräftigte, wie Heidegger es auch selbst noch tat, ließ sich der Geist dieser Lesart nicht mehr in die Lampe zurück befehlen.¹⁷ Denn die „Kehre“ entschied nun darüber, ob *Sein und Zeit*, als vorgängige Analytik des Daseins zur Seinserkenntnis, nur mit anderen Mitteln fortgesetzt wurde, wie es Löwith gegen Missverständnisse seiner Korrektur erklärte,¹⁸ oder ob eine Abkehr von ei-

worden sein. Zwar zitiert Franzen – wie Bollnow – Heideggers Satz zu SZ 1.3 „Hier kehrt sich das Ganze um“, lässt den anderen aber ebenfalls weg, dass die Kehre „nicht eine Änderung des Standpunktes“ sei und verkehrt das Weggelassene wie Bollnow *et al.* ins Gegenteil der „fundamentalen Wandlung in seinem Denken“.

17 Karl Löwith: Heideggers „Kehre“. In: *Die neue Rundschau*, 62, (4), 1951, S. 48–79, S. 73: SZ 1.3 sei die Kehre „von der endlichen Zeitlichkeit des Daseins zu einer bleibenden Zeit des Seins“; ders., *Denker in dürftiger Zeit* (wie Anm. 1), S. 43: „keine Abkehr von *Sein und Zeit* sowie von ‚Welt‘ und ‚Geschehen‘“, die Kehre „verkehrt nur das Woher ihrer möglichen Begründbarkeit“ (Sprung zu *alētheia*); siehe auch Otto Pöggelers Klarstellung, *Sein als Ereignis*. Martin Heidegger zum 70. Geburtstag. In: *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* 13, 1959, S. 597–632, hier: S. 617: „Da nur die beiden ersten Kapitel von *Sein und Zeit* veröffentlicht wurden, entstand das Mißverständnis, die Kehre bedeute die Wendung von einer früheren (existenzphilosophischen) zu einer später ausgearbeiteten (seinsgeschichtlichen) Position.“

18 Löwith: *Denker in dürftiger Zeit* (wie Anm. 1), S. 17, Anm. 2: Kehre vom entschlossenen Dasein „zum sich selbst gebenden Sein, für dessen Verständnis zuerst das ‚je‘ eigene Dasein das Fundament war, wogegen es später nur dem Anspruch des Seins zu entsprechen hat und also nicht mehr fundamental ist“; mit Karl Lehmann: *Vom Ursprung und Sinn der Seinsfrage im Denken Martin Heideggers*. Inauguraldissertation, Rom 1961/62. 2. Fassung, Freiburg i. Br. 2003, S. 182, 190–192, wird hier Löwiths Sicht nicht geteilt, das Dasein

ner philosophischen Anthropologie hin zur Seinsfrage zu sehen sei,¹⁹ was aufgrund des dazu nötigen reduktionistischen Verständnisses von *Sein und Zeit* zwar bald durch das Etikett des „seinsgeschichtlichen Ansatzes“ nach der „Fundamentalontologie“ ersetzt wurde, worin das „Fundament“ dieser Ontologie aber unbestimmt und auch im Zweifel blieb, was nach *Sein und Zeit* in der „Kehre“ denn ins „Seinsgeschichtliche“ gekehrt wurde, sofern es nicht jene Selbstverkündung des Seins als das Wesen der Wahrheit war, die bald der „aletheiologische Ansatz“ genannt wurde.²⁰

Doch das Innerste des exegetischen Katechismus der Heidegger-Deutung wurde gerade mit dieser *reductio ad absurdum* gesetzt, dass Heidegger durch die „Kehre“ zu „einer unmittelbaren Erfassung des Seins geführt“ worden sei, „die des Umwegs über den Menschen nicht mehr“ bedürfe (wenn hier auch zunächst wohl der Modus von *Sein und Zeit* gemeint gewesen sein dürfte, vom Dasein zum Sein zu gelangen). Diese Deutung der „Kehre“ in Heideggers Denken betrifft nun die zentrale Problematik der heideggerschen Selbstentbergung des Wesens der Wahrheit des Seins, die darin liegt, dass das Denken weder von dem Denker aufgegeben wurde, noch dass eine solche Überwindung des *cogito* für das Gewahrwerden der Unverborgenheit möglich war, da der Sein/Ereignis-Denken-Dualismus, der sich in der „Kehre“ zu *Zeit und Sein* schon hätte zeigen sollen, das gar nicht zuließ. Später kommt Heidegger zwar der Selbstaufgabe der Philosophie als Selbstdenken-können in der Erörterung der Gelassenheit nahe – und dem damit verglichenen „großen Tod“ (*daishi*) des Zen-Buddhismus –, läuft aber auch dann zum einen nicht in diesen Tod vor, sondern verharret in der Möglichkeit dessen und spricht zum anderen weiter der Wahrheit und dem „Walten ihres Wesens“ zu, im „Wesen des Denkens“ einzukehren, wobei das „Wesen des Denkens“ weiter denkt und das „Wesen der Wahrheit“ nicht im Sinn des neuen Anfangs das *arrhêton*, das Unsagbare, bleibt.²¹ Im Gegenteil, das Sein wirft dem Dichter den Gebrauch der „das Seyn“ stiftenden Sprache zu, es mutet dem Denken zu, das Sein zu denken, und das lässt die Sprache gedeihen, die das Sein stiftet, und da

in SZ sei das „Fundament“ der Seinserkenntnis, denn „fundamental“ ist „der Bezug des Seins zum Dasein“ (Lehmann, ebd., S. 192), d. i. das temporale Sein im Ereignis-Denken des Daseins, mithin in der gescheiterten „Kehre“.

19 Gegen die von Christian Graf von Krockow dargelegte Sicht, SZ sei nur philosophische Anthropologie und mithin nur auf das Dasein des Menschen zu reduzieren, siehe Lehmann: *Ursprung* (wie Anm. 18), S. 182, Anm. 59 und, wie ebd. referenziert, SZ, S. 17: die „Analytik des Daseins bleibt ganz auf die leitende Aufgabe der ‚Ausarbeitung der Seinsfrage orientiert‘; die „philosophische Anthropologie“ ist bei Heidegger immer als Dichotomie der Seinsvergessenheit und der Seinserkenntnis konzipiert und so finalistisch bestimmt.

20 für die „Kehre“ von der „Fundamentalontologie“ zum „aletheiologischen Ansatz“ und der „Seinsgeschichte“ siehe Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann; Winfried Franzen, *supra* (Anm. 16).

21 GA 13 (Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit. Aus einem Feldweggespräch über das Denken), S. 46; zum Vergleich mit dem „großen Tod“ im Zen-Buddhismus, siehe Florian Seidl: *Satori und Aletheia. Ein interkultureller Vergleich des Wahrheitsverständnisses im japanischen Zen-Buddhismus mit dem antiplatonischen Philosophieren Martin Heideggers und Henri Bergsons*. Dissertation. Universität Regensburg 2009, S. 110; GA 65 (Beiträge), S. 414: „Das Erdenken der Wahrheit des Seyns“; spätere Marginalien zum Unsagbaren des Seins können angesichts der das Sein stiftenden Bedeutung der Sprache bei Heidegger nur als Lehngedanken buddhistischer Lehrmeinungen begriffen werden.

ist angesichts der begrifflichen *alētheia* Koichi Tsujimura zuzustimmen, dass sie nur „ein Schatten der Zen-Wahrheit“ ist.²²

III

Im *Humanismusbrief* meint die Kehre also die Überwindung des Subjektivismus schon durch *Sein und Zeit*, da „alle Subjektivität des Menschen“ bereits dort „verlassen“ sei,²³ und das folgt der Perspektive der mit-gemeinten Umkehr der beiden ersten Abschnitte durch den Versuch des dritten Abschnitts, *Zeit und Sein*. Zur Erläuterung ist für Heidegger, wie zitiert, der Begriff des „Entwurfs“ zentral, „die existenziale Seinsverfassung des Spielraums des faktischen Seinkönnens“, ein „Existenzial“,²⁴ das als subjektivistischer Akt missverstanden wäre. Doch wird im *Humanismusbrief* in der Bestimmung des „Entwurfs“ als „ekstatischer Bezug zur Lichtung des Seins“²⁵ die „Lichtung“ schon für *Sein und Zeit* als eine zum Sein hingewendete Eigenheit benannt, obgleich sie dort noch explizit jene des „Daseins“ ist, als „lumen naturale“, das innere Licht des je Einzelnen, durch das sich das „Da“ erschließt.²⁶ Rückblickend beschreibt Heidegger damit eine Umkehr vom Existenzial des Daseins zur Bestimmung der Möglichkeit des sich entbergenden Seins – zunächst noch insistierend explizit „im Menschen“ und „an ihm“, dem „Dasein „selbst“, „so, daß es selbst die Lichtung ist“,²⁷ die „Lichtung des Daseins“²⁸ und später „das Da als Lichtung des Seins“, das der Mensch „in ‚die Sorge‘ nimmt“,²⁹ da ist er schon nicht mehr „selbst die Lichtung“, und sein „Entwurf“ ist nun das „ekstatische Innestehen in der Lichtung“,³⁰ und es heißt:

22 Koichi Tsujimura: Die Wahrheit des Seins und das absolute Nichts“. In: Ryosuke Ohashi: *Die Philosophie der Kyōto-Schule*. Freiburg i. Br., München 1990, S. 441–454, hier 446, zit. n. Seidl: *Sartori und Aletheia* (wie Anm. 21), S. 133; der ehemalige Heidegger-Schüler Tsujimura legt dar, dass die Wahrheit des japanischen Zen-Buddhismus eine unbegriffliche, die Wahrheit bei Heidegger dagegen eine begrifflich gedachte sei; Seidls Einwand, ebd., betrifft dann aber Heideggers unüberwundene Unterscheidung zwischen dem Dasein der Menschen und dem Seienden der Dinge, die Seidl eine „kleine Entfernung“ nennt; tatsächlich verschwindet im Gewährwerden der Wahrheit des Seins in dem dort erörterten Sansuikyō aber gerade die Dichotomie des Seienden und des *cogito*: das Sein z. B. des Wassers sei nur in dem Maß zu erkennen, in dem der Betrachter „wasserhaft“ werde, siehe ebd. S. 84; Sein dagegen weiterhin begrifflich zu erfassen, was etwa das „Wasserhafte“ gar nicht tun könnte, ist nicht ganz „die letzte Spur“ (Seidl) des *cogito-cogitatum*, sondern dessen Fortsetzung; unbeachtet bleibt dort auch, dass der Dialog zur Gelassenheit verfasst wurde, als Heidegger schon mehr als zehn Jahre lang bestimmt hatte, wie das Sein sei – das Geschehen, das Ereignis, die Zerklüftung – und den durchdachten Festsetzungen mit dem „Wesen des Denkens“ ein *cogito* anfügte, das jene im „Nahekommen“ (GA 13, S. 72, ἀγγιβασινη, Heraklit, DK 22 B 122) verstehen kann, so dass der „Schatten der Zen-Wahrheit“ auch die zum Zweck ihrer Entbergung begrifflich bestimmte Wahrheit genannt werden kann, die, alles in allem, wieder auf Heraklit und Parmenides zurück geht. Eine Selbstaufgabe („großer Tod“) ist bei Heidegger unmöglich: das „Vorlaufen in den Tod“ ist die „Modifikation des *Man*“ und die „Geburt“ im Zurückkommen“ (SZ, 130, 391).

23 GA 9, S. 202.

24 SZ, S. 145; 221 Punkt 3.

25 GA 9 (Humanismusbrief), S. 327.

26 SZ, S. 133, 170.

27 ebd., S. 133.

28 ebd., S. 170.

29 GA 9 (Humanismusbrief), S. 327.

30 ebd.

„Das Stehen in der Lichtung des Seins nenne ich die Ek-sistenz des Menschen.“³¹ Diese graduelle Versetzung lässt schon erkennen, dass „die Lichtung“, die bald die „Wahrheit“ entbirgt, im klassischen „lumen naturale“³² des je einzelnen Daseins ihren Ursprung hat.³³

Darin ist demnach aber keine solche Abkehr zu sehen, sondern jener Sinn, der in *Sein und Zeit* „schon vorschwebt“, der erst noch umzukehrende Sinn, denn mit der Umkehr zur Zeit als dem Horizont des Seins im dritten Abschnitt sollte dem Dasein die Lichtung nicht entzogen werden, die auch die Lichtung des ek-statischen Innestehens des Daseins ist. Im Vorhaben von *Zeit und Sein* ist die Abkunft der „Lichtung“ vom Dasein und ihre Hinwendung zum Sein also die aletheiologische Kehre, da die Lichtung, die bald mit dem Unverborgenen der Wahrheit zusammenfällt³⁴, sich von der des Daseins zu einer solchen kehrt, die als die des Seins dessen Sinn offenbart – und anderen offenbaren sollte.

Der Erörterung der Differenz vorgreifend, die zwischen den Bedeutungen des Wortes „Kehre“ in Heideggers Texten und in der Sicht der Deuter seiner Person und seines Werks liegt, seien es seine Kritiker oder seine Gefolgschaft, ist die Annäherung der ursprünglichen Aussage an den davon losgelösten Chor der Meinungen auch durch diese Versetzung des Orts der Lichtung bezeichnend. Auf dem dritten der Seminare, die im französischen *Le Thor* abgehalten wurden, kam Heidegger im September 1969 – rund zwanzig Jahre, nachdem die Forschung erstmals eine „Kehre“ nach *Sein und Zeit* gesehen hatte – auf die graduelle Transposition der „Lichtung“ zurück, die, da das Wort zu einer Art operativem Begriff in seinen Werken geworden war, dem klare Konturen mehr und mehr

³¹ GA 9 (Humanismusbrief), S. 323–324.

³² SZ, S. 133, 170; siehe auch (auf Deutsch unpublishiert): Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Vortrag gehalten von Prof. Martin Heidegger am Pfingstmontag in der Akademischen Vereinigung, Marburg, 24. 5. 1926. Nachschrift von Ernst Fuchs (siehe: The Hannah Arendt Collection, www.blogs.bard.edu/arendtcollection/heidegger-martin-interpretationen-aus-der-antiken-philosophie), S. 7: „das menschliche Dasein hat die Seinsart, daß es ein Licht in sich trägt, es ist in sich selbst gelichtet“; vgl. gr. φέγγος; γνῶσεως φῶς, unterschieden zwischen dem des passiven (νοῦς παθητικός) und des aktiven Geistes νοῦς ποιητικός; Arist., De An. III, 5, 430 a 15; stoisch: Sextus Emp., Adv. Math., VII, 299; röm.: Cic., Tusculanae disputationes, III, 2,1; De finibus bonorum et malorum, V, 21, 59; christl.: Augustinus: De Civ. Dei, VIII, 7; von Albertus Magnus durch den Aristoteles-Kommentar von Averroes übernommen; Thomas von Aquin, „lumen intellectus agentis“, De anima III, tr. 3, c. 11; Melancthon, Corpus Reformatorum XIII, 138: „Cui et insita est lux, qua esse Deum agnoscimus ... et insitae sunt notitiae“; Spinoza: Theologisch-politischer Traktat (TTP) XV [6]: G III.184 I. 31–32: „mentis lux“, sei „in Wahrheit das Licht der Seele“, ohne das die Theologie „nur Träume und Erdichtungen sieht“; Leibniz: Neue Abhandlungen (NE), I, 2,1.

³³ zu den Umkehrungen der Existenzialien in Heideggers Deutungen von SZ siehe Löwith: *Denker in dürftiger Zeit* (wie Anm. 1), Kap. I; Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann: *Selbstinterpretation* (wie Anm. 16); Herman Philipse: Heideggers philosophisch-religiöse (pascalsche) Strategie. In: *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, Band 57, 2003, 571–588, hier: S. 574–575; dass Heideggers Sicht auf SZ den Gedanken der Kehre von SZ 1.3 trotz des Misslingens enthielt, wurde in der Debatte kaum berücksichtigt, wofür Philipse beispielhaft ist, der eine Zwei-Schritte-Strategie gemäß Blaise Pascal als Metastruktur von *Sein und Zeit* entdeckt, deren hypothetische Projektion dadurch gerechtfertigt sei, die spätere Umkehr der Existenzialien zu erklären, wobei Philipse aber SZ 1.3 und die erst dadurch geplante Umkehr nicht bedenkt.

³⁴ GA 65 (Beiträge), S. 236; Nach der Transposition des *lumen naturale* des Daseins zur Lichtung des Seins machen Lichtung und Verbergung die Wesung der Wahrheit aus, und sind „das Ereignis selbst.“

fehlten,³⁵ nunmehr als die „Offenheit“³⁶ paraphrasiert wurde: „Indem es das Wort Sinn von Sein zugunsten von Wahrheit des Seins aufgibt, betont das aus ‚Sein und Zeit‘ hervorgehende Denken künftig mehr die Offenheit des Seins selbst als die Offenheit des Daseins angesichts der Offenheit des Seins.“³⁷

Über zwanzig Jahre nach dem *Humanismusbrief* teilt Heidegger hier einen Modus dazu mit, wie jene im Ursprung gemeinte Verortung der „Lichtung“ als die des Seins in der Folge seines Denkens, das „aus ‚Sein und Zeit‘“ hervorging, „betont“ werden konnte und zwar, indem „das Denken“ die Frage nach dem Sinn zugunsten jener nach der Wahrheit des Seins aufgegeben habe. Dem fügt Heidegger in *Le Thor* also hinzu: „Das bedeutet ‚die Kehre‘, in der das Denken sich immer entschiedener dem Sein als Sein zuwendet.“³⁸ Die späte Inanspruchnahme der seit 1949 über sein Denken behaupteten Umkehr ist sicher auch als Hingabe des knapp 80jährigen an eine Paraphrasierung dessen zu erkennen, was er zuvor im Gegenteil als ein Fortschreiten nach der gescheiterten Kehre von *Zeit und Sein* bezeichnet hatte – „keine Änderung des Standpunktes“ –, das allein durch die „Aufgabe“ hoch angesetzter Fragen, darunter die Fundamentalfra ge nach dem Sinn des Seins, möglich gewesen sei.³⁹ Aber der Rekurs auf die schmeichelndere Deutung des Scheiterns mit dem Verweis auf die „Wahrheit des Seins“ ist umso fragwürdiger, als es sich bei gerade dieser Wahrheit des Seins um das zweite der Gebiete handelt, von dem Heidegger das Misslingen einer solchen ontologischen Kehre eingestand.

Nach der „Kehre“, wie Heidegger 1969 anmerkt, diesen Begriff nun von anderen im Sinn eines Richtungswechsels seines Denkens übernehmend, habe sein aus diesem Schei-

³⁵ Siehe GA 14 (Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens), S. 89–90.

³⁶ zum Zusammenhang von „Offenheit“ und „Lichtung“ siehe GA 15 (Heraklit), S. 262; GA 9 (Vom Wesen der Wahrheit), S. 185–193; Ernst Tugendhat: Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger, Berlin 1967, S. 391: „Das Sein ist als das Offene die Lichtung“; GA 9 (Humanismusbrief), S. 201: „Der Name dieser Lichtung ist ἀλήθεια“

³⁷ GA 15 (Seminar in *Le Thor* 1969), S. 345.

³⁸ a.a.O. in *Le Thor* gab Heidegger als Grund der „Kehre“ an, GA 15, S. 335, „das Denken“ habe den „Sinn von Sein“ durch „Wahrheit des Seins“ ersetzt, da der Ansatz „zu sehr ermöglicht, den ‚Entwurf‘ als menschliche Leistung zu verstehen“, mithin, um den „Entwurf“ in SZ nicht länger dem Missverständnis einer „Struktur der Subjektivität“ auszusetzen, siehe auch GA, 82 S. 401–403; von Herrmann: *Selbstinterpretation* (wie Anm. 16), S. 276, hatte den „aletheiologischen Ansatz“ als „Kehre“ schon 1964 mit Referenz auf Heidegger angegeben; ein solches Missverständnis war durch SZ, S. 145 u. 221, 3 („Bestimmung“ von „Dasein ist in der Wahrheit“) aber schon weithin ausgeschlossen; es sei zudem beachtet, wie Heidegger seine vorherigen Angaben zum überwundenen Subjektivismus schon in SZ mit einer „Kehre“ seines Denkens dadurch eint, dass diese „Kehre“ nur dazu gedient habe, das Missverständnis um den ontologischen Status des „Entwurfs“ zu beseitigen, wodurch das Unvermögen der anderen zum Grund für die „Kehre“ wird; anders als im *Humanismusbrief*, in dem Heidegger noch den Grund nennt, sein Denken habe „im Sagen“ versagt, versagt hier das Denken der anderen; diese „Kehre“ ist mit dem aletheiologischen Ansatz von 1930 auch anders datiert, als 1964 im Brief an von Herrmann („ein langwieriges Unterwegs“, *infra*), was die Frage aufwirft, in welchen Zeitraum dieses die „Kehre“ von Heidegger bedingende Missverständnis der anderen zu setzen sei. Welchem Dasein sich die „Wahrheit des Seins“ unabhängig von der „Struktur der Subjektivität“ entbergen konnte, wurde auch in *Le Thor* verschwiegen.

³⁹ Siehe SZ, S. 19: „Die fundamentale ontologische Aufgabe der Interpretation von Sein als solchem begreift daher in sich die Herausarbeitung der *Temporalität des Seins*.“

tern hervorgegangenes Denken, wie gesagt, „mehr die Offenheit des Seins selbst“ betont, sich also der „Wahrheit des Seins“ gewidmet. Nun ist darin aber keine „Kehre“ zu erkennen, wenn diese nicht ein „Weitergehen“ darstellt, denn die Wahrheit des Seins war seit dem „Natorp-Bericht“ von 1922, dem Vortrag *Wahrsein und Dasein* von 1923/24, der *Sophistes*-Vorlesung von 1924/25 und dem § 44 in *Sein und Zeit* ein Standard des heideggerischen Denkens, der mithin eine Kontinuität, in den Kernaussagen sogar ein bedenkliches Verharren belegt,⁴⁰ das sich bis zum „Nachtrag“ des Seminars in Zähringen von 1973 erstreckt.⁴¹ Die 1922 begonnene und in *Sein und Zeit* wiederholte Deutung von *alētheia* als „Unverborgenheit“⁴² wurde also nach dem Verlust der Zeit als Horizont des Seins bloß wieder aufgenommen und nun anstelle der Sinnfrage des Seins erörtert. Dabei blieb zudem die Ersetzung des Ausdrucks „Sinn von Sein“ durch „Wahrheit von Sein“⁴³ in der *alētheia*-Deutung als „Unverborgenheit“ stecken, da die Umkehr zum Wesen (Sein) also auch misslang, wie Heidegger 1967 anmerkte: „Der Vortrag ‚Vom Wesen der Wahrheit‘ sollte bereits im ursprünglichen Entwurf durch einen zweiten ‚Von der Wahrheit des Wesens‘ ergänzt werden. Dieser mißlang aus Gründen, die jetzt in dem Brief ‚Über den Humanismus‘ angedeutet sind.“⁴⁴ Würden diese späten Aussagen von Heidegger dazu ernst genommen werden, dann wäre die „Kehre“, eine solche vom Scheitern (*Zeit und Sein*) hin zum Misslingen (*Wahrheit des Wesens*) – worin kein Makel liegen würde. Das Scheitern mag als Begleitung des Muts zum Umdenken gelten, welcher sich Heidegger wohl nicht ganz absprechen lässt. Denn der Mann aus Meßkirch war entschlossen zum Hügel bei den Quellen der Amygdala geschritten, um die Hydra der Philosophie aus ihrer Höhle zu locken, und mutig schlug er ihr den Kopf des Subjektivismus ein...⁴⁵

⁴⁰ zur Kontinuität des Wahrheitsbegriffs siehe den Irrtum von Tugendhat, *infra*.

⁴¹ GA 15, S. 401–407.

⁴² Siehe GA 62 [Phänomenologische Interpretation zu Aristoteles. (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation). Ausarbeitung für die Marburger und die Göttinger Philosophische Fakultät, 1922 = „Natorp-Bericht“], S. 379–380: *ἀληθεία* bedeute nicht „Übereinstimmung (*adaequatio*)“, sondern „Unverborgenheit“, *ἀληθές* bedeute „unverborgen da-sein“ und *ἀληθεύειν* bedeute „das je vermeinte ... Seiende als Unverhülltes in Verwahrung bringen und nehmen“, siehe dazu Elena Nardelli: Philosophie als Übersetzung. Heidegger übersetzt die Nikomachische Ethik, in: *Tetsugaku*, Vol. 2, 2018, The Philosophical Association of Japan, S. 163–173, hier: S. 167: „Die grundsätzliche Perspektive bleibt dieselbe“, bezüglich der Deutung von *ἀληθεύειν* im „Natorp-Bericht“, der Vorlesung „Platon: Sophistes“ und SZ, S. 33; GA 18 (Grundbegriffe der Aristotelischen Philosophie, Vorlesung SS 1924), S. 119, 122, 265; GA 19 (Vorlesung „Platon: Sophistes“ WS 1924/25), S. 17, 23, 175, 187, u. *passim*, insbesondere S. 616–623: Auseinandersetzung mit W. Jaeger, vgl. ebd. S. 664: Nachwort der Herausgeberin; Heidegger: Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Pfingstmontag 1926 (wie Anm. 32), S. 7–8; SZ, S. 219.

⁴³ GA 15 (Seminar in Le Thor), S. 335.

⁴⁴ GA 9 (Zweiter Teil der Anmerkung zu ‚Vom Wesen der Wahrheit‘), S. 201; siehe auch GA 15 (Beiträge), S. 288: „Auch in der Wahrheitsfrage drängt sich die Kehre auf: Wesen der Wahrheit und Wahrheit des Wesens.“

⁴⁵ „Subjektivismus“ meint hier Verweisungszusammenhänge, die auf das Subjekt intentionalistischer Akte im husserlschen Sinn zurückgeführt werden oder sich darauf zurückführen lassen oder die den philosophischen Gedanken mit intentionalistischen Gegenständen begründen; dagegen gibt Heidegger eine Definition, die nicht den Status der Gegenstände, sondern den *topos* der Referenz betrifft, GA 82, S. 196, § 111, „Fundamentallontologie“ heiße, „das Subjekt als Ansatz- und Ausweisungsbereich zu überwinden“, was leicht zu umgehen ist, indem subjektivistische Bestimmungen aus dem „System Subjekt“ in andere Bereiche verwiesen werden, so

IV

Aus den wenigen Erwähnungen für die Gründe des Misslingens der Umkehr sowohl von *Sein und Zeit* wie vom *Wesen der Wahrheit* ist auch jene Inhärenz zu entnehmen, durch die sich erhellt, warum es in Heideggers ursprünglicher Sicht danach keinen Richtungswechsel in seinem Denken über das Sein gegeben haben kann. Selbst, als er den Begriff „Kehre“ 1963 erstmals auf sein eigenes Denken bezog, beharrte Heidegger weiter darauf, diese sei nicht „auf Grund einer Änderung des Standpunktes oder gar der Preisgabe der Fragestellung in ‚Sein und Zeit‘ erfolgt.“⁴⁶ Vielmehr, so heißt es im Brief an W. J. Richardson, habe sich das „Denken der Kehre“ daraus ergeben, „daß ich bei der zu denkenden Sache ‚Sein und Zeit‘ geblieben bin, d.h. nach der Hinsicht gefragt habe, die schon in ‚Sein und Zeit‘ (S. 39) unter dem Titel ‚Zeit und Sein‘ angezeigt wurde.“ Denn die „Kehre“, so wird die Erklärung aus dem *Humanismusbrief* wiederholt, „gehört in den durch die Titel ‚Sein und Zeit, ‚Zeit und Sein‘ genannten Sachverhalt selbst“, also in den der Umkehr, in der sich das Sein erst entbirgt, wie Heidegger erneut erläutert: „Das ‚Geschehen‘ der Kehre, wonach Sie fragen, ‚ist‘ das Seyn als solches.“ Wird jedoch hier in Betracht gezogen, dass die Einlassung

dass zwar das Subjekt nicht mehr der Ausweisungsbereich ist, das Subjektivistische aber weiter bestimmend bleibt; die Definition von Günter Figal: *Martin Heidegger. Phänomenologie der Freiheit*, Tübingen, 1988, 2013, S. 9, die offenbar als Verweisungszusammenhang von mentalen Vollzügen begriffen werden kann, in dem diese vorrangig „die Korrelation des Bewusstseins und seiner Gegenstände erst verständlich“ machen, wobei stets „ein Charakteristikum“ dominant werde, legt mit der Bedingung des „nicht mehr als einzelnen Gedanken oder einzelne Handlung identifizierbaren“ Vollzugs die Vermutung nahe, dass sie von Hegels Panlogismus hergeleitet ist und die Form der Zetetik genüge, um mit dem Systemischen auch den Subjektivismus zu überwinden (vgl. GA 65, S. 65). Selbst wenn das nicht der Fall ist, scheint die Feststellung, a.a.O., S. 12, „Heideggers Konzept“ der Freiheit sei „neu“, da „es nicht mehr durch eine Orientierung an den Vollzügen selbst charakterisiert ist“, den Umstand, dass Heidegger auch nicht erst nach der Möglichkeit dieser „Vollzüge“ fragt, in die Deutung einer Überwindung des Subjektivistischen mit hineinzunehmen, was die Frage nach dem Subjekt des Erkennens ebenso auslöst, wie Heidegger es tut; ein Gebirge ist aber nicht „überwunden“, wenn jemand es umgeht; dafür unzureichend ist auch die Transposition des Freiheitsbegriffs weg vom Subjekt (wie bei Hegels „Geschichte“ und Schellings „Seyn“, siehe Günther Anders: *Über Heidegger*. München 2001, S. 151), und hin zur Freiheit als „Überstieg zur Welt“ (GA 9, S. 163), als „Wesen der Wahrheit“ (ebd. S. 186) und der Freiheit des Offenbaren des Seins, da der finalistische Charakter dieser „Freiheit“ und die dadurch gegebene Bindung an das Seinsverständnis und an das Sein die Frage an diese zurück verweist (Anders, a.a.O.: *„Freiheitsphilosophie ohne Freiheit“*). Gerade das Finalistische des ontologisierten und von Figal noch abstrahierten Freiheitsbegriffs setzt dessen Umkehr der Nomenklatur der Begriffe, die meint, „die Intentionen des interpretierten Autors deutlicher zu machen, als dies ihm selbst gelungen ist“, a.a.O., S. 12, so geschliffen das gedacht sein mag, in die Zweifelhafte, in der sie sich seit drei Jahrzehnten befindet. Sich der „Freiheit“ des Seins auszusetzen, war für Heidegger in der Selbstsicht immerhin auch 1933 entscheidend, bekannt seit 1953; da zeigt sich das Vermeinte von Figals Deutung auch darin, dass der Vorsitzende der Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft „überrascht, entsetzt und schockiert“ war (Badische Zeitung v. 23. 1. 2015), da er durch die Publikation der *Schwarzen Hefte* erst erkannte, dass im Denken des Freiheitsphilosophen und gleichzeitigen (!) Nationalsozialisten der Antisemitismus nicht mehr zu bestreiten war.

46 Brief an William J. Richardson. In: W.J. Richardson, *Heidegger – Through Phenomenology to Thought*. Den Haag 1963, S. XVII; die Verwendung des Personalpronomens, „in meinem Denken“, als Heidegger längst von einem entpersonalisierten, passiven Denken sprach („der Vortrag wurde gedacht“, „wurde gesprochen“), ermöglicht die Nivellierung der metabolischen Kehre und der Heidegger seit 1949 von anderen zugesprochenen Wendung in der philosophischen Entwicklung, was willig aufgenommen wurde, *infra*, Kapitel VII, m. Anm. 132.

in dem Brief mit der Aussage beginnt: „Das Denken der Kehre ist eine Wendung in meinem Denken“, dieselbe Wendung ein paar Zeilen später aber „das Seyn als solches“ ist, so ist der Modus offensichtlich, der das Fortschreiten nach dem Misslingen ermöglichte: in der Kehre erst „ist“ das „Seyn als solches“, so Heidegger zu Richardson. Die Kehre ist das „Geschehen des Seyns“, das sich entbirgt, mithin „ist“ sie, das Sein entbergend, auch, oder genauer, gerade erst und nur im Denken über das Sein. Demnach muss es als irrelevant gewertet werden, ob die „Kehre“ hin zu *Zeit und Sein* in Worte gefasst werden konnte, da das Prinzip des Geschehens, das das Sein von der Verborgenheit zur Unverborgenheit, *alētheia*, kehrt, dadurch gar nicht verändert werden kann. Die „Wendung in meinem Denken“, von der Heidegger spricht, ist folglich das sich wendende Sein, das zu *Sein und Zeit* mit dem Plan seiner Umkehr geführt hatte, und diese „Kehre“ blieb beständig nur dadurch möglich, „dass ich bei der zu denkenden Sache geblieben bin.“

Somit ist gemäß den Zeugnissen, die Heidegger davon gibt, indem das Sein die Sache seines Denkens blieb, ein Richtungswechsel, eine Änderung des Standpunkts gar nicht möglich gewesen, und was gemeinhin trotzdem damit bezeichnet wird, erweist sich vielmehr als ein Fortschreiten. In *Sein und Zeit* heißt es: „Die eigentliche Geschichtlichkeit versteht die Geschichte als die ‚Wiederkehr‘ des Möglichen“,⁴⁷ und der Leitgedanke der Wiederkehr des Möglichen bestimmte die Schriften der Jahre danach. *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, 1931/32: „Noch unbegriffen, ja nicht einmal einer Wesensgründung bedürftig, fängt die Ek-sistenz des geschichtlichen Menschen in jenem Augenblick an, da der erste Denker fragend sich der Unverborgenheit des Seienden stellt mit der Frage, was das Seiende sei.“⁴⁸

Statt eine „Kehre“ in der Richtung des heideggerschen Denkens zu suchen, wo keine ist, hätte das „entschwundene Selbstseinkönnen, die ontologische Verfassung des Daseins, die es allein ermöglicht, das Sein zu erschließen, die Frage nach der Subjektivität des Seinsverständnisses des sich entbergenden Seins auf den Plan der Philosophen rufen sollen, denn nun „zeitigt“ sich das Sein selbst. Und die „Ek-sistenz des geschichtlichen Menschen“, das Hineinstehen in das sich entbergende Sein, fängt ja an, da „der erste Denker“ sich fragt, was das Seiende sei. Mit diesem „ersten Denker“, der so und anders genannt wird, erhebt sich der Zirkel einwand des Subjektivismus – „unbegriffen, ja nicht einmal einer Wesensgründung bedürftig“ sei der erste Denker, der aber gleich nach „dem Seienden“ fragt.

Zu diesem epistemologischen Problem hat sich Heidegger 1964 geäußert, als er von dem Versuch von *Zeit und Sein* sagte, dadurch sei „zwar die im üblichen Sinne ‚transzendental‘ gestellte Frage nach der Gegenständlichkeit der Gegenstände vermieden“ worden, allerdings mit der Folge, „daß sie sich aber gerade in die Seinsfrage einschlich in die Form der Frage nach der Bedingung der Möglichkeit (...) des Verstehens von Sein als Sein.“⁴⁹

⁴⁷ SZ, S. 391–392; siehe auch GA 11, S. 20.

⁴⁸ GA 9 (*Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*), S. 189.

⁴⁹ GA 82 (*Zum Einblick in die Notwendigkeit der Kehre*), S. 403, Brief an F.-W. von Herrmann vom 20. Februar 1964; durch die metontologische Kehre, wie Heidegger dort ausführt, ließ sich der Begriff der Temporalität nicht unabhängig vom Dasein begründen.

Durch das metontologische „Umschlagen“, das als dargelegte Kehre von *Zeit und Sein* gescheitert war, entberge sich das Sein also so weit selbst, so dass nach dem Status der Gegenstände nicht mehr gefragt werden müsse, dafür jedoch nach dem des Verstehens. Doch die Subjektivität des Subjekts, blieb auch im Ausweg aus dem gescheiterten Versuch, den Heidegger mit Beginn der 1930er Jahre unter dem Schlagwort der Wahrheit nimmt, ungeklärt.

Mit dem Scheitern, so Heidegger 1964, „ergab sich eine Situation des Denkens, in der dieses vor einen Sachverhalt sich gestellt sah, der dem Denken die Kehre abverlangte. Aber diese war nicht die Sache eines momentanen Aktes, der sich in einem ‚Kehrt marsch!‘ erledigt – die Kehre wurde der Anlaß für ein langwieriges Unterwegs.“ Entgegen der ersten Darstellung im *Humanismusbrief* und die Versetzung der „Kehre“ aus dem Jahr zuvor vollendend, variiert Heidegger nun, indem er es bestreitet, den Satz „Hier kehrt sich das Ganze um“ und erklärt, „es bleibt dabei, daß die Wendung von ‚Sein und Zeit‘ zu Zeit und Sein zwar nicht schon die Kehre selbst ist, aber die durch den Gang von Sein und Zeit erreichte Lage des Denkens, in der es sich vor die Notwendigkeit der Kehre gebracht sieht.“⁵⁰

Mit der Versetzung der „Kehre“ – im *Humanismusbrief* von 1946 wird sie vierfach *Zeit und Sein* zugesprochen, im Brief an Richardson von 1963 dem „Geschehen des Seyns“ und dem „Denken“ und im Brief an von Herrmann 1964 wird sie „dem Denken“ abverlangt – war sie nun in einem entpersonalisiert dargestellten „Denken“ angekommen, womit Heidegger sicher auch auf die Resonanz dieses Begriffs und der entsprechenden Zuordnung durch andere reagierte. Doch aufschlussreicher ist hier, dass Heidegger sich selbst zwar erstmals eine Umkehr nach *Sein und Zeit* zuschreibt, die Gültigkeit dieses Werks damit aber keineswegs infrage gestellt sehen will,⁵¹ denn dadurch laufe man „Gefahr, das Denken nach der Kehre für einen spekulativen Spaziergang zu halten, bei dem man anscheinend nur noch dichtet“, was mit dem Hinweis begegnet wird, vielmehr werde „die ‚Ἀλήθεια‘ als solche“ das „Denkwürdige“, und die „Verbindlichkeit des entsprechenden Denkens“, also der Zirkel einwand des Subjektivismus, könne „erst dann erörtert werden, wenn zuvor die Sache, die bindet, hinreichend gezeigt ist, wobei die ‚Logik‘ dieses Denkens als Besinnung auf die Sprache zur Aufgabe wird.“⁵²

So widersprechend sich Heidegger zur „Kehre“ in diesem Sinn äußert, so vielschichtig lässt sich daraus aber entnehmen, wie sich das zu kehrende subjektivistische Verstehen ohne die „Temporalität“ gekehrt habe, wie sich die *ἀλήθεια* also als der „zum Sein selbst gehörende Charakter“ nun jenseits der zuvor noch angestrebten *veritas temporalis* scheinbar von selbst offenbarte. Unter dem Titel „Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie“ hielt Heidegger im Sommer 1927 eine Vorlesung, „Neue Ausarbeitung des 3. Abschnitts des I. Teiles von ‚Sein und Zeit‘“,⁵³ den zweiten Versuch der gescheiterten Kehre, worin zunächst

⁵⁰ GA 82 (Zum Einblick in die Notwendigkeit der Kehre), S. 403; vgl. dagegen *supra* Anm. 3, *Humanismusbrief*.

⁵¹ Siehe auch ebd., (Laufende Anmerkungen zu ‚Sein und Zeit‘), S. 16: „der Weg von ‚Sein und Zeit‘ zwar notwendig – aber nicht das Eigentliche.“

⁵² ebd., (Zum Einblick in die Notwendigkeit der Kehre), S. 403.

⁵³ GA 24, S. 1, Anm. 1.

die geforderte „Destruktion der Geschichte der Ontologie“ im Vordergrund steht.⁵⁴ In dieser erhaltenen „Kehre“ verschwindet das „Selbstseinkönnen“, das „Man“ geht in der „alltäglichen Seinsart“ auf, und die „Jemeinigkeit“ und „Eigentlichkeit“ werden nur kurz abgehandelt, da die Konstitution des endlichen Daseins zum Seinsverständnis nun weit in den Hintergrund rückt, dagegen aber der erwähnte „Entwurf“ aus *Sein und Zeit* – „die Lichtung des Daseins“ und bald der „ekstatische Bezug zur Lichtung des Seins“ – entscheidend wird: „An diesem Horizont“ der Endlichkeit der Zeit „hat jede Ekstase der Zeit, d.h. die Zeitlichkeit selbst ihr Ende. Aber dieses Ende ist nichts anderes als der Anfang und Ausgang für die Möglichkeit alles Entwerfens“⁵⁵. Im „Entwurf“ findet jene Depotenzierung des Subjekts statt, die mit der Ermächtigung der Zeit, der „Temporalität“, einhergeht, jedoch weiterhin im Modus der nur durch das Dasein gegebenen „Zeitlichkeit“: des aus der Zukunft die Gegenwart bestimmenden „Gewesen“. Wenn sich die „Temporalität“ nicht aus dem Dasein bestimmen ließ, so konnte sie doch über dieses hinaus als „Geschehen“ wirken oder „wesen“, und das wesende Geschehen des Seins ist notwendig eins mit der Wahrheit. Das „Wesen der Wahrheit“, die „Lichtung und Verbergung als Ursprung des Da, west in seinem Grunde“, sagt Heidegger in *Vom Ereignis (Beiträge)*, und dieser aktive Wahrheits- und Seinsbegriff wird 1931/32 mit dem Wechsel vom „Geschehen des Daseins“ in *Sein und Zeit* zum „Geschehen der Wahrheit“ derart allbestimmend,⁵⁶ dass die Frage nach der „Bedingung der Möglichkeit (...) des Verstehens von Sein als Sein“ zugunsten der Verlockung eines *agens* der sich entbergenden Wahrheit aufgeschoben wurde.

Mit der Übertragung des *agens* auf das Sein und der damit einhergehenden Freiheit als Freiheit des Seinlassens der Wahrheit, überdies mit dem „anderen Anfang“, dem

⁵⁴ ebd., S. 175.

⁵⁵ GA 24, S. 437.

⁵⁶ GA 65 (Beiträge), S. 70. Vgl. SZ, §§ 73–74; Martin Heidegger: Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes. 1931/32, Édition Bilingue Numérique. Paris 2002, S. 40, 50, 56; zur Datierung auf 1931/32, ebd. Avant-Propos du Traducteur: Brief an Elisabeth Blochmann v. 20. Dezember 1935. Das *agens* des Seins ist grundsätzlich im ontologischen Metabolismus, in den Ekstasen der Zeitlichkeit, in der sich zeitigenden Zeitlichkeit, SZ, S. 329, in der sich auslegenden Zeitlichkeit, ebd. S. 402 und, 1927, im „Selbstentwurf der Zeitlichkeit“, GA 24, S. 436–37, 438–39, 444 vorgezeichnet. Die chronologische Einordnung des Historikers Morat: *Tat zur Gelassenheit* (wie Anm. 4), S. 141–142, 168, 172, der das *agens* des Seins erst auf 1936 (Beiträge) datiert, ist nicht haltbar, siehe auch GA 66, S. 424: „Seit dem Frühjahr 1932 steht in den Grundzügen der Plan fest, der in dem Entwurf ‚Vom Ereignis‘ [=Beiträge, K.N.] seine erste Gestalt gewinnt“; es zeigt sich auch 1930 im Welt/Freiheitsbegriff, GA 9, S. 186: Vom Wesen der Wahrheit wurde „im Herbst und Winter 1930 (...) vorgetragen“; ebd. S. 164: „Welt ist nie, sondern weltet“ und: „Das entwerfend-überwerfende Waltenlassen von Welt ist die Freiheit“; das mit D. Frede referenzierte, epistemologisch aber allzu uneindeutige Paradigma von Morat, a.a.O., S. 139–140, der „Wandel vom ‚aktiven‘ zum ‚passiven‘ Verständnis der Wahrheit fand erst nach Heideggers Niederlegung des Rektorats statt“, muss in derselben Folge zurückgewiesen werden, es ist schon für SZ mit Blick auf SZ 1,3 fragwürdig; siehe auch Seidl: Sartori und Aletheia (wie Anm. 21), S. 110: „Heideggers Gelassenheit meint keine Passivität, sondern ist jenseits der Dualität von aktiv und passiv gedacht“, was offenbar GA 13, S. 41 wiederholt; vgl. GA 73,1, S. 73; der erste Teil des erst nach Morats Publikation erschienenen Bands GA 73,1 *Zum Ereignis-Denken* stammt aus der ersten Hälfte der 1930er Jahre; ebd. S. 27: „Offenheit ist Wesung des Seyns selbst“; S. 49: „Wahrheit‘ als anfängliche Wesung des Anfangs“; siehe auch *Schöpferische Landschaften*, 1933; der Übergang zum Seinlassen eines sich entbergenden Seins war keine Folge des Scheiterns des Rektorats, wie es Morat nahelegt, a.a.O., S. 142, sondern eine der Kehre von SZ 1,3 oder ihres Scheiterns.

Wieder-holen der vorontologischen Wahrheit des ursprünglichen Daseins durch die Freiheit der Wahrheit als dem Unverborgenen, war zu Beginn der 1930er Jahre das seinsgeschichtlich Tätige so weit vorhanden, dass ein entsprechendes „Ereignis-Denken“ zum Sein formuliert werden konnte. Doch schon im nun gleichermaßen bedeutend werdenden Werk-Begriff sind auch der Dichter, der Denker, der Staatslenker am Werk, in denen sich Heidegger in mancherlei Hinsicht selbst erkennt, wie auch die Dringlichkeit der dem Denken zu folgendenden Tat immerzu betont und schließlich in Heideggers nationalsozialistischen Tätigkeiten auch umgesetzt wird.⁵⁷ So ist die Frage, ob diese Tätigkeiten dem *agens* des Seins und der Freiheit einer passiven Entbergung der Wahrheit im Sinn dieser „Seinsgeschichte“ entsprachen, durch den geistigen Fremdkörper der „Kehre“ bisher nur marginal in den Blick geraten. Doch auch ohne Etikettierungen wie „Seinsgeschichte“ und „passives Wahrheitsverständnis“ für revisionsbedürftig zu halten, zeigt sich, wie verfehlt es ist, Heideggers philosophische und politische Entwicklung durch die Notionen von Tat und Gelassenheit als Merkmale einer „Kehre“ zu trennen, insofern die sich entbergende Wahrheit immer nur in der seinsstiftenden Tätigkeit der „Einzigsten“ möglich ist. Und da fällt es auf, dass sich das Dasein bald viele Helden wählte und dass sich die Werkenden und Wirkenden der Überwindung der subjektivistischen „Metaphysik“ nur fügen wollten, wenn sie in der Freiheit zum Wesen der Wahrheit funktional als Entbergende der Wahrheit des Wesens gelten konnten.

In den *Beiträgen* heißt es: „Der andere Anfang ist der das Seyn verwandelnde Einsprung in seine ursprüngliche Wahrheit.“⁵⁸ Und zum Sprung dahin „kommen immer nur wenige und diese auf verschiedenen Pfaden.“⁵⁹ Wenn Heidegger rückblickend sagt, „Sein und Zeit‘ ist der Übergang zum Sprung“⁶⁰, so konstatiert es also einen solchen „Sprung“ statt der „Kehre“, denn wer da zum Sprung ansetzt, ist der Verfasser von *Sein und Zeit*, wobei der „Sprung in den Wendepunkt der Kehre“ ein solcher der „Wenigen“⁶¹ ist, die, als eigentliche Denker, nach der Wahrheit des Seins fragen. Der eigentliche Heidegger, das ist der Wirt der Wahrheit des „Seyns“, der Kehre, die in ihm einkehrt, oder, um es mit seinen Worten zu sagen, es ist der „Botengänger der Botschaft der Entbergung“.⁶²

Doch auch wenn Heidegger nun eine Form bevorzugt, in der es heißt, seine Texte seien „gedacht“ und seine Vorträge „gesprochen“ worden, und in der alles subjektive Tun im milde stimmenden Moll des Geschehenlassens erklingt und das „Geschehen des Seins“ in gleichem Maß zunimmt, bis das Wesen west, so lässt sich weiterhin fragen, ob der „Sprung, das Gewagteste im Vorgehen des anfänglichen Denkens“, seine erste, offensichtliche Eigenart des Wollens so sinnhaft ins Gegenteil wenden kann, wenn er nur „gestimmt von jener Scheu“ sei, „in der der Wille der Verhaltnenheit sich übersteigt zur Inständigkeit

⁵⁷ Siehe die Quellen bei Morat: *Tat zur Gelassenheit* (wie Anm. 4), S. 131–133.

⁵⁸ GA 65 (*Beiträge*), S. 183.

⁵⁹ ebd., S. 236.

⁶⁰ ebd., S. 234.

⁶¹ ebd., S. 11.

⁶² GA 12 (Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache), S. 129; in dem Dialog zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden schreibt Heidegger dieses Wort dem „Fragenden“ zu.

des Ausstehens der fernsten Nähe der zögernden Versagung“, oder ob es nicht doch so sein möchte, dass solcher Überstieg zum Inständigen des Ausstehens der Nähe der Versagung, welche zögert und im Zögern der Seinsentbergung weicht, alles Subjektive vom gewagten Sprung bis zum Gewähr des sich aus seiner Verborgenheit lichtenden Seins eben bloß besonders besänftigt.⁶³

Auf dem Weg zur Überwindung des Subjektivismus und der „Metaphysik“ ist es sicher äußerst hilfreich, das *agens* im Sein zu entdecken und es auszustehen, doch gilt es dabei dennoch zu wissen, wie das „Seyn“ zu seinen Eigenschaften kam: Der Sprung „erspringt“ allem zuvor die Zugehörigkeit zum Seyn in dessen voller Wesung als Ereignis“,⁶⁴ da ist das „Seyn“ bereits vor dem Sprung bestimmt, als „Ereignis“. Und das Sein ist bei Heidegger durchweg so bestimmt, dass es entschlossen erschlossen werden kann: wie das Sein sein muss, um zu ermöglichen, das „Subjektivistische“ zu überwinden, so ist es, in einer Art monadenhafter Übereinstimmung mit den Bedingungen der Seinserschließung, und diese Synchronizität kann auch die Subjektivierung des Seinsbegriffs genannt werden.⁶⁵

Nach dem Sein zu fragen und zu sehen, dass es tätig ist und sich ereignet und Botschaften entbergen kann, wenn es in Botengängern einkehrt, leitet aber in einen Bereich der Verkündung über, und wenn sich das „transzendente Agens“⁶⁶ des Seins in Substantivierungen wie „Wesung“ und Neolinguismen wie „west“ auch mehr oder weniger verbirgt, so ist es aus dem „Ereignis“ und der „Ereignung“ nicht fortzudenken. Doch die Wiederkehr der seinsbestimmenden Zeit als „Geschehen des Seyns“, das sich als solches in doch beachtlicher Übereinstimmung mit Nietzsches und Diltheys und Yorcks Sein als Werden entbarg, wurde als subjektivistische Setzung ebenso durch die Konzeption einer seinsgeschichtlichen „Kehre“ in einen nächsten „Schleier der Maya“ (Nietzsche) gehüllt wie die intentionalistischen und in husserlscher Diktion fundamentalsubjektivistischen Akte wenigstens des Sagens des Entborgenen. Da es mit *Zeit und Sein* nicht vorangegangen war, weil sich die Zeit nicht fassen ließ, wurde sie gegen den schon vorhandenen Modus der „Unverborgenheit“ getauscht, und da fügte es sich für den Denker, zu den wenigen zu gehören, denen diese sich auch lichten konnte.

Durch den Verlust der Zeit als dem Entwurfsbereich des Seins in Not, bot sich also, wie Heidegger in *Le Thor* ja selbst berichtet, das solidere *alētheia*-Thema an, das durch das Studium der alten Griechen schon vor aller Seinsgeschichte verfügbar war. Die von einer

⁶³ GA 65, S. 227 (Beiträge), Punkt 115: „Die Leitstimmung des Sprungs“.

⁶⁴ ebd.

⁶⁵ Für den Rekurs auf die Monaden bei Leibniz siehe GA 24 (Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie), S. 427; auch Philipse: Heideggers Strategie (wie Anm. 33), S. 573, sagt, dass sich seit *Sein und Zeit*, „die Rangfolge“ von Dasein und Sein umkehrte: „Nun heißt es vom Dasein, daß es vom Sein abhängt, welches ein Agens oder Ereignis sei, das sich zur Gesamtheit alles Seienden radikal transzendent verhalte“; Bollnow: Kehre (wie Anm. 5), S. 122: das „Sein jetzt als etwas Handelndes und Leidendes (...), man möchte sagen als Subjekt“ m. Zitat GA 9, S. 339: „Das Sein als das Geschick, das Wahrheit schickt“; Maria Perrefort, *Opfer und Gehorsam. Kritische Untersuchungen zur Struktur von Heideggers Gelassenheitsidee*, Würzburg, 1990, S. 16: „Projektion eines heimlichen Subjektes“, zit. n. Morat: *Tat zur Gelassenheit* (wie Anm. 4), S. 175, Anm. 57.

⁶⁶ Philipse: Heideggers Strategie (wie Anm. 33), S. 573.

etymologisierenden Deutung des griechischen Wortes abgeleitete Formel „*alētheia* ist Unverborgenheit“, in *Sein und Zeit* noch ein sekundärer Begriff,⁶⁷ stieg somit zum Leitmotiv in Heideggers Denken auf, da sie den Weg öffnete, die Wahrheit des Seins ohne die Mächtigkeit der Zeit zu verkünden, welche, ins *agens* des Seins versetzt, das Geschehen und so das Er-eignis als das Sich-an-eignen nur ermöglicht. Entbergend lichtete sich das Sein: der cartesische König ist tot, es lebe – der heimliche König, der „der Botengänger“ heißt.

V

Mit Blick auf die Ereignisse, die zum Versuch eines ein ganzheitliches Gemeinschaftswesen schaffenden und totalitären Universitätsregiments führten, ist die Frage ganz erheblich, ob der Eigentliche, der Wissende, der auf der Lichtung, die seit dem Beginn der 1930er Jahre die des Seins ist, ausharrt, um das Geschehen des Seins in der Freiheit des Seinlassens der Wahrheit einkehren zu lassen, den Subjektivismus zugunsten der Wahrheit tatsächlich überwindet. Denn so hätte sich dem Botengänger der Botschaft des Seins das vermeintliche Wesen der Wahrheit zunächst als jenes des Nationalsozialismus entborgen und das ohne jedes Zutun des Boten oder, um es mit Otto Bollnows Worten zu sagen, in der Form „einer unmittelbaren Erfassung des Seins“, die „des Umwegs über den Menschen nicht mehr bedarf“. Und dass sich Heidegger auch als ein solcher Botengänger wählte, als er begann, die behauptete Botschaft dieses Geschehens des Seins zu verkünden und in die Tat umzusetzen, ist nicht nur explizit durch Löwiths Überlieferung des Gesprächs in Rom und in den Ruinen von Tusculum und durch Briefe an den Bruder und an Elisabeth Blochmann belegt, es lässt sich auch aus dem Werk-Begriff folgern, der in einer immer noch zu

⁶⁷ Siehe SZ, S. 33; ebd. S. 219 wird erläutert, dass *ἀλήθεια* die „Sachen selbst“ bedeute, „das, was sich zeigt, das Seiende im Wie der Entdecktheit“, sie sei „Wahrheit im Sinne der Entdecktheit (Unverborgenheit)“. Die Übersetzung durch das Wort ‚Wahrheit‘ und die Begriffsbestimmungen verdecken den Sinn dessen, was die Griechen als vorphilosophisches Verständnis“ dem Wort zugrunde gelegt hätten. Ähnlich in *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, GA 9, S. 188 u. 196/4, GA 12, S. 86: „In jedem Fall wird das eine klar: Die Frage nach der *Ἀλήθεια* nach der Unverborgenheit als solcher, ist nicht die Frage nach der Wahrheit. Darum war es nicht sachgemäß und demzufolge irreführend, die *Ἀλήθεια* im Sinne der Lichtung Wahrheit zu nennen.“ Darin sah Ernst Tugendhat: Philosophische Aufsätze, Frankfurt /M. 1992, S. 14, eine von Heideggers „seltenen Korrekturen“, die aufgrund von Tugendhats Aufsatz *Heideggers Idee von der Wahrheit* vorgenommen worden sei, „doch hat er es nicht über sich gebracht, mich dabei zu erwähnen“. Die Lesart von „Heideggers Selbstkorrektur“ und dem „Widerruf“ seines Wahrheitsbegriffes seit 1930 („retraction“, Daniel O. Dahlstrom: *Transcendental Truth and the Truth That Prevails*). In: Steven Crowell; Jeff Malpass, *Transcendental Heidegger*. Stanford 2007, S. 64) wurde mehrfach wiederholt [Tilo Wesche: *Wahrheit und Werturteil. Eine Theorie der praktischen Rationalität*, S. 289; Lorenz B. Puntel: ‚Wahrheit‘ als semantisch-ontologischer Grundbegriff. In: Ingolf U. Dalferth; Philipp Stoellger: *Wahrheit in Perspektiven: Probleme einer offenen Konstellation*. Tübingen 2004, S. 73: „*ἀλήθεια* bedeutet Heidegger zufolge ursprünglich: *Unverborgenheit* (im Sinne der Lichtung) u.ä. Nachdem Heidegger beinahe ein Leben lang diese These vertreten hat, gab er sie im Jahre 1964 auf, indem er eine bedeutsame Selbstkorrektur vornahm: „...“]; es scheint sich hier jedoch um einen Irrtum von Tugendhat zu handeln, die Stelle belegt vielmehr die Kontinuität des Begriffs bei Heidegger: „Darum war es nicht sachgemäß und demzufolge irreführend [von den auch dort erwähnten Übersetzungen und der ontologischen Tradition], die *Ἀλήθεια* im Sinne der Lichtung [also die vorontologische „Unverborgenheit“] Wahrheit zu nennen“, woraufhin Heidegger wiederholt, was in SZ dazu gesagt wurde. Auch der Kontext bestätigt das, und es hätte Tugendhat zweifeln lassen können, dass Heidegger das Leitmotiv seines Denkens der Seinsentbergung mit einem Satz *ad acta* gelegt haben sollte.

wenig beachteten Schrift erstmals ausgearbeitet wurde, die Heidegger zeit seines Lebens „in einem Schubert“ verwahrte. Die Frage nach der Gültigkeit der „Kehre“ im Sinn einer Überwindung des Subjektivismus hin zur Wahrheit des Seins ist somit auch eine nach der seinsphilosophischen Dimension von Heideggers nationalsozialistischem Aufbruch.

In einer Erörterung des „Schubert-Textes“ zeigt sich zudem, wie die „Jemeinigkeit“ und das „Selbstseinkönnen“ aus *Sein und Zeit* mit dem dort nur einmal erwähnten „Volk“ und der „Gemeinschaft“ in eine Einheit gesetzt werden, ähnlich dem „Schicksal“ und dem „Geschick“, die Heidegger erst noch unterscheidet, bald aber im Sinn eines seinsgeschichtlichen Wetterleuchtens verwendet. In *Sein und Zeit* heißt es dazu: „Wenn aber das schicksalhafte Dasein als In-der-Welt-sein wesentlich im Mitsein mit anderen existiert, ist sein Geschehen ein Mitgeschehen und bestimmt als Geschick. Damit bezeichnen wir das Geschehen der Gemeinschaft, des Volkes.“⁶⁸ So ist es nicht ganz zutreffend, wenn gesagt wird, „Schicksal“ meine das Geschehen des Einzelnen, „Geschick“ aber das der Gemeinschaft oder des Volkes.⁶⁹ Denn „Geschick“ meint das Geschehen des Daseins als Mitsein, und „Dasein“ ist immer auch „Mitsein“.⁷⁰ „Geschick“ ist schon in *Sein und Zeit* mithin eine Ereignisart des „Schicksals“, und so sagt Heidegger, erst das „schicksalhafte Geschick des Daseins in und mit seiner ‚Generation‘ macht das volle, eigentliche Geschehen des Daseins aus.“ Das „Geschehen des Daseins“ ist von dem Geschehen des Mitseins also nicht zu trennen, es ist „Schicksal“ und „Geschick“. Wenn Heidegger einige Jahre später, im Dezember 1931, an seinen Bruder schreibt, es sehe so aus, „als ob Deutschland erwacht und sein Schicksal begreift und erfaßt“,⁷¹ so folgt das zwar nicht streng der Terminologie aus *Sein und Zeit*, referiert aber doch auf eben diese Konzeption: aus „den in der Zukunft verwurzelten Phänomenen der Überlieferung und Wiederholung wurde deutlich, warum das Geschehen der eigentlichen Geschichte sein Gewicht in der Vergangenheit hat.“⁷² So ist das „tatsächlich‘ eigentlich Dagewesene“ auch schon im frühen Hauptwerk „die existenzielle Möglichkeit, in der sich Schicksal, Geschick und Welt-Geschichte faktisch“ bestimmen, als die „stille Kraft des Möglichen“.⁷³

Und die „stille Kraft des Möglichen“ ist schon nicht so weit entfernt vom „Geschehen des Seyns“, dass dieses in der gesetzten Umkehr zu *Zeit und Sein* nicht gerade daraus geschlossen werden könnte. Es lässt sich durchweg zeigen, dass die Zuordnungen des Aktiven und Passiven sich zwar nach *Sein und Zeit* anders gewichten, doch weder dann noch zuvor absolut sind und dass der grundlegende Gedanke eines Geschicks, dessen Macht die

⁶⁸ SZ, S. 384.

⁶⁹ Siehe Thomas Sheehan: L'affaire Faye: Faut-il brûler Heidegger? In: *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 60, Heft 2, 2016, S. 481–535, hier: S. 493.

⁷⁰ SZ, S. 120: „Das Mitsein bestimmt existenzial das Dasein auch dann, wenn ein Anderer faktisch nicht vorhanden und wahrgenommen ist. Auch das Alleinsein des Daseins ist Mitsein in der Welt.“

⁷¹ Brief an seinen Bruder, 18. Dezember 1931. In: *Heidegger und der Antisemitismus. Positionen im Widerstreit. Mit Briefen von Martin und Fritz Heidegger*. Hrsg. v. Walter Homolka. Freiburg i. Br. 2016, S. 21.

⁷² SZ, S. 386–387.

⁷³ S. 394.

Eigentlichen oder „die Einzigen“⁷⁴ zur Freiheit verhelfen, seitdem nur fortgesetzt wurde, ohne, wie Heidegger sagt, eine „Änderung des Standpunktes“: Im „Miteinandersein“ und „in der Entschlossenheit“ sind „die Schicksale im Vorhinein schon geleitet“,⁷⁵ da ist das Passive des Subjekts bereits in *Sein und Zeit* vorgezeichnet. Und in „der Mitteilung und im Kampf wird die Macht des Geschickes erst frei“,⁷⁶ da wird die Macht des Geschehens des Mitseins durch die Tätigkeit des einzelnen Daseins „erst frei“, worin schon die Konzeptionen des „Schöpfenden“, des Dichtenden, des „einzigen Denkers“, des „Gewalt-tägigen“,⁷⁷ der das „Geschehen des Seyns“ in der Freiheit zum Seinlassen zum Austrag bringt, erkennbar sind. Entsprechend wird das Ereignis der freigesetzten Macht des Geschicks des Volks zum entborgenen „Geschehen des Seyns“.

Der von Heidegger zeitlebens zurückgehaltene Schubert-Text – die ursprüngliche Fassung von *Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* aus den Jahren 1931/32 –, widerlegte mehrere gängige Thesen, als er 1989 erstmals in den *Heidegger-Studien* veröffentlicht wurde.⁷⁸ So etwas muss man nicht gleich zur Kenntnis nehmen, doch ist die Entscheidung zwischen der philologischen Evidenz und den Thesen der Forschung auch nicht disjunktiv. Insbesondere die historiographisierende Version einer „Kehre“ in Heideggers Denken, die aufgrund des Misslingens des Rektorats im Jahr 1934 stattgefunden habe, lässt sich durch diese Schrift – wie auch durch die erwähnten anderen – *ad acta* legen, schon, da sie das passive Erschließen der aktiven Wahrheit und mithin den Werkbegriff deutlich vor den Beginn des Rektorats 1933 setzt.⁷⁹ Auch zahlreiche der zentralen Begriffe und Konzeptionen oder

⁷⁴ GA 65 (Beiträge), S. 43.

⁷⁵ SZ, S. 384.

⁷⁶ ebd.

⁷⁷ Siehe GA 40 (Einführung in die Metaphysik), S. 159 (als Deutung des ersten Chorlieds der *Antigone*).

⁷⁸ Heidegger-Studien. Berlin, 1989, Bd. 5, S. 5–22; Heidegger: *Ursprung* (wie Anm. 56); „in einem Schubert aufbewahrt“: Hermann Heidegger, ebd. S. 10; so ist auch das „Wesen der Erde“ als das „Sichverschließende“, ebd., S. 26–30, bereits auf 1931/32 zu datieren, nicht erst auf 1935.

⁷⁹ Die These von Morat: *Tat zur Gelassenheit* (wie Anm. 4), S. 199, Anm. 104, einer „Kehre“ zur Passivität nach dem Rektorat setzt voraus, dass der Werkbegriff bei Heidegger erst nach 1934 entsteht, was u.a. der Schubert-Text, wie noch zu sehen, widerlegt. Morat erwähnt den Text, a. a. O., S. 200, Anm. 105, kennt den Inhalt aber nicht oder verschweigt ihn um seiner These willen. Unter dem Vorbehalt einer solchen Methodik nun aber zuverlässige Studien zu kritisieren, siehe ders., ebd. S. 199, Anm. 104, geht über eine Fehldarstellung noch hinaus: nicht die Theorie von Alexander Schwan: *Politische Philosophie im Denken Heideggers*. Opladen, 1965, 1989, siehe insb. S. 94, Anm. 30, ist unzutreffend, sondern Morats Datierung von Heideggers Werkbegriff – obgleich Schwan, anders als Morat, den Schubert-Text noch nicht kennen konnte. Dass das Scheitern des Rektorats auf Grundlagen von Heideggers Denken großen Einfluss gehabt hätte, ist unbelegt und unwahrscheinlich. Morats Studie hat für das Thema des Einflusses der Jünger-Brüder auf Heideggers Denken sicher bleibenden Wert, doch die Paradigmen, die Heideggers politisches Handeln und sein Denken bedingend erklären sollen („Abschied von der Tat“: 1934), folgen einem historiographisierenden Entwurf der philosophischen Exegese, der in dieser Kernaussage bezüglich des philosophischen Werks unzutreffend ist – und oft auch Fehlschlüsse durch mangelnde Fachkenntnisse zeigt, *pars pro toto*: Im Kontext geistiger Strömungen der Weimarer Republik sagt Morat, a.a.O. S. 111, das „Existenzideal des ‚Vorlaufens in den Tod‘ und in die ‚äußerste Möglichkeit der Selbstaufgabe‘ erscheint gleichzeitig als das ‚Existenzideal des todesmutigen Frontkämpfers‘“, eine Lesart, die, bei aller gebotenen Kritik, einer faden Fehldeutung folgt, über die sich schon Heidegger nicht zu unrecht aufregte, GA 65, S. 284: „Unvermögen, die dort vorbereitete Fragestellung nachzuvollziehen“. Das „Vorlaufen

ihre Vorformen, die 1932 zum Plan für *Vom Ereignis (Beiträge)* geführt haben werden, finden sich hier schon.

Da der Verlust der Zeit als Bestimmung oder als „Horizont“ des Seinsverständnisses nach dem stillen Scheitern von *Zeit und Sein* durch den Modus *alētheia und Sein* ersetzt wurde, musste das Sein also nicht mehr dargelegt werden, sondern konnte sich durch die Unverborgenheit als Geschehen selbst mitteilen, wobei diese Subjektivierung des Seins also die entscheidende Frage nach dem Verbleib des Subjekts des Erkennens offenlässt, das cartesisch *cogito* heißt und kantisch *Ich denke, so ich erlebe*. Dieses nunmehr ungewollte Subjekt sollte jetzt teils im Begriff des Werks verschwinden, teils aber auch aus ihm – als jenes der „Einzigsten“ des Da des Seins und so dem sich entbergenden Sein ganz unterstellt und gewissermaßen entsubjektiviert – wieder hervorgehen. Das Verschwinden im Werk besorgt das Subjekt selbst, wie in jenem Schubert-Text zu lesen: „Gerade in der großen Kunst – und von ihr allein ist hier die Rede – bleibt der Künstler gegenüber der Wirklichkeit des Werkes etwas Gleichgültiges, fast wie ein im Schaffen sich selbst vernichtender Durchgang.“⁸⁰ Im Schaffen des Werks – und da geht es, wie noch zu sehen, um die Entbergung der Wahrheit – vernichtet sich der Künstler –, fast – selbst, so dass fast nur Werk und Wahrheit bleiben.⁸¹ Und der Schaffende als solcher kann auch nicht mehr sein als der Durchgang der Notwendigkeit der Entbergung der Wahrheit, denn „die Notwendigkeit des Werkes erst ist der Grund der Möglichkeit des Künstlers.“⁸² Und da war lange nicht erkennbar, dass damit die Überwindung des Subjektivismus von statten gehen sollte.

Doch in dem für Heideggers Denken wie auch für sein politisches Handeln der 1930er Jahre grundlegenden Ereignis-Wahrheit-Werk-Modus wird jenes transzendental-metaphysische Wesen, das die Repräsentation der Erfahrung, die Tätigkeit des Verstands und der Vernunft, das Denken und somit auch die Vorstellung des Seins erst erzeugt, als ein „im Schaffen sich selbst vernichtender Durchgang“ und als Einheit mit dem Da „fast“ aufgelöst und gegenüber der Entbergung der Wahrheit des Seins explizit entmach-

in den Tod“ ist schon einmal kein „Existenzideal“, sondern eine Bedingung des eigentlichen Daseins, und es hat nichts mit in den Tod „laufen“ zu tun; es meint die Abkehr von „sich andrängenden Möglichkeiten“, z. B. der *meditatio futurae vitae*, angesichts der Sorge um den Tod. Der Imperativ aus SZ ist nicht *Sei bereit zu sterben*, sondern: *Vergegenwärtige dir den Tod als das Nichts deines Daseins, nur dann ist die Not zur Eigentlichkeit (und von da aus das Sein) einsehbar*, siehe SZ, § 49 u. S. 264; GA 20, S. 440; GA 65 (Beiträge), S. 283: „nicht, damit das bloße ‚Nichts‘ erreicht werde, sondern umgekehrt, damit sich die Offenheit für das Seyn ganz aus dem Äußersten öffne“; SZ, S. 391: „Geburt‘ im Zurückkommen“ nach dem Vorlaufen in den Tod; 1950 bezüglich des Seins, GA 70 (Das Ding), S. 180: „Der Tod birgt als der Schrein des Nichts das Wesende des Seins in sich.“ Das „Vorlaufen in den Tod“ verdient jedoch Kritik im Vergleich mit „großen Tod“ im Zen-Buddhismus, *supra*.

80 Heidegger: Ursprung (wie Anm. 56), S. 14.

81 Dass der Künstler geradezu „ausgeschaltet“ wird, *infra*, ist in der Minimierung seiner Bedeutung in anderen Theorien m. W. nicht der Fall; schwerer wiegt aber, dass der Zweck hier in der Möglichkeit der Entbergung der Wahrheit durch das sich selbst ins Werk setzende Werk liegt, siehe Markus Weidler: *Heidegger's Style. On Philosophical Anthropology and Aesthetics*. London, Oxford 2019, S. 77: „it is generally possible to relate such de-emphasizing of the artist's identity to various political agendas, including liberal or socialist ones. For example Karl Popper de-emphasized the significance of the artist as creator such as Heidegger did. However, Popper did not tie this approach to an eschatology of Primal Language through which being reveals itself“.

82 Heidegger: Ursprung (wie Anm. 56), S. 16.

tet.⁸³ Die „Hervorbringung“ des Kunstwerks durch den Künstler wird auf der Suche nach dem „Werksein des Werkes“ vom Werk „abgelöst“,⁸⁴ es wird „zu Beginn eigens die Hervorbringung durch den Künstler ausgeschaltet.“⁸⁵ Als bloße Möglichkeit der „Notwendigkeit des Werkes“ ist der Künstler kaum der Rede wert, denn die „*Ins-Werk-Setzung der Wahrheit*“ ist „*das Wesen der Kunst*“ und „dem, der das Da ist“, wird „die Offenheit“ vorausgeworfen, „d.h. der dichtende Entwurf wird dem Da-sein zugeworfen“, vom herakliteschen „Geschehen“ der „Eröffnung der Offenheit des Widerstreits von Unverborgenem und Verborgenen“, dem „Herauskommen von Verdeckung und Verstellung“, und „dieses in sich gefügte Geschehen ist das Geschehen dessen, was wir Wahrheit nennen.“⁸⁶ Das „Wesen der Kunst als Ins-Werk-setzen der Wahrheit ist der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes“,⁸⁷ und so ist das Werk eines jener „Bestreitung“, die in anderen Zeiten noch *polemos* hieß, und derlei nun anstelle des Subjekts erwirkt. Im Werk ist „das Geschehen der Wahrheit am Werk“,⁸⁸ und diese, „als Offenheit“, ist „immer Offenheit des Da, in das alles Seiende und Unseiende hereinsteht“ – und wer „übernimmt es, dieses ‚Da‘ zu sein? Antwort: der Mensch – nicht als Einzelner, auch nicht als Gemeinschaft.“ Denn diese „beiden Weisen des Menschseins“ seien nur möglich, „wenn der Mensch zuvor das Da übernimmt.“ Und indem „der Mensch das Da ist, d.h. geschichtlich ist, wird er ein Volk.“⁸⁹ Wie sich in *Sein und Zeit* das Schicksal des einzelnen Daseins und das Geschick des Mitseins des Daseins und des Volkes im „schicksalhaften Geschick“ trafen, so treffen sich der einzelne Mensch und das Volk im Da der Wahrheit der „Geschichte“, die im Werk offen ist. Ontologische Einheit: Mensch und Volk sind eins im „Da“. In diesem Geschehen des Verschwindens des Subjekts bleiben nur „Einzigste“ zur „Stiftung des Seyns“⁹⁰ zurück, voran die Dichter.⁹¹

⁸³ Siehe der Mensch als „Machthaber des Seins“, *Humanismusbrief*, GA 9, S. 330.

⁸⁴ Heidegger: Ursprung (wie Anm. 56), S. 14.

⁸⁵ ebd., S. 24.

⁸⁶ ebd., S. 40.

⁸⁷ ebd., S. 52

⁸⁸ ebd. S. 40; auch die „Wahrheit als Grundgeschehen im Wesen des Menschen“, GA 36/37, S. 176–179, ist, wie der Titel sagt, ein Geschehen der Wahrheit, und dessen bloße Verortung „im Wesen des Menschen“ bestimmt die Existenz des Menschen (daher „Grundgeschehen“) und nicht der Tiere (ebd., S. 178); das „Grundgeschehen der Wahrheit“ ist schon wörtlich keine solche „aktivistische Deutung der Wahrheitsfrage“, die den Menschen und in diesem Sinn das „Subjektivistische“ betrifft, wie es Morat: *Tat zur Gelassenheit* (wie Anm. 4), S. 141–42, meint, um zu belegen, dass Heidegger „1933 und 1934 die spätere Wende zur Kritik des Subjektivismus noch nicht vollzogen hat“, sondern auf den „heroischen Existenzialismus“ von SZ zurückgegangen sei, wobei zudem hätte auffallen können, dass das „Geschehen“ in SZ noch das des Daseins und nicht der Wahrheit ist.

⁸⁹ Heidegger: Ursprung (wie Anm. 56), S. 48.

⁹⁰ ebd., S. 46.

⁹¹ Es ist Reinhard Mehring: *Heideggers Überlieferungsgeschick: eine dionysische Selbstinszenierung*. Würzburg 1992, S. 69, Anm. 16 gegen Schwan: *Politische Philosophie* (wie Anm. 79), S. 91, zuzustimmen, dass dieser mit der *polis* als „Werk für die Werke“ das „Fundierungsverhältnis von Dichtung und Staatsgründer“ bei Heidegger verkehrt. Auch wenn die Rektoratsrede wie eine Synopsis für eine privatnationalsozialistische *Politeia* gelesen werden kann, ist es zu dieser aber nie gekommen, und sie war auch nie geplant. Zwar belegen die Begrifflichkeiten des Volkes, des „Volkhaften“, des „völkischen Prinzips“ und des „Volkskörpers“, als Einheit mit dem Menschen im Da und als nur als solche seiend, auch in den *Beiträgen*, GA 65, S. 42, 43, 50, 51, 97, 98, 319 (§

und, schon 1931/32, erstlich Hölderlin, denn das „Volk ist immer schon in sein Da geworfen (Hölderlin, der Dichter).“⁹²

In der erstaunlich verkannten Kontinuität, die *Sein und Zeit* und die zweite Fassung von *Zeit und Sein* 1929 mit den drei Werken *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (1929), *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (1931/32) und *Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerks* (1931/32) zwar nicht ganz linear verbindet, doch die mittels der *alētheia* als Modus einer unmittelbaren Entbergung der Wahrheit des Seins und als Ersatz für die Zeit als „Horizont“ des Seins ermöglicht wird,⁹³ ist bis zum 1932 feststehenden „Plan“ für *Vom Ereignis (Beiträge)* bereits das konzeptionelle und terminologische Repertoire, das Heideggers philosophisches Werk wenigstens bis zum *Humanismusbrief* prägt oder sogar beherrscht, weitgehend entwickelt – „Sprung“,⁹⁴ „Geschehen der Wahrheit“, „Ereignis“, das „anfängliche Denken“, die „Bestreitung“, bald „Zerklüftung des Seyns“,⁹⁵ das „Werk“ als „Stiftung des Seyns“ und „Hölderlin, der Dichter“ –, und so führt von dort eine nun recht gerade Linie zum zweiten Hauptwerk, *Vom Ereignis (Beiträge)*.

Wird von hier aus also der Werk-Begriff zugrunde gelegt, der in der ersten Studie, die eine *Politische Philosophie im Denken Heideggers* erkannte, als Sprachwerk, Kunstwerk, Denkwerk und Staatswerk erörtert wurde,⁹⁶ so lässt sich darin, hier begründet, die Subjektivierung des Geschehens des Seins, des Geschehens der Wahrheit, des Ins-Werk-setzens des Werks selbst, als eine bloße Versetzung des Subjektiven erkennen, die zudem zu einer Spaltung führt und bald mit dem Dichter, dem Denker, dem Staatslenker, dem Gründer

196), 398 (§ 251), 399, dass das im Boden verwurzelte und geschichtliche Dasein gemäß der Formel „Mensch und Volk sind eins im Da“ einen seinsgeschichtlichen Entwurf begründet, der Heideggers Formung eines nur dann seienden Volkes genannt werden kann. Doch bleibt der Dichter, ebd. S. 11 und *passim*, jener, der „das Seyn stiftet“, und diese Stellung des Ersten der Dichtung, mithin der „Werks für die Werke“, ist schon in *Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerks 1931/32* unzweideutig.

92 Heidegger: Ursprung (wie Anm. 56), S. 48; des weiteren: S. 36: „Die Dichtung Hölderlins steht wirklicher in unserer Sprache als alle Theater, Lichtspiele und Reimereien“. Spätestens mit der Publikation des „Schuber-Textes“ ist das Paradigma von Heideggers „Einmaligkeit des Selbst als eine situierte Vereinzelung“ [Theodore Kisiel: Der Zeitbegriff beim frühen Heidegger (um 1925), in: *Phänomenologische Forschungen*. Vol. 14, *Zeit und Zeitlichkeit bei Husserl und Heidegger* (1983), s. 192–211, Hamburg, 1983, hier: S. 199], insofern sie der „Universalität des transzendentalen Ich“ als „Einmaligkeit des Selbst“ (ebd.) entgegen gesetzt wird, auf die Konzeption der „Einzigsten“ u.ä. zu reduzieren, deren Individualität gleichwohl in der finalistischen Bestimmung der „Stiftung des Seyns“ begrenzt ist und im „Da“ in einer Einheit mit dem Volk aufgeht.

93 siehe zur Umkehr der Wertigkeit von Zeit und Wahrheit auch die *Beiträge*, GA 65, S. 74, 234; für seine These, Heidegger sei vor allem als Freiheitsphilosoph zu begreifen, erörtert Figal: *Phänomenologie der Freiheit* (wie Anm. 45) Kontinuität und Wandel des Begriffs der Freiheit u.a. in den genannten Werken, da dieser von *Sein und Zeit* zu *Vom Wesen des Grundes* und *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* seine Form annimmt.

94 GA 9 (*Was ist Metaphysik*, 1929), S. 118; 122.

95 die von Heraklit hergenommene *coincidentia oppositorum* des Seins wird zu jener von Lichtung und Verbergung, *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* von 1930, GA 9, S. 193–198, und Heidegger: Ursprung (wie Anm. 56), S. 40, eine Weiterentwicklung von SZ, S. 30; die „Zerklüftung des Seins“ in GA 73.1 nimmt in diesem Sinn mit der nachgerade infantilistisch erscheinenden Paraphrasierung „auseinandergebogen“ als der ersten Bemerkung dazu, S. 5, Punkt 1, auf das bekannteste der einschlägigen Fragmente von Heraklit, DK 22 B 51, Bezug, und variiert das unter Punkt 12.

96 Schwan: *Politische Philosophie* (wie Anm. 79), *passim*.

und Stifter, dem Gewalt-tätigen, dem Helden, den sich das Dasein wählt, ähnlich wie es Herkules bei den Quellen der Amymone erging, viele Köpfe nachwachsen sieht. Wer immerzu von dem Unverborgenem der Wahrheit spricht, dem wird vielleicht nicht zugetraut, die Wahrheit zu verbergen, obgleich die Warnung vor dem Ich ein gängiges Kunststückchen ist. Doch im teils nüchternen, teils passionierten, teils bemühten, teils aberwitzigen Wähnen der „Kehre“ konnten sich die vielen Köpfe dieses neuen Subjektivismus hinter den Etiketten der „Seinsgeschichte“ und der „Überwindung des Subjektivismus“ verbergen, wobei nur sehr gelegentlich auffiel, dass die Wahrheit sich jemandem entbergen müsse und so die „Erkenntnis der Erkenntnis“⁹⁷ wieder zur Frage steht.

Der Einwand, dass derlei Hantieren mit bloßen Etikettierungen aber nicht Heidegger treffen könne, der die Überwindung des Transzendenzproblems aus „transzendentalen Ideal“ und „intuitus originarius“ selbst „nicht durch eine Flucht ins Objektive“, sondern „einzig durch eine ständig zu erneuernde ontologische Interpretation der Subjektivität des Subjekts“⁹⁸ für möglich hielt, verschiebt die Frage also auf dieses nächste Feld, auf das der Interpretation der Subjektivität des Springenden, des im Da Da-seienden, in dem die Wahrheit als Grundgeschehen und als Werk des Widerstreits des Sichverbergenden mit dem Unverborgenem west. Bei allen Aussagen, die Heidegger über das Sein tätigte, dass es Geschehen sei, Unverborgenheit und Verborgenheit zugleich, Zerklüftung, „das in sich gegenschwingende Ereignis“, das die „Kehre“ anzeige⁹⁹ – als hätte niemand zuvor die Fragmente von Heraklit und das Lehrgedicht von Parmenides gelesen¹⁰⁰ –, auch das „Erzittern der Erschwingung in der „Kehre“ als „Wesung des Seyns“,¹⁰¹ bei allen solchen Aussagen, die die Bände „Zum Ereignis-Denken“ und „Vom Ereignis“ (*Beiträge*) füllen, verharret die Analyse der Subjektivität des Subjekts, das solches erschließt, in der „Loslösung von jedem persönlichen ‚Gemächte‘“ noch vor der Gründung des „anderen Anfangs“, in einem Sagedich-los noch vor dem „Anklang“ des Wesens des Seins, welches aber im Sagen gesammelt werde und doch „nur selbst aus diesem Wesen“ erklinge,¹⁰² was hinzunehmen angesichts der damit einhergehenden Affirmation einer historischen Wende des Denkens überhaupt ein *amen* ist, dem das *sapere aude* weiterhin entgegen steht, da hier keine bloße Anleitung zur Meditation gegeben, sondern die Wahrhaftigkeit des Sagens des Seins durch „Einzigs-te“ legitimiert wird.

Die Übernahme der Legende der „Kehre“ hat bei den Gefolgsleuten als solche „Einzigs-te“ dann nur die Dichter und Denker zugelassen. Die Verherrlichung jenes „Einzigs-

⁹⁷ Manfred Brelage: *Studien zur Transzendentalphilosophie*, Berlin 1965, S. 42; siehe auch Anders: *Über Heidegger* (wie Anm. 45), S. 245–46 („Scheinkonkretheit“).

⁹⁸ GA 9 (Vom Wesen des Grundes), S. 162.

⁹⁹ GA 65 (Beiträge), S. 261

¹⁰⁰ eine Kehre entspricht auch dem Sprachbild *παλιντροπος κέλευθος*, „sich zurückrichtender Weg“, „gegenstrebige Bahn“ bei Parmenides, DK 28 B 6, der aber die zur antiken Metontologie gegenteilige Bedeutung des sich der Seinerkenntnis verschließenden Wegs hat. Der Antagonismus des Dichters und der „Doppelköpfe“ findet sich bei Heidegger in dem „eigentlichen Dasein“/den „Einzigsten“ und dem uneigentlichen Dasein wieder.

¹⁰¹ GA 65 (Beiträge), S. 262.

¹⁰² ebd., S. 4.

ten“, der schon im Dezember 1931 als ein solcher erscheint, der „einen ungewöhnlichen und sicheren, politischen Instinkt hat und eben schon gehabt hat, wo wir alle noch benebelt waren“ und dessen Bewegung „künftig noch ganz andere Kräfte zuwachsen“, was zurückführen werde „in das Wesen und die Aufgabe der Deutschen“¹⁰³ ist jedoch die erste jener Emanationen des sich selbst entbergenden Seins, womit die Frage der Verborgenheit des Subjektivistischen über das rein Ontologische hinaus bedeutend wird.

Denn der Subjektivismus der Seinsentbergung betrifft dann die Möglichkeit des Gewährwerdens des Nationalsozialismus als „ungewöhnliche sammelnde Kraft“ der „Berufung des Deutschen in der Geschichte des Abendlandes“, des exzessiven Hitlerismus und seiner Folgen; die These, Heidegger sei schon bei *Sein und Zeit* als Nazi am Werk gewesen, obgleich er da noch landsmannschaftlich-volksstämmisch und nicht nationalistisch orientiert war, schließt den für Heidegger historischen Moment eines solchen Wetterleuchtens des Seins aus, das durch jene im Voraus bestehenden Dispositionen so erfasst werden konnte, die evidentermaßen nicht allein im cartesischen Sinn durch das Subjekt des *cogito* herzuleiten oder allgemein intentionalistisch „subjektivistisch“ zu nennen sind, sondern darüber hinaus durch alle individuell weltanschaulichen und charakterlichen Eigenheiten konstituiert werden, die dafür erforderlich sind, gerade als Seinsphilosoph ein Sagender des Nazismus zu sein. Dieser Heidegger als Botengänger der Botschaft eines Seins, das ihm die Botschaft des Nationalsozialismus entbarg, der vermeintlich seinsgeschichtlich erweckte Nationalsozialist, wird durch die genannte These wie auch durch jene einer nur anfänglichen Verblendung, die Heideggers Werk nicht betreffe, aber auch durch die Konstruktionen „der Kehre“, die gerade für jene Zeit gilt, ausgespart.

Doch war die Botschaft einer geschichtlichen Großartigkeit des NS-Aufbruchs keineswegs, wie in der Verlegenheit um die Einordnung des Nazismus ins Seinsdenken gesagt wurde, eine „Missachtung der Verwiesenheit des Daseins an das Sein“,¹⁰⁴ sondern der erste Offenbarungseid der Seinsentbergung, die sich als eine *adaequatio* der subjektiven Dispositionen des Botengängers zeigt, als ontologische *petitio principii* im ersten Sinn des Wortes, als ein „Gesuch“ des Gewollten durch den Modus der Unverborgenheit. Hätte sich das Sein Heidegger auch einmal als ein humanistischer Imperativ entborgen oder als die Not zum Widerstand gegen den Anlass des Brands der Synagoge, neben deren noch rauchender Ruine der Professor in der Freiburger Universität gleich nebenan am Morgen des 10. November 1938 ungerührt dozierte, hätte ihm das Sein einmal nur das ihm Widerstrebende enthüllt, so wäre dieses eine Mal ersichtlich eine andere als die erwünschte Wahrheit in die Lichtung gekommen.

VI

Obgleich die braune Variante der Reise nach Syrakus zeitlich den Publikationen der Seinsentbergung durch Deutungen der Dichtung und Kunst und durch Verse zum Sein vorherging, muss der Gedanke der Staatsgründung, die heideggersche *Akadēmeia*, die an

¹⁰³ Heidegger: Brief an Fritz Heidegger v. 18. Dezember 1931 (wie Anm. 71), S. 22.

¹⁰⁴ Florian Grosser: *Revolution denken. Heidegger und das Politische 1919–1969*. München 2011, S. 98.

liberalen Professoren, aber auch am Kompetenzstreit mit dem SA-Hochschulamt scheiterte, im seinsphilosophischen Entwurf des Werks gegenüber der Dichtung jedoch als nachrangig betrachtet werden.¹⁰⁵ Heidegger war schon im zweiten Versuch, *Sein und Zeit* umzukehren, auf die Dichtung als den Modus der Seinsentbergung durch die Ek-sistenz des Daseins gekommen, da „alles geschichtlich Seiende im Sinne des Weltgeschichtlichen – die Kulturwerke – hinsichtlich seines Entstehens unter ganz anderen Seinsbedingungen steht als hinsichtlich seines Verfallens“ und letzteres schon in den Bereich der Innerweltlichkeit der Natur, das Entstehen aber noch zum In-der-Welt-sein des Daseins gehöre, das „eine Welt sich vorwirft“ und in diesem Vorwerfen der Welt, dem „Vorwurf“, auch „immer schon *aus sich heraus getreten*, ex-sistere,“ sei.¹⁰⁶ Die Dichtung ist folglich nicht anderes als das elementare „Zum-Wort-kommen, d.h. Entdecktwerden der Existenz als des In-der-Welt-seins.“¹⁰⁷ Doch der Dichter dieser Dichtung war da noch Rilke und nicht Heidegger. Nachdem jedoch das Dasein des Künstlers zugunsten des subjektivierten Seins in *Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* 1931/32 „ausgeschaltet“ worden war, betätigte sich Heidegger selbst als Entbergender des Seins und des Wesens der Wahrheit. Das Nachdenken über das Wie des Philosophierens war somit keineswegs, wie gemeint wurde, jenes, dem sich Heidegger nach dem Verlust des seinsbestimmenden Zeithorizonts „ganz“¹⁰⁸ hingab, denn das Wie des entborgenen Seins war nicht minder gewichtig, wodurch der Denker zum Mahner der Not des Neu-Gründens des Philosophierens über das Sein, aber auch zu jenem Böttinger der Botschaft wurde.

Dabei ermöglicht die Faktizität des In-der-Welt-seins, das Allheitliche, das Dichter immer in der Form eines poetischen Subjektivismus aus sich selbst schöpften, nun in den Dingen oder im Verhältnis zu ihnen zu sehen und es im Lichten der Unverborgenheit zu entbergen. Wenn etwa der Dichter, Rilke, angesichts der Verfallenheit einer Ruine noch das einstige Leben dort sieht, so fügt er hinzu, „es ist zu Haus in mir“.¹⁰⁹ Heidegger versetzt diesen Ort des Entspringens nunmehr in das Dingliche und bekräftigt gar, es sei dort nicht „hineingedichtet, sondern umgekehrt“ eine „Auslegung und Erleuchtung dessen, was in dieser Mauer ‚wirklich‘ ist, was im natürlichen Verhältnis zu ihr heraus-

105 Siehe R. Mehrings Kritik an der Studie von A. Schwan, *supra* Anm. 91. Zur Reise nach Syrakus: Carl F. von Weizsäcker: Begegnungen in vier Jahrzehnten. In: *Erinnerungen an Martin Heidegger*. Hrsg. v. Günther Neske, 1977, S. 239–247, hier, S. 246: „Am Tag seines Rücktritts vom Rektoramt soll ihm Schadewaldt in der Straßenbahn begegnet sein und ihn gefragt haben: Nun, Herr Heidegger, sind Sie aus Syrakus zurück?“ Die Anekdote der Anspielung auf Platons Reisen nach Syrakus und dem Vorhaben, dort seinen Stadtstaat zu gründen, wurde von Hassan Givsan angezweifelt und als „Entlastungstopos“ kritisiert, siehe ders.: *Eine bestürzende Geschichte: warum Philosophen sich durch den ‚Fall Heidegger‘ korrumpieren lassen*, S. 14–15. Würzburg 1998. Zum Konflikt mit dem SA-Hochschulamt: GA 16, S. 256–57; Schwan: *Politische Philosophie* (wie Anm. 79), S. 212–13; Schwans Ansicht, nur der Konflikt mit dem SA-Hochschulamt habe zur Heidegers Rücktritt geführt, ist überholt.

106 GA 24 (Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie), S. 241–42.

107 ebd. S. 244.

108 Figal: *Phänomenologie der Freiheit* (wie Anm. 45), S. 15.

109 Rainer Maria Rilke, Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge, *Sämtliche Werke* 1–6. Wiesbaden und Frankfurt/Main, 1955–1966, Band 6, S. 749–750; Heidegger GA 24, S. 246.

springt“, womit das Verhältnis zwischen dem Betrachter und dem Seienden das Sehen der „ursprünglichen“ Welt ermögliche. Das einstige Leben ist dann nicht „zu Haus in mir“, es gelte vielmehr zu sehen, wie es „aus den Dingen uns entgegenspringt“, und darin sei der Lebensbegriff enthalten, „den Dilthey schon ahnte und den wir mit dem Begriff der Existenz als In-der-Welt-sein faßten.“¹¹⁰ Das in solcher Entbergung unverändert enthaltene Maß des Subjektivistischen, das, wie auch aufgelöstes Salz ja nicht verschwindet, sich nur einer unverändert beibehaltenen Perspektive entzieht, findet sich notwendigerweise im gesamten Bereich der Deutungen der Mauern, Kunstwerke und Dichtungen wieder, was Heidegger mit seiner historischen Fehldeutung von van Goghs Gemälde „Ein paar alte Schuhe“ in *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* in einer Weise zeigt, die das „zu Haus in mir“ nicht widerlegt, sondern erweist. Denn es sei die „Unverborgenheit des Seins“, die ἀληθεια, die hervortrete, „dadurch, dass wir uns vor das Gemälde van Goghs“ bringen, das ein Paar Schnürstiefel abbildet. Es gehe um die „Eröffnung dessen, was das Zeug, das Paar Bauernschuhe, in Wahrheit ist“,¹¹¹ und es sei das Gemälde, das entberge, dass „die Bäuerin durch dieses Zeug eingelassen in den schweigenden Zuruf der Erde“¹¹² sei. Nach dem kunsthistorischen Nachweis, dass die Schnürstiefel die von van Gogh waren und die Bauern auf seinen Gemälden Holzschuhe trugen,¹¹³ steht damit also nicht die verfehlte Hermeneutik eines Gemäldes in Frage, sondern die Botschaft des Boten des Lichten des Seins, denn „das Gemälde van Goghs“ selbst „hat gesprochen“, das „Kunstwerk gab zu wissen, was das Schuhzeug in Wahrheit ist“¹¹⁴ – der Bote winkte es nur. Nun mag der Teufel des Seins darüber lachen, doch er entbirgt sich doch in der „Auslegung und Erleuchtung“ der ursprünglichen Welt, als Botschaft des „winkenden Boten der Gottheit“, die sich im Kunstwerk als Wesung des Unverborgenen lichtet. Wie die Seinsentbergung im ersten Angang das bis in das Innere der Seele hinein Subjektivistische eines euphorischen Hitlerismus zeitigte, so zeitigte sie auch hier erweislich das Gegenteil des Wesens der Wahrheit: das Nachgeahmte und Unzutreffende, das Hervorgeholte, welches seit jeher in Heideggers Mystik des Bodens lauerte, die in den Schuhen des Künstlers nun eifrig die einer Bäuerin tief in den Furchen des Feldes der Erde und noch den Himmel darüber sieht, worin die Adepten das Ur-Geviert erkennen und dabei aber hinnehmen, dass sich eben dieses also als eine Verkehrung der Wahrheit offenbarte.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰ ebd., S. 246–247.

¹¹¹ GA 5 (Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes), S. 21.

¹¹² ebd., S. 19.

¹¹³ Siehe Jacob B. de la Faille: *The Works of Vincent van Gogh* [1939], New York 1970, Nr. 255 [=F. 255]: *Ein paar alte Schuhe*; siehe zur Debatte um die Deutung des Gemäldes, Dietrich Schubert: *Van Goghs Sinnbild. Ein Paar alte Schuhe* von 1885, oder: ein Holzweg Heideggers. In: *Habitus: Norm und Transgression in Bild und Text*. Hrsg. v. Tobias Frese, Annette Hoffmann. Berlin 2011, S. 330–354; Hilde Zaloscer: Ist intellektuelle Probität eine philosophische Kategorie? Betrachtungen zum Heidegger Vortrag in der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Literatur, *FORVM*, N. 496–498, Seite 47, Juni 1995 u. Kaveh Nassirin: Von Heideggers ausgesetzten Kindern. Ein Streifzug durch den ‚Fall Heidegger‘ anlässlich einer Biographie von Thomas Rohkrämer. In: *sans phrase*, 17, Winter 2020/21, S. 229–245, hier: 240–241 m. Anm. 51.

¹¹⁴ GA 5 (Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes), S. 21.

¹¹⁵ Siehe Jianwen Zhou: Zeug. Kunstwerk. Ding, S. 257–266. In: *Denkspuren, Festschrift für Heinrich Hüni*.

Gerade die Erde, die bald zum „Geviert“ gehört und nicht wenig dem Verwurzelten des Daseins aus *Sein und Zeit* folgt, ist der Ort des Widerstreits der Verbergung und Entbergung der Wahrheit der Welt, und wenn dabei der ursprüngliche „Sprung“ statt jener später erst von anderen dorthin versetzten „Kehre“ gesehen wird, so lässt sich die Bewegung betrachten, mitsamt dem „Absprung“ und der Landung.¹¹⁶ In *Sein und Zeit* ist das, was etwas zeigt, das „Zeigzeug“, das dem platonischen *dēloma* entspricht,¹¹⁷ Kunstwerke werden da noch nicht erörtert und an eine Hermeneutik der Kunst und der Dichtung soll nicht zu denken sein. Doch schon im nächsten Schritt oder eben mit einem Sprung nach dem Verlust der Möglichkeit des zeitbestimmten Seins bringen „wir uns vor Werke der großen Kunst“, der bildlichen, aber auch „in den Bereich der ‚Antigone‘ des Sophokles.“¹¹⁸ Die „Hervorbringung“ durch den ausgeschalteten Künstler oder Dichter wird nun von der „Herstellung“ getrennt, und in diesem Wort kehrt sich „das Ganze um“: denn nicht das Werk wird hergestellt, es ist das Werk selbst, das etwas herstellt und zwar „die Erde“, es stellt sie auch, als das „Sichverschließende ins Offene“,¹¹⁹ und so ist es, im Handumdrehen – Kehre! –, nicht mehr das verwurzelte Dasein, dessen Zeitlichkeit sich zum Horizont des Verständnisses des Seins umkehren wird, sondern das vom diesem Dasein hervorgebrachte Werk, das das Wesen des Seins aus der sichverschließenden Erde ins Offene stellt. Und bald schon ist das Werk „die Kehre, die eben das Wesen des Seins selbst als das in sich gegenswingende Ereignis anzeigt“, denn das „Gründen ist hier kehrig: (...) stiftend entwerfend.“¹²⁰

Nach dem Sprung über die Hürde der Unmöglichkeit eines vor dem Horizont der Zeit zu verstehenden Seins und der jenseits dessen beginnenden Subjektivierung dieses Seins, das sich im Werk nun selbst mitteilt, wird hier das herstellende Werk subjektiviert, der „sich entwickelnde Bau im Sichzurückwenden in den aufragenden Grund“,¹²¹ wobei der „Gang zum Seyn“, von dem gleich die Rede sein wird, noch im Sprung gerade genug war, um eine Abkehr von *Sein und Zeit* zu verhindern. Bald ist die Stätte der Entbergung

Hrsg. v. Oliver Cosmus; Frauke A. Kurbacher. Würzburg 2008, S. 260; Karsten Harries: „Das Ding“, „Bauen. Wohnen. Denken“, „...dichterisch wohne der Mensch...“ und andere Texte aus dem Umfeld: Unterwegs zum Geviert. In: Thomä: Was wäre, wenn es die Kehre nicht gäbe? *Handbuch* (wie Anm. 10), S. 250–260, hier: S. 253: „Was hier ‚Verlässlichkeit‘ heißt, weist schon voraus auf die sammelnde Einheit des Gevierts“; siehe GA 5 (Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks), S. 19: „Wir nennen es die Verlässlichkeit. Kraft ihrer ist die Bäuerin durch dieses Zeug eingelassen in den schweigenden Zuruf der Erde“; zum „Geviert“ aus Himmel, Erde, den Sterblichen und Göttlichen (den „winkenden Boten der Gottheit“), GA 7 (Bauen. Wohnen. Denken), S. 152; in dem Maß, in dem Heidegger sich als Bote des Seins begriff, ist hier auch eine klandestine Selbstvergöttlichung zu sehen; d.w. ebd. (Das Ding), *passim*.

116 Heidegger: Ursprung (wie Anm. 56), S. 18: „Zum Mittvollzug dieser Kreisbewegung unseres Fragens kommen wir aber nur durch einen Sprung. Und am Ende ist dieser Sprung die einzige Weise des rechten Mitwissens um *den* Ursprung, dem wir nachfragen. So hängt alles daran, daß wir für diesen Sprung den rechten Absprung nehmen.“

117 Siehe SZ, § 17, S. 79; zur Beschränkung darauf, ebd. S. 77–78; Plat., *Krat.*, 435 a–b.

118 Heidegger: Ursprung (wie Anm. 56), S. 14.

119 ebd. S. 28.

120 ebd., S. 261.

121 GA 65 (Beiträge), S 77.

ein *ou*-topischer, ein nicht-örtlicher Ort, und diesem „Ort des Gedichtes entquillt die Woge, die jeweils das Sagen als ein dichtendes bewegt.“¹²² Und da „das einzige Gedicht im Ungesprochenen verbleibt, können wir seinen Ort nur auf die Weise erörtern, daß wir versuchen, vom Gesprochenen einzelner Dichtungen her in den Ort zu weisen“, wie Platon ja schon sagte.¹²³ So können wir „das Seyn selbst, gerade wenn es im Sprung ersprungen wird, nie unmittelbar sagen“, nur in der „Erschweigung“ suchen, und „das ursprüngliche Suchen ist jenes Ergreifen des schon Gefundenen, nämlich des Sichverbergenden als solchen.“¹²⁴ Dieser „Sucher des Seyns ist im eigensten Übermaß sucherischer Kraft der Dichter, der das Seyn ‚stiftet.‘“¹²⁵ Es ist sigetische Einkehr, die dem Dichter Verse über den Gang zum Sein und die Erschweigung zuwirft: „Birg ins Wort die stille Kunde/eines Sprunges über Groß und Klein,/und verlier’ die leeren Funde/ jähens Scheins im Gang zum Seyn.“¹²⁶

Aber ja, „eines Sprunges über Groß und Klein“, auf dass es sich reime mit „Seyn“. Es gehört die Frage einmal grundsätzlich aufgeworfen, ob, nach Botschaften zur alleinigen Größe des deutschen Volkes oder dem bauerlichen Boden, der zum Wesen der Wahrheit der Schuhe von van Gogh nur hinzu gesetzt wurde, ob hier nicht der Bote einer Botschaft zu erkennen ist, die diesen von einem nur metaphysisch gedachten Ort des Seins aus erreichte, oder ob Verse wie der zum „Gang zum Seyn“ solche im Werk der Bestreitung der Verborgenheit und Unverborgenheit entsprungene und von der dem *ou-topos* entquollenen Woge bewegtes Sagen sind. Denn auch das in der Folge der Suche nach einem aletheiologischen Modus zu Tage tretende Gelichtete, sei es in der Form der Deutungen von Kunstwerken oder Dichtungen – Hölderlin! – oder sei es in jener von Heideggers zahlreichen Versen zur Wahrheit des Seins, sind in ihrer Bewertung immer der Legende einer Überwindung des Subjektivismus durch die „Kehre“ unterworfen. Hölderlin sagt: „Es muß/bei Zeiten weg, durch wen der Geist geredet.“¹²⁷ Nach dem Vers zum „Gang zum Seyn“ von 1938 verlief Heideggers Leben noch Jahrzehnte weiter, und es bleibt zu fragen, warum gerade darin die Wahrheit des Seins nicht liegen sollte.

VII

Eine von der Vorschrift der „Kehre“ ungehinderte Sicht eröffnet also die exegetische Möglichkeit, in dem „Kräftequell“ des Bodens der Heimat¹²⁸ von 1922 und der Verwurzelung des eigentlichen Daseins und seiner neuen „Geburt“ aus *Sein und Zeit* die Ursprünge des „ersten Denkers“ von 1931/32 und seines „anderen Anfangs“ zu erwägen und auch die

¹²² GA 12 (Unterwegs zur Sprache), S. 33–34.

¹²³ ebd.; siehe Plat., Phaidr., 247 c: „sie sehen das Jenseits des Himmels“ (*αἱ δὲ θεωροῦσι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*), doch „den überhimmlischen Ort (*ὑπερουράνιον τόπον*) hat noch kein Dichter besungen.“

¹²⁴ GA 65 (Beiträge), S. 79, 80.

¹²⁵ Heidegger: Ursprung (wie Anm. 56), S. 46; GA 65 (Beiträge), S. 11.

¹²⁶ GA 66 (Besinnung), S. 4.

¹²⁷ Sämtliche Werke IV (Der Tod des Empedokles), 2. Akt, 4. Auftritt.

¹²⁸ Brief an seine Eltern und an seinen Bruder, 29. Januar 1922, Martin Heidegger, Briefwechsel mit seinen Eltern, Freiburg/Br., 2013, S. 51; siehe auch Kaveh Nassirin: Bodenlosigkeit (wie Anm. 8), Zitat 2.

Kontinuität zwischen der Geschichte als dem „Zusammenhang eines Werdens“¹²⁹ in *Sein und Zeit* und der „Seinsgeschichte“ danach zu bestimmen, wie jene zwischen der *alētheia* seit dem „Natorp-Bericht“ und der *alētheia*, die jenem „ersten Denker“ im Anfang des Neu-Gründens die Unverborgenheit des Seins enthüllt. Wird in Betracht gezogen, wie unbeirrt die eingeschlagene Richtung nach dem Scheitern von *Zeit und Sein* fortgesetzt wurde, bis zum „Zuspruch des Feldweges“ 1949, der nur so lange spricht, „als Menschen sind, die, in seiner Luft geboren, ihn hören können“,¹³⁰ muss die Konzeption der „Kehre“ als irreführend gelten. Doch der Begriff und seine mannigfaltigen Deutungen verkletten sich auch in der Abwehr, was Heideggers Schüler und Vertrauter Hans-Georg Gadamer exemplarisch in der Erklärung erkennen lässt, die „berühmte ‚Kehre‘“ sei „alles andere als ein Bruch in Heideggers Denken“ gewesen und zum Fazit der Zustimmung zur Kontinuität in *Der eine Weg Martin Heideggers* kommt, dass die „Kehre“ als „ein Weitergehen“ zu verstehen sei.¹³¹ Die *Kehre auf einem einmal eingeschlagenen Weg* ist dann nicht viel mehr als ein Notbehelf, auf den die Heidegger-Forschung geraten ist, als es galt, die philologische Evidenz mit der ihr widerstreitenden Rezeption der Ursprungslegende von Bollnow zu vereinen, und bald wurden die metontologische Kehre und die „Kehre“ auf Heideggers „Denkweg“ eingegeben.¹³²

Mit der seinsgeschichtlichen „Kehre“ sei der Mensch nicht länger „Platzhalter des Nichts, sondern Hirte des Seins“¹³³ hieß es in der Meditation über den „philosophiege-

129 SZ, S. 378.

130 GA 13, S. 89.

131 Hans-Georg Gadamer: *Gesammelte Werke*. Tübingen 1985–1991. Bd. 3, 1987, (Die Griechen, 1979) S. 287; ebd., (Der eine Weg Martin Heideggers, 1986), S. 423, wo Gadamer auch eine „Kehre vor der Kehre“ im Jahr 1924 sieht.

132 Von Heidegger vorbereitet, *supra*, Anm. 46; beispielhaft ist F.-W. v. Herrmanns Synonymisierung der Begriffe „Kehre“ und „Umkipfung“, siehe GA 9, S. 487, letzteren Heidegger als Marginalie in einem Exemplar von *Vom Wesen des Grundes* anmerkte, ebd., S. 163, Anm. a., auf das „erste“ Gründen“ hinweisend, das aus der in SZ geforderten Destruktion der Geschichte der Ontologie hervorgehe: in diesen „Bereich, der die Zerstörung des Bisherigen erzwingt und eine völlige Umkipfung notwendig macht“ werde im Kapitel III von WdG ein „Schritt“ getan, womit die „Umkipfung“ zum „Gründen“ ein gerades Fortschreiten nach SZ ist; die unbelegte Selbstbeschreibung der „Umkipfung“ als Heideggers „Kehre“ wurde von Oliver Cosmus: *Anonyme Phänomenologie. Die Einheit von Heideggers Denkweg*, Würzburg 2001, S. 79, unkritisch übernommen, obgleich auch dieser das Kapitel III in WdW als Kontinuität der geforderten Destruktion in SZ wertet; siehe auch Lehmann: *Ursprung* (wie Anm. 18), S. 192: „Die Kehre erfolgt nur auf einem von Anfang an eingeschlagenen Weg“; Gerhard Pollmeier: *Das Wahrheitsverständnis Martin Heideggers und Hans Urs von Balthasars*. Inauguraldissertation. St. Augustin 2015, S. 74, legt die Antwort des „Fragenden“ aus Heideggers *Gespräch von der Sprache* von 1953/54 (kurz nachdem Bollnow die Legende der „Kehre“ erfunden hatte), ohne Hinweis auf diese Text-Collage, als Definition der „Kehre“ aus: „Die ‚Kehre‘ wird von Heidegger so kommentiert: ...“ folgt GA 12, S. 94, (das Wort „Kehre“ ist dort unerwähnt) auf die „Frage des ‚Japaners‘“, „Man sagt, Sie hätten Ihren Standpunkt gewechselt“, sagt „der Fragende“: „Ich habe einen früheren Standpunkt verlassen, nicht um dagegen einen anderen einzutauschen ... Und Denkwege bergen in sich das Geheimnisvolle, daß wir sie vorwärts und rückwärts gehen können, daß sogar der Weg zurück uns erst vorwärts führt“; dass das bereits eine Definition für die neue Begrifflichkeit der „Kehre“ gewesen sei, ist unbelegt und unwahrscheinlich. Es ist ohnehin noch eine Bekräftigung nicht der „Abkehr“, sondern der im *Humanismusbrief* ähnlich erwähnten Kontinuität.

133 Walter Schulz: Über den philosophiegeschichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers. In: *Philosophische Rundschau*, 1. Jg. 1953/54, S. 65–93 u. 211–232. In: *Heidegger. Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werks*. Hrsg. v. Otto

schichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers“. ¹³⁴ Die Legende einer Umkehr des Denkens stellte darin über den einen Denker hinaus noch die des philosophischen Denkens überhaupt in die Kulissen der Proklamationen. Und in der Einkleidung des Hirten erschien das Subjekt so unverdächtig, dass aufmerksame Geister, die bloß einen „Nominalismus“ und einen „Positivismus“ darin erkennen konnten, wenn von dem Hirten des Seins verkündet wurde, „daß das Abstrakte für konkret zu gelten habe, daß es die Wahrheit sei“, wie weltanschaulich ungeeignete Buhrufer wirkten ¹³⁵ und es bald niemandem mehr auffallen wollte, dass das Sein vor dem Ende des Subjektivismus noch als ein „zeitliches“, als „Geschehen“, als „Wesung“, als „Zerklüftung“, als „Sich-Entbergend“ bestimmt wurde, bis es als „Seyn“ die Wahrheit entbarg und gehütet werden konnte. ¹³⁶ Welcher der Wendepunkt der „Kehre“ sei, an dem das Subjekt seine „Vormachtstellung“ dem Sein gegenüber aufgegeben hatte, um Hirte zu sein, blieb bei alledem dunkel.

Nach der dargelegten sukzessiven Übernahme der „Kehre“ nannte Heidegger sie in seinen Notizen von 1973–75 zwar „irrig“, doch nur insofern sie eine Abkehr bald nach *Sein und Zeit* meine, da „die Inständigkeit in der Lichtung des Seins“ da „noch nicht hinreichend erfahren“ gewesen sei. ¹³⁷ Einmal hingenommen, dass die Legende einer wuchtigen Umkehr auf einem Weg des Denkens gegenüber dem Beharren auf einer Kontinuität, das

Pöggeler. 1984, S. 95–139. Hier zit. n. Pöggeler, S. 110, Heideggers Formulierung aus dem *Humanismusbrief* wiederholend, vgl. GA 9, S. 118, 331, 342.

134 Schulz: *Philosophiegeschichtlicher Ort* (wie Anm. 133), S. 116.

135 Siehe Theodor W. Adorno: *Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie*, *passim*; K. H. Haag: *Kritik der modernen Ontologie*. Stuttgart 1960, S. 83; „Fundamentalontologie ist getarnter Nominalismus: willkürliche Begriffsbildung und darum noch relativistischer als das nominalistische Extrem: der moderne Positivismus. Wie dieser verkündet auch sie dem Individuum einfach, daß das Abstrakte für konkret zu gelten habe, daß es die Wahrheit sei“, zit. n. Lehmann: *Ursprung* (wie Anm. 18), S. 190, Anm. 83; an Haags Fazit, ebd., „Sie dient so objektiv der Negation der Menschlichkeit“, ist sicher die politische Intention der Exegese abzulesen, doch in Betracht gezogen, dass die Legende der „Kehre“ als „radikale Umkehr“, die Heidegger nach SZ vollzogen habe, von dessen Schüler Bollnow stammt, der dem „Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur“, der SA und, wie Heidegger, der NSDAP und dem NSLB angehört hatte, liegt der ideologiekritische Ansatz nahe.

136 Siehe Lehmann: *Ursprung* (wie Anm. 18), S. 192: „Vielleicht schließt die Seinsverfassung des Daseins das Seinsverständnis doch zu sehr in sich ein, so daß sich unversehens wieder die Gefahr einer neuen ‚Subjektivität‘ einstellt.“ Das vorontologische Seinsverständnis zu erreichen, ist in *Sein und Zeit* noch das erste Ziel, und auch als ein vorontologisches ist das Seinsverständnis immer nur im Dasein begründet, schon GA 20 (Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, 1925), S. 184–85: „Einzig Grund für die Möglichkeit der Seinsfrage überhaupt, ist das *Dasein selbst als Möglichsein*.“ Die Faktizität dafür wird schon im Ich-sagen zugrunde gelegt, SZ, S. 321: „*Im Ich-sagen spricht sich das Dasein als In-der-Welt-sein aus*“, ebd., S. 183: „Sein kann daher unbegriffen sein, aber es ist nie völlig unverstanden“; Heidegger kommt gemäß der Hermeneutik der Faktizität auf den Modus, vom Dasein aus ein erst herzustellendes Dasein zu entwerfen, dem sich der Sinn des Seins durch den Rückgang in das vorontologische Seinsverständnis erschließe, von dem nicht gesagt werden kann, dass es dem transzendentalen Subjektivismus und dessen Begriffen vorausgehe. Auch ist das zu erschließende Sein notwendigerweise dem entworfenen Dasein gemäß, das im Los-sagen von der Alltäglichkeit des Man und, SZ, S. 391, im Rückgang „zu dem vor ihm schon Gewesenen“, dem „Sichüberliefern des Erbes“, als neue „Geburt“ im Zurückkommen“ aus dem Vorlaufen in den Tod entsteht, und so bestimmt die Konstitution der Bedingungen der Seinerschließung auch das Sein („hermeneutischer Zirkel“).

137 Martin Heidegger: „Kehre“, „Sagen der Kehre“ (Ms. 1973–75). In: *Heidegger-Jahrbuch* 2007, S. 9.

ein nicht minder wuchtiges Scheitern verbirgt, sicher auch ihre Verlockungen gehabt haben dürfte, ist mit dem erstaunlichen Entschwinden des eigentlichen Daseins in der Lichtung des Seins oder mit der „fehlenden Alternative zur Daseinsanalyse von SZ“, ¹³⁸ um es in die Diktion des einstigen Vorsitzenden der *Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft*, Günter Figal, zu setzen, nun aber jene Überwindung des Subjektivistischen gegeben, die die „Geburt“ des „ersten Denkers“, eines der „Einzigsten“, mithin das Subjekt der Inständigkeit, als die Bedingung ihrer Möglichkeit in der Verborgenheit des Unerörterten bewahrt, was nur sehr selten und marginal gestört wird, etwa, wenn Herman Philipse anmerkt, es sei durch viele Stellen in *Vom Ereignis* (*Beiträge*) und *Besinnung* unstreitig, dass „Heidegger sich selbst als einen dieser ‚Einzigsten‘ begriff.“ ¹³⁹ Ob die „Inständigkeit in der Lichtung des Seins“ jenen „Einzigsten“ paraphrasiert, den eigentlichen Heidegger, und das nach *Sein und Zeit* so auffällige Fehlen der „Analyse der Subjektivität des Subjekts“ folglich den Botengänger der Botschaft des Seins verschont, ist im Klang des Kanons der „Kehre“ der Überwindung all dessen leicht zu übergehen. „Wir sehen nicht so sehr primär und ursprünglich die Gegenstände und Dinge“, sagt Heidegger, „sondern zunächst sprechen wir darüber, genauer sprechen wir nicht das aus, was wir sehen, sondern umgekehrt, wir sehen, was man über die Sache spricht.“ ¹⁴⁰

So gelingt es kaum noch einem Forscher, keine „Kehre“ in Heideggers philosophischer Entwicklung zu entdecken, das Deutungsdictat ist gar so mächtig, dass es selbst der Erkenntnis folgt, dass die „Kehre“ weniger in den Konsequenzen, die Heidegger aus diesem Scheitern zog“ bestehe, wie Figal es als „These“ formuliert, „als vielmehr in der Umkehrung der Fragestellung von *Sein und Zeit* zu der von *Zeit und Sein*“ zu sehen sei, also „nicht primär darin, dass Heidegger eine philosophische Entwicklung vollzogen hätte“, auch wenn sich eine solche „nicht bestreiten“ lasse, doch die sei eher „peripher“. ¹⁴¹ In derselben Publikation setzt Figal aber doch seine eigene, kühne Interpretation des heideggerischen Gesamtwerks als „Phänomenologie der Freiheit“ in die gerade leer geräumte Stelle der „Kehre“ ein, was dennoch wenig überrascht, da die Formulierung einer These zur „Kehre“ schon zum Amtseid der Heidegger-Forscher geworden ist: „Die ‚Kehre‘, so soll sich zeigen, ist nichts anderes als die Wendung zu einer Erörterung der Freiheit“, und das ließe sich als der erwähnte Standard überlesen, doch es heißt, eine „Freiheit, die die Freiheit, wie sie bisher dargestellt wurde, nicht dementiert, sondern mit ihrer Darstellung in SZ kohärent ist“, ¹⁴² und so also kehrt der Weg zurück zur Kehre ohne Kehre.

Doch sich von der ursprünglich bollnowschen Legende um die „Kehre“ zu emanzipieren, könnte schon die Nachdenklichkeit infolge der Frage nahelegen, warum jeder Sprung und jede Entwicklung in Heideggers Denken, die auch in der Perspektive einer

¹³⁸ Figal: *Phänomenologie der Freiheit* (wie Anm. 45), S. 15.

¹³⁹ Herman Philipse: *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being. A Critical Interpretation*, Princeton 1998, S. 496, Anm. 170: *Beiträge* S. 11 (die „Wenigen“, die „Seltenen“), 28 („Zugehöriger“ zur „Wahrheit des Seins“), 398 (die „Suchenden“), 414 (die „Einzelnen“); Philipse übersieht S. 43 (die „Einzigsten“).

¹⁴⁰ GA 20, S. 75.

¹⁴¹ Figal: *Phänomenologie der Freiheit* (wie Anm. 45), S. 15.

¹⁴² ebd., S. 237.

demgegenüber ungleich dominanteren Kontinuität selbstredend nicht ausgeschlossen werden, in unphilosophischer Folgsamkeit mit gerade diesem Sprachbild belegt werden sollte, das längst daran zweifeln lässt, „was ursprünglich geschöpft und errungen und was nachgeredet ist“.¹⁴³ Wird mit Dieter Thomä, darin eher als ein Rufer ein einsamer Flüsterer in der Wüste, erwogen, was wäre, wenn es die „Kehre“ nicht gäbe, so ist schon die Entsagung der Pflicht erfüllt, sie unbedingt zu finden, und in dieser Folge eines unvermeintlichen Zugangs zu Heideggers philosophischen Etappen mit Thomä festzustellen, dass der Ausweg, der aus dem stillen Scheitern der Kehre von *Zeit und Sein* genommen wurde, dieses Wort mitnichten rechtfertigt, bleibt dennoch als Fazit sicher nicht zwingend, so sehr dieses hier auch geteilt wird.¹⁴⁴ Die Einebnung der Begriffe der metontologischen Kehre und jener behaupteten in Heideggers Entwicklung zu beenden, hebt im Übrigen die sicher gewichtigere Frage hervor, ob die seinsentbergende Kehre den griechischen ontologischen Metabolismus nur epigonal wiederholt oder einen originalen Gedanken enthält, einen solchen, der nur auf Heidegger zurückgeht.¹⁴⁵ Auch gibt die Öffnung der Grenzen eines so engen hermeneutischen Raums den Blick darauf frei, in welchem Maß für überwunden erklärte Bestimmungen subjektivistischer Intentionen teils in ein handelndes, leidendes, wollendes Geschehen der Wahrheit des Seins übertragen, teils auch in einer Auswahl der Einzigsten verborgen wurden, mit denen das Selbstseinkönnen als das Dasein der Wenigen, *oligoi*, der dichterischen und philosophischen Denker wiederkehrt, die sich die Seinsfrage stellen und denen einer vorangeht.

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¹⁴³ SZ, S. 169; siehe auch Thomä: *Handbuch* (wie Anm. 10), S. 107, wo darauf hingewiesen wird, dass die Rede von der Kehre sich so lange halte, weil das Früh- und Spätwerk nur oberflächlich verglichen werden.

¹⁴⁴ Siehe Thomä: Was wäre, wenn es die Kehre nicht gäbe? *Handbuch* (wie Anm. 10), S. 250–260.

¹⁴⁵ Es mag dafür auch aufschlussreich sein, dass Heidegger das Erweckungserlebnis nach dem „Hineinhören in den Vorgesang“ nicht mit eigenen Worten, sondern mit einem Zitat von Platon beschreibt, GA 16 (Edmund Husserl zum siebenzigsten Geburtstag), S. 59–60.

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God's Disability and Human Ability Orthodox Church and People with Disabilities

Abstract: Resurrected Christ comes to the Apostles bearing signs of His torture. His body is a perfect body, but yet his “glorious body of the resurrected Christ is disfigured and disabled in that it still bears the marks of crucifixion.” His ribs have obvious signs of injuries. Resurrected Christ has a perfect body that passes through the walls, and yet with visible wounds, “and by his wounds we are healed” (Is 53:4). United apostles have been with no fear, because His visible “defects” convinced them that eschatology entered present time. It is because of his bodily “imperfections” that they believed in Him. Wounds became a powerful symbol of faith, motivation and conviction. Disability, sickness and other conditions of human beings became incorporated into God, participating in His suffering body.

Keywords: ability, disability, clean, unclean, sin, suffering, resurrection, Church

1. Disabling our Body

Almost every day, hundreds of people visit a small church in Belgrade. They go there to venerate the relics of Saint Petka, a famous saint in this area of the Balkans. The body of Saint Petka was found to be uncorrupted after her death and, for more than one century, it was kept in the Romanian city of Iași. But pieces of her body have been sent to several cities across the Balkans. Piece of her hand have been safeguarded and venerated, and placed in a small box at this Belgrade church. Accepted by God because of her love and life, Saint Petka has been fragmented into relics in order to be venerated. And, at the same time, each of these parts represents her whole body. However, at the same time, her body has been “disabled”, i.e. the integrity of her body has been destroyed. Her “able body” died and her sanctity throughout the centuries has been through her “disabled” body, i.e. dispersed in many churches and venerated by many faithful. Saint Petka is only one vivid example, but the Orthodox tradition has plenty of similar ones. In fact, every Orthodox Church has altar table in which particles of relics of saints are embedded. Metaphorically speaking, it turns out that every “able Christian” became a “disabled saint” dispersed in small pieces across the churches. Sainthood somehow recognizes and accepts our fragile nature and reveals the truth that each of us can become disabled in a moment. But we should not be afraid of it either since reaching the space of sainthood every piece of body carries the wholeness of the living body.

Martyrdom has been a seed for new believers. And in order to sow that seed, martyrs “disabled” their bodies, accepted their sudden destiny in order to testify Christ. Because of this acceptance of disability parts of these bodies have been revered in churches for centuries. Bodily destruction does not mean something bad or impure, but, in Christian understanding, it expressed faithfulness to Christ. The martyrdom of St. Ignatius powerfully testifies this truth.

May I have joy of the beasts that have been
prepared for me; and I pray that I may find them
prompt; nay I will entice them that they may devour me
promptly, not as they have done to some, refusing to
touch them through fear. Yea though of themselves they
should not be willing while I am ready, I myself will force them to it.
Bear with me. I know what is expedient for me.
Now am I beginning to be a disciple. May nought of
things visible and things invisible envy me; that I
may attain unto Jesus Christ. Come fire and cross and
grapplings with wild beasts, [cuttings and manglings,]
wrenching of bones, hacking of limbs, crushings of my
whole body, come cruel tortures of the devil to assail
me. Only be it mine to attain unto Jesus Christ.

Saint Ignatius to Romans 5:2-3

2. Suffering on the Cross

Completing His mission, Christ surrendered his body to the Romans. His body had been tortured and mutilated. The “Disabled” God on the Cross becomes the “able” Savior that accepts all of humanity at this point, overarching all differences and excluding exclusion. The disabled body¹ of Christ became acceptable for believers. In His death Christ became one of us bearing our inflictions on His Body. Christ obviously wanted to overcome the barriers between clean and unclean, i.e. the ritual understanding of faith that was practiced at the time. After His resurrection, barriers that once divided borders between clean/unclean were left behind. From now on we can talk only about the division between the new and old creation.²

It is obvious that Christ wants to radically accentuate His teaching in order to prevail over old ambiguities. In doing so, He eats with sinners, He doesn’t follow rules of ritual cleaning, works on Saturday and, as a pinnacle – He dies on the cross as cursed according to the Old Testament (Deuteronomy 21:23).³ “God made him who had no sin to be sin for us, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God” (2Cor 5:21). In

1 Panayiotis Thoma, “Wounds of Christ: Wounds of the World. The Crucified and Resurrected Christ and Christians Towards a Suffering Humanity”, *Bogoslovje* 2 (2017), pp. 111-23.

2 Alexander Schmemmann, *Introduction to Liturgical Theology*, Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, (2003), p. 183.

3 The same idea repeats apostle Paul in Gal 3:13.

His death, Christ showed that His suffering is without sin. Old premises that connected illness with sinfulness and wrongdoing were abandoned in His sacrifice.⁴ Not only that His martyrdom hasn't been the consequence of sin, but, moreover, His martyrdom was for the salvation of humanity.

3. Clean and unclean: barriers

The Jerusalem Temple that once was the center of identity for Jews and Christians alike was shattered in 70AD. The most important place in the Temple symbolically belongs to the curtains. One curtain was hung between the Porch and the Holy Place⁵ and Holy Place was then separated by two curtains from the Most Holy Place, and only the High Priest was allowed to enter on the Day of Atonement (Heb 9:6).⁶ Symbolically these curtains divide the world into pure and impure.

In Ezekiel 44:23 the priests' role is to "teach my people the difference between the holy and profane, and cause them to discern between the unclean and the clean." The sacred was seen as a terrible force capable of killing anyone who interferes with it. Impureness did not kill, but could weaken the human body, and bring humans to uncertainty. Manifestations of the life cycle are considered impure: woman's birth, sexual intercourse, in some cases even sexual organs (Exod. 20:26). "For the ancient Hebrew, then, things were sacred if they belonged to an order of things considered higher than the human plane of existence."⁷

Impurity was also coming from some sorts of mixing things together. "The woman shall not wear that which pertained unto a man, neither shall a man put on a woman's garment: for all that do so *are* abomination unto the Lord thy God" (Deuteronomy 22:5), also "Thou shalt not wear a garment of divers sorts, *as* of woolen and linen together" (Deuteronomy 22:11). Behind these "mixing impurity laws" we can discern fear of disorder, chaos. In order to understand this more closely we are called to look at Genesis and the description of God's creation of the world out of chaos. God is delivering new world from chaos, splitting light from darkness, sea from land, man from woman... making demarcation lines he produces the order and the world in which we live. That is the way how God expresses his Holiness through this order.⁸ Moreover He asks "Be holy as I am holy" (Exodus 19:6). This became the norm for expressing and living as God lives.⁹ "Purity" is a system where

4 Sammy Githuku, "Biblical Perspectives on Disability" in the book: *Disability, Society and Theology: Voices from Africa*, ed. Samuel Kabue, Esther Mombo, Joseph Galgalo, C. B. Peter, Limuru: Zapf Chancery, (2011), 79-93, p. 93.

5 Floyd V. Filson, "Temple, Synagogue, and Church", *The Biblical Archaeologist*, Vol. 7, No. 4, (1944), p. 81.

6 Margaret Barker, *The Great High Priest: The Temple Roots of Christian Liturgy*, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, (2003), p. 49.

7 Paolo Sacchi, *The History of the Second Temple Period*, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, (2000), p. 440.

8 Jerome H. Neyrey, "The Symbolic Universe of Luke-Acts: 'They Turn the World Upside Down'", in the book: *The Social World of Luke-Acts, Models for Interpretation*, ed. Jerome H. Neyrey, Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, (1999), p. 277.

9 *Ibid.*

people perceive that certain things belong to certain places.¹⁰ It was a way to structure and organize the world, to maintain and keep borders of their own society.¹¹ Concepts of pollution and defilement are among the means used by preliterate or tribal societies to maintain their separateness, boundedness, and exclusivity.¹² These concepts and rules contribute strongly to the sense of the tribe's own world in which is the most important bondage between members in order to secure holiness of the People of God, their uniqueness. Outside of the borders of Holy People it is normal to see danger, threat, alienation and uncertainty. In order to safeguard its uniqueness, members need to accept marks of their social identity, which are laws of purity and impurity, holy and profane.¹³ This identification through the Law brings security. At the same time, the Law, as it is presented, is identified with perfect God. In that sense, the Law is the main point in which one group consolidates its own identity, defends itself from outsiders through rules that bear exclusivity¹⁴ and connects with God.

Having in mind this kind of interpretation that tries to explain clean/unclean ideology we can better comprehend the importance of the veil in the Temple. The veil is a symbol and protector of the religious and cultic worldview. It was a protector that kept the most holy place safeguarded against the impurity. And impurity has been any sickness, any body lacking its parts and any health disorder. Symbolically, the most holy place should be protected by this veil – veil that places border between health and sickness.

At the point of death "Jesus uttered a loud cry, and breathed His last. And the veil of the temple was torn in two from top to bottom" (Mark 15:37-38). At the moment of Christ's death, the veil was destroyed, the old world shattered. That would give impulse to a new creation and a new world where dichotomy between pure and impure needs to be overcome. The eschatological significance of Christ put the old covenant into the past tense giving priority to the opening of God's grace to "all who believe, the fulfillment of God's purposes through Israel to the world."

God's great cleanup of the world had begun, and his communities were part of the "new creation," of the way the world is meant to be. "If anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; see, everything has become new!" (2 Cor. 5:17). "Disabled" God on the cross at his point of dying gave an impulse of inclusion of human-kind into the "Holy of Holies." Disability, sickness and other conditions of human beings became incorporated into God, participating in His suffering body. It seems that Ortho-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

¹¹ Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians – The Social World of the Apostle Paul*, Yale: Yale University Press, (1983), p. 36.

¹² For more about importance of food rules for identity see: Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, (1966)

¹³ James D. G. Dunn, *The New Perspective on Paul*, Michigan/Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans, (2008), p. 109.

¹⁴ In Old Testament we find idea about God's salvation to the heathen world. But those are only indications that never reached clear and definitive assertion that full salvation enjoyed by Israel is promised to all people: Walter Eichrodt, *Theology of the Old Testament*, London: SCM Press, Volume One, (1969), p. 432.

dox theology has not explored extensively the importance of the Gospel story in which the veil was torn apart. And, in many aspects of our practice, did not achieve theological deconstruction of cultic understanding where clean/unclean still plays important role.¹⁵

4. Sin and suffering

It seems that Early Fathers relied heavily on the experience of Christ and His suffering. Identifying suffering with Christ helped them support their argument of inclusion of those excluded from society. The traditional view at the time reasoned that sickness is a consequence of sin. It is obvious that the same understanding existed in the time of the Gospels and for that reason after healing the blind man apostles asked: "Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he should be born blind?" (John 9:2). Christ refuted this traditional view: "It was neither that this man sinned, nor his parents; but it was in order that the works of God might be displayed in him," (John 9:3). The same question has been posed in the Old Testament and it is Job that represented righteous man who suffers with no reason. Building on these ideas that reject sinfulness in the matters of sickness Orthodox spiritual collection brings to mind the saying of Abba Agathon who said: "If I could meet a leper, give him my body and take his, I would be very happy. For, this is indeed perfect love."¹⁶ Suddenly, to bear marks of illness on the body became a mark of true Christian faith and not the mark of shame.

Early Christianity would follow these steps. Gregory of Nyssa especially accentuated that physically ill, exiled lepers, "possess a divine sanctity that may benefit the physical well only by direct contact."¹⁷ Gregory's sermons, preached during the famine: *De pauperibus amandis 1* (PG 46.453-70) and *De pauperibus amandis 2* (PG 46.471-90) refer to leprosy as the "sacred disease".¹⁸ Gregory of Nyssa writes:

The hand is mutilated but it is not insensitive to assistance. The foot is gangrenous but always able to run to God; the eye is missing, but it discerns invisible goodness nonetheless, to the enlightenment of the soul. Don't despise their misshapen body; yet a little while and you will contemplate a vision more astonishing than a complete miracle. Our frail nature is not prone to long-term endurance. As soon as there is no more weaving to be done on the corruptible and terrestrial body, the soul, delivered, will manifest its interior beauty... If we want to be received by them in the eternal places, let us receive them now. If we wish to heal the wounds by which our sins have afflicted us, heal today the ulcers that break down their flesh.¹⁹

¹⁵ It is enough to mention clean/unclean dialectic in the context of women's uncleanness expressed through canons of the Orthodox Church: St. Dionysus, canon II. Cf. Rastko Jovic, „Neko me se dotače," *Veroučitelj u školi 2*, Beograd: PBF ITI (2011), p. 75-90/ Растко Јовић, „Неко ме се дотаче," *Вероучитељ у школи 2*, Београд: ПБФ ИТИ (2011), p. 75-90.

¹⁶ John Chrysostom, *In the Heart of the Desert: The Spirituality of the Desert Fathers and Mothers*, Bloomington: World Wisdom, (2008), p. 152.

¹⁷ Susan R. Holman, *The Hungry are Dying: Beggars and Bishops in Roman Cappadocia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2001), p.145.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 161.

¹⁹ Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Love of the Poor 2*, 199-206: Translation from the book: Susan R. Holman, *The Hungry are Dying: Beggars and Bishops in Roman Cappadocia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2001), p. 204-5.

The theological interpretation of the Fall brought the idea that our condition, whatever it is, represents only some condition of “illness”. In the world where we live today, it is difficult to speak about health in an absolute sense, because health never exists in totality. In other words, “health” is always in some sense “illness” that has simply not appeared as such and/or is not significant enough to be identified as such.”²⁰ This kind of interpretation obviously tended to change the traditional view of society.

5. Inclusion of Death and Resurrection

Already in Apostolic canons of the Orthodox Church that probably came to us from the fourth century²¹ we can find a new way of interpreting what disability represents to the Church. Instead of allowing the same old differences between clean/unclean, i.e. between health/illness, canons offered a new path. Old dichotomies suddenly do not play a substantial role. Instead to base the canons on old convictions, the new basis became the Church and Her role in society. It is obvious that the accent has been given to the mission of the Church. It is also striking that these canons rely on the Gospel tradition which wants to make a demarcation between old and new understandings of priesthood.

Jewish priesthood needed to be pure and sound bodily. Any imperfection on their bodies could be understood impure leaving them out of office. Leviticus 21:18-20 specifically orders that any PWD (Person with Disability)²² cannot be a priest: “*For no one who has a defect shall approach: a blind man, or a lame man, or he who has a disfigured face, or any deformed limb, or a man who has a broken foot or broken hand.*” The reasoning behind this law was obvious at the time, the defect has been understood as an unholy quality that would hinder a person’s approach to God. The space of communion between God and man should be kept clean in a religious way of understanding of this term. It is because of God who is perfect that nobody with imperfection can approach. Those Levites that suffered some kind of physical defect were removed from their priesthood.²³

In order to present the new understanding of priesthood and comprehension of the world the *Apostolic Canons* established the new criteria for the priesthood. Firstly, priesthood is not a specific cast in the Church anymore, but the whole community represented “a royal priesthood.” And from that royal priesthood Church would choose specific priesthood (bishop, priest, deacon). If the Church had kept the Old Testament understanding then anyone with some physical inabilities could not be accepted in the Church at all. Keeping in mind that every believer represents a general priesthood of believers, any

²⁰ Jean-Claude Larchet, *The Theology of Illness*, Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Press, (2002), p. 53.

²¹ Atanasije Yevtic, *Svesteni kanoni Crkve*, Beograd (2003), pp. 31-6/Атанасије Јевтић, Свештени канони Цркве, Београд, (2005), pp. 31-6.

²² Cf. Aikaterini Pekridou, “Disability as a Question for Ecumenical Dialogue” in the book: *Orthodox Handbook on Ecumenism: Resources for Theological Education*, ed. P. Kalaitzidis, Th. FitzGerald, C. Hovorun, Aik. Pekridou, N. Asproulis, G. Liagre, D. Werner, Geneva: World Council of Churches/Volos Academy, (2013), pp. 822-6.

²³ Nikolaj Afanasjev, *Eklisiologija stranja u klir*, Vrsac, (2002), p. 128./ Афанасјев Н., Еклесиологија ступања у клир, Вршац, (2002), p. 128.

physical defect would cut him off from that priesthood. The Apostolic Canons expressed a different vision and particular sensitivity towards people with some kind of disabilities (PWD). Several canons deal with these sensitive issues, namely 57, 77, 78:

Ap. 57: If any Clergyman ridicules the lame, or the deaf or the blind or the crippled, let him be excommunicated. The same applies to a layman.

Ap. 77: If any cripple, or anyone with a defect in an eye or in a leg, is worthy of the episcopate, let him be made a bishop, for it is not an injury to the body that defiles one, but a pollution of the soul.

Ap. 78: Let no one that is deaf nor anyone that is blind be made a Bishop, not on the ground that he is deficient morally, but lest he should be embarrassed in the exercise of ecclesiastical functions.

Especially important is canon 77 that clearly states Church reasoning towards any physical inability: "If any cripple, or anyone with a defect in an eye or in a leg, is worthy of the episcopate, let him be made a bishop, for it is not an injury to the body that defiles one, but a pollution of the soul."²⁴

In *Rudder* we find the commentary on canon 78 which clearly states that person with some disability should "not be made a bishop, not because these defects imply any moral unfitness or that he is unworthy, but because he is prevented by these defects from performing the holy rites²⁵ in the church. For how can anyone that cannot see or that cannot hear officiate at the altar?"²⁶ St. Sava comments on this canon, too, in his collection of Church Laws (*Zakonopravilo/Zakonopravilo*). He concludes that nothing in a body could hinder someone from priesthood.²⁷ What counts is a clean soul, and not the body. If someone cannot be a priest it is because of practical issues, i.e. if he cannot serve the Liturgy.²⁸ In the same manner, Orthodox canonist Nikodim Milas, commenting on canon *Apostolic* 77 concludes, "Bodily defects do not defile man, but his inner dirtiness that comes from the soul."²⁹

Blastares³⁰ in his *Syntagma Canonum* concludes almost the same, i.e. bodily defects do not affect man and his priesthood, the only reason could be practical impossibil-

²⁴ *The Rudder*, ed. Ralph J. Masterjohn, West Brookfield: The Orthodox Christian Educational Society, (2005), p. 230.

²⁵ Father Teofil Paraian is exception as a blind priest in Romanian Orthodox Church, (<http://www.johnsanidopoulos.com/2009/11/romanian-staretz-teofil-paraian-falls.html>, last visited: 18.8.2016.)

²⁶ *The Rudder*, ed. Ralph J. Masterjohn, West Brookfield: The Orthodox Christian Educational Society, (2005), p. 231.

²⁷ *Zakonopravilo Svetog Save: na srpskoslovenskom i srpskom jeziku*, pr. Miodrag M. Petrović, Manastir Žiča, (2004), p. 157./ *Законopravilo Светог Саве: на српскословенском и српском језику*, пр. Миодраг М. Петровић, Манастир Жича, (2004), p. 157.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Nikodim Milas, *Pravoslavno Crkveno pravo*, Beograd-Šibenik: Istina, (2004), p. 275./ Никодим Милаш, *Православно Црквено право*, Београд-Шибеник: Истина, (2004), p. 275.

³⁰ Matija Vlastar, *Sintagma*, Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, (2013), p. 385./ Матија Властар, *Синтагма*, Београд: Српска академија наука и уметности, (2013), p. 385.

ity to serve the Liturgy. Other commentators share almost identical view.³¹ It becomes more than obvious that the Liturgy became the main criterion in the Orthodox Church in a practical understanding of that service. Clean and unclean does not play any role in the context of these canons, neither do they say anything about sinfulness and heredity of sin. These canons show concern of the Early Church to follow Christ's teaching properly. Also, anyone who became a priest and lost his physical wholeness would be still a priest, i.e. priesthood would not be taken from him.

6. Liturgy as a Dialogue

In this context we could develop more proactive understanding of Liturgy as well. In all these canons we have practical reasoning, but it is obvious that relationship and relation between the priest and the Liturgy has been understood in a very static form. We are getting a picture that in the relation between a priest and the Liturgy there is a monologue. A person who serves needs to be adequate for the Liturgy which is unchangeable and monolithic. Somehow it seems that Liturgy became object of adoration itself, while all responsibility lies on those who serve it. The Liturgy itself became a cemented event to which we need to accommodate: physically and spiritually. This is also a great problem for the Liturgy itself, which has been turned into a cult or a show. More than ever, it is evident that the Liturgy and people became two distant entities with no dialogue. If we were more accurate, then we would be able to preserve the true meaning of the Liturgy and that is collective endeavor, i.e. Liturgy is a space of dialogue between people and God, Liturgy is a dialogue within itself and not the monologue between distant entities (Liturgy < > priesthood; Liturgy < > people of God). This would be more dynamic comprehension of the Liturgy as a dialogue within itself.

Every language, metaphorically speaking, would be included in the dialogue. If someone has some problems, through the opening of the other side, these issues would be overcome in a dialogue. For example, in the future a Priest with no hands could serve the Liturgy if someone from the altar helps him. That would be only one example of the dialogue in which the Liturgy represents synergy between God and man, a place where we understand the needs of others. There is no fear, disabled person is enabled through the helper to serve the Liturgy in the name of the Church which is consisted of all: abled and disabled. This would make church more conscious what the Liturgy truly is, liberating Liturgy itself from the cultic understanding. Only in this manner, truly the space of the Church would become the space where "only exclusion that is permissible - even imperative - is of exclusiveness itself."³²

7. Liturgy as a Place of Inclusion

Resurrected Christ comes to the Apostles bearing signs of His torture. His body is a perfect body, but yet his "glorious body of the resurrected Christ is disfigured and disabled in that

³¹ <http://www.agioskanon.ru/apostol/001.htm#77> visited on: 11.09.2016.

³² John Zizioulas, *Community and Otherness*, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, (2006), p. 92.

it still bears the marks of crucifixion.”³³ His ribs have obvious signs of injuries. Resurrected Christ has a perfect body that passes through the walls, and yet with visible wounds, “and by his wounds we are healed” (Is 53:4). United apostles have been with no fear, because His visible “defects” convinced them that eschatology entered present time. It is because of his bodily “imperfections” that they believed in Him. Wounds became a powerful symbol of faith, motivation and conviction. It is not perfection that should inspire apostles to proclaim the new faith, but it is his violated body. In case of Apostle Thomas, resurrection has been testified not by his glorious body, not by the Apostles and other witnesses, but by His visible wounds as a testimony of His suffering. In His wounds, Thomas found glorious and resurrected Christ.

Inclusion is given to us by Christ's sacrifice. In Rom 15:7 Paul says that Christians should welcome one another just as Christ has welcomed them through his death. “Wherefore, accept one another, just as Christ also accepted us to the glory of God” (Rom 15:7). The Apostle obviously found the mode of inclusion as dominant in his view and his link with Christ's death. Emphasizing the interrelation between the inclusion in the community and Christ's death Paul is posing the main question at stake: How can Church practice Christ's inclusion?³⁴ The very same question we could ask dealing with this matter. Inclusivity for Paul found its expression in a communal meal, at the table. The theology of Christ's inclusivity and sacrifice is rooted in the common meal, at event of solidarity and not in the physical space or any other sacred space. “To experience inclusion in the community at the table, and to extend that experience to others, is in the most profound sense *to proclaim the Lord's death until he comes*.”³⁵ Obviously, for the early Church the space of Eucharist has been essential to display the newness of the Gospel which enables diverse people to sit and eat at the same table despite their differences. In other words, the Eucharist allows and includes in itself differences, forbidding those differences to become barriers. Differences are safeguarded, borders are maintained, but borders are not to become barriers. Safeguarding differences, we safeguard uniqueness of every human being providing different means to different needs.

“So then, brothers and sisters, when you come together to eat, wait for one another” (1 Cor. 11:33). Mentioning of 1Cor. 11 is even more important in the context of our Liturgies realizing that the presence of Christ has been measured by inclusion which has been expressed through the words “wait one another” and not by the ritual or the quality of bread and wine.³⁶ Authenticity of Eucharist has been measured by inclusion – *wait for one*

33 C. B. Peter, “One in Christ: Priesthood of the Disabled and the Exercising of Gifts” in the book: *Disability, Society and Theology: Voices from Africa*, ed. Samuel Kabue, Esther Mombo, Joseph Galgalo, C. B. Peter, Limuru: Zapf Chancery, (2011), pp. 59-78, p. 69.

34 Cf. Slaviša Kostić, “Orthodox Responses to the Social Problem”, *Philotheos* 5 (2005), p. 402-415; Also, Irinej Dobrijević, “Solidarity and Social Justice: The Mission of the Serbian Orthodox Church towards European Integration”, *Philotheos* 6 (2006), p. 324-332

35 Dennis E. Smith, *From Symposium to Eucharist: The Banquet in the Early Christian World*, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, (2002), p. 200.

36 Растко Јовић, „Недостојни хришћани: Недостојност хришћана као питање социјалне солидарности“, *Видослов Божић* (2012), p. 159-171/ Rastko Jović, „Nedostojni hrišćani: Nedostojnost hrišćana kao pitanje socijalne solidarnosti“, *Vidoslov Božić* (2012), p. 159-171

another. In other words, there is no authentic Eucharistic feast if we do not have a real communion where inclusion allows for the participation of different people, and different gifts.

8. PWD Challenge to the Liturgy

But PWD also reminds us that we have more way to go. We went further than the Jewish understanding of priesthood claiming that physical inability is not a barrier for a priesthood. Did we really theologically rely on this? When we think it is obvious that physical impediments could be problematic for a Church. In other words, someone would say that precisely because of physical impediments women cannot be priests in the Orthodox Church. Maybe the time has come to reason these issues in a new way in the Orthodox Church and PWD inspired us to discuss them. Problems of PWD and their life in the Church show the importance of our inner theological dialogue and consistency that is needed.

We also tried to show that clean/unclean barrier has been abandoned in Apostolic Canons when it comes to the issue of priesthood and physical disabilities. Yet, the very same tradition expresses itself also in opposite direction when it comes to women, where the old same dialectic between clean/unclean plays a major role. It is enough to read the second canon of St. Dyonisios concerning women having their period in which it is said that “but if one is not wholly clean both in soul and in body, he shall be prevented from coming up to the Holy of Holies.”³⁷ Suddenly, we have been drawn into the theology of clean/unclean but also into the theology where veil still exists separating profane from Holy of Holies. More importantly, we have been pushed into inconsistency. In one case Christianity flew over old divisions and on the other it is Christianity that sanctifies old ambiguities with a new strength.

Concluding Remarks: Enabling our Talents

The exclusion of PWD in the Church challenges our ever-present exclusion visible in some aspects of majority of “a royal priesthood.” For example, Liturgical language in many Orthodox churches is not everyday language. In that sense, liturgical language excludes the majority of the people from participation in the Liturgy because of its inaccessibility. Inaccessibility of language coincides with physical inaccessibility of our Liturgies for PWDs. We still have a long way to go to express our theology in practice, and our liturgies into participatory event that represents “disabled” Christ on the cross that saves the world.

Challenge of the role of PWD in the Church is our chance to make our theology more consistent and, at the same time, our activities more precise and sharper. On a symbolic level, PWD challenge of our theology enables Church to open up our theological discussion giving more space to those theologically “disabled”.

In a famous story on talents, it is God who tells us that everyone is born with talents and in order to live in His presence we have been called to multiply our talents (Mat 25:14-30). It is more than obvious that on our journey in life we need to work on our per-

³⁷ *The Rudder*, ed. Ralph J. Masterjohn, West Brookfield: The Orthodox Christian Educational Society, (2005), p. 1366.

sonal progress, opening horizons of our possibilities. In other words, God invites us to develop our talents. In the story on talents, the one who received one talent dug it in the ground. Concerning our present situation, it would be an even greater misunderstanding if the Church advises people to dig their talents into the ground in order to please God. The Church as Body of Christ, needless to say, would need to give space to Christ, i.e. even "disabled" in her present condition, Church needs to be "able" to invite and offer people hope and possibility to multiply their talents. Otherwise we turn into "able" disablers of people's gifts betraying teaching and life of Christ.

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Views on the (Serbian Orthodox) Church Calendar as An Element of Cultural Heritage in Serbia: Attitudes on Online Platforms*

Abstract: The Serbian Orthodox Church is considered by a number of Serbian citizens to be the “guardian” of tradition and cultural heritage. Issues related to church reforms are thus often particularly sensitive, and are perceived by some of the public as a danger to the preservation of cultural and religious identity. On the other hand, there are opinions in favor of reforms. In this context, the issue of church calendar reform is of special interest. Although it has been raised for more than a century, it is still as relevant as in the first attempts at the reform thereof. This paper explores the attitudes on online platforms in Serbia on this issue. Is the church calendar perceived as an integral part of the cultural heritage? What are the pros and cons of calendar reform? What would be the consequences of its potential change?

Keywords: online platforms, church calendar, cultural heritage, reform

Introduction

The Serbian Orthodox Church is considered by a number of Serbian citizens to be the “guardian” of tradition and cultural heritage. Issues related to church reforms are thus often particularly sensitive, and are perceived by some of the public as a danger to the preservation of cultural and religious identity. On the other hand, there are opinions in favor of reforms. In this context, the issue of church calendar reform is of special interest. Although raised for more than a century, it is still as relevant as in the first attempts at the reform thereof.

In the relatively frequent controversies on this topic, the main arguments of the opponents of the modification are related to the preservation of religious and national identity through tradition, which the calendar is an integral part of. Some of them refer to church dogmatists, and even the voices of those who speak in favor of greater accuracy of the Julian calendar in relation to the Gregorian one can be heard (Karelin 2005).

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The question arises as to how widely any of these views are accepted in society. We tried to approach the answer to this topic in one of our previous researches (Stefanović-Banović 2011). On that occasion, partly through a survey and partly through direct interviews, we examined whether and in what way the citizens of Serbia think about this issue today, and with what arguments the most engaged supporters, or opponents of calendar reform, act, as well as how much and what kind of influence knowledge and information have on the attitude towards this topic.

In this paper, we will try to build on previous research by observing the views on this issue on online platforms in Serbia.

It is important to note that the calendar issue includes two phenomena: one is the calendar itself, which determines fixed holidays, and the other is the paschal cycle (Paschalia), the way of calculating the date of Easter and all movable holidays related to it. The topic of the paschal cycle was not taken into account during this research, as that would significantly exceed the expected scope of work.

Research methodology

We conducted a survey of information and attitudes regarding the possible revision of the church calendar using a qualitative approach. We tried to obtain as wide a range of opinions as possible, aware of the fact that some of them may be completely individual or in some other sense cannot be considered representative of the wider population. Therefore, the aim of the research was not to determine the prevailing attitudes, but to identify the main directions in which they are formed, as well as to establish what they are based on.

An important factor that we took into account when choosing this research method was the complexity of the topic we were dealing with. We believed that a quantitative approach, by its nature, would lead to a certain loss of nuance of attitudes and omission of part of the information in the process of their statistical analysis.

The research was conducted according to the model of so-called *focus groups* or *discussion groups*³⁸, with the groups not being formed by researchers, but spontaneously, as people interested in this topic came together around an article on a website or on a message board. The literature recognizes this research model as valid.³⁹ The main advantages of this model are related to the anonymity that the participants enjoy, so they express their views more freely and honestly, and enter into discussions with other people more easily. On the other hand, the same circumstances favor the development of unreasonable discussion, digressions, and even leaving aside the main topic entirely. Accordingly, in our research, only those comments related to the topic, as well as those that do not in any way endanger the dignity of any of the discussants or third parties, were used as material.

³⁸ See for example: Ritchie, Jane & Lewis, Jane (eds.) (2003). *Qualitative research practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*, London – New Delhi. 58.

³⁹ See for example: Mann, Chris & Stewart, Fiona (eds.) (2000). *Internet Communication and Qualitative Research: A Handbook for Researching Online*, London – New Delhi. 99-125.

The criterion for selecting the respondents was the availability of material, that is, comments. As the comments were anonymous, in most cases no data on participants were available. Since the main goal of the research was to recognize a range of attitudes regarding the possible reform of the calendar, we believe that the absence of this type of information about the respondents did not significantly affect the interpretation of the results.

We collected research material using two basic types of sources: message boards and comments on news on websites. We analyzed the comments published from 2005 up to today. This time frame is conditioned primarily by technological factors - the widespread use of the Internet and this type of communication in general.

The comments were, for the most part, collected from the online editions of local newspapers: "B92", "Politika", "Blic", "Novosti", "Glas javnosti", "Vesti online", "Alo", "Telegraf", etc. The forums we used were: pouke.org, forum.krstarica.com, elitesecurity.org, forum.slobodnavojvodina.org, and so on. A complete list of websites covered by this research is included at the end of the paper.

The collected comments were categorized in relation to the main topic they deal with. In doing so, we singled out several basic categories, i.e., directions of thinking regarding the calendar issue. We believe that this *a posteriori* approach is more relevant to the researched topic than the *a priori* one, which would define in advance the basic theses, that is, questions for research.

The comments we publish in this paper are not always presented in their original form, but are transcribed into Cyrillic and proofread if necessary. In addition, parts of the comments that use inappropriate language or could be offensive are excluded.

On the Julian and Gregorian calendars

The Julian calendar came into force on January 1, 45 BC, by decree of Julius Caesar. It was created through the reform of the old Roman calendar, in which the length of the year was not fixed, but in order to harmonize it with the solar year⁴⁰, the council headed by the *pontifex maximus* determined the duration of the intercalary month⁴¹. This way of determining the length of the year was subject to misuse, e.g., for earlier or later tax collection, etc. (*Old style calendar*, Wikipedia 2011).

The calendar reform was entrusted to the astronomer Sosigenes of Alexandria.⁴² According to the data available at the time, the solar year lasted 365.25 days, which is why

⁴⁰ The solar year is the time it takes the Earth to complete one orbit around the Sun. Depending on the reference body in relation to which the Earth's position in relation to the Sun is determined, the solar year can be tropical, sidereal, anomalistic, etc. In this paper, the solar year will entail a tropical solar year, except where otherwise specified. On the solar year: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Year#Sidereal.2C_tropical.2C_and_anomalistic_years.

⁴¹ The intercalary month is present in lunisolar calendars, in which the duration of the month is determined according to the lunar phases, and the length of the year - according to the Sun. As the solar year does not contain the whole number of lunar cycles, an intercalary month is added to some years, which aims to compensate for the difference between the solar and lunar years. See: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intercalation>.

⁴² Sosigenes of Alexandria, first century BC, mathematician, and astronomer. Little is known about him, but he is mentioned as the creator of the Julian calendar in Pliny the Elder's encyclopedia *Naturalis Historia*. See more at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sosigenes_of_Alexandria.

every fourth year was declared a leap year and one day was added to it. The year was divided into 12 months and started on January 1, when the Roman Senate traditionally sat.

The Christian church never had the need to create its own calendar, but always used the calendar of the local community (Janković 2007). Thus, naturally, the first calendar that the Church used was Julian.

According to today's calculations, the Julian year lasts 11 minutes and 13.92 seconds longer than the solar year, which is why every 128 years the Julian year is one day longer than the solar one (*Year*, Wikipedia 2011). This difference was noticed in the first centuries, when making tables for determining the date of Easter. After numerous attempts at reform, the Catholic Church adopted a new calendar on February 24, 1582, by decree of Pope Gregory XIII. At that time, the difference between the Julian and solar years was 10 days, which was compensated by the fact that after October 4, 1582, October 15 came. A correction was made to the method of determining leap years: the years at which the centuries end are common unless they are divisible by 400. Thus, the years 1700, 1800 and 1900 were common in the Gregorian and leap in the Julian, so the difference between the two calendars today is 13 days. From 2100, the difference will be 14 days.

* * *

Comments collected from the Internet show a very different levels of knowledge about the historical circumstances and facts related to the Julian and Gregorian calendars. Knowledge of the calendar issue ranges from very solid to very superficial. In this sense, there is an interesting comment of an author of a text (B92 2009), which quite vividly depicts this situation:

Judging by the reactions I get on the blog when I write about the calendar, I can see that the reformation of the obviously incorrect calendar, due to ignorance, is still perceived in our public as an attack on Serbian and Orthodox, and that counting of days is neither Serbian nor Orthodox – it was established by a man whose heir declared both of them Gods on earth!⁴³

Some people point to superficial knowledge, and even misconceptions about the calendar issue. One of the main ones is the perception of the Julian calendar as “Serbian” or “Orthodox”. In this context, one man replies:

Its own calendar??? Was that calendar perhaps created by Bishop Julius? This calendar is from the time of paganism (as well as many of our customs), which only confirms that it takes a lot of time for Serbs to accept advanced ideas and innovations, even the Christian religion as younger than the religion when Serbs worshiped trees and read from animal intestines.⁴⁴

In a similar manner, an author of another comment believes that the calendar question is primarily a matter of astronomical accuracy of the calendar, and not a question of religion:

Catholic calendar! Nonsense, how is that the Catholic calendar? Universal, new, Gregorian, yes, but not Catholic. The fact that Pope Gregory initiated and adopted it has nothing to do with

⁴³ http://www.b92.net/zivot/nauka.php?nav_id=382703

⁴⁴ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendar/komentar>

Catholicism, but with the fact that Julian is totally inaccurate!!! Actually, more inaccurate than Gregorian in any case, the fact that some people here on the forum say that Gregorian is inaccurate is not true, it is just better than Julian.⁴⁵

The level of knowledge about the relationship between the two calendars is evidenced by specific examples, with the date of the Christmas celebration being most often mentioned. Some of the commentators point out the inconsistency regarding the date of Christmas, and the calendar used by adherents of the SOC in general:

I don't see a reason why the herd is kept in ignorance, why it is claimed that [we] Serbs celebrate Christmas on January 7 (and how Serbs will accept to celebrate it on January 8 in the next century), what the Serbian New Year means and I would also like to I see some future Transfiguration at the end of August!⁴⁶

On the one hand, some people state that Christmas and New Year are celebrated on December 25 and January 1, respectively, but according to the Julian calendar:

Folks, we still celebrate Christmas on December 25 (just according to the Julian calendar)! To me, Christmas is not on January 7, but on December 25, except that I do not follow the Gregorian but the Julian calendar.⁴⁷

We Serbs celebrate Christmas on December 25 according to our old calendar, and according to the new calendar Christmas falls on January 7.⁴⁸

Orthodox people always celebrate Christmas in December according to the only correct calendar. That's why I find it interesting that these titles don't make a difference, but always count when the holidays fall according to the Gregorian calendar.⁴⁹

On the other hand, many commentators are convinced and determined in their attitude to celebrate Christmas on January 7:

Next and every following year we will celebrate on January 7.⁵⁰

As long as I am alive, I will celebrate Christmas on January 7.⁵¹

Some of the people in the comments also point to the problem that will arise when, due to different calculations of leap years, the difference between the Julian and Gregorian calendars in 2100 will increase by another day:

Our big problem is that we don't realize that we celebrate Christmas on December 25. If this situation remains, the problem will arise in 2100, when, according to this calculation, Christmas will be on January 8. The All-Orthodox Council is being prepared and the calendar issue will certainly be one of the items on the agenda to be analyzed (among other issues), and no one knows yet when that will happen. So, there is no need to worry and panic. In practice, the Gregorian is being used.⁵²

⁴⁵ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentari>

⁴⁶ http://www.b92.net/zivot/auka.php?nav_id=382703

⁴⁷ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

⁴⁸ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

⁴⁹ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

⁵⁰ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

⁵¹ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

⁵² <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

Looking at people's knowledge of the calendar, we also noticed misinformation that commentators use as arguments for their views.

Can someone please tell me who, in Serbia or Greece, celebrates Christmas on December 25, not as a Catholic, but as an Orthodox?⁵³

We can see from one of the answers that the difference between the Julian and Gregorian calendars is misunderstood:⁵⁴

Well, the church already uses a part of the Gregorian calendar, otherwise the dates would be reduced by 1582 by another 3 days, which is the mistake in the Julian calendar.⁵⁵

One of the people thinks the lunar calendar is the most accurate:⁵⁶

Muslims, just like some others in the world, use the lunar calendar, which does not follow the seasons as Julian and Gregorian do, but that is why there is not a single mistake in it and it is 100% accurate, which is scientifically and proven.⁵⁷

On the revision of the church calendar

The Gregorian calendar was immediately accepted in most Catholic countries. Protestant countries accepted it, with great resistance, in the next two centuries (Radić 2011). The Orthodox population, especially in the areas of the expansionist policy of the Catholic Church, perceived every difference as a way of preserving their identity, so keeping the Julian calendar was also considered an important element of independence (Sljepčević 1966, 155–158). Yet, the unquestionable inaccuracy of the Julian calendar left open the question of its revision. This issue was also one of the main topics at the Congress of Orthodox Churches, held in Constantinople in May 1923, at the invitation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The proposal of Professor Milutin Milanković, a member of the Serbian delegation, received absolute support on that occasion. Milanković's proposal foresaw the introduction of a new rule for determining leap years⁵⁸, which would reduce the difference in relation to the solar year to only two seconds. In this case, the deviation would be only one day every 43,200 years. However, this proposal never came to life in practice.

At a session held in the same year (1923), the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church accepted Milanković's proposal in principle, but with a delay of its implementation until all Orthodox churches agreed on it. As this did not happen, the Julian calendar remained in force.

⁵³ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

⁵⁴ In 1582, the Gregorian calendar differed from the Julian calendar by 10 days. From then until today, the difference has grown to 13 days.

⁵⁵ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendar/komentar>

⁵⁶ The lunar calendar is based on lunar phases. The 12 months of the lunar calendar last approximately 354 days, which is why it is behind the solar 11 or 12 days a year. See: http://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lunarni_kalendar.

⁵⁷ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendar/komentar>

⁵⁸ The leap years at the end of the century would be only those which divided by 9 leave a remainder of 2 or 6.

At the Council held in December 1923, the Greek Orthodox Church adopted the Gregorian calendar for fixed holidays, but when it comes to moving holidays, it kept the old way of calculating the date of Easter (the paschal cycle). Such a rapid development of events led to the separation of one part of bishops, clergy and adherents, and to the establishment of the community of “Orthodox Christians”, which declared the Greek Orthodox Church an “apostate from Orthodoxy” (Pavle 1998). At the last conference dealing with this issue, held in 1982 in Chambézy, Switzerland, the Russian, Jerusalem and Serbian Orthodox Churches announced that they could not proceed with the revision of the calendar for fear of a possible schism (Radić 2011).

* * *

The analyzed material shows that there is knowledge about the calendar reform in the Orthodox churches. People on message boards are somewhat familiar with the events surrounding Milanković’s proposal for a reformed Julian calendar and its (non-)adoption, but they are not always informed of the reasons why the reformed calendar did not come to life in the Serbian Orthodox Church. Many point out the difference between the reformed Julian (Milanković’s) calendar and the Gregorian one, and the fact that the Serbian Orthodox Church did not accept the Gregorian, but revised the Julian calendar. People often emphasize the fact that the creator of the revised calendar is a Serb, so the calendar is considered “Serbian” too.

What many Serbs do not know – the so-called new calendar used by Greeks, Bulgarians, Romanians, etc. is Milanković’s calendar. Therefore, it is not the Roman Catholic, but the Serbian calendar.⁵⁹

What is the advantage of such a calendar?” The most accurate calendar in the world was made by our guy, Milutin Milanković, and why our church and country do not use that calendar, is completely beyond me. If a Serb has already made the most accurate calendar so far, can’t we do him a favor and accept it as ours? Isn’t it enough that it is the most accurate in the world?⁶⁰

Insisting on the use of the outdated calendar is a big mistake of the Serbian Orthodox Church, especially if it is known that the most accurate calculation of time was designed by a Serb-Orthodox!!!⁶¹

Arguments in favor of calendar revision

The arguments of the supporters of the calendar revision are based on different standpoints. A number of people support an astronomically more accurate calendar. Others see the reform as an opportunity for the unity of all Christians. Some arguments are based on issues of modernization and tradition, while certain people base their support on practical issues.

In the context of advocating for the adoption of a “more accurate” calendar, Milanković’s calendar and the view that it is exactly the one that should be adopted are most often mentioned.

⁵⁹ <http://www.pouke.org/verujem/index.php?topic=12705.0>

⁶⁰ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentari>

⁶¹ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentari>

Should we also mention the fact that today the calendar of Trpković and Milanković, which has replaced the Gregorian calendar, has already been accepted in relevant scientific circles all over the world? It is realistic to expect that most governments and churches around the world will switch to this 'made in Serbia' calendar in the coming centuries.⁶²

The very fact that the Julian calendar is one day behind in 128 years, while the Gregorian calendar is one day behind in 3226 years, says it all. Ingenious, not only because of the calendar, Milanković actually improved the Gregorian calendar and thus inevitably brought the Julian one closer to it. The new calendar would be useful to everyone as its annual deviation is only 2 seconds.⁶³

We also come across opinions according to which the veneration of Christ and the saints is connected with the accuracy of the calendar, that is, the dates of holidays:

After all, the application of the Julian calendar is a distinct way of disrespecting Christian saints – if we are baptized in their name, we can try to calculate exactly when they were born and when they died...⁶⁴

The Julian calendar is not logical - first Christ was born, then came the New Year and a new era - and that is January 7th and 13th ... But just as we, like the whole world, have to celebrate the New Year on January 1st, then it makes sense that Christmas is celebrated on December 25th - this way it turns out that we start a new year and era before the birth of Christ...⁶⁵

Close to these views are the authors of the comments who believe that an inaccurate calendar harms the church:

I love and respect the church, but using an inaccurate calendar only hurts it.⁶⁶

If the church is based on customs that are inaccurate, how can anyone believe in it? (...) Well, for God's sake, the Church has accepted that the earth is not flat, so why wouldn't it accept a calendar that is accurate?!

On the other hand, the arguments of a number of supporters of the calendar reform are based precisely on the aspiration towards the unity of all Christians. They believe that the Julian calendar separates the Serbian Orthodox Church from other churches:

It would be nice to adopt a reformed Julian calendar that we invented ourselves, instead of the current one, which is not only inaccurate but separates us from the rest of Christendom.⁶⁸

Yes, Christmas should be celebrated according to the Gregorian calendar when the whole world, i.e., Christians celebrate it...⁶⁹

I join those who are in favor of the application of the Gregorian calendar, when the whole world - not only Roman Catholics, but also Protestants celebrate Christmas. I would like Or-

⁶² http://www.b92.net/zivot/nauka.php?nav_id=382703

⁶³ <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Milankovicev-kalendar-tacniji-od-gregorijanskog.lt.html>

⁶⁴ http://www.b92.net/zivot/nauka.php?nav_id=382703

⁶⁵ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendar/komentar>

⁶⁶ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendar/komentar>

⁶⁷ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendar/komentar>

⁶⁸ http://www.b92.net/zivot/nauka.php?nav_id=382703

⁶⁹ <http://www.srpskadijaspora.info/vest.asp?id=6704>

thodox Serbs to do the same, and to get the amount of energy that unites Christians: *ut unum sint* – that they may be one!⁷⁰

I personally like to celebrate “our” Christmas, yet my desire to share happiness with all Christians on the same day is greater.⁷¹

In a similar context, it is pointed out that some Orthodox churches have already accepted the reform:

It is such a nonsense to stick to the Julian calendar... Well, Greeks, Bulgarians and Romanians are Orthodox too, and they use the new calendar ...⁷²

If the whole Orthodox world has adopted one rule, and if the whole world has agreed to it, why do we have to act differently?⁷³

Advocacy for calendar reform is often based on issues of modernization and tradition. Some people believe that the lack of calendar reform is one of the indicators of resistance to the modernization of society as a whole:

The SOC is still using the inaccurate Julian calendar commissioned by Gaius Julius Caesar, one of the greatest persecutors of Christians in the history of the human race. The SOC will not accept a more accurate Gregorian calendar only because it was made by Catholics. The SOC knows that the Julian calendar is incorrect, but along with few other countries, they refuse to change their mind. Serbian society and the SOC do not show initiative in correcting mistakes. Serbian society and the SOC do not have the initiative in discovering and implementing new things. Serbian society is unprepared for initiatives that lead to progress, even though we do have experts.⁷⁴

It's a pity that because of those 15 days of difference (consequently) so many people of the Orthodox faith were tortured and suffered... So, keep sticking so blindly and stubbornly to outdated delusions!⁷⁵

Yees! And we should start using ells to measure lengths and okas to measure weights (volume?)!⁷⁶

Malice, that has never brought us anything good!!! Now the whole world uses the Gregorian (and our priests in worldly life), but, out of spite, we will not give up the Julian!!!⁷⁷

There are also opinions that the reform would not endanger the identity and tradition, which is one of the basic arguments of the opponents of the reform:

⁷⁰ <http://www.srpskadijaspora.info/vest.asp?id=6705>

⁷¹ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentar>

⁷² <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentar>

⁷³ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentar>

⁷⁴ http://www.b92.net/zivot/nauka.php?nav_id=382703

⁷⁵ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentar>

⁷⁶ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentar>

⁷⁷ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentar>

My greatest wish is for all Christians to celebrate at the same time, that is, according to the Gregorian calendar. We should not be afraid for our identity, we have been and will remain pure Orthodox as before. To be with the world, and God will be with us Serbs.⁷⁸

We do not have to give up anything, just accept the correction of the existing one.⁷⁹

No one will disrupt our faith if we move to a new calendar!⁸⁰

There are also opinions according to which the preservation of tradition is not an adequate argument against the reform of the calendar, since in other fields modernization is accepted:

You don't want to give up the calendar, but it wasn't so hard for you to give up horses and carriages and switch to Audi or Mercedes...⁸¹

I would support the church to continue with the Julian calendar, as it has done so far, if someone from the church would publicly present some very good arguments in favor of it as far as religious practice is concerned, but it is not right to just refer to tradition. It is not an argument, at least not for the modern world.⁸²

Some people who visit websites and message boards see calendar reform as something that would be necessary in order to function more simply and practically in everyday life. It is believed that everyday life would be significantly easier if a "new" calendar was used in the church as well.

We need to adapt to the time and celebration of our environment (Europe), as work and trade are a connected vessel; we will especially feel that once Serbia is admitted to the EU. This does not mean that we pandering anyone or changing our faith.⁸³

Because the 'Serbian New Year' falls on December 31 ... but the Serbs decided to celebrate it in January. It is one thing to be ignorant and uneducated ... but when someone explains to you that it is very strange when your passport, ID, and even birth certificate include dates according to the universal and generally accepted Gregorian calendar, and you still celebrate the new year in January ... Then it is bigotry.⁸⁴

An issue that would certainly require a special study is the life of SOC adherents in the diaspora. Due to the difference between the calendars, it often happens that the biggest Christian holidays according to the Julian calendar are during working days, which creates problems of a practical nature. Here are just a few comments that point to this aspect as one of the arguments in favor of calendar reform:

⁷⁸ <http://www.srpskadijaspora.info/vest.asp?id=6701>

⁷⁹ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentar>

⁸⁰ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentar>

⁸¹ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentar>

⁸² <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentar>

⁸³ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentar>

⁸⁴ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentar>

I agree. Especially for us who live in the west, it is very difficult when, like it happened yesterday, we have to work on Christmas. I originally planned to go to the liturgy, but I had to cancel because I was notified of an urgent meeting. Many people did not make it even to the evening service yesterday because they were caught in a traffic jam.⁸⁵

The old calendar creates problems for Orthodox adherents living in the diaspora. I cannot celebrate Christmas and Easter at the same time as those who adhere to the new calendar. I am limited in a way, because during my Christmas and Easter I have to work, children have to go to school, etc. I haven't read anywhere that any of the Orthodox authorities gave a valid reason why the Serbian Orthodox Church adheres to the old calendar.⁸⁶

Arguments against calendar revision

The astronomical facts stated so far undeniably speak in favor of the calendar revision from the aspect of mathematical calculations. Here we will consider some of the arguments of the opponents of the reform.

After the Council of Constantinople in 1923, the Russian Patriarch Tikhon reacted, among others, stating the reasons both against the legitimacy of the Council and against the adopted revision of the Julian calendar. In his statement to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union in 1924, he stated arguments that can still be considered equally relevant today. Although he believed that the revision of the calendar was not contrary to the teachings of the church, and that it would bring many benefits to the faithful, the Russian patriarch warned that there were several important reasons why the reform should not be implemented. As the main reasons, he cites the disruption of the unity of the Orthodox Churches, the fear of schisms, such as the one in Greece, the feeling of imposition by the civil authorities and the resistance of unprepared adherents. He also reminds of the close connection of the Russian village with rituals and the importance that people attach to their immutability. "Due to the people's poor knowledge of canons and dogmas, calendar reform would be seen as an attack on religious identity" (Tikhon 2006).

Among the opponents of the calendar reform, the Georgian clergyman, Archimandrite Raphael Karelin, is often quoted from modern sources. Through the views he advocates, one gains insight into the shift in the focus of arguments against reform from the socio-cultural to the theological sphere.

Among the arguments in the field of social phenomena, Karelin notes that other religions also use calendars that are inconsistent with the astronomical year, and that this does not create any problems in religious service, but is considered an integral part of the tradition: "Jews and Muslims use lunar calendars, while the Japanese use both the traditional imperial and modern calendars" (Karelin 2004). Emphasizing the relativity of the human conception of time, he believes that the calendar has not only a mathematical but also

⁸⁵ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentari>

⁸⁶ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentari>

a philosophical and religious dimension. As an argument for “greater accuracy of the Julian compared to the Gregorian calendar”, he cites the fact that the duration of the Julian year represents a value that is between the duration of the tropical and sidereal,⁸⁷ and sees therein a balance between “earthly and cosmic time”. He also warns that no calendar can be absolutely astronomically accurate, and that the Church, if it embarks on the path of revisionism, will have to constantly “break and deform the constitution and forms of its service” (Karelin 2005).

* * *

The stated arguments of the opponents of the calendar revision can also be found in the analyzed comments. They can be observed in several basic directions.

One group of arguments is based on the (in)accuracy of the Julian calendar. First of all, there is the statement that in many cultures there are calendars that are not harmonized with the Gregorian, which is in everyday use. Such calendars, and especially the holidays that are celebrated according to them, are not considered a disadvantage, but a treasure of those cultures. Accordingly, people have opinions on the Julian calendar:

We Orthodox Serbs will continue to use the Julian calendar and that's it! The so-called “Gregorian calendar” was introduced in Serbia only in 1918... To this day, it has not been fully accepted ... And it will never be! Before that, the Julian calendar was used for centuries. By the way, the Chinese New Year is also celebrated in the world, Mexicans celebrate “cinco de mayo” and their New Year everywhere, Jews celebrate their New Year (according to their calendar, the year is five thousand seven hundred and some...), etc. But only when it comes to the Serbian New Year, January 14, there is always a group (...) that is bothered by it and that would like to be “modern”.⁸⁸

There is no reason to give up the Julian calendar, because we are so past the religious significance of these holidays that we celebrate and it has become part of the tradition of Serbs. If the Chinese can celebrate the New Year in February or the Jews in September, I don't see why some people are so annoyed by the “Serbian” New Year and other holidays.⁸⁹

Some comments emphasize the connection between the calendar and the liturgical time. Reforming the calendar would lead to a discontinuity in this cycle, which entails a number of issues related to church life, both theological and practical:

The reform of the calendar in the Church is not a question of accuracy, but of avoiding the breaking of the liturgical chain. For the liturgy, which according to the church teaching is held at the same time ‘both above and on Earth,’ the most important thing is that both are held at the

⁸⁷ The tropical year is the time period that elapses between two passages of the Sun through the same imaginary point in the sky, and lasts 365 days, 5 hours, 48 minutes and 46 seconds. The sidereal year is determined by the passage of the Sun through the same point in relation to distant stars and is longer than the tropical one by 20 minutes and 26 seconds. The Julian year lasts 365 days and 6 hours, which is why it is about 11 minutes longer than the tropical one, and about 9 minutes shorter than the sidereal year. See: <http://static.astronomija.co.rs/kalendar/knjiga/godina.htm>

⁸⁸ <http://www.srpskadijaspora.info/vest.asp?id=6699>

⁸⁹ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendar/komentar>

same time. Who cares if it is calendar correct or not? As if the church cared about the calendar established by the Roman emperor. If you are not a believer, leave the SOC alone. And “celebrate” quasi-Christmas and quasi-Easter whenever you want.⁹⁰

Among the arguments of the opponents of the calendar revision, which are in some way related to the (in)accuracy of the Julian calendar, there are also the statements that the Julian calendar is more accurate than the Gregorian:

The Gregorian calendar is not more accurate, but precisely because of the inaccuracy that is the same as in the Julian, it must be corrected from time to time. In astronomy and astronomy-related fields (from determining the date of Easter to GPS synchronization), the Julian calendar is still used for all calculations.⁹¹

In fact, it is a misidentification of the Julian day, a unit of measurement used in astronomy, with the Julian calendar.⁹² On the other hand, some of the comments present accurate astronomical data as arguments against calendar revision. These views are based on the fact that no calendar can be absolutely accurate, and those who advocate them believe that the revision of the Julian calendar is therefore pointless:

The main difference between the Julian and Gregorian calendars is in the schedule of leap years (i.e., that famous February with 29 days). Everyone knows that it takes 365.25 days for the Earth to orbit the Sun. That is the value the Julian calendar works with, that is, every fourth year, one leap day is added. Yet, that number is not exactly correct, the exact value is somewhere around 365.25636042 days. The very fact that this is a number with so many decimals indicates that no matter how hard we try, we will never be able to make a perfect calendar. As for the astronomical accuracy, which is what the supporters of the Gregorian calendar like to talk about, it is important to keep in mind that it will also be behind!⁹³

Not true! The two incorrect calendars are linked by a difference of two weeks. This means that the following can happen - that Gregorian Christmas falls in the spring, and Julian a little later, if no calendar corrections are made. So, it's not just a question of the Julian calendar, it's a question of both calendars.⁹⁴

The second group of arguments against calendar revision is based on issues of identity and tradition. People believe that the reform of the calendar, and any change in the church in general, would make us lose part of the ethnic and religious identity or tradition, all in the direction of globalization, “Catholicization” and “destruction of the Orthodox Church”.

The Julian calendar is perceived by a number of people as one of the ways to protect and keep religious and ethnic identity. To that end, the main features of the Julian calendar that are emphasized are its tradition, that is, the difference in relation to the Gregorian. The reform would be understood as the discontinuation of tradition and a kind of “capitu-

⁹⁰ http://www.b92.net/zivot/nauka.php?nav_id=382703

⁹¹ <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Milankovicev-kalendar-tacniji-od-gregorijanskog.lt.html>

⁹² Julian day is a unit of measurement most commonly used in astronomy to make it easier to calculate the time period between two events. It is the number of days elapsed from January 1, 4713 BC at noon. See for example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_day.

⁹³ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

⁹⁴ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendar/komentari>

lation” to Catholicism. On the other hand, the difference between the Julian and Gregorian calendars makes it easier to “preserve identity”:

We get it, the ‘turning’ of the Julian calendar towards the Gregorian began, which could be more accurately described with: Orthodox / Serbs, kneel before Catholics!!!⁹⁵

For all the so-called Serbs, who have a problem with the Julian calendar, and who are probably annoyed by the Cyrillic alphabet and therefore don’t use it, with all the saints we have, Sava, Nicholas, Basil of Ostrog, I will not accept Vatican bankers, think about it, gentlemen, culture is being taken away from us little by little.⁹⁶

Unfortunately, this is not the unity of the Orthodox Church, but its disintegration!⁹⁷

I am one of those who support an outdated and inaccurate calendar. Why? I think it makes it easier to preserve one’s identity, because the Catholic Church has seceded from the One, Holy and Catholic Church.⁹⁸

There is also the opinion that the SOC should never abandon its tradition, and that other churches, in accordance with the efforts to unite all Christians, should “return to the old calendar”:

I believe that if Christian unity is at stake, then those who once left the old calendar (probably to prove they are smarter) should be so supportive and go back to the old calendar, that could be acceptable. Yet, I personally, and people close to me, will not accept any changes. There is no change.⁹⁹

For some people who visit websites and message boards, the issue of the calendar is a matter of tradition and preservation of the ancestral heritage, and any change is considered a “renunciation of the ancestors”. Judging by the comments, their authors see immutability as one of the most important features of cultural heritage. Based on some comments, it could be said that the date of marking the holiday is more important than the church conciliarity:

My grandfather, great-grandfather, great-great-grandfather all used to celebrate, and why am I any better than them and think that I should renounce my ancestors, there comes (...) and wants to sell his soul for money, well I would rather be broke, but I will never change my faith.¹⁰⁰

However, people are not crazy, we practice our religion and customs properly, and these things cannot be changed whenever someone feels like it.¹⁰¹

Celebrate it whenever you want, I will do it on January 7th. (...) With faith in God, I do not need intermediaries, I will celebrate as my ancestors celebrated, so will my children as well.¹⁰²

Some would even be ready to leave the SOC if the calendar was revised:

⁹⁵ <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Milankovicev-kalendar-tacniji-od-gregorijanskog.lt.html>

⁹⁶ <http://www.srpskadijaspora.info/vest.asp?id=6697>

⁹⁷ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

⁹⁸ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendar/komentari>

⁹⁹ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

¹⁰¹ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

¹⁰² <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

I will go to the church that follows the old calendar as long as it exists, and once it ceases to exist (and obviously the West has its fingers in it), I will be a believer for myself ... I don't need Western-oriented priests...¹⁰³

Next and every other year we will celebrate on January 7, (...) and if you change that, you will see how few adherents will come to your service, I will be the first who will not show up, I am not a sellout.¹⁰⁴

Others, on the other hand, see the potential reform as a serious danger in the form of ecumenism, which in this group of answers is always mentioned in a negative context - as heresy, approaching Catholicism and losing faith:

As long as I'm alive, I will celebrate Christmas on January 7th. You damn ecumenists, there are those of us who will under no circumstances accept that.¹⁰⁵

Orthodox people always celebrate Christmas in December according to the only correct calendar. That's why I find it interesting that these titles don't make a difference, but always count when the holidays fall according to the Gregorian calendar. Ecumenism is a heresy and the worst apostasy of Orthodoxy, as well as one of the worst sins. Remember that, you church dignitaries!¹⁰⁶

What ecumenists (apostates of the faith) are trying to do in the local Churches, which, unfortunately, include the top of our Church with many metropolitans, bishops ... has nothing to do with the accuracy of the calendar, but is just one in a series of steps towards the Vatican, i.e., the apostasy of the Orthodox faith, which will inevitably lead to a schism in our Church!¹⁰⁷

A number of arguments against the reform of the church calendar are also based on the perception of the calendar issue as imposed as part of a larger global political and social process. Various religious and political factors are accused of trying to disrupt the unity and identity of Orthodox people, or Serbs, by imposing a new calendar:

It is important that the Russians do not accept that, if they do, then the resisters will disappear in two generations. They become a sect, and sectarians and schismatics become a church. And the Bible says that true Christians will eventually be persecuted. We will see ... The power of the Zionist globalists is great. People are likely to accept colonial fascism for cheap cookies and a pair of sneakers.¹⁰⁸

I think that this news [about the calendar reform] is a new hoax of foreign services, such as the Pope coming to Niš, just to make the Serbs argue amongst themselves. Let us preserve unity, and not to attack each other immediately.¹⁰⁹

One of these attitudes is based on the thesis of "concealing" information on the calculation of time since the creation of the world. An author of a comment refers to Serbian medieval manuscripts, overlooking the fact that such dating was transferred to them from the Byzantine originals from which they were translated:

¹⁰³ <http://www.srpskadijaspora.info/vest.asp?id=6702>

¹⁰⁴ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

¹⁰⁵ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

¹⁰⁶ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

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¹⁰⁹ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

By the way, since I mentioned the Jews and that they are now in the year 5781... Even in the old Serbian medieval writings, you can find the information that for us Serbs, at that time, the Julian calendar was a “novelty”, and that they used the old Serbian calendar, according to which it seems that we are now in the year 5718...! These data were hidden and destroyed due to the imposition of the story (historical lie) about how we Serbs “came from the Carpathians” (from somewhere...!?), while in fact it is proof that we have always been here and that our history did not begin with the “arrival of the Slavs”, but much, much earlier... Even up to 5718 years ago!!! Think about it!!!¹¹⁰

The third group of arguments against calendar revision, after those based on accuracy and on preserving identity and tradition, is based on practical issues. Arguments that take into account the direct consequences of a possible reform, above all a possible schism in the SOC, are most common:

Tradition and customs are such a big part of people's lives that this change can lead, and has already partly led (where the calendar has been changed) to great schisms and disagreements! Is this small practical benefit, obtained with a unique calendar, worth the conflicts and schisms in all Orthodox churches, which will inevitably occur?”¹¹¹

We all know that the majority will not accept that, such a decision would bring even more divisions, and do we really need that today?”¹¹²

It is obvious that Mount Athos will never switch to the new calendar, no matter what. It is also clear that here, in Russia and in Georgia, there will be an even greater division within the church! It is crystal clear that this makes us formally unite with ecumenists, and part from within! Are you ready for a date change with all these consequences? Is it more important to you to share the same date with Catholics, than to preserve the unity of your own church? Are you willing to sacrifice it all just for a date?”¹¹³

To this end, one recognizes possible divisions and greater passion in the light of Christian aspirations for salvation:

Let's be real, what do we actually get with all this? Truly nothing of importance for salvation. And how much rage will such a decision bring? It will drive thousands of Christians into sin, by encouraging outrage, schisms, arrogance... So, because of something that does not contribute to salvation, we will drive away thousands of people to hell!”¹¹⁴

The calendar issue has a special significance in the diaspora. As stated in the arguments of the supporters of the reforms, there are views that the adoption of the “new” calendar would facilitate everyday life in the diaspora. On the other hand, we come across attitudes that consider such arguments unfounded:

Are our people in the diaspora ashamed to ask for a day off for Christmas? I think that our people in the diaspora have the right to ask for a day off for their Christmas. I asked and got two days off.”¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰ <http://www.srpskadijaspora.info/vest.asp?id=6699>

¹¹¹ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

¹¹² <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

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¹¹⁴ <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozic-u-decembru>

¹¹⁵ <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendara/komentari>

Conclusion

The consequences of the reform of the church calendar, if it happens, can be viewed from a technical and cultural standpoint. Analysis of the theological consequences would significantly exceed the scope of this paper and deviate from the course of observing the calendar as a cultural phenomenon.

Technically, if a calendar revision is adopted that involves a 13-day correction in relation to the solar year, whatever that “new” calendar may be, the first challenge would be to find a way to skip these 13 days in the annual ritual cycle. The Greek Orthodox Church resolved this issue by having March 24 right after March 10, in 1923.

The most important social aspect of calendar reform would be the issue of acceptance of reform by adherents. Adoption of revised calendar in Greek Orthodox Church caused dissatisfaction of a large number of adherents, and even led to schism. Looking at the Greek example, the Serbian and Russian Orthodox Churches have postponed the implementation of the reformed Julian (Milanković's) calendar.

An analysis of the web comments above shows that the arguments of the supporters and opponents of the reform of the church calendar are motivated by almost the same reasons, but they explain them from opposite standpoints. Attitudes can be grouped into three main directions: attitudes based on the (in)accuracy of the Julian calendar, attitudes based on issues of tradition, religious and ethnic identity, and those based on practical issues, that is, everyday life.

Though astronomical inaccuracy clearly speaks in favor of calendar reform, opponents of the revision point out that this argument is not relevant in liturgical terms, and that the continuity of the holiday cycle is much more important than the accuracy of the calendar.

Issues related to the preservation of religious and ethnic identity and tradition are the ones that attract the most attention and controversy on message boards and in comments on news related to calendar reform. Supporters of the reform believe that the calendar is a purely technical issue, and that its change would not lead to the loss of any part of the tradition, nor would it jeopardize our identity. On the other hand, opponents of the reform see any attempt to change the calendar as a danger to tradition, recognizing immutability as one of its most important features and a guarantee of preserving cultural identity. The celebration of church holidays according to the Julian calendar is perceived as the preservation of ancestral heritage. It is interesting that in such comments, the dates of the holidays are stated almost exclusively according to the Gregorian calendar (Christmas on January 7, etc.). Some look at the calendar issue being brought up as one of the ways in which people want to divide and weaken the Orthodox Church.

When it comes to the practical consequences of the possible adoption of the reformed calendar, commentators first expressed concern about a possible schism within the SOC. Then they state all the advantages that the reform would bring to the SOC adherents in the diaspora. It is interesting that we also come across the comments of adherents from the diaspora who say the opposite - that the difference between the calendars is not a special problem for them.

Among the comments, there are even suggestions on how to resolve the calendar issue. Opinions are very diverse: starting with the belief that Milanković's calendar should be adopted as the most accurate¹¹⁶, then that the church calendar should be harmonized with the astronomical one every year¹¹⁷, that the decision should be left to the All-Orthodox Council¹¹⁸, or the people, with a "petition"¹¹⁹, to the view that everyone should decide for themselves which calendar they want to use, as "after all, religion is a matter of choice."¹²⁰

The most noticeable characteristic noted in the collected material is that many people are insufficiently informed about this issue. On the one hand, we find obvious historical, astronomical, and even theological mistakes. On the other, a large number of views are based on information that is only partially accurate. Also, a significant number of arguments start from the understanding of the church calendar as an integral and immutable part of tradition and religious identity.

We believe that, above all, the unique and unambiguous position of the SOC on the issue of calendar reform would be a significant factor in clarifying many dilemmas and eliminating misconceptions. In addition, raising general awareness and knowledge would be necessary in order to see the whole picture and reach a general consensus, without which the reform of the calendar, instead of solving one, would open up other issues.

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116 "I am of the opinion that we should accept Milanković's calendar regarding fixed holidays, and keep the Easter (Paschalia) as it is now (let's not forget that the holy fire gets lit on our Easter)", <http://www.srpskadijaspورا.info/vest.asp?id=6696>

117 "That is why it may be better for Our Church, regardless of the Secular Calendar, to harmonize its calendar of holidays every year with the celestial one, as it is the only one that is Godly, while all other calendars err, since they were created by sinful people.", <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendar/komentari>

118 "The All-Orthodox Council is being prepared and the calendar issue will certainly be one of the items on the agenda to be analyzed (among other issues), and no one knows yet when that will happen. So, there is no need to worry and panic", <http://www.vesti-online.com/komentari/377575/Vesti/Srbija/Dogodine-Bozicu-decembru>

119 "Hey folks, can someone start a petition where we can vote and state whether we want the change or not? (...) Can the people declare themselves once, and not let the church constantly harp on us because of their hatred towards Catholics!", <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/171579/Episkop-Jovan-SPC-se-nikad-nece-odreci-svog-kalendar/komentari>

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