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PHILOTHEOS

International Journal for Philosophy and Theology

Wolfgang Speyer

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Book Review

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of the Serbian People* (Andrej Jeftić)

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
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Ganzheitliches Erkennen und heilsgeschichtliche Offenbarung. Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Wissen und Glaube

„Das eigentliche, einzige und tiefste Thema der Welt- und Menschengeschichte, dem alle übrigen untergeordnet sind, bleibt der Conflict des Unglaubens und Glaubens.“

J. W. Goethe, West-östlicher Divan,
Noten und Abhandlungen, Israel in der Wüste

1. Möglichkeiten eines ganzheitlichen Erkennens

Das hier zu besprechende Thema hat seit dem Hochmittelalter immer wieder bis in die Gegenwart Antworten hervorgerufen¹. Hervorzuheben ist Anselm von Canterbury (um 1033 – 1109) mit seinem Wort: *fides quaerens intellectum*, „der (christliche) Glaube, der die Vernunft sucht“². Da dieses Problem in dem alles umfassenden Rahmen von Gott, Welt und Mensch steht, unterliegt seine Beantwortung nicht nur logischen Überlegungen und Schlüssen, sondern ist eng mit der Frage verknüpft, wie der Einzelne sich in der Welt erfährt und sieht. Insofern ist diese Frage auch ein Kapitel aus dem Themenbereich „Geist und Materie“. Da die innere Einstellung des Einzelnen auf die Beantwortung dieses umfassenden Themas Einfluss besitzt, kann eine Übereinstimmung aller, ein *consensus omnium*, wohl kaum erreicht werden.

Erkennen / Wissen und Glauben gründen in der Erfahrung und Entfaltung des menschlichen personalen Geistes und seiner Seele sowie deren Vermögen, Fühlen und Wollen, zu denen dann noch das Ahnen kommt³. Erkennen, das zu Wissen führt, und Glauben erwachsen aus der Begegnung der jeweiligen Gemeinschaft, in der der Einzelne

¹ K. LOWITH, Wissen, Glaube und Skepsis (Göttingen 1958) 5-25; ‚Wissen und Glaube‘; J. HABERMAS, Glauben und Wissen (Frankfurt a. M. 2001); P. WEINGARTNER (Hrsg.), Glaube und Vernunft. Interdisziplinäres Streitgespräch zur Enzyklika *Fides et Ratio* (Frankfurt a. M. 2004); M. HAILER, Glauben und Wissen. Arbeitsbuch Theologie und Philosophie (Göttingen 2006); J.-E. PLEINES, Glauben oder Wissen: Analyse eines Dilemmas (Hildesheim 2008); K. CEMING / M. NEGELE (Hrsg.), Im Spannungsfeld von Glauben und Denken. Festschrift K. Kienzler (Münster 2009).

² K. KIENZLER, Anselm von Canterbury. Theologie wird Wissenschaft: U. KÖPF (Hrsg.), Theologen des Mittelalters (Darmstadt 2002) 43-60.

³ F. von Schiller, An die Freude: „... Ahnest du den Schöpfer, Welt?“; W. NIECKE, Art. Ahnung: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 1 (1971) 115-117, wo allerdings Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788), der Ahnung und Intuition als die Quellen der Einsicht annahm, nicht erwähnt ist; Novalis, Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs Bd.3, hrsg. von H. J. MÄHL / R. SAMUEL, Kommentar von H. J. BALMES u. a. (München, Wien 1978, Ndr. Darmstadt 1999) 675 Sachregister: ‚Ahnung, Ahndungskraft‘; ferner sei genannt Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843) mit seiner Abhandlung ‚Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung‘ = Abt. 1, Schriften zur reinen Philosophie, Bd. 3 (Jena 1805, Ndr. Aalen 1968) 173-327.

steht, seiner Familie und seines Volkes, und seiner eigenen Erfahrung mit dem Wirklichkeitsganzen. Aus dem Staunen über das Wunder des eigenen Daseins und Soseins und über die wunderbaren Erscheinungen der Welt folgt, dass die von Geist und Seele erfahrene Tiefe der Wirklichkeit über das durch die fünf Sinne Vermittelte weit hinausreicht⁴. So besteht zum einen ein Verhältnis zwischen dem menschlichen Ich als Subjekt und der Wirklichkeit der Erscheinungen der Welt als dem Objekt: Der fühlende, denkende, wollende, aber auch der ahnende Mensch, der aus dem Unbewusstsein allmählich zum Bewusstsein seiner selbst erwacht ist, steht der Wirklichkeit bis zu einem gewissen Grade gegenüber und vermag über dieses sein Gegenüberstehen nachzudenken. Andererseits gehört er aber als leibliches, seelisches und geistiges Wesen selbst zu dieser ihm prinzipiell vorgeordneten Gesamtwirklichkeit. So erkennt er sich bei näherer Selbstreflexion zugleich als vorgedacht und als verursacht⁵ und erlebt sich deshalb als abhängig, ja, wie Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768 – 1834) es ausgedrückt hat, als „schlechthinnig abhängig“⁶. Das personale Selbstbewusstsein, das mit Fühlen, Wollen, Denken und Ahnen ausgestattet ist, erscheint in seinem An- und Für-sich-Sein durch die Weltordnung, welche das antike mythische und religiös-philosophische Denken als Kosmos / *mundus* gedeutet hat und welche die jüdische und christliche Offenbarung als Schöpfung des diese übersteigenden Gottes bezeichnet, als gegeben und als nicht mehr weiter hinterfragbar. Das auf sich selbst bezogene menschliche Ich-Bewusstsein ist vom Menschen weder frei gewählt noch von ihm geschaffen, sondern bildet die Grundvoraussetzung und den Hintergrund allen Fragens und Antwortens. Das Fragen ist aber das Hauptkennzeichen des auf Erkennen ausgerichteten menschlichen Denkvermögens⁷.

Das personale Selbstbewusstsein äußert sich in schöpferischem Handeln, wobei die Sprache dessen erster Ausdruck ist. Ebenso sind Kunst und Technik Ausdruck dieser schöpferischen Möglichkeit⁸.

Eine weitere grundlegende Erkenntnis, die sich dem Nachdenken über das Wirklichkeitsganze mit Einschluss des Menschen aufdrängt, ist die Erkenntnis von dessen gegensätzlichem und ambivalentem, ja geradezu paradoxalem Charakter als dem be-

⁴ Heraklit: Vorsokratiker 22 B 45 (DIELS / KRANZ): „Der Seele Grenzen kannst du im Gehen nicht ausfindig machen und ob du jegliche Straße abschnittest; so tiefen Sinn [griechisch Logos] hat sie“. Was hier von der Seele gesagt ist, gilt ebenso für den Erscheinungskosmos, das Universum; F. SEIFERT, *Seele und Bewusstsein* (München, Basel 1962); G. JÜTTEMANN / M. SONNTAG / CH. WULF (Hrsg.), *Die Seele. Ihre Geschichte im Abendland* (Weinheim 1991). – S. MATUSCHEK, *Über das Staunen. Eine ideengeschichtliche Analyse = Studien zur deutschen Literatur* 116 (Tübingen 1991).

⁵ Dem *cogito sum* von René Descartes geht das *cogitor* (*sc. a Deo cogitante*), *ergo sum cogitans* voraus, wie FRANZ VON BAADER nachdrücklich betont: *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. 8 (Leipzig 1855, Ndr. Aalen 1963) 339 f.; Bd. 12 (Leipzig 1860, Ndr. Aalen 1963) 376; S. PEETZ, *Die Wiederkehr im Unterschied. Ernst von Lasaulx* (Freiburg i. Br. 1989) 141-143.

⁶ K. E. WELKER, *Die grundsätzliche Beurteilung der Religionsgeschichte durch Schleiermacher* (Leiden, Köln 1965) Reg.: „Abhängigkeit ‚schlechthinnig‘“.

⁷ E. CORETH, *Was ist der Mensch? Grundzüge einer philosophischen Anthropologie* ³(Innsbruck 1980); DERS., *Was ist der Mensch?*: P. GORDAN (Hrsg.), *Mensch werden, Mensch sein* (Kevelaer, Graz 1983) 41-99.

⁸ W. F. OTTO, *Dionysos = Frankfurter Studien zur Religion und Kultur der Antike* 4 (Frankfurt a. M. 1933, Ndr. ebd. 1980) 26 f.: „Die Schöpferischen sind sich immer bewusst gewesen, dass der Akt des Schaffens durch etwas in Bewegung gesetzt werden muss, das nicht in des Menschen Hand ist. Und je größer ihre Schöpfungsgewalt war, umso gewisser ist ihr Glaube an das wesenhafte Sein und die Herrlichkeit dieses Bewegenden gewesen. Selbst die bescheidenen Nachkömmlinge der großen Meister konnten des Gedankens der Inspiration nicht entraten. Leider hat die Wissenschaft versäumt, dieses Phänomen in seiner Bedeutung zu würdigen...“

stimmenden und tragenden Grundzug⁹. Die uns durch die Sinne, die Vernunft und das Ahnungsvermögen zugängliche Wirklichkeit mit Einschluss des Menschen enthüllt sich als ein räumlich und zeitlich bestimmtes Nebeneinander und Nacheinander von Gegensätzen. Dieses Neben- und Nacheinander kann auch zu einem Mit- und Ineinander der Gegensätze werden, so dass dadurch Komplementarität entsteht. So stehen sich Bewusstsein und Unbewusstsein, Ich (Subjekt) und Welt (Objekt), Sein und Werden/Vergehen, Ruhe und Bewegung, Kosmos und Chaos, Licht und Finsternis, Leben und Tod, Heil/Segen und Unheil/Fluch, Freiheit und Notwendigkeit, Liebe und Hass gegenüber, um nur einige der bestimmenden Gegensätze aus einer schwer überschaubaren Fülle äußerer und innerer Polaritäten zu nennen, die auf den Ebenen und Stufen der Wirklichkeit der Welt und des Menschen sowie seiner Kultur zu erkennen sind und diese bestimmen¹⁰. Der Verstand als die logisch vom Individuellen zum Allgemeinen und vom Allgemeinen zum Individuellen schreitende Denkkraft vermag nicht sehr weit über das sich stets in Bewegung und stets in Verwandlung befindliche Neben- und Nacheinander sowie Mit- und Ineinander der Gegensätze, über diese zwiespältige Einheit, *concordia discors*, oder diese einheitliche Zwietracht, *discordia concors*, von allem hinaus zu gelangen. In dieser Ambivalenz begegnen wir dem Inbegriff des Universums als eines stets gleichen und stets sich wandelnden Ganzen¹¹.

Zusammen mit Gegensätzlichkeit, Ambivalenz und Komplementarität, die als prägende Struktur in den mannigfaltigen Erscheinungen der Wirklichkeit anwesend ist und wirkt, ist eine Stufenfolge, ein Aufstieg von niedrigerer zu höherer Seinswirklichkeit und somit eine Steigerung erkennbar, mit der eine Differenzierung verbunden ist¹². Dabei ist oft in dem Neben- und Nacheinander des aus der Einheit des Anfangs wachsenden Mannigfaltigen ein Weiterschreiten zu qualitativ Höherem zu beobachten. Dies spricht für die Annahme einer gewissen Zielgerichtetheit der Erscheinungen¹³. Allerdings verlaufen

⁹ P. YOGANANDA, Autobiographie eines Yogi, dt. Übers. (München 1974, Ndr. 2001) 282: „Die ganze Welt der Erscheinungen steht unter der unabänderlichen Gewalt der Polarität. Es gibt kein physikalisches, chemisches oder anderes wissenschaftliches Gesetz, das nicht vom Prinzip der Gegensätzlichkeit beherrscht würde.“ Diese Gegensätzlichkeit ist nach Yogananda Ausdruck der ‚Maya‘, des „unwirklichen oder trügerischen Schleiers“, mit dem sich Gott als die absolute Einheit umgibt (ebd. 282 f.). – W. SPEYER, Kosmos, Schöpfung, Nichts. Der Mensch in der Entscheidung = Salzburger Theologische Studien 37 (Innsbruck 2010) 43-56: „Vom Paradox der Wirklichkeit“.

¹⁰ R. GUARDINI, Der Gegensatz (Mainz 1925, Ndr. ebd. 1985); W. BEIERWALTES, Art. Gegensatz: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 3 (1974) 105-117; P. PROBST, Art. Polarität: ebd. 7 (1989) 1026-1029; SPEYER, Kosmos a. O. 57-73: „Der Gegensatz von Ruhe und Bewegung und die Frage der Letztbegründung“.

¹¹ J. W. Goethe, Metamorphose der Tiere V. 50-55:

Dieser schöne Begriff von Macht und Schranken, von Willkür
Und Gesetz, von Freiheit und Maß, von beweglicher Ordnung,
Vorzug und Mangel erfreue dich hoch: die heilige Muse
Bringt harmonisch in dir, mit sanftem Zwange belehrend.
Keinen höhern Begriff erringt der sittliche Denker,
Keinen der tätige Mann, der dichtende Künstler...

¹² Zur Arbor Porphyriana: W. SPEYER, Zu einem Quellenproblem bei Sidonius Apollinaris (carm. 15, 36-125): Hermes 92 (1964) 225-248, bes. 233-241; H. M. Baumgartner, Art. Arbor porphyriana (!): Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 1 (1971) 493 f. – Zur Steigerung W. SCHADEWALDT, Goethestudien. Natur und Altertum (Zürich, Stuttgart 1963) Reg.: „Steigerung“.

¹³ A. ST. PEASE, Caeli enarrant: Harvard Theological Review 34 (1941) 163-200; R. SPAEMANN / R. LÖW, Die Frage Wozu? Geschichte und Wiederentdeckung des teleologischen Denkens ³(München, Zürich 1991); M. STÖCKLER, Art. Teleologie I. Naturphilosophisch: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche 9 ³(2000) 1317 f.; H. SEIDL, Evolution und Naturfinalität (Hildesheim 2008); M. LEUNISSEN, Art. Teleologie: CH. RAPP / K. CORCIULUS (Hrsg.), Aristoteles Handbuch. Leben. Werk. Wirkung (Stuttgart 2011) 348-354.

die zielgerichteten Prozesse weder in der Schöpfung/Natur noch in der Kultur nur in einer linear aufsteigenden Linie. Die Geschichte des Lebendigen auf der Erde und auch die Geschichte der Kulturen verweisen vielmehr auf ein Auf und Ab der Entfaltungen des jeweils Lebendigen und der kulturellen Schöpfungen. Das Vergangene ist stets im Gegenwärtigen und somit das Alte im Neuen in verwandelter Weise anwesend. Diese verwandelte Weise muss nicht nur linear ansteigen und nicht nur positiv geprägt sein. Jedenfalls erscheint in Werden und Wandel, in aller Veränderung die Kraft des Seiend-Beharrenden unübersehbar. Auch hier dürfte bei allem Wechsel, bei allem Auf und Ab der Veränderung, ein In- und Miteinander des Gegensatzes von Werden/Vergehen/Wandel und Sein vorliegen: Das Werden, das Vergehen und der Wandel können sich nur auf dem Hintergrund des Seins ereignen, und das Sein und das Seiende sich nur im Werden und im Wandel zeigen, wobei dieses bald mehr positiv steigend, bald mehr negativ abfallend und dann wieder steigend erscheinen kann. Diese hier dargelegte Lehre von den Gegensätzen, welche die Welterscheinungen bestimmen, spiegelt das chinesische Symbol von Yin und Yang, dem männlichen und dem weiblichen schöpferischen Prinzip. Mit Recht ist dieses Symbol in einen Kreis eingeschrieben, der in eine dunkle und in eine lichte S-förmig geteilte Hälfte zerfällt¹⁴. Das Gegen-, Mit- und Ineinander der Gegensätze vollzieht sich demnach in einem immerwährenden Kreislauf innerhalb des kreis- oder kugelförmig vorgestellten Wirklichkeitsganzen. In diesem Ganzen kann der eine Gegensatzpol nicht ohne den anderen sein. So gehören die gründenden Gegensatzpole Anfang und Ende und Geburt und Tod zusammen, ähnlich wie Höhe und Tiefe und wie Rechts und Links. Im Ganzen der uns zugänglichen lebendigen Wirklichkeit zeigt sich so die Grundstruktur von Gegensatz und Ambivalenz. Ein immerwährender Kreis scheint das Wirklichkeitsganze zu umschließen und dies nicht nur im räumlichen und zeitlichen, also im physikalischen Bereich, sondern auch in einem geistigen. Deshalb reden einzelne echte gewachsene Mythen der Natur- und Volksreligionen vom immerwährenden Kreis, als dessen Bild der die Welt umschließende göttliche Okeanos oder die göttliche Uroboros-Schlange gelten kann oder auch der mythische Vogel Phönix, der sich aus dem eigenen Tod selbst wieder ins Leben bringt, um erneut zu sterben und wieder aufzuleben¹⁵. Ähnliches spricht die Vorstellung von der Wiederkehr von Tag und Nacht, von Jahr und Weltenjahr aus, also der Gedanke von der ‚Wiederkehr des Gleichen‘. Diese Wiederkehr vollzieht sich aber tatsächlich nicht nur im Gleichen, sondern auch im Unterschied; denn tatsächlich bestimmen Kreis und Linie, Ruhe und Bewegung, Sein und Werden bzw. Vergehen, das Mythische und das Geschichtliche in einem paradoxalen Zusammenspiel

¹⁴ H. BAUMANN, Das doppelte Geschlecht: Ethnologische Studien zur Bisexualität in Ritus und Mythos (Berlin 1955, Ndr. ebd. 1980) Reg.: ‚Yin – Yang‘; M. ELIADE, Geschichte der religiösen Ideen, Bd.2 Von Gautama Buddha bis zu den Anfängen des Christentums, deutsche Ausgabe (Freiburg i. Brsg. 1979) Reg.: ‚Yang – Yin Symbolismus‘; M. GRANET, La pensée chinoise (Paris 1934 u. ö.), dt. Übers. = Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 519 (Frankfurt, M. 1985) 86.109; E. KIM, Licht und Schatten als Zwiespalt oder Harmonie? Nietzsches Auffassung von Dionysos und Apollo im Vergleich mit dem fernöstlichen Yin-Yang-Verständnis: Sein – Erkennen – Handeln. Festschrift H. Beck = Schriften zur Triadik und Ontodynamik 7 (Frankfurt 1994) 99-108; E. KIM, Licht und Schatten als Zwiespalt oder Harmonie? Nietzsches Auffassung von Dionysos und Apollo im Vergleich mit dem fernöstlichen Yin-Yang-Verständnis: Sein – Erkennen – Handeln. Festschrift H. Beck = Schriften zur Triadik und Ontodynamik 7 (Frankfurt 1994) 99-108; T. GRIMM, Art. Yin – Yang: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 12 (2004) 1111.

¹⁵ W. SPEYER, Zwischen Traum und Wirklichkeit, zwischen Zeit und Ewigkeit. Der Mensch als das Wesen des ‚Zwischen‘ = Salzburger Theologische Studien 51 (Innsbruck 2014) Reg.: ‚Uroboros‘.

die Wirklichkeit¹⁶. Aus den genannten Gegensätzen baut sich die Gegenwart der lebendigen Erscheinungswelt auf. Wie das Selbst des Menschen der Wirklichkeitsebene des Seins zugehört, so das sich in der Zeit gestaltende Ich zugleich auch der Wirklichkeit des Werdens im Sinne des griechischen Ausspruches: „Werde, der du bist!“¹⁷.

2. Heilsgeschichtliche Offenbarung als Gabe an den Menschen

Die Grundüberzeugung vom bewegten, weil belebten, dämonisch/göttlichen Wesen der Gesamtwirklichkeit prägt mehr oder minder die Früh- und Hochkulturen. Eine Änderung ergab sich erst infolge der alttestamentlichen und neutestamentlichen Offenbarung von der einmaligen Schöpfung, von der Unterscheidung zwischen dem Personal-Göttlichen und der Welt, dem persönlichen Schöpfergott und seiner Schöpfung sowie der einmaligen Erlösung durch den ‚Gottessohn‘ Jesus Christus. Eine Linearität ist in dieser Offenbarung insofern ausgesprochen, als nunmehr das Geschichtliche einen Höchstrang erhält und in das Bezugssystem des einen Gottes zu seiner Schöpfung gestellt erscheint. Wie vor allem das erste Buch des Alten Testaments, das Buch Genesis, und das letzte Buch des Neuen Testaments, die Apokalypse des Johannes, mitteilen, nimmt der eine Gott seine Schöpfung, die infolge der Freiheit, welche die von ihm geschaffenen Geister, bestimmte Engel, und der von ihm geschaffene Mensch missbraucht haben, mit Fluch und Verderben belastet ist, nach einer Zeit der Reinigung im Akt des Sich-ihrer-Erbarmens wieder zu sich zurück. In diesem Bezugssystem der alt- und neutestamentlichen Offenbarung, die wesentlich als Geschichte des Heils zu verstehen ist, erscheint alles Unheil nur als Durchgang für die von Gott beschlossene endgültige Verwandlung des gefallenem Wirklichkeitsganzen¹⁸. So steht „die Wiederherstellung ins Vollkommene“, die *restitutio in integrum*, oder die ἀποκατάστασις τῶν πάντων im Sinne des Origenes (185 – um 254) am Ende dieser raum-zeitlichen Wirklichkeit oder Schöpfung¹⁹. In diesem aus der Offenbarung stammenden Sinngefüge gibt es deshalb nur einen einzigen Kreis. Dieser geht aus Gott hervor und endet wieder bei ihm. Innerhalb der sichtbaren Schöpfung bildet der Mensch den Schlusspunkt. Seine Heimholung vom Ort jenseits des Paradieses, das seine ursprüngliche Anwesenheit bei Gott bedeutet, hat mit dem Leben, Wirken, Sterben und Auferstehen Jesu Christi sein letztes Kapitel begonnen. Die mit Jesu Christi Kommen verbundene ‚Fülle der Zeit‘ bedeutet, dass mit seinem Erscheinen die Schlusphase der Welt- und Menschheitsgeschichte angefangen hat, die Epoche vor der Heimholung und Verwandlung der Welt durch Gott.

Im Dialog ‚Timaios‘ Platons, der wie kein anderer seiner Dialoge auf das Denken der Theologie der nachfolgenden Jahrhunderte bis weit in das christliche Mittelalter gewirkt hat, stellt der Dialogteilnehmer Timaios gegenüber Sokrates folgende Analogie auf: „Wie das Wesen sich zum Werden verhält, so die Wahrheit zum Glauben“²⁰. ‚Glaub-

¹⁶ Ebd. 19-72: ‚Zeit und Ewigkeit in den antiken Religionen und in der ältesten Reflexion‘.

¹⁷ Pindar, Pyth. 2,72.

¹⁸ Gen. 12, 3; 50, 20; W. SPEYER, Art. Fluch: RAC 7 (1969) 1160-1288, bes. 1234 f.: ‚Heilswirken Gottes‘; J. FREY / ST. KRAUTER / H. LICHTENBERGER (Hrsg.), Heil und Geschichte. Die Geschichtsbezogenheit des Heils und das Problem der Heilsgeschichte in der biblischen Tradition und in der theologischen Deutung = Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 248 (Tübingen 2009).

¹⁹ Origenes, de principiis 1, 6, 2. Sein Satz: *semper similis est finis initiis* bedeutet: Gott war im Anfang alles in allem und wird es am Ende wiederum sein; vgl. 1 Cor. 15, 28.

²⁰ Plat. Tim. 29 c.

be‘, πίστις, entspricht bei Platon der ‚Meinung‘; der ‚Vermutung‘, δόξα, und steht dem Range nach unter der Wahrheit, unter der von der Vernunft begründeten Erkenntnis. Diese Stufung zwischen Wahrheit und Glaube besteht nach jüdischem und christlichem Offenbarungsverständnis nicht; denn nach diesem Verständnis ist es gerade umgekehrt. Der Glaube dieser beiden im strengen Sinn zu verstehenden Offenbarungsreligionen besteht gerade darin, dass deren Inhalt weder eine vom denkenden Menschen konstruierte noch gefundene Wahrheit ist, keine methodisch gesuchte und gefundene Erkenntnis ist, sondern ‚Gottes Wort‘, also eine von außen, von oben dem Menschen geschenkte Wahrheit. Das Verhältnis zwischen Glauben im Verständnis von ‚etwas für wahr halten‘ und Wissen im Sinne von ‚Wahres Erkennen‘ ist also gerade umgekehrt. Erst von dieser Position aus kommt es in der Geistesgeschichte zu der neuen Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Wissen und Glauben; diese Frage konnte es zuvor nicht geben. Für das griechische Wahrheitsdenken, angefangen von den frühen religiösen Philosophen, deren Tradition Platon weiterführt, steht die vom denkenden Menschen rational gefundene Wahrheit an der Spitze dessen, was der Mensch aufgrund seiner Vernunft als dem spezifisch Menschlichen erreichen kann. Für Juden und Christen ist aber dieses natürliche Wissen nur relativ gegenüber dem aus der Offenbarung stammenden Wissen, das im Glauben bejaht wird. Auch ist der Glaube nach jüdischem und christlichem Verständnis etwas Umfassenderes als die philosophisch gefundene Erkenntnis von Wahrem. Damit der Glaube an die Offenbarung zustande kommt, bedarf es nämlich der Kräfte des inneren Menschen. Am Glauben sind die Kräfte des Willens ebenso beteiligt wie die des Fühlens, also der Herzenserkenntnis. Deshalb steht nach dem jüdischen und christlichen Bild von der Wirklichkeit dieser Glaube an die Offenbarung über dem Wissen, das allein aus der Erkenntnis, der *ratio* oder des *intellectus*, stammt.

Andererseits kann der Glaube an diese Offenbarung der rationalen Erkenntnis nicht entbehren. Bereits im Offenbarungsglauben finden sich Anteile der Rationalität. Deshalb ist es nicht zulässig, die Offenbarung gänzlich als übernatürlich aufzufassen. Sie ähnelt vielmehr dem Urheber des christlichen Glaubens, also Jesus Christus, der als Gott-Mensch in Erscheinung getreten ist²¹. Deshalb können wir die jüdische und christliche Offenbarung und ihren Wahrheitsanspruch als eine gott-menschliche bezeichnen.

Erst seit der Zeit der jüdischen und christlichen Offenbarung, seit dem Alten Israel als dem erwählten realen Volk Gottes und dem Neuen Israel als dem erwählten geistigen Volk Gottes, also dem Neuen Israel der Christusgläubigen, gibt es im Vollsinn den Widerstreit von Glauben und Wissen. Das mythische Zeitalter der Menschheit mit seiner *unio magica*²², seinen gewachsenen Religionen kannte nur eine einzige Antwort des Menschen auf den von ihm geführten Dialog mit der Gesamtwirklichkeit und wusste noch nichts von einer Spannung oder sogar einem Widerspruch zwischen Religion, also religiösem Glauben, und einer rationalen Durchdringung des Weltganzen, also Wissen. Erst als der Mensch in die recht junge Epoche der Geschichte und damit in eine räumliche und zeitliche Perspektive zur Wirklichkeit eingetreten war, begann sich die ältere Einheit mit der Wirklichkeit, wie sie in dem Jahrhunderttausende währenden mythischen Zeitalter geherrscht hatte, für ihn allmählich aufzulösen. Erst in der geschichtlichen Pe-

²¹ A. GRILLMEIER, Art. Gottmensch III (Patristik): RAC 12 (1983) 312-366.

²² S. MOWINCKEL, Religion und Kultus, deutsche Übersetzung (Göttingen 1953) 13-27: ‚Das magische Weltbild‘.

riode konnte der Mensch aus seiner anfänglichen Selbstvergessenheit, die gleichsam der Selbstvergessenheit des Kleinkindes entspricht, herausgerufen werden und selber heraustreten. Dies geschah in besonderer Weise im alten Israel. Eine Wirklichkeit begegnete hier dem Menschen, die nicht mehr ganz zu ihm und seiner Welt gehörte; denn der ‚Gott der Väter‘, „der Gott Abrahams, Isaaks und Jakobs“, war nicht mehr der Repräsentant einer chaotisch-kosmischen, einer dämonisch-göttlichen Macht, wie sie in dieser Welt im dämonisch-göttlichen Himmel, in der dämonisch-göttlichen Erde oder in den dämonisch-göttlichen vier Elementen der Natur- und Volksreligionen aufscheint, sondern der weltunabhängige Schöpfer dieses Universums. Er zeigte sich dem Menschen aber nicht unmittelbar, andernfalls hätte er ihn durch die Erhabenheit seiner Wirklichkeit überwältigt, sondern offenbarte sich nur mittelbar, gleichsam gebrochen, so dass er die Freiheit der menschlichen Entscheidung unangetastet ließ. Insofern blieb und bleibt der Glaube als der Glaube an den einen sich auf göttlich-menschliche Weise offenbarenden Schöpfergott auch bis zu einem gewissen Grad ein Wagnis²³.

Diese in Israel begonnene Selbstmitteilung Gottes und die damit gegebene Geschichte vom endgültigen Heil für den Menschen läuft über Abraham, Mose zu den Königen in Israel und zu den Propheten und über sie zu Johannes dem Täufer und dem ihm geistig verbundenen Jesus aus Nazareth. Mit Jesu Erscheinen war nach dem Evangelium die ‚Fülle der Zeit‘, das heißt der Beginn ihres Endes, des Endes der Weltzeit, angebrochen²⁴. Die Menschheit trat auf diese Weise in ihre Endphase ein. Für den christlichen Glauben steht deshalb die heute lebende Menschheit in einem endzeitlichen oder in einem eschatologischen Horizont²⁵. Die auf die Apostel gegründete Kirche führt in der Zeit nach Jesus Christus sein Heilswerk mit Hilfe des ihr verheißenen und seit dem ersten Pfingstfest verliehenen Heiligen Geistes bis zum Ende der Zeit weiter.

3. Die Ablehnung der Heilsgeschichte

Die freie, gnadenhafte Selbstmitteilung Gottes in Gestalt Jesu Christ und die Mitteilung des Heiligen Geistes, deren im Glauben vermittelte Tatsächlichkeit so gewaltig ist, dass sie die Menschheit zu einem grundsätzlichen Wandel ihres bisherigen Tuns hätte bringen müssen, hat dem natürlichen Streben des Menschen nach Autonomie eine Schranke gesetzt, über die er sich nur mit größtem Schaden für sich selbst und für die ihm und seinem Machtstreben ausgelieferte Erde hinwegsetzen kann. Die Autorität, die ihn hindern müsste, in der Weise der mythischen Giganten oder des mythischen Prometheus zu handeln, geht vom Schöpfer- und Erlösergott selbst aus und liegt vornehmlich in der Tatsache der Schöpfung und der Offenbarung. Dieser durch Schöpfung und Offenbarung mitgeteilte Glaube bestimmt also, was der Mensch tatsächlich ist und was er erstreben soll, um seine Gebrochenheit, die Folge der Erbsünde, abzulegen und heil zu werden²⁶. An der Tatsache der Schöpfung und der Offenbarung Gottes im Neuen und im Alten Testament

²³ P. WUST, Ungewissheit und Wagnis (Salzburg 1937, Ndr. München 1962); V. BERNING, Art. Wust, Peter: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche 10³(2001) 1334 f.

²⁴ Mc. 1, 15; Gal. 4, 4: „Als aber die Fülle der Zeit kam, entsandte Gott seinen Sohn...“

²⁵ W. RADL, Art. Parusie: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche 7³(1998) 1402-1404.

²⁶ Die Vorstellung der Erbsünde ist nicht auf die jüdische und christliche Glaubenstradition beschränkt; J. GROSS, Geschichte des Erbsündendogmas, Bd. 1-4 (München 1960-1972); sie begegnet bereits in Aussagen, die vom Mythos ihren Ausgang nehmen; K. ZIEGLER, Art. Orphische Dichtung: Pauly / Wissowa 18, 2 (1942) 1321-1417, bes. 1354 f.

scheiden sich die Geister. Hier liegt die Schwierigkeit für den Menschen als Angehörigen eines subjektiven Zeitalters, das auf dem Boden des Christentums im Hochmittelalter begonnen, in der Renaissance vertieft und in der Zeitspanne vom späten 19. Jahrhundert bis heute seinen vorläufigen Höhepunkt erreicht hat.

Der Mangel an Erfahrung des Heiligen, wie er seit der philosophisch-wissenschaftlichen Aufklärung des 18. Jahrhunderts erkennbar wird, führte mehr und mehr zur Aushöhlung des geistigen Bildes des Heiligen und damit auch zur Entleerung der Gottesvorstellung. Wenn es in J. W. Goethes ‚Faust‘ heißt: „Das Wunder ist des Glaubens liebstes Kind“, so ist die Dimension des Übernatürlichen scharf, wenn auch pointiert beleuchtet²⁷. Das Wunder, das es für den Rationalismus nicht gibt und nicht geben kann, weist auf die heilige Macht hin und gehört zum Umkreis der Hiero- und Theophanien. Nur wo diese vom Einzelnen erfahren werden oder geschichtlich zuverlässig, aber dadurch bereits abgeschwächt, überliefert sind und dann auch nur vermittelt wahrgenommen werden können, vermag der Glaube an Offenbarung Wurzeln zu schlagen. Nur auf diese Weise kann die Welt Gottes existentiell von der Gesamtpersönlichkeit des Einzelnen und seiner Gemeinschaft wahrgenommen werden.

Der aufgeklärte Mensch der Gegenwart ist nicht mehr gewillt, über sich einen Herrn und einen Gesetzgeber anzuerkennen. Die Mentalität eines Menschen ohne Gott ist deshalb von seiner Wurzel her ungläubig. Für diesen Menschen, der sein Vorgeordnetsein und seine Verankerung im Kosmos bzw. in der Schöpfung vergessen hat, kann es die Frage von Glauben und Wissen nicht mehr geben. Er erkennt nur noch das Wissen an und zwar in seiner rationalistischen, relativistischen und subjektiven Färbung²⁸.

Prüfen wir das auf sich allein gestellte Wissen des heutigen Menschen auf seine Grundlage, seine Dauer und Sinnhaftigkeit, so ergibt sich bald, dass ein derartiges Wissen über das Wirklichkeitsganze nur sehr bedingt zu gewinnen ist und dass die letzten Fragen nach dem Sinn dieser Welt und dem Sinn des einzelnen Lebens dann nur mit dem *ignoramus, ignorabimus* von E. H. du Bois-Reymond (1818 Berlin – 1896 ebd.) zu beantworten sind. So läuft hier alles auf die beiden Möglichkeiten zu: Entweder Glauben, das heißt, die Offenbarung des Schöpfer- und Erlösergottes anzunehmen, ja sich ihr zu unterwerfen, oder in der Beschränktheit seines Menschseins und seiner Kontingenz stecken zu bleiben und so sich mehr und mehr dem neben dem Segensaspekt auch vorhandenen Fluchaspekt der raum-zeitlichen Wirklichkeit, nämlich dem Tod, der Absurdität und dem nichtenden Nichts, auszuliefern, wie dies Hauptströmungen in der Literatur und in der Kunst seit der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis heute vor Augen stellen²⁹.

Blicken wir auf die Irrtümer unserer Gegenwart, so zeigen sie sich vor allem in einem blinden Fortschrittsglauben an die Errungenschaften der Naturwissenschaften, einem Glauben an die eindeutigen Segnungen, die unmittelbar mit allem verbunden sein sollen, was der menschliche Geist erfindet und technisch ins Werk setzen kann, zum an-

²⁷ Faust I Nacht, Vers 766.

²⁸ G. KRÜGER, Religiöse und profane Welterfahrung (Frankfurt, M. 1973); B. KILGA, Autonomie und Glaube. Betrachtungen zum Wandel des Bewusstseins = Im Kontext 29 (Anif, Salzburg 2008).

²⁹ H. DE LUBAC, Die Tragödie des Humanismus ohne Gott: Feuerbach-Nietzsche-Comte und Dostojewskij als Prophet, deutsche Übersetzung von E. Steinacker (Salzburg 1950); B. WELTE, Über die verschiedenen Bedeutungen des Nichts: Denken im Schatten des Nihilismus, Festschrift W. Weischedel (Darmstadt 1975) 26-34; SPEYER, Kosmos a. O. (s. o. Anm. 9) 24. 250 f.

dern aber in einer Naturmystik, die das Werk des Schöpfers statt des Schöpfers anbetet und deutlich neuheidnische Züge aufweist. Ungezügelter Fortschrittsglaube, Subjektivismus, Agnostizismus, Okkultismus und Natur- sowie Leibvergötterung sind auf dem Hintergrund eines nichtenden Nihilismus, der heute immer weitere Kreise erfasst, die Gegner, denen der christliche Glaube gegenübersteht, ganz abgesehen von den zahlreichen Verzerrungen der christlichen Botschaft in Splitterkirchen und kirchlichen Sekten.

4. Die Verbindung ganzheitlichen Erkennens mit der Offenbarung

Glauben gibt es nur auf dem Boden der heilsgeschichtlichen Offenbarung, wie sie im Alten Testament niedergelegt ist und wie sie das Neue Testament weitergeführt hat. Ein eigenes Problem stellt hier der Islam dar, der sich gleichfalls auf das Alte Testament beruft und die Anbetung des einen Schöpfergottes mit ihm teilt.

Dieser Glaube kann mit der Erkenntnis und dem Wissen in den Fragen über das Wirklichkeitsganze mit Einschluss des Menschen nicht in Widerspruch geraten. Wenn Widersprüche auftreten, so können diese nur die Ebenen des Geschichtlichen und der naturwissenschaftlichen Erklärung betreffen. Wenn die naturwissenschaftliche Erklärung nicht mehr in den Grenzen ihrer Bedingtheiten und Möglichkeiten bleibt, sondern sie überschreitet, obwohl die methodischen Voraussetzungen der nur auf dem Experiment gründenden Naturwissenschaften dies tatsächlich nicht erlauben, da auf diese Weise kein ganzheitlicher Blickpunkt zustande kommen kann, den aber das Wirklichkeitsganze für sich einfordert, beginnt eine von der Sache her nicht begründbare Rivalität zwischen Naturwissenschaft und Offenbarung. Das Wirklichkeitsganze, also der raum-zeitliche Kosmos und der ihn spiegelnde Mensch, fordern tatsächlich eine ganzheitliche Betrachtung. Weder die Welt noch der Mensch lassen sich durch die Kategorien des rein Rational-Logischen fassen, auf denen die Ergebnisse der Naturwissenschaft ausschließlich beruhen. Gehen wir vom Menschen aus, so bestimmt der alles begründende Gegensatz von Unbewusstem und Bewusstem, von Irrationalität und Rationalität den Menschen und ebenso seinen Dialogpartner, die Welt³⁰. Auf diesem Gegensatz beruhen die aus der Religion, genauer aus dem Mythos und dem Kultus, entstandene Dichtung, bildende Kunst und religiöse Philosophie. Insofern können die naturwissenschaftlich gewonnenen Ergebnisse nur einen Ausschnitt der zugleich offen zugänglichen und geheim bleibenden Wirklichkeit offenlegen³¹.

Der menschliche Intellekt ist keine programmierte Denkmachine. Vielmehr sind am Akt des Erkennens ebenso Fühlen im Sinne von ‚Ahnden‘ und Wollen beteiligt. Die Erkenntnis, wenn sie nicht reduziert wird, eben vom Willen, ist genauso ganzheitlich ausgerichtet wie die Ganzheit der Erscheinungswelt, welcher der Mensch als eine Ganzheit in seinem Person-Sein, in seinem Denken, Fühlen und Wollen gegenübertritt. Auf dieser Grundlage baut eine ganzheitlich ausgerichtete Philosophie auf. Diese ist von ihrer Wurzel eine religiöse Philosophie, da sie von den diese unsere Wirklichkeit bestimmenden Gegensätzen, wie dem Unbedingten und Bedingten, dem Unendlichen und Endlichen, dem Irrationalen und Rationalen, dem Unbewussten und Bewussten, der Ewigkeit und der Zeit, dem Göttlichen und Menschlichen, ausgeht. Insofern unterscheidet sie sich von

³⁰ R. MORTLEY, Art. Gnosis I (Erkenntnislehre): RAC 11 (1981) 446-537, bes. 447-454.

³¹ SPEYER, Traum und Wirklichkeit a. O. (s. o. Anm. 15) 164-182: ‚Die Wirklichkeit als das Geheime-Offenbare‘.

einer Betrachtungsweise, die nur das Rational-Logische und das Materielle gelten lässt. Der religiösen Philosophie steht die Dichtung nahe. Beide haben das Mythische, die echten gewachsenen Mythen, die ihrerseits auf die ganzheitlich angelegte menschliche Seele antworten, zu ihrer Mutter und wurzeln in der Erfahrung, dass die Welt eine Welt der Gegensätze ist und deshalb grundsätzlich eine geheime und eine offenbare und eine redende und eine schweigende Seite aufweist³².

Die religiöse Philosophie als Schule eines ganzheitlichen Denkens geht von letzten nicht weiter auflösbaren Phänomenen aus und erkennt, dass sie von den nicht mehr weiter auflösbaren Anfängen abhängt³³. Zu diesen Anfängen gehört zunächst das zu sich selbst erwachte personale menschliche Bewusstsein. In ihm leuchten alle weiteren Anfänge auf, wie das Licht, das im Außen der sinnhaften Wirklichkeit dem zu sich selbst erwachten und selbsttätigen Bewusstsein entspricht, oder wie der Anfang des Lebens selber³⁴. Was Urphänomen, Archetypus oder was ‚Elementargedanke‘, was der thomistische Satz *in primo stabiliendum est* bedeutet, immer geht es um einen Anfang, der als Quelle für ein Kontinuum zu gelten hat, in dem die einzelne Erscheinung und der einzelne Mensch stehen. Alle Anfänge in der Ordnung dieser raum-zeitlichen Welt weisen in ihrer Vielheit auf den unbedingten Quell aller sichtbaren und aller geistigen Quellen zurück, auf den einen unbedingten geheimnisvollen Anfang als ihre Bedingung. So vermag ein in dieser Weise ganzheitlich vorgehendes Denken bis an die Grenze der Erscheinungswelt vorzudringen und das Geheime, das sich bis zu einem gewissen Grade in der raum-zeitlichen Wirklichkeit offenbart, zu berühren. In diesem Punkt trifft sich die philosophische oder vom Natürlichen ausgehende Betrachtungsweise mit dem übernatürlichen Glauben. Hierin spricht sich die die eigene Grenze übersteigende Kraft des menschlichen Intellektes aus, der mehr ist als die Ratio, da er in der menschlichen Person gründet und so auch das Irrationale als das Übrationale zu berühren vermag. In diesen Zusammenhang gehört auch das für den Menschen so wesentliche Urvertrauen, ein Vertrauen auf den gründenden Anfang, der die Bedingung für den Sinn des Ganzen mit Einschluss des Endes der raum-zeitlichen Welt ist.

Gegenüber der menschlichen Annäherung an Gott gibt es sowohl in der Geschichte der Uroffenbarung als auch in der Geschichte der heilsgeschichtlichen Offenbarung den umgekehrten Weg, den Weg nicht vom Menschen zu Gott, sondern den Weg von Gott zum Menschen. Dies ist der Weg der Gnade. Die Hiero- und Theophanien in beiden Offenbarungsformen bezeugen dies³⁵. Der Aufstieg des Menschen zu Gott und der Abstieg Gottes zu den Menschen gehören zusammen und bedeuten letztlich dasselbe³⁶. Eine derartige Theophanie als Ausdruck der Gnade hat beispielsweise Blaise Pascal (1623 – 1662) im Jahre 1654 erlebt. Der berühmte Zettel mit dem ‚Memorial‘, den er in sein Rockfutter eingenäht hatte, überliefert sein Erlebnis einer „Nacht des Feuers“. Hier bedeutet die Nacht die Schöpfungs- und die Menschenwelt; das Feuer aber steht für das dynamisch wirkende Lebensprinzip des Göttlichen. Wörtlich heißt es bei ihm: „Feuer, Gott

³² Ebd. 133-163: ‚Der gewachsene Mythos in Bild und Wort als Offenbarung‘.

³³ Ebd. 73-105: ‚Anfang und Ende, theologisch/philosophisch und religionsgeschichtlich betrachtet‘.

³⁴ SPEYER, Kosmos a. O. (s. o. Anm. 9) 74-86: ‚Zur theologisch-philosophischen Bedeutung des Lichtes‘.

³⁵ M. ELIADE, Die Religionen und das Heilige, deutsche Ausgabe (Salzburg 1954, Ndr. Frankfurt a. M. 1986) Reg.: ‚Hierophanien‘; ferner E. PAX, Art. Epiphanie, in: RAC 5 (1962) 832-909.

³⁶ Heraklit: Vorsokratiker 22 B 60 (DIELS / KRANZ): „Der Weg hinauf und hinab ein und derselbe“.

Abrahams, Gott Isaaks, Gott Jakobs, und nicht der Philosophen und der Gelehrten, Gewissheit, Empfinden, Freude, Friede. Gott Jesu Christi...“³⁷ Das reale Erleben Gottes ist für Pascal dem theologischen Begriffsdenken weit überlegen. Gott steht für ihn als die einzige wahre Wirklichkeit dem Schattenbild der Schöpfung gegenüber. Pascal trennt wie die Denker der Neuzeit immer mehr Denken und Glauben voneinander, wie seine Unterscheidung von *cœur* und *raison* und *l'esprit de finesse* und *l'esprit de géométrie* in seinen *Pensées* beweist³⁸. Je stärker der Rationalismus seit dem 17. Jahrhundert, dem Grand Siècle, wird, umso mehr findet sich auch sein Gegensatz ein, der zwischen Religion und Esoterik schillert³⁹.

In der ganzheitlichen Betrachtungsweise wird auch der von Blaise Pascal so scharf herausgestellte Gegensatz vom Gott der Philosophen und vom Gott Abrahams, Jakobs und Isaaks bis zu einem gewissen Grad überwunden; denn die ganzheitlich denkende und schlussfolgernde menschliche Vernunft vermag bis zum Quell des heilsgeschichtlichen Offenbarungsglaubens vorzudringen, also zu Gott. Ferner kann sie zu der Einsicht gelangen, dass Gott die Individualität jeder Einzelercheinung der raum-zeitlichen Welt und die mit dieser Individualität verwandte Personalität des einzelnen Menschen in sich birgt, dass er aber diese Struktur transzendiert, die er in Analogie zu sich geschaffen hat⁴⁰.

³⁷ Zum 'Memorial' R. GUARDINI, Christliches Bewusstsein. Versuche über Pascal (Leipzig 1935) 25-59: 'Das Memorial. Die religiöse Entscheidung im Leben Pascals'; R. ZAISER, Die Epiphanie in der französischen Literatur. Zur Entmystifizierung eines religiösen Erlebnismusters (Tübingen 1995) 75-103; der Verfasser versucht diesen Text „als eine Fiktion zu dechiffrieren“ (ebd. 98 f.).

³⁸ Pascal, *Pensées* frg. 424. 512 (552. 576 LAFUMA).

³⁹ Andere Beispiele sind Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), René Descartes (1596 – 1650), Isaac Newton (1642 – 1726), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 – 1716), Emanuel Swedenborg (1688 – 1772). – W. FRIETSCH, Newtons Geheimnis. Wissenschaft und Esoterik – Zwei Seiten einer Medaille (Gaggenau 2006); E. BENZ, Emanuel Swedenborg. Naturforscher und Seher² (Zürich 1969).

⁴⁰ SPEYER, Traum und Wirklichkeit a. O. (s. o. Anm. 15) Reg.: 'Personifikation'. – Als Prinzip des Verhältnisses von Gott und Schöpfung hat der Gedanke zu gelten: *deus semper maior*; vgl. Seneca, *naturales quaestiones* 1 praef. 13: *quid est deus? mens universi. quid est deus? quod vides totum et quod non vides totum. sic demum magnitudo illi sua redditur; qua nihil maius cogitari potest, si solus est omnia, si opus suum et intra et extra tenet.* – E. PRZYWARA, *Deus semper maior*. Theologie der Exerzitien, Bd. 1–2² (Wien 1964); DERS., *Analogia entis*. Metaphysik. Ur-Struktur und All-Rhythmus = DERS., *Schriften*, Bd. 3 (Einsiedeln 1962).

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„Warum ist überhaupt etwas und nicht vielmehr nichts?“

Diese Frage bezeichnet eines der wichtigsten Themen der Philosophie; sie wurde in der Form z. B. von *G. W. Leibniz* vorgetragen und ist so in die Geschichte eingegangen. Im Blick auf die modernen Naturwissenschaften ist sie aber heute neu aufzuwerfen.

Zur aktuellen Diskussion:

Bei der Frage wird offenbar vorausgesetzt, daß dies, daß überhaupt etwas ist, einen „Grund“ haben muß. Das scheint aber nun im Blick auf die modernen Naturwissenschaften anfechtbar: Denn gewisse mikrophysikalische Ereignisse scheinen nicht kausal bedingt zu sein, sondern vielmehr grundlos, spontan zu entstehen (z.B. das Auftreten von Energiequanten in einem „Vakuum“; auch die „zufälligen“ Genmutationen bzw. Erbsprünge, die den Fortschritt der Evolution von bewußtlosem Leben zum Bewußtsein bedingen).

Zur Auseinandersetzung sind mehrere Schritte zu bedenken:

1. Daraus, daß sich bei gewissen mikrophysikalischen Vorgängen Gründe (bzw. Ursachen) naturwissenschaftlich nicht feststellen lassen, folgt nicht, daß solche nicht dennoch vorhanden sind. Eine (naturwissenschaftliche) *N i c h t - E r k e n n t n i s* der Existenz von Ursachen ist nicht gleichbedeutend mit einer *E r k e n n t n i s* der Nicht-Existenz solcher Ursachen.

Ähnlich: Die grundsätzliche naturwissenschaftliche Nicht-Erkenntbarkeit der Existenz eines göttlichen Grundes bedeutet nicht schon die Erkenntnis, daß ein göttlicher Grund nicht existiert (der z. B. die Welt, während sie sich entwickelt, im Sein begründet und trägt).

Es zeigt sich: Die Naturwissenschaften sind stets auch philosophisch in Blick zu nehmen, aber es sind auch die grundsätzlichen Grenzen ihrer Bedeutung (die in ihrer Fragestellung und Blickrichtung gründen) zu sehen.

2. Aber man kann noch einen Schritt weiter gehen und sagen: Daß ein Seiendes (wie z. B. der Mensch oder auch ein Energiequant), das von sich aus die Möglichkeit hätte, anstelle zu sein auch nicht zu sein, *o h n e G r u n d* dennoch ist, erscheint absolut unmöglich. Denn: a) Wenn es nichts gäbe, von dem her zugunsten der Möglichkeit zu sein entschieden ist, so wäre nichts, das die essentielle Unbestimmtheit des Seienden hinsichtlich seines Seins in die Bestimmtheit des Seins überführen würde; und

b) Das Sein, das dem nicht schon von sich aus Seiden de facto zukommt, kann nicht aus nichts kommen. (Das „Nichts“ ist ja ein bloßes „Gedankending“ und realiter nichts; aus „ihm“ kann also auch nichts kommen.); oder

c) ein „nicht in etwas Gründen“ bedeutete ein „in nichts gründen“; in nichts (oder: im „Nichts“) kann aber nichts gründen.

So ist durch Auseinandersetzung mit den modernen Naturwissenschaften die Frage heute noch reflektierter zu stellen.

Systematische Argumentation:

1. Zunächst ist zu sehen: Die Frage bezieht sich auf das Seiende, sofern für dieses auch die Möglichkeit besteht, anstatt zu sein nicht zu sein (z. B. auf den Menschen, der ja einmal nicht war). Für dieses Seiende gibt es also an sich zwei Möglichkeiten: die Möglichkeit zu sein und die Möglichkeit nicht zu sein; letztere ist de facto verwirklicht.

Dabei bezieht sich die Frage nicht nur auf einzelnes, sondern auf das *Insgesamt* des Seiden, für das diese beiden Möglichkeiten bestehen.

2. Nun aber ist der Grund verschieden von dem was er begründet.

3. Also ist der Grund für das Sein des Insgesamt des Seienden, für das die beiden Möglichkeiten gelten, von diesem Insgesamt verschieden.

Das heißt: Der Grund ist ein Seiendes, das nicht die Möglichkeit zu sein und die Möglichkeit nicht zu sein, sondern nur die Möglichkeit zu sein hat; damit fällt bei ihm die Möglichkeit zu sein schon mit dem Sein zusammen: Der Grund ist *das Sein selbst!*

4. Unter dem Seienden, für das prinzipiell sowohl die Möglichkeit zu sein als auch – alternativ – die Möglichkeit nicht zu sein besteht, sind auch *Personen* (nämlich wir Menschen).

Der Grund kann aber nicht ärmer sein als das was er begründet und was aus ihm hervorgeht.

Also ist „das Sein selbst“ persönlichen, ansprechbaren Charakters: „*das Sein in Person*“!

Thomas v. Aquin sagt, daß dies der beste Name für „Gott“ sei – in einer gewissen Entsprechung zu der Antwort Gottes aus einem brennenden Dornbusch an Moses auf dessen Frage, wer er ist (Exodus 3,14): „Ich bin der ‘Ich bin’“; „.....so sollst du zu den Israeliten sprechen: Der ‘Ich bin’ hat mich zu euch gesandt!“

5. Also lautet die Antwort auf die Frage, warum überhaupt etwas ist und nicht vielmehr nichts: weil Gott (als „das Sein in Person“) es will!

Schlußanmerkungen:

1. Die Überzeugung von der Existenz Gottes (im Sinne des genannten Gottesbegriffs) bedeutet also nicht einen irrationalen Glauben, sondern ist in philosophischer Argumentation fundiert.

2. Dabei habe ich den Begriff „*Gottesbeweis*“ bewußt vermieden. Denn im technischen Zeitalter versteht man vielfach unter einem „Beweis“ eine Denktechnik, jemanden zu einer bestimmten Auffassung zu „zwingen“; man sagt, ein Beweis ist entweder „zwingend“ oder überhaupt keiner. Aber wer möchte sich in Sinnfragen schon zwingen lassen!?

Man sollte vielmehr nicht sagen: Ich *muß* so denken (ob ich will oder nicht), sondern: Ich *darf* so denken (weil die Wirklichkeit sich so zeigt).

3. Die Erkenntnis, daß alles Seiende – auch man selbst – von Gott kommt und von ihm getragen wird, kann dazu motivieren, sich ihm tendentiell unbegrenzt zu überantworten und zur Verfügung zu stellen.

Vgl. vom Verf.: *Natürliche Theologie. Grundriß philosophischer Gotteserkenntnis*, München-Salzburg 2. Aufl. 2009; *Philosophische Argumentation zur Existenz Gottes: Plato, Augustinus, Martin Buber* (Grenzgebiete der Wissenschaft 63(2024)155-171).

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Analogy and Structure in two of Plato's Dialogues: Early and Middle

Socratic questioning is motivated by two types of problems: well-structured problems and ill-structured problems. Well-structured problems are problems whose structure can be defined; an ill-structured problem is a problem whose structure lacks definition. I argue that the principle question of a dialogue often has as its subject matter ill-structured problems (ISPs) and the operative questions of a dialogue, small bore questions that contribute to the elaboration of a concept's extension, have as their subject matter well-structured problems (WSPs). I show that the dialogues often conflate WSPs with ISPs at the level of operative questioning and that conflating the two problems is intentional and justifiable.

The outline of my argument will be as follows. In part 1 I briefly explain the distinction between principle and operative questions. I then show, citing Plato's *Meno*, how the questions point to the distinction between WSPs and ISPs. In part 2 I list the criteria that problems must satisfy in part or whole in order to be classified as WSPs. Such a list will thereby indicate some of the features of ISPs. In part 3 I describe Socratic questioning and its reliance on principle and operative questions. Conflating WSPs with ISPs often occurs at the level of operative questions. In part 4 I argue that Plato's *Minos* is another dialogue that conflates WSPs with ISPs in its principle and operative questions. *Minos* meets one or more of the conditions that define WSPs by either analogizing the features of formal completeness to moral concepts or describing moral concepts by using formal language. In addition to *Minos*, I discuss the analogy in the *Meno* between doubling the square and defining virtue. Each of the examples I discuss progressively satisfy the conditions that define WSPs. The geometrical problem from the *Meno*, for example, satisfies all the criteria that define WSPs and should be seen as a crucial example of Plato's attempt to formalize moral concepts. In part 5 I offer a defense of Socratic questioning conflating WSPs with ISPs in its principle and operative questions. The defense is premised on the assumption that Socratic questioning is designed to instill intellectual discipline in the interlocutor, insofar as he is brought to see the importance of logical relationships, and to combat the interlocutor's skepticism.

1. Principle and Operative Questions

A principle question is a definitional one that orients the smaller or operative questions in a dialogue towards the elaboration of a concept's extension, e.g., friendship (*Lysis*), piety (*Euthyphro*), bravery (*Laches*), law (*Minos*). The principle / operative distinction in regard to Socratic questioning is really about WSPs and ISPs.

One of the peculiarities of the Socratic dialogues is that Plato seems to misrepresent the category to which virtue belongs. Often Socrates speaks about virtue and mathematical entities as if they belonged to the same category. For example, the slave boy's attempt in the *Meno* to double the square is a good illustration of the sort of problem I have in mind. The slave boy has a clearly defined initial state insofar as his goal is well defined, i.e., to double the area of the square. He also has a well defined final state insofar as a finite course of action will eventuate in the realization of the doubling of the square. The main characteristic of the geometrical problem entertained by the slave boy is that it is a WSP.

However, the slave boy's well-structured problem is introduced within the context of a more substantive argument that is designed to solve a more substantive problem. Namely, to say what virtue *is*. The procedure the slave employs to double the square is supposed to be analogous to the immortal soul's ability to recollect, if questioned rightly, virtue knowledge. However, the analogy is a forced one. Defining virtue does not fall into the category of problems that have a structural relation between the initial state and final state. Unlike *Meno*'s geometrical problem, there are no procedures implicit in the initial state for generating possible definitions of virtue. The lack of a procedure that guarantees a finite number of definitions, which can be sifted through and tested, make it impossible to identify the correct definition of virtue. There is no well-defined final state. The main characteristic of the virtue problem entertained by Socrates and *Meno* is that it is an ISP. *Meno* is just one significant example of a dialogue that conflates WSPs with ISPs. (In part 4 I discuss further the analogy in the *Meno* between doubling the square and defining virtue.)

Given that in the *Meno* Plato speaks about virtue and geometrical problems as if they belonged to the same genus, might he have reasons for conflating WSPs with ISPs? In other words, might Plato's category mistake be intentional? I will argue that it is.

2. WSPs

Although a formal definition of a WSP is elusive, there are criteria that have been proposed by scholars in the fields of computer science and artificial intelligence.¹ WSPs must satisfy one or more of the following:

- a. There is a definite criterion for testing any proposed solution, and a mechanizable process for applying the criterion. (At a minimum, the three examples cited from Plato's dialogues satisfy criterion "a".)
- b. There is at least one problem space in which can be represented the initial problem state, the goal state, and all the other states that may be reached, or considered, in the course of attempting a solution of the problem.
- c. Attainable state changes can be represented in a problem space, as transitions from given states to states directly attainable from them.
- d. All of these conditions hold in the strong sense that the basic processes postulated require only practicable amounts of computation, and the information postulated is

¹ The list of conditions is taken from Herbert Simon's book, *Models of Discovery: and other Topics in the Methods of Science* (1977, 305-324). Some of the conditions listed by Simon are taken from Walter R. Reitman's book, *Cognition and Thought: An Information-Processing Approach* (1965, 148-180).

effectively available to the processes—i.e., available with the help of only practicable amounts of search.

All four conditions for identifying a WSP can be illustrated by the process of solving the following mathematical problem: “What is the smallest prime number greater than ten?”² To answer this problem requires that we know that a prime number is a natural number having but two possible distinct natural number divisors: one and itself. Next we might list three ascending consecutive natural numbers greater than ten beginning with the number eleven, followed by twelve, and then thirteen. To determine the answer to the question we need only to apply the definition (criterion) of a prime number to all three numbers. However, having determined that there are no further divisors and having successfully divided eleven by one and itself, it is not necessary to apply the mechanizable process of dividing by one and itself to either twelve or thirteen. Eleven is the smallest prime number greater than ten. The problem space contained in this example is: *The smallest prime number that is greater than ten is* The problem space guarantees a solution to the problem insofar as there is a structural relation between the states generated (possible solutions) and tested and the eventual solution to the problem. The problem space names the solution generating process: natural numbers greater than ten that have but two possible natural number divisors are possible solutions to the problem. Attainable state changes is illustrated by selecting three consecutive numbers greater than ten—eleven, twelve, thirteen—and testing each number for primality. Transitions from states to states are guaranteed by starting with the lowest number and moving in an ascending and consecutive direction. A practicable amount of computation ensures that there is a procedure for generating possible solutions in a finite number of steps. Given the mathematical problem under consideration, testing eleven, twelve, and thirteen for primality guarantees a practicable amount of computation in finding a solution to the problem.

Having discussed some of the characteristics of WSPs, ISPs seem to be characterized by a lack of structure or definition. They do not exhibit any of the four characteristics I have discussed. Most crucially, ISPs lack a criterion for testing proposed solutions and a mechanizable process for applying the criterion. Conflating WSPs with ISPs occurs often in Plato's dialogues and is an important feature of Socratic questioning.³

3. Socratic Questioning

As I have explained, principle questions determine the subject matter of a particular dialogue. There is one principle question per dialogue (e.g., “What is law?”; “What is virtue?”). Operative questions are the small bore questions entertained by Socrates and his interlocutor. They determine what precisely the principle question can be used to refer to. Socratic questioning's

² Discovering the proof of a theorem in formal logic is similar to the type of WSP I am discussing. Cf. Simon (1977, 154-165).

³ The designation, Socratic questioning, pertains to the type of questions and the problems entailed by these questions, within Plato's dialogues. Although there is a close resemblance between the Socratic elenchus and what I refer to as Socratic questioning, the latter process is not only refutative; it is also a process for modeling proper moral inquiry.

effectiveness resides in its ability to expose an interlocutor's pretense of knowledge on the topic under discussion while at the same time making useful conceptual distinctions on the topic. The pattern of Socratic questioning can be characterized as follows.

An interlocutor makes a statement or assertion that gives Socrates a target for refutation. (Typically the interlocutor's assertion is his attempt to define the subject matter of the principle question. Often the principle question refers to an ISP.)

Socrates begins the refutation by introducing propositions which are not argued for but usually accepted by the interlocutor. (Socrates' propositions are introduced through operative questions. Often the propositions refer to a WSP.) Socrates then gets the interlocutor to agree to the propositions, which brings about the negation (denial) of the interlocutor's attempt to define the subject matter of the principle question). Socrates subsequently assumes that the interlocutor's original statement or assertion has been negated and the negation of his assertion or statement has been shown to be true (the interlocutor may withdraw agreement to Socrates' propositions, but he hardly ever does).

Lastly, the interlocutor is shown to be in a state of *aporia* (i.e., confusion or perplexity brought about by having recognized he has inconsistent belief sets).⁴

The general idea behind Socratic questioning is to get agreement from the interlocutor that there is a principle question before determining, through many operative questions, what it refers to. After having received agreement, if the interlocutor claims to know moral concept X, Socrates believes that the interlocutor should be able to give an account of X (the definition of X). The interlocutor often cannot give an account of X (that withstands refutation), so Socrates infers from the interlocutor's inability to say what moral concept X is that he does not know moral concept X. Socratic questioning's principle / operative distinction points to a pattern within the Socratic dialogues of discussing moral concepts as if they were conceptually complete or WSPs. Several passages from the *Minos* clearly display the pattern. In the *Minos* analogous relationships are drawn between law and things that are well-structured.

4. *Minos* (313a-b4; 316b9-c5)⁵

The principle question in the *Minos* is "what is the law (*nomos*)?" This is the standard "what is X?" question. The operative questions in the *Minos*, all of which push the dialogue to its conclusion, revolve around the principle question. As I have mentioned, conflating WSPs with ISPs often occurs at the level of operative questioning. Often the prop-

⁴ The recent scholarship on the Socratic elenchus is in line with what I refer to as Socratic questioning. For example, Gary Alan Scott's book (2002) *Does Socrates Have a Method?* is a collection of essays written by various scholars offering interpretations of Socrates' elenctic exchanges. One of the more compelling essays in the collection, written by Carpenter and Polansky (89-100), argue that the Socratic elenchus is not a particular method at all, but the Socratic dialectic generally. They show that there are a number of refutations, such as refutations of definitions, behaviors, proposed procedures, and substantive doctrines. Due to the variety of contexts in which refutations appears, Carpenter and Polansky conclude that any attempt to establish a general method or logic for refutations is futile. Robert Metcalf's (2004, 37-64; esp. 41-46) interpretation of the Socratic elenchus is persuasive and very much in line with my interpretation. Metcalf emphasizes the *ad hominem* aspect of Socrates' cross-examinations that is on display in the *Crito*.

⁵ Except where indicated, M. Schofield's (Cooper 1997, 1308-1317) translation is used. For a scholarly defense of Plato's authorship of the *Minos* see Morrow 1960, 24-37, and Pangle 1980, 511n1; 1987, 1-7. Both commentators focus on the style of the *Minos*, as well as the likelihood of the dialogue having been written as an introduction to the *Laws*.

ositions Socrates introduces—but not argue for—to refute the interlocutor's attempt to answer the principle question are framed as operative questions. The questions are comparative in nature in so far as they are designed to show analogous relationships. Although in the *Minos* there are several analogous relationships involving law, my argument will be limited to discussing only two: gold and pieces at checkers in the game of checkers. However, the two I have chosen are good illustrations of Socrates' attempt to analogize the features of formal completeness to moral concepts or describe moral concepts by using formal language.

Without any introductions or scene-setting, Socrates abruptly initiates the discussion in the *Minos* by asking the nameless interlocutor—"Law, in our view, what is it?" (313a).⁶ Typical of the confidence displayed by interlocutor(s) in other dialogues, the interlocutor assumes that Socrates' question is too indefinite. He wants to know, "What sort of laws are you asking about" (313a1). Of course the premise of Socrates' question is that there is something that law is in virtue of itself (*kath'auto*). Consequently, there is no need to speak of "laws" prior to establishing what law *is*. Socrates' question does suggest how the interlocutor might reformulate his definition of law through reflecting on the comparison between gold and law.

Well, now, is it possible that law differs from law in this very respect of being law [THE PRINCIPLE QUESTION]? Think about the question I'm actually asking you. If I had asked: "What is gold [OPERATIVE QUESTION]?", then if you had asked me in the same way: "What sort of gold am I referring to?," I reckon that your question would have been incorrect. For surely gold does not differ at all from gold...in respect of being gold. (313a-6)

Regarding such a question the interlocutor would not bother to ask "what sort of gold?" because the essence of gold is the same whether or not we are discussing flakes or nuggets of gold or gold jewelry, gold utensils or gold coin. Socrates is requesting that the interlocutor give a definition of law in terms of the necessary and sufficient condition for being the kind of thing it is. Such a definition would display a thing's essence or what a thing is: properties that are constitutive of a kind, and underlie explain the kind's other necessary attributes. It is the kind's properties that account for its stability and support inductive inferences and characteristic interactions.

The passage under consideration is a good illustration of conflating WSPs with ISPs. In light of the gold / law analogy, Socrates suggests that law is like the kind of thing that can be grasped in its constitution or structure. All laws should be objectively identifiable because, at the most basic level, they have the same properties or structure.⁷ Is law like gold? Although Socrates' analogy suggests that he has an appreciation of some of the structural features of gold, the gold / law analogy should especially resonate with modern readers.⁸ Having the atomic number 79 is the essential property of

⁶ That the interlocutor is nameless suggests that the discussion of law will be focused on law as such and that the interlocutor represents a type of intellectual whose skepticism informs his thinking about the scope and purpose of law.

⁷ Cobb (1988, 187-207) makes a similar claim: "Thus he [Socrates] attempts a connection between *nomos* and what people subjectively affirm as normative while suggesting that *nomos* has some sort of objective priority to what people affirm" (191).

⁸ Kuhn (2000, 58-89) points out that even in antiquity the pureness of gold was determined by theory. However, the difference between the ancient identification of the substance gold and the modern identification of the substance gold is that modern science steadily increases its ability to detect impurities in gold.

gold; it accounts for gold's other attributes such as yellowness and ductility. Although gold is a natural kind thing, it is a WSP in the sense that among objects made of imitation gold like fool's gold, gold can be identified according to a mechanizable process. For example, X-ray spectroscopy is one procedure that is used to identify gold. The procedure is able to do so because it is designed to identify elements, compounds and atomic structures by measuring radiant energy. Not only can gold be identified according to a criterion that can be mechanically applied, such a process is effective precisely because it requires only practicable amounts of computation. Consequently, Socrates' gold / law analogy calls attention to gold's formal completeness, and by doing so, gold is shown to satisfy two of the conditions that define WSPs.⁹

Unlike gold, law does not seem like the sort of thing that can be grasped in its constitution or structure. Law seems to be a conventional notion. The usual translation of law as a legislative decree is narrow. At 314c3 Socrates defines law as a decree of the community, but only to show that the extension of the term is not exhausted by such a definition. Law must be taken in its broad sense to also mean tradition, custom or culture—that which is authoritative for proper human behavior. However, despite the interlocutor's repeated claim that the sole basis of any given law is convention (313b5; 315a4), Socrates insists that law *qua* law is uncontaminated by historical forces. Socrates says as much in the following passage:

Ideally, nevertheless, law is discovery of reality. So it must be that any human beings who do not always make use of the same laws, as appears to be the case with us, are not always capable of discovering what ideally law does discover—reality. Let's have a look and see whether it actually does become quite clear to us from our inquiry whether we always make use of the same laws, or different ones at different times, and whether all make use of the same laws, or different people different ones. (315a7-b6)

Socrates allows that the Athenians may have different laws in different periods of their history and that different communities have different laws. However, he contends that law still wishes everywhere and always to be discovery of reality though some humans apparently are not always able to discover it. The stress placed upon "wishes" (*bouletai*) concedes some ground to the interlocutor's skepticism about law discovering reality. Socrates' larger point is to get the interlocutor to appreciate that law itself, in spite of faulty interpretations and implementation, should be construed as a well-structured thing or as having formal completeness.

The next analogous relationship involving law that conflates WSPs with ISPs is Socrates' suggestion that law be construed as having an identity like the one that defines the movement of a checker piece in the game of checkers. The interlocutor's insistence on judging the nature of law by appealing to the relationship of law to place and time, prompts Socrates to respond to the interlocutor's claim that law is what is accepted by different people in different locales by echoing his earlier discussion about the essence of gold as unifying all instances of gold things.

When you express things this way, Socrates, these things [laws] do not seem to be accepted always both by us and by the others. But when I consider that we are constantly turning the laws upside down, I cannot be persuaded.—Perhaps you do not take into consideration that when

⁹ I am suggesting that Socrates may be expressing clumsily the idea that the formal features of gold are instrumental in how it is observed and justifies empirical conclusions based upon its observation (i.e., inductive inferences).

we move the pieces at checkers they remain the same pieces [IMPLIED OPERATIVE QUESTION]. But look at the question with me in the following way. Have you come across a treatise on health for the sick? (316b9-c5)

Socrates asks the interlocutor to consider “that when we move the pieces at checkers they remain the same pieces” (316c1-2). Like the gold / law analogy, the implied operative question Socrates introduces in the passage presupposes that a piece at checkers has a real definition based upon a real property or properties. At 317d Socrates goes so far as to say that “law is the discovery of reality.” Never mind that the interlocutor’s claim is that law only has a nominal definition; Socrates insists that the definition of law mirrors the structure of law as a natural kind thing.¹⁰ By claiming such status for law, Socrates conflates WSPs with ISPs.

A piece at checkers maintains its identity because its meaning, despite a change in context or position, remains the same. It operates according to definitory rules of the game that define what is possible at each stage of the game, what moves are permissible in particular circumstances, and what constitutes winning and losing.¹¹ Consequently, any perceived change of identity on the part of the checker piece, due to shifting contexts, is merely apparent change. Although checker pieces are not natural kind things, Socrates is consistent in drawing the analogy between the essence of law and the identity of a piece at checkers in the game of checkers.

Despite the fact that Socrates employs several suggestive analogies in *Minos* to illuminate the essence of law, it is problematic that his examples tend to be of things that have a formal completeness about them. Several passages from the dialogue suggest that Socrates understands that the nature of law, taken in its broad sense, cannot be grasped apart from its historical accretions. Nonetheless, his operative questions analogize the nature of law to natural kind things and things that are marked off by rules indicating a principle of individuation. Unlike law, gold and a piece at checkers are WSPs insofar as at a minimum they satisfy criterion “a” of the criteria that define well-structured problems. The geometrical problem in Plato’s *Meno*, on the other hand, satisfies all the criteria that define WSPs. Compared to the analogies cited from the *Minos*, the analogy from the *Meno* should be seen as the culmination of Socrates’ previous two attempts to draw an analogy between a WSP and an ISP. The analogy in the *Meno* suggests that the process of discovering the formal features of a geometrical problem is similar to the process of discovering the formal features of virtue.

Meno (82b-85d)

The *Meno* begins by Meno asking Socrates if virtue comes about by teaching, practice, nature or some other way. Rather than addressing his question, Socrates asks Meno the principle question of the dialogue. Namely, to say what virtue *is*. Like the interlocutor’s definition of law in the *Minos*, Meno offers a definition of virtue that is mediated through history and culture.

¹⁰ Along these same lines, Vlastos (Day 1994, n 26) goes so far as to say that exploring ‘real definitions’ not ‘nominal definitions’ is the primary object of Socratic inquiry (the “What is X?” question). I am in full agreement with Vlastos.

¹¹ Board games like checkers (*petteia*) are discussed in a number of different contexts throughout the Platonic corpus. Checkers is mentioned in the *Republic* at 333a14 in the context of craft-knowledge and justice and at 422e6 in the context of military strategy (Grube 1992).

First, if you want the virtue of a man, it is easy to say that a man's virtue consists of being able to manage public affairs and in so doing to benefit his friends and harm his enemies and to be careful that no harm comes to himself; if you want the virtue of a woman, it is not difficult to describe: she must manage the home well, preserve its possessions, and be submissive to her husband; the virtue of a child, whether male or female, is different again, and so is that of an elderly man, if you want that, or if you want that of a free man or a slave. (71e1-72a5)¹²

Contrary to Socrates' request, Meno's definition does not identify the single form that is both the necessary and sufficient condition for being a virtue. Instead, Meno cites instances of virtue rather than the universal sought by Socrates' principle question. Meno does attempt to offer the sort of definition of virtue that Socrates requests, but only after Socrates demonstrates the type of definition he is in search of by asking Meno an operative question.

In passages 72b1-b6 Socrates makes a customary move insofar as the subject matter of his operative question is well-structured; it analogizes a natural kind thing (i.e., bees) to that of virtue. Socrates' point is that despite bees having different functions, they are all bees. Likewise, just as men, women, children and slaves excel at their respective virtues, each virtue is identified as such because they fall under a kind.

Although the passage under consideration is another example of Socrates conflating WSPs with ISPs through his principle and operative questions, its significance is that it sets up another analogy to explain the nature of virtue that is unlike the gold/checkers analogy discussed in the *Minos*. The content of the analogy is quite formal; it suggests that the process of defining virtue is like the process of solving a geometrical problem because each task is a WSP.

After three failed attempts to offer a definition of virtue that withstands Socrates' cross-examination, Meno tries to "numb" (80c-d) Socrates with the paradox of learning. The paradox states that: *What a knower does not know he is completely blank about so that he could not know what he is looking for or recognize it once he has found it*. Socrates gets around the paradox by explaining the myth of recollection. He explains that priestess and priests believe the soul is immortal and that it is reincarnated. Having lived many lives, been to the underworld many times, and learned all things before its embodiment, the soul merely needs to recollect what it used to know. Therefore, since "the whole of nature is akin" (81d), the embodied soul consists of all knowledge, and such knowledge can be recollected in the here and now by the embodied soul. Instead of redoubling his effort to define virtue, Meno forces Socrates to prove that learning is recollection. Such proof is undertaken by Socrates by illustrating how one of Meno's ignorant slave boys recollects how to double the square.

The geometrical problem is an unambiguous case of a WSP. The problem can be stated as follows: How long is the side of the square the area of which is double the area of the given square? The task the slave attempts to perform can be characterized by the following diagrammatic presentation.¹³

¹² Except where indicated, all translations from the *Meno* are from G.M.A Grube's translation (Cooper 1997).

¹³ Except for minor changes, my diagrammatic presentation is an adaption of Grube (1981, 71-75) and Scott (2006, 98-99).

Socrates and Boy

Socrates and Meno

82b-e

Q. If a square with sides of 2ft has an area of 4ft^2 what would be the length of the sides of a square with an area of 8ft^2 ?

A. 4ft.

82e-83a: the slave boy thinks he knows the answer but in fact he doesn't.

83a-e

Q. If the area of a square with 4ft sides is 16ft^2 , and the area of a square with 2ft sides is 4ft^2 , what length of sides would a square of 8ft^2 area have?

A. 3ft.


Q. But wouldn't that give an area of 9ft^2 ?

A. It seems so.

83e-84d: now he is aware of his ignorance.

84d-85c

Solution of problem: ABCD is a square whose sides are 2ft and whose area is 4ft^2 . Area of BDEF is double that of ABCD; so its area is 8ft^2 ; so the diagonal BD is the length of the 8ft^2 area.



85d: the correct answers must have been in him all along.

Given that the geometrical problem is a WSP, the criterion for testing its proposed solution and the mechanizable process for applying the criterion requires that the slave can add two natural numbers at a time, no greater than 10 and, through Socrates' leading questions, see that numbers connected by operators give the same result whatever their grouping, as long as their arrangement remains the same.¹⁴ The problem space of the geometrical problem is: *How long is the side of the square the area of which is double the area of the given square?* Contained within the problem space is the procedure for how the slave-boy should go about generating possible solutions to the problem and identifying

¹⁴ E.g., the associative law for mathematics $(a \times b) \times c = a \times (b \times c)$.

the correct solution once it is found. The sequence of Socrates' initial questioning is first to get the slave-boy to consider a square (82b9); ask if such a square can be bigger or smaller (82c4); ask how many feet the whole square would be if one side is two feet and the other side is two feet (82c5-6); and then ask how "we" could have another figure twice the size of this one (82d5). The significance of the initial series of questions Socrates asks the slave are designed to show the structural relationship between the problem space, the process the slave should use to generate solutions to the problem, and how to recognize the correct solution to the problem once he has found it.¹⁵ The attainable state changes in the geometrical problem can be represented in the problem space by showing that the slave recollecting things in order (82e12-13) necessitates that certain operators be in play, such as adding. Lastly, the nature of the geometrical problem the slave-boy attempts to solve guarantees a practical amount of computation and a modest procedure requiring a finite number of steps for generating solutions.

Comparing the process of doubling the square to the process of defining virtue suggests that there is an isomorphic relationship between virtue and the geometrical problem. The textual evidence for this suggestion is that after Socrates' summation of the slave boy's demonstration he indicates that the process of defining virtue ("recollecting things in order, as one must recollect," 82e12-13), and what is attainable through the process, resembles the well-structured process of solving the geometrical problem. Thus, Socrates reiterates the principle question of the dialogue.

Since we are of one mind that one should seek to find out what one does not know, shall we try to find out together what virtue is [PRINCIPLE QUESTION]? (86c4-5).

The doctrine of recollection does not seem to be at issue so much as the claim that virtue is structured in such a way that language or thought can capture it.¹⁶ Socrates seems to be arguing that language and thought contain truthbearers (e.g., words, concepts, definitions) that correspond to facts (e.g., virtue itself, relations or state of affairs). Demanding that Meno formulate the right definition of virtue that is as self-evidently recognized as the process of doubling the square accounts for the repeated refutations of Meno's definitions and accounts for interlocutors repeatedly failing to come to grips with the nature of Socrates' principle question / operative question orientation in other dialogues, especially in the early dialogues. However, Meno's paradox still stands, and it does so because virtue's ill-structuredness, unlike the slave boy's geometrical problem, makes it very difficult for Socrates and Meno to know what they are looking for or recognize it once they have found it.

¹⁵ Because the problem space names the solution generating process, the slave-boy's incorrect answers to Socrates' questions are shown to be self-evidently wrong.

¹⁶ That is, through elenctic exchanges. Fine's (2003, 61-65) insightful analysis of the *Meno* seems to be in line with my argument that recollection is not at issue so much as is the process of inferential demonstration and dialectic (i.e. Socratic questioning). Weiss (2001, 79-125) is correct to argue that virtue, unlike geometry, lacks clear criteria as to what is and who are the recognized experts at it (81). However, she fails to explain adequately the difference between virtue and a teachable and learnable subject like geometry and all other *mathēma*. Additionally, she fails to see that conflating the process of recollecting virtue-knowledge with the process of the slave-boy doubling the square is not to "fool" (83) Meno to get him to "pursue moral inquiry" (81). Rather, in conflating the two processes Socrates is emphasizing the importance seeing logical relationships and combating Meno's moral skepticism.

5. Defending Socratic Questioning

The central theme of my argument thus far has been that the principle / operative characterization of the type of questions Socrates asks in the dialogues is an effective approach to understanding Socratic questioning. Additionally, I have shown that such a distinction is based on a further distinction between ill-structured problems (ISPs) and well-structured problems (WSPs). Citing examples from Plato's *Minos* and *Meno*, I have highlighted two methodological features of Socratic questioning: the principle question of a dialogue tends to revolve around ill-structured problems and the operative questions tend to revolve around well-structured problems, and that the two types of problems are often conflated at the level of operative questioning. Typically the conflation of the two problems takes place when Socrates draws analogies between the moral concept under discussion and a natural kind thing or a well-structured activity. However, conflating the two problems is intentional and justifiable on the grounds that Socrates is modeling an intellectual perspective that seeks to instill intellectual discipline in the interlocutor and to combat the interlocutor's skepticism. Such skepticism holds that some things must be known for certain in order to know anything at all. Socrates' analogies provide the interlocutor the opportunity to see logical relationships and to reflect on foundations and criteria for what constitutes knowledge in certain spheres.

In the context of my argument, reading the *Minos* as a synoptic view of Socrates' orientation towards interlocutors who are morally skeptical, and then reading *Meno* as a specific view of how Socrates handles such interlocutors, it becomes clear that moral skepticism is a condition that makes an interlocutor open to the Socratic conversation but susceptible during it to assuming a sophistic stance towards the moral topic under discussion. The analogies discussed in the *Minos* and the *Meno* should be thought of as antidotes, the power of which is to get the interlocutor to gradually settle into a moral groove, both behaviorally and intellectually. The analogous relationships discussed in the *Minos* between law and well-structured things like gold and a piece at checkers is introduced in the context of the interlocutor reflecting Athenian skepticism about law. It is not just the interlocutor's immediate views that Socrates seeks to address in drawing the analogies; he also addressing an intellectual perspective that sees all moral discourse as amorphous and lacking any firm foundations or limits.

The gold / law analogy is introduced after the interlocutor suggests that law is merely a conventional notion, and that there are many such laws (313a1). Notwithstanding that Socrates' phrasing of the principle question indicates that he intended the interlocutor to say what law is in virtue of itself in the same way that gold can be defined in terms of the necessary and sufficient condition for being gold. From 313a1 to the conclusion of the dialogue the interlocutor is supposed to reference the gold analogy *inter alia* as a model for thinking about the essence of law. As a natural kind thing, gold is an instructive model. It illustrates that nature is divided into various kinds and species and that taxonomy corresponds to nature's divisions. Linking law with a natural kind thing shows the interlocutor how to fashion a generalized formulation of the structure or essence proper to a certain class. It also helps the interlocutor to see that there are natural limits and foundational knowledge that define particular spheres. Merely reflecting on the gold / law analogy goes some distance in disciplining the interlocutor's intellectual perspective. Conversely, construing the nature of law as a historical phenomenon forces

the interlocutor into an undisciplined intellectual position that assumes that there can be no definition by intension when it comes to law. Lacking a defining property, the moniker “law” merely designates the enumeration of decrees and resolutions promulgated by cities (314c-2). However, it is problematic to define law by enumeration since such an enumeration would be limitless. Consequently, the interlocutor’s current position on law is indefensible mainly on pragmatic grounds.

The law / checkers analogy is introduced within the context of Socrates arguing that where there is knowledge, the same things about the same matters are accepted always (316d). Likewise, Socrates observes that checker players use the same pieces when they play the game, and that the pieces move according to the same rules wherever the game is played. The analogy is especially instructive for the skeptical interlocutor insofar as Socrates tries to get him to see that the function of the rules of a game is an effective model for understanding the essence and function of the laws that govern a city. Definitory rules of games cultivate mental habits in players that repeatedly play such games. The purpose of these rules, aside from conveying normative content, is to provide an objective order in which each player encounters as a valid order. Consequently, definitory rules of a game are inherently stabilizing forces. Each player enters into the game having a clear expectation of its fixed goal and the sort of behavior expected to reach it. Socrates’ analogy also underscores the fact that a citizen’s character reflects the laws that define his daily conduct. Laws standardize conduct and thought and engender a sense of self-worth insofar as an individual’s behavior is circumscribed by communal norms. Precisely because citizens internalize the laws under which they live, determining the nature of law becomes crucial.¹⁷

The upshot of Socrates’ law / checkers analogy is that the skeptical interlocutor is offered two approaches to reflecting on law, both of which have practical consequences. The first approach is embodied in Socrates’ implicit claim that laws, like rules, are inherently stabilizing forces in human conduct. At a minimum, these stabilizing forces make the interlocutor aware of the practical need for law to provide a standard of due measure rather than relative measure in particular “spheres, whether in medicine or cookery or in gardening” (317b13). The second approach links the stabilizing force of law to natural foundations. Since law is discovery of reality human conduct has an implicit natural end or goal that reason discloses in terms of which humans can rationally rank goods (i.e., soulful goods, bodily goods and external goods). Such a ranking goes some distance in helping the skeptical interlocutor see that thinking about law in the right way necessitates right conduct and thereby improves the souls of those living under the laws (321d-9).

The geometrical problem / virtue analogy in the *Meno* is the last example of Socratic questioning conflating WSPs with ISPs. The analogy formalizes the features of virtue by comparing the procedure of identifying the single form of virtue to doubling a square. Whereas in the *Minos* the interlocutor’s anonymity allows Socrates to assume a synoptic approach towards a type of interlocutor who is morally skeptical, in the *Meno* the interlocutor Meno makes it necessary for Socrates to couple his refutations of Meno’s definitions of virtue with a critique of Meno’s character. Meno’s skepticism requires that Socrates subtly mount an *ad hominem* attack on his character while arguing that virtue

¹⁷ Beginning at 317dff. Socrates takes it for granted that the term “law” is by definition a just law. Unlawful laws are designated as “lawless” (314d, 317c) and “wicked resolutions” (314e9-10).

has a single form. The attack is in the guise of Socrates commenting on the fact that Meno's definitions of virtue are derivative and that they make no reference to virtuous conduct. Meno's first two definitions of virtue derive from the sophist Gorgias, and the third is derived from an unnamed poet.

The geometrical problem / virtue analogy is introduced in the context of Meno's failed attempts to define virtue (71e-77b) and Socrates appeal to the myth of recollection in order get around the paradox of learning (81c-e4). After having been shown that his initial, Gorgias-derived definition of virtue failed to identify the form of virtue (71e1-72a5), Meno's second, Gorgias-derived definition states that virtue is the ability "to rule over people" (73c5-d1). The second definition is an improvement over the first insofar as it identifies two features common to all cases of virtue: function and excellence at it. However, the definition is inadequate because it does not include knowing how to rule oneself nor does it include a good notion of what it means to rule. As Socrates points out, slaves and children may have virtue but it would not be due to their ability to rule over men (73d3-6). That Meno's second definition of virtue is especially tied up with his character is attested to by Socrates' offer that they add to "able to rule" *justly and not unjustly*. The fact that Socrates has to remind Meno to add the caveat *justly and not unjustly* indicates that Meno had not included in "able" to rule the notion of knowing what to do and being just. Meno's definition merely focuses on having power.

Meno's third and last definition of virtue, which is derived from an unnamed poet, is "to desire beautiful things and have the power to acquire them" (77b1-3). Socrates divides the definition in order to assess its merits. He first deals with "to desire beautiful things" (77b4-78b7) and then he turns to the second part of the definition "and have the power to acquire them" (78b8-79c8). Socrates refutes the definition on the grounds that Meno does not specify if by "beautiful things" he means really or naturally good things and not merely apparently or conventionally good things; and if "the power to acquire them" were the ability to do so rightly and well. As with his second definition, Meno has to be prompted again by Socrates to make a reference to justice and the other virtues in his definition (78c5-d3).¹⁸ By referencing the virtues Meno has defined virtue in terms of its parts (e.g. identifying the genus virtue in terms of the species of virtue). However, Socrates reminds him that they cannot have knowledge of the parts of virtue without knowing virtue itself, i.e., the form of virtue (79c).

Meno is not beyond moral reform, but his derivative definitions of virtue do indicate that he is in need of the intellectual perspective modeled by Socrates' analogies.¹⁹ He needs to be shown how to think about virtue for himself. The geometrical problem / virtue analogy is a good model for getting Meno to think about virtue because it emphasizes important spatial and structural relations between virtue and the slave-boy's geometrical problem. The perception of logical relationships is uppermost in the process of the slave-boy recollecting how to double the square. Although the slave-boy's geometrical problem is a case of empirical discovery, Socrates drawing the square in the sand merely functions as a visual cue for the slave (82b9-e3). He is not basing his argument

¹⁸ Meno's definitions should be read in the context of Socrates' comments about Meno's tyrannical behavior (76a8-c3). According to Xenophon's *Anabasis* (2.6.21-9), Meno turned out to be a very unscrupulous person.

¹⁹ I disagree with Scott's (n14, 60-62) claim that Meno is intellectually lazy. Meno seems to be quite capable, but he is in need of moral guidance.

on the visible lines he has drawn for the slave-boy; rather Socrates' argument is based on what the visible lines represent.²⁰ Consequently, the knowledge the slave-boy exhibits while recollecting is not contingent knowledge.

Paralleling the empirical process needed by the slave-boy to recollect, Meno's initial definition of virtue is inadequate precisely because he cites particular instances of conventional human functions (for various classes of people) and has virtue be excellence at these functions. Socrates is not interested in particular instances of virtue; rather he wants Meno to define virtue in terms of that which unites all particular instances of virtue. The insight gained by Meno witnessing the slave-boy recollecting is designed to help him see that the logical structure of virtue is such that when it is correctly defined its definition will be as self-evidently correct as the slave-boy's initial answers were shown to be self-evidently incorrect. The slave-boy recollecting also shows Meno that he has to take an active role in the process of discovering what virtue is and to genuinely assimilate what is to be known about virtue. Having the ability to add two natural numbers together provided the slave-boy with the initial notions that made it possible for him to double the square. Likewise, Socrates helps Meno to see that the process of turning his initial definition of virtue into understanding requires that he assimilate what is to be known about virtue. He must build upon his three attempts to define virtue. Additionally, as Socrates underscores in proposing the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge, a correct definition of virtue has practical consequences insofar as the soul led by understanding rules, desires things, and acquires things beneficially (87c4-89a1). In other words, to recollect is to gain insight because virtue is a property of the intellect. What alone can make Meno go wrong is ignorance. The virtue / geometrical problem analogy is crucial in getting Meno to straighten out his views. Thus, helping him achieve the good for which he ought to aim.

Conclusion

The principle / operative distinction is an insightful and unique way of accounting for the type of questions on display in Plato's dialogues. However, the distinction is only half the story. I have argued that the principle / operative distinction is really about conflating two types of problems within Socratic questioning: well-structured problems and ill-structured problems. Although such problems may seem to compromise the integrity of Socratic questioning, I have shown that the purpose of conflating the two types of problems is to model an intellectual perspective that seeks to instill intellectual discipline in the interlocutor, insofar as he is brought to see the importance of logical relationships, and to combat the interlocutor's skepticism. I have also emphasized the methodological diversity in play within the dialogues. The reader of the Socratic dialogues should not only be aware of the fact that Socrates seeks to alter the intellectual perspective of the interlocutor on the topic explored, the reader should also appreciate how Socrates' efficient style of argumentation renders very little in the dialogues as superfluous. Socrates' use of analogies is a good illustration of such efficiency.

²⁰ On the geometer's interest in the square itself see the *Republic* (510c-e).

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Ὁ ὅρος μύστης στήν προχριστιανική του χρήση

Περίληψη: Εἰς τὴν παρούσαν ἐργασίαν ἐκτίθενται ἐνδεικτικὰ χωρία τοῦ ὅρου **μύστης**, ἔτσι ὅπως εἶχε διαμορφωθεῖ ἡ χρήση του καὶ οἱ σημασιολογικὲς ἀποχρώσεις ποὺ λαμβάνει σὲ χωρία ἀρχαίων συγγραφέων. Παρουσιάζονται ἑξὶ χωρία, τὰ ὁποῖα ἀποδεικνύουν ὅτι ὁ μύστης ἦταν μέτοχος καὶ πλήρες μέλος τῶν μυστηριακῶν λατρειῶν, ὄχι μόνο τῶν Μυστηρίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὀργίων. Κάθε χωρίο ἀκολουθεῖται ἀπὸ μετάφραση σὲ μία ἀπὸ τὶς σύγχρονες γλῶσσες. Ἀπὸ τὸ χωρίο τοῦ Ἀριστοφάνη προκύπτει ὅτι ὁ ὅρος ἀρχικὰ εἶχε διατυπωθεῖ ὡς ἐπίθετο καὶ ὄχι ὡς οὐσιαστικό. Ὡς τέτοιο μέρος τοῦ λόγου, λειτουργεῖ καὶ ὡς προσωνυμία (ἐπωνυμία) τῶν ἀρχαίων θεοτήτων. Παρ' ὅλο πὺν ἡ σημασιολογία του δείχνει νοηματικὴ διαφάνεια, ἡ ἐτυμολογία τοῦ ὅρου παραμένει ἀνεπαρκῶς προσδιορισμένη. Στὰ ἐτυμολογικὰ λεξικά δὲν ἀποτελεῖ ξεχωριστὸ λῆμμα, ἀλλὰ συγκαταλέγεται στὰ ὀνοματικά παράγωγα τοῦ ρήματος μύω.

Λέξεις κλειδιά: μύστης, ὅρος, σημασιολογία, ἀπόδοση, τεχνικὸς ὅρος.

Οἱ μύστες στήν ἀρχαιότητα, ὡς γνωστόν, ἀποτελοῦσαν μέλη ἀρχαίων μυστηριακῶν λατρειῶν, τῶν μυστηρίων, δηλαδή, καὶ τῶν ὀργίων. Ὁ μύστης ἦταν ἄτομο τὸ ὁποῖο συμμετεῖχε στὶς λατρεῖες αὐτές καί, μαζί με τοὺς ἐπόπτες ἀποτελοῦσε πλήρες μέλος τῆς λατρείας, ἐφ' ὅσον προηγουμένως εἶχε μνηθεῖ στὰ μυστήρια, περνώντας ἀπὸ τὴν τελετὴ τῆς μνήσεως. Τηρουμένων τῶν ἀναλογιῶν, καὶ αὐτὸ λόγῳ συσχετισμοῦ καὶ παραλληλισμοῦ σὲ διαχρονικὸ ἐπίπεδο τῆς «λειτουργίας» τοῦ ὅρου, ἡ τελετὴ αὐτὴ τῆς μνήσεως ἀντιστοιχεῖ μετὰ Ἁγία Μυστήρια τῆς Βαπτίσεως καὶ τοῦ Χρίσματος στήν χριστιανικὴ λατεία.

Ὁ ὅρος αὐτός, ἐνῶ εἶναι γνωστός ἀπὸ τὰ κείμενα τῶν Ἀρχαίων, στήν Καινὴ Διαθήκη δὲν χρησιμοποιεῖται ἀπὸ τοὺς Ἀποστόλους. Βρίσκεται, ὅμως, καὶ μάλιστα τακτικά, στὰ κείμενα τῶν Πατέρων τῆς Ἐκκλησίας. Σὲ αὐτὴν τὴν μικρὴ μας μελέτη τοῦ ὅρου μύστης θὰ περιοριστοῦμε στήν παρουσίαση τῶν ἑξὶ ἐνδεικτικῶν χωρίων ἀπὸ τὰ ἔργα συγγραφέων τῆς προχριστιανικῆς ἐποχῆς ἑλληνικῆς λογογραφίας. Θὰ παραθέσουμε λόγῳ σύγκρισης καὶ ἐρμηνείας προσιτὲς σὲ μᾶς μεταφράσεις τῶν χωρίων αὐτῶν σὲ κάποιες εὐρωπαϊκὲς γλῶσσες, στήν Ἀγγλικὴ καὶ στὴ Γαλλικὴ κυρίως, ὅλα μέ σκοπὸ τὴ συζήτηση τῆς χρήσης του, τῆς σημασιολογίας του καὶ τῆς μετέπειτα συγκαταλογῆς του σὲ τεχνικοὺς ὅρους.

Ὁ ὅρος μύστης στὶς ἀρχαῖες γραπτὲς πηγὲς γιὰ πρώτη φορὰ ἐμφανίζεται σὲ ἓνα ἀπόσπασμα τοῦ Ἡράκλειτου. Ἡ πιὸ παλαιὰ, ἐπομένως, γραπτὴ του μαρτυρία χρονολογεῖται στὸν ΣΤ' αἰῶνα πρὸ Χριστοῦ. Ὡς ἐκ τούτου, δὲν ἀπαντᾷ στὸν Ὅμηρο, πρώτη φορὰ μνημονευόμενος στήν ἰωνικὴ πεζογραφία.

1. Ο Κλήμης ὁ Ἀλεξανδρινός, προσήλυτος χριστιανὸς ἀπὸ τον Β'-Γ' αἰῶνα, ὅταν στὸ ἔργο του «Προτρεπτικὸς λόγος πρὸς Ἑλλήνας» ἐνθαρρύνει τὸν πληθυσμὸ τῆς Ἀρχαίας Ἑλλάδας νὰ παρατήσῃ τὶς μυστηριακὲς λατρεῖες, ταυτόχρονα προτρέποντάς τους νὰ δεχτοῦν τὴν καινούριαν πίστην, ἀναφέρει καὶ τὰ λόγια τοῦ Ἡράκλειτου. Ὁ Ἡράκλειτος, ἀπὸ τὴν πλευρὰ του, ἀπειλεῖ καὶ «μαντεύεται τὸ πῦρ» σὲ ὅλους ὅσοι συμμετέχουν στὶς τελετὲς μυσήσεως εἰς τὰ μυστήρια, διότι αὐτὲς ἐναντιῶνονται, ἔρχονται σὲ κρούση μὲ ὅσα εἶναι ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια, Ἡρακλ. Ἀπόσπασμα 14 (Ἀλεξ. Κλήμ. *Προτρ.* Β' 22.2.):

τίσι δὴ μαντεύεται Ἡ. ὁ Ἐφέσιος; νυκτιπόλοις, μάγοις, βάκχοις, λήναις, **μύσταις**· τούτοις ἀπειλεῖ τὰ μετὰ θάνατον, τούτοις μαντεύεται τὸ πῦρ· τὰ γὰρ νομιζόμενα κατ' ἀνθρώπους μυστήρια ἀνιερωστὶ μυεῦνται.

Μετάφραση στὴν Ἀγγλικὴ ἔχει ὡς ἐξῆς:

And in truth against these Heraclitus the Ephesian prophesies, as “the night-walkers, the magi, the bacchanals, the Lenæan revellers, **the initiated**.” These he threatens with what will follow death, and predicts for them fire. For what are regarded among men as mysteries, they celebrate sacrilegiously. (Schaff et alii, 1885)

Στὴ μετάφραση στὴ σερβοκροατικὴ γλῶσσα τοῦ Sironić, ἡ ἀπόδοση τοῦ ὅρου, εἶναι **mist** (Sironić 1983, 150). Συγκρίνοντας τὶς παρατιθέμενες μεταφράσεις παρατηρεῖται πὼς ὁ ὅρος μας ἀντιμετωπίζεται διαφορετικὰ, ἂν καὶ πλήρως καὶ μὲ ἀκρίβεια ἔχει ἀποδοθεῖ τὸ σημασιολογικὸ του φορτίο καὶ στὶς δύο γλῶσσες. Στὴν Ἀγγλικὴ γιὰ τὸν ὅρο μας ἀντιστοιχεῖ ἡ λέξη the initiate, ἡ ὁποία ἀποτελεῖ σωστὴ, πλήρη καὶ ἱκανὴ ἀπόδοση τοῦ ὅρου μέσα ἀπὸ τὸ ἀγγλικὸ λεξιλόγιο. Ἐδῶ πρόκειται γιὰ μιὰ ὡς πρὸς τὴν προέλευσὴ τῆς λατινικῆς λέξης, ἄρα ξένη καὶ δανεισμὸ γιὰ τὸν ἀγγλικὸ χῶρο.¹ Ἐφ' ὅσον πρόκειται γιὰ μιὰ λέξη ἡ ὁποία σχετικὰ ἀργὰ εἰσῆλθε στὴν Ἀγγλικήν, μιλάμε γιὰ τὸν ΙΖ' αἰῶνα, θὰ μπορούσε κάποιος νὰ ἀναρωτηθεῖ, ἐὰν τὸ χωρίο αὐτὸ ἤθελε νὰ μεταφράσῃ στὰ ἀγγλικά ἕνας μεταφραστὴς τοῦ ΙΣΤ' ἢ τοῦ ΙΕ' αἰῶνα, ἐν πάσῃ περιπτώσει ἐὰν ἐπρόκειτο νὰ γίνῃ ἡ μετάφραση πρὶν τὸν ΙΖ' αἰῶνα, μὲ ποιά λέξη θὰ ἀποδίδονταν ὁ ὅρος μας. Τὸ ζήτημα αὐτὸ γιὰ μᾶς ἀποτελεῖ ἀπορρία· μετάφραση πρὸ παλαιὰ ἀπὸ αὐτὴν τοῦ ΙΘ' αἰῶνα τοῦ Schaff καὶ τῶν συνεργατῶν τοῦ δὲν βρήκαμε καὶ δὲν γνωρίζουμε ἐὰν ὑπῆρχε.

Ἄλλο πόρισμα ποὺ προκύπτει λέγει ὅτι, ἐφ' ὅσον τὸ ἀγγλικὸ ἢ καὶ ἀγγλοσαξονικὸ λεξιλόγιο δὲν διέθεταν ἀντοίστοιχη, ἀνάλογη λέξη γιὰ τὸν ὅρο μας, σημαίνει ὅτι τέτοια ἔννοια δὲν εἶχε πραγματοποιηθεῖ στὸ δικὸ τους κοινωνικὸ-πολιτιστικὸ πλαίσιο. Στὸ τέλος, νὰ προσθέσουμε ὅτι στὴν Ἀγγλικὴ ὁ ὅρος μύστης ἐν γένει ἀποδίδεται μὲ τὴ λέξη the initiate.

Ἡ τελευταῖα παρατήρηση ἰσχύει καὶ γιὰ τὴν ἀπόδοση τοῦ ὅρου ἀπὸ τὸν Sironić. Τὸ κοινωνικὸ-πολιτιστικὸ πλαίσιο τῶν Σλάβων, μάλιστα τὸ θρησκευτικὸ, ἐπίσης φαίνεται νὰ μὴν εἶχε αὐτὴν τὴν ἔννοια τοῦ μύστη ὡς πλήρους μέλους λατρείας, ὁ ὁποῖος ἔπρεπε νὰ πληροῖ κάποιες προϋποθέσεις γιὰ αὐτὴν τὴν θέση. Οἱ λατρεῖες, σαφῶς, ὑπῆρχαν στοὺς Σλάβους, ὅπως καὶ στοὺς Ἀγγλους. Οἱ μυστηριακὲς λατρεῖες, ὅμως, διακρίνουν μόνον τὸν ἐλληνικὸ πολιτιστικὸ-θρησκευτικὸ χῶρο. Στὴ μετάφραση τοῦ Sironić, γιὰ τὴν ἐρμηνεία τοῦ ὅρου τὸ ἴδιο χρησιμοποιοῦνται ἐπίσης μιὰ δάνεια λέξη, ἐδῶ ὅμως ἀπὸ τὴ μητρικὴ γλῶσσα τοῦ ὅρου, δηλαδὴ ὁ ἴδιος ὅρος, ἀπλᾶ προσαρμοσμένος, mist, καὶ ὅχι ὁ ἀντίστοιχος λατινισμὸς. Αὐτὸ μᾶλλον θὰ ὀφείλεται στὶς πρὸ στενὲς πολιτιστι-

¹ Ὁ δανεισμὸς αὐτὸς εἰς τὴν Ἀγγλικὴν χρονολογεῖται στὸν ΙΖ' αἰῶνα, σύμφωνα μὲ τὸ Λεξικὸ τοῦ Collins. Ἡ λέξη προέρχεται ἀπὸ τὸ ῥῆμα initiāre, τὸ παράγωγο τοῦ οὐσιαστικοῦ initium «ἀρχή» (Collins ²1988, s.v.). Ἀπο τὴν ἴδια λεξικὴ βάση σχηματίστηκε καὶ τὸ οὐσιαστικὸ δηλωτικὸ σχετικῆς πράξεως initiation «μύησης».

κές ἐπιρρόες τοῦ ἑλληνικοῦ στοιχείου στὸ σλαβικό, πάρ' ὅλο πού δὲν ἰσχύει ἐν γένει.² Ἄρα, παρ' ὅλο πού καὶ στίς δύο μεταφράσεις ἔχουμε νὰ κάνουμε μὲ δάνειες λέξεις – καὶ νὰ ἐπαναλάβουμε ὅτι αὐτὸ ὀφείλεται στὸ ὅτι ἡ ἰδέα τοῦ μύστη ἦταν καὶ παρέμεινε μόνο ἑλληνική, μιὰ ἰδέα ἡ ὁποία γιὰ τὸ ἴδιο ἑλληνικό λεξιλόγιο ἀπὸ τὴν πλευρὰ τῆς προέλευσής της παραμένει ἀδιάφανη, ἔφ' ὅσον ἡ ἐτυμολογία της ἀκόμη δὲν ἔχει ἐρμηνευτεῖ – στὴν ἀγγλικὴ μετάφραση ἡ δάνεια λέξη, the initiate, εἶναι παρμένη ἀπὸ τὸν γιὰ τὸν ἀγγλοσαξονικό κόσμο κυρίαρχο πολιτισμό, τὸν ρωμαϊκό, ἐνῶ στὴ μετάφραση τοῦ Sironiῆ ἡ δάνεια λέξη, mist, πάρθηκε ἀπὸ τὸν γιὰ τοὺς Σλάβους κυρίαρχο πολιτισμό, τὸν ἑλληνικό. Ἔτσι προκύπτει ὅτι ἡ μετάφραση στὴν Ἀγγλικὴ εἶναι σημασιολογικὰ ἀποτελεσματική, ἐνῶ στὴν ἄλλη, σὲ τελικὴ ἀνάλυση, ὁ ὅρος μας μένει ἀμετάφραστος. Ὅποτε, ἐκεῖνος πού θέλει νὰ καταλάβει τί σημαίνει αὐτὸς ὁ ὅρος, πρέπει νὰ ἐξοικειωθεῖ μὲ τὴ γνήσια του σημασία στὸν ἑλληνικό θρησκευτικό χῶρο, μέσα ἀπὸ τὰ σχετικὰ βιβλία καὶ λεξικά.

Λίγα λόγια γιὰ τοὺς μύστες, ὅπως μᾶς τοὺς παρουσιάζει ὁ Ἡράκλειτος. Στὸ χωρίο αὐτὸ σαφῶς φαίνεται πόσο ἀπωθητικοὶ φαντάζουν στὸν φιλόσοφο οἱ μύστες. Τὴν ἴδια γνώμη ἔχει καὶ γιὰ τοὺς, ὅπως τοὺς ἀπαριθμεῖ, νυκτιπόλους, μάγους, βάκχους καὶ γυναικες «λήνας». Πάρ' ὅλο πού δὲν διακρίνεται μὲ σαφήνεια σὲ ποιά ἀπ' ὅλες τὶς μυστηριακές λατρεῖες ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἀναφέρεται, ἀπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀδιαφάνεια, ὁμως, προκύπτει ὅτι ὁ ὅρος μύστης ἦταν δηλωτικός τοῦ μέλους κάθε λατρείας αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἵδους.³ Σήμαινε, δηλαδή, γενικὰ καὶ πάντα, τὸν μεμνημένον, τὸν μυηθέντα, τὸν ἄνθρωπο φορέα καὶ ἀναπόσπαστο μέρος τῆς λατρείας.

Στὸ τέλος, πρέπει νὰ ἐπισημάνουμε ὅτι ἡ ἐπίκριση, μάλλον ἢ κατάκριση τοῦ Ἡράκλειτου ἀναφέρεται στὸν ἀνέρο τρόπο μὲ τὸν ὁποῖον τελοῦνται οἱ μῆσεις στὰ Μυστήρια, γιὰ τὰ ὁποῖα ὑπονοεῖται ὅτι ἀποτελοῦν «τὸ ἱερόν τε ὅσιον». Ἐφ' ὅσον οἱ τελετὲς τῶν μῆσεων ἐκτελοῦνται «ἀνιερωσί», ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἀκράδαντα διαφωνεῖ.

Αὐτὸ τὸ χωρίο, ἐπίσης, ὡς γραπτὴ πηγὴ ἑλληνικῶν ἰδεῶν καὶ ὅρων εἶναι ἐξίσου πολὺτιμο καὶ ἀπὸ μιὰ ἄλλη ὄψη: μέσα σὲ μιὰ μικρὴ παράγραφο φυλάσσονται οὔτε λίγο οὔτε πολὺ τρία κύρια λήμματα ἀπὸ τὸν χῶρο τῆς θρησκείας, καὶ μάλιστα σὰν τὰ παλαιότερα μνημεῖα τους. Πρόκειται γιὰ τοὺς ὅρους «μυστήρια», «μύστης» καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα «μυέομαι», ῥῆμα τὸ ὁποῖο σώζεται σὲ ἰωνικὴ διάλεκτο. Ἕνας ἀπ' αὐτοὺς εἶναι, ὡς γνωστόν, καὶ διεθνῶς πασίγνωστο δάνειο καὶ τεχνικός ὅρος σὲ ὅλες τὶς εὐρωπαϊκὲς γλώσσες, Μυστήρια: ἀγγλικά Mysteries, γαλλικά Mystères, γερμανικά Mysterien κ.ἄ.

2. Στὸν *Ἡρακλῆ μαινόμενο*, ἔργο τοῦ Εὐριπίδη, ἐπίσης τεκμηριώνεται ἡ χρῆση τοῦ ὅρου μας, ἐδῶ σὲ μυστηριακὲς λατρεῖες ἄλλου τύπου. Πρόκειται γιὰ τὰ μέλη τῶν ἀρχαίων ὀργίων. Ἡ πλοκὴ μέχρι τὸ σχετικὸ στίχο ἔχει ὡς ἐξῆς: ὁ Ἡρακλῆς, ὕστερα ἀπὸ τὴν ἐπιστροφή του ἀπὸ τὸν κάτω κόσμος, ὅπου εἶχε διαμείνει κάποιον χρονικὸ διάστημα μὲ τὸν Ἄδη καὶ τὴ βίαια κεκτημένη νέα σύζυγό του Περσεφόνη, ὅταν ἐρωτήθηκε ἀπὸ τὸν θετὸ πατέρα του τὸν Ἀμφιτρύωνα ἀν τὸν τρικέφαλο Κέρβερο τὸν εἶχε νικήσει ὁ ἴδιος μὲ τὶς δυνάμεις του ἢ τὸν ἔλαβε ὡς δῶρο ἀπὸ τὴ θεὰ Περσεφόνη, δίνοντας ἀπάντηση ὅτι ἀπὸ τὸν Κέρβερο ἀπέσπασε ἄξια καὶ τίμια τὴ νίκη στὴ μονομαχία τους, θὰ προσθέσει καὶ τὴν προσωπικὴ τοῦ ἐρμηνεία αὐτῆς τῆς εὐνοϊκῆς γιὰ τὸν ἴδιον ἔκβασης, *Ἐυριπ. Ἡρακλ.Μαιν.* 613:

² Παραδείγματος χάριν, καὶ ἐννοιολογικὰ πλησίον, στὴ Σερβικὴ ὁ ὅρος «μύστης» δὲν δανεῖζεται ἀπὸ τὴν Ἑλληνικήν. Τὸν ἀποδίδει λατινικὸς δανεισμός, initiation.

³ Ἐφ' ὅσον, ὁμως, στὴν ἴδια κατηγορία τοποθετεῖ βάκχους καὶ λήνας (παρατηρεῖται πὺς δὲν ἀναφέρει τὸ συνώνυμό τους «μαινάδες»), ἐδῶ μάλλον γίνεται λόγος γιὰ τὰ Διονυσιακὰ Μυστήρια, τὰ ὁποῖα ἐνδεχομένως νὰ ὑπονοοῦσαν καὶ κάποια ὀργαστικὰ στοιχεῖα, παρὰ γιὰ τὰ Ἐλευσῖνια.

τὰ μυστῶν δ' ὄργι' εὐτύχησ' ἰδών.

Μετάφραση στὴ Γαλλικὴ ἔχει ὡς ἐξῆς:

... le destin m'a été favorable parce que j'ai vu les rites **des initiés** aux mystères. (Berguin, 1966)

Μετάφραση στὴν Ἀγγλικὴ ἔχει ὡς ἐξῆς:

I was blessed because **I was initiated** into the Eleusinian mysteries (before I went down to Hades) (Theodoridis, 2012)

Οἱ μεταφράσεις στὴν Ἀγγλικὴ καὶ στὴ Γαλλικὴ ἐπιβεβαιώνουν τὴν παραπάνω παρατήρηση πὼς ὁ ὅρος μας στὶς εὐρωπαϊκὲς γλώσσες ὁμόφωνα ἀποδίδεται μὲ δάνειες λέξεις ἀπὸ τὴ Λατινικὴ. Παρατηρεῖται, ὅμως, διαφορετικὴ ἀπόδοση τοῦ περιεχόμενου ὁλόκληρης τῆς παρατιθέμενης πρότασης, δηλαδὴ τῆς ἀπάντησης τοῦ Ἑρακλῆ πρὸς τὸν θεοὶ πατέρα του. Ἐνῶ, ἀπὸ τὴ μία πλευρὰ, στὴ Γαλλικὴ ἔχουμε τὴν ἐπακριβῆ καὶ πλήρη ἀπόδοση τῆς ἀπάντησης τοῦ Ἑρακλῆ, ὁ ὁποῖος λέγει πὼς ἦταν τυχερὸς ἐπειδὴ προτοῦ νὰ κατεβῇ στὸν Ἄδη εἶχε δεῖ τὴ λατρεία, τὰ ὄργια τῶν μυστῶν, «**j'ai vu les rites des initiés**», στὴν ἀγγλικὴ μετάφραση, ἀπὸ τὴν ἄλλη, λέγεται πὼς ὁ Ἑρακλῆς θεωρεῖ τὸν ἑαυτό του εὐλογημένο ἐπειδὴ προηγουμένως εἶχε μνηθεῖ τὰ ὄργια, «**I was initiated**». Δὲν ὑπάρχει ἀμφιβολία ὅτι ὁ Ἑρακλῆς μὲ κάποιο τρόπο συμμετεῖχε στὰ ὄργια, ὅπως τὸ ὑποδεικνύει καὶ ὁ στίχος μας. Τὸ λιγότερο, ἦταν παρὼν στὴν ἐκτέλεσή τους, ἐπειδὴ τὰ εἶδε, «ἰδών». Ὅμως, τὸ νόημα τῆς συμμετοχῆς ἢ μνησεως στὰ ὄργια δὲν βγαίνει, τοῦλάχιστον ὄχι ἄμεσα, ἀπὸ τὴν ἀπάντηση τοῦ Ἑρακλῆ. Ὅποτε, στὴν ἀπόδοση στὴν Ἀγγλικὴ πρόκειται γιὰ ἐλεύθερη μετάφραση.

Ὁ ὅρος μας σὲ αὐτὸν τὸν στίχο τοῦ Εὐριπίδη βρίσκεται στὴ γενικὴ πτώση τοῦ πληθυντικοῦ καὶ λειτουργεῖ ὡς προσδιοριστικὸ στοιχεῖο. Σὲ αὐτὸν τὸν γραμματικὸ τύπο δηλώνει τὴν ἔντονη κτητικότητα ἀπὸ τὴν πλευρὰ τῶν μυστῶν ὡς πρὸς τὰ ὄργια, καὶ σὲ ἀντιδιαστολὴ μὲ τὴν πιὸ γενικευμένη φράση «μυστικὰ ὄργια», ὅπου σημασιολογικὰ τονίζεται περισσότερο ἢ ἔννοια τῶν ὀργίων. Στὴν παρατιθέμενη πρόταση ὁ τόνος βρίσκεται στους φορεῖς τῶν ὀργίων· οἱ μύστες εἶναι αὐτοὶ στοὺς ὁποίους ἀνήκει ἡ λατρεία αὐτῇ, «τὰ μυστῶν ὄργια». Ἡ κοινὴ φράση «μυστικὰ ὄργια» ἐξάλλου δὲν ἀναφέρεται συγκεκριμένα στοὺς μύστες, οὔτε ὑποδεικνύει κάτι ποὺ θα συνδέονταν πιὸ στενὰ μὲ τοὺς ἴδιους.

3. Μὲ ἐτερόπρωτο ὀνοματικὸ προσδιορισμὸ σὲ Γενικὴ πτώση ἀπαντᾶται ὁ ὅρος μύστης σὲ μία ἀποσπασματικὰ σφζόμενη τραγωδία τοῦ Ἑυριπίδη, *Ἀποσπ.* 475.10:

ἀγνὸν δὲ βίον τείνων ἐξ οὗ
Διὸς Ἰδαίου **μύστης** γενόμεν,

...

βάκχος ἐκλήθην ὀσιωθεῖς.

Σὲ αὐτοὺς τοὺς στίχους σώζεται ἡ φράση «Διὸς Ἰδαίου μύστης», ἀπὸ τὴν ὁποία μαρτυρεῖται πὼς εἶχε διατυπωθεῖ ὁ ἐννοιολογικὸς συνδυασμὸς, ὁ ὁποῖος δήλωνε τὸ ποιανοῦ μύστης ἦταν ὁ τάδε ἄνθρωπος· τὸ σὲ ποιὸν θεοῦ, ὀνόματι, ἀνήκε τὸ συγκεκριμένο ἄτομο, τῆς λατρείας εἰς ποιὸν θεοῦ ἦταν μέτοχος.

4. Ὡς ἓνα βῆμα παραπάνω στὴν ἀνάπτυξη αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐννοιολογικοῦ συνδυασμοῦ, χωρὶς νὰ μπορούμε νὰ ποῦμε μὲ βεβαιότητα ποῖο προηγήθηκε, ὁ ὅρος μας ἀποτελεῖ ἐπωνυμία τῶν θεῶν.

Ὁ Πανυσανίας, ὅταν περιγράφει τὰ ἀρχαῖα μνημεῖα, ναοὺς, μαντεῖα καὶ τεμένη, τὰ ὁποῖα βρίσκονταν στὸ μεγάλο δρόμο ὁ ὁποῖος ὀδηγοῦσε ἀπὸ τὴν Ἀρχαία Τεγέα τῆς Ἀρ-

καδίας πρὸς τὸ Ἄργος, μεταξὺ τῶν ἄλλων ἀφηγεῖται πὺς κοντὰ στὸ ναὸ τῆς θεᾶς Δήμη-
τρας βρισκόταν τὸ μαντεῖο τοῦ Διόνυσου τοῦ Μύστου, Η΄54.5:

...πλησίον δὲ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἱερὸν **Διονύσου Μύστου**.

«...καὶ ἐκεῖ κοντὰ ὑπάρχει ἓνας ἄλλος ναὸς τοῦ Διόνυσου τοῦ Μύστη»

Ἀπὸ αὐτὸν τὸν στίχο φαίνεται πὺς ὁ ὅρος μας λειτούργησε ὡς προσωνυμία. Ὅταν ση-
μειώνει αὐτὴν τὴ λειτουργία (function), γράφεται μὲ κεφαλαῖο γράμμα. Στὴν οὐσία,
λειτουργεῖ ὡς ἐπίθετο.

5. Ὁ Διόνυσος δὲν ἦταν ὁ μόνος θεός, ὁ ὁποῖος εἶχε τὴν προσωνυμία ἢ ὅποια ἐκφράζο-
νταν μὲ τὸν ὄρο μύστης. Ὁ Ἀρτεμίδωρος ὁ Ἐφέσιος, ὀνειρομάντης καὶ χειρομάντης, ὁ
ὁποῖος πρόσθεσε στὸ ὄνομά του τὸ ἐπίθετο Δαλδιαῖος, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔκανε λόγῳ τοῦ ὅτι
ἢ μητέρα του κατάγονταν ἀπὸ τὴν πόλιν τῆς Δάλδης Λυδίας, ὅπου ἀπὸ τὴν ἄλλη πλευ-
ρὰ βρισκόταν ὁ ναὸς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος. Στὸ ἔργο του Ονειροκριτικὸν ἐπίσης προσδίδει τὸ
ἴδιο ἐπίθετο στὴν θεότητα, Β΄70.158:

τὸν Δαλδιαῖον **Ἀπόλλωνα**, ὃν **Μύστην** καλοῦμεν.

«τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα τὸν Δαλδιαῖον, τὸν ὁποῖον ὀνομάζουμε Μύστη»

6. Τὸ τελευταῖο χωρίο, τὸ ὁποῖο παρουσιάζουμε βρίσκεται στοὺς Βατράχους τοῦ Ἀριστο-
φάνη. Ἡ πλοκὴ ἐδῶ, μεταξὺ τῶν ἄλλων, μιλάει γιὰ τοὺς συμμετέχοντες στὰ Μυστήρια.
Ὁ χορός, ὁ ὁποῖος ἀποτελεῖται ἀπὸ βάτραχους, ἀποτρέπει τὴ συμμετοχὴ στὴ λατρεία, στὸ
χορὸ καὶ στὰ ἄσματα ἀφιερωμένα εἰς δόξαν καὶ ἔπαινο τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ κρασιοῦ, σὲ ὅσους
ἀποδείχτηκαν ἀνήθικοι ἢ μὲ κάποιον τρόπο ἔχουν προσβάλει τὴν θεότητα, Βάτρ. 370:

Τούτοις αὐδῶ καὺθις ἐπαυδῶ καὺθις τὸ τρίτον μάλ’ ἐπαυδῶ

ἐξίστασθαι **μύσταισι χοροῖς**· ὑμεῖς δ’ ἀνεγείρετε μολπὴν

καὶ παννυχίδας τὰς ἡμετέρας αἱ τῇδε πρέπουσιν ἐορτῇ.

Μετάφραση στὴ Νεοελληνικὴ ἔχει ὡς ἐξῆς (ἄνευ στοιχείων μεταφραστοῦ⁴):

Τούτους και μια και ξανά και τρεις το κηρύττω απ’ **τους χορούς των Μυστηρίων** μακριά.

Και σεις το τραγοῦδι αρχίστε, μην παύετε και τους χορούς τους ολονύκτιους στη γιορτὴ μας
που πρέπουν.

Μετάφραση στὴν Ἀγγλικὴ ἔχει ὡς ἐξῆς:

To all you people I say and say again and for a third time I say: Stand well away from **the
dances of the Initiates!**

Chorus: (*To the Initiates*)

Come now, you Initiates, raises your voices and lift your feet, dance a dance that fits the
occasion! It’s a night-long festival! (Theodoridis 2008)

Μετάφραση στὴ Γαλλικὴ ἔχει ὡς ἐξῆς:

à tous ceux-là je dis, je redis, je répète et redis encore pour la troisième fois, de céder la place
à nos **chœurs mystiques** ! Et vous, élevez la voix et chantez nos hymnes nocturnes en usage
pour cette fête ! (Talbot, 1897)

Τὸ πρῶτο πράγμα ποὺ χρῆζει παρατηρήσεως ἐδῶ, κατὰ τὴ γνώμη μας, εἶναι τὸ ὅτι ἡ φράση,
στὴν ὁποία βρίσκεται ὁ ὅρος μας, «μύσταισι χοροῖς», στίς παρατιθέμενες μεταφράσεις σὲ
τρεῖς σύγχρονες γλώσσες, ἔχει ἀποδοθεῖ μὲ τρεῖς διαφορετικοὺς τρόπους. Στὴ Νεοελληνι-
κὴ ἡ φράση ἐρμηνεύτηκε ὡς «χοροὶ τῶν Μυστηρίων», δηλαδὴ χοροὶ τῆς μυστηριακῆς λα-
τρείας, μυστηριακοὶ χοροί. Στὴν Ἀγγλική, ἡ φράση ἐρμηνεύτηκε ὡς «χοροὶ τῶν μυστῶν»,
the dances of the Initiates. Στὴ Γαλλικὴ ὡς «χοροὶ μυστικοί», chœurs mystiques.

⁴ Ἡ μετάφραση αὐτὴ διατίθεται στὴν ἠλεκτρονικὴ ἴστοσελίδα: www.24grammata.com (20-04-2015).

Ἡ Δοτική πτώση τῆς φράσης «μύστασι χοροῖς», με παλαιά διαλεκτική κατάληξη -σι⁵, στην Ὀνομαστική ἀποβαίνει «μύσται χοροί». Σὲ αὐτὴν τὴ συνεκφορά, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ λέξη «χορός» ἀποτελεῖ τὸ οὐσιαστικό, ὁ ὄρος μας συνεπῶς λειτουργεῖ ὡς ἐπίθετο. Ἀπὸ τὴ φιλολογικῆς ἀπόψεως, τὸ χωρίο αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐξαιρετικὰ σημαντικό, μᾶλλον ἀποκαλυπτικό, διότι σαφῶς φαίνεται ὅτι ὁ ὄρος εἶχε λειτουργία ἐπιθέτου ὡς μέρους τοῦ λόγου. Σήμαινε, δηλαδή, καὶ αὐτὸ μᾶλλον συσχετίζεται με τὸν πρῶμο, τὸν πρῶτο χαρακτήρα τῆς λέξης, τὴν ιδιότητα τοῦ μύστου ὡς προσωπικὸ του χαρακτηριστικό, τὸ ὁποῖο διακρινόταν, ἦταν αἰσθητὰ παρὸν στὴ σημασία τῆς λέξης στὴν ἀρχαιότητα.⁶ Καὶ ὅταν λέμε ἀρχαιότητα, συμπεριλαμβάνεται ἐνδεχομένως καὶ ἡ περίοδος πρὶν ἀπὸ τὸν Ὅμηρο. Τέτοια παραδείγματα ὑπάρχουν στὸ ἐλληνικὸ λεξιλόγιο. Ἐνα ἐπίθετο, δηλαδή, με τὴν πάροδο τοῦ χρόνου νὰ «χάσει» τὸν χαρακτήρα τοῦ ἐπιθέτου καὶ νὰ ἐκλαμβάνεται ὡς οὐσιαστικό. Παραδείγματος χάριν, Ἀθηναῖος. Ἡ λέξη ἀρχικὰ διατυπώθηκε ὡς ἐπίθετο καὶ σήμαινε ἄνθρωπο ἀπὸ τὴν Ἀθήνα, τὸν Ἀθηναῖο. Ἐκ τῶν ὑστέρων ἔχει σχηματιστεῖ καὶ τὸ «σωστό», δηλαδή κτητικὸ ἐπίθετο, τὸ «ἀθηναϊκός», ὅπως τὸ «μυστικός». Αὐτὲς οἱ λέξεις, ἀπὸ τὴ στιγμή ποὺ διαμορφώθηκαν ἐμπεριέχουν τὸ μορφωτικὸ στοιχεῖο (ἀγγλ. *formant*) -ικ- καὶ εἶναι πάντοτε ἐπίθετα καὶ μόνο. Αὐτὴ ἡ ἄποψη γιὰ τὸν ὄρο μύστης θὰ μπορούσε νὰ ἰσχύει καὶ ὅταν αὐτὸς ὑποδηλώνει τὶς προσωινμίες, ἐπωνυμίες τῶν ἀρχαίων θεοτήτων, τοῦ Διόνυσου καὶ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνα, ὅπως τὶς ἀναλύσαμε παραπάνω. Οὐσιαστικά, ὅπως ἤδη ἀναφέραμε, ἐκεῖ ἐν πράξει πρόκειται γιὰ τὰ ἐπίθετα – Διόνυσος Μύστης, Ἀπόλλων Μύστης.

Ἄν ἐπιστρέψουμε στὶς μεταφράσεις τοῦ χωρίου μας, βάσει τῆς ἀνάλυσης ποὺ κάναμε, προκύπτει ὅτι μόνο ἡ ἀπόδοση στὴν Ἀγγλικὴ ἐρμηνεύει πιστὰ τὴν ἐλληνικὴ φράση, δηλαδή τὸ «the dances of the Initiates». Καὶ ἔτσι, διότι ἡ φράση μιλάει γιὰ τοὺς χοροὺς τοὺς ὁποίους τελοῦσαν οἱ ἴδιοι οἱ μύστες. Δὲν πρόκειται γιὰ ἐν γένει μυστικοὺς χοροὺς, ὅπως αὐτοὶ ἔχουν ἐρμηνευτεῖ στὴ γαλλικὴ μετάφραση, *chœurs mystiques*, οἱ ὁποῖοι ἐνδεχομένως νὰ διακρίνονταν ὡς ἰδιαίτεροι χορευτικοὶ τύποι· πολὺ λιγότερον δὲ ἡ φράση σημαίνει τοὺς χοροὺς τῶν Μυστηρίων, ὅπως τὸ προτείνει ἡ ἀπόδοση στὴ Νεοελληνικὴ. Στὸ τέλος, πρέπει νὰ ἐπισημάνουμε ὅτι τὸ Λεξικὸ τῶν Liddell/Scott ἀναφέρει μόνο αὐτὸ τὸ χωρίο στὸ ὁποῖο ὁ ὄρος μας ἀναμφισβήτητα λειτουργεῖ ὡς ἐπίθετο.

Νὰ προσθέσουμε ὅτι τὰ ἐτυμολογικὰ λεξικά τῶν Frisk (1954-1972), Chantraine (1968-1980) καὶ Beekes (2009) δὲν παρουσιάζουν αὐτὸν τὸν ὄρο ὡς ξεχωριστὸ λήμμα. Τὸν παρουσιάζουν ὅλοι *s.v.* μύω.

Τὰ συμπεράσματα, τὰ ὁποῖα προκύπτουν ἀπὸ αὐτὴν τὴ μελέτη τοῦ ὄρου μύστης, ἐπιβεβαιώνουν ὅτι, σύμφωνα με τὴ διάφανη σημασιολογία τοῦ ὄρου, ὁ μύστης ἦταν μέτοχος καὶ πλήρης μέλος τῶν μυστηριακῶν λατρειῶν – τῶν Μυστηρίων καὶ τῶν ὀργίων. Ἀπὸ τὸ χωρίο τοῦ Ἀριστοφάνη ἐνδέχεται κανεὶς νὰ συμπεράνει ὅτι ὁ ὄρος ἀρχικὰ εἶχε διατυπωθεῖ μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπίθετο καὶ ὄχι ὡς οὐσιαστικό· ἐπίθετο τὸ ὁποῖο μετὰ τὸ σημασιολογικὸ του φορτίο κατὰ πᾶσα πιθανότητα δῆλωνε κάποιο ἐντονο προσωπικὸ χαρακτηριστικό, τὸ ὁποῖο μετὰ τὴν πάροδο τοῦ χρόνου κατέληξε νὰ εἶναι ἡ ὀνοματικὴ ἀπόδοση τῆς ἔννοιας «μύστης», ἐφ' ὅσον αὐτὴ γίνεται ἀντιληπτὴ ὡς οὐσιαστικό. Ὡς ἐπίθετο, ὁ ὄρος μύστης λειτουργεῖ καὶ ὡς προσωινμία (ἐπωνυμία) τῶν ἀρχαίων θεοτήτων. Παρ' ὅλη τὴ

⁵ Ὡς πρὸς τὴν προέλευση, ἡ κατάληξη -σι ἀρχικὰ ἀποτελοῦσε δεικτικὸ στοιχεῖο τοῦ τύπου, δηλαδή ἀξίας λέξεων σε πτώση Τοπική. Καὶ σήμερα σώζεται σὲ ὀρισμένους ἀπολιθωμένους ὀνομαστικούς τύπους, παραδείγματος χάριν, Ἀθήνησι.

⁶ Βέβαια, τὸ σὲ τί ἀκριβῶς συνίσταται αὐτὸ τὸ χαρακτηριστικό, πέραν τῆς γνωστῆς σημασίας τῆς λέξης, παραμένει ἄγνωστο, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ ἐτυμολογία τῆς λέξης δὲν ἔχει ἐρμηνευτεῖ με βεβαιότητα.

νοηματική διαφάνειά του, ή ετυμολογία του ὅρου δὲν ἔχει ὀρίσκει με βεβαιότητα. Στὰ ετυμολογικὰ λεξικά δὲν ἀποτελεῖ ξεχωριστὸ λήμμα, ἀλλὰ συγκαταλέγεται στὰ ὀνοματικὰ παράγωγα τοῦ ῥήματος μύω.

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The Term *mystes* [μύστης] in its Pre-Christian Use

Abstract. This paper presents indicative quotations of the term *mystes*. They are taken from the texts of ancient writers, focusing on the way its use and its semasiological aspects were formed. Six excerpts are selected to assess the fact that *mystes* was an active participant and a full member of the ancient Mystery cults, not only of the Mysteries, but of the Orgies, too. Most quotations are followed by their interpretation in English or French. Aristophanes' fragment leads to conclusion that initially the term was introduced and formulated rather as an adjective, than as a noun. As such, it serves as a name, title, or cognomen, referring to ancient deities. Although its semasiology indicates rather intelligible transparency, its etymology remains insufficiently determined. In etymological dictionaries it is not presented as a separate lemma, but is assumed to be a noun derivative of a verb, thus presented s.v. μύω [μύō].

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Le rapport entre l'homme et les dieux dans la pratique de la théurgie

*Introduction*¹

La dimension religieuse est une caractéristique de l'âme humaine, ainsi que le rapport au surnaturel est présent dans la culture de tous les peuples. Au fil du temps, le culte des dieux a connu des formes diverses, depuis les plus simples aux plus complexes. Parmi celles-ci, la théurgie fait une figure spéciale. Habituellement, dans le culte des dieux, le plus important est le rituel, c'est à dire le rapport concrète des gens avec les dieux, tandis que la partie théorique, bien qu'important, n'est pas très développée. Mais la théurgie combine la pratique des rituels de nature magique et ésotérique avec un fondement théorique très solide, de facture philosophique.

Ceux qui ont donné à la théurgie cette caractéristique hautement spéculative ont été les néoplatoniciens, qui étaient ouvertes aux traditions de la pensée orientale et qui ont développé à leur manière la tendance trouvée dans *Les Oracles Chaldaïques*. En fait, la position des philosophes néoplatoniciens envers la théurgie n'est pas unitaire, parce que Plotin donne la plus grande appréciation au rationnel et Porphyre est très réticent, parfois presque hostile en se référant aux pratiques théurgiques. Dans son *Lettre à Anébon*, Porphyre exprime ses réserves à leur sujet, mais sans oser les condamner et les rejeter ouvertement.

Celui qui a imposée dans le néoplatonisme la ferme orientation vers la théurgie, qui est devenu l'une des caractéristiques de ce courant philosophique, a été Jamblique, l'élève de Porphyre, qui, dans les *Mystères d'Égypte*, critique la position de son maître, en voulant prouver que la théurgie est supérieure à tout culte ordinaire des dieux et que le rapport entre l'homme et les dieux dans sa pratique, est très spécial.

Le spécifique de la théurgie

Du point de vue de Jamblique, la théurgie suppose l'invocation et l'évocation des dieux par les gens à travers d'un culte formé de rituels purement symboliques qui va au-delà de la raison, par lequel le praticien entre en communion avec les dieux et obtient de ceux-ci de nombreux bienfaits. Par conséquent, il y a deux aspects principaux de la théurgie:

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a) «...elle est exercée par des hommes et garde notre place naturel dans le tout...»²

b) «...appuyée sur les signes divins, elle remonte par eux jusqu'aux êtres supérieures, auxquels elle s'unit, et se dirige harmonieusement selon leur ordonnance, en quoi elle peut à bon droit revêtir la forme des dieux.»³

Les conséquences de ces deux aspects sont les suivantes:

a) la théurgie «...évoque naturellement et comme supérieures les puissances du tout, en tant que l'évocateur est un homme.»⁴

b) le théurge «...leur commande, puisqu'il revête en quelque sorte, par les symboles secrets, la tenue hiératique des dieux.»⁵

Le rapport des hommes aux dieux établit par le culte théurgique n'exprime pas une nécessité des dieux, qui sont des êtres parfaits et n'ont besoin de rien, mais c'est une nécessité des hommes. Toutefois, la force de l'action théurgique vient dans la plus grande mesure de la part des dieux et moins de la part des hommes. Pour pratiquer la théurgie d'une manière efficace, les hommes doit réaliser une activité intellectuelle intense, par laquelle ils doivent apprendre les exigences des dieux et les significations des diverses aspects du culte sacré. Mais cette activité n'est pas suffisante et, de plus, les bénéfices de la théurgie ne sont pas de nature intellectuelle.

L'activité théurgique n'est pas similaire à l'activité humaine, qui se réalise par l'entremise des distances, des distinctions et de la succession temporelle. Dans l'invocation le dieu n'est pas appelé comme une entité distincte et située à la distance de celui qui fait cette invocation. Celle-ci est une activité sacrée réalisée dans la communion entre le dieu et l'homme, qui sont également imprégnés de la toute puissante énergie divine. Comme toute action divine, elle se fait par «identité, unité, accord», dès lors, dans le culte sacré, il n'y a pas une distinction entre celui qui fait l'invocation et celui qui est invoqué. L'homme devient un avec le dieu, en gagnant l'unité et la simplicité divine.⁶

Au cours du rituel théurgique, quand les gens s'adressent aux dieux, il n'y a pas un dialogue comme entre les gens parce que les dieux n'ont pas des organes du corps et ils n'ont pas besoin d'entendre ou de parler. Mais du moment que les théurges s'identifient avec le dieu, pendant l'invocation le dieu parle, en fait, avec soi-même. Par conséquent, en pratiquant la théurgie l'homme ne s'humilie pas devant les dieux, mais utilise leur puissance pour monter à leur niveau. D'autre part il ne les subordonne pas, ne fait pas d'eux comme simples exécutants, mais il respecte leur volonté et les règles imposées par cette volonté. C'est une sorte de partenariat entre les dieux et les hommes: ses conditions sont imposées par les dieux, mais il tient compte de la nature humaine, de la potentialité et de sa capacité de perfectionnement.

La justification de la théurgie

Pour Jamblique, la pratique de la théurgie est justifiée par le fait que l'âme humaine, qui exprime l'essence de l'homme, est de nature divine. Avant sa naissance, donc avant de

² Jamblique, *Les Mystères d'Égypte*, IV 2 (184, 1-13) Texte établi et traduit par Édouard des Places, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1989, p. 148.

³ Idem.

⁴ Idem.

⁵ Idem.

⁶ Ibidem, IV 3 (185, 11-18), p. 149.

se mêler avec un corps, l'âme a été unie avec les dieux par la contemplation. Mais par l'incarnation, l'homme «s'est glissé dans une autre âme, combinée à la forme spécifiquement humaine et par là trouvé pris aux liens de la nécessité et de la fatalité.»⁷ Pour devenir libre et obtenir le bonheur, l'homme doit connaître le Bien, c'est-à-dire le divin, et se rappeler le dieu-Père créateur de l'univers. Cela rend la théurgie.

D'ailleurs, l'homme peut monter aux dieux parce que sa connexion avec eux est permanente, même dans son état dégradé en tant qu'être du monde. Ainsi, la conscience humaine est intimement unie aux dieux. La connaissance de l'homme sur l'existence des dieux est innée, et elle est faite par l'intuition pure. Par conséquent, Jamblique estime qu'elle est tout à fait différente de la connaissance habituelle, et il critique Porphyre parce que celui-ci les met toutes les deux sur le même plan.

Pendant la connaissance commune, les gens utilisent la raison, mais ils sont incapables de connaître les dieux par l'entremise de la raison. Les hommes pensent, cependant, que cela est possible, et ils font toutes sortes d'hypothèses à cet égard, mais leurs hypothèses expriment seulement les passions humaines. Mais en fait, outre la raison, nous gardons dans l'esprit la «copie mystique et indicible des dieux», qui nous aide à élever vers eux.⁸ Par conséquent, même sur la terre, les dieux sont dans un «communauté théurgique» avec les hommes.

Le rapport de l'homme avec les dieux par la prière et l'adoration est naturel parce que l'homme est inférieur dans tous les sens aux dieux. La conscience de son infériorité le fait d'adresser des prières et d'établir un dialogue permanent avec ceux-ci, pendant lequel il devient semblable aux dieux et peut atteindre lui-même leur perfection. En fait, seuls les dieux méritent des dons, des adorations, des prosternations, car eux seuls sont dignes d'admiration en raison de leur supériorité. Aucun homme ne mérite ces choses.

En fait, les hommes ne font pas les sacrifices à l'honneur des dieux, parce que les dieux n'ont besoin de rien, pas même de la vénération des hommes, mais parce qu'ils sont efficaces. S'ils sont effectués correctement, ils mettent en mouvement simultanément toutes les bonnes causes dans l'univers, y compris la dernière et l'unique cause, car ils sont tous dans l'unité.

Lorsqu'il parle en général du rapport entre l'homme et les dieux, Jamblique vise la relation entre l'homme et tous les êtres supérieurs, qui comprend, dans l'ordre croissant: les âmes pures, les héros, les archontes matérielles, les archontes cosmiques, les démons, les anges, les archanges et, enfin, les dieux. Tous les êtres qui sont sur les niveaux inférieurs aux dieux sont assimilés par Jamblique, en principe, avec les dieux parce qu'ils sont les compagnons éternels des dieux. Tous ces êtres sont appelés genres supérieurs⁹ car ils ont leur existence d'eux-mêmes et se distinguent fermement les uns des autres. Par conséquent, Jamblique prend soin de nous décrire quelques caractéristiques de chacun de ces êtres.

«Il faut réserver aux démons des puissances fécondantes, qui président à la nature et aux liens des âmes avec les corps ; mes aux héros il convienne d'en attribuer de vivifiantes, qui règnent sur les hommes et sont affranchies du devenir»¹⁰ ; «De plus, ordre et tranquillité conviennent aux dieux ; pour les archanges, c'est l'ordre et la tranquillité qui

⁷ Ibidem, X 5 (290, 12-15), p. 213.

⁸ Ibidem, VII 4 (255, 15-17), p. 192.

⁹ D'autres noms que Jamblique donne également aux dieux, démons, héros, âmes pures sont : «êtres supérieurs», «êtres divins», «intellects purs», «esprits purs».

¹⁰ Ibidem, II 1 (67, 15 - 58, 2), p. 78.

ont un caractère actif ; chez les anges être ranges et calmes ne va plus sans mouvement ; trouble et désordre accompagnent les visions démoniques. Les apparitions des archontes (...) : tumultueuses et rapides s'ils sont liés à la matière ; s'ils dominent, fixement stables en elles-mêmes. Celles des héros se présentent dans leur mouvement et ne manquent pas de changement. Celles des âmes ressemblent un peu à celles des héros, toutefois elles sont inférieures à celles-ci.»¹¹

Le but ultime de la théurgie et ses effets concrets

Le but ultime de la théurgie c'est la purification et la délivrance de l'âme des contraintes de l'existence terrestre, et aussi son salut, c'est-à-dire l'ascension vers la nature suprême, intelligible et divine. La théurgie nous unit avec le Dément universel, qui n'est autre que la raison unique et éternelle de l'univers. Dans cette communion l'âme devient théurgique et se joint à l'activité créatrice divine. En effet, de cette manière, l'âme revient à son état d'origine, à sa propre nature et elle trouve ainsi le bonheur. La technique de cette ascension est expliquée par Jamblique comme ça : pendant les sacrifices la matière est détruite par le feu et l'âme est exaltée aux dieux ; comme le feu assimile la matière de la même manière nous sommes assimilés par les dieux, en devenant comme eux, donc immatériels.¹²

Mais outre sa fin ultime, la théurgie produit de nombreux effets bénéfiques qui visent soit la connaissance ésotérique soit les divers aspects de la vie des gens, qui, d'ailleurs, sont des étapes préparatoires pour la réalisation du but suprême. Les effets généraux de nature cognitive sont les suivants :

«...grâce à eux, l'indicible s'exprime en symboles mystérieux, les êtres sans forme sont maîtrisés dans des formes, ceux qui sont supérieurs à toute copie sont reproduits au moyen de copies, et toutes choses s'achèvent par une seule cause divine, qui est tellement séparée des passions qu'à la raison même il n'est pas possible de l'atteindre.»¹³

Certains rituels théurgiques sont destinés à éliminer la colère des dieux, qui n'est pas une passion, un ressentiment, mais l'élimination des soins bénéfiques des dieux pour nous, de laquelle nous seules sommes coupables. Les rituels apaisent notre âme et nous libère de la passion qui nous éloigne de dieux. Les sacrifices expiatoires éloignent le mal autour de la terre ; par conséquent, ils nous protègent de sa tentation qu'ils éliminent dès le début. Ils demandent également aux dieux de transformer leur bienveillance pour nous en protection effective qui élimine tous les inconvénients de la vie.¹⁴ En ce sens, la théurgie permet à notre âme d'être surveillée et guidée par un dieu véritable parce que jusqu'à elle est conseillée seulement par un démon personnel.

En ce qui concerne les théurges, en invoquant les dieux, ils obtiennent de nombreux et grands dons. Tout d'abord, la bonne volonté de leurs dieux répandre la lumière divine sur eux. Pour cette raison, les dieux aident les âmes de théurges de s'écarter du corps et de passer vers l'intelligible. Cela signifie que les dieux appellent vers eux-mêmes les âmes des théurges, en leur accordant l'unité avec le divine. Délivrée de corps, l'âme contemple l'intelligible, étant engagée dans une activité divine, qui la purifie, la

¹¹ Ibidem, II 3 (72,12 - 73, 5), p. 81.

¹² Ibidem, V (124,4 - 125,7), pp. 166-167.

¹³ Ibidem, I 21 (65, 8-14), pp. 76-77.

¹⁴ Ibidem I 13 (43,1 - 44,10), pp. 63-64.

rend intouchable et au-delà de la condition humaine ordinaire. Elle renonce à sa propre vie, obtenant une nouvelle vie dans la sphère des dieux. Le théurge s'échappe de la fatalité et de tous les maux¹⁵ et, en outre, les effets de son activité visent à la fois les villes, les peuples, les nations, les terres, les maisons.¹⁶

Les pratiques théurgiques

Pour Jamblique, les pratiques de la théurgie ont des significations, des causes et des rôles différents.

«... en effet, les unes ont une cause ineffable et supranationale ; d'autres sont comme des symboles consacrés de toute éternité aux êtres supérieurs ; d'autres conserve une autre image, de même que la nature génératrice frappe les formes visibles des concepts invisibles ; d'autres sont honorifiques ou vise une représentation quelconque ou encore une lieu de parenté ; certaines préparent ce qui nous est utile ou purifient en quelque façon et délivrent nos passions humaines, ou encartent tel autre danger qui nous menace.»¹⁷

La théurgie admet que tous les dieux ont les mêmes pouvoirs, mais qu'ils ont réparti leurs tâches, chacun ayant en soin une partie quelconque de l'univers et des choses terrestres particuliers. Ces choses sont «reliées» à leurs dieux protecteurs, qui se trouvent symboliquement en eux. C'est pourquoi les théurges invoquent les dieux diverses, en utilisant les moyens distincts d'invocation. En ce sens, ce qui est autorisé ou obligatoire pour un cas, est déconseillé ou interdit pour d'autres cas. Par exemple, pour les dieux qui protègent les animaux nous sommes obligés de sacrifier des animaux mais pour les dieux sans liaison avec la matière cette chose est interdite.¹⁸

Malgré la multitude de dieux, en fait, il n'y a que deux principaux types:

- a) dieux matériels, qui règnent sur la matière;
- b) dieux immatériels, qui ne se rapportent pas du tout à elle.

Mais l'homme ne peut pas accéder aux derniers que par les premiers, ainsi que les rituels doivent commencer avec eux. Par conséquent, l'art de la théurgie a différentes étapes, à partir de la plus simple, et en passant aux autres à mesure que le théurge augmente la pureté de son âme. Mais le culte du dieu suprême ne peut être pratiqué que par très peu de gens, des êtres supérieurs, vers la fin de leur vie.¹⁹

La responsabilité du théurge pendant l'acte sacrificiel est très grande. Si le sacrifice n'est pas parfait et quelque chose a été omis, les conséquences sont très graves. Les dieux peuvent même punir le théurge, en tenant compte de tous les faits de ses vies antérieures. Nous pouvons donc parler non seulement des avantages mais aussi des risques de la pratique théurgique, qui parfois ne peuvent pas être contrôlés.

Les théurges se rapportent aux dieux par l'entremise des symboles cachés dont les Egyptiens ont donné une interprétation intellectuelle. Il s'agit des noms originaires qui ne sont pas des conventions mais expriment correctement la nature des choses. Ils ont presque le même pouvoir que les êtres supérieurs, et sans eux, aucun rituel sacré ne peut être accompli.²⁰

¹⁵ Ibidem I 12 (40,16 - 42,17), pp. 62-63.

¹⁶ Ibidem V 10 (211, 6 -15), p. 165.

¹⁷ Ibidem, I 11 (87,6-16), p. 60.

¹⁸ Ibidem, VI 1 (241,1 - 242,6), pp. 183-184.

¹⁹ Ibidem, V 22 (230,15 - 231,2), p. 177.

²⁰ Ibidem, VII 5 (258,1 - 260,2), pp. 194-195.

A la question de Porphyre: comment les dieux, des êtres supérieurs peuvent recevoir les commandements des hommes, des êtres inférieurs, Jamblique répond que les dieux offrent volontiers leurs dons, accordant aux gens pieux ce qu'ils méritent. Dans la pratique théurgique ne se pose pas le problème d'une contrainte ou d'une menace envers les dieux. Le théurge menace seulement les forces cosmiques irrationnelles qui ne peuvent discerner entre le bien et le mal, ou entre le vrai et le faux, et ses menaces sont faites en tant que bénéficiaire d'une puissance qui vient de dieux.²¹ D'ailleurs, il est responsable de la façon dont il utilise son pouvoir sur les êtres irrationnels. Il est obligé de l'utiliser pour le bien de l'univers et il est coupable s'il s'écarte de l'ordre universel.²²

Conclusion:

La théurgie - la voie suprême pour obtenir la perfection humaine

Selon Jamblique, parmi toutes les voies que l'homme peut suivre pour surmonter sa condition humaine ingrate, la théurgie est la plus élevée. La théurgie ne renverse pas la volonté des dieux et ne change pas le destin qu'on a été donnée à l'homme par sa propre nature. Par contre, ce destin est accompli justement en pratiquant la théurgie parce que dès le début les dieux ont envoyé l'âme de l'homme dans le monde avec l'intention de le retourner à l'intelligible.

Bien que l'abaissement des âmes dans le devenir exprime leur dégradation, elle fait partie de l'ordre et de l'harmonie que les dieux ont instituée dans l'univers.²³ Par conséquent, les âmes ne pouvaient pas l'éviter. Mais dans la théurgie l'homme retrouve la force de revenir à sa véritable nature, sous la direction bienveillante des dieux, qui l'aident à se purifier.

En raison du culte sacré l'homme reprend peu à peu sa ressemblance avec le divin et finalement il fusionne avec le dieu créateur de l'univers, qui est aussi le lieu du Bien, ce qui affirme pleinement la dignité ontologique de l'homme en tant qu'être divin. La satisfaction intellectuelle de l'union avec l'âme divine et de la contemplation de Bin, c'est le bonheur. Il est le résultat de la théurgie, dans laquelle les dieux et les hommes sont dans une relation permanente, de plus en plus étroite, et dont les effets bénéfiques se répandent non seulement sur le genre humaine mais sur tout l'univers.

The Relationship between Man and Gods within the Theurgy Practice in Iamblichus Summary

Given that ancient Neoplatonism was already open to the Eastern traditions of thought, it is Iamblichus who legitimates the practice of theurgy within this philosophical current. As a reaction to his teacher point of view, Porphyry, who in *Lettre à Anébon* is extremely reluctant to this kind of worship, Iamblichus in *Les Mystères d'Égypte*, tries to prove that theurgy is superior to any ordinary worship of the gods and that the way people refer to gods in its practice is completely special.

People's reference to gods by theurgy worship does not express a need of gods, who are perfect beings and do not need anything, but one of people's. Rituals illuminate the soul, purify it

²¹ Ibidem, VI 5 (241,1 - 242,6), pp. 183-184.

²² Ibidem, IV 1 (187,5 - 189,3), pp. 150-151.

²³ Ibidem, VIII 8 (272, 6 - 15), pp. 201-202.

of all passions and freeing it from all the trouble of living within the frames of becoming, exalt it to the intelligible, towards gods, making it get into communion with them and become like them.

Moreover, theurgy is the only form of knowledge that humans can accomplish in relation to gods, for in fact they cannot know them by means of reason. But through theurgic rites, gods seem to people in perfect agreement with essences, powers and specific activities to each. Iamblichus disagree with Porphyry who thought that gods can produce visions to people, as for him truth is co-natural with gods and thinks that deceive occurs only as a result of the mistakes in the practice of theurgy. Moreover, Iamblichus believes that gods reveal to people not only their own image, but also all higher beings who accompany them as well as the areas and parts of the universe or super-cosmic ones they take care of.

During the theurgy ritual, gods are invoked by means of objects that express their different powers and evoked by symbolic names, unintelligible to us, but which express the hidden nature of gods and have an almost equal power to the one gods own. But people do not constrain gods to give them the gifts, so they do not use magic, violence or gods passions, for they are above all. Theurgists appeal to their benevolence, using practices that gods themselves have revealed to the people as worthy and effective in order to address gods. Thus divine is driven by itself while being also compassionate towards the pious and giving them what they deserve. When people address gods there does not exist a dialogue as it takes place between people, for gods do not need bodily organs to communicate. They already have the benefits that people ask for and because theurgists and gods are in a communion, with no real distinction between the invoking and the one who is invoked, the moment when theurgists discuss with gods, gods actually talk to themselves.

Within the ritual, although the theurgist addresses to a particular god, through that god the theurgist is in relation with all gods, meaning all good causes of the universe, for all are in the unit. When the ritual is perfect, one can reach demiurge, the single cause of the universe. But the worship of the one, the supreme deity can only be practiced by very few people, the purest ones, and only when they are nearly the end of their life. But regardless of the union level we are with gods, this union brings us happiness, which is a gift of theurgic practice.

Iamblichus believes that by theurgy practice the will of gods will not be reversed and the fate they have conceived for man is not changed by its own nature. Rather, this destiny is fulfilled, since from the beginning gods have sent the soul into the world bearing the intention that he returned to the intelligible. Soul ascent and descent are component parts of the order and harmony that gods set up within the universe.

Katharina Comoth

Köln am Rhein

Nero als Apollo Citharoedus und Apocalypsis Ioannis 13,18

„... ὅτι θέατρον ἐγενήθημεν τῷ κόσμῳ...;
 ... quia spectaculum facti sumus mundo...;
 ... denn zum Schauspiel sind wir geworden der Welt...“¹

Als Paulus – wohl von Ephesos aus um das Jahr 55 im ersten Brief an die ἐκκλησία τοῦ θεοῦ von Korinth – wo alle zwei Jahre am Isthmos die Isthmischen Spiele ausgetragen wurden – den Blick auf den Gekreuzigten und die Kreuzigung lenkte (1 Kor 2,2), bahnten sich in Roms Vaticanischen Gärten die Wettkämpfe der *Neronia* an, inszeniert für AVG(VSTVS) *Nero (als) Apollo Citharoedus*² : Es wird berichtet³, daß die kaiserliche Claque der Reichshauptstadt für Stimmung sorgte: Sie bestand schließlich aus einer Körperschaft von 5000 Leuten, welche die Bezeichnung *Augustianer* trugen: „Der Hof hatte sie angeworben; sie waren durch Jugend und Körperkraft ausgezeichnet und trugen pomadisierten Haarschopf und prächtige Gewänder. Einige waren von Natur aus frech, andere hofften auf Machteinfluß. Diese ließen, wie es heißt, Tag und Nacht Beifall erschallen, legten immer wieder der Wohlgestalt und Stimme des Kaisers göttliche Bezeichnungen bei und rückten so seine Person schon in eine überirdische Sphäre. Dafür lebten sie, als ob sie wirkliche Verdienste besäßen, in Ruhm und Ehre. Die Anführer einzelner Abteilungen erhielten mit 400.000 Sesterzen im Jahr mehr Gehalt als ein kaiserlicher Procurator.“⁴

I.

Mit Bezug auf die Aufstellung im Stadion am Isthmos hatte Paulus das Evangelium als Maßstab benannt für „all diejenigen – die den Namen unseres Herrn Jesus Christus anrufen“ (1 Kor 1,2) und um einen „unvergänglichen Kranz“ rennen (ebd. 9,23-26): „Wer

¹ 1 Kor 4,9.

² Vgl. dazu die Münze Abb. 10 bei Reinhard Wolters – Martin Ziegert: Umbrüche – Die Reichsprägung Neros und Domitians im Vergleich, in: *Nero und Domitian. Mediale Diskurse der Herrscherrepräsentation im Vergleich*. Hrsg. von Sophia Bönisch-Meyer u. a., Tübingen 2014 (43-80), S. 78 – dazu den Text S. 53 u. 63. Die Münze wurde 64-66 in Rom geprägt: Bild und Beschreibung auch unter www.romanatic.com/1167. Unter den frühen Zuschauern der Auftritte Neros wird sein Erzieher Seneca gewesen sein, der auch gräzisierende Schauspiele verfaßte.

³ Vgl. Stephan Elbern: *Nero. Kaiser – Künstler – Antichrist*. Mainz 2010, 114 und Julian Krüger: *Nero. Der römische Kaiser und seine Zeit*. Köln [u. a.] 2012, 125.

⁴ Krüger (wie Anm. 3), ebd.

feststeht in seinem Herzen und nicht genötigt ist, sondern über seinen Willen verfügt, und in seinem Herzen beschlossen hat, seine Jungfrau zu bewahren (ἐαυτοῦ παρθένον, virginem suam), der tut wohl: καλῶς ποιήσει, bene faciet“ (Ebd. 7,37) Ein Wettkampf ganz anderer Art ist für Korinth – Hauptstadt der römischen Provinz Achaia mit den Wohnheiten einer Hafenstadt, mit einer *Jeunesse dorée* und Spielen am Isthmos angelegt: der Wettkampf von Schein und Sein in höchster geordneter Sittlichkeit, für die nicht Apollon als Beispiel steht, sondern der in seinem Herzen jungfräuliche Jesus (mit direkter Aussprache⁵ und durchaus mit der Kunst der Diplomatie vertraut⁶). Mit ihm sind die Gesetzlosen (: ἀνόμους, sine lege) zu gewinnen für das Gesetz Christi (: ἔννομος Χριστοῦ, in lege essem Christi), 1 Kor 9,21.

Lauft in der Rennbahn um den Preis, den nur einer erlangt: 1 Kor 9,24.⁷ Paulus (um 64 unter Nero in Rom hingerichtet) war – wie Plutarch (um 45 n. Chr. in Chaironeia geboren) – Römischer Staatsbürger. Beide haben sich nicht ausdrücklich mit *AVGVSTVS Nero (als Apollo Citharoedus)* zu seiner Zeit angelegt.⁸ Plutarch vermied – ab etwa 95 war er Priester in Delphi –, sich (moral- und erkenntnis-)philosophisch mit Apollon auseinanderzusetzen (das hatten längst große Dramatiker wie Euripides öffentlich getan⁹): „Zu töten ja bewog ich dich der Mutter Leib (μητρῶον δέμας)“ sagt Schützer: φύλαξ hier als Beispiel in den *Eumeniden* von Aischylos (84) zu Orestes – der ‚Mutter Mörder‘ (bühnenmäßig), wie Nero – durch Veranlassung bei Agrippina *in natura*.

Offenbar hat der junge Nero mit seinem Erzieher Seneca die Tragödien eifrig gelesen und mit Apollon als *eine* der dramatischen Personen [Τὰ τοῦ δράματος πρόσωπα¹⁰] im Laufe der Zeit eine *Apollomanie* entwickelt, die von der in der Kaiserzeit üblichen ‚Angleichung‘ abwich: princeps – pontifex maximus – artifex. Klassiker der ironischen Mitteilung hatten einst „dem Apollon (!) und seinem Delphischen Tempel“, wie Sokrates mit Blick auf die *inverse Wirkung* berichtet, den Spruch (ῥήμα) ‚Erkenne Dich selbst‘ gewidmet (wobei bemerkt werden muß, daß widmen etwas anderes bedeutet als weihen),

⁵ „...Ich bin es“, ...ὅτι ἐγὼ εἰμι, ...quia ego sum: Lk 22,70 und bei Joh 18,37: „...ich bin ein König“, ... quia rex sum, ...ὅτι βασιλεὺς εἰμι.

⁶ Vor allem, wenn er „Du sagst es“ (Tu dicis, σὺ λέγεις) antwortet wie dem Statthalter Pontius Pilatus – vgl. Mt 27,11; Mk 15,2; Lk 23,3; Joh 18,37 – dazu (vor dem Synedrium): „Ihr sagt es“, ὑμεῖς λέγετε, Vos dicitis, Lk 22,70.

⁷ Die Rennbahn der Isthmischen Spiele wird Paulus bekannt gewesen sein, denn nach Apg 18,11 war er „ein Jahr und sechs Monate“ in der Stadt mit „viel Volk – des Herrn“ (ebd. 18,9/10) – nicht allzu weit entfernt von Delphi.

⁸ In *De E apud Delphos* erwähnt Plutarch Neros Griechenlandreise nur als zeitlichen Hinweis (385 B). Bereits Augustus wurde in seinem *Goldenen Zeitalter* Apollon angleichend vergöttlicht (divus) – nicht gleich gesetzt (deus); vgl. dazu Livia, das *goldene E* in Delphi *weihend angleichend* an Ἑστία (=Vesta – „denn die ist dieselbe“: Cicero, *De natura deorum* II.67); als diva nicht gleich gesetzt mit dea oder mit [einer der] Vestalischen Jungfrauen in Rom, die dem Pontifex Maximus für den Erhalt des ewigen Feuers *verantwortlich* waren – ihm nicht untergeben: Bei ihnen wurden Dokumente von zentraler Bedeutung hinterlegt wie das von *Tacitus* erwähnte Testament des Augustus, vgl. *Annalen* I.8). Bezeichnenderweise verschweigt Plutarch die Weihung des Schwerts von Augustus an Apollon in Delphi, während er die Weihung von Livias goldenem E’ angibt (385 F), dazu Dietmar Kienast: *Augustus. Prinzeps und Monarch*. Darmstadt (5. Aufl.) 2014, S. 462 – Anm. 38.

⁹ Beispielsweise in Ion 436 ff. – mit der Pointe, daß Apollon sich gesetzlos zeige, sine lege, und der Aufforderung (Ions) an ihn: ἀρετὰς δίωκε, Übe Tugend! Vgl. dazu meine Rezension *Plutarch: De E apud Delphos* in: *Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger* 67 (2014), 5-8. Einige *Spätabiturienten* sehen noch heute mit Apollon ihren „Weg der Erkenntnis“.

¹⁰ Besonnenheit zur rechten Zeit [σωφρονοῦντες ἐν χρόνῳ] kommt schließlich durch Athena (Aischylos, *Eumeniden* 1000).

kurzum ein Spruch, der fortan „in aller Munde ist: πάντες ὕμνοῦσιν“ (Platon: Protagoras 343 a/b). A - pollon war ein Fangschluß (für die Einbildung) gewesen, der sich weder logisch noch moralisch verteidigen ließ, ‚Apollon‘ sein Platzhalter¹¹: Virtuose der Verstellung. Wirklich leben will man anders.¹²

Das Christentum hatte von Anfang an die kompromißlose Bindung an *Sittlichkeit – der Natur eingeschrieben* durch den λόγος, der mit Jesus „unter uns gewohnt hat“ (Joh 1,14). Durch die Bindung an Sittlichkeit steht das frühe Christentum vor allem der Platonischen *Philosophie selbst* nahe, ohne mit ihr identisch zu sein.

II.

Mit der Kreuzigung war *das Kreuz des Gekreuzigten* in den Vordergrund getreten als *Verbindungszeichen von etwas darin Verborgenen*, was Nero im status des divus wohl ahnte, vielleicht sogar begriff. Seinen Spitzenbeamten werden die Sendschreiben von Paulus aus Korinth im Frühjahr 58 an die ‚Heiligen in Rom‘, deren Glaube gerühmt wird auf der ganzen Welt: in universo mundo (Röm 1,7/8) bekannt geworden sein, denn Paulus verkündete durch die Gemeinde in Rom der ganzen Welt die Rechtsordnung Gottes: **iudicium Dei** (Röm 1,32), die im Kreuz verborgen ist als Verbindungszeichen Jesu Christi: + Der Brand Roms im Juli 64 wurde zwar nicht von Nero gelegt, doch durch ihn veranlaßt wie (u. a.) der Mord an seine Mutter Agrippina. Er legte den Brand Roms den Christen zur Last und steigerte seine Apollomanie in gefallsüchtiger Annahme von νέος Ἀπόλλων: Während des Krieges in der römischen Provinz *Iudaea* (in dem es wohl vor allem darum ging, wer das Recht weist: *iudex*) besuchte Nero 66/67 Griechenland, genau genommen veranstaltete er eine (Künstler-)Tournée mit und zu Claqueuren, die ihm Altäre stifteten¹³: „Eine Besonderheit sind mehrere Altäre in Athen, die Nero als νέος Ἀπόλλων geweiht waren“.¹⁴ Vielleicht war der junge Plutarch anwesend. Von der Sittlichkeit abgesehen fehlte dem griechischen Gott Apollon die Inkarnation. Nero hatte seine Herkunft. An den Inhalt der Sendschreiben von Paulus *per fidem Iesu Christi* (Röm 3,22) war nicht heranzukommen. Vermutlich wußte das auch Plutarch, als er die in Anm. 8 erwähnte Schrift (über das Gespräch von ‚damals‘) verfaßte.

III.

Etwa gleichzeitig wie Plutarch in Delphi während der Niederschrift von ‚damals‘ schrieb Johannes als Verbannter unter Domitian auf der Insel Patmos die Apokalypse im Hinblick auf das, was er geschaut hatte und zum Ausdruck bringt gegen das Tier: Τὸ θηρίον, bestiam, „das war und nicht ist und wieder dasein wird: παρῆσται, aderit“ (Apok 17,8)

¹¹ Als *Kunstwerk* in Marmor im *Scheinwerferlicht* blieb er erhalten, überlebensgroß, angeschlagen und restauriert, vgl. http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_Kitharoidos (Berlin_SK_44). In natura möchte man ihn nicht sehen. Er lockert die Sitten und stiftet zum Mord an.

¹² Da keiner sein eigenes Gesicht authentisch sehen kann ist der Spruch Γνωθὶ σαυτὸν – das Rhema von Delphi in aller Munde – in der Philosophie selbst Spiegel geworden, spekulatives System von Selbst-Verhältnissen.

¹³ Nero war um die 30 Jahre alt, Plutarch um 22.

¹⁴ In fünf von diesen taucht die Anrufung Neros als νέος Ἀπόλλων auf; vgl. Sophia Bönisch-Meyer - Christian Witschel: Das epigraphische Image des Herrschers. Entwicklung, Ausgestaltung und Rezeption der Ansprache des Kaisers in den Inschriften Neros und Domitians, in: Nero und Domitian (o. Anm. 2), 81-179, S. 126 mit Anm. 204. [Abb. 3, ebd. S. 177, zeigt einen Altar, auf dem die Zuschreibung Νέρωνος νέου Ἀπόλλωνος in Umsetzung der *damnatio memoriae* getilgt worden ist, dazu ebd. S. 153.]

gegen das Wort Gottes: ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ, Verbum Dei (ebd. 19,13), König der Könige und Herr der Herren (ebd. 19,16).¹⁵ Im *Widerspruch* gegen die Bestie mit der Zahl 666 (ebd. 13,18) ist *das Wort Gottes* Allherrscher: παντοκράτωρ, omnipotens (ebd. 15,3) und so Autorität oder höchste Instanz.

Wer Vernunft hat: νοῦν; intellectum bemerkt die Verschiedenheit zwischen dem Lamm: τὸ ἀρνίον; Agnus und seiner Gefolgschaft als *Erstlinge für Gott* unter den Menschen (ebd. 14,4) von der Bestie mit der Zahl sechshundertsechundsechzig, „eines Menschen Zahl“ – mit *Nero als Charakterstudie* in „Babylon magna“ (ebd. 18,2), „trunken vom Blut der Heiligen und vom Blute der Zeugen Jesu: et de sanguine martyrum Iesu“ (ebd. 17,6).¹⁶ Idol von *Großbabilon* als Reichshauptstadt ist der *Verderber* „und sein Name auf griechisch Ἀπολλύων“ (ebd. 9,11).¹⁷ Die ‚Bestie‘ ist Merkmal eines (wild gewordenen) Menschen, der dem ‚Lamm‘ und seinem Gefolge nachstellt zum (blutigen) Zeugnis für *Treu und Wahr*: πιστὸς καὶ ἀληθινός, Fidelis et Verax, dem König im Himmel, der richtet und streitet mit Gerechtigkeit: in iustitia (ebd. 19,11) gegen die Bestie und Könige der Erde (ebd. 19,19): Verstellung ist ausgeschlossen.

Die Grundlegung staatlicher Autorität ist nicht Thema von *Apocalypsis*, die Johannes selbst ‚Apocalypsis Iesu Christi‘ nennt (ebd. 1,1). In „Babylon magna“ waren die Schriften von Cicero (106-43 v. Chr.) u. a. *Über den Staat*: De re publicam und *Über die Gesetze*: De legibus stillschweigend bekannt, *Über die Pflichten*: De officiis und *Über das höchste Gut und das größte Übel*: De finibus bonorum et malorum. Im Ringen um eine Weltordnung hatte Cicero in Anlehnung an Platon erkannt, wie wichtig es ist, einen Maßstab zu haben, der die sittliche Qualität eines Staates ausmacht, welche im Wissen um göttliche und menschliche Dinge *Werk der Weisheit* ist: opus sapientiae.

¹⁵ Ἀποκάλυψις [Ἰωάννου] setzt die Frohe Botschaft Gottes [εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ θεοῦ; evangelium Dei] vom Reich Gottes [: βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ; regnum Dei] voraus: In Mk 1,14/15 hat es sich genähert [: ἤγγικεν; appropinquavit], in Apocalypsis Ioannis ist es durch die ‚Bestie‘ im Dienst des ‚Drachen‘ (jederzeit) gefährdet [woran z. B. *Traian* – unter dem Ignatius von Antiochien in Rom durch ‚damnatio ad bestias‘ den Löwen zum Martyrium ausgesetzt worden ist – als *Portrait-Gemme* (Römisch, 98-102 n. Chr.) in einem *Bischofsring* erinnert: Inv. L 322 vom Kölner Domschatz; Katalog-Nr. 133 auf S. 79 von *Die Schatzkammer des Kölner Domes/Leonie Becks*, Köln 2000: ISBN 3-922442-41-2].

¹⁶ Dazu Krüger (wie Anm. 3): „Hinter der Zahl 666 verbirgt sich der Name Nero, dessen einzelnen Buchstaben ein Zahlenwert (der hebräischen Schrift) zugeordnet durch Summierung für die Eingeweihten den Namen des Kaisers ergibt (*Neron Kesar*).“ Ebd. 259.

¹⁷ Wohlwollend wird Apollon mit Sol in Verbindung gebracht (Quem solem esse volunt, vgl. Cicero – wie Anm. 8, ebd. II.68), ab-solut glänzend – von Natur aus gefallsüchtig; Apollyon: eine apokalyptische Beschwerde mit versteckter Kamera auf *Neron Kesar*.

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Les thèses de Proclus à propos de l'écologie

Introduction

La question sur l'éthique environnementale ou sur une philosophie écologique se présente à l'avant-scène d'intérêt dans les temps modernes, pendant lesquels les interventions humaines catalytiquement négatives contre l'écosystème se vérifient. L'homme de la société industrielle et méta-industrielle s'approche de l'environnement physique outillage, en qualité d'un espace dont il peut puiser des ressources pour renforcer sa puissance économique. Excité par la psychologie de la productivité et par l'idéologie de l'efficacité il a choisi une action d'exploitation qui ouvrirait des trajets pour réaliser les modèles capitalistes et les relations de la propriété aux dépens de l'environnement. Par cette manière, il a développé une division verticale et discordante entre un terrain humain et non-humain, qui a apporté à l'avant-scène les règles d'un utilitarisme extrême. Dans ce cadre le juste est déterminé de tout ce que constitue le choix humain.

Il va sans dire qu'une telle question ne pourrait pas être posée aux temps anciens, puisque les valeurs culturelles étaient alors différentes. Pendant cette ère, la relation de l'homme avec l'environnement est bien loin d'être outillée et propriétaire et elle est développée aux termes de coexistence et de collaboration. Il s'agit d'une relation qui reflète une attitude de vie particulière et une proposition interprétative du corps social en face des objets physiques. Les deux facteurs susmentionnés sont tissés ensemble avec l'admission du rôle fonctionnel que joue l'environnement en faveur d'homme mais en même temps de l'autonomie dont on dispose pour son propre développement. Néanmoins, tout ce qui exprimé n'est pas simplement le fruit d'une biothéorie. Il présuppose une cosmothéorie d'un type particulier, un rapprochement scientifique mûr du monde physique et une attitude axiologique positive envers lui. Le monde des êtres perceptibles occupe une place supérieure dans l'échelle des valeurs et il est interprété comme une région avec un sens spécialement positif, que l'homme a le devoir de découvrir dans tous ses détails.

Nous tâcherons de découvrir tout ce qui est mentionné ci-dessus dans l'oeuvre du philosophe néoplatonicien Proclus (412-485) et plus particulièrement dans son traité vaste: *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*.¹ Dans ce traité, Proclus essaie de constituer de manière systématique une théorie cosmologique de tous côtés, dont les parties s'attachent étroitement entre elles. Mettant en valeur la tradition relative jusqu'à son temps et surpassant ses conclusions au niveau d'analyse et de propositions herméneutiques, il développe une

¹ Pour une analyse détaillée du traité mentionné voir P. Bastid, *Proclus et le crépuscule de la pensée grecque*, ed. "J. Vrin", Paris 1969, pp. 119-207. Ce traité a été traduit en français par A.-J. Festugière (éd.), *Commentaire sur le Timée*, 5 vol. (Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques), Paris: Vrin, 1966-1968.

théorie sur le monde, selon laquelle la valeur est le facteur souverain. Nous estimons que dans le traité en question une introduction d'une théorie écocentrique sur l'environnement est faite. Certes cette entreprise n'est pas basée sur les causes qui ne seraient pas valables aujourd'hui. Sûrement elle est exprimée par des propositions qui peuvent répondre, tantôt directement et tantôt indirectement, aux questions angoissantes de notre temps. Avec l'étude que nous avons en mains nous tâcherons essentiellement une exploration introductive du sujet. Nous estimons que son intégration aux formes conceptuelles et méthodologiques nécessaires, pour la fondation d'une théorie complète, exige une longue recherche. Synoptiquement nous marquerons simplement que le philosophe néoplatonicien aborde l'environnement physique avec la sobriété d'un scientifique savant. De plus, il essaie de le présenter à travers des équilibres axiologiques de telle forme qu'elles assurent la réévaluation de toutes ses parties. Surpassant de beaucoup les limites étroites d'une éthique environnementale, il construit un système raisonnable de philosophie de la nature.

A] La particularité de l'hierarchie dans le monde naturel

Néanmoins, en premier lieu, nous devons remarquer que Proclus construit son système cosmologique par un procédé méthodique de sorte qu'elle rend catholiquement valable la hiérarchie des êtres en êtres supérieurs et en êtres inférieurs. Il s'agit d'une hiérarchie qui s'organise en suivant les distinctions qualitatives parmi les substances et pas tellement parmi les successions ou les priorités temporelles.² Néanmoins, la hiérarchie mentionnée ne conduit pas aux suzerainetés, mais elle écarte complètement le chaos et le désordre et assure une harmonie qui s'ordonne à de divers niveaux. Souvent même le philosophe présente la hiérarchie se prolonger à cadence, à savoir des fonctions apparaissent dans le cadre d'une réglementation qui est posée par une cause supérieure. Plus spécifiquement, Proclus soutient que les prescriptions du monde physique ont été déjà formées au mode du développement du métaphysique.

Dans le cadre en question, nous soutiendrions que la hiérarchie touche les limites du "paroxysme" (si elle ne les surpasse pas).³ Pour comprendre certains principes généraux, il est nécessaire de remarquer que dans les textes du philosophe néoplatonicien aucune parallélité constructive précise de terme à terme n'apparaît entre la hiérarchie métaphysique et la hiérarchie physique. Chaque monde se constitue avec des critères spéciaux des successions et des développements et obéit à une législation spéciale concernant la hiérarchie. En tout cas, tous les deux mondes suivent des régularités rigides de sorte que la caractérisation du système leur est attribuée aisément. Ce dernier fait nous servira à concevoir la priorité que présente dans le monde physique – aussi bien que dans le monde métaphysique – le tout contre la partie, le général contre le particulier.

Le prolongement de la priorité susmentionnée sur les relations que les êtres particuliers développent entre eux devient inévitable. Malgré l'événement que Proclus a fondé une hiérarchie cosmologique rigide, il n'a pas introduit le régime d'un facteur dominant et déterminant en face du reste. Aucun être et aucun groupe d'êtres du même genre

² Pour la notion de la hiérarchie dans l'ouvrage de Proclus, voir indicativement *Théologie Platonicienne*, V, 6, 5-18-28. Voir aussi, P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, I, Paris 1968, pp. 213-246 et 260-272.

³ In *Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, I, 384.27-385.16: "Εἴ οὖν ὁ Θεός πᾶσαν ἀπειρίαν ὑφίστησιν, ἐσχάτην οὖσαν ἀπειρίαν. Καὶ αὕτη μὲν πρωτίστη καὶ ἄρρητος αἰτία τῆς ὕλης. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ πανταχοῦ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἀνάλογον ὄντα πρὸς τῆς νοητῆς αἰτίας[...]"». Voir aussi, J. Trouillard, *L'un et l'Âme selon Proclus*, ed. "Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1972, pp. 69-89.

ne constitue le législateur ou le régulateur des procédés. La possibilité d'appliquer au moins un principe réglementaire n'est pas reconnue à aucun être particulier ou spécial.

Aisément donc nous appuierions que le philosophe forme dès le début l'idée d'un écosystème physique général, qui constitue la base ontologique et la présupposition causale de tous les corps particuliers physiques avec leur qualités et leur fonctions. Il exclut ainsi les déterminations intérieures et indépendantes et il pose à la marge quelconque intervention de contrôle d'une catégorie des êtres sur une autre.⁴ Si nous recherchons les justifications ultimes de cette situation, nous dirions qu'elles sont dues surtout – sinon exclusivement – à la manière par laquelle Proclus entend l'aboutissement des interactions métaphysiques, à travers lequel il forme une prescription spéciale constructive sur le moyen de construction et de fonctionnement du monde de l'expérience perceptible.

Plus particulièrement, après le stage final du développement du monde métaphysique le philosophe Néoplatonicien présente dans la hiérarchie des formations ontologiques la "Nature". Il s'agit d'une région non pas directement perceptible du côté des centres humains cognitifs, dans laquelle tous les êtres sensibles ou les groupes d'êtres sont renfermés en germe, comme possibilités qui ne sont pas encore activées et qui vont apparaître dans une autre étape de développements. Ces germes constituent des termes physiques archétypiques et des noyaux productifs inépuisables. Ce sont en quelque sorte des éléments peu volumineux, dont chacun d'eux possède un matériel productif rigoureusement spécialisé et une possibilité de contribuer au développement constructif d'un nouveau système, du devenir et des changements. Parallèlement, les éléments mentionnés se meuvent avec des possibilités attractives, de sorte qu'ils sont conduits à des combinaisons mutuelles et à des synthèses rigidement spécialisées. Le produit de chaque synthèse est une catégorie spéciale d'êtres ou de corps avec des qualités.⁵ Entre parenthèses au moins, il est nécessaire de marquer que l'évolution de la Nature n'est pas la matière non façonnée mais c'est des substances matérielles qui ont reçu une forme et que l'homme peut observer.⁶ Une des caractéristiques même des termes physiques c'est qu'ils ne fournissent pas seulement l'existence, la vie et d'autres diverses propriétés au monde de l'expérience sensible, mais qu'ils assurent à sa substance la durée, et de plus une perceptive

⁴ Voir *Théologie Platonicienne* (*Περὶ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα Θεολογίας*), III, s. 14.18-21.9: «De tous les êtres, le degré le plus bas est le degré corporel ; de fait le corporel tient non seulement son être mais aussi la totalité de sa perfection d'une autre cause plus élevée, et il ne doit à sa propre puissance ni la simplicité, ni la composition, ni la sempiternité, ni l'indestructibilité [...] Aucun corps n'est capable de se donner sa puissance» (trad. H.D. Saffrey et L.G.F. Westerink in *Proclus. Théologie Platonicienne* III, ed. "Les Belles Lettres", Paris 1978). "Τῶν τοίνυν ὄντων πάντων ἔσχατον ἐστί τὸ σωματικόν. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ τὴν τελειότητα πᾶσαν ἐξ ἄλλης αἰτίας ἔχει πρεσβυτέρας καὶ οὔτε τὸ ἀπλοῦν οὔτε τὸ σύνθετον οὔτε τὸ αἰδίων οὔτε τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκειᾶς δυνάμεως ἔλαχεν [...] Τῶν μὲν τῶν σωμάτων οὐδὲν ἐαυτῷ τῆς δυνάμεως παρεκτικόν», (20.9-21.6). Dans cette unité étendue Proclus constitue un système des principes pour expliquer la production et la fonction des êtres.

⁵ Pour la notion de la Nature dans le système de Proclus, voir indicativement *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, V, 279.6-323.13. Voir aussi P. Bastid, *Proclus et le crépuscule...*, pp. 383-390.

⁶ Il reste peut-être indécis le sujet concernant si Proclus accepte l'existence d'un concret, non façonné état de la matière. Dans son système ontologique aucune entité n'échappe pas de la causalité de la Principe Suprême. De la dépendance mentionnée la production est déterminée comme un processus que derive absolument de la Principe Suprême et à cause de cela il n'est pas possible d'être considéré comme un règlement simple d'une situation sans lois et ordre. Dans le cadre d'un rigide monisme, la matière se trouve en permanence à cohérence avec les idées. T. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (*Εἰς τὸν Τίμαιον Πλάτωνος*), II, 382.7-396.26. Selon nos estimations, chaque référence du philosophe à un état de matière se fait pour buts théoriques et méthodologiques. Nécessités syllogistiques conduisent aux élaborations de tel genre.

de perpétuité. Donc, le monde mentionné est sous-jacent à l'évolution et au changement mais pas au danger de la perte. Cette condition nihiliste menace seulement des essences à part, sans affecter le fonctionnement général du tout. Une image d'écosystème est ainsi formée indirectement et s'organise évolutivement au fond du temps. Cette durée manifeste le continu, qui conduit obligatoirement à la recherche de ces législations qui l'assurent et des significations qui l'interprètent.⁷ La perspective de l'entelechie est un facteur qui ne doit pas être exclu.

À partir des constatations ci-dessus, il résulte que chaque noyau-terme doit accomplir un but productif spécifique. C'est exactement pourquoi on doit reconnaître originellement à sa substance la reprise d'une mission permanente, qui fonctionne – d'après un aspect ontologique – d'une manière restreinte pour tout ce qui va suivre.

D'ailleurs, le caractère monistique du système de Proclus exclut n'importe quelle autonomie à ses parties. Tout ce qui apparaît dans un nouveau niveau d'existence, fonctionne de la même manière que dans son précédent, avec des différenciations - rétrogradations qui n'introduisent rien de radicalement nouveau. Il s'agit au fond d'une répétition sous de nouveaux modes formels.⁸ L'engagement mentionné fonctionne d'une manière déterminante et dans le niveau des sémasiologies, qui résultent à un certain degré aussi bien de l'attitude que nous maintenons face à la question axiologique. Une estimation initiale est conservée avec de rétrogradations graduelles. Ici, le processus délibératif, d'après les textes de Proclus, pourrait être formulé selon la manière suivante: D'après un examen général, chaque catégorie d'êtres dérive d'une région qui, avec sa propre disposition, montre la fonction cohérente, rationnelle et totale des procédés métaphysiques. La "Nature" donc contient l'ensemble des procédés métaphysiques pendant leur intégration et ensuite elle procède avec une exécution rigide des lois à la formation des corps physiques. Fondé ainsi le système physique n'a pas besoin d'autre intervention corrective extérieure ou postérieure pour se mettre en fonction. Ce qui est conduit à l'existence, il est déjà prescrit. C'est pour cette raison qu'il s'engage à suivre une nécessité productive et fonctionnelle ou une exécution ontologique des lois. Par conséquent, aucune partie du monde physique ne peut pas entreprendre de fonctions autonomes ni acquérir de sémasiologies propres ni même fournir de sémasiologies au reste. La hétéro-détermination de toutes les parties est universelle de sorte qu'elle écarte n'importe quelle tendance d'indépendance.⁹

B] La valeur ontologique inhérente chez tous les êtres

L'écosystème physique donc, que Proclus assemble, a une valeur innée a priori, puisqu'il résulte d'une réalité qui le surpasse ontologiquement et axiologiquement. Les conditions en vertu desquelles il résulte sont supérieures à son existence. Les spécifications primaires des éléments physiques ont des prescriptions métaphysiques et en même temps

⁷ Pour un examen systématique de la notion du continu aux conceptions du Proclus sur la production, voir T. Trouillard, *Procession Néoplatonicienne et création judeo-chrétienne*, *Néoplatonisme*, Paris 1981, pp. 10-16.

⁸ Voir *In Platonis commentaria*, II, 382.7-396.26. P. Bastid note relativement: "Une fois de plus constatons dans le système de Proclus l'homogénéité parfaite de toutes choses, homogénéité que de l'Un a la matière rien n'interrompt", (*Proclus et le crépuscule...*, p. 391).

⁹ Voir, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, II, 139.25-140.10: "τὴν μὲν τάξιν φυλάττοντα τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτῇ ὁμοιότητα". *Théologie Platonicienne*, IV, 87.5-7: "Ἀνοθεν ἄχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων ἢ τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσις διήκει, πάντα διακοσμοῦσα καὶ συνέχουσα τοῖς οἰκείοις εἶδεσιν". Voir aussi, T. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus*, "Les Belles Lettres", Paris 1982, pp. 109-118.

elles constituent les facteurs directs qui déterminent la composition et le fonctionnement des êtres que l'écosystème renferme.

Il est en effet remarquable que l'idiome de l'organité est reconnu à tous les êtres, malgré leurs différenciations qualitatives. Dès le point de départ de leur formation ils fonctionnent comme des organismes, car seulement par cette qualité leur existence acquiert du sens et leur place est justifiée, sous la forme de coexister, dans l'écosystème. Il est à remarquer que l'organité constitue l'expression perceptible de l'action métaphysique. Il n'est pas possible que l'image dynamique que les entités métaphysiques présentent se reflète sur des formes d'existence inorganiques. Selon Proclus, un tel reflet possible diminuerait la valeur du monde métaphysique, au moins en termes de qualité de ses interventions.¹⁰

Dès l'interprétation synthétique des derniers raisonnements il résulte que les êtres sensibles, en tant que formations postérieures, ne jouent pas de rôle clé pour que l'écosystème obtienne une valeur primaire et un but d'existence. C'est tout le contraire. Les êtres eux-mêmes tirent des explications ontologiques et un sens d'existence de ces termes sur lesquels l'écosystème est structuré ou mis en place et de fonctions qu'il a offertes à chaque partie de sa structure. Ils ne peuvent pas intervenir de sorte qu'ils transforment structurellement ce qui est déterminé par en haut ou de même qu'ils offrent de nouveaux contenus herméneutiques et ontologiques. Chaque apparition d'entité n'est vraiment rien de nouveau mais un dévoilement perceptible du déjà existant dans la région suprasensible.¹¹ Ici parallèlement il est nécessaire de noter que dans le système du philosophe néoplatonicien le monde des archétypes intelligibles ne constitue pas seulement la cause qualitative mais aussi la cause définitive et finale du physique. Donc, aucun être ne remplit les présuppositions de donner à soi-même une définition d'existence en se basant à quelques unes de ses propres possibilités pour un auto-accomplissement indépendant. Il assurera le complément de son existence seulement en cas de répétition en forme de ses propres termes les éléments qu'il a engagés d'en haut.¹²

C] La mission de l'homme dans le monde naturel

Les conséquences des sus-mentionnés pour la place ontologique et axiologique de l'espèce humaine deviennent progressivement évidentes. Selon Proclus, l'homme en tant qu'existence rationnelle vivante constitue l'être le plus élevé étant dans l'échelle de la création en ce qui concerne le degré de la possession des qualités et leur synthèse. Il tient la qualité de l'intelligence – et donc tous les processus délibératifs qui résultent de son opération –, tandis que les autres êtres tiennent seulement l'état de l'existence et de la vie.¹³

¹⁰ Voir, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, I, 294.9-28: “Ὡς γάρ κινεῖται ἐκεῖθεν, καὶ αἰεὶ γίνεται. Πάν γάρ τὸ ἐξ ἀκινήτου γιγνόμενον αἰτίας ἀνέκλειπτον ἔλαχε φύσιν. Ὡστε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὁ κόσμος ἔχει ἂν τὸ αἰδίων ἐξ ἀκινήτου αἰτίας προϊὼν [...] Πολλῷ ἄρα μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν γένεσις. Αἰεὶ ἐν τέλει ἐστί, μιμουμένη τὴν τελειότητα τοῦ ποιοῦντος”. Voir aussi, J. Trouillard, *La procession du temps selon Proclus*, *Diotima* (1976), pp. 104-113.

¹¹ Voir, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, III, 222.19-22: “Πάν γοῦν τὸ μεταβλητὸν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὸν καὶ γενητὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν ἐξ αἰτίας γέγονεν ἀκινήτου μὲν κατ’ οὐσίαν, ἄλλως δὲ κινουμένης κατ’ ἐνέργειαν”. Aussi, III, 55.5-7: “Πάν γοῦν τὸ γενόμενον ἐστί πρό τῆς γενέσεως ἀφανῶς ἰδρυμένον ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ αἰτίᾳ”.

¹² Voir, *Théologie Platonicienne*, II, 40.2-41.5. Que la Principe Suprême constitue la cause finale du monde physique est d'engagement pour quiconque opinion aux données cosmologiques. Le Divin Suprême constitue le critère absolu et final du sens des êtres physiques. Quiconque autre recherche du sens total de-venne superflu.

¹³ Voir, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, I, 386.19-29: “Ὁ δημιουργὸς κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐνάδα τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, καθ’ ἣν καὶ θεός, ἐστί δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕλης αἴτιος, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ὄν τὸ δημιουργικὸν αὐτῆς μὲν οὐκ

Mais en tout cas, l'homme est le produit de la manière dont l'écosystème se manifeste évolutivement et sous ses propres lois. La possibilité de développer une altérité ontologique radicale est ainsi exclue aussi bien face à l'ensemble dans lequel elle appartient que face à ses autres parties. Et ceci, parce qu'une éventuelle altérité introduirait la perspective de constitution de systèmes ontologiques distincts entre eux qui élimineraient automatiquement le monisme. Parallèlement ils ne correspondraient point à ce qui est considéré comme réel, ni à sa structure, d'après la logique formelle, puisque l'homme partage des propriétés communes avec les autres êtres. De même, une telle perspective est tout à fait étrangère à la fonction universelle, sous-jacente aux lois et téléologique du monde de l'expérience perceptible. Ici prédominent inchangés des principes réglementaires qui se spécialisent par rapport selon le cas.¹⁴ Même en résumé il est nécessaire de clarifier que la fonction sous-jacente aux lois ne signifie pas une production mécanique rigide. Le philosophe néoplatonicien introduit des éléments de volonté dans l'expression productive du Divin, au moment où il estime aussi bien que tous les êtres sensibles possèdent, certainement avec des variations, des caractéristiques psychiques. L'impact des lois ici signifie que tous les êtres obtiennent en quelque sorte certaines dimensions intellectuelles.¹⁵

Proclus analyse exhaustivement et avec une adéquation méthodologique et solide la spécification ci-dessus. Dans son écosystème diverses procédures de transformations sont développées ; leurs résultats diffèrent entre eux par rapport aux propriétés qu'elles possèdent ou acquièrent. Le produit de ces processus est le développement chez l'espèce humaine d'une caractéristique particulière – et peut-être unique –, que les autres espèces ne possèdent pas.

L'homme a l'habileté de méditer, mais il l'acquiert parce que d'abord il existe et vit. Sinon, l'intelligence n'aurait aucune possibilité de présence. Nous pourrions donc appuyer que dans le cadre d'une théorie concernant l'évolution des formes d'existence supérieures se présentent par intervalles dans l'univers cosmique (ou dans le cadre limité de la planète Terre). En tout cas, indépendamment des nouveaux éléments que ces for-

αἴτιος, τῶν δὲ σωμάτων ἢ σώματα καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν ποιότητων... Καὶ πάντα μὲν ὅσα κατὰ τὰς δευτέρας ποιεῖ δυνάμεις μετὰ τῶν προτέρων ἀπεργάζεται. Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἔννουν καὶ ζωῆς μετέχει καὶ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῆς ἐνώσεως, καὶ τὸ ζῶον ἐστὶ τε καὶ ἔν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὄν διὰ τῆς οικείας ἐνότητος συνέχεται". Pour les termes "εἶναι-ζωή-νοῦς", voir Proclus, *Elements de Théologie*, pr. 101-103, pp. 90.17-92.29 (ed. E.R. Dodds). Voir aussi, W. Beierwaltes, *Proklos, Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik*, Frankfurt am Main 1979, pp. 93-118.

¹⁴ Voir, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, I, 262.16-25: "Οὐ γὰρ δεῖ πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς, ἀλλ' εἰς κοίρανος ἔστω ἐν πάντων αἴτιον καὶ μία πρόνοια καὶ εἰς εἰρμός, ἔστω δὲ καὶ ἅμα τῇ μοναδί τὸ οἰκεῖον πλῆθος καὶ πολλοὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ αἴτια ποικίλα καὶ πρόνοια πολυειδής καὶ τάξις διάφορος, πανταχοῦ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος ἐχέτω περὶ τὴν μονάδα σύνταξιν καὶ τὰ ποικίλα περὶ τὸ κοινόν, ἵνα σειρά τις ὄντως χρυσὴ πάντων ὑπάρχῃ καὶ πάντα διακοσμητὰ δεόντως". Voir aussi, J. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus*, pp. 71-91.

¹⁵ Pour la présence totale de l'"Âme" à la "Nature" et au monde de l'expérience perceptible nous citons indicativement le texte suivant: "Ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐν πλῆθος καὶ εἰς λόγος καὶ ἀριθμὸς παντοίων εἰδῶν, καὶ μιμεῖται τὴν τέλει τὴν δημιουργικὴν καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν τῶν δυνάμεων τοῦ πατρὸς. Πρῶτον τοίνυν αὐτὴν καθ' ὅλην ἣτις ἐστὶ κατανοήσωμεν, μένουσάν τε καὶ προϊούσαν ἐν ἑαυτῇ καὶ ἐπιστρέφουσαν, καὶ διὰ καὶ προνοοῦσαν ἄλλως μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ καθαρῶν εἰδῶν καὶ ἐγκοσμίων, ἄλλως δὲ τῶν σωμάτων ἀπάντων καὶ τῆς μεριστῆς οὐσίας", (*In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, II, 218.26-219.10). Dans l'œuvre de Proclus l'"Âme" constitue cette réalité ontologique que transfère les produits des processus-synthèses metaphysiques à la "Nature" et ainsi rend possible la production du monde de l'expérience perceptible. Voir *Elements de Théologie*, pr. 160.21-184.20, pp. 184-211. Voir aussi P. Bastid, *Proclus et le crépuscule...*, pp. 365-382. J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'Âme selon Proclus*, pp. 22-67. Pour la thèse d'élément de la volonté pendant le processus productif dans l'œuvre de Proclus, voir *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, I, 371.16-372.16. Voir aussi J. Trouillard, *Procession néoplatonicienne...*, pp. 5-10.

mes présentent, elles ont leur fond, biologiquement dirait-on, aux formes précédentes. Un rapprochement surtout prudent des textes cosmologiques de Proclus nous conduirait à la constatation que chaque forme d'existence supérieure est le prolongement des formes précédentes et qualitativement inférieures aux catégories des êtres nouvellement présentées. En tout cas, quelconque forme d'évolution qui apparaisse ne modifie point la composition générale de la production et de la structuration fonctionnelle des êtres qui ont déjà déterminé les premières couches nucléaires. L'évolution essentiellement met en avant sous une forme de développement les possibilités inépuisables peut-être productives et formatives des noyaux.¹⁶ L'homme acquiert ainsi sa valeur non seulement de lui-même mais aussi bien des termes cosmiques qui sont valables dans une échelle universelle, qui l'alimentent et l'entourent. Si l'écosystème n'existait pas, l'homme n'existerait non plus. Il ne s'autodétermine pas seulement mais aussi il se hétérodétermine et même initialement. Son organisme est un état biologique qui lui appartient en faveur, et certes non en qualité de revêtement mais en qualité de consistance. Ces nécessités sont inébranlables.

Les relations et les dépendances ci-dessus s'étendent même sur la manière dont l'homme met en action le mode biologique de son existence. Ses actions et les processus à travers lesquels passe sa présence reflètent les normes spéciales qui lui ont été greffées par un organisme plus général et plus catholique qui fonctionne archétypiquement face à lui. Il ne s'agit pas simplement de représentation figurative mais d'une représentation véritable et réelle. L'homme est un microcosme véritable. C'est donc une substance concrète qui découle des conditions cosmiques générales déjà constituées. Il spécifie les principes catholiques à travers des combinaisons. À savoir il s'agit d'une spécification qui a lieu sous les termes qui lui sont propres, sans pourtant violer les présuppositions générales que l'écosystème a déterminées comme paradigme.¹⁷ Par conséquent, l'homme ne peut pas servir d'exemple. Il est loin de ses normes de définir primairement des principes de vie. C'est-à-dire qu'il ne possède pas les présuppositions indispensables pour attribuer de la valeur aux autres êtres comme puissance de supériorité. Le contraire renverserait les raisons les plus profondes pour lesquelles l'écosystème a été constitué avec ses variétés. L'homme n'a dès ses normes ontologiques envers n'importe quel être ni la possibilité de le produire ni la possibilité de lui donner une forme. À cause de l'absence des possibilités ci-dessus il ne peut pas avoir les prétextes d'interventions sur la question axiologique qui, dans le système philosophique de Proclus, avant n'importe quel autre caractère, est d'ordre ontologique. Sa seule intervention qui aura du sens proviendra du fait d'une compréhension profonde de son entourage et de son comportement analogue à cette compréhension. Le fait que l'homme ne peut pas intervenir aux structures de développement des autres êtres constitue l'extension normale des observations précédentes. La violence de la biodiversité définie d'en haut, de la biostabilité et même de bioévolu-

¹⁶ Voir, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, V, 281.4-288.27. Pour la notion de la causalité au Proclus, voir Ev. Moutsopoulos, *Les structures de l'imaginaire dans la philosophie de Proclus*, ed. "Les Belles Lettres", Paris 1985, pp. 43-60.

¹⁷ Voir, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, V, 311.21-314.22: "Τὰ γὰρ παρὰ τῆς ὅλης δημιουργίας ὑφέστηκεν. Ἡ δὲ τῆς λοιπῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου προσάρτησις ἀφομοιοῖ τοὺς ἐγκοσμίους τῇ πατρικῇ δυνάμει..." Ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος τὸ μερικὸν ἐστὶ τοῦτο ζῶον, ὃ προσήρτηται τῇ ἀθανάτῳ ψυχῇ. Πρὸς δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων βλέπει δημιουργία. Τοῦ γὰρ ὅλου χάριν ἀπογεννᾶται καὶ τὰ μέρη...". Voir aussi, L. J. Rosan, *The philosophy of Proclus*, New York 1949, pp. 75-114.

tivité, qui constituent des éléments primaires de l'écosystème, ne s'intègre pas du tout à l'horizon des habiletés. Selon Proclus, le monde physique n'est pas un système fermé mais un effectif et par conséquent il suit une marche de développement.

Même s'il se présente en tant que fermé, une situation pareille exprimerait le complètement de la course, le fait que ses noyaux spermatiques seraient conduits à l'activation de toutes leurs possibilités. C'est donc de cet organisme très ample que l'homme constitue une partie.¹⁸ C'est un mécanisme organique à part qui s'intègre fonctionnellement dans ce cadre qui pourrait être nommé: chaîne cosmique. C'est un maillon, soit le supérieur, dans la composition de la chaîne, un échantillon de son développement. Si dans le cadre de ce développement le principe de la succession fonctionne pour le mieux ou de la transition au plus qualitatif, cela ne constitue pas une donnée qui affecte les indications précédentes.

Notez bien, finalement, que d'après le philosophe néoplatonicien la dimension esthétique ou la beauté de l'écosystème s'appuient sur les fonctions que lui-même suit et sur l'harmonie avec laquelle ses parties coexistent. Cette harmonie découle de la présence réglementaire que les fonctions en question posent. Il s'agit surtout des moyens qui ont été délivrés par la région métaphysique, dans laquelle on se développe la beauté divine et archétypique, c'est-à-dire la beauté absolue.¹⁹ Dans ce cas donc l'homme ne possède pas ce qui est esthétiquement excellent,²⁰ de manière autodyname et à travers la manière dont il formerait soi-même. La beauté divine est diffusée sur tous les niveaux et devient perceptible en partageant ses interventions. Tous les êtres participent à la beauté divine, en proportion de leur propre substance, et cette participation met en place chacun d'entre eux d'une manière individuelle dans la catégorie de ce qui est esthétiquement excellent.

On pourrait certes appuyer que dans la substance humaine une combinaison d'éléments est réalisée avec une telle technotropie harmonieuse, de sorte qu'elle ne présente pas de substance esthétiquement plus excellente que les autres êtres. L'élévation toutefois du plus excellent ne supprime pas la présence de l'excellent. Donc, ici aussi les graduations et les hiérarchisations se meuvent dans le même cadre ontologique et appartiennent à la même perspective de démiurgie.²¹ Nous aboutirions ainsi aux transgressions du normal, si nous posions des coupures verticales à une unité, aux qualités de laquelle – et non seulement aux qualités esthétiques – appartient la diversité.

¹⁸ Voir, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, V, 171.21-189.18: “Ο σύμπας οὕτωςί κόσμος πολὺς καὶ ποικίλος ὢν...”. A la unité thématique mentionnée Proclus essaye à proposer une théologie autant que une scientifique approche de la variété et des états d'évolution du monde de l'expérience perceptible.

¹⁹ Voir indicativement *Théologie Platonicienne*, I, 106.5-109.2.

²⁰ Voir, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, II, 264.10-275.19: “Ἐκεῖθεν γάρ πρόεισι τό καλόν. Ἐκεῖ οὖν ἡ καλλοποιός αἰτία, δι’ ἣν πάντα καλὰ, νοῦς καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ σώματος φύσις... Το παράδειγμα αἴτιον τοῦ κάλλους... τό δέ νοητόν τοῦ τε κάλλους καὶ τοῦ εἶδους...”.

²¹ Voir *Εἰς τὸν Τίμαιον Πλάτωνος*, IV, 140.19-141.29: “Πάντων τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν πρόοδοι γεγόνασιν εἰς τὴν γῆν καὶ ἀποπερατώσεις, καὶ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῇ πάντα χθονίως, ὅσα ἐν οὐρανῷ οὐρανίως...”. Aussi, V, 238.19-243.19: “πάν ζῶον ἀνάγκη λογικὴν ἔχειν καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν... Πάντα δ’ οὖν τὰ ζῶα καὶ νῦν ἀπεργάζεσθαι προστάττει τοῖς νέοις θεοῖς ὁ πατήρ καὶ γεννᾷν τῷ ἀθανάτῳ τό θνητόν προσυφαίνουσι... καὶ τὰ φυτὰ πάντα παράγουσι, τῶν τιμιωτέρων ἔνεκα ταῦτα ὑποστήσαντες... Πολλοὺ ἄρα δεῖ τὴν ζωοφαγίαν ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀποδέχεσθαι...”. Dans la plus ample région thématique à la quelle appartient la paragraphe ci-dessus, Proclus revise le sujet sur l'alimentation à échelle universelle. Appuye, donc, que chacune catégorie des êtres doit d'ajuster sa alimentation rigide à sa bioorganique texture.

Conclusions

D'après tout ce que nous avons examiné, nous aboutissons aux constatations suivantes:

A. Proclus constitue sa théorie sur le monde physique, excluant un modèle anthropocentrique qui sera le maître absolu des autres créatures. Il ne procède pas à des coupures entre un niveau humain et non humain, mais il met seulement en avant, dans le cadre d'un monisme cosmologique, des différenciations, soit sous les termes d'une – en quelque sorte – perfection augmentative. Par conséquent, chaque être a un sens d'existence.

B. Il exclut quelconque condition de fondation du sujet évaluatif en se basant au principe de l'unicité ou de l'exclusivité. Tous les êtres physiques sont doués des moyens de prescriptions métaphysiques, alors ils se présentent comme produits de la bonté divine. Indirectement donc on se formule la proposition suivante: qu'il n'est pas normal pour certains êtres d'être exclus de quelconque perspective d'importance et, par extension, de respect. La présence des autres êtres n'est pas pour l'homme outillée ou d'usage/chrestique. Ils coexistent avec lui dans le cadre d'une cohésion cosmique.

C. Il estime que à l'horizon des perspectives humaines le principe de l'utilitarisme ne doit pas exister. Malgré le fait que dans tout ce que nous avons examiné il n'exprime pas de sujets d'une composition éthique, les prolongements de ses thèses sur la production du monde physique dans la région des actions sont évidentes. L'homme est appelé à concevoir qu'il ne peut pas déployer de désirs ou de préférences qui vont briser la présence et le fonctionnement qui ont été déterminés sur les autres êtres. Aucune forme de liberté ou mieux d'arbitraire ne lui est reconnue, de sorte qu'il intervient avec des renversements au cadre de vie valable délimité. Voilà pourquoi nous pourrions aisément soutenir qu'il se place plutôt dans un niveau de devoirs que de droits. Si donc nous essayions de présenter la théorie du philosophe néoplatonicien sur l'éthique environnementale, nous aurions comme moteur les engagements que déterminent dans la société ses devoirs face à l'écosystème.

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The theology of the “Free Slaves”

Introduction

Old Testament history, as well as the development of the theological ideas within it, is often viewed upon from a narrower theological-exegetical perspective which often overlooks a deep connection between the religious and the social aspects. Although the Old Testament represents a wide range of theological ideas which were eventually modified, there are internal, deep structures that could be named “the truth of faith”, which framed and ideologically directed theological contemplation of the Biblical writers. One of the basic postulates of Yahweism was that faith in God includes an adequate attitude towards another man. The religious aspect is inseparable from the social one. A man’s internal religious belief by nature is reflected on the social level. In this regard, it is important to recognize the link between the religious and social elements of the Biblical theologians, especially the prophets, in relation to the world in which they lived. This reveals a great, one could say essential, difference between the then-valid religious and social principles and the prophetic theological insight.

1. The religious-social understanding of the world in which the Israel originated

The ancient Israel, as a nation, arrived to the stage of history when many kingdoms and many Middle Eastern nations had already went through a long period of their civilizations’ development and had created rich cultures. This is the age of the Egyptian New Kingdom - the age of the great boom and expansion. At the same time, Egypt was a civilization dating back as many as fifteen centuries. In Mesopotamia, Sumerians and Akkadians have long since disappeared from the historical scene. Sargon the Great, Hammurabi, Zimri-Lim already belonged to the long past ... Hebron was then a city several millennia old; The Phoenicians have long since crossed the Mediterranean Sea. It was a time when the political scene was dominated by: Egypt, Hittite Empire, Assyria, Mitanni. Literacy was prevalent throughout the biggest part of the Middle East; *The epic of Gilgamesh*, *The Enûma Eliš*, *The Lessons for King Meri-ka-rea* etc. were written a long time ago. The Great Pyramids - a masterpiece of the Egyptian engineers – were built a thousand years ago. The world in which Israel emerged had long since built its temples, cities, roads, had its own theology, powerful state and its ideology.

The people of the old Middle East had built up an ethical and aesthetic vision of the world. The basis of their ethics and aesthetics was a religious belief. In fact, the ancient Middle East basically built up a religious picture of reality that dominated all the aspects of

human life. Of course, the religious consciousness had also undergone several transformations. There were different variations on, often very similar, religious models. At the stage of history, the nations were taking turns. Each one introduced some of their own characteristics, although the basic structure remained identical. This can, above all, be seen in the religious and political consciousness which were intertwined. In general, the ancient civilization of the Middle East was quite complex and rich. In the earlier times, many prejudices (often ideological) of the Eastern despotism, slavery society, pre-critical thought etc. were present in the biblical science. In recent years, an increasing number of discovered records and other artifacts have shed a new light on the world of the ancient civilization.

Regardless of the many unknowns, and at the risk of somewhat simplifying the old Middle Eastern thought, the main spiritual structure can essentially be reconstructed. Namely, the life of man was conformed to the life of the broader community ruled by a clear social order. The social structure was an accentuated pyramidal-hierarchical structure. The old Mesopotamians and Egyptians believed that the monarchy was a God given form of functioning society. The ruler was at the top of the social ladder as the undisputed master. His status was special compared to all the others. After him came the members of the royal family, who often occupied high state positions, then came the high court officials (advisers, officials, high priests). The representatives of these classes were mostly also large landowners. A high and important place in society was occupied by the local managers and their officials. On the lower level were merchants and craftsmen, while the lowest level consisted of the farmers, laborers and slaves. The entire social structure was based on their work.

The ruler was the crown of the pyramidal socio-political structure. In Mesopotamia, in the earlier past, he was the guardian of the city-state in the name of the divine patron saint. In later empires, his domain extended over the whole country. The texts of the middle of the third millennium testify of a very developed sovereign ideology based on a religious belief. A part of the inscription of the city-state of Lagash (ca. 2450) describes the ruler as a divine being – he was created and fostered by gods:

Ningirsu (patron-god of Lagash) implanted the semen for Eanatum (king of Lagash) in the womb [...] rejoiced over Eanatum. Inanna (a goddess) accompanied him, named him Eana-Inanna-Ibgalakakatum (his full name: 'worthy in the (temple) Eana of Inanna of Ibgal'), and set him on the special lap of Ninhursag (a mother of goddess). Ninhursag [offered him] her special breast. Ningirsu rejoiced over Eanatum, semen implanted in the womb by Ningirsu. Ningirsu laid his span upon him, for (a length of) five forearms he set his forearm upon him (He measured) five forearms (cubits), one span! Ningirsu, with great joy, [gave him], the kin[gship of Lagash].¹

The rulers were, in a special way, the "sons of God". Hammurabi himself says that he was born from the God Son, and Lipit-Ishtar was perceived as the son of god Enlil. A ruler's holiness was expressed in several ways. He was "the ruler of the country" or "master of the four corners of the universe," which was originally attributed to the gods. Of an Akkadian ruler is said: "Naram-Sin, the strong man, the god of Akkad, the ruler of the four corners (ie, the universe): Lugal-ušumgal, the scribe, the governor Lagash."²

¹ *Corpus des Inscriptions "royales" présargonique de Lagash*, Ean. 1: iv-v, E.Sollberger/J.Cooper, 1971, 1C5acf.

² F. Thureau-Dangin, *Reueil des tablettes chaldéennes*, Paris 1903, 165-166.

Similar views have also existed in Egypt. At one point Amenofis II of Amade celebrated pharaoh: "beloved bodily son of Re... good God, this Re's creature, ruler ... image of Horus on the throne of his father, great in power."³ The title appears in the New Empire, particularly in the 18th dynasty, "Re's image", "Re's holy image", "the living image on the earth" and so on. Pharaoh is "a bright image of the lord of the universe and the creature of the gods of Heliopolis ... Re has created him... as a living image".⁴ One text says of him: "He is a God who makes us alive through his works". Thus, Akhenaten means "the creative manifestation of Aton".⁵ The pharaoh says to himself: "I am his (Osiris') son, his protégé, his image that comes from him." At one point Amon says to Amenofis III: "my living image, a creature of my limbs." The ruler's label "image of God" is present in the area of Canaan as well. Thus, one text says: "The king's father, my lord; was the image (salam) of Baal; and the king, my lord; is the image of Baal."⁶ The ruler lived in close connection with the gods, but at the same time resided among the people. He represented the essential link between the gods and men, between the cosmic and the social. Through participation in the divine life he was the creator of life and fertility.⁷

The ruler was the guarantor and defender of the cosmic order whose earthly parallel is "law and order".⁸ The state order has a religious foundation; religious and secular are an integral form of social reality. At the head of the political-religious order stood the ruler himself.⁹ All the other roles (positions) were derived from it, whether they were a religious or a political-economic one. In fact, the ruler and his subjects should imitate the gods, because the gods are responsible for the cosmic order. The cosmic order is the paradigm of social order. The framework established by the gods (with the supreme god) must be reflected in the country. Therefore, people were obliged to consecrate the ground. The construction of temples and cities, as well as the cultivation of agricultural resources is a sacred act, because it frees creation of wilderness and chaos. Through conceived interventions order is established in the nature, the order overcomes chaos. Through order the natural elements are overcome, and such a structure ought to rule in the human society as well.

According to the Egyptian theology, the world is governed by *maat*, a term which could be translated as "truth", "justice", "the correct order", "balance" and the like. The pharaoh was the incarnation of the divine *maat*. *Maat* is a connection between the divine and the human.¹⁰ The embodiment of divine *maat* - Pharaoh also kept (maintained) cosmic and social order; therefore he was the bearer of life. Since the social order is one aspect of the cosmic order, it was thought that the empire existed since the beginning of the world.¹¹ The creator was also the first emperor - cosmogony and the origin of state

³ Cf. H. Wildberger, *Das Abbild Gottes, Gen 1, 26-30* (ThZ 21), 485.

⁴ Cf. W. H. Schmidt, *Die Schöpfungsgeschichte der Priesterschaft*, Neukirchen 1964, 138.

⁵ J. van Dijk, *The Amarna Period and the Later New Kingdom*, in: *The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt* (ed. I. Shaw), Oxford University Press, 2000, 276.

⁶ Cf. W. H. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, 140.

⁷ M. Eljajade, *Istorija verovanja i religijskih ideja I*, Beograd 1991, 69.

⁸ A. Kuhrt, *The Ancient Near East c. 3000 – 300 BC*, London and New York 1995 / Beograd 2004, 145 (serbian translation).

⁹ A. Kuhrt, *op. cit.*, 31 (serbian translation).

¹⁰ J. Assmann, *Herrschaft und Heil*. Politische Theologie in Altägypten, Israel und Europa, München/Wien 2000, 38-39.

¹¹ M. Eljajade, *op. cit.*, 81.

are simultaneous, these are two aspects of the same reality. The first emperor was a god and was later inherited by the pharaohs. This, in essence, meant that the state and social institutions are the expression of the divine *maat*. God Ra "establishes order (*Maat*) instead of chaos" in creation. He appointed the Pharaoh to rule the country "always and forever", while the ruler on earth, imitating divine intervention, brings order instead of disorder. The very God of heaven establishes the order in the country. Disorder or chaos is perceived in the destroyed social order or the invasion of external enemies. Other nations that potentially or indirectly threaten the country are the embodiment evil and chaos. However, the Pharaoh was unable to govern arbitrarily – regardless of *maat*. He had to govern in accordance with it; it is only in this way that the link between the heavenly and the earthly was established. Ruling according to the divine *maat* meant the maintenance of the cosmic order. After death, the pharaoh crossed over into the divine pantheon. The preservation of pharaoh's mummy – which is why they built the pyramids – meant the salvation of the state and its subjects. The very social structure, which was extremely pyramidal-hierarchical, pointed to the divine. There is the one who is on the top and he places everything in order.

Every Egyptian was required to harmonize his life with the all-governing *maat*: "I was a man who loved *maat* and hated sin, knowing that God is terrified (of sin)". The order is possible if all social structures governed according to the governing *maat*. Essentially, this meant that everyone fulfilled their social role, regardless of one's class. Changes in the social order were considered to be an opposition to *maat*, which meant sin and injustice (*isfet*). This is certainly one of the main reasons why there were no serious social revolutions in the Old East. The existing social structure was accepted as a God given form, as a sacred order. Such a view was also fostered by a pessimistic anthropology, especially in Mesopotamia. Specifically, according to the Mesopotamian myth *Enûma Eliš*, the man was created from the blood of the evil demon Kingu. His role on the earth is to serve the gods and to support the order which they established.

Although life on earth ought to imitate the heavenly patterns there was a significant difference between these two worlds. The old Middle Eastern religious ideas clearly limited man. The border between gods and men is insurmountable. It was one of the key motifs of the *Epic of Gilgamesh*. The only possibility of participation in the divine is to accept God-given order, embodied by the temples, ziggurats, the pyramids, the imperial palace ... It was the center from which the order was established pyramidally, which was, as such, a consecrated expression of existence. It was the dominant paradigm of the ancient world which was, with certain modifications, valid from the beginning of the Sumerian city-states until the end of the Roman Empire. The freedom of the individual in relation to the established order would have been unimaginable.

2. Israel – a counterweight to the ruling ideology

Compared to the great peoples who built the old Middle Eastern civilization, Israel was, in political and cultural terms, a negligible historical phenomenon. Of Israel as a nation one can only talk after their entry into Canaan. The earliest this could be is 13th century B.C. Researchers believe that somewhere in this period, a smaller group of Israelites left Egypt and headed to the Promised Land. Regardless of the extent to which the narrative of the Exodus corresponds to historical reality, one aspect is of particular impor-

tance. Namely, according to the biblical narrative, God has chosen the Egyptian slaves and made a covenant with them. The Exodus tells the story of the people who escaped from slavery in Egypt, entered into a covenant with God at Mount Sinai and headed to the Promised Land. While in other Middle Eastern nations, the holders of alliances and special relationships with God (gods) were the rulers, Israelites established their relationship with God through the entire nation, which had previously been enslaved.

The ups and downs through which the Israelites go, moving from Egypt to the Promised Land, testify in an unusual way to a deep sense of freedom. The narrative is often imbued with tension between Moses (God) and the people. Nothing is presupposed. The participants of the event actively and freely make decisions. On the way to the Promised Land, the rest of the nation often opposes Moses (Ex 32). The description of the central event – the making of the covenant – clearly testifies. Moses – the mediator between God and Israelites – tells the people the will of Yahweh for them to accept it (Ex 24, 3.7). When contributions were being collected for the ark, God speaks to Moses: *You are to receive the offering for me from everyone whose heart prompts them to give.* (25, 1). Contribution to the offer to God should be from the heart, it is given in freedom and love. In fact, the whole concept of the Exodus is based on the idea of freedom.

No less important is the entry into and the conquer of the Promised Land. The biblical report of a lightning-fast war can not be taken as a true reflection of historical events. In the biblical teaching, there is a theory that Israel peacefully integrated into Canaan and eventually became the dominant ethnic community which founded its own state. In recent decades there appeared another very interesting hypothesis, which merits special attention. In fact, according to a number of prominent experts,¹² Israel has emerged as a result of social rebellion within Canaanite society and unification with a group of escaped slaves from Egypt. The runaway slaves entered the Promised Land carrying a theologically based idea of freedom and equality. At first they lived in a hilly part of Canaan, and they were later joined by the lower social strata from the Canaanite cities, who at the time of the great invasion of “Sea People” rebelled against the ruling classes and escaped into the hills, joining the Israelites. There is plenty of compelling scientific evidence supporting this thesis.

In this context, it is important to mention one archaeological discovery which is in favor of this hypothesis. Specifically, it is the phenomenon of the so-called Israelite houses from the pre-monarchy period. While in the cities of Canaan and throughout the Middle East there existed a concept of urban settlement according to which there were clearly separated parts of the city for the rich and the poor strata of the population, which was also reflected in the richness of the buildings, the Israelite type of house and the whole village was represented by an egalitarian social concept. The houses were simple and there are no urban solutions according to which some parts of the village were separated from the others in the sense of social stratification of the residents. This suggests that the early Israel, in the years of its origin and the first centuries of presence in the area of Canaan, was based on the religious organization, the foreground of which emphasized social equality – of course, corresponding to the broader social and political-economic

¹² Cf. G. Mendenhall, *The Tenth Generation: The Origins of Biblical Tradition*, Baltimore 1973; N. K. Gottwald, *The Tribes of Yahweh. A Sociology of the Religion of Liberated Israel 1250-1050 B. C. E.*, New York 1979; G. Ahlstrom, *Who Were the Israelites?*, Winona Lake, 1986; N. P. Lemche, *Early Israel: Anthropological and Historical Studies on the Israelite Society before the Monarchy*, Leiden, 1985.

system. It is from this perspective that one should consider the Biblical story of the Tower of Babel (Gen 11), as well as the statement that the first founder of the city was Cain – fratricide (Gen 4, 17). The stories of early Israel and the listed texts from the Biblical narrative are implicitly very critical of the then prevailing social system.

Two important historical narratives related to the Exodus and the settlement of Israel are fundamentally based on the idea of freedom and equality. Between these two events stands a desert as a place in which Israel felt that kind of life to the greatest extent. The desert will later, in the consciousness of the prophet, play precisely that role. The prophets called upon the ideal of the desert, criticizing the internal stratification of Israel (Hos 13, 5). In general, the nomadic-desert way of life carries a basic egalitarian concept,¹³ which was not possible in the then-civilized urban system. However, unlike the earlier tribal equality, which was represented in many ancient nomadic peoples, in the ancient Israel the idea of human equality received special theological outlines.

The latter history of Israel brought ordeals for the ancient ideals. Namely, after establishing ethnic superiority over other nations in the territory of Canaan, Israelites encountered great challenges in confrontation with the Philistines and other nations. The better organized surrounding nations were superior on the field of battle, and eventually the question of the internal organization of Israel arose. The solution was the establishment of the monarchy. This would soon lead Israelites to a position that, at the time of kings David and Solomon, they were the dominant political factor which took over control of the country. Biblical writers largely idealized the works of King David. However, the very next the king, Solomon, was designated as the originator of collapse (1Kings 11). Of course, this issue ought to be viewed from a wider angle. The Israelites, of nomadic mentality, had increasingly more intensive contact with the Canaan's agrarian culture. This was reflected in their basic habits and lifestyle. Agrarian cults were basically the starting point of the contemporary pagan religious consciousness and the driving force of civilization process.

Soon, there appeared the prophets who were vehemently opposed to new trends within Israel. Yahweh, in their consciousness, could not become a God of the state and the weather conditions. He had a very different nature, and could not be compared to the gods of the neighboring Syrian world.¹⁴ There was a real danger of 'Canaanizing' Yahweh, as the new circumstances, especially related to fertility cults, could draw the very cult of Yahweh into a similar ritual form. It was a very real ordeal. Canaanites were in the civilizational and cultural sense incomparably superior to Israelites. Other nations which came to the area of cultural and superior nations usually adopted their traditions and continued to operate under a similar religious and social matrix. However, the Israelite prophets and groups of loyal Yahweists did not accept such a model. Behind many of the biblical narratives and prophetic condemnation one can clearly see fierce opposition to Canaanite cults.

The criticism of Canaanite cults was a criticism of a lifestyle that profoundly reflected onto the religious consciousness, while at the same time springing from it. This criticism is also found in the narrative of Cain and Abel. Cain was a farmer, a paradigm of the Canaanites. His sacrifice was not accepted by God, but the shepherd-nomad Abel's was. The

¹³ H. W. Robinson, *Corporate Personality in Ancient Israel*, Philadelphia 1964, 18-20.

¹⁴ F. Stolz, „Unterscheidung von Gott und Welt: Monotheismus“, *Weltbilder der Religionen, Kultur und Natur: Diesseits und Jenseits. Kontrollierbares und Unkontrollierbares*, Zürich 2001, 146.

8th century prophets Hosea and Amos criticized the pagan rituals particularly. The essence of immorality to the Israelites of that time, according to the prophetic understanding, lied in their perverted religious practice and preference of Canaanite cults, "Baal and Astarte". Even when they formally confessed Yahweh, they had more respect for him as Baal, the god of goods and property. So, Hosea, in the image of an unfaithful woman, regards the entire Israel that is similarly in prostitution with Canaanite gods (2, 5). The purpose of such a religion is to achieve material prosperity, which is made possible through the rituals devoted to fertility deities.¹⁵ In such cults, strong elements of magical consciousness are present. Certain ritualistic operations had to have been performed in order to achieve the desired effect. The very cult of Yahweh was frequently ritualized and transformed into the established religious patterns, which obscured the original meaning of the faith.

The prophets were not only a minority, but they were often persecuted and considered a disruptive element within the nation, as evidenced by the narrative cycles of Elijah and Elisha. The majority of Israelite community, led by the Emperor and the court, accepted the system that was too similar to other nations'. Israel as a political entity could survive as an empire only if it was established by the models applicable to those times. The problem was that by this, Yahweistic ideals were crumbling. It is understandable that the biblical writer attributed the sins to Solomon and his introduction of foreign cults which spoiled the true faith in Yahweh. In essence, with Solomon and the development of the state apparatus a systemic corruption of the earlier ideals is introduced. The ideals of liberty and equality are disappearing in the process of establishing a hierarchically organized state. In fact, the prophets criticized the very concept of the empire (ref. Hos 9, 15). In 1 Sam 8, 1ss one reads of the champions coming to Samuel to ask him to appoint them an emperor. The biblical writer describes the reaction of Samuel: *He said, "This is what the king who will reign over you will claim as his rights: He will take your sons and make them serve with his chariots and horses, and they will run in front of his chariots. Some he will assign to be commanders of thousands and commanders of fifties, and others to plow his ground and reap his harvest, and still others to make weapons of war and equipment for his chariots. He will take your daughters to be perfumers and cooks and bakers. He will take the best of your fields and vineyards and olive groves and give them to his attendants. He will take a tenth of your grain and of your vintage and give it to his officials and attendants. Your male and female servants and the best of your cattle and donkeys he will take for his own use. He will take a tenth of your flocks, and you yourselves will become his slaves. When that day comes, you will cry out for relief from the king you have chosen, but the Lord will not answer you in that day.* (1Sam 8, 11-18). In these words the theological vision of a theological movement that has strongly opposed the very idea of the empire is expressed. In the biblical studies it is referred to as the anti-monarchist (cf. 1 Sam 8; 10, 17-25; 12).

The tensions between the Yahweists and the syncretists culminated in the 8th century, when a greater social stratification occurred. It was a kind of a period of social transition. The state apparatus was built on a hierarchical basis, which presupposed the formation of a layer of wealthy people. The conquest of the new territories contributed to this. The increase in power and wealth of certain social strata was happening at the expense of the poorer (cf. Micah 2, 2). The faith in God Baal – a landowner, implied such

¹⁵ Cf. J. Drane, *Introducing the Old Testament*, Oxford 1999 / Beograd 2003, 179-180 (serbian translation).

a cult. The sign that God is on one's side was evident in his material possessions, the abundance of crops. Today it is possible only to assume (based on the current analogy) in which perfidious ways such a transition was performed. The prophets were involving themselves in the fight against it. An example of this is the prophet Elijah who was opposed to Ahab and Jezebel and was engaged in active struggle with the pagan cults and customs (1Kings 17–19).¹⁶ It was probably sometime in this period that the Israelite theologians made the idealized division of the country according to their tribes and conducted numerous genealogies. Although these parts of the Old Testament may seem boring and pointless to contemporary readers, they had a distinct theological importance at the time of occurrence as well as later. This was the way it was shown that the country is divided by tribes and families, and therefore needs to be owned by them, while the genealogy aimed to demonstrate genealogical bond between the then oppressed and disenfranchised with their ancestors who were given the land.

Almost the entire period of the monarchy was marked by tension between the Yahweists and those prone to respecting other gods.¹⁷ However, it would be difficult to understand such a protest of the prophets against a mere difference between the ritual in the cults of Yahweh and the other gods, or that it was about a whole-hearted affection towards a national god. The prophets, because of the sins of Israel, often announced the ruin their own people (2Kings 21, 12–15; Hos 7–8; Amos 3, 9–11). Israel's God is the one who brings the Assyrians as a punishment that should come upon Ephraim and Judah. God also raises the Babylonian emperor to demolish Jerusalem. Criticism by the prophets on account of Israel testifies that Jehovah is not a national god in the classical meaning. At the same time, in the Old Testament writings, one can find many instances where the Israelites are shown as no better than others or even on the contrary – worse than others. Some texts mention non-Israelites that were very honorable people (Pharaoh in the narrative of Abraham and Sarah, Abimelech, Uriah the Hittite, the people of Nineveh who repent). In fact, belonging to the true Israel implied a distinctive way of life, which overcame national framework and placed the emphasis on the fulfillment of the provisions of the Covenant. Certainly, one should be aware that the prophets often depicted almost pure ideals and utopian views, of which they themselves were often aware (cf. Is 2, 12, 13, 6.9; Joel 3, 14; Amos 5, 18–20; Ob 1, 15). However, these ideals were supposed to be important religious imperatives.

The essential difference between Yahweism and pagan belief lied in the belief system. This is especially related to the Yahweistic understanding of the man. The prophets often criticize Israel for incorrectly respecting God - offering sacrifices while doing injustice to one another (cf. Am 2, 6; 3, 10; 4, 1; 5, 11–12). The prophets reject such a cult clearly and vigorously: *I hate, I despise your religious festivals; your assemblies are a stench to me. Even though you bring me burnt offerings and grain offerings, I will not accept them. Though you bring choice fellowship offerings, I will have no regard for them. Away with the noise of your songs! I will not listen to the music of your harps. (Am 5, 21–23) or: For I desire mercy, not sacrifice, and acknowledgment of God rather than burnt offerings. (Hos*

¹⁶ Cf. E. F. Kempbell Jr., *A Land Divided*. Judah and Israel from the Daeth of Solomon to the Fall of Samaria, in: *The Oxford History of the Biblical World* (ed. M. Coogan), Oxford University Press 1998, 221–223.

¹⁷ Cf. B. Lang, *Der monarchische Monotheismus und die Konstellation zweier Götter im Frühjudentum*: Ein neuer Versuch über Menschensohn, Sophia und Christologie, Ein Gott allein?, OBO, Freiburg Schweiz 1994, 559–563.

6: 6). The knowledge of God consists of keeping the law, which is primarily related to an adequate attitude towards another man. What the knowledge of God means can be read from the following words: *He did what was right and just, so all went well with him. He defended the cause of the poor and needy, and so all went well. Is that not what it means to know me?* "declares the Lord. (Jer 22, 16). The true faith in Yahweh necessarily implies the prophet's instructions: *He has shown you, O mortal, what is good. And what does the Lord require of you? To act justly and to love mercy.* (Mi 6: 8). In contrast to the cult in which the relationship to the neighbor was neglected, the prophets emphasize: *But let justice roll on like a river; righteousness like a never-failing stream!* (Am 5, 24).

Of course, this raises the question of what the justice is to the prophets. It is known that in ancient Egypt, in the Amarna period, abundant sacrifices were offered to the gods, while the largest number of population was suffering from malnutrition. That in itself might not seem so daunting were it not in a religious context. However, the shocking fact is that such practices did not provoke criticism by the Egyptian theologians. It was a fulfillment of some higher justice (*Maat*), which holds all in existence. In the Amarna period, the status of the righteousness (*maaty*) was acquired through the complete loyalty to the monarch and order (*Maat*) which he embodied.¹⁸ In such a conception, the importance of individual personality was obscured. Slavery was based on this scorn of the common man. The people could only imitate and respect the existing order (justice), which did not exist for their sake.

However, to the Old Testament prophets, the righteousness was measured by respect towards the fellow human being. The fulfillment of Justice reflected, above all, in love and compassion toward the fellow man: *He follows my decrees and faithfully keeps my laws... but gives his food to the hungry and provides clothing for the naked.* (Ez 18, 5.7c). Isaiah summed it up: *"The multitude of your sacrifices—what are they to me?" says the Lord. "I have more than enough of burnt offerings, of rams and the fat of fattened animals; I have no pleasure in the blood of bulls and lambs and goats. When you come to appear before me, who has asked this of you, this trampling of my courts? Stop bringing meaningless offerings! Your incense is detestable to me. New Moons, Sabbaths and convocations – I cannot bear your worthless assemblies. Your New Moon feasts and your appointed festivals I hate with all my being. They have become a burden to me; I am weary of bearing them. When you spread out your hands in prayer, I hide my eyes from you; even when you offer many prayers, I am not listening. Your hands are full of blood! Wash and make yourselves clean. Take your evil deeds out of my sight; stop doing wrong. Learn to do right; seek justice. Defend the oppressed. Take up the cause of the fatherless; plead the case of the widow* (1, 11-17). Everyone was required to uphold justice. This related in every sense to the emperor (Jer). Emperors did not need to have a lot of *horses, women, silver and gold* (Deut 17, 16-17), but they needed to fulfill the law: *and not consider himself better than his fellow Israelites* (Deut 17, 20a). In these provisions of Deuteronomy the Old Testament ideals radiate: all are equal before God, and they should remain such between each other. The ideal emperor – David, was a shepherd in his youth. This refuted any divine origin of the Israelite emperor.

It has been said that the Egyptians and other nations, the only one who was god-like was the ruler. Contrary to such beliefs stood the Old Testament understanding that

¹⁸ Cf. J. van Dijk, *op. cit.*, 277-278.

every man is God-like (Gen 1, 26-27). The Bible especially emphasizes human dignity, so in one place the psalmist says that the man is slightly *lesser than Elohim* (Ps 8, 5). In this respect, there is a consistent match between basic theological ideas. The God who made a covenant with the runaway slaves is the God who created a man by his own image. A proper relationship with God is achieved through a relationship with the neighbor, because he is God-like. There are no value differences between the people; there is no awareness of the classes. Israel self-reflected as a brotherhood of the people of God.¹⁹ The expressions *re'a* (the neighbor) and *'âh* (brother) include all the members of the Sinai covenant.²⁰ The 'Sons of Israel' were the people of brotherhood, whose bodily origin is of the twelve brothers. An example of a strong connection between the chosen people can be seen in relation to the debtor or servant, a member of the same people (Lev 21, 2.16; 22, 25; Deut 15, 2.12; 23, 20; 24, 7).²¹

According to the Old Testament understanding, the true religion was based on the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by the Covenant. Israel was called upon to be a holy nation: *You are to be holy to me because I, the Lord, am holy* (Lev 20, 26). Holiness meant the fulfillment of justice and having love and compassion. In the so-called Code of holiness one finds: *Do not hate a fellow Israelite in your heart. Rebuke your neighbor frankly so you will not share in their guilt. Do not seek revenge or bear a grudge against anyone among your people, but love your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord* (Lev 19, 17-18). The maintenance of the Covenant with Yahweh meant the fulfillment of the commandments, which demand a love of God and neighbor. To love one's neighbor as oneself implied, among other things, to experience him as an equal. Such a theology the ancient world did not know.

¹⁹ H. W. Wolff, *Anthropologie des Alten Testaments*, Gütersloh 1973, 272.

²⁰ J. B. Bauer, *Nächster* (BhW II), 903.

²¹ Cf G. von Rad, *Das Gottesvolk im Deuteronomium* (BWANT 47), 1929, 12.

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On the Genre of Commentary in the Biblical Exegesis

In the field of exegesis, the determinant *commentary* connotes the text which is directly linked to a particular biblical text, explicating it as the basis and purpose of its own origination.¹ In general, a majority of texts arises as a direct or indirect reaction to the existing texts or their creative upgrading. However, the commentary is in this sense a special one – it does not pretend to become an autonomous, closed and self-sufficient reading. On the contrary, the commentary exists and has its value only in relation to the text that it interprets and at which it is very explicitly based on. The aim of this paper is to list the important characteristics of the literary genre of commentary and to mention some concepts of textual reception related to it (chart 1).

Based on abovementioned dependence of the commentaries on their ground (commentated text), there is a hermeneutical dichotomy between the text and the commentary.² Here a hermeneutical concept of the text represents more than a syntactic concept of the text – it is actually the encoded information that establishes a connection between the author (who is often the bearer of the divine message) and the remote recipients, to whom the reception of such messages provides the existentially important responses. This way understood, the text is equal to the canonical text, but even if it does not belong to a particular religious canon, it certainly represents a reading that is normative for the consciousness of a particular community. Thus, for example, the Homeric epics were not part of a religious canon, but were normative texts for the ancient Greek culture. According to Assmann, normative texts establish customs, law, rules, conduct or they found the awareness of the community through the narration of history, myths and legends.³ The Christian canon texts have the same role. Christian theology, however, has recognized in

¹ The term ‘commentary’ (commentarii/ὑπόμνημα) had a wide field of meanings in the ancient Greek and Latin usages. The noun ὑπόμνημα stems from verb μνησκόω, which means ‘to remember’, so it has “the basic meaning of memory (Thuc.2.44.2, also by Socrates, Demosthenes, Xenophon)” (F. Montanari, ‘Hypomnema’, Brill’s New Pauly, vol. 6 (2005), 641). In the first period ‘hypomnemata’ and ‘commentarii’ included all notes which followed works from different fields. They were intended to be ‘reminders’, so ‘to commentate’ had the same meaning as ‘to note’, ‘to record’ or ‘aid memory’. In the meaning of ‘exegetical work’, commentaries have existed from the Hellenistic period. In Greece, they were associated with so called Alexandrian exegetical school (e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle). In the Latin-speaking world grammarian Servius wrote commentaries on Virgil’s poetry in the 5th cen. BC and he established some important themes that “have become canons of the genre – the life of the poet, the title and character of his poem, his intention and the number and sequence of books” (R.A. Kaster, ‘Commentary’, Brill’s New Pauly, vol. 3 (2003), 631).

² J. Assmann, “Text und Kommentar”, in J. Assmann – B. Gladigow, eds., *Text und Kommentar, Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation 4*, München (1995), 19.

³ J. Assmann, “Text und Kommentar”, 10.

these writings not only their normative roles, but also their soteriological significance – the text of the Scripture bears the divine revelation. In other words, the Bible represents a communicative act between God and man.

According to the aforementioned dichotomy, the text is a normative canonical unit of informative content and communicative importance, and it is impossible to understand it without a certain process of interpretation. As opposed to the text, a commentary is a secondary reading, one kind of “secondary literature” which brings text closer to the recipients, translating it to a code recognizable to the addressees and guiding them into the correct reading and understanding of the text itself. A commentary is an intermediary between the text and the audience and a commentator has a role of a guide who presents and illuminates the text. In this process, commentator does not pretend to trustworthiness and absoluteness of their own interpretation, but rather tries to offer the recipients a valid methodology of interpretation.⁴ A cause of the necessity of the commentaries is so called *Zerdehnung der Sprachsituation*⁵ (“expanded speech-situation”). This concept is a part of a theory which beholds the text as a communicative situation identical to the verbal conversation, with the difference that this situation is ‘expanded’, since the message sender is temporally and spatially distant from their addressees. In such case, a commentary serves to span this distance and make a text clear to a certain group of recipients. This fact is manifested in the Christian commentaries. They are directed to the local congregation or, later on, to schools and teaching.

Textual decoding is another important concept that is based on the previous one.⁶ Namely, in attempt to make the text clear and to interpret it correctly, commentators deal themselves with textual decoding and this process does not depend on the methodology of the interpretation which they have chosen. A vivid instance that is cited by W. Raible explains a pith of this treatment – a new, unknown notion is made clear to a child by known and accepted notions.⁷ A decoding is the basis of communication and it always takes place in the speech acts or in the reading of written passages, as an internal act of the understanding of statements. An apparent form of decoding is paraphrase, an expressing of the same content through a new syntactic and morphological set. In commentaries, it is an indispensable and favoured method.

Finally, patristic commentaries are built exclusively on the basis of the texts which belong to the Christian biblical canon. Therefore, their topic is a canonical text, or, in other words, a canonical text is, at the same time, a commented one. A text, which is normative and inevitable in certain religious practice, gets a status of a canonical text in canonization process. Since the moment of canonization, it becomes invariable and by sounding and form steadily determined.⁸ Since such establishing, it becomes authority that is normative and formative on several degrees. According to it the rituals are formed,

⁴ R. Kieffer, “Was heisst das, einen Text zu kommentieren?“, *Biblische Zeitschrift* 20 (1976), 215.

⁵ E. Konrad, “Zum Textbegriff“, in A. Rothkegel/B. Sandig, eds., *Text - Textsorten - Semantik*. Hamburg: Buske (1984), 9-25.

⁶ W. Raible, “Arten des Kommentierens – Arten der Sinnbildung – Arten des Verstehens“, in J. Assmann – B. Gladigow, eds., *Text und Kommentar*, 51.

⁷ W. Raible, “Arten des Kommentierens“, 51.

⁸ “Festgelegte Texte sind in ihrem Wortlaut und in ihrem Umfang fixiert. Von ihnen gilt die berühmte Kanonformel, die besagt, dass *nichts hinzugefügt, nichts weggenommen, nichts verändert werden darf*.“ J. Assmann, *Text und Kommentar*, 11; cf. A. C. Kibel, *The canonical text*, Daedelus, vol.112 (1983), 240.

binic schools and pertained to Old Testament canon, which was unavoidable in Jewish religious education.¹¹ From the moment of foundation of the first Christian schools, the same process kept up in these schools.¹² A general structure of such interpretations involves the following steps: ἀναγνωστικόν, ἐξηγητικόν, διορθωτικόν, κριτικόν¹³, or, according to a model from the Roman principate – *lectio, emendatio, explanatio, iudicium*¹⁴. A segment, which should be interpreted, was first read aloud and then attentively and gradually investigated. A certain statement would be illuminated from philological perspective, word by word, then it would be paraphrased and syntactically analysed, and finally, the more profound reflections would be added to these explications.

2) The onset of the written commentaries is made by notes on the margins of the ancient texts which had given different explications to words and statements in the original manuscript. These short explanations – glosses and scholia – later had grown out to the autonomous works, which could be published independently from the source by which they had arisen. Christian exegetes take over the ancient commentating in both aspects – in verbal sense, they interpret the texts according to the abovementioned model, and, on the other hand, they compose written interpretations in form of ancient commentary. The first survived Christian commentary belongs to Hippolytus, a Bishop of Rome and it is Commentary on Daniel. It is assumed that it originates from 204 AD. From Hippolytus to Theodoret of Cyrus, who is usually presupposed to be the last representative of period of the great Church Fathers and who stands, at the same time, on the boundary of the culture which could be hold for ancient, a plenty of various commentaries on Scripture have ensued. In this period “an interpretation of Scripture flourished”,¹⁵ the exegesis developed itself from applied Greek hermeneutics to a strong, independent and inventive system of textual exposing and interpretation. According to their extent and structure, Jerome had categorized the commentaries, adding as a note to his translation of Origen’s work that there were three types of commentaries: excerpta (σχόλια), homilecticum genus (ὁμιλία) and volumina (τόμοι).¹⁶ Scholia are short comments which follow the singular verses of certain biblical text according to their order. Interpreting the Book of Daniel, Jerome gives, after a short introduction, important remarks on certain verses.¹⁷ As a special form of scholia,

¹¹ In Jewish environment, the Scripture was the basis of education which began in the family. A father had a duty to teach the sons about faith. The elementary school (Bet Sefer), as well as the higher school (Bet Midrash and Bet Talmud) concerned themselves on studying of the Torah. Rabbinic education aspired to define a right and consistent implementation of the Torah in ethics and law. The same process was carrying out in synagogue. (G. Stemberger, *Einleitung in Talmud und Midrash*, München (2011), 18-23). The Mishnah struggles to define Israelite identity and practice. Talmud and Midrash seek to define community and community practice in terms of the ancient texts. (F.H. Gorman Jr, “Commenting on commentary: Reflections on a Genre”, in T.J. Sandoval-C. Mandolfo, eds., *Relating to the Text*, London – New York (2003) 101.)

¹² B. Lang, “Homiletische Bibelkommentare“, in J. Assman – B. Gladigow, eds., *Text und Kommentar*, 205.

¹³ These demands are similar to those postulated by Dionysius Thrax. (Ch. Schäublin, *Untersuchungen zur Methode und Herkunft der Antiochenischen Exegese*, Köln – Bonn (1974), 34-35)

¹⁴ P. Dragutinović, *Komentar kao književna vrsta*, Srpska teologija u XX veku 14, Beograd (2013), 20.

¹⁵ B. Lang, “Homiletische Bibelkommentare“, 199.

¹⁶ Primum ejus opus Excerpta, quae Graece σχόλια nuncupantur, in quibus ea quae sibi videbantur obscura, atque habere aliquid difficultatis, summam breviterque perstrinxit. Secundum homilecticum genus, de quo et praesens interpretatio ejus est. Tertium quod ipse inscripsit Τόμους nos volumina possumus nuncupare, in quo opere tota ingenii sui vela spirantibus ventis dedit, et recedens a terra in medium pelagis aufugit. (*Translatio homiliarum Origenis in Jeremiam et Ezechielem*, Prol. PL 25, 741-742A)

¹⁷ In these ‘scholia’ Jerome concerns about the quality of translation, so he, in the same way as Origene, gives the comparative view of the actual translations of concrete words or phrases: (Vers. 3.) *Et ait rex As-*

there are quaestiones et responsiones (ζητήματα καὶ λύσεις) and this form exposes the exegetical reflections on a text in an obvious, effective and explicit way. The structure of this genre tries to identify with inner course of reception. During the acceptance of a message, unclear places are recognized in our consciousness as questions. A question represents the best and, perhaps, the only way to initiate the textual interpretation and the reasoning and thought, in general. Depending on their rhetoric skill, commentators discuss details from biblical text in the form of setting up and solving problems. From the historic perspective, ζητήματα καὶ λύσεις stems from the Christian apologists who had to answer the questions and perplexities of heretics or infidels.¹⁸ We might ascribe this exegetical form also to aforementioned linguistic and psychological factors. The power of question is undisputable and a figure of rhetoric question doesn't mean illusory questioning, although it does not mean a real dialogue. The questioning is real even if it is not actualized between several persons, but in consciousness of an author or recipients. With regard to the fact that there are many anachronisms, contradictions and potential misunderstandings in biblical writings, Fathers tried to prove a coherence of the Scripture and to demonstrate that these discrepancies are illusory and superficial. Modern hermeneutics considers that these problems are products of heterogeneity of traditions that have built a final form of canonical redactions. Regardless of modern solutions, Christian exegetes, applying ἀκολουθία,¹⁹ attempted to reconstruct a textual meaning in such way that questions and discrepancies do not make a destructive, but constructive influence on it. They are mostly successful in such attempts. Anachronism about Abram's movement from Haran to Canaan Augustine declares in the following way:

Quomodo accipiendum sit, quod, cum esset Tharra pater Abrae annorum septuaginta, genuit Abram et postea cum suis omnibus mansit in Charran et uixit annos ducentos quinque in Charran und mortuus est, *et dixit dominus ad Abram*, ut exiret de Charran, et exiit inde, cum esset idem Abram septuaginta quinque annorum?

Nisi quia per recapitulationem ostenditur uiuo Thara loctum esse Dominum et Abram uiuo patre suo secundum praeceptum domini exisse de Charran, cum esset septuaginta quinque annorum, centesimo et quadragessimio quinto anno uitae patris sui, si dies uitae patris eius anni ducenti quinque fuerunt, ut ideo scriptum sit: *fuerunt anni uitae Tharre ducenti quinque in Charran*.²⁰

Speaking in general, Augustine explicates everything which could challenge an inward discussion during the reading as a question which is further solved. However, ζητήματα καὶ

phanez praeposito eunuchorum suorum [Vulg. tacet suorum], *ut introduceret de filiis Israel et de semine regio et tyrannorum, pueros in quibus nulla esset macula*. Pro *Asphanez* in editione vulgata ἀβριεσδρί scriptum reperi, et pro φορτομνί, quod Theodotio posuit, LXX et Aquila, *electos* transtulerunt, Symmachus *Parthos*, pro verbo, nomen gentis intelligens, quod nos juxta editionem Hebraeorum quae κατ' ἀκριβειαν legitur, in *tyrannos* vertimus, maxime quia praecedit, *de regio semine*. (*Commentaria in Daniele*, PL 25, 624A)

¹⁸ Ch. Schäublin, *Untersuchungen*, 50.

¹⁹ "Refers to unpacking the logic of the Bible" (H. S. Pappas, *Theodore of Mopsuestia's Commentary on Psalm 44 (LXX): A Study of Exegesis and Christology*, Greek Orthodox Theological Review 47:1-4 (2002), 61). Ἀκολουθία appears by Origen as consistency of argumentation (Origenes, princ. IV 3,9). Theodore of Mopsuestia use it to reconstruct the biblical narrative, eg. in commentary on Jona, explaining v. 1:5b *But Jonah had gone below into the hold of the ship, lain down, and fallen sound asleep*, he says: Οὐχ ὅτι μετὰ τὸ ἐκεῖνα γενέσθε εἰς τὸ πλοῖον κατελθὼν ἐκάθευδεν. γελοῖν γὰρ εἰ παραχῆς τοσάτης γενοένης καὶ πάντων περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας κινδυνεύοντων τῆς οἰκείας, εἰς ὕπνον ἑαυτὸν ἐδίδου. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν εὐθὺς ἐπιβάς πεποήκε τοῦ πλοίου. (*In Jonam Prophetam*, PG 66, 161D-A)

²⁰ *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*, CSEL 28, 12 (v. 3-15)

λύσεις is not a typical patristic commentary. If we are guided by the lexicological theory of prototypes,²¹ trying to define a semantic centre of lexeme *commentary*, we have to conclude with certainty that a representative of commentarial genre is τόμος, a long and voluminous manuscript. A corpus of patristic exegetical texts involves plenty of such commentaries – writers take into consideration a certain biblical book and they analyse it systematically and vigilantly in steps. In a formal sense, they practice analysis verse by verse, keeping themselves thoroughly on singular statements without omitting any details nor passages. A primary philological analysis is followed by deeper theological views. Sometimes the exegetes digress from the main course of a text and in the excursus explain some notice which has appeared formerly and about which they expound the other ancient knowledge, apart from exegesis. Τόμοι contain a prologue – a preface which should illuminate a purpose and a methodology of interpretation. Usually, there are the following demands in a prologue:

1. σκοπός – purpose (intention);
2. χρήσιμον – requisite (of interpretation);
3. γνήσιον – authentically, correctly;
4. τάξις τῆς ἀναγνώσεως – sequence of reading;
5. αἰτία τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς – motive of writing;
6. εἰς κεφάλαια διαίρεσις – division into the passages;
7. ὑπὸ ποῖον μέρος ἀνάγεται τὸ παρὸν σύγγραμμα – designation of the literary genre and the type of text.²²

Prologues are precious because they contain theoretical principles of interpretation and they enable an insight in certain approach to the text. There are, for example, two prologues in Commentary on psalms of Diodore of Tarsus, Preface and Prologue to Psalm CXVIII, and they give an imposing exegetical material. The author presents the intention and the requisite of commentary, the methods of interpretation and he defines the important notices. The purpose of commentating is generally by the Fathers appointed as ὠφέλεια – “advantage”, “benefit”, “behoof”.²³ By Diodore it’s identical to Paul’s judgment of purpose of the Scripture, stated in 2Tim 3:16 – “training in righteousness”. All parts of the Bible are equal bearers of this purpose.²⁴ Origen claims also that a teach-

²¹ Prototype is a word that is intuitively perceived as a semantic center of certain group of related lexemes. Theory of prototypes defines a prototype as a paradigmatic bearer of semantic meaning. (E. Rosch, *Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories*, Journal of Experimental Psychology (1975), 192-233; R. E. Grandy, “Semantic Fields, Prototypes and Lexicon”, in A. Lehrer, E. F. Kittay, R. Lehrer, eds., *Frames, Fields and Contrasts*, Routledge (2009), 112-120)

²² Ch. Schaublin, *Untersuchungen*, 66.

²³ ὠφέλεια: a term used in patristic exegesis for the moral and theological benefit a passage of Scripture offers to the reader/hearer. The noun has the basic meaning of “advantage” or “benefit.” This is the meaning the word has in the LXX, though in 2 Macc 2:25, it is used specifically for the “benefit” the author hopes the audience will receive from reading about Judas and the other Maccabees (cf. Wisd 6:25, in which the speaker uses the verb ὠφελέω to urge the reader to benefit from his instructions). ὠφέλεια occurs twice in the NT, once in a positive sense (Rom 3:1) and once in the negative sense of self-interested gain (Jude 16). Paul uses the adjective ὠφέλιμος in 2 Tim 3:16, in which he states that “all Scripture is inspired of God and beneficial for teaching.” ὠφέλεια emerges as an important hermeneutical term, especially in the so-called Antiochene school of exegesis, to refer to the moral and dogmatic “benefit” that can be derived from a passage of Scripture. Second Timothy 3:16 may have helped to inspire this usage, for a quotation of this verse serves as the very first sentence of Diodore of Tarsus’s *Commentary on the Psalms* (Prol. 1-3). Diodore’s work influenced his students Theodore of Mopsuestia and St. John Chrysostom.

²⁴ Πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος, κατὰ τὸν μακάριον Παῦλον, καὶ ὠφέλιμος πρὸς διδασκαλίαν, πρὸς ἔλεγχον, πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν, πρὸς παιδείαν τὴν ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ. Διδάσκει μὲν τὰ χρήσιμα, ἐλέγχει τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, ἐπα-

er should interpret a text so that it is “for the best benefit of young people” (καὶ ἐπιλέγειν ἐκάστοις τὰ συντείνοντα εἰς ὠφέλιαν τῶν νέων)²⁵. Hence, the Scripture is God’s gift that brings an advantage in every sense to a human being. Therefore, the commentary, being the interpretation of the Scripture, should have this same role.

The third type of the commentary is homily and it lies on the boundary between sermons and commentaries.²⁶ Homilies have some features of the commentary because their structure is founded on biblical quotation. However, there are a large number of rhetorical and didactical elements in homilies. Primarily, they are directed to a wider audience and intended for a verbal performance which makes them different from the genre of the written commentary. In addition, they have primarily didactical and ethical purpose, which reduces the research elements in them. On the other hand, Lang, discussing homilies as passing type, emphasizes that the Fathers didn’t know the classification on the scientific and the preaching in theology.²⁷ Thanking to this fact, patristic theology had, in spite of abundance of genres, one and the same aim – a benefit of listeners and readers – and, also, a similar content. Patristic works were written in various genres, but they were coherent and similar in content. For instance, the homilies on the Genesis of one author couldn’t share a content which is opposed to another type of commentary on the Genesis of the same author. Thus, when we separate the researching and scientific from the preaching, we do that on the ground of differences between the genres as well as we do so from the perspective of the modern hermeneutics. The Fathers didn’t apply this division, although they were well acquainted with the mentioned forms and they respected the demands of a certain genre. Whenever someone decided to interpret a text, he had to choose a genre beforehand and to fulfil its demands. The writing in antiquity, in general, presupposed imitation of valuable style of some famous and established predecessors. The same could be applied for the rhetorical tradition. A frequent pseudonymousness confirms this. Opposite to the recent tendencies, the writing under pseudonym gave the audience a confidence in work and pledged its value. Homilies, in general, contain a precious exegetical material which was imbued with the other aspects of theology – ethics, liturgical life, dogmatic confessions. Homilies are vivid and stirring expression of concrete church community in concrete historical frame. This form demonstrates rhetorical skill of the successful orators. Chrysostom’s homilies integrate various aforementioned elements. They combine styles, and also elements of exegesis with ethics, didactics and doxology.²⁸

2. Characteristics of biblical commentaries

As a result of review of the commentaries, which appeared between the 2nd and the 5th century, it’s possible to list certain typical characteristics, in spite of the great variability

νορθοῦται τὰ ἐλλείματα, καὶ οὕτως ἀπαρτίζει τὸν τέλειον ἄνθρωπον. ἵνα ἄρτιος ᾗ ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος, πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἀπηρτισμένος. Καὶ οὐκ ἂν τις ἀμάρτοι, ὅλον τοῦτο τῆς θείας γραφῆς τὸ ἐγκώμιον συναγαγὼν ἐνεῖναι τῇ βίβλῳ τῶν θείων ψαλμῶν. Δικεοσύνην μὲν γὰρ παιδεύει πρῶτος καὶ ἐπεικῶς τοὺς μαθεῖν ἐθέλοντας, ἐλέγχει ἐπιμελῶς καὶ οὐ μετὰ τραχύτητος τοὺς ἀυθαδεστέρους, ἐπανορθοῦται καὶ ὅσα τυχὸν καὶ προηρημένοις ἡμῖν, οὐ καλῶς ἐγγίωεται πταισμάτα. (*Préface du Commentaire*, trans. by L. Mariès, *Recherches de Science Religieuse* 9 (1919), 82 (v.1-11))

²⁵ *Contra Celsum*, PG 11, 486B

²⁶ B. Lang, *Homiletische Bibelkommentare*, 202.

²⁷ B. Lang, *Homiletische Bibelkommentare*, 202.

²⁸ *Homiliae in Genesin*, PG 53

of their topics and motives.²⁹ This set of features can be classified into two groups: 1) formal characteristics – which include traits of the genre and 2) substantial characteristics – which involve some hermeneutical concepts related to the act of textual reception itself.

2.1. Formal characteristics of the commentary

a) Interpretation *verse by verse*. This is perhaps the most obvious feature of the biblical commentaries. In both schools of reception, Alexandrian and Antiochian, and in all types of commentaries, quotation of the biblical verses is in the essence of interpretative structure. Even the first Hippolytus' work had such structure, although Hippolytus quoted verses of Daniel together with quotes from another biblical writings, mostly from the Revelation. Also, his commentary is more a Christological interpretation of Daniel's book as a whole than an analysis of the concrete verses.³⁰ The interpretation *verse by verse* is presupposed and expected in the latter commentaries. By the Antiochenes it is followed by interpretation *ad litteram*. Augustine's Commentary on the Genesis is a useful instance. It integrates most of the aforementioned features and it consistently quotes the biblical verses according to their order.³¹

b) Intertextuality. In order to explain a certain biblical book, an exegete often refers to the part of some another canonical book. In this case, under the term of intertextuality we understand that verses of one biblical book are interpreted in relation to the passages of another book of the Scripture. Commentary, as dependent reading based directly on the biblical source, often makes the analogies between the explained verses and the verses of related biblical writings, commonly the New Testament passages. Very often the passage of another text serves to illuminate a commentated text. Such intertextuality is a consequence of two facts: as first, there is an idea of the unity of the Scripture and, as second, there is a fact that the Old Testament can be clear only as *Relecture*. Thus, it is impossible to understand it without a turn on the New Testament events. In Hippolytus' interpretation there is a plenty of references to the fragments of the New Testament writings and there is a strong intention to connect Daniel with Revelation and to make it understandable through it.³² This kind of intertextuality is reduced in some Antiochian commentaries, since it is not allowed to interpret all texts in connection with the New Testament (i.e. typologically). On the contrary, there are instances in which typological interpretation is emphasized.³³ In patristic exegetical works the intertextuality rarely

²⁹ Speaking of the features and the content of the biblical commentaries, W. Schenk lists different aspects of textual analysis. The commentary as a genre involves text-critical analysis as well as the ethic and metaphysic treatises based on certain biblical statement. Commentary deals with editions and translations of certain text or with theological usages of the text (sermons, etc.). (W. Schenk, *Was ist ein Kommentar?*, Biblische Zeitschrift 24 (1980), 1-20)

³⁰ If we try to define a literary genre of Hippolytus' commentary, it will not yet represent a 'real' commentary. Intentions of the author are identical to his tendency to point out at the Roman Empire as at the *fourth beast* of Daniel's prophecy. He makes an analogy between the Book of Daniel and the Revelation in order to condemn the Roman Empire. (cf. G. Lohfink, *Kommentar als Gattung*, Bibel und Leben 5 (1974), 1)

³¹ Augustine discusses in details the words and expressions of the Genesis, using rhetorical questiones and logical conclusions. In this way he resolves some ambiguities in the text. An immense volume of the commentary is due to the extensive explications of verses, e.g. the emergence of the light is discussed in long treatise (*De Genesi ad Litteram*, CSEL 28, 5-31).

³² ὡς Ἰωάννης ἐν τῇ Ἀποκαλύψει αὐτοῦ διηγείται. Ἡμερὰ γὰρ Κυρίου, ὡς χίλια ἔτι. (*In Daniele*, PG 10, IV B, 645)

³³ Some psalms are, by Diodore and Theodore, interpreted only as historical texts without spiritual or messianic reflections (R. C. Hill, His Master's voice. Theodore of Mopsuestia on psalms, Heythrop Journal

means a referring of one author to another. However, there are such cases – Jerome often takes into consideration Origen's interpretations and translations of Scripture.³⁴

c) Paraphrase. It represents an unavoidable technique in text's explanation. Paraphrased utterance usually stays immediately after a verse's quotation, stating the same content in a different form. In this way, a commentator repeats and translates the text in a code understandable for recipients. Paraphrase mainly increases a biblical statement (but does not enrich it) and it expresses more than is present in the text on first sight. However, this surplus is illusory since the biblical discourse strives to conciseness. There are a lot of elliptical utterances. Also, one part of the content is implied by the context, so there is much information which is implicitly and potentially contained in the text. Nevertheless, a discourse of the commentary which we, from the perspective of modern hermeneutics, recognized as a scientific style has intent to be explicit, analytic and extensive. The Antiochian tradition especially insists on an exact and analytical decomposition of the biblical utterance into the lesser fragments which would be later on paraphrased, in some instances even in several variants. There is a plenty of such instances in Diodore's Commentary on Psalms: "*Lord, who will abide in your dwelling, or who will dwell on your holy mountain?* (v.1). In other words: Who will escape falling victim to captivity, perils from enemies, or any other hardship?"³⁵; "*Let all the earth fear the Lord* (v. 8): it is right, then, for all the inhabitants of the earth (189) to fear and thus all the more admire and reverence him"³⁶; "*He came to see me, he spoke idly* (v. 6), meaning, They concentrated on trickery, wishing me good health in words while plotting against me what they did not dare say, fear of royalty causing them to give no open signs of hostility."³⁷ Paraphrase goes with semantic analysis of certain words.

d) Semantic analysis. Trying to find the right textual meaning, the Fathers analyse the meanings of certain words and compare the Greek (Septuagint) translation with the Jewish original text. The latter happens during the researching of the documents originated in Jewish. The exegetes often criticize and castigate translations in some points. Semantic analysis doesn't serve to maintain the rhetoric and grammar traditions, but to be an argument for one correct reception. Even the Hippolytus' commentary, although very far from a critical philological review, has such elements, which can be the fact that vindicates a necessity of semantic analysis. This also suggests that semantic analysis is spontaneous and expected in interpretation.³⁸ Some more important notions are in details explained. Interpreting John 1:1, Origen argues that the word "beginning" is

XLV (2004), 48) On the contrary, Diodore, in Prologue to Ps CXVIII, gives an analogy between the literal meaning of the psalm and eschatological events, expressing that with firm conviction and belief: *Εὐκαιρῶς γὰρ τότε ἕκαστος ἄνθρωπος ἐρεῖ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς Ἑζεκίας· Ὑπόσω σε, κύριε, ὅτι ὑπέλαβες με, καὶ οὐκ ἠψφρανας τοὺς ἐχθροὺς μου ἐπ' ἐμέ, τοῦ μὲν Ἑζεκίου ἐχθροὺς καλέσαντος τοὺς τε Ἀσυρίους καὶ τοὺς τῇ ἀρρωστίᾳ ἐπευφρανθέντας, τῶν δὲ ἀωτρώπων πάντων κυρίως καλοῦντων ἐχθροὺς πάντα ὁμοῦ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὸν θάνατον αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν διάβολον, ὅσα τῇ θνητότητι συμπαρομαρτεῖ. (Prologue du Psaume CXVIII, Recherches de Science Religieuse 9 (1919), 96 (v.30 – 35))*

³⁴ *Interpretatio Homiliarum duarum Origenis in Canticum* (PL 23), *Translatio homiliarum novem Origenis in Visiones Isaiae* (PL 24), *Translatio Homiliarum Origenis in Evangelium Lucae* (PL 26) etc.

³⁵ *Commentary on Psalms 1–51* (trans. R. C. Hill), Brill Leiden (2005), 44.

³⁶ *Commentary on Psalms 1–51*, 101.

³⁷ *Commentary on Psalms 1–51*, 132.

³⁸ Τὸ δὲ ὡφὰζ χρυσίον καθαρόν σημαίνει, τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς Ἑβραϊδος εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνίδα μετατιθέμενον. (In Danielem, PG 10, XXV C, 657).

polysemous in Greek as well as in the contexts of its usage in the Scripture (εὐρήσει καὶ κατὰ τὸν θεῖον λόγον τὸ πολύσημον τῆς φωνῆς³⁹). Hence, it is significant to understand its meaning in a given context about which he further discusses.⁴⁰

In many instances Christian exegetes, in polemics with heretical interpretation of faith, defeat heretical attitudes with the help of exact explaining of lexical meanings. In a great extent one nuance of lexical meaning is able to change a further theological interpretation as it's demonstrated in Basil's writing *De Spiritu Sancto*.⁴¹

e) Excursus. In long commentaries (τόμοι), authors sometimes distant themselves from the main course of the text and make one kind of *outgoing* in the other fields of ancient science. In Matthew's commentary Origen imparts the readers about pearl while he interprets the parable of merchant looking for a precious pearl (Mt 13:45).⁴² Although τόμοι are extensive even without excurses, it seems that these "additions" do not lade but rather exonerate a reader, especially because they bring out interesting details and testify about ancient scientific knowledge. The early Christian exegetes keep the Greek, i.e. Aristotelian tendency to systemize and expose different elements of knowledge together. There was no boundary between faith, philosophy and science as it exists in modern times. Philosophy (i.e. theology), as the source and the head of all scientific branches, involves knowledge of natural sciences, which were later completely emancipated from it.⁴³

Various scientific disciplines represent, in this early stage of development, complementary areas, something like mathematical concentric sets. Therefore, scepticism which appears by modern reader while reading these discourses did not exist in this period. Therefore, the Fathers, without distorting of the requirements of the literary genre, nor theological discourse, interpolated occasionally such exposures in their works.

2.2 Substantial characteristics of the commentary

When we are talking about hermeneutical principles and features of commentary, it is not easy to take all of them into consideration, since every particular commentary is a special one if it is authentic. However, the process of exegesis has produced some known and significant hermeneutical terms which refer to the reception of textual meaning.

a) Literal meaning. The first step in the interpretation is the understanding of a basic meaning of sentences, applying syntactical and lexical analysis. This literal sense of the Scripture

³⁹ In *Evangelium Joannis*, PG 14, 16B

⁴⁰ Τασούτων σημαινόμενων ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἡμῖν ὑποπεσόντων περὶ ἀρχῆς, ζητοῦμεν ἐπὶ τίνος δεῖ λαμβάνειν τὸ Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος. (In *Evangelium Joannis*, PG 14, 21A)

⁴¹ Basil the Great, determining the exact meaning of the preposition ἐκ (ἐξ), exposes contexts of its usage in order to defend the deity of the Holy Spirit. "For instance, the phrase of which (ἐξ οὗ) does not always and absolutely, as they suppose, indicate the material, but it is more in accordance with the usage of Scripture to apply this term in the case of the Supreme Cause, as in the words *One God, of whom are all things* (ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα) (1Cor 8:6) and again, *All things of God* (ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ) (1Cor 11:12). The word of truth has, however, frequently used this term in the case of the material, as when it says *You shall make an ark of incorruptible wood* (ἐκ ξύλων); and *You shall make the candlestick of pure gold* (ἐκ χρυσοῦ) and *The first man is of the earth* (ἐκ γῆς) earthy; and *You are formed out of clay* (ἐκ πηλοῦ) as I am. But these men, to the end, as we have already remarked, that they may establish the difference of nature, have laid down the law that this phrase befits the Father alone." (*De Spiritu Sancto*, PG 32, 5 A-B)

⁴² In *Matthaeum*, PG 13, 452-453

⁴³ Theology itself was ensued on a basis of Greek philosophy as well as exegesis was formed according to the ancient Greek commentaries. (Ch. Schäublin, "Zur paganen Prägung der christlichen Exegese", in J. Van Oort/ und U. Wickert, eds., *Christliche exegete zwischen Nicaea und Chalcedon*, Kampen 1999, 148-173)

is further differently interpreted. Origen calls it 'corporeal', the primary and the least important level of biblical textual meaning. He supplements it with 'soul' and 'spiritual' senses, which are revealed to the believers. These three senses stay in analogy with the parts of a human being – body, soul and spirit, and, "the spiritual sense is, among them, achievable only to the perfect".⁴⁴ The corporeal sense is unhidden and obvious and it is, by Alexandrian exegetes, subordinate, in axiological sense, to higher and spiritual meanings. In commentaries, literal meaning is the first and unavoidable degree in the interpretation, according to the Greek grammatical methodology. Augustine's extant commentary on the Genesis has such caption *De Genesi ad litteram*. According to Augustine, the literal meaning is an authentic and a real sense which explains what actually happened. It is filled up with deeper spiritual meaning, which stays in harmony and consistency with it and which could be multifarious.⁴⁵ The founder of Antiochian reception, Diodore, and his disciples make this sense equal with the term of history. At the same time, they ascribe it a very significant role in the process of the Scripture's interpretation. Understanding *ad litteram* is, actually, historical and it is *the basis of the more profound insights*⁴⁶. Historicity of the biblical events could not be neglected during seeking for more elevated meanings of the text. Literal meaning represents an initial degree of reception in commentating. It could be further interpreted through history, allegory or typology, depending on exegetical approach of the commentator. These three concepts do not have influence on formal side of the commentary, but rather they represent an inner individual attitude of the interpreter to the topic and content of biblical text. They categorize some of significant and the most frequent approaches to the biblical text in patristic exegesis. From the perspective of modern hermeneutics, these concepts could be appointed as degrees of textual meaning which are brought out from a basic literal meaning of the text.

b) History. In the Prologue to Ps CXVIII Diodore defines history as "plain narration of historical events" (πράγματος γεγονότος καθαρά διήγησις)⁴⁷. In other words, history represents chronological succession of the events which are recorded and archived in the text and which are not only literally images useful to hide spiritual meaning. In the Antiochian historical-grammatical methodology, analysis of statements (verba) serves to make the content of text (res) equal to real historic context in which the text has appeared. Trustworthiness of the Old Testament history does not repeal possibility of secondary and spiritual interpretation which Diodore calls θεωρία. This term is, actually, identical to typology.⁴⁸ In the Antiochian heritage history corresponds to literal meaning and it represents a basic level of textual reception.

⁴⁴ Princ prooemium IV 2, 4.

⁴⁵ cf. K. Pollmann, "Der Metatext Bibel zwischen Wissenschaft und Glauben. Augustinus' 'De Genesi ad litteram' und mögliche Folgen", in O. Wischmeyer – S. Scholz, eds., *Die Bibel als Text. Beiträge zu einer textbezogenen Bibelhermeneutik*, Tübingen – Basel (2008), 121-122.

⁴⁶ *Préface*, 88 (v.4).

⁴⁷ *Prologue*, 94 (v.38)

⁴⁸ History of Israel refers to the New Testament history which is more significant than the previous one and which represents the fulfillment of the Old Testament events. In the Prologue to the Commentary on Jonah, Theodore emphasizes this attitude: Εὗρίσκε τό τε κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τύπος τις τὰ παλαιὰ τῶν ὕστερον, ἔχοντα μὲν τινα μίμησιν πρὸς ταῦτα, μετὰ τοῦ καὶ χρειάν ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις παρέχεσθαι καιροῖς δηλούμενα δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ὅποσον ἡλάττωνται ταῦτα. (*In Jonam Prophetam*, PG 66, 152 B)

c) Allegoresis. In biblical exegesis, allegoresis implements the figure of allegory⁴⁹ in the interpretation of the biblical text. As well as allegorical image refers to phenomena which are not directly and explicitly mentioned in it, the allegorical interpretation gives the biblical text as a whole the character of allegory. In allegorizing the text is perceived as a literary image that contains the concepts which have no real existence – persons, events and all evident motives serve as signs and symbols of completely different reality. In other word, if a biblical statement were explained in terms of allegory, than it would represent a code with a hidden meaning. Allegoresis has its origin in myths' interpretations of Greek philosophers.⁵⁰ Philo of Alexandria applied it in his commentaries on the Bible trying to make a synthesis of Greek philosophy and Jewish faith. For instance, his view of creation is direct implementation of Plato's ontology on reports in the Genesis.⁵¹ His spiritual interpretations became fruitful for Christian usage of this approach in the exegesis. However, if we understand allegoresis in the terms of Greek stylistic, we cannot considerate it as an appropriate method in the biblical exegesis. Allegoresis neglects the phenomenal side of the statement. If we make an analogy with allegorical interpretations of myths, we will see that such approach gives the Scripture the character of myth, i.e. mythological image. That happens because the meaning *ad litteram* is abolished and perceived only as ostensible, while it has not any real relevance. This fact has significant soteriological implications. From this reason some Christian exegetes reproached to allegorical interpretation of the biblical text.⁵²

d) Typology. As exegetical approach, it's settled on conviction that the Old Testament events have twofold value – one in concrete historical context in which they appeared, and the second, as a paradigm of the forthcoming future events (New Testament's or eschatological). By the Antiochian, we recognized it in the concept of *theoria*, which involves more profound, mostly christological implications of Israelite history.⁵³

⁴⁹ Allegory is as a rhetorical trope and a figure of speech defined in ancient rhetoric (H. Lausberg, *Handbook of literary poetic*, Brill Leiden (1998), 399-403)

⁵⁰ Plutarch, interpreting the myth of Isis and Osiris, claims that Greek myths, as well as myths of the other ancient peoples, have the same purpose. They transform the abstract metaphysical concepts and relations into a vivid and simple language of symbols. In this way the abstract noumena become understandable and obvious (cf. R. Kubat, *Alegoreza u platonističkoj tradiciji*, Srpska teologija u XX veku 14 (2013), 7-14)

⁵¹ "For God, as apprehending beforehand, as a God must do, that there could not exist a good imitation without a good model, and that of the things perceptible to the external senses nothing could be faultless which was not fashioned with reference to some archetypal idea conceived by the intellect, when he had determined to create this visible world, previously formed that one which is perceptible only by the intellect, in order that so using an incorporeal model formed as far as possible on the image of God, he might then make this corporeal world, a younger likeness of the elder creation, which should embrace as many different genera perceptible to the external senses, as the other world contains of those which are visible only to the intellect. But that world which consists of ideas, it were impious in any degree to attempt to describe or even to imagine: but how it was created, we shall know if we take for our guide a certain image of the things which exist among us." (Philo, *On the Creation* (trans. by F. M. Young) IV, (16-17))

⁵² Allegoresis is primarily rejected by the Antiochian representatives and there are several reasons for this rejection – the resistance against Arianism and Apollinarism, the struggle against Gnosticism and spiritualism, the following to Aristotle's philosophy or the proximity of the Syriac-speaking world. (F. Thome, *Historia contra mythos*, Borengässer, Bonn (2004), 4-5).

⁵³ Ταῦτα γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ἱστορίαν ἀτεθεῖ, οὐδὲ τὴν θεωρίαν ἐκβάλλει, ἀλλ' ἡ μεσότης αὐτῆ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία, ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν καὶ θεωρίαν, καὶ ἐλληνισμοῦ ἀπαλλάττει, ἕτερα ἀνθ' ἑτέρων ἀγορεύοντος, καὶ ἀλλόκοτα ἐπισηφροντος, καὶ πρὸς Ἰουδαϊσμόν οὐ καθέλκει, καὶ ἀποπνίγει, ἀναγκάζουσα τὴν λέξει μόνῃ προσκαθῆσθαι, καὶ ἐκείνην θεραπεύειν, περαιτέρω δ' ἔτι καὶ ὑψηλότερον νοεῖν συγχωροῦσα.

(*Préface*, 88 (v.22-27))

In Alexandrians exegetical writings typology also was being maintained as affirmed understanding of former biblical events. Typology operates also in reverse direction – the New Testament episodes are perceived as fulfillment of former events and they are also commentated through quotations from the Old Testament books. Former phenomena are *types* and *icons* of the future. Hippolytus' commentary expounds this point and uses the terms τύπος and εἰκών: "for the Sabbath is the type and emblem (τύπος ἐστὶ καὶ εἰκὼν) of the future kingdom of the saints"⁵⁴; "For the things that took place of old in the wilderness, under Moses, in the case of the tabernacle, were constituted types and emblems of spiritual mysteries (τύποι καὶ εἰκόνες τῶν πνευματικῶν ἐτελοῦντο μυστηρίων), in order that, when the truth came in Christ in these last days, you might be able to perceive that these things were fulfilled"⁵⁵. Typology is based on mirroring whereat one event reflects another one as icon. So, the meaning of the Old Testament texts corresponds to real historical situations which are, at the same time, reflections and types of the latter. In spite of the typology, allegoresis transforms recorded events into symbols and plain signs of another sense.⁵⁶ Christian typological interpretation has its origin in the New Testament writings – Christ himself explains his disciples some episodes (Mt 11:10, 12:18, 12:40; Mk 1:2, 3, 7:6, 9:12; Lk 17:26, 19:46, 20:17). Apostle Paul practices the same interpretation using here the term *allegory*, although it is obvious that he does not assume it in the sense of the Greek stylistic.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ In *Danielem*, PG 10, IV A, 645.

⁵⁵ In *Danielem*, PG 10, V B, 645.

⁵⁶ F. M. Young, *Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture*, Cambridge University Press, (1997), 162.

⁵⁷ As Diodore explains, Paul uses the term allegory, interpreting the story of Sarah and Hagar, but he has no intention to neglect the historicity of this story: Ἐχρήσατο μὲν γὰρ τῷ ὀνόματι καὶ ὁ μακάριος Παῦλος φήσας· ἀπὸ ἀνὰ ἐστὶν ἀλληγορούμενα· αὐταὶ γὰρ εἰσὶν δύο διαθήκαι, καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ἐχρήσατο τῷ ὀνόματι καὶ τῷ πράγματι ὡς Ἕλληνες κέχρηται.... Τίς γὰρ ἂν ἐπεισεν τὸν ἀπόστολον εἰπεῖν μὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν Ἀγάρ καὶ κατὰ τὴν Σάρραν (*Prologue*, 90 (v.8-11) - 92 (v.2-3))

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Die Berührungspunkte der traditionellen und narrativen Exegese des Johannesevangeliums

1. Einleitung

Nicht in die komplexe Thematik der Gründe eingehend, warum die Entstehung und Entwicklung der modernen Bibelwissenschaft der östlichen orthodoxen Kirchen immer mit den Herausforderungen der kreativen Synthese der einheimischen Tradition mit fortgeschrittenen Errungenschaften der westlichen Bibelforschung verflochten wurden, wird der vorgeschlagenen Studie gleich am Anfang ausreichend sein, an die Tatsache der bis jetzigen Drehung der serbischen (Bibel-) Theologie Richtung denjenigen akademischen Kernen der Orthodoxie (Kiew, Moskau, Athen) zu erinnern, die frei waren, sich erfolgreicher mit dieser Synthese zu befassen. Im Sinne der traditionellen Orientation, haben das Amphitheater der Orthodoxen theologischen Fakultät der Universität Belgrad, weiter auch theologisches Journal dieser höchsten akademischen Institution der serbischen orthodoxen Kirche, mit seltener Erwartung die vor Kurzem gehaltene Vorlesung des Neutestamentlern Christos Karakolis aus Athen angenommen, über die konkreten Probleme, mit welchen sich der zeitgenössische orthodoxe Neutestamentler bei der Bestimmung des Inhalts seines wissenschaftlichen Gegenstandes und Art der Anwendung seiner Wissenschaft begegnet¹. Aber gerade mit dieser Vorlesung, wurde der serbischen

¹ Ch. Karakolis, „Новозаветна наука у православној Цркви и теологији. Потреба и изазов једне синтезе“ („Die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft in der Orthodoxen Kirche und Theologie. Das Bedürfnis und die Herausforderung einer Synthese“), *Βοϊσλoвье (Theologie)* 1-2 (2010), 50-71. Diese Studie wurde zuerst auf Griechisch veröffentlicht (X. K. Kapaκόλn, „H καινοδιαθηκική επιστήμη στην Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία και Θεολογία. Ανάγκη και πρόκληση μιας συνθέσεως“, *Διακονία και λόγος. Χριστήριος τόμος προς τιμήν του αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και πάσης Ελλάδος Χριστοδούλου* [hrsg. Γ. Γαλίτης κ.ά.; Αθήνα, 2004], 53-76); sie folgt den früher veröffentlichten orthodoxen Befassungen mit dem selben Thema: S. Agouridēs, „Biblical studies in Orthodox theology“, *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 17 (1972), 51-62; Π. Β. Βασιλειάδης, „Βιβλική κριτική και Ορθοδοξία“, in: ders., *Βιβλικές ερμηνευτικές μελέτες*, Θεσσαλονίκη: Πουρναρά 1988, 49-101; S. Crisp, „Orthodox Biblical Scholarship between Patristics and Postmodernity: A View from the West“, in: J. D. G. Dunn, H. Klein, U. Luz und V. Mihoc (Hrsg.), *Auslegung der Bibel in orthodoxer und westlicher Perspektive. Akten des west-östlichen Neutestamentler/innen Symposiums von Neamt vom 4. – 11. September 1998*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 130, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2000, 123-136; G. Galitis, „Die historisch-kritische Bibelwissenschaft und die orthodoxe Theologie“, in: *La theologie dans l'eglise et dans le monde*, Etudes theologiques 4, Chambesy – Geneve: Centre orthodoxe du Patriarcat oecuménique 1984, 109-125; I. Δ. Καραβιδόπουλου, „Οι βιβλικές σπουδές στην Ελλάδα. Σύνοψη ιστορική αναδρομή – μελλοντικές προοπτικές“, in: *Μελέτες ερμηνείας και θεολογίας της Καινής Διαθήκης*, Βιβλική Βιβλιοθήκη 7, Θεσσαλονίκη: Πουρναρά 1990, 226-248; K. Nikolakopoulos, „Grundprinzipien der orthodoxen patristischen Hermeneutik. Dissonanz oder Ergänzung zur historisch-kritischen Methode?“, *Orthodoxes Forum* 13 (1999), 171-184; E. Oikonomou, *Bibel und Bibelwissenschaft in der Orthodoxen Kirche*, Stuttgarter Bibelstudien 81, Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk 1976, 52-58; Th. G. Stylianopoulos, *The New Testament: An Orthodox Perspective I. Scripture, Tradition, Hermeneutics*, Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press 1997, 147-238.

theologischen Atmosphäre gleichzeitig auch ermutigendes Zeichen gegeben, konkreter diese Herausforderung anzunehmen; imaginäre, also, als Antwort auf das gegebene Signal, ist die vorgeschlagene Studie Richtung Erkennung der Bindeglieder der Tradition und Wissenschaft im Domäne der narratologischen Interpretation des Johannesevangeliums gerichtet². Das Erste bezieht sich auf *das Phänomen der Erzählung*.

2. Die Erzählung

Beim Nachdenken über die Punkte, in welchen die Tradition und die Wissenschaft sich fruchtbar begegnen, ist es zuerst notwendig, den Begriff Tradition zu präzisieren, der manchmal inert mit dem Erbe der Artikulation vom Glauben in der Vergangenheit ausgeglichen wurde. Genauer mit den Kategorien *universitas*, *antiquitas* und *consensio* bestimmt, die aus dem berühmten Diktum des Vinzenz von Lérins herauskommen: „Teneamus quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est“³, Tradition bedeutet natürlich das Erbe der Vergangenheit, aber geht auch wesentlich tiefer – Richtung vererbte *kirchliche katholische Glaubensregel*, die unter den Vätern verschiedene Namen erwarb: *regula fidei* (Tertullian)⁴, ὁ κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας (Irenäus)⁵ oder ὁ σκοπὸς τῆς πίστεως (Athanasios)⁶. Im Domäne der biblischen Exegese, die in der Antike als einzige theologische Methode galt, bedeutet das nicht nur das Erbe des Glaubensausdrucks, der väterlichen Schriften und überhaupt der Person der Väter, sondern vor allem das Erbe des katholischen Geistes der Kirche, der immer im Zustand ist, gegenüber der Vielzahl der privaten Deutungen der Heiligen Schrift zu stehen und dynamisch seinen Sinn zu normieren⁷. Bei der Antwort auf die Frage – wo funktioniert dieser Geist? – zeigt die Orthodoxie auf die Liturgie wie auf die Grundschrift ihrer Tradition⁸, und mit dem sicht-

² Zwischen den verschiedenen Literaturzugängen zum Johannesevangelium, die z.B. auflisten: M. W. G. Stibbe (Hrsg.), *The Gospel of John As Literature. An Anthology of Twentieth-Century Perspectives*, Leiden: Brill 1993, hier auf das angebotene Modell anlehnd: R. A. Culpepper, *Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel. A Study in Literary Design*, Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1983, das er weiter entwickelte: J. Zummstein, *Kreative Erinnerung. Relecture und Auslegung im Johannesevangelium*, Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments 84; Zürich: Theologischer Verlag ²2004.

³ Commonitorium I 2 (PL 50.640).

⁴ De praescriptione haereticorum 12-14 (PL 2.25-28); Adversus Praxeum 2-3 (PL 2.156-159).

⁵ Adversus haereses I 10:1 (PG 7a.549-551); I 22:1 (PG 7a.659-660); III 4:2 (PG 7a.851-855).

⁶ Contra arianos III 35 (PG 26.400).

⁷ Vincentius Lirinensis, Commonitirium I 2 (PL 50.640): „Atque idcirco multum necesse est, propter tantos tam varii erroris anfractus, ut propheticae et apostolicae interpretationis linea secundum Ecclesiastici et Catholici sensus normam dirigatur.“

⁸ Die Priorität dieser Vorstellung auf die Liturgie der Kirche, als Grundschrift der Tradition ist nicht das Ergebnis der Abwesenheit der theoretischen Definition der Kirche in den ersten Jahrhunderten ihres Bestehen, so daher das Halten des christlichen Kults ihres primitiven Ausdrucks, sondern des Verstehens der Eucharistie als vollständige Kirche, zur welcher die Orthodoxie in der Mitte des vorherigen Jahrhunderts wiederum kam, dank der breiteren Bewegung der Wiederherstellung des Liturgielebens. Gerade in diesem Geiste soll man die Worte von Georgi Florowsky (1893-1979) verstehen, mit welchen dieser russischer Theologe, seine Adressierungen an die Sitzung der Kommission für Glauben und Kirchenverfassung des Ökumenischen Rates der Kirchen 1950 in Lund beginnend, auch das Prozess der liturgischen Wiederherstellung im Orthodoxie begann: „Christianity is a liturgical tradition. The Church is first of all a worshipping community. Worship comes first, doctrine and discipline second“ – G. Florovsky, „The Elements of Liturgy: An Orthodox View“, in: P. Edwall (Hrsg.), *Ways of Worship: The Report of a Theological Commission of Faith and Order*, London: SCM Press 1952, 52-65:52. Zusammen mit dieser Aussage brachte die Orthodoxie die Schlüsselstudien über eucharistischen Theologie zur Welt, die schon die Wiederherstellung des liturgischen Lebens von Wurzel an bedeuteten: Н. Н. Афанасьев, *Трапеза Господня*, Париж 1952; А. Д. Шмеман, *Введение в литургическое*

baren Zeichen seiner Anerkennung betrachtet sie zusammengefasstes *confessio fidei* bei der Taufe in die Liturgiegemeinschaft des Heiligen Geistes, die mit der zentralen Aufstellung der Heiligen Schrift auf den Tischaltar als primärer Raum seiner Lesung und seines Verstehens deklariert wird⁹.

Bemerken wir, aber, dass Referenzwissenschaftsarbeiten der orthodoxen Theologen, die sich immer um die notwendige Erfrischung des richtigen Bewusstseins der Tradition bemühen, das gründliche christliche Phänomen *der Erzählung* nicht erwähnen. Und der Umgang mit diesem Phänomen im Unternehmen der immer wieder neuen Definition der Tradition ist wichtig nicht nur weil die Geschichte der Rettung vor allem durch mündliche Erzählung überliefert wurde¹⁰, sondern auch weil die Erzählung der christlichen Geschichte die Wirkung des katholischen Geistes der Kirche offenbar macht. Zum Beispiel, Pauls Überlieferung der Eucharistiefeier (1Kor 11:23-25), oder Stefans Erzählung vor dem Sindrenion (Apg 7:2-53), zeigen, dass es gerade *eine spezifische Erzählung* ist, was die Gemeinschaft der Gläubigen versammelt und die notwendige Identität verleiht, indem es ihre Einheit kompakt macht, trotz ihrer ethnischen, geographischen und jeder anderen Partikularität¹¹. Darüber hinaus, die Intrusion hinter aller möglichen

δογασловие, Париж 1961; I. Δ. Ζηζιούλας, *Ἡ ἐνότης τῆς Ἐκκλησίας ἐν τῇ θείᾳ εὐχαριστίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ κατὰ τοὺς τρεῖς πρώτους αἰῶνας. Διατριβὴ ἐπὶ διδασκαλίᾳ*, Ἐν Αῠθῆναις 1965. Über die Wiederherstellung des Liturgiegebens in der Serbischen orthodoxen Kirche siehe mehr: V. Vukašinović, *Liturgical Renewal in the 20th Century: The History and Theological Ideas of the Liturgical Movement in the Roman Catholic Church and Its Mutual Relation to the Liturgical Life of the Orthodox Church*, Fairfax: Eastern Christian Publications 2002; N. Glibetić, „Liturgical Renewal Movement in Contemporary Serbia“, in: B. Groen, S. Hawkes-Teeple und S. Alexopoulos (Hrsg.), *Inquiries into Eastern Christian Worship. Selected Papers of the Second International Congress of the Society of Oriental Liturgy, Rome, 17-21 September 2008*, JECS 12, Leuven: Peeters 2012, 393-414.

⁹ G. Florovsky, „Function of Tradition in the Ancient Church“, *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 9 (1963-1964), 181-200, 192-193; J. Breck, *The Power of the Word in the Worshiping Church*, Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press 1986, 17-18: „In authentic Orthodox experience, the Word comes to its fullest expression within a sacramental context. Whether proclaimed through Scripture reading and preaching, or sung in the form of antiphons (psalms) and dogmatic hymns (festal troparia, the Monogenes and Credo), the Word of God is primarily communicated – expressed and received – by the ecclesial act of *celebration*, and in particular, celebration of the eucharistic mystery.“

¹⁰ Im alten Israel, stellt das Erzählen die Grundlage der Glaubensanbetung, der Liturgie und der Kathi-hese dar (z.B. Ps 77:3-4; Ex 12:26-27; Dtn 6:20-25; 26:5-11), dann auch in der neutestamentlichen Zeit: Jesus vor allem lehrt in den Parabeln (Mk 4:1-34) und Neues Testament beinhaltet vier verschiedene Narrative über sein Leben, seinen Tod und Auferstehung; vgl. L. D. Barr, *New Testament Story: An Introduction*, Belmont: Wadsworth 1987; H. E. Heaton, „The Storytelling World of the First Century and the Gospels“, in: H. E. Heaton, Ph. Ruge-Jones und Th. E. Boomershine (Hrsg.), *The Bible in Ancient and Modern Media: Story and Performance*, Eugene: Cascade Books 2009, 21-35.

¹¹ Darüber lesen wir schon bei Irenäus von Lyon, dessen Insistieren an der Unveränderlichkeit von dem, was er *Hypothese* (ὑπόθεσις) nennt und woran παραβολαῖς sich anpassen müssen (οἰκειοῦν τῇ τῆς πίστεως ὑπόθεσι), wichtig wegen enger Gebundenheit mit dem Johannesevangelium ist (Adv. haer. I 10:3, PG 7a.556). Aber was ist richtig ὑπόθεσις? Zwischen vielen Bedeutungen von diesem Wort, wählt Irenäus, die Handlung, Geschichte oder Resümee der antiken Vorstellung, der Drama oder des Gespräches aus: zuerst dieses Exposé des Untergangs und Rettung von sich äußernd, an welchen die Opponenten halten, hebt Irenäus hervor dass *solche Hypothese* „οὐτε Προφητῶν ἐκήρυξαν, οὐτε ὁ Κύριος ἐδίδασκεν, οὐτε Ἀπόστολοι παρέδωκαν“ (Adv. haer. I 8:1; PG 7a.520); an zweiter Stelle, schreibt Irenäus dass die Gnostiker durch den Missbrauch von Oktaeder theologischen Nomens des Johannesevangeliums nur zur *gleichen Hypothese* (εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν ὑπόθεσιν μετήνεγκαν; Adv. haer. I 9:2; PG 7a.540-541) kommen, nach welcher Logos nicht zum Fleisch geworden ist: „Κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐκείνων ὑπόθεσιν, οὐχ ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο“ (541). Also sie verfügen mit ihrer *Hypothese* oder *Erzählung*, die oberhalb der Heiligen Schrift schwebt, in welcher bestimmte Ausdrücke verschiedene Bedeutung bekommen, als von dieser, die sie in der richtigen Hypothese oder Erzählung der Kirche haben, wie z. B. die Mosaik-Darstellung des Kaisers sich in das Bild des Hundes oder Fuchses

Erzählungen berühren wir *die Konstruktion einer christlichen Metaerzählung*, die mit dem Gott der Schöpfung, Abrahams und der Propheten beginnt, als Höhepunkt im Christus und bis zum Neuen Jerusalem reicht, die auch die Glaubensregel ist, da sie den Kern ausmacht, woran sich die katholische Kirche erinnert und worüber sie erzählt, zuerst auf ihrer gründlichen, liturgischen Schicht¹². Sie übergibt also, diese Metanarration mittels Taufen ihren Kindern als den *Heiligen* (οἱ ἅγιοι), bzw. als den aktiven Teilnehmern der gleichen Erzählung, in der οἱ ἀπόστολοι καὶ οἱ προφῆται (Apk 18:20) leben, was sie mittels liturgischen Rezital des

Glaubensbekenntnisses als ihrer zusammengefasster Form bestätigt – beginnend von einem Gott bis zum ewigen Leben. So, wenn man sagen kann, dass die zentrale Altarposition der Heiligen Schrift der Ruf auf sein Verstehen im Lichte dieser einen, unterliegenden, mit dem Geist lebenden und übergebenden Erzählung ist, dann kann man sagen, dass auch das Phänomen der Erzählung in der Wurzel alleine liegt – der Tradition und der Narratologie auch.

Falls, auf diese Weise denkend, sich die Tradition und die Wissenschaft im Phänomen der Erzählung treffen, von welcher Bedeutung ist das für die Exegese des Johannesevangeliums? Die Antwort auf die gestellte Frage ist nicht einfach, da es Richtung Verbindung von konkreter Schrift mit hier grob skizzierten Metanarrativ geht und dann auch mit seinen verschiedenen Ausdrücken, unter welchen man vorwiegend der zeitgenössischen liturgischen Form hindeuten sollte. Aber wenn wir uns vorstellen, dass zuerst eine Grundform der mündlichen christlichen Erzählung lebte, was nicht unmöglich ist, in Anbetracht auf die drei Förderungen des Diktums von Vinzenz von Lérins, so ist es leichter die Vorstellung über seine Eigenschaften zu haben: 1) vor allem, Autor dieser Erzählung ist der Gott selbst, 2) die sich, im Einklang damit, entlang des maximalen Zeitrahmens erstreckt – von dem zeitlosen Anfang bis zum eschatologischen Ende und 3) die von ausdrücklicher Performativität sein muss, da sie auch deswegen besteht, um den Zuhörer Teil von sich selbst zu machen. Es macht den Eindruck, als ob in dem gesamten Prozess der Umwandlung vom vorgestellten Metanarrativ in verschiedenste Schriftformen, das Johannesevangelium sehr Glaubwürdig den herausragenden Eigenschaften bleibt: 1) sein Umschlag enthält integrale antike Erzählung, entstanden durch Vaters Entscheidung, dass wegen Rettung der Welt er seinen einzigen Sohn abgab (3:16)¹³, 2) die vom zeitlosen Anfang (1:1) Richtung Universalem paradigmatischen

umwandeln lässt (Adv. haer. I 8:1; PG 7a.521), oder wie Homers Verse die Bedeutung mittels Ausziehen aus dem Kontext geändert werden können (Adv. haer. I 9:4; PG 7a.544-548). Gegenüber der *Geschichte* der Gnostiker, gibt es die *Geschichte* der Kirche, so wer die wahrhaftige Hypothese besitzt (oder: „ὁ τὸν κανόνα τῆς ἀληθείας ἀκλινῇ ἐν ἑαυτῷ κατέχων“, PG 7a.545), hat keine Probleme mit dem Verstehen der Schrift. Letztendlich, ὑπόθεσις ist vorwiegend mündliche Geschichte, als geschriebenen Doktrinen, da die frühchristlichen Gemeinschaften ihren Glauben mittels Zuhören, Gedächtnis, Singen und weitererzählen der Worte Gottes formten, die *als solche* in die Textur der christlichen Sprache eingebaut ist. Siehe: W. C. van Unnik, „Interesting document of second century theological discussion (Irenaeus, Adv Haer 1:10,3)“, *Vigiliae Christianae* 31 (1977), 196-228, besonders: 206-208; vgl. Florovsky, *Tradition* (Anm. 9), 184-186.

¹² Vgl. P. M. Blowers, „The regula fidei and the Narrative Character of Early Christian Faith“, *Pro Ecclesia* 6 (1997), 199-228:202-204.

¹³ Vgl. Culpepper, *Anatomy* (Anm. 2), 77-98; Culpepper, „The Plot of John’s Story of Jesus“, *Interpretation* 49 (1995), 347-358; ders., *The Gospel and Letters of John*, IBT; Nashville: Abingdon Press 1998, 72-86; J. T. Nielsen, „The Narrative Structures of Glory and Glorification in the Fourth Gospel“, *New Testament Studies* 56 (2010), 343-366:348-354.

Ende geht: „Mein Herr und mein Gott!“ (20:28)¹⁴ und 3) die ganz am Ende explizit ihre Performativität (20:30-31; vgl. 1:14.18)¹⁵ herausragt, in den narratologischen Studien gezeigt durch ihren strategischen Umgang mit dem Glauben der impliziten Leser¹⁶. So auch ohne besondere komplexe Forschungsprozesse, kommen wir zur Schlüsseinsicht: willst du traditionell in der Exegese dieses Evangeliums sein, dann bist du verpflichtet zuerst die Anatomie seiner Erzählung zu verstehen.

Es ist aber doch nicht genug, bei diesem Argument zu bleiben, da die Tradition ein Phänomen ist, das mit der Vergangenheit nicht uneingeschränkt ist. Beginnend noch mit dem zweiten Jahrhundert, verlässt die Kirche die narrativen Konzeptionen der neutestamentlichen Bücher, um ihre einzelnen Überlieferungen freiwilliger nach aktuellen christologischen Herausforderungen, als neuen Ausdrücken des ursprünglichen Metanarrativs zu organisieren¹⁷. Also, im Grunde sprechend ist die Erzählung geeigneter Boden des Treffens von Tradition und Narratologie, aber die Frage kann nicht umgangen werden: auf welche Weise kann das narratologische Lesen des Evangeliums heute reales Verhältnis mit der traditionellen Aktivität des Geistes haben? Die Frage auf diese Antwort entwickelt sich in zwei gegenseitig verbundene Richtungen, von welchen einer mehr hermeneutischer und die andere exegetischer Natur ist. So als erstes, Verstehen des Textes im Herzen der Tradition alleine steht dem nahe, was die Narratologie erreicht, worauf vor allem die Distanz beider dieser Zugänge von historischen Fragen hindeutet; aber, die Nähe ist wesentlich größer als die bemerkte Distanz: nämlich, das in der orthodoxen Liturgie der Brauch des Singens von biblischen Texten geblieben ist¹⁸, ist nicht erst das

¹⁴ Vgl. J. Zummstein, „Narratologische Lektüre der johanneischen Ostergeschichte“, *Kreative Erinnerung* (Anm. 2), 277-290:280. Erinnern wir, dass Thomas Perikope, obwohl paradigmatisch für die späteren Leser des Evangeliums (20:29), trotzdem die erzählte Zeit nicht begrenzt. Ziel der Abschiedsreden (13-17) ist die Zukunft der Offenbarung, was den Höhepunkt im Abschiedsgebet Jesu (17:1-26) hat, das mit den Prolepsen in den Vergangenheitsformen den Leser in den Punkt des eschatologischen Endes hinstellt. Siehe: J. Zummstein, „Die verklarte Vergangenheit: Geschichte sub specie aeternitatis nach Johannes 17,“ *Kreative Erinnerung*, 207-218:213-216; J. Frey, „Das johanneische Zeitverständnis“, in: ders., *Die johanneische Eschatologie. Bd 2*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 110; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1998, 89-93.

¹⁵ Darüber, dass die Verse 20:30-31 das ursprüngliche Ende des Evangeliums sein könnten, siehe: Tertullian, *Adversus Praxeas* 25:4 (PL 2.188); auch: M. Latke, „Joh 20:30f als Buchschluss“, *Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 78 (1987), 288-292; U. Schnelle, *Antidoketische Christologie im Johannesevangelium. Eine Untersuchung zur Stellung des vierten Evangeliums in der johanneischen Schule*, Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments 144, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1987, 152; G. Schenke, „Das Erscheinen Jesu vor den Jüngern und der ungläubige Thomas. Johannes 20,19–31“, in: L. Painchaud und P.-H. Poirier (Hrsg.), *Coptica – Gnostica – Manichaica. FS Wolf-Peter Funk*, Bibliothèque copte de Nag Hammadi – Section Etudes 7, Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval 2006, 893–904.

¹⁶ Siehe: J. Zummstein, „Das Johannesevangelium: Eine Strategie des Glaubens“, *Kreative Erinnerung* (Anm. 2), 31-45.

¹⁷ Das zeigt klar morphologische und semantische Änderung des narratologisch funktionellen Begriffs bestimmter Sicht $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, die im synoptischen Evangelium der Weg Jesu Leiden und Auferstehung vereinigt (Mk 8:31par), in unbestimmte Form $\nu\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, die schon seit Beginn des zweiten Jahrhunderts, im Einklang mit der neuen christologischen Konzeption, als neuer Ausdruck der Universalität Christi Menschennatur funktioniert (vgl. Ign. Eph. 20:2). Siehe: U. Luz, „The Son of Man in Matthew: Heavenly Judge or Human Christ“, *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 48 (1992), 3-21:19-20.

¹⁸ Die Tatsache, dass die Bibel in der Spätantike stufenweise die Komponente der liturgischen und teleturgischen Praxis der Kirche im Osten wird, verstand der orthodoxe Bibelwissenschaftler Savas Agourides (1921-2009) als Indikation der Schwächung ihrer prophetischer Kraft im Leben der Christen: S. Agourides, „The Orthodox Church and Contemporary Biblical Research“ in: *Auslegung der Bibel* (Anm. 1), 139-154:140: „This absorption of the Scriptures into the Church's liturgical life was an adverse event only because, in this way, the Bible lost more and more of its independent and prophetic nature and thus ceased to be a factor guiding the

Ergebnis der Unterwerfung der allgemeinen Singerei des Rituals, sondern Ausdruck des tiefen Bewusstseins der Kirche, dass das Wort Gottes mit dem Verstand unfassbar ist; es ist, also, das was in der Atmosphäre des Geistes effizient den Subjekt ausdenkt¹⁹, und nicht umgekehrt, was gleich dem narratologoschen Prinzip das Selbst durch die Sache des Textes konstituiert wird²⁰; und in beiden Fällen also, wird das Subjekt mit der Welt der Erzählung umwandelt. Die zweite Richtung ist exegetischer Natur und bezieht sich auf den effizienteren Beitrag der akademischen Exegese, den konkreten Lebensbedürfnissen der Kirche, denen mehr geschmeidige Narratologie, als steife Methodologie historischer Kritik helfen kann; darüber hinaus wirkt die Erfrischung des biblischen Sinnes mit Hilfe des narratologischen Zugangs und Überdenkens der Bedeutung praktisch angewandter Absätze der Heiligen Schrift²¹ nicht so schmerzhaft gegenüber die traditionel-

Church and the people. It became part of worship. Not only did the text of the Holy Gospel become a devotional object, but the habit was introduced of chanting the established biblical reading in Church in the same way that hymns were sung.“

¹⁹ Zitieren wir hier einen der führenden orthodoxen Theologen der heutigen Zeit: Metropolitan of Pergamon John D. Zizioulas, *Lectures in Christian dogmatics*, London: T&T Clark 2008, 159: „It is within the framework of worship and the divine Eucharist that we find the reason and meaning of the gospel we chant... We all experience the desire to grasp knowledge and land it in our net. The Word of God can never be grasped: all our concepts and conceptualising must wait for the Word of God to grasp us. It is our desire to take control of the truth of God which is driving the demand to replace chanting with reading in order to make the Scriptural readings instantly and universally comprehensible. However, even the word ‘comprehensible’ is telling: who believes that he can comprehend or apprehend these readings from the Word of God?“

²⁰ Nach P. Ricoeur, *Essays on Biblical interpretation*, Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1980, 108: „[It means] the final defeat of the pretension of consciousness to set itself up as the standard of meaning. To understand oneself before the text is not to impose one’s own finite capacity of understanding on it, but to expose oneself to receive from it a larger self which would be the proposed way of existing that most appropriately responds to the proposed world of the text. Understanding then is the complete opposite of a constitution for which the subject would have the key. It would be better in this regard to say that the self is constituted by the issue of the text.“

²¹ Nehmen wir als Beispiel den Absatz über die Heilung des genommenen Menschen in Bethesda, der in der orthodoxen gottesdienstlicher Tradition liturgisch (5:1-17) in der vierten Woche nach dem Osterfest vorgelesen wird. Da dieses Vorlesen die Grundlage des thematischen Inhalts des kirchlichen Gottesdienstes während der nachkommenden Woche ausmacht, der bis zur fünften Woche nach Ostern über den Inhalt des gelesenen Zeichens singt, so sind die Teilnehmer des Gottesdienstes während dieser Woche mit dem Thema der singenden Heilung *geführt*. Auf welche Weise, zeigt die Manier des Beginns der Hymnen (steichira) mit Übersingen des Wunderinhalts, weiter die Beendigung durch Identifizierung der ganzen gottesdienstlichen Gemeinschaft mit der Figur des Geheilten, mittels Vers wie folgt: „...ἄρόν σου τὸν κράββατον καὶ περιπάτει. Πάντα σοι δυνατό, πάντα ὑπακούει, πάντα ὑποτέτακται, πάντων ἡμῶν μνήσθητι, καὶ ἐλέησον Ἄγιε, ὡς φίλάνθρωπος“ (*Πεντηκοστήριον*, Αθήνα: Αποστολική Διακονία της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος 1986, 71). Darüber hinaus, solche Gestaltung der Gottesdienstteilnehmer durch die Heilung, die für sie im *Heiligen Geist* real wie für einst geheilten Menschen, geht sogar so weit, dass die Figur dieses Menschen mittels zuschreiben von Reaktionen ändert, die aus dem Text 5:1-17 nicht folgen, wie es seine (unsere!) Initiative für Heilung ist: „Ἀταφος νεκρὸς ὑπάρχων ὁ Παράλυτος, ἰδὼν σε ἐβόησεν· Ἐλέησόν με Κύριε, ὅτι ἡ κλίνη μου τύμβος μοι ἐγένετο. Τί μοι κέρδος ζωῆς; οὐ χρήζω τῆς Προβατικῆς κολυμβήθρας· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ μοι τίς ὁ ἐμβάλλων με, ταρρατομένον τῶν ὑδάτων· ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῇ πηγῇ προσέρχομαι τῶν ἱαμάτων, ἵνα καὶ γὰρ μετὰ πάντων κράζω· Παντοδύναμε Κύριε, δόξα σοι“ (*Πεντηκοστήριον*, 71). In diesem Geiste soll man auch patristische Interpretation des Verses 5:15 verstehen, nach welcher *das Berichten* (ἀνήγγειλεν) des Geheilten an Juden ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὸν ὑγιῇ, keine Verleumdung oder Perfidie ist, was man doch denken könnte in Betracht auf unmittelbare spätere Entscheidung von Juden (5:16.18) und ihre Entwicklung Richtung Kreuz, sondern stolze Zeugung des Heilenden, mit welcher auch andere angezogen werden sollten (vgl. z. B. Johannes Chrysostomus, In Joannem 38:2; PG 59.213). Solche Deutung, besonders wegen der positiven Konnotation des Verbes ἀναγγέλλω im Johannesevangelium (vgl. 4:25; 16:13.14.15), nehmen auch einige zeitgenössische Deuter (S. v. Tilborg, *Imaginative Love in John*, Biblical Interpretation Series 2, Leiden: Brill 1993, 218-219) an, aber es ist die Frage, ob sie *das Selbst* annehmen will, das ausschließlich mit der Welt der Erzählung geformt ist. Zuerst Culpepper (*Anatomy* [Anm. 2], 137-138), und dann extensiver auch

len Werte, wie als solche gewisse Ergebnisse des Kritizismus scheinen können – angefangen von der Orthodoxie fremde Frage nach dem historischen Jesus. Auf diese Weise, können wir bemerken, durch Zusammenarbeit beider Richtungen im gewissen Kreis, zeigt das Phänomen der Erzählung wesentliches Potenzial für kreative Synthese der Tradition und Wissenschaft, die sich in der Exegese des Vierten Evangeliums weiter durch das Thema *Figur* stärken, als wesentliches Element des Narrativs.

3. Figuren

Über die Regeln der Charakterisierung kann man schon bei Aristoteles (Poet 1454a) lesen und es gibt keine Zweifel, dass Autor des Evangeliums sich an einigen Prinzipien in der literarischen Ausführung seiner Figuren gehalten hat: in Anbetracht auf das narratologische Verstehen des Ziels von diesem Buch als strategische Entwicklung des Glaubens vom Auditorium, kann man leicht die Einsicht des selben Zugangs verstehen, nach welchem die Figuren des Evangeliums Repräsentanten der bestimmten Typen des Glaubens sind²². Darüber hinaus gibt der repräsentative Entwicklung ihres Glaubens, und zwar auf ausdrücklich performativen Kreuzung zwischen dem Schüler und Juden (die Welt), besondere Kraft der episodischen Struktur der Erzählung²³, dessen Fähigkeit der Abschattung des Hauptnarrativen wahrscheinlich mit ursprünglicher Praxis der Anwendung ihrer Episoden erklärt werden könnte²⁴. Nicht in diese Erklärungen hineingehend, werden wir auf noch einer Manier der orthodoxen Tradition erinnern, die nahe der Narratologie steht, und welche sich in die gottesdienstliche Pflege der Repräsentativität des Glaubens von Figuren des Evangeliums widerspiegelt. Nämlich die Komposition des orthodoxen liturgischen Lektionars ist solche, dass während der Periode von Pentecostarion, welcher sich von Ostern bis Pfingsten erstreckt, das Lesen der Episoden des Evangeliums bringt, die die Grundlage der fünft thematischen sieben ausmachen (über

R. Metzner, „Der Geheilte von Johannes 5 – Repräsentant des Unglaubens“, *Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 90 (1999), 177-193, zeigen das Gegenteil: die Unfähigkeit des Geheilten glaubhafter Zeuge des Glaubens zu sein, ihn als den Vertreter des Unglaubens im narrativen Plan des Evangeliums charakterisierend. So im Gegensatz zu dieser Ansicht des Charakters vom Geheilten in der orthodoxen gottesdienstlichen Tradition, der seine Gesundheit bewusst vom Jesus verlangt, verleiht die narrative Exegese dem Leser Einsicht in seine Unfähigkeit der Erkennung des Heilers im Jesus (5:6-7), bzw. des Glaubens in ihn als den Sohn Gottes (5:13.15), wie er sich durch Zeichen in Bethesda (5:17) offenbart. Auf diese Weise mit diesem Vergleich bemerken wir, dass das traditionelle und narratologische Verstehen einer Erzählung auf gleichen hermeneutischen Grundlagen stehen können, aber dass ihr Ergebnis nicht der gleiche sein muss; doch das bedeutet nicht deren Ausschaltung: denn, wie die Kirche im Einklang mit den Bedürfnissen, die Freiheit hatte, mit dem Gottesdienst den Charakter des geheilten Menschen zu definieren, indem sie ihn nach dem realen Bedürfnissen des Lebens formen wird, so ist sie auch nicht weniger behindert dass im Einklang mit den selben Bedürfnissen die narratologische Einsicht in die andere Seite seines Charakters auszunützen. Ob sie das machen wird und auf welche Weise, bleibt ihre kreative Aufgabe in den konkreten Lebensumständen.

²² Vgl. Culpepper, *Anatomy* (Anm. 2), 99-148, 146-148; Zummstein, *Strategie* (Anm. 16), 42-43.

²³ Vgl. Culpepper, *Anatomy* (Anm. 2), 77-98; Zummstein, *Strategie* (Anm. 16), 33-34.

²⁴ Auf diese praktische Anwendung des Evangeliums würde die Nähe seiner episodischen Struktur mit ähnlichen Anatomien der antiken griechischem Drama zeigen, wie es darüber schreibt: J.-A. A. Brant, *Dialogue and Drama. Elements of Greek Tragedy in the Fourth Gospel*, Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers 2004, 27. Aber die performative Struktur des christlichen Textes, sogar innerhalb der Gemeinschaft, die auf dem hellenistischen Gebiet (Ephesus) lebte, wäre doch eher mit der gottesdienstlicher Tradition des Lesens von Briefen in der Synagoge bestimmt, weswegen Mitte voriges Jahrhundert die Theorien über das Evangelium als den ersten liturgischen Lektionaren der frühchristlichen Gemeinschaft entstanden sind. In Betracht auf Johannes Evangelium äußern diese These: A. Guilding, *The Fourth Gospel and Jewish Worship*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1960; L. Morris, *The New Testament and the Jewish Lectionaries*, London: Tyndale Press 1964.

Thomas, den Frauen am Grab, den Gelähmten, der samaritanischen Frau und dem Blindgeborenem)²⁵. Daher, das was die Narratologie in der Anatomie der Johanneserzählung erkennt, und das ist die Fähigkeit der Figuren innerhalb der eingekreisten Episoden bestimmte Sicht des Glaubens in das inkarnierte Logos auszudrücken, das die orthodoxe gottesdienstliche Tradition mit ausdrücklich performativem Grund pflegt, während der ersten fünf Wochen nach dem Osterfest, mit welcher sie Richtung Fest des Kommen des Heiligen Geistes (Pfingsten) geht. So wenn wir der Tradition noch konsequenter sein wollen, werden wir sagen, dass ihre komplette Grundsicht bzw. gottesdienstliche Welt, repräsentativ ist: die Wochen während der Periode der Großen Fastenzeit, auch mit der Vorbereitung für sie, dann die Charaktere der Heiligen und die Struktur des Kalenders, all das hat den Hauch bestimmter Typen der Zeugung des christlichen Glaubens oder Figuren = paradigmatischen Fähigkeiten bestimmter historischer Persönlichkeiten, sich selbst vollkommen den Teilnehmern des Metanarrativs zu machen. Die Gründe der Ähnlichkeit zwischen dem Evangelium und Interesse des Gottesdienstes für die Repräsentativität seiner Figuren, ist hier nicht das Ziel dies zu erklären, sondern man sollte sagen, dass die narratologische Beschäftigung mit dieser Repräsentativität ziemliches Potenzial für das kreative Treffen mit der Tradition hat. Endlich geht die Aufmerksamkeit auf das Phänomen *des Buches* über.

4. Buch

Da sich das Evangelium sich gegenüber bewusst wie gegenüber dem Buch benimmt, sagen explizit seine (ursprünglich letzten) Verse 20:30-31 aus. Denn es gibt auch andere, nicht so direkte Zeiger dieses Verhältnisses, erkennbar in diesen literarischen Mechanismen, mit welchen dieses Buch in ihrer geordneten Gemeinschaft positioniert wird. Der zeitgenössischen Narratologie ist es klar geworden, dass dieses Mechanismus in der Grundlage der Person des Lieblingjüngers ausmacht, der die Legitimität der geschriebenen Interpretation von Jesu Christi garantiert, so wie den Charakter des Geistes, des Trösters (Beistandes), der den Christus in den nach österlichen Zeit ersetzt und ohne welchen diese Interpretation keinen Sinn hat (2:22; 12:16; 20:9)²⁶. Also mit der Erkennung dieses literarischen Mechanismus, bemerkt die narrative Exegese die hermeneutische Schlüsselposition des Buches zur Zeit des Heiligen Geistes, damit gleichzeitig mit traditionellen Anforderung für die Deutung der Heiligen Schrift in diesem Ambiente be-
gegnet.

Mit der Hervorhebung dieser Begegnung des Buches und Geistes wird die Möglichkeit des Visiers noch einer seiner Dimension eröffnet, die nicht bedeutungslos ist.

²⁵ S. Anm. 21. Obwohl sie das Lesen aus dem Vierten Evangelium (17:1-17) vorschreibt, gehört die sechste Woche, die dem Fest der Kirchenväter in Nicea gewidmet ist, doch nicht dieser Reihe. Der Grund der Abweichung ist der Charakter der vorherigen Wochenreihe, bestimmt mit dem Thema der nach österlichen Meldungen Jesus bis zu (feiern) seiner Himmelfahrt.

²⁶ Vgl. J. Zummstein, „Erinnerung und Oster-Relecture im Johannesevangelium“, *Kreative Erinnerung* (Anm. 2), 47-63:56-59. Es ist wichtig zu bemerken, dass beide Figuren *gemeinsam* jede auf ihre charakteristische Weise, auf *den Platz Jesu* stehen: der Lieblingsjünger ist vorgeladen mit sich bzw. seiner schriftlichen Zeugnis (21:24) der neue Sohn der Mutter (19:26-27) zu werden, während auch der Geist, der Paraklet genannt, den abwesenden Christus ersetzt (14:16.17.26; 15:26; 16:7-11.13-15). Das Evangelium sagt dem Leser, dass es in der nachösterlichen Atmosphäre, mit der Wirkung des Heiligen Geistes, den Jesus Christus präsent macht, in welcher Richtung man auch die Worte verstehen soll (6:63): τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν τὸ ζῳοποιῶν, ἢ σὰρξ οὐκ ὀφείλει οὐδέν· τὰ ῥήματα ἃ ἐγὼ λελάληκα ὑμῖν πνεῦμά ἐστιν καὶ ζῳή ἐστιν.

Mit explizitem nämlich dem Verhalten gegenüber sich selbst als gegenüber dem Buch (20:30-31), das Evangelium verhältet sich gleich auch gegenüber den verwendeten historischen Fakten, die mittels narrativem performativen Ziel organisiert sind, gar nicht außerhalb von ihm verständlich sind – das heißt außerhalb der nachösterlichen Atmosphäre des Geistes, in welcher dieses Narrativ entsteht und funktioniert (13:7). Das zeigen auf originellem Wege die Charaktere von Maria und Thomas, die das Thema des Berührens von auferstandenem Jesus verbindet. Im Unterschied zu Maria, als Zeugin des Todes Jesu (19:25) und daraus die Personifikation des logischen Schlussfolgerung *auf Grund der gegebenen Tatsachen* (20:2.13.15) – das bedeutet, dem Versuch dem Protagonisten potentiell anhängliche Faktographie ihn „auf dem Boden“ zu halten (20:17) – lädt Thomas innerhalb des mit dem Geist inspirierter Anordnung den Leser ein, seinen Glauben durch Berühren der historischen Fakten am Körper des Buches zu basieren (20:27). In diesem Ruf, der auch mit einer Dosis der Selbstkritik erklingt (20:29; vgl. 20:8-9), erkennen wir das literarische Grundmechanismus der Selbstpositionierung des Buches in der geordneten Gemeinschaft, aber wir bemerken auch ihr nicht wertloses Verhältnis gegenüber sich selbst als *dem Körper des inkarnierten und auferstandenen Logos*²⁷. Dieses Verhältnis ist eigentlich auf anderem Wege (alexandrinische Sympathie für Allegorie) in der östlichen exegetischen Tradition rezipiert worden²⁸ und wird heute noch gleichwertig in der orthodoxen gottesdienstlichen Praxis gespürt, in welcher z. B. das Austragen des Lektionars aus der Mitte des Altarraumes während gewisser liturgischer Tätigkeiten (wie es Prozessie ist), die Ankunft des Sohnes Gottes in die Welt symbolisiert²⁹. Auf die-

²⁷ Falls aus dem Text des Evangeliums wir in die Welt der antiken Schreibkultur übergehen, werden wir sehen, dass dieses Verhältnis dank dem Verhalten des antiken Autors gegenüber dem geschriebenen Wort (Logos) wie die Eltern gegenüber dem Kind gegründet wurde (Plato, Phaedrus 275). Dieses Evangelium, mit dem Prolog (1:1-18) als den Hüter dieses Sinnes, äußert auf folgende Weise: wie der Vater in die Welt den Sohn schickt, so auch das Treten der geschriebenen Zeugnisse auf seinen leeren Stelle, mit der Wirkung des Geistes (s. Anm. 26), die Möglichkeit des Verstehens dieser Zeugnisse als Verkörperung impliziert. Dies bestätigt der Befehl der Mission (20:21): *καθὼς ἀπέσταλκέν με ὁ πατήρ, καὶ γὰρ πέμπω ὑμᾶς*, das in der nächsten Verbindung mit dem Geben des Geistes steht (20:22): *καὶ τοῦτο εἰπὼν ἐνεφύσησεν καὶ λέγει αὐτοῖς: λάβετε πνεῦμα ἅγιον*. So wenn wir in Betracht auch gesamtes Spektrum des Wortes *λόγος* ziehen, so ist es dann möglich den Vers 1:14a (*ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*) mit der Entstehung des Evangeliums als *geschriebenes Werk* zu verbinden, das die Säule der neuen Schechina (1:14b) wird und dessen Pragmatik *innerhalb dieser Schechina* solche ist, dass auf das aktive Verhältnis ruft (1:14c) [Sehen der Herlichkeit!]. Mit dem Denken in dieser Richtung, wird die epilogische Interpretation der Selbstkritik bei der letzten Adressierung Christi an Thomas (20:29) sichtbar, die wir in der Endkonstatation des Buches lesen, über eigene Unfähigkeit mit dem geschriebenen Wort das präexistente, verkörperte Wort zu ersetzen (21:25; vgl. 1:1.14.18). Es soll auch bemerkt werden, dass die Idee des Verhältnisses gegenüber dem geschriebenen Werk so wie gegenüber dem verkörperten Wort auch nicht der modernen Linguistik fremd ist: direkt das Johannesevangelium nicht erwähnend, aber aus der Sicht den Begriff *Logos* nicht lassend, meint Derrida das Akt des Schreibens als *Erbsünde* im platonistischen Sinne, da dadurch das natürliche Verhältnis zwischen sprachlichem Klang und geschriebenem Wort umgedreht wurde: J. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. by G. Ch. Spivak, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1976, 35: „It is the natural relationship [of sound in speech to the written sign] that would have been inverted by the original sin of writing“.

²⁸ Mehr über dieses Thema, siehe: J. Panagopoulos, „Sache und Energie. Zur theologischen Grundlegung der biblischen Hermeneutik bei den griechischen Kirchenvätern“, in: H. Cancik, H. Lichtenberger und P. Schäfer (Hrsg.), *Geschichte – Tradition – Reflexion. Frühes Christentum III. Festschrift M. Hengel*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1996, 567-584; ders., „Christologie und Schriftauslegung bei den griechischen Kirchenvätern“, *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 89 (1992), 41-58; M. Fiedrowicz, *Theologie der Kirchenväter. Grundlagen frühchristlicher Glaubensreflexion*, Freiburg – Basel – Wien: Herder 2007; ²⁰2010, 125-127.

²⁹ Sollen hier zugunsten dessen die Worte des byzantinischen Theologen aus dem XIV Jahrhundert Nikolaos Kabasilas zitiert werden, für dessen Deutung der Liturgie das zeitgenössische Orthodoxie wenig Interesse zeigt (Liturgiae expositio XX; PG 150.412C): „Τούτων δὲ ἁσθέντων, ὁ ἱερεὺς ἐν μέσῳ πρὸ τοῦ

se Weise vervollkommenet das narratologische Denken bzw. wissenschaftlicher Versuch des Ausgehens zur Begegnung der ursprünglichen Intention des impliziten Autors vom Evangeliums, das Ausgehen zur Begegnung der traditionellen Interpretation dieses Buches, womit die Perspektive der kreativen Zusammenarbeit der Tradition und Narratologie – vergessen wir nicht, angegeben mit dem Evangelium selbst – gefestigt wird!

5. Zusammenfassung

Mit der vorgeschlagenen Studie, die anhand des Phänomens der Erzählung, Figuren und selbstverstehen einer neutestamentlichen Buches versucht die Begegnungspunkte zwischen der wissenschaftlichen und traditionellen Interpretation in ihrer Grundlage und gleichzeitig auch lebens-realen tiefsten Schicht zu zeigen, wurden sicher nicht alle Möglichkeiten dieser kreativen Verbindung umfasst worden. Besonders anspruchsvoll und potentiell fruchtbar Forschungsraum machen das narratologische Lesen der Bibeltexte in den Teilen der Kirchenväter aus, aber auch in andere Denkmälern der christlichen Kultur, besonders denjenigen der visuellen Kunst (unter welche man auch die zeitgenössischen Herausforderungen der Verfilmung rechnen soll). Aber das bedeutet nicht, dass es hier keinen Beschluss gibt. Als erstes, in Betracht der wurzeligen Verbundenheit mit der Tradition, ermöglicht das narratologische Lesen der heiligen Schrift effizientere integrative und dadurch auch prophezeitische Rolle des Wortes Gottes in dem fragmentarischen geschichtlichen Bestehen, besonders desintegriert mit dem modernen technologischen Fortschritt. Und als zweites, solches Lesen der Schrift, das die Tradition von der Gefahr der dogmatischen Interpretation bewahrt, wird zur neuen Paradigma dieses überlieferten Umwandlung der wissenschaftlichen Methode im Baptisterium der orthodoxen Theologie.

θυσιαστηρίου ιστάμενος ὑψοῦ τὸ Εὐαγγέλιον αἰρεῖ καὶ ἀναδεικνύσι, τὴν ἀνάδειξιν τοῦ Κυρίου σημαίνων, ὅτε ἤρξατο φαίνεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς.“ Der Erklärung wegen, beginnt Kabasilas mit diesen Worten die Erklärung der liturgischen Prozession, die gerade in der Orthodoxie unter dem Namen „der kleine Eingang“ bekannt ist, während welcher der Priester, während des dritten Antiphons (τούτων δὲ ἁσθέντων), die Heilige Schrift vom Tischaltar nimmt, um sie zu tragen, damit er sie dann durch die Nord Tür des Ikonostase aus dem Altar austrägt und so im Kreis gehend wieder in ihn durch die zentrale oder die Königstür einträgt. Mehr über diese Thema, siehe: H. Wybrew, *The Orthodox liturgy. The development of the eucharistic liturgy in the Byzantine rite*, Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press 1990, 77-80.

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Ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. Cyril of Alexandria and Polemics over filioque of Gregory Palamas

The hesychast controversy – is it a doctrinal conflict between the East and the West in the byzantine arena¹ or an inner-byzantine debate betwixt nominalists and realists, dogmatic development and theology of repetition?² Irrespective of how we opt to answer the posed question concerning the causes of the hesychast controversy, that is, regardless of whether we give advantage to the first or second aforestated interpretation, we will even-ly be obligated to acknowledge the fact that the relation between the East and the West was in great measure embroiled in this fairly significant and long-standing religious dispute³. This is particularly pertinent to the earliest phase of the aforementioned controversy, when the question of application of different methodologies as regards the doctrine on the Holy Trinity⁴ – primarily related to the issue of the procession of the Holy Spirit – set the stage for other forms of dissention between Barlaam of Calabria and Gregory

¹ One of the main advocates of this thesis is certainly J. Romanides, “Notes on the Palamite Controversy and Related Topics”, *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 6 (1960–1961) 186–205, who believed that the main philosophical, theological and epistemological assumptions of Barlaam of Calabria are mainly based upon Augustine’s thought and Latin theology in general. This standpoint is going to be accepted, unconditionally and without engaging in further analyses, by many other authors, one of whom is also Σ. Γιαγκάζογλου, *Κοινωνία θεώσεως. Ἡ σύνθεση χριστολογίας καὶ πνευματολογίας στὸ ἔργο τοῦ ἁγίου Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ*, Ἀθήνα: Ἐκδόσεις Δόμος 2001, 16–17.

² So J. Meyendorff, *St. Gregory Palamas and Orthodox Spirituality*, translated by A. Fiske, Crestwood, New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press 1974, ²1998, who deems that the hesychast controversy actually reflects one “domestic” conflict between the byzantine humanists, whose ideas were implicitly advocated by Barlaam, on the one hand, and the byzantine monastic circles, on the other. Similar thesis is advocated by K. Ware, “Ἡ σημασία τοῦ Ἁγίου Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ γὰ τὴν σημερινὴ Δύση”, in: *Ὁ ἅγιος Γρηγόριος ὁ Παλαμᾶς στὴν ἱστορία καὶ τὸ παρόν. Πρακτικὰ Διεθνῶν ἐπιστημονικῶν συνεδρίων Ἀθηνῶν (13–15 Νοεμβρίου 1998) καὶ Λεμεσοῦ (5–7 Νοεμβρίου 1999)*. Ἐποπτεία Γ. Ἱ. Μαντζαρίδη, Ἁγίου Ὁρος: Ἱερά Μεγίστη Μονὴ Βατοπαϊδίου 2000, 159–166: 160, and B. Dupuy, “La pneumatologie de saint Grégoire Palamas”, *Istina* 44 (1999) 354–367: 358.

³ The intense and dynamic relationship between the East and the West within the hesychast controversy was sometimes accompanied by completely unexpected turn of events. This primarily refers to the discovery of Palamas’ borrowings from Augustine’s writing *De trinitate*, which somewhat altered the typical East-West confrontation established with regard to the hesychast dispute by the ideological interpreters from both ends of the christian world. For this issue and further references see: M. Кнежевић, “Mens–notitia–amor/Νοῦς–γνώσις–ἔρως. Схолија на случај ‘Augustinus/Palamas’”, in: Б. Шијаковић, прир., *Српска теологија у двадесетом веку: истраживачки проблеми и резултати II*, Београд: Институт за теолошка истраживања 2012, 42–61. (in Serbian, with summary in English)

⁴ For this issue, see synoptically: G. Podskalsky, *Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz. Der Streit um die theologische Methodik in der spätbyzantinischen Geistesgeschichte (14./15. Jh.), seine systematischen Grundlagen und seine historische Entwicklung*, Byzantinisches Archiv № 15, München: C. H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung 1977, 124–173: 127–164.

Palamas. On this occasion, I will take into consideration only one aspect of the aforesaid problem, that is, the ever-intriguing question of *filioque*, to which Palamas dedicated his first writing of dogmatic nature, viz. his notable *Apodictic Treatises on the Procession of the Holy Spirit*. In that writing, Palamas, compelled by the polemical objection put forward by the Latins, endeavours to provide an orthodox interpretation of certain passages from writings by Cyril of Alexandria, where he (referring to the Father and the Son) says that the Holy Spirit originates “from both” (ἐξ ἀμφοῖν), or, again, that he is from the “essence of the Son” (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ υἱοῦ), that is, that he springs “from the Father through the Son” (ἐκ πατρὸς δι’ υἱοῦ). These and similar passages, which the advocates of *filioque* already cited as a significant traditional argument in favour of their thesis, Palamas will have to interpret in an orthodox way and to substantiate the main, in his view, intention that Cyril on that occasion had. Hereinafter, (1) I will elucidate the manner in which Cyril himself formulates the aforementioned theses and addresses the passages that Palamas, whilst recapitulating the “Latin” objection, actually refers to; (2) I will provide a thorough representation of Palamas’ understanding of these cyrillican pericopes, which he elaborates upon in his *Second Apodictic Treatise on the Procession of the Holy Spirit*; and finally, (3) I will examine, in general outlines, the interpretative credibility of Palamas’ reading of the disputable passages from Cyril’s writings.

1.

It is generally understood that there are several passages⁵ which earned Cyril the title of “one of the most authoritative defenders of the *filioque*”⁶ and led to his becoming the most prominent figure regarding this disputable issue⁷. However, only few of those passages are explicitly reflected upon by Gregory Palamas, which is why I will only take those into account here⁸. In point of fact, Palamas, initiating his response to the filioquist reading of Cyril, condenses several different sections from his writings, expounding the main point of the Latin objection. Firstly, I will quote that passage, and then taxatively refer to Cyril’s writings which this Latin argument draws on. Also, for the sake of

⁵ To my knowledge, there is no article which provides a more thorough list of cyrillican passages regarding the issue of the procession of the Holy Spirit than that drawn up by A. Θεοδώρου, “Ἡ περὶ ἐκπορεύσεως τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος διδασκαλία Κυρίλλου τοῦ Ἀλεξανδρείας καὶ Ἐπιφανίου Κύπρου”, *Θεολογία* ΜΔ 3–4 (1973) 561–582; ME 1 (1974) 80–101; ME 2 (1974) 276–308; ME 3 (1974) 478–510. However, I have to note that this composition is more a diligently drafted index than a (well-done) study. Specifically, for passages from Cyril’s opus which induce a filioquist reading (eighteen of them in total), see 285–297.

⁶ H. du Manoir de Juaye, *Dogme et Spiritualité chez Saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie*, Paris 1944, 225 (I quote according to: A. E. Siecienski, *The Filioque. History of a Doctrinal Controversy*, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010, 48).

⁷ Therefore, he is the author who appears most frequently in Latin *florilegia* in support of the *filioque*; cf. A. E. Siecienski, *The Filioque. History of a Doctrinal Controversy*, Oxford 2010, 47.

⁸ Naturally, I cannot go into details concerning Cyril’s teaching on the procession of the Holy Spirit. With regard to that issue, I refer to the following studies: G. C. Berthold, “Cyril of Alexandria and the ‘Filioque’”, *Studia Patristica* 19 (1989) 143–147; M. O. Boulnois, *La paradoxe trinitaire chez Cyrille d’Alexandrie: Herméneutique, analyses philosophiques et argumentation théologique*, Collection des Études Augustiniennes. Série Antiquité 143, Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes 1994; M. O. Boulnois “The Mystery of the Trinity according to Cyril of Alexandria: The Deployment of the Triad and Its Recapitulation into the Unity of Divinity”, in: Th. Weinandy, D. Keating, eds., *The Theology of Cyril of Alexandria: A Critical Appreciation*, New York: T&T Clark 2003, 75–112: 103–108; B. E. Daley, “The Fullness of the Saving God: Cyril of Alexandria on the Holy Spirit”, in: Th. Weinandy, D. Keating, eds., *The Theology of Cyril of Alexandria...*, New York 2003, 113–148: 144–148; A. E. Siecienski, *The Filioque. History of a Doctrinal Controversy*, Oxford 2010, 47–50.

plainer comparison of key phrases which I shall later employ, the original Greek text will be provided alongside an English translation:

But, Cyril of Alexandria, it is said, states that the Son has in himself by nature particular and exceptional [properties] of the Father, since the property of the begetter is naturally transferred onto him, and also states that the Spirit is from the essence of the Son and that he springs from the Father through the Son so as to sanctify the creation, and that he substantially comes forth from both. And, again, in the seventh letter of those sent to Hermias about the Son, he explains to us these [things]: “Having absolved of the sin the one who is devoted to him, he anoints him with his Spirit, whom he himself inspires as Logos from God the Father, and pours him out upon us from his own nature. And possessing the Spirit, he gives him not by measure”, according to John, “but inspires him from himself, as does the Father.”⁹

Ἀλλ’ ὁ τῆς Ἀλεξανδρείας, φασί, Κύριλλος, ἔχειν φησὶ τὸν υἱὸν φυσικῶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἴδια καὶ ἐξαίρετα, διαβαινούσης εἰς αὐτὸν φυσικῶς τῆς τοῦ γεννήσαντος ιδιότητος, καὶ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα λέγει· καὶ προχεόμενον ἐκ πατρὸς δι’ υἱοῦ τὴν κτίσιν ἀγιάζειν, καὶ ἐξ ἁμφοῖν προχεόμενον οὐσιωδῶς. Καὶ αὖθις ἐν ἐβδόμῳ τῶν Πρὸς Ἑρμείαν ἐξηξηγούμενων λόγων περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν διατρανοῖ· ‘ἀπολύων γάρ, φησίν, ἁμαρτίας τὸν αὐτῷ προσκειμενον, τῷ ἰδίῳ λοιπὸν καταχρίει πνεύματι, ὅπερ ἐνίησι μὲν αὐτός, ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ πατρὸς λόγος καὶ ἐξ ἰδίας ἡμῖν ἀναπηγάξει φύσεως. Καὶ οὐκ ἐκ μέτρου ἔχον διδώσι τὸ πνεῦμα κατὰ τὴν Ἰωάννου φωνήν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ἐνίησιν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, καθάπερ ἀμέλει καὶ ὁ πατήρ’.

As far as I was able to discern, Gregory Palamas, whilst recapitulating the Latin argument in favour of the thesis of *filioque*, has in mind at least six writings from the capacious oeuvre of Cyril of Alexandria. The *first* passage can, indubitably, be located in two of Cyril’s writings, namely: in his well-known *Thesaurus* and in his writing entitled *Commentary on John*. As regards *Thesaurus*, the 33rd paragraph is of vital importance here for us, bearing an indicative title: “That the Spirit is, by nature, God, and hence from the Father’s essence, and that he is bestowed upon the creation through the Son.”¹⁰ The chief objection that Cyril here comes to grips is, to use terminology dating from a later time, the objection of *pantheism*. Namely, Cyril’s adversaries affirm that if, due to the fact that the Spirit is from God (ἐκ Θεοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα), it is held as true that he is consubstantial with God, it will, since according to the apostle Paul the creation is also from God (τὰ πάντα ἐκ Θεοῦ), have to be acknowledged that the whole creation is also of divine essence. This will consequently be conducive to the fusion of two realms of existence as well as the multiplication of the sphere of the divine. Therefore, Cyril’s primary undertaking is to discern the dual causality related to the divine being, that is, to point out the double character of “ἐξ οὗ”, and to underline the fundamental ontological *hiatus* between the created and uncreated – which is, at the same time, the most fundamental distinction of reality he draws¹¹. Whilst the Holy Spirit is from God as the one who “exists

⁹ Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ, Λόγος ἀποδεικτικὸς Β’ 62, in: Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ, *Συγγράμματα*. Ἐκδίδονται ἐπιμελείᾳ Π. Κ. Χρήστου. Τόμος Α’. Λόγοι ἀποδεικτικοί. Ἀντεπιγραφαί. Ἐπιστολαὶ πρὸς Βαρλαάμ καὶ Ἀκινδύνον. Ὑπὲρ ἡσυχάζοντων. Ἐκδίδουν Β. Bobrinsky, Π. Παπαευαγγέλου, Ι. Meyendorff, Π. Χρήστου, Θεσσαλονίκη: Κυρομάνος 1962, ²1988 [further: ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ ²1988]], 23–153: 134.11–22. I quote in parallel according to the edition: Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ, *Ἄπαντα τὰ ἔργα. Ι. Λόγοι ἀποδεικτικοὶ δύο περὶ ἐκπορεύσεως τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος. Ἀντεπιγραφαί. Ἐπιστολαὶ πρὸς Ἀκινδύνον καὶ Βαρλαάμ*. Ἐπόπται Παν. Κ. Χρήστου, Θεοδ. Ν. Ζήσης. Ἐπιμεληταὶ Βασ. Δ. Φανουργάκης, Ἐλευθ. Γ. Μερετάκης. Εἰσαγωγή, Μετάφρασις-Σχόλια Ὑπὸ Π. Κ. Χρήστου, Ἐλληνες Πατέρες τῆς Ἐκκλησίας № 51, Πατερικαὶ ἐκδόσεις Γρηγόριος ὁ Παλαμᾶς, Θεσσαλονίκη 1981 [further: ΕΠΕ 51 [1981]], 68–336: 300.3–16.

¹⁰ Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, *Ἡ βίβλος τῶν θησαυρῶν περὶ τῆς Ἁγίας καὶ ὁμοουσίου Τριάδος ΑΓ’*, PG 75, 565B–573C.

¹¹ Cf. H. van Loon, *The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria*, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae № 96, Leiden, Boston: Brill 2009, 178.

in him by nature” (φυσικῶς ἐνυπάρχον αὐτῷ), and since the Holy Spirit is “embedded in his essence” (οὐσιωδῶς ἐμπεπηγός), created beings are, Cyril points out, only “inappropriately” (καταχρηστικώτερον) taken as “from” (ἐκ) God¹². Corroborating his theses with the scriptural pericopes and analogies of the co-naturalness of man and the spirit that dwells in him, and proving that “ἐξ οὗ” does not have to pertain to “consubstantiality”, Cyril emphasizes, through a rather meticulous interpretation of the eighth paragraph of *The Epistle to the Romans*, that the apostle Paul¹³ does not inadvertently refer to the Spirit as the “Spirit of God” and immediately thereupon as the “Spirit of Christ”. Cyril claims that Paul’s prime intention is to show how *all properties of the Father pass onto out of him naturally begotten Son* (πάντα τὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἴδια, διαβαίνει ἐπὶ τὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ φυσικῶς γεννηθέντα Υἱόν), and to underscore that the Spirit is of one essence with the Son, whilst they exist one within another (ὡς αὐτὸ τε ὑπάρχειν ἐν Υἱῷ, καὶ Υἱὸν ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ταυτότητα)¹⁴. Also, in one of the following *aliuds*, Cyril talks about the theology of adoption by the Holy Spirit, where we become participants of the divine nature: the Holy Spirit, he says, *is granted to the saints through the Son* (τοῖς ἁγίοις δι’ Υἱοῦ χορηγούμενον), deifying them and inviting them to be adopted¹⁵.

In regard to Cyril’s second writing we have mentioned concerning Palamas’ formulation “ἔχειν φησὶ τὸν υἱὸν φυσικῶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἴδια καὶ ἐξαίρετα, διαβαινούσης εἰς αὐτὸν φυσικῶς τῆς τοῦ γεννήσαντος ιδιότητος”, namely, *Commentary on John*, his twelfth book is of the utmost importance for us, seeing that there we find a formulation which is even more similar to Palamas’ than the aforementioned one from *Thesaurus*: namely, πάντα τὰ τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἴδια φυσικῶς ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ. In the aforementioned passage, Cyril, talking about the renewal of matter into imperishability and glory by means of participating in the Holy Spirit, whose “grantor and donor” (χορηγὸς καὶ δοτὴρ) is Christ himself, explicitly states: “The Father has within himself and from himself the Spirit, the very same [Spirit] has also the Son, since he is consubstantial with him, and substantially originates him from himself, having all properties of the begetter naturally”¹⁶.

¹² Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, *Ἡ βίβλος τῶν θησαυρῶν... ΑΓ’*, PG 75, 565C–568A.

¹³ The number of Cyril’s references to the apostle Paul is fascinating; so, it comes as no surprise when he is qualified as “Paulinist”; cf. N. Russell, *Cyril of Alexandria*, The Early Church Fathers, London, New York: Routledge 2000, 14.

¹⁴ Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, *Ἡ βίβλος τῶν θησαυρῶν... ΑΓ’*, PG 75, 568C. – The thesis that exactly this section from Cyril’s *Thesaurus* is one of the sources which Palamas here has in mind is testified by the chapter 30 of his first *Apodictic Treatise*, where the Archbishop of Salonica considers, granted somewhat deeper, precisely the chapter 33 of the aforementioned Cyril’s writing, with respect to the meaning of “ἐξ οὗ”. Generally speaking, in the said passage, Palamas, referring to Gregory of Nazianzus and Cyril of Alexandria, deems that, if we accept the thesis that the Spirit gains existence “from” the Son, we will have to come to the paradoxical conclusion that the Spirit is one of the creatures – due to the fact that only in terms of non-beings (τὰ οὐκ ὄντα) is it taken that they have the Son as ἀρχή of their existence. The same way Palamas, in this passage, interprets the phrase “from both” (παρ’ ἀμφοτέρων/ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων): since the creation originated from the Father through the Son – thus, both the Father and the Son being origin of all (ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅλων) – the (Latin) objection that the Holy Spirit hypostatically proceeds “from both” (ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων) necessarily implies that both the Son and the Father are the origin (ἀρχή) of the Spirit, which reduces the Spirit to the level of a creature and leads to the diarchy within the divine being. Palamas implicitly suggests that the phrase “from both” refers to the sphere of nature and natural properties, since that is the only way to preserve the hypostatic monocausality. See: *Λόγος ἀποδεικτικὸς Α’* 30, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [1988] 57.14–32–58.1–21 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 136.6–31–138.1–16.

¹⁵ Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, *Ἡ βίβλος τῶν θησαυρῶν... ΑΓ’*, PG 75, 569C.

¹⁶ Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, *Εἰς τὸ Κατὰ Ἰωάννην Εὐαγγέλιον XII*, PG 74, 716B: “Ἐχει δὲ ὁ Πατὴρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἴδιον Πνεῦμα, ἔχει τοῦτο ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὁ Υἱός, ἐπεὶ ἐστὶν ὁμοούσιος αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πέφηνεν οὐσιωδῶς, πάντα τὰ τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἴδια φυσικῶς ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ”.

The fact that *both* of these writings are the firsthand sources that Palamas on the given occasion had in mind is corroborated by the propinquity of formulations – bearing in mind that in *Thesaurus* it is said “ἐπὶ τὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ φυσικῶς γεννηθέντα Υἱόν”, whilst in the *Commentary on John* “πάντα τὰ τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἴδια φυσικῶς ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ” is mentioned, whereby, due to a higher lexical similarity, the focus, of course, shifts to the latter. This is also corroborated by the ninth paragraph of Palamas’ writing *Against Bekkos*, in whose “Inscription” we find a formulation almost identical to that of Cyril’s from *Thesaurus*: “πάντα τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἴδια φυσικῶς διαβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννηθέντα υἱόν”¹⁷.

The *second* passage that Palamas on given occasion takes into consideration – at least in the case of the phrase “προχεῖται ἐκ πατρὸς δι’ υἱοῦ” and its variations – can be encountered in miscellaneous Cyril’s writings, such as, for instance, his *Festal Homily*¹⁸ or his treatise *On Adoration in Spirit and in Truth*, where it can be read that the Holy Spirit comes forth from the Father through the Son (ἐκ Πατρὸς δι’ Υἱοῦ προχέμενον Πνεῦμα)¹⁹. However, if we compare more vigilantly the texts of the two christian authors and avoid those rather incomplete references found in critical edition of Palamas’ *Apodictic Treatises*²⁰, we shall discern that the most explicit source that Palamas on this occasion has in mind is actually Cyril’s *Dialogues on the Holy Trinity*, where the Archbishop of Alexandria, whilst enouncing that the Holy Spirit springs from the divine nature, says that he “comes forth directly from the Father through the Son, sanctifying the creation” (προχέμενον δὲ ὥσπερ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς, διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, καὶ ἀγιάζον τὴν κτίσιν). It is more than apparent to everyone that this formulation of Cyril’s is almost entirely transcribed in the aforementioned Palamas’ *Second Apodictic Treatise* 62, where Palamas, whilst paraphrasing Cyril, states that the Holy Spirit “comes forth from the Father through the Son so as to sanctify the creation” (προχέμενον ἐκ πατρὸς δι’ υἱοῦ τὴν κτίσιν ἀγιάζειν).²¹ Cyril’s assertion that the Holy Spirit is “from the essence of the Son”, which Palamas quotes in the aforementioned paragraph (see p. 3), can also be located in various Cyril’s writings, one of which is also *Thesaurus*, paragraph 34, one section of which bears an indicative title: “That the Holy Spirit is from the essence of the Father and the Son”. In that passage, interpreting in soteriological categories 1 Corinthians 12:3, where Paul says that Jesus cannot be called Lord except through the Holy Spirit, Cyril inversely proves the divine character of the Spirit: namely, if only through the Spirit, according to Paul, the divine character of the Son can be known, then the Spirit must be of the same essence as the Son. Thus, using, on this occasion too, the inappropriate category of quality (ποιότης) concerning the Holy Spirit – in sooth with certain restriction “so to speak” – Cyril accentuates that

¹⁷ Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ, *Ἀντεπιγραφαί* 9, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α΄ [21988], 161–175: 169.24–25 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981], 344–373: 360.17–18.

¹⁸ Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, *Ὁμιλίας ἑορταστικά* 18, PG 77, 817AB: “Αὐτός γε μὴν ὁ Κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς τὸ ἐκ Πατρὸς δι’ αὐτοῦ προχέμενον Πνεῦμα ζωοποιὸν ὀνόμαζεν ὕδωρ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ Σαμαραίᾳ γυναῖκα τὰς διαλέξεις πιούμενος”.

¹⁹ Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, *Περὶ τῆς ἐν Πνεύματι καὶ ἀληθείᾳ προσκυνήσεως καὶ λατρείας* Α΄, PG 68, 148A.

²⁰ Here, of course, I have in mind ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α΄ [21988], 23–153, where, concerning our case, quite arbitrary references are provided, without a more concrete comparison of the texts (cf. 134).

²¹ Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, *Πρὸς Ἑρμείαν πρεσβύτερον, κατὰ πεῦσιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν, Λόγος ΣΤ΄*, PG 75, 1013B.

“the Holy Spirit is from the essence of the Son” (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα), and consequently God himself, not a created entity.²²

The *third* passage, which also represents the main backing of the Latin perusal of Cyril of Alexandria and which Palamas in the mentioned paragraph from his *Apodictic Treatises* unequivocally has in mind, is located in the first book of Cyril’s *On Adoration in Spirit and in Truth*, his earliest exegetical writing, which was, in all probability, composed *ca.* 423²³. Written in the form of a dialogue between Cyril himself and Palladius, this writing mainly investigates the issue of compatibility between the Old and New Testament, i.e. between Judaism and Christianity. Actually, the major purpose of the writing in question is to show the concord of the two Testaments, which would lead to the conclusion that Christians, and not Jews, are actually the genuine heirs of God’s promises. However, in one passage, Cyril, whilst referring to the problem of inner-trinitarian relations, primarily to the question of the procession of the Holy Spirit, says that he “is the Spirit of God the Father, as well as of the Son, and *comes forth substantially from both*, that is, *from the Father through the Son*” (εἴπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς, καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, τὸ οὐσιωδῶς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἦγουν ἐκ Πατρὸς δι’ Υἱοῦ προχέμενον Πνεῦμα)²⁴. That this text is the very source that Palamas must have had in mind on the said occasion, is substantiated by the fact that the phrase “ἐξ ἀμφοῖν” appears, as far as I was able to deduce, in this particular form only in this passage of Cyril’s writings – with the exception of certain phrases, of course, such as “δι’ ἀμφοῖν”, which is to be found in Cyril’s *Second Treatise on the Right Faith*, where he, noting that the Son is equal in everything to the Father from whom he originates, emphasizes the fact that the life-giving Spirit flows forth through both, viz. through the Father and the Son (πρόεισι δὲ δι’ ἀμφοῖν καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ζωοποιῶν)²⁵.

Finally, the *fourth* passage that Palamas takes into consideration is, *actually*, Cyril’s *Dialogue on the Incarnation of the Only-Begotten*, chapter 7, where Cyril, once again in a specifically economic context, talks about the sending of the Holy Spirit and underlines his consubstantiality with the Father and the Son. Palamas, as we have already seen, cites this passage well-nigh *verbatim*, erroneously locating it in Cyril’s writing *De Sancta Trinitate Dialogi*.²⁶

After we have, I believe, indubitably ascertained the major textual backing of the Latin objection Palamas had to face, let us now take a look at how the Archbishop of Salonica interprets these “filioquistic” passages from Cyril’s writings as well as the manner in which he develops his argumentation.

²² Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, *Ἡ βίβλος τῶν θησανρῶν... ΑΔ’*, PG 75, 588A.

²³ Thus G. Jouassard, “L’activité littéraire de saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie jusqu’à 428: Essai de chronologie et de synthèse”, in: *Mélanges Podechard*, Lyons: Facultés catholiques 1945, 159–174; then, “La date des écrits anti-ariens de saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie”, *Revue bénédictine* 87 (1977) 172–178, whose chronology is followed by other scholars as well. Cf. L. J. Welch, *Christology and Eucharist in the Early Thought of Cyril of Alexandria*, San Francisco: Catholic Scholars Press, International Scholars Publications 1994, 6–7.

²⁴ Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, *Περὶ τῆς ἐν Πνεύματι καὶ ἀληθείᾳ προσκυνήσεως καὶ λατρείας Α’*, PG 68, 148A.

²⁵ Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, *Λόγος δεύτερος προσφωνητικός ταῖς εὐσεβεστάταις βασιλίσσαις, περὶ τῆς ὀρθῆς πίστεως ΝΑ’*, PG 76, 1408B.

²⁶ Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, *Περὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως τοῦ Μονογενοῦς*, PG 75, 1241A.

2.

Palamas' interpretation of Cyril's passages that are allegedly in favour of the thesis of *filioque* appears, to remind, for the first and only time in his *Second Apodictic Treatise*, starting with chapter 62, wherein the analysis of this inconvenient "Latin" objection is being programmatically undertaken, and ending with chapter 69 – of course, with some digressions and aberrations from the main topic. Unlike Maximus the Confessor, who finds a hermeneutical key for the filioquistic reading of Cyril of Alexandria, but also for the very stability of practice of *filioque* in the West, primarily in the linguistic limitations of the Latin language²⁷, showing on that occasion solid precision in his own formulations²⁸, Palamas' argumentation is somewhat more extensive and is, of course, molded so as to be favourable to his own polemical agenda. Synoptically, his argumentation is deployed evenly in three directions, since, Palamas believes, the attitude of Cyril, according to which the Holy Spirit comes forth from the Father and the Son, can denote three significant theological things. Let us see which ones.

a) Firstly, a thing completely expected, Palamas incorporates cyrillican "filioquistic" passages into his own prevalent interpretative matrix that is reflected in the distinction between two types of causality, determined according to whether they pertain to the "economic" or "theological" Trinity. In other words, it is referred to what Gregory Palamas, in his *Apodictic Treatises* 1, 29, explicitly calls "the double procession of the Holy Spirit" (ἡ δὲ τοῦ πνεύματος πρόοδος διττὴ [...])²⁹. As for causality in the *literal* sense of the word, Palamas states that we predominantly need to bear in mind the causality of economic type, since this kind of causality is precisely "for our sake", or "for a cause" (δι' αἰτίας), that is, "of temporal" (χρονικόν) character, which altogether means that it does not, in any way, refer to the absolute realm of the divine being. On the other hand, causality in the context of "theological" Trinity actually transcends the very concept of causality and it is referred to by that name only in an inappropriate sense: in other words, when the divine existence is taken *eo ipso*, it inevitably takes on characteristics of "noncausality" (ἀναίτιος) and "beyond time" (ὑπέρχρονος). Hence, Palamas deems that, when Cyril of Alexandria says that the Holy Spirit comes forth from the Son in order to sanctify the creation, he does imply the actual *temporal* outpouring of the Holy Spirit in the economic realm, which happens *for a cause*; namely, he, in Palamas' opinion, has in mind the bestowing of the Spirit from the Son in history, with the intention of absolving

²⁷ See: G. C. Berthold, "Maximus the Confessor and the *Filioque*", *Studia Patristica* XVIII, 1 (1989) 113–117: 115.

²⁸ Maximus uses the term προΐέναι, and not ἐκπορεύεσθαι concerning the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son; to him, thus G. C. Berthold, "Maximus the Confessor and the *Filioque*", *Studia Patristica* XVIII, 1 (1989) 113–117: 115, the terms "from the Son" and "through the Son" are synonyms in that sense. Likewise, Cyril of Alexandria does not say, in any of his presumed filioquistic sections, that the Spirit "proceeds" (ἐκπορεύεσθαι) from the Father and the Son; as instead, he claims that the Spirit "comes forth" or "flows forth" (προΐέναι, προχέεται) from the Son, which is something rather different; thus A. E. Siecienski, *The Filioque. History of a Doctrinal Controversy*, Oxford 2010, 49. See also note 44.

²⁹ For this, see synoptically: C. B. Scouteris, "The Double Procession of the Holy Spirit according to Saint Gregory Palamas", in: *Der Heilige Geist im Leben der Kirche. Forscher aus dem Osten und Westen Europas an den Quellen des gemeinsamen Glaubens. Pro Oriente-Studentagung "Der Heilige Geist bei den griechischen und lateinischen Kirchenvätern im ersten Jahrtausend"*, Wien, Juni 2003. Herausgegeben von Y. de Andia, P. L. Hofrichter, Pro Oriente XXIX. Wiener Patristische Tagungen II, Innsbruck, Wien: Tyrolia-Verlag 2005, 329–338.

sins and sanctifying the creation. Therefore, in that economic context the Spirit is given *from the Son* in the same way as he is given from the Father. This economic emission of the Spirit pertains to, according to Palamas' opinion, "*the divine grace and energy of the Spirit*" (τῆς θείας χάριτος καὶ ἐνεργείας τοῦ πνεύματος) and it occurs not only from the Father *and the Son*, but also from the *Holy Spirit himself*.³⁰ The act of the outpouring of the Spirit – when by Spirit we mean energy – actually belongs to all three hypostases of the Holy Trinity, since the energy or grace is a property of divine nature as such, rather than some of the hypostases³¹. That, of course, does not mean that the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit owes its existence to the Son in a strictly triadological plane³²: unlike the economic emission of the Spirit, his eternal procession is deprived of the temporal conditionality and any derived causality, since it occurs, Palamas says, "neither for something, nor towards someone, and by no means in time" (οὐ διὰ τι οὐδὲ πρὸς τινας οὔτε ὑπὸ χρόνον ὅλως). In the context of that which can be labelled "triadological causality", the Spirit does not come forth from the Son, but immediately, causelessly, and eternally proceeds *ex Patre solo*. Intensifying the matter completely, Palamas will, in this passage – with the aim of showing that the Father is the only cause (μόνος αἴτιος) in a triadological context – even renounce something that he will elsewhere resolutely claim³³: namely, that the procession of the Holy Spirit *also* in the triadological realm occurs "through" (διὰ) or even "from" (ἐκ) the Son: "the Son does not have from (ἐκ) himself the Spirit, nor does the Spirit have through (διὰ) the Son the being (τὴν ὑπαρξιν), but the Father has the Spirit from (ἐκ) himself, proceeding [him] out of himself directly, causelessly and pre-eternally"³⁴.

b) Secondly, Gregory Palamas, endeavouring to wrest Cyril from the filioquistic interpretative matrix, presents one particularly important, I think, review of the phrase "οὐσιωδῶς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἦγουν ἐκ Πατρὸς δι' Υἱοῦ προχεόμενον Πνεῦμα", especially of the word "substantial" (οὐσιωδῶς) which occurs in this frequently cited pericope. Firstly, Palamas endeavours to neutralize, or at least mitigate, this unpleasant Latin objection in one strictly psychological sense, stating that Cyril's claim according to which the outpouring of the Spirit occurs "substantially from both" is not "unusual at all" (οὐδὲν

³⁰ See: *Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός* B' 65, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α' [1988] 136.19–30–137.1–3 | ЕПЕ 51 [1981] 304.14–29; B' 69, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α' [1988] 140.17–20–141.1–24 | ЕПЕ 51 [1981] 312.10–31–314.1–9; B' 79, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α' [1988] 149.22–28 | ЕПЕ 51 [1981] 330.14–20.

³¹ *Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός* B' 69, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α' [1988] 141.9–10 | ЕПЕ 51 [1981] 312.23–24.

³² In certain passages, although before explanations of disputable Cyril's passages are to be programmatically assailed, Palamas reads the phrase "ἐξ ἀμφοῖν" solely in terms of energetic transmission in the economic framework: "Whenever you, therefore, hear him say that the Holy Spirit pours forth from both of them, as from the Father substantially through the Son, do understand reverently that he teaches the transmission of these natural powers and energies of God, but not the pouring forth of the divine hypostasis of the Spirit"; *Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός* B' 20, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α' [1988] 96.23–28 | ЕПЕ 51 [1981] 220.23–27: "Ὅταν οὖν ἀκούσῃς αὐτὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ὡς ἐκ πατρὸς οὐσιωδῶς δι' υἱοῦ προχεόμενον, τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον λέγοντα, τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν τούτων δυνάμεων τε καὶ ἐνεργειῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ μετάδοσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν θεϊαν τοῦ πνεύματος ὑπόστασιν προχεῖσθαι διδάσκειν, εὐσεβῶς νόμισον". Cf. note 93.

³³ For the use of prepositions "from" and "through" in Palamas' triadology I refer to my paper: M. Knežević, "“Ек” и “διὰ” у “Аποдиктичким словима о исхођењу Светог Духа” Григорија Паламе", *Смисао. Часопис Одјељења за друштвене науке Матице српске – Друштво чланова у Црној Гори* 1/1 (2012) 39–59. (in Serbian, with summary in English)

³⁴ *Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός* B' 64, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α' [1988] 136.6–9 | ЕПЕ 51 [1981] 302.31–304.1–3: "[...] οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ μὲν ἔχει τὸ πνεῦμα ὁ υἱός, οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν ὑπαρξιν τὸ πνεῦμα ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἔχει ὁ πατήρ, ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἀμέσως ἐκπορευόμενον ἀνατίως καὶ προαιωνίως [...]".

καὶνόν). However, this polemical trick of Palamas', which is, it should be mentioned, just one in a series of his noteworthy "byzantine" manners³⁵, can be plainly opposed with the thesis that this and similar modes of expression are not encountered frequently in patristic literature, referring to which Palamas deems one of the main regulations of proper theologization. Secondly, Palamas refers to an argument *ex traditio*, relying on Gregory the Theologian, which is here of paramount importance: videlicet, what Cyril means when he says that the Holy Spirit comes forth "substantially from both" relates to the outpouring of the Spirit onto the apostles, which is, Palamas deems, wholly compatible with the statement of Gregory the Theologian, according to which the Holy Spirit is "substantially present and co-dwelling with the apostles, we can say" (οὐσιωδῶς ὥς ἂν εἴποι τις παρὸν καὶ συμπολιτευόμενον). Thirdly, Palamas, as in some prior instances, and utterly in accordance with the byzantine theological tradition, christologically funds pneumatology, in the sense that he performs the teaching on the Holy Spirit *per analogiam* with the teaching on the Son³⁶. Actually, on the subject of cyrillian phrase "οὐσιωδῶς ἐξ ἁμφοῖν", Palamas underlines that the same mode of expression can be used apropos the Son as well, primarily in the context of his incarnation: the sending of Logos towards us was precisely of the "substantial" (οὐσιώδης) character, in view of the fact that it occurred from *the Father and the Spirit*, therefore, *from both* (ἐξ ἁμφοῖν τοῦ πατρὸς γενομένη καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος)³⁷. Palamas declares that the sending of the Spirit should be interpreted in the same direction: the Spirit was also *substantially* sent out and outpoured from both. Accordingly, the Spirit outpours forth substantially for us and after us (ἐκκέχυται τοίνυν οὐσιωδῶς δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ μεθ' ἡμᾶς), since he manifested himself bestowing the divine power through himself (δι' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν θεῖαν δύναμιν παρέχον). However, this being of vital importance, the Spirit, Palamas says, *always* comes to us *substantially* (πάρεστιν αἰεὶ οὐσιωδῶς ἡμῖν), but in the same way *hypostatically* as well (πάντως δὲ καὶ καθ' ὑπόστασιν) – despite the fact that we do not participate in the essence nor in the hypostasis, but only in the grace³⁸. All of this, of course, should be reflected upon economically: just like the sending of the Son is not the same as his eternal generation – in the sense that the Son was not born eternally "from both", that is, *ex Patre Spirituque*, nor was he born "for our sake", but only and solely from the Father – in the same manner, the Spirit does not, in the strictly triadological context, proceed "from both", that is, *ex Patre Filioque*, since his pre-eternal procession occurs causelessly from the Father only (πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων ἀναιτίως ἐκ μόνου τοῦ πατρός). I will get later to this significant passage, which could – in principle at least – disprove the assertions of some scholars of Gregory Palamas who explicitly confront him with Gregory of Nazianzus in order to push him completely into pseudo-dionysian and, thereafter, neoplatonic framework.

³⁵ For Palamas as a skilled polemicist see Γ. Α. Δημητρακόπουλος, *Αὐγουστῖνος καὶ Γρηγόριος Παλαμᾶς. Τὰ προβλήματα τῶν ἀριστοτελικῶν κατηγοριῶν καὶ τῆς τριαδικῆς ψυχοθεολογίας*, Ἀθήνα: Παρουσία 1997, 102–104, 107–110.

³⁶ Cf. *Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός* Α' 34, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α' [21988] 65.33–35–66.1–9 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 154.14–25. See also: M. Knežević, "The Order (τάξις) of Persons of the Holy Trinity in 'Apodictic Treatises' of Gregory Palamas", *Philothéos. International Journal for Philosophy and Theology* 12 (2012) 84–102: 89–90.

³⁷ This would mean not only that pneumatology is funded christologically, but also *vice-versa*, that is, that christology is funded pneumatologically; see: Α. Јевтић, "Православно богословље о Светом Духу", in: Α. Јевтић, *Χριστός Αλφα и Омеѡа*, друго, допуњено издање, Савремено православно богословље, Врњачка Бања, Требиње: Манастир Тврдош, Братство Св. Симеона Мироточивог 2004, 201–222: 213–215.

³⁸ *Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός* Β' 64, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α' [21988] 135.24–28 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 302.15–19.

c) Last but not least, Palamas construes cyrillican passages with potential filioquistic overtones under the prism of differentiation between *nature* and *person* in the domain of triadology, during which the notion of *consubstantiality* and the distinction between *natural* and *hypostatic* properties of divine persons emerge as key concepts. In that direction, Palamas neutralizes the Latin objection vis-à-vis cyrillican thesis that “the Holy Spirit outflows from the divine nature *and of the Son*”, by claiming that some implicit causality on the Son’s part is not the question at issue, but only and solely the affirmation of *consubstantiality* of the Spirit with the Son, and hence with the Father. Therefore, cyrillican “from the Son”, according to Palamas, means “from the Son’s nature”, *ergo* the preposition “ἐκ” in the context of relationship between the Son and the Spirit always pertains to the plane of *nature*, and not in the slightest to the plane of hypostases, since the Son’s hypostasis can never be taken as the cause of the Spirit’s hypostasis. “Whenever”, Palamas categorically claims, “this divinely contemplating Cyril says that the Spirit is from the essence of the Son, he indicates that the Son is consubstantial with the Spirit and not his cause”³⁹. Palamas continues in the same direction a few paragraphs later:

[...] it could be well said that the Spirit does not proceed from the hypostasis of the Son, but naturally from the Father and from the essence of the Son, due to the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, so that – since this shows the consubstantiality of the divine Spirit with the Father and the Son, and not the different existence of the Spirit from the Father –, due to the consubstantiality, it is the same to say the Spirit is also from the essence of the Son and to say the Spirit is of the same essence with the Son. Therefore, the consubstantiality of the Spirit is shown from the Son’s [consubstantiality], which is more apparent and previously promised and established [...] ⁴⁰.

According to Palamas, this kind of reading of cyrillican “filioquistic” theses has a historic and systemic foundation. Namely, it is conditioned by both the historical context of Cyril’s time as well as the conceptual framework of the tradition where he belongs. In other words, the fact that Palamas reads the abovementioned pericopes by highlighting the *consubstantiality*, is vindicated, according to him, by the fact that the Archbishop of Alexandria, whilst presenting the aforesaid views and formulations, actually addressed those who opposed this quite substantial (and today rather neglected) dogma⁴¹. On the other hand, the Eastern tradition, Palamas claims, is not familiar with the mode of expression in relation to which the Son would be taken as *the hypostatic cause within the triadological milieu*. This foundation of Palamas’ reading of cyrillican pericopes

³⁹ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Β’ 64, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 136.11–13 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 304.6–8: “Καὶ ὁσάκις ὁ θεόφρων οὗτος Κύριλλος ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα λέγει, τὸ ὁμοούσιον παρίστησιν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἶτιον εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ πνεύματος”. See also: Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Β’ 76, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 147.24–29 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 326.10–15.

⁴⁰ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Β’ 67, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 139.5–13 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 308.32–33–310.1–9: “Τοιγαροῦν εὖ ἂν ἔχοι λέγειν οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ υἱοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐξ αὐτοῦ φυσικῶς καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα, διὰ τὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὁμοούσιον, καὶ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ πνεύματος πρὸς τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ὁμοουσιότητος ἐντεῦθεν δεικνυμένης, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τῆς διαφορῶν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ πνεύματος, ἴσον δέ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα διὰ τὴν ὁμοουσιότητα, καὶ ὅτι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶν οὐσίας τῷ υἱῷ τὸ πνεῦμα. Ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ ἡ ὁμοουσιότης δεικνύεται τοῦ πνεύματος ὡς φανερωτέρας καὶ προκατηγελημένης καὶ προπεπιστωμένης [...]”.

⁴¹ The reintroduction of the term ὁμοούσιον will especially be insisted upon by the significant contemporary theologian Nikolaos Loudovikos. Cf. N. Λουδοβίκος, *Ἡ κλειστή πνευματικότητα καὶ τὸ νόημα τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ. Ὁ μυστικισμός τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια φύσεως καὶ προσώπου*, Θρησκευολογία 21, Αθήνα: Ἑλληνικά γράμματα 1999; idem, *Ἡ Αποφατικὴ Ἐκκλησιολογία τοῦ Ὁμοουσίου. Ἡ ἀρχέγονη Ἐκκλησία σήμερα*, Αθήνα: Ἀρμός 2002; idem, *Οἱ τρόμοι τοῦ προσώπου καὶ τὰ βάσανα τοῦ ἔρωτα. Κριτικοὶ στοχασμοὶ γιὰ μιὰ μετανεωτερικὴ θεολογικὴ ὀντολογία*, Αθήνα: Ἀρμός 2010.

is obviously summarized in his assertion that “no one of pious theologians of all centuries ever said that the Spirit is from the hypostasis of the Son, but from the hypostasis of the Father” and that “if someone ever said that he is from the nature of the Son and naturally from him, that was because the nature of the Father and the Son is one and the same”⁴². Moreover, Palamas states that Cyril’s unequivocal affiliation with such a tradition is undoubtedly substantiated by the fact that, in his writings, he “*never* says that the Holy Spirit comes forth from the hypostasis [of the Son]”⁴³ – ascertainment for which the defender of hesychasts must be given full credit and regarding which, at least when it comes to the verb ἐκπορεύεσθαι, he is granted enough backing even by the contemporary scholars of Cyril’s thought⁴⁴.

Therefore: cyrillican phrases “from the Son”, “from the essence of the Son”, “from both”, and the like, are of the same meaning, according to Palamas, with the phrases “from the nature of the Son” and “*consubstantial* with the Son”. Accordingly, they can never relate to the plane of *hypostatic* causality. That type of causality will remain an exclusive privilege of the Father – something that Palamas will repeatedly apostrophize with the thesis that the coming forth of the Holy Spirit, albeit from the divine nature and of the Son, occurs “according to the hypostasis of the Father only” (καθ’ ὑπόστασιν μόνην τὴν πατρικὴν)⁴⁵.

Running parallel to this is Palamas’ interpretation of cyrillican phrase, according to which the properties of the Father pass onto his naturally begotten Son. As said by Palamas, “properties” in question here need to be considered in terms of particularities of the divine nature, particularities which are common to all three persons of the Holy Trinity, and which do not fall within the scope of the “hypostatic” or “incommunicable” properties that characterize only and solely each of the hypostases individually:

⁴² Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Β’ 65, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 137.7–11 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 306.2–7: “Διὸ οὐδεὶς οὐδέποτε τῶν ἀπ’ αἰῶνος εὐσεβῶν θεολόγων ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως εἶναι τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα εἶπεν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποστάσεως· ἐκ δὲ τῆς φύσεως τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ φυσικῶς εἶναι ἐξ αὐτοῦ εἶπερ τις φαίη, ἀλλ’ ὡς μίᾳς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως οὐσῆς τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ”.

⁴³ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Β’ 68, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 139.20–25 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 310.16–22: “Καὶ τοῦτο διὰ πολλῆς ποιούμενος σπουδῆς ὁ θεὸς Κύριλλος, τὸ μηδένα παραχθέντα δοξάζειν ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ἐκ τῆς φύσεως αὐτοῦ καὶ φυσικῶς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ὅσακις λέγει, τὸ πνεῦμά φησι τὸ ἅγιον καὶ ἐκ τῆς φύσεως αὐτοῦ πηγάζειν, καθ’ ἣν ὁ αὐτός ἐστι μετὰ πατρός, ἀλλ’ οὐδαμοῦ τῶν λόγων ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως [...]”.

⁴⁴ Despite the indubitable fact that Cyril never considers the question of personal procession of the Holy Spirit extensively or in isolation, nor does he directly search for the personal and ontological role that the Son plays in all of this, it is still evident that he is predominantly careful in terms of restricting the use of the word ἐκπορεύεσθαι for the Spirit’s ultimate origin in the Father, who is the “source of divinity” (cf. note 28), that is, he never uses it in the sense that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, or even from the Father and the Son. On the other hand, Cyril uses the verb προῖέναι in a more “relaxed” manner, with the aim of emphasizing that the Spirit comes forth “from the common essence of God”, “from the essence of the Father”, “from the essence of the Son”, “from the Father and the Son”, “from the Father through the Son”, “through the Father and the Son”, “through the Son”, etc. See: B. E. Daley, “The Fullness of the Saving God: Cyril of Alexandria on the Holy Spirit”, in: Th. Weinandy, D. Keating, eds., *The Theology of Cyril of Alexandria*..., New York 2003, 113–148: 144–145; N. Russell, *Cyril of Alexandria*, London, New York 2000, 29, 213–214, note 92. For references with regard to Cyril’s use of the verb προῖέναι concerning the Holy Spirit see: M. O. Boulnois, *La paradoxe trinitaire chez Cyrille d’Alexandrie*..., Paris 1994, 525. Whilst Daley and Boulnois think that Cyril is along the lines of the synodical definition in this terminological choice, that is, Cappadocians and John 15:26, Russell finds such a viewpoint problematic.

⁴⁵ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Α’ 6, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 33.25–26–34.1–2 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 88.17–18, 21–22; Β’ 65, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 137.6–7 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 306.2; Β’ 73, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 144.17, 26 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 318.31–32, 320.9; Β’ 74, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 146.6 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 322.23–24; cf. Β’ 76, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 147.24 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 326.9–10.

“The Son has in himself by nature particular and exceptional [properties] of the Father, since the property of the begetter is naturally transferred onto him”: not hypostatic particularities of the Father and exceptional [properties] – hence, neither does he have beginninglessness, nor unbegottenness, nor begetting – but has natural and distinctive characteristics of the Father’s nature, which the Holy Spirit also naturally possesses.⁴⁶

Cyril, in other words, claims that the Son has the same properties as the Father – and like the Spirit, we might add – “naturally and substantially and always according to the nature” (φυσικῶς τε καὶ οὐσιωδῶς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν αἰεὶ)⁴⁷, which, actually, in another fashion confirms the divinely equal character of each of the three persons of the Holy Trinity.

As a supplementary corroboration of (a) the attitude that cyrillican “ἐκ” refers to the plane of *nature* and, in the first place, to *consubstantiality*, and consequently (b) the interpretation that the properties, which are discussed in the aforementioned cyrillican pericopes, are to be interpreted as *natural*, and in no way as hypostatic properties, Palamas adds two more arguments. One of them is contained within Cyril’s response to criticism directed at him in his day, in which, Palamas says, the Archbishop of Alexandria was “defamed” for supposedly advocating the view that the Spirit has existence from the hypostasis of the Son as well. The second argument is summarized, as we shall soon see, in the paragraph 34 of the *Thesaurus*. With regard to the “defamation” to which Cyril was exposed, it presumably refers to (somewhat justified) distrust of Theodoret of Cyrus⁴⁸ regarding the ninth out of twelve of Cyril’s anathemas that we find at the end of his *Third Letter to Nestorius*⁴⁹. Generally speaking, Cyril’s somewhat unconventional speech about the Holy Spirit present in the ninth anathematism, where it is defined as “ἴδιον τοῦ Υἱοῦ”, raised suspicions in the mind of the Bishop of Cyrus, suspicions which he did not hesitate to reveal publicly, and even to call some of Cyril’s attitudes nothing less than “blasphemous”⁵⁰. Crucial to our case are, I think, two of Theodoret’s writings, one of which is *Reprehensio duodecim anathematismorum Cyrilli*, composed at the be-

⁴⁶ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικὸς Β΄ 67, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α΄ [21988] 139.13–19 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 310.9–15: “ἔχει τε ὁ υἱὸς φυσικῶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἴδια καὶ ἐξαιρετά, διαβαينوῦσης εἰς αὐτὸν φυσικῶς τῆς τοῦ γεννήσαντος ιδιότητος· οὐ τὰ ὑποστατικὰ ἴδια τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ἐξαιρετά – οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ἀναρχον ἔχει καὶ ἀγέννητον ἢ τὸ γόνιμον – ἀλλὰ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ ἴδια τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς φύσεως αὐχήματα, ἅπερ ἔχει φυσικῶς καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον”.

⁴⁷ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικὸς Β΄ 68, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α΄ [21988] 139.26–27 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 310.22–23.

⁴⁸ For the blessed Theodoret, see: Th. Urbainczyk, *Theodoret of Cyrrhus. The Bishop and the Holy Man*, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press 2002; I. Pásztori-Kupán, *Theodoret of Cyrus*, London, New York: Routledge 2006.

⁴⁹ Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, *Τῶν εὐλαβεστάτων καὶ θεοφιλεστάτων συλλειτουργῶν Νεστορίῳ Κύριλλος καὶ ἡ συνελθοῦσα σύνοδος ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ ἐκ τῆς Αἰγυπτιακῆς διοικήσεως ἐν κυρίῳ χαίρειν*, in: Cyril of Alexandria, *Select Letters*. Edited and Translated by L. R. Wickham, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1983, 12[33]: 30.24–29: “Εἴ τις φησὶ τὸν ἕνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν δεδοξάσθαι παρὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, ὡς ἄλλοτρίᾳ δυνάμει τῇ δι’ αὐτοῦ χρώμενον καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῦ λαβόντα τὸ ἐνεργεῖν δύνασθαι κατὰ πνευμάτων ἀκαθάρτων καὶ τὸ πληροῦν εἰς ἀνθρώπους τὰς θεοσημείας, καὶ οὐχὶ δὴ μᾶλλον ἴδιον αὐτοῦ τὸ πνεῦμά φησιν, δι’ οὗ καὶ ἐνήργηκε τὰς θεοσημείας, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω”. For this, see: Δ. Λιάλιου, “Πνευματολογικὲς ἐπισημάνσεις ἐπὶ τοῦ Θ’ Ἀναθεματισμοῦ τῆς Γ’ Ἐπιστολῆς τοῦ Αγ. Κυρίλλου πρὸς Νεστόριο”, in: *Πρακτικά Θεολογικοῦ Συνεδρίου με θέμα “Τὸ Ἅγιον Πνεῦμα” (11–14 Νοεμβρίου 1991)*. Πρόνοια καὶ Προεδρία τοῦ Παναγιωτάτου Μητροπολίτου Θεσσαλονίκης κ. κ. Παντελεήμονος Β΄, Θεσσαλονίκη: Ιερὰ Μητρόπολις Θεσσαλονίκης, Μέλισσα 1992.

⁵⁰ As mentioned by J. F. Bethune-Baker, *An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine to the Time of the Council of Chalcedon*, London: Methuen and Co. 1903, 216, Theodoret is the first to definitely negate that the Holy Spirit receives his essence from both the Father and the Son. For a detailed discussion of what was involved in Theodoret’s and Cyril’s views regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit see: A. de Halleaux, “Cyrille, Théodoret et le ‘Filioque’”, *Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique* 74 (1979) 597–625.

ginning of 431 at the request of John of Antioch as an antiochian refutation of Cyril's anathematisms. In response to the prominent ninth anathema of Cyril and after procuring enough patristic and scriptural pericopes, which should undoubtedly show that the "careful researcher of divine dogmas" (ὁ ἀκριβὴς τῶν θείων δογμάτων ἐξεταστής), the way Theodoret ironically calls Cyril, anathematizes not only the prophets, apostles, and the archangel Gabriel, but the Savior of all himself, the Bishop of Cyrus puts forward the following attitudes:

We say that it was not God the Word, consubstantial and co-eternal with the Spirit, who was formed by the Holy Spirit and anointed, but the human nature which was assumed by him at the end of days. We shall confess together that the Spirit of the Son was his own if he spoke of [the Spirit] as of the same nature and proceeding from the Father, and shall accept the expression as consistent with true piety. But if [he would speak of the Spirit] as being of the Son, or as having [his] origin through the Son, we shall reject this as blasphemous and impious. For we believe the Lord when he says, "The Spirit which proceeds from the Father" and likewise the most godly Paul saying, "We have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God".⁵¹

The second writing that must be borne in mind here is Theodoret's *Epistola 151*, directed at Eastern monks, where the Bishop of Cyrus summarizes his critique of Cyril's anathemas, including the disputable ninth one⁵². In one passage, Theodoret, with regard to the disputable issue of the procession of the Holy Spirit, categorically claims that Cyril even "blasphemes" (βλάσφημεῖ) when it comes to this issue and he directly brings him, in the best traditions of the byzantine polemical strategies, into direct connection with some of the infamous heretics:

He even blasphemes the Holy Spirit: he does not say, in keeping with Lord, that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, but that he has existence from the Son. And that is the fruit of Apollinarius' seed; and it resembles Macedonius' cunning plough.⁵³

In his response to these more than open admonitions which, were they to be interpreted in the light of what was said in Matthew 12: 31–32⁵⁴, really assume immense polemical and ecclesiological proportions, Cyril, Palamas says, "proclaimed that he was defamed"

⁵¹ Θεοδορήτου Κύρου, *Reprehensio duodecim anathematismorum Cyrilli*, PG 76, 432CD: "Διαπλασθῆναι δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος, καὶ χρισθῆναι οὐ τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον φαμέν, τὸν τῷ Πατρὶ ὁμοούσιον, καὶ συναΐδιον, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπ' ἐσχάτου τῶν ἡμερῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ληφθεῖσαν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν. Ἴδιον δὲ τὸ Πνεῦμα τοῦ Υἱοῦ, εἰ μὲν ὡς ὁμοφύες, καὶ ἐκ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον ἔρη, συνομολογήσομεν καὶ ὡς εὐσεβῇ δεζόμεθα τὴν φωνήν. Εἰ δ' ὡς ἐξ Υἱοῦ, ἢ δι' Υἱοῦ τὴν ὑπαρξίν ἔχον, ὡς βλάσφημον τοῦτο, καὶ ὡς δυσσεβὲς ἀπορρήψομεν. Πιστεύομεν γὰρ τῷ Κυρίῳ λέγοντι· 'Τὸ Πνεῦμα, ὃ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεται'· καὶ τῷ θειοτάτῳ δὲ Παύλῳ ὁμοίως φάσκοντι· 'Ἦμεῖς δὲ οὐ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ'". For a similar attitude concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit cf. also Θεοδορήτου Κύρου, *Ἐρμηνεῖα τῆς Πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἐπιστολῆς Η'*, PG 82, 132C: "Τὸ γὰρ πανάγιον Πνεῦμα καὶ Θεοῦ προσηγόρευσε, καὶ Χριστοῦ· οὐκ ἐπειδὴ, κατὰ τοὺς δυσανήμους αἰρετικούς, ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ δεδημιούργηται· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ὁμοούσιόν ἐστι Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ, καὶ ἐκ Πατρὸς μὲν ἐκπορεύεται κατὰ τὴν τῶν Εὐαγγελίων διδασκαλίαν, ἡ δὲ τοῦτο χάρις τοῖς ἀξίοις διὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ χορηγεῖται".

⁵² This epistle was written in the same period as *Reprehensio*; its (christological) contents are summarized in P. B. Clayton, Jr., *The Christology of Theodoret of Cyrus. Antiochene Christology from the Council of Ephesus (431) to the Council of Chalcedon (451)*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007, 136–141. For a more detailed review of Theodoret's *Reprehensio* see: *Ibid.*, 141–153.

⁵³ Θεοδορήτου Κύρου, *Ἐπιστολαί 151*, Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ Εὐφρατησίᾳ, καὶ Ὁσροηνῇ, καὶ Συρίᾳ, καὶ Φοινίκῃ καὶ Κιλικίᾳ μονάζοντας, PG 83, 1417D: "Βλάσφημεῖ δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα· οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς αὐτὸ λέγων ἐκπορεύεσθαι, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Κυρίου φωνήν, ἀλλ' ἐξ Υἱοῦ τὴν ὑπαρξίν ἔχειν. Καὶ οὗτος δὲ τῶν Ἀπολλιναρίου σπερμάτων ὁ καρπός· γειννιάζει δὲ καὶ τῇ Μακεδονίῳ πονηρᾷ γεωργίᾳ".

⁵⁴ Cf. Mark 3:29; Luke 12:10.

and he also accentuated the fact that the Spirit is “ἴδιον τοῦ υἱοῦ” in the sense that he is “not alien” (οὐκ ἀλλότριον) to the Son, but also emphasized that the Spirit “is not from the Son” (οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ)⁵⁵. As regards the sources, it can be established that, besides *Apologeticus contra Theodoretum pro XII capitibus*, where Cyril says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from God and the Father (ἐκπορεύεται μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς) and that he is “not alien to the Son” (οὐκ ἀλλότριόν ἐστι τοῦ Υἱοῦ)⁵⁶, Palamas probably has in mind one of famous Cyril’s writings entitled *Laetentur caeli*, that is, *Epistle 39*, addressed to John of Antioch and composed in a conciliatory tone in springtime (April 23th) 433⁵⁷. In that rather important document, Cyril, albeit quite incidentally, whilst talking about the unwavering determination in relation to which not a single word or a syllable of Nicene Creed ought to be changed, points out that the fathers who convened in Nicaea were “being talked to by the Spirit of God the Father, who [the Spirit] proceeds from him, but who is not alien to the Son in terms of his essence”⁵⁸. Such Cyril’s manner of speaking was apparently satisfactory, if we might add, to Theodoret as well⁵⁹, judging at least by his *Epistle 171*, where he expresses delight as a result of Cyril’s confession that “the Holy Spirit has no existence from nor through the Son, but [as] proceeding from the Father, being called, as consubstantial, the property of the Son”⁶⁰. However, if we compare what Cyril actually said there with the formulation that Theodoret provides, we will notice that his “delight” was just partially founded in Cyril’s text itself⁶¹. On the other hand, if we compare what Cyril, in these two passages, explicitly states with the formulations with which Palamas paraphrases Cyril, we shall observe that there is really no absolute textual concordance there as well: namely, the crucial “οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ” is missing, in spite of the fact that such an inference must inevitably arise from Cyril’s statement that the *Spirit proceeds from the Father*, without any mention that this procession occurs *and from the Son*⁶².

⁵⁵ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Β’ 68, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 139.28–29–140.1–2 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 310.24–27. Cf. Β’ 76, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 147.24–29 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 326.10–15.

⁵⁶ Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, Ἐπιστολὴ Πρὸς Εὐόπτιον. Πρὸς τὴν παρὰ Θεοδώρητον κατὰ τῶν δώδεκα κεφαλῶν ἀντιρρήσιν. Πρὸς τοὺς τομῶντας συνηγορεῖν τοῖς Νεστορίου δόγμασιν, ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχουσι, κεφάλαια ΙΒ’, PG 76, 433BC.

⁵⁷ See: A. de Halleux, “Cyrille, Théodoret et le ‘Filioque’”, *Revue d’histoire ecclesiastique* 74 (1979) 597–625: 606.

⁵⁸ Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, Ἐπιστολαὶ XXXIX, *Ad Ioannem Antiochenum episcopum, missa per Paulum episcopum Emesae*, PG 77, 181A: “Ὁ γὰρ ἦσαν αὐτοὶ οἱ λαοῦντες, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ Πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς· ὃ ἐκπορεύεται μὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἐστὶ δὲ οὐκ ἀλλότριον τοῦ Υἱοῦ κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον”.

⁵⁹ The teaching of the blessed Theodoret on the Holy Trinity is summarized in his short writing *Περὶ τῆς ἁγίας καὶ ζωοποιῶν Τριάδος*, PG 75, 1147A–1190A, which was, up until the study of A. Ehrhard, “Die Cyrill von Alexandrien zugeschriebene Schrift περὶ τῆς τοῦ Κυρίου ἐνανθρωπήσεως, ein Werk Theodorets von Cyrus”, *Theologische Quartalschrift* 70 (1888) 179–243, 406–450, 623–653, ascribed to Cyril of Alexandria himself. For Theodoret’s triadology, see: I. Pásztori-Kupán, *Theodoret of Cyrus’s Double Treatise “On the Trinity” and “On the Incarnation”: The Antiochene Pathway to Chalcedon*, Kolozsvár, Cluj: The Transylvanian District of the Reformed Church in Romania 2007, 50–107.

⁶⁰ Θεοδώρητου Κύρου, Ἐπιστολαὶ POA’, *Πρὸς τὸν Ἀντιοχείας Ἰωάννην μετὰ τὰς διαλλαγὰς*, PG 83, 1484C: “[...] καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον οὐκ ἐξ Υἱοῦ, ἢ δι’ Υἱοῦ τὴν ὑπαρξιν ἔχον, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, ἴδιον δὲ Υἱοῦ ὡς ὁμοούσιον ὀνομαζόμενον”.

⁶¹ I. Pásztori-Kupán, *Theodoret of Cyrus’s Double Treatise “On the Trinity” and “On the Incarnation”*..., Kolozsvár, Cluj 2007, 97.

⁶² For the passages within Cyril’s opus where the Holy Spirit is defined as “ἴδιον τοῦ υἱοῦ”, see: Ἀ. Θεοδώρου, “Ἡ περὶ ἐκπορεύσεως τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος διδασκαλία Κυρίλλου τοῦ Ἀλεξανδρείας καὶ

Finally, I shall quote the passage from the paragraph 34 of Cyril's *Thesaurus* that I announced a while ago. This passage, Palamas reasons, Cyril *anticipatively* juxtaposes with the latter reasoning of the "Latins", according to which – on the basis of his statement that the property of the begetter is naturally transferred onto the Son – it is to be inferred that the hypostasis of the Son is the cause of the hypostasis of the divine Spirit⁶³. In the said passage, primarily with the purpose of proving the divine character of the Spirit, Cyril explicitly states that the *Spirit* substantially possesses within himself all the *distinctiveness* of God the *Father*, whose Spirit he actually is, bestowing himself on the creation through the Son ([...] πῶς οὐκ ἔσται τὸ Πνεῦμα Θεός, ὅλην ἔχων οὐσιωδῶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὴν ιδιότητα τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ Θεοῦ, οὗ καὶ Πνεῦμα ἐστὶ δι' Υἱοῦ τῇ κτίσει χορηγούμενον;)⁶⁴. Palamas gathers that this attitude of Cyril's should represent the hermeneutical key to understanding his thesis that "the *Son* has in himself by nature particular and exceptional [properties] of the Father, since the property of the begetter is naturally transferred onto him", as it can be clearly inferred from it that *natural*, not *hypostatic*, properties are those which are transferred from the Father onto the Son – and then, as we have seen, onto the Holy Spirit as well⁶⁵. The conclusion that *that* is actually the only interpretation which can be resorted to, Palamas infers *a contrario*: namely, if it is to be assumed that the *hypostatic* properties of the Father are those which are transferred onto the Spirit, it would be inevitable, Palamas underscores, to come to a paradoxical thesis that the Holy Spirit is at the same time the begetting one, since this – i.e. begetting – is the hypostatic characteristic of the Father⁶⁶. Therefore, just as the Spirit cannot be taken as the hypostatic principle of the Son, on the basis of the statement that he substantially possesses within himself all the distinctiveness of the Father, so neither the Son cannot be taken as the hypostatic cause of the Holy Spirit, on the basis of the statement that the property of the begetter is naturally transferred onto him.

"Επιφανίου Κύπρου", *Θεολογία* ME 1 (1974) 80–101: 89–92. – Actually, the terms ἴδιον, ἴδιος, ιδιότης do not have an unambiguous use in Cyril: namely, sometimes they are used to denote the *hypostatic* particularities of the three persons of the Holy Trinity, and sometimes to denote their *common* characteristics. For the use of these terms in Cyril, see in details: H. van Loon, *The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria*, Leiden, Boston 2009, 185–189, 279–282, 299, 311–312, 332, 393–395, 450–451, 470–471, 517–518.

⁶³ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Β' 68, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α' [21988] 140.5–7 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 310.31–32.

⁶⁴ Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, *Ἡ βίβλος τῶν θησαυρῶν... ΛΔ'*, PG 75, 576C. See also note 65.

⁶⁵ Cyril repeatedly states that the *Son* is τὸ ἴδιον of the *essence of the Father*, therefore pointing out their *consubstantiality*. Cf. Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, *Ἡ βίβλος τῶν θησαυρῶν... ΙΒ'*; *ΙΓ'*; *ΚΔ'*; *ΑΒ'*, PG 75, 181A ([...] ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ γεννήσαντος οὐσίας τὸ ἴδιον [...]); 181B (Τὸ γὰρ ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας ἐν Υἱῷ κείμενον [...]); 185A (Τὸ γὰρ ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας ἀπαραλλάκτως ἔχων ὁ Υἱός [...]); 185B ([...] τῆς πατρικῆς οὐσίας τὸ ἴδιον ὑπάρχων ὁ Υἱός [...]); 204C ([...] διὰ τὸ εἶναι με τῆς σῆς [τοῦ Πατρὸς] οὐσίας τὸ ἴδιον [...]); 225CD ([...] τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ ἴδιον ὑπάρχων ὁ Υἱός [...]); 396B ([...] καὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ [τοῦ Πατρὸς] τὸ ἴδιον [...]); 421C ([...] τὸ ἴδιον τῆς ἑαυτοῦ [τοῦ Πατρὸς] οὐσίας [...]); 461C ([...] τῆς πατρώσας οὐσίας ὅλον ἔχων τὸ ἴδιον [...]). – When, for denoting the common nature of divinity, he uses the noun ιδιότης, as in this case, it is used as a collective noun; hence, this way it denotes the entire set of natural properties. Thus, in *Ἡ βίβλος τῶν θησαυρῶν... ΣΤ'*, PG 75, 80C, the Son is described as an "impress and likeness of his [Father's] distinctiveness ([...] χαρακτήρ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁμοίωμα τῆς ιδιότητος αὐτοῦ [τοῦ Πατρὸς] [...])". The fact that the term ιδιότης is used here precisely in terms of denoting the fullness of the *natural* properties, as it is suggested by Gregory Palamas, is corroborated by H. van Loon, *The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria*, Leiden, Boston 2009, 187 (to whom I owe references in this note). In that sense, alongside the cited passage from *Thesaurus* (note 64), *De Sancta Trinitate Dialogi VI*, PG 75, 1009D ought to be read as well, where it is said that the Son "possesses the entire distinctiveness of the Father within himself" (τὴν τοῦ Πατρὸς ιδιότητα πᾶσαν ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ).

⁶⁶ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Β' 68, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α' [21988] 140.13–16 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 312.6–9.

In this fashion, Palamas deems, Cyril anticipatively refutes the Latin filioquistic reading of certain formulations from his writings. In other words, in utilizing those same arguments with which they justify their erroneous⁶⁷ interpretation of Cyril, pursuant to which the hypostasis of the Son is the cause of the hypostasis of the divine Spirit, “Latins” ought to actually distance themselves from their “malicious thinking” (κακόνοια) and should, by means of the very Cyril’s writings, discard their own misinterpretation of Cyril’s ideas. Truth be told, Palamas himself, in one segment, also counterfeits Cyril’s *Thesaurus*, since he cites the specified passage as “ὅλην ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐσιωδῶς τὴν ιδιότητα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ”⁶⁸ instead of “ὅλην ἔχων οὐσιωδῶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὴν ιδιότητα τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ Θεοῦ”, as stated in the original Cyril’s text. This, so to speak, “displacement”, which surely favoured Palamas’ polemical intention, did not, however, affect his intended aim in this presentation of evidence: even if he had cited *verbatim* Cyril’s *Thesaurus*, Palamas would have been able to draw the same conclusion properly, which he actually drew.

Summa summarum: when Cyril of Alexandria asserts that the Spirit originates, comes forth, or is poured forth *and from the Son*, he implies (a) energetic derivation of the Spirit from the Son, (b) substantial coming forth of the Spirit from the Father and the Son in terms of his substantial (and hypostatic) presence in the economic realm, c) consubstantiality of the Spirit with the Son and in general consubstantiality of the three persons of the Holy Trinity.

3.

After I have referred to the sources in Cyril’s oeuvre which Palamas, summarizing the Latin objection, invokes, as well as the ways of his own interpretation of the aforesaid cyrillian passages, I will now consider, *grosso modo*, the interpretative credibility of Palamas’ reading of Cyril of Alexandria with regard to the “disputable” passages in his opus which allegedly support the thesis of *filioque*.

a) Firstly, it can be easily discerned that the Archbishop of Salonica, unlike many of today’s western researchers, addresses the “filioquistic” passages in Cyril’s opus *contextually*, which means that he interprets them within the *historic* and *conceptual* framework in which the Archbishop of Alexandria expounded his ideas and, above all, in the context of discussions of which he partook actively. Following that methodological principle, Palamas, as we have seen, interprets the cyrillian passages in the context of proving the *consubstantiality* of the Spirit with the Father and the Son⁶⁹. In other words, all of cyrillian passages that Palamas takes into consideration regarding the rebuttal of the Latin reading are either of economic character, thus suggesting the temporal bestowing of grace or energy of the Spirit which occurs *through* or *from* the Son, or aim at displaying the co-equal divinity and consubstantiality of the three persons of the Holy Trinity⁷⁰. That was

⁶⁷ Cf. Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Β’ 48, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 122.20–22 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 274.26–29.

⁶⁸ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Β’ 68, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 140.11–12 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 312.4–5.

⁶⁹ Cf. J. Meyendorff, *Initiation à la théologie byzantine. L’histoire et la doctrine*. Traduit de l’anglais par A. Sanglade avec la collaboration de C. Andronikof, Coll. Initiations, Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf 1975, 125–126.

⁷⁰ G. C. Berthold, “Cyril of Alexandria and the ‘Filioque’”, *Studia Patristica* 19 (1989) 143–147: 143, notes that, concerning the teaching on the Holy Spirit, we find two contexts of argumentation in Cyril, with an obvious transition from *triadological* towards *christological* one: namely, the first is concerned with showing the divine character of the Spirit, whilst the second pertains to examining the ways in which the incarnate Son possesses and manifests the Spirit.

exactly the primary undertaking of Cyril and it was a priority on his theological agenda⁷¹, something that Palamas himself suggests when he claims that Cyril directed the aforementioned formulations at “those who opposed consubstantiality” (ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας τῷ ὁμοουσίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα γέγραφε)⁷².

Thus, Palamas, whilst interpreting Cyril in the context of tradition to which he belonged and in the context of historic controversies of his age, effectively eludes the trap of *anachronism*⁷³ into which the authors, who are prone to see Cyril as an advocate of *filioque* on the eastern side, undeniably fall⁷⁴. Precisely speaking, Palamas provides here adequate instructions for avoiding one *post factum* reading, in the sense that an idea, which was already accepted once, is interpreted as if it originated much earlier in time than what it actually is. Hence, Cyril’s texts, instead of having ideas of the later period projected upon them, ought to be read in the context of this author’s prevalent interpretative motives, which were mainly of christological and soteriological character⁷⁵. The latter conflict over *filioque* was completely alien and unknown to Cyril.⁷⁶ So, the appropriate line of reasoning is the one which indicates that, without later pneumatological disputes between the East and the West, the critique which – starting with Theodoret of Cyrus – was directed at Cyril regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit “and from the Son”, would be actually thrust aside⁷⁷.

⁷¹ Cf. Γ. Φλωροβски, *Источни оци V–VIII века*. Са руског превео М. Р. Мијатов, Хиландарски путокази № 28, Манастир Хиландар 1998, 60.

⁷² Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Β’ 64, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [1988] 136.14–15 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 304.8–10. Moreover, as a supplementary corroboration for such a reading of Cyril, Palamas quotes two more passages from his writings: firstly, from Cyril’s *Dialogues on the Trinity*, where it is said that “the Son cannot be imagined as being different from the Father in terms of *natural identity*, the same as the Holy Spirit” (οὐχ ἕτερος ἂν ὁ υἱὸς εἶναι νοοῖτο παρὰ τὸν πατέρα, ὅσον εἰς ταυτότητα φυσικὴν, πάντως δὲ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον), and then from the *Commentary on John*, where the Archbishop of Alexandria accentuates that “the Holy Spirit is not different from the Son in terms of *identity of nature*” (οὐδὲν ἕτερον παρὰ τὸν υἱὸν ὑπάρχει τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ὅσον εἰς ταυτότητα φύσεως); see: Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Β’ 65, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [1988] 137.13–15, 17–18 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 306.9–11, 13–14.

⁷³ Cf. G. C. Berthold, “Cyril of Alexandria and the ‘Filioque’”, *Studia Patristica* 19 (1989) 143–147: 147: “It would be anachronistic to insert a fifth century doctor into a ninth century discussion and expect him to give a clear and unambiguous answer to a question he never faced as such. The problem of the *filioque* developed in a specific historical framework which was not Cyril’s”. M. O. Boulnois, *La paradoxe trinitaire chez Cyrille d’Alexandrie...*, Paris 1994, 527–529, also thinks that Cyril, despite the fact that he provides one of the most lucid Greek testimonies for the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and/through the Son, does not directly address this disputable issue, since he uses a set of mutually correcting formulations so as to describe the procession of the Holy Spirit.

⁷⁴ So, E. B. Pusey, “Preface”, in: *Commentary on the Gospel According to S. John* by S. Cyril, Archbishop of Alexandria. Vol. I, S. John I–VIII, A Library of Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church, anterior to the division of the East and West. Translated by members of the English Church, Oxford: James Parker & Co. MDCCCLXXIV, vii–lx: ix, claims that Cyril’s teaching on the procession of the Holy Spirit is “identical” to the western teaching on the *filioque*, that is, “to the words we now repeat, *Who proceedeth from the Father and the Son*”.

⁷⁵ A. E. Siecienski, *The Filioque. History of a Doctrinal Controversy*, Oxford 2010, 48.

⁷⁶ B. E. Daley, “The Fullness of the Saving God: Cyril of Alexandria on the Holy Spirit”, in: Th. Weinandy, D. Keating, eds., *The Theology of Cyril of Alexandria...*, New York 2003, 107. Cf also: B. Bobrinskoy, *The Mystery of the Trinity: Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the Biblical and Patristic Tradition*, translated by A. P. Gythiel, Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press 1999, 254.

⁷⁷ A. de Halleux, “Cyrille, Théodoret et le ‘Filioque’”, *Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique* 74 (1979) 597–625: 597. Cf. Σ. Β. Στολίγκα, “Η διδασκαλία τοῦ Ἁγίου Γρηγορίου Παλαμᾶ γιὰ τὴν ἐκπόρευση τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος καὶ οἱ πηγές της”, *Εκκλησιαστικὸς Φάρος* 76 (2005) 165–193: 184.

b) Nevertheless, notwithstanding the fact that Cyril cannot be regarded as an advocate of *filioque*, it is beyond doubt that he, in a more distinct way than his theological predecessors, insisted on formulating a closer relationship between the Son and the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, his opulent theological speculation, which gives a major role to the relationship between the Holy Spirit and the Son both within the framework of theology, as well as economy⁷⁸, provides “a fertile field for deeper investigations into the mystery of God three in one.”⁷⁹ The resonance of such an attitude of Cyril’s can be indubitably discerned in Palamas’ formulations in his *Apodictic Treatises* where it is explicitly underlined that, despite having the hypostatic causality excluded, the procession of the Holy Spirit is most closely related to the person of the Son. To elaborate further, Gregory Palamas, right along the lines of Cyril’s views, according to which the Spirit “naturally and substantially rests on the Son”⁸⁰, openly persists in his effort to establish the relationship between the Son and the Holy Spirit not only in the economic plane, but also in the *sphere of triadology*⁸¹. This irrefutable fact is clearly evident in Palamas’ tendency – which, truth to tell, was not without certain tensions and hesitations – to attribute not only the preposition “through” (διά), but even the preposition “from” (ἐκ) with regard to the procession of the Holy Spirit *and to the Son* – even in the domain of the immanent trinitarian existence. Upon a closer inspection of certain passages in his *Apodictic Treatises*, it becomes obvious that Palamas’ interpretation of Cyril’s usage of the preposition “ἐκ” is definitely broader than its exclusive pertaining to the energetic and economic plane, which means that the Spirit’s “and from the Son” is attributable *also* to the milieu of inner-trinitarian relations. Actually, it has the purpose of pointing out the co-naturalness and affiliation of the Spirit with the Son:

And if someone, because of the latter descent [of the Spirit] towards us, and especially out of opposition to those who estrange the Spirit from the Son, said that he [= Spirit] shines from both, or from the Father through the Son, or from the Son, or something similar, he did so in a sense that he [= Spirit] exists also in the Son and that he belongs to him and that he is not alien to him⁸².

For this tendency of Palamas’, save for the testimonies in the passages we have already had the chance to encounter, we find the paradigmatic confirmation also in the explicit and important interpolation in the *Second Apodictic Treatise* 65, where the defender of the hesychasts, talking about the coming forth of the Spirit from the Son’s nature, categorically adds that it occurs “if you wish, *according to the eternal*

⁷⁸ M. O. Boulnois “The Mystery of the Trinity according to Cyril of Alexandria...”, in: Th. Weinandy, D. Keating, eds., *The Theology of Cyril of Alexandria...*, New York 2003, 75–112: 103, 106–107.

⁷⁹ G. C. Berthold, “Cyril of Alexandria and the ‘Filioque’”, *Studia Patristica* 19 (1989) 143–147: 147.

⁸⁰ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Β΄ 71, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α΄ [21988] 143.29–32 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 318.9–12.

⁸¹ Cf. regarding this: J. D. Zizioulas, “Pneumatology and the Importance of the Person: A Commentary on the Second Ecumenical Council”, in: J. D. Zizioulas, *Communion and Otherness. Further Studies in Personhood and the Church*. Edited by P. McPartlan, London, New York: T&T Clark 2006, 178–205: 193–195. See also: В. В. Болотовъ, *Къ вопросу о filioque*. Съ предисловіем проф. А. Бриллиантова, С.-Петербургъ: Типографія М. Меркушева 1914, 46–52 (theses 3 and 4).

⁸² Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Β΄ 76, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α΄ [21988] 147.24–29 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 326.10–15: “Εἰ δὲ διὰ τὴν γενομένην ἐπιφοίτησιν ὕστερον ἡμῖν, καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς τοὺς ἀλλοτριούντας τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐνιστάμενοι, ἐξ ἀμφοῖν εἰπέ τις αὐτό, ἢ ἐκ πατρὸς δι’ υἱοῦ ἢ ὅτι τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐκλάμπει καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τούτοις, ἀλλ’ ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ ὑπάρχον καὶ ἴδιον αὐτοῦ καὶ κατ’ οὐδὲν ἀλλότριον”.

existence as well” (ἔστω δὴ, εἰ βούλεσθε, καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰδίον ὑπαρξιν)⁸³. It is clear that this structural apposition of Palamas’ unequivocally suggests that neither he nor Cyril separate completely eternal relations from temporal sendings⁸⁴ – although neither of them identifies these two realms of divine existence⁸⁵.

One direct consequence of such an approach to the procession of the Holy Spirit is that “the Son [...] has co-existent before all the ages the Holy Spirit” as the one that “exists in him”⁸⁶ and rests upon him and, consequently, the one that is “by nature attached and accompanied” ([...] συνὸν καὶ συμπαρομαρτοῦν [...] κατὰ φύσιν [...])⁸⁷ to him. Being from one and the same principle, the Son and the Holy Spirit are in the closest and most direct relationship: the Spirit, Palamas says, as “the one that comes forth from the Father is never separated from him, being as much united with the Son substantially and inseparably, as the one who rests upon the Son and exists in him, and always naturally (φυσικῶς) dwells in him”⁸⁸. Formulations by which Palamas denotes the inner-trinitarian connection between the Son and the Spirit, and which, in the manner of Cyril, suggest that the Son is not excluded *tout court* from the procession of the Spirit from the Father⁸⁹ – like, for instance, the ones where Palamas says that the Spirit is the “property” (ἴδιον) of the Son; that he rests on the Son (ἐν τῷ υἱῷ ἀναπαύεσθαι); that he from eternity naturally dwells in the Son (ἐν τῷ υἱῷ φυσικῶς ἐξ αἰδίου ὄν/ἐν τῷ υἱῷ διήκει αἰδίως/ἐν τῷ υἱῷ ὑπάρχον φυσικῶς καὶ αἰδίως); that he is in no way alien to him (κατ’ οὐδὲν ἀλλότριον), etc. – all of these together suggest that between the Son and the Spirit exists from eternity a circuminsession (περιχώρησις), meaning that these two caused divine hypostases are mutually inseparable and inconceivable one without the other⁹⁰. Furthermore,

⁸³ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικὸς Β’ 65, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 137.5 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 304.31–306.1.

⁸⁴ M. O. Boulnois “The Mystery of the Trinity according to Cyril of Alexandria...”, in: Th. Weinandy, D. Keating, eds., *The Theology of Cyril of Alexandria...*, New York 2003, 75–112: 106; G. C. Berthold, “Cyril of Alexandria and the ‘Filioque’”, *Studia Patristica* 19 (1989) 143–147: 144.

⁸⁵ Especially in the sense of rejecting the “umgekehrt” from the famous Rahner’s formula “Die ‘ökonomische’ Trinität ist die ‘immanente’ Trinität und umgekehrt”. See: K. Rahner, “Der dreifaltige Gott als transzendenter Ursprung der Heilsgeschichte”, in: *Mysterium Salutis. Grundriß heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik. Band II: Die Heilsgeschichte vor Christus*. Herausgegeben von J. Feiner, M. Löhrer. Unter Mitarbeit von K. Rahner, H. U. von Balthasar, H. Fries, K. Lehmann, A. Diessler, u. a., Einsiedeln, Zürich, Köln: Benziger Verlag 1967, 317–401: 328.

⁸⁶ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικὸς Β’ 28, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 103.12–13 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 234.20–21; Β’ 29, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 104.15 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 236.32.

⁸⁷ Γρηγορίου Παλαμά, *Αντιρρητικοὶ πρὸς Ἀκίνδυνον* 3, 7, 17, in: Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμά *Συγγράμματα*. Ἐκδίδονται ἐπιμελείᾳ Π. Κ. Χρήστου. Τόμος Γ’. *Αντιρρητικοὶ πρὸς Ἀκίνδυνον*. Προλογίζει Π. Χρήστου. Ἐκδίδουν Α. Κοντογιάννης. Β. Φανουργάκης, Κυρομάνος, Θεσσαλονίκη 1970, 174.11–12 | Γρηγορίου Παλαμά *Ἀπαντα τὰ ἔργα*. 5. *Πρὸς Ἀκίνδυνον λόγοι ἀντιρρητικοὶ (Α–Γ)*. Εἰσαγωγή, Κείμενο–Μετάφρασις–Σχόλια Ἀπὸ τὸν Π. Κ. Χρήστου. Ἐπόπτης Ἐκδόσεως Π. Κ. Χρήστου. Ἐπιμελητὴς Ἐκδόσεως Ἐ. Γ. Μερετάκης, Ἕλληνες Πατέρες τῆς Ἐκκλησίας № 87, Θεσσαλονίκη: Ἐκδοτικὸς οἶκος Ἐλευθερίου Μερετάκη Τὸ Βυζάντιον, Πατερικαὶ ἑκδόσεις Γρηγόριος ὁ Παλαμᾶς 1987, 392.1–2. Cf. Α. Ράντοβιτς, *Τὸ μυστήριον τῆς Ἁγίας Τριάδος κατὰ τὸν ἅγιον Γρηγόριον Παλαμᾶν*, Ἀνάλεκτα Βλατάδων № 16, Θεσσαλονίκη: Πατριαρχικὸν Ἱδρυμα Πατερικῶν Μελετῶν 1973, 21991, 163.

⁸⁸ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικὸς Β’ 73, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 144.20–24 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 320.3–6: “Οὕτω δὲ ὄν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς, οὐτ’ αὐτοῦ διίσταται ποτε, καὶ τῷ υἱῷ οὐχ ἦπτον ἦνται οὐσιωδῶς τε καὶ ἀδιαστάτως, αὐτῷ τε ἐπαναπαυόμενον καὶ ἴδιον αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχον καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ φυσικῶς διατελοῦν ἀεὶ”.

⁸⁹ Cf. N. Russell, *Cyril of Alexandria*, London, New York 2000, 29.

⁹⁰ Cf. Λόγος ἀποδεικτικὸς Α’ 33, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 63.12–15 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 148.19–21: “[...] μὲν γὰρ ἅμα ἐξ αἰδίου ὁ υἱὸς τε καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ἐν ἀλλήλοις τε ὄντα καὶ ἀλλήλων ἐχόμενα καὶ δι’ ἀλλήλων ἀφύρτως τε καὶ ἀμίγως χωροῦντα [...]”.

we could eventually say that Palamas accepts almost any relation between the Son and the Spirit except the “causal” existential relation (καθ’ ὑπαρξιν)⁹¹. In Palamas’ view, the Son and the Holy Spirit

[...] not only come from the same principle but are also inseparable one from the other, dwelling one into another, showing each other and manifesting one through another, but they are not one through the other nor [one] from the other nor [one] of the other: since the cause is one.⁹²

This way, Palamas goes a lot further than those interpreters of Cyril who are prone to reduce his “ἐξ ἀμφοῖν” *exclusively* to the energetic outpouring of the Spirit in the economic context⁹³. Upon close examination, it becomes apparent that the outpouring of the Spirit as energy is possible exactly due to the existence of the unbreakable relationship between the Spirit and the Son in the inner-trinitarian context, where it can be said that the hypostasis of the Spirit comes “from the Son” in terms of his coming forth *from the essence* of the Son. To put it otherwise, the inner-trinitarian relation between the Son and the Spirit, owing to which the Spirit, as naturally existing from the Father in the Son, has all the energy of the Son, and thanks to which the Son is called “the treasurer of the divine Spirit” (ταμίας τοῦ θείου πνεύματος)⁹⁴, is a key prerequisite for the possibility of giving the Spirit on the part of the incarnated Son in the domain of the economy of salvation⁹⁵.

Therefore, if all of these and similar attitudes of Gregory Palamas are taken into consideration, an inescapable conclusion that is to be reached is that the Archbishop of Salonica is right along the lines of the Archbishop of Alexandria not only in terms of establishing a more firm relationship between the Son and the Spirit in the domain of divine existence *per se*, but also – only far more emphasized – in terms of strict renunciation of any hypostatic causality on the Son’s part. Following the abundance of formulations and further elaborations, it can be said that Palamas – which was natural – went even further in this respect than Cyril himself⁹⁶.

⁹¹ See: Α. Πάντοβιτς, *Τὸ μυστήριον τῆς Ἁγίας Τριάδος κατὰ τὸν ἅγιον Γρηγόριον Παλαμῶν*, Θεσσαλονίκη 1973, 1991, 159–166: 166. In this sense, the insistence of V. Lossky, *Théologie mystique de l’Église d’Orient*, Les religions № 13, Paris: Aubier, Éditions Mouton 1960, 166, on “l’indépendance de l’hypostase du Saint-Esprit vis-à-vis du Fils, quant à son origine éternelle” appears problematic to me. (italics added)

⁹² Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Β’ 41, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 115.17–21 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 260.28–30–262.1–2: “[...] ὡς ἂν εἰδῶμεν μὴ μόνον ἐκ μιᾶς ὑπάρχοντα ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδιαστάτως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ ἐνυπάρχοντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἄλληλα δεικνύοντα καὶ δι’ ἀλλήλων προφανόμενα, ἀλλ’ οὐ δι’ ἀλλήλων ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἢ ἀλλήλων ὄντα: ἐν γὰρ τὸ ἐξ οὗ”.

⁹³ Thus Α. Θεοδώρου, “Ἡ περὶ ἐκπορεύσεως τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος διδασκαλία Κυρίλλου τοῦ Ἀλεξανδρείας καὶ Ἐπιφανίου Κύπρου”, *Θεολογία* ME 1 (1974) 80–101: 88. Cf. also: J. Meyendorff, *A Study of Gregory Palamas*. Translated by G. Lawrence, [London: The Faith Press 1964, Wing Road, Bedfordshire: The Faith Press 1974] Crestwood, New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press 1998, 230–231.

⁹⁴ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Α’ 29, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 56.11 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 134.6–7. Cf. Β’ 73, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 144.24 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 320.7.

⁹⁵ Cf. J. Lison, “L’énergie des trois hypostases divines selon Grégoires Palamas”, *Science et Esprit* 44, 1 (1992) 67–77: 69.

⁹⁶ Naturally, if Cyril is not credited with the latter teaching of Gregory of Cyprus on the “eternal shining of the Holy Spirit from the Son” as “the central term between the eternal procession and temporal sending of the Holy Spirit” – as it is, if I understood correctly, implicitly done by J. Lison, “L’énergie des trois hypostases divines selon Grégoires Palamas”, *Science et Esprit* 44, 1 (1992) 67–77: 75. For a possible contribution of Gregory Palamas to the contemporary discussion concerning this problem, see: D. Staniloae, “The Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and his Relation to the Son, as the Basis of our Deification and Adoption”, in: *Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ: Ecumenical Reflections on the Filioque Controversy*, ed. by L. Vischer, Faith and Order Paper № 103, London: SPCK, Geneva: World Council of Churches 1981, 174–186.

c) For the very end, lest I remain indebted for something I mentioned earlier, I will return to Palamas' reference to Gregory the Theologian from the chapter 63 of his *Second Apodictic Treatise*. This passage, I repeat, can be of great importance not only for gaining a proper understanding of Palamas' reading of Cyril of Alexandria, but also for an accurate evaluation of the significant and crucial background of his teaching on energies. First and foremost, let me cite the quotation itself again and offer an explanation regarding its origin. As regards the quotation (or the paraphrase, more precisely), it refers to Nazianzen's statement that the Holy Spirit, during his outpouring onto the apostles, is "substantially, associated with them, and dwelling in them, we may say". The passage which Palamas on this occasion has in mind, and which the editors of the critical edition of his *Apodictic Treatises* marked as unfamiliar (χωρίον μὴ ἀντιχνευθέν)⁹⁷, is to be found, actually, in the eleventh paragraph of the famous *Oration 41* at Pentecost, which was pronounced by Gregory of Nazianzus on the Feast of Pentecost 379 in Constantinople. On that occasion, Gregory of Nazianzus, after having briefly imparted his interpretation of the mystical meaning of the number *seven*, as part of the tale of the divine and consubstantial character of the Father and the Son with the Holy Spirit⁹⁸, who acted in the angelic and heavenly powers as well as in the fathers, prophets, and Christ's disciples, says that the Holy Spirit, in these latter ones, acted triply and in three periods: namely, before Christ's glorification (that is, during his *sufferings*) then, after Christ's glorification (that is, after his *resurrection*) and, finally, after Christ's return to himself (that is, after his *ascension*). Of these three operations of the Spirit, each one is, Nazianzen muses, "more noticeable" than the former one ([...] τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ἀμυδρῶς· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον, ἐκτυπώτερον· τὸ δὲ νῦν τελεώτερον [...]), which means that, and now we arrive at a crucial passage for us, after Pentecost the Spirit "is no longer present only in energy, but as we may say, substantially, associating with us, and dwelling in us" ([...] οὐκέτι ἐνεργεῖα παρὸν ὡς πρότερον, οὐσιωδῶς δέ, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, συγγινόμενόν τε καὶ συμπολιτευόμενον)⁹⁹. This "substantial" coming forth of the Spirit as the Second Comforter ought to be, Gregory contends, taken as an acknowledgement of the consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son, since the "Second" is used precisely for the consubstantial ones (ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοουσίων). To paraphrase, this substantial co-dwelling of the Spirit with the apostles, and generally with the Christians, in a way represents a "bodily" appearance of the Spirit which resembles the bodily sojourn of the Son on Earth: "For it was fitting that as the Son had lived with us in bodily form – so the Spirit too should appear in bodily form; and that after Christ had returned to his own place, he should have come down to us – coming because he is the Lord; sent, because he is not a rival God"¹⁰⁰.

Therefore, we can ascertain with ease that Palamas' formulation "οὐσιωδῶς ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις παρὸν καὶ συμπολιτευόμενον" and Gregory's construction "οὐκέτι ἐνεργεῖα παρὸν ὡς πρότερον, οὐσιωδῶς δέ, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, συγγινόμενόν τε καὶ συμπολιτευόμενον" unam-

⁹⁷ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικὸς Β' 63, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α' [21988] 135, note 1 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 302, note 147.

⁹⁸ Cf. a series of qualifications that Gregory of Nazianzus uses for the Holy Spirit: Γρηγορίου τοῦ Θεολόγου, Λόγος ΜΑ', Εἰς τὴν Πεντηκοστήν, PG 36, 441BC.

⁹⁹ Γρηγορίου τοῦ Θεολόγου, Λόγος ΜΑ', Εἰς τὴν Πεντηκοστήν, PG 36, 444C.

¹⁰⁰ Γρηγορίου τοῦ Θεολόγου, Λόγος ΜΑ', Εἰς τὴν Πεντηκοστήν, PG 36, 444C: "Ἐπεπε γάρ, Υἱοῦ σωματικῶς ἡμῖν ὁμίλησαντος, καὶ αὐτὸ φανῆναι σωματικῶς· καὶ Χριστοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπανελθόντος, ἐκεῖνο πρὸς ἡμᾶς κατελθεῖν· ἐρχόμενον μὲν ὡς Κύριον, πεμπόμενον δὲ ὡς οὐκ ἀντίθεον".

biguously show that the Archbishop of Salonica, on the given occasion, invokes actually the aforementioned passage from *Oration 41* of the famous Archbishop of Constantinople¹⁰¹.

So much, therefore, for the source itself that Palamas had in mind. As regards the interpretation, whose outlines I already laid out earlier (see p. 9–10), it is useful, in the function of a *preludio*, to remind that the critical literature contains a thesis, advanced primarily by Reinhard Flogaus – and who presented it, by his own admission, along the lines of Dorothea Wendebourg and Gerhard Podskalsky – according to which Gregory Palamas is one of the main representatives of the late byzantine trend that was characterized by not regarding Gregory of Nazianzus as the highest theological authority anymore, but an unknown author from the fifth century who wrote under the pseudonym of Dionysius the Areopagite¹⁰². As one of the arguments supporting that thesis, which implies that in Palamas the divine hypostases in their importance for the salvation of man fade into background in regard to the divine energy – insofar as man can participate only in the divine energy, whilst divine hypostases remain imparticipable and transcendent¹⁰³ – Flogaus points exactly at a theological dissonance which, he thinks, exists between the two Gregories concerning the mentioned passage from the *Oration 41*. Namely, Flogaus avers, while Palamas advocates the thesis that the Holy Spirit is generally present within the apostles and christians *only* through his energy, Gregory of Nazianzus advocates something quite opposite, that is, the attitude that the *energetic* presence of the Spirit is characteristic of the period *before* Pentecost, after which he, as we have seen, is in a more “perfect” way present amongst people. In other words, for Gregory of Nazianzus the Spirit is *after* the Pentecost present not in energy (οὐκέτι ἐνεργεία), as advocated by Gregory Palamas, but is, conversely, present “substantially” (οὐσιωδῶς). Thus, Flogaus implicitly argues that Palamas counter-positions himself in this respect not only in regard to the great Cappadocian, but also in relation to the early christian-johannine and ancient ecclesiastical understanding, according to which the Holy Spirit *himself* is the one who was sent by the Father and the Son into the world (John 14:26; 15:26). Flogaus concludes that for Palamas, “ist an Pfingsten nicht der Hl. Geist selbst, seine *Person*, mitgeteilt wor-

¹⁰¹ That Palamas, amongst others, also read the famous *Oration 41* of Gregory of Nazianzus is also notable in his direct invocation in four of his other writings, regarding Nazianzen's interpretation of the seven spirits the prophet Isaiah talks about (11: 2–3) in terms of *energies*, that is, *operations* of the Holy Spirit. Cf. *Περὶ ἐνώσεως καὶ διακρίσεως* 33, in: Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ, *Συγγράμματα*. Ἐκδίδονται ἐπιμελεία Π. Κ. Χρήστου. Τόμος Β΄. Πραγματεῖαι καὶ ἐπιστολαὶ γραφεῖσαι κατὰ τὰ ἔτη 1340–1346. Προλογίζει Π. Χρήστου. Ἐκδίδουν Γ. Μαντζαρίδης, Ν. Ματσούκας, Β. Ψευτογκᾶς, Θεσσαλονίκη: Κυρομάνος [1966] ²1994, 69–95: 94.2–4, 10–12 | ΕΠΕ 61 [1983] 76–129: 126.16–18, 24–27; *Ὁρθοδόξου Θεοφάνους δι᾿ἀλεξίς* 9, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Β΄ [1994] 232.15–18 | ΕΠΕ 61 [1983] 390.8–10; *Ἀντιρρητικοὶ πρὸς Ἀκίνδυνον* Ε΄, 15, 58, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Γ΄ [1970] 330.16–30 | ΕΠΕ 88 [1987] 204.21–206.1–13; *Κεφάλαια ἑκατὸν πενήκοντα* 70, in: *Saint Gregory Palamas, The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters*. A Critical Edition, Translation and Study by R. E. Sinkewicz, Studies and Texts № 83, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1988, 164.9–11. For Gregory of Nazianzus and the passage in question, see: Γρηγορίου τοῦ Θεολόγου, *Λόγος ΜΑ΄*, *Εἰς τὴν Πεντηκοστήν*, 3, PG 36, 432C.

¹⁰² Cf. G. Podskalsky, *Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz*, München 1977, 61: “Erst im Palamitenstreit wird Gregorios von Nazianz durch Ps.-Dionysios Areopagites aus seiner Stellung als führender Autorität verdrängt”.

¹⁰³ It is what D. Wendebourg, *Geist oder Energie. Zur Frage der innergöttlichen Verankerung des christlichen Lebens in der byzantinischen Theologie*, Münchener Monographien zur historischen und systematischen Theologie № 4, München: Chr.-Kaiser-Verlag 1980, 10, 244, and elsewhere calls “defunctionalization” (*Entfunktionalisierung*) of the persons of the Holy Trinity.

den, sondern nur die eine göttliche *Energie* der Trinität, die freilich auch schon zuvor, wenngleich in beschränkterem Maße, in der Welt gegenwärtig gewesen war”¹⁰⁴.

After such an introduction, let us go back to the chapters 63 and 64 of Palamas’ *Apodictic Treatises*. In those two brief paragraphs, as we have already seen, Palamas explicitly brings into connection Cyril’s “οὐσιωδῶς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν” with “οὐσιωδῶς ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις παρὸν καὶ συμπολιτευόμενον” of Gregory of Nazianzus, openly suggesting that both of these phrases relate to the level of *economy*. For this *substantial* character of the *economic* coming forth of the Spirit, Palamas finds an analogy in the sending of Logos from the Father and the Spirit upon his incarnation, the sending which was also “οὐσιωδῆς”, but which must not be confused by any means with the Son’s (pre-eternal) birth from the Father only. However, a thing of the utmost importance now is the new emphasis which Palamas gives here: namely, notwithstanding the fact that he advocates the thesis that “we do not partake in the essence or the hypostasis [of the Spirit] at all, but in the grace”, he also underscores in the same powerful fashion that the Spirit, manifesting himself by means of bestowing the divine power, “*always* makes present himself to us *substantially*” ([...] ἀλλὰ καὶ παρέστιν αἰεὶ οὐσιωδῶς ἡμῖν [...]), “as well as *hypostatically*” ([...] πάντως δὲ καὶ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν [...])¹⁰⁵. Outpouring of the Spirit from the Son (παρὰ δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ) occurs, Palamas continues, only insofar as the Son (economically) receives him from the Father; and when Cyril of Alexandria says that the Spirit is “from the essence of the Son”, it ought not be interpreted in terms of the relationship of causality between these two persons of the Holy Trinity.

If we now judge from what was explicitly stated in this passage, which Flogaus and some other scholars utterly disregard or deftly misplace, it turns out that, according to Palamas, the energetic presence of the Spirit by no means excludes but, on the contrary, implies his *substantial* and *hypostatic* presence in the economy of salvation. In other words, Palamas holds that despite the fact that the energy of the Spirit is not to be equated with the person of the Spirit¹⁰⁶, it is nevertheless inseparable from the very operator and grantor of the energy¹⁰⁷. This passage may be, of course, opposed to plenty of other ones – e. g. the one that we find already in the chapter 69 of *Apodictic Treatises*¹⁰⁸ – but this does not have to mean that Palamas’ thought concerning this matter is laden with contradiction or some tension. If any tension exists at all, it is my firm belief that it is reflected in the absence of clear articulation of his attitude, and not in the implicit advocacy of such an attitude; in other words, when Palamas claims that the worthy do not unite themselves substantially or hypostatically with God, he does not suggest that the presence of the Holy Spirit is not substantial or hypostatic, but presumably makes a distinction between the *presence* of the Holy Spirit, which is *substantial* and *hypostatic* – as is the presence of the incarnate Son – and between *that which we receive* and which is

¹⁰⁴ R. Flogaus, “Die Theologie des Gregorios Palamas – Hindernis oder Hilfe für die ökumenische Verständigung?”, *Ostkirchliche Studien* 47, 2–3 (1998) 105–123: 114–116 (115).

¹⁰⁵ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικὸς Β’ 63–64, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 134–136 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 300–304.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. V. Lossky, *Théologie mystique de l’Église d’Orient*, Paris 1960, 169.

¹⁰⁷ А. Јевтић, „Православно богословље о Светом Духу“, in: А. Јевтић, *Христос Алфа и Омега*, Врњачка Бања, Требиње 2004, 201–222: 214–215.

¹⁰⁸ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικὸς Α’ 69, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α’ [21988] 141.13–16 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 312.28–31.

the grace or energy of the Holy Spirit. Hence, the energy in question here is the one that we receive “partially” (μέτρῳ) and which the Son possesses “wholly” (ὁλόκληρον)¹⁰⁹, but which includes *personal* and complete presence of the Spirit himself¹¹⁰, who constitutively partakes of sanctification and deification. All of this, with a plethora of other passages from the voluminous literary corpus of the Archbishop of Salonica, makes it clear enough how wrong it is to depict Palamas’ theological portrait on a specifically neoplatonic background. It also elucidates the fact that his teaching on energetic presence of the Spirit ought to be subsumed under a patristic tradition¹¹¹ rather than indirectly to be connected with the respective teaching of Theodore of Mopsuestia¹¹².

Therefore, to finally draw a conclusion, in the case of Cyril of Alexandria, but also in the case of a brief and more incidental, but remarkably symptomatic reference to Gregory of Nazianzus, it is shown that Palamas fathomed the tradition to which he belonged much better than some of his interpreters are willing to acknowledge. Truth be told, all of this will not mean that certain aberrations and extravagances of various types are not present in Palamas; however, those aberrations and extravagances must be, partially at least, ascribed both to the polemical framework in which the defender of the hesychasts worked as well as to the speed of developments in the byzantine intellectual – and political – arena of the age, all of which did not allow for a more nuanced theological discourse. Nevertheless, despite the imbalance of the theological expression, qualification *plus platonizans quam christianizans* can hardly be applicable to Palamas. The same holds true for the assertion that his thought lacks or is completely devoid of a christological – or even ecclesiological – nerve, and that it has insufficient concordance between the “theology of person” and “theology of energies” (despite the undeniable fact that the mentioned concordance is not always apparent). The given example from the chapters 63 and 64 of his *Apodictic Treatises*, along with some other passages in his writings, clearly and openly show that, according to Palamas, the theology of energies does not exclude the constitutive role of the divine hypostases in the economy of salvation, but, on the contrary, necessarily implies it.

¹⁰⁹ Λόγος ἀποδεικτικός Α' 69, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ Α' [21988] 141.22–23 | ΕΠΕ 51 [1981] 315.6–8.

¹¹⁰ See: D. Coffey, “The Palamite Doctrine of God: A New Perspective”, *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 32 (1986) 329–358: 336, who states that “for him [Palamas], therefore, when the Holy Spirit dwells in us, while he does so by virtue of the divine energies and not the divine essence, it is nevertheless *he himself* who indwells”. Cf. also: J. Lison, “L'énergie des trois hypostases divines selon Grégoires Palamas”, *Science et Esprit* 44, 1 (1992) 67–77: 71.

¹¹¹ The assumed opposition of Palamas to Gregory of Nazianzus with regard to “energetic *versus* hypostatic” presence of the Spirit at Pentecost, which is, the way I see it, significantly assuaged by Palamas’ emphasis on the “substantial” and “hypostatic” presence of the Holy Spirit (see note 105), is additionally shaken by the contents of the twelfth paragraph of the *Oration 41*, where the famous Cappadocian explicitly states that the diversity of the tongues of fire, viz. the Holy Spirit, refers to the diversity of *gifts* (χαρισμάτων διάφορον); see: Γρηγορίου τοῦ Θεολόγου, Λόγος ΜΑ', *Εἰς τὴν Πεντηκοστήν*, 12, PG 36, 445A.

¹¹² Cf. D. A. Keating, *The Appropriation of Divine Life in Cyril of Alexandria*, Oxford Theological Monographs, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, 218, 227: “Where Theodore repeatedly teaches that it is the grace of operation, not the person or nature of the Spirit who inhabits the saints, Cyril insists that it is the Holy Spirit himself who dwells in us as the source of all grace and working”. – Naturally, the real question here is – question that I shall, of course, put aside – how much the understanding of Theodore of Mopsuestia actually differed, in this regard, from the patristic tradition; so, for example, J. McWilliam Dewart, *The Theology of Grace of Theodore of Mopsuestia*, Washington: Catholic University of America Press 1971, 146, claims that “it is in fact open to question whether Theodore understood the indwelling of the Spirit in the same sense that the other patristic writers did”. It is also worth mentioning that Palamas repeatedly accentuated that the unity with the divine energy does not mean anything different than the unity with God himself.

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Ἡ ἐρμηνευτική μέθοδος τοῦ Θεοδώρητου Κύρου **Μία προσπάθεια πρὸς ἐπίτευξη τῆς ἰσορροπίας μεταξύ ἱστορισμοῦ** **καὶ ἀλληγορίας, μεταξύ γράμματος καὶ πνεύματος**

1. Εἰσαγωγικές παρατηρήσεις

Ὁ Θεοδώρητος Κύρου (393-461)¹ ἀνήκει στὶς μεγάλες θεολογικές προσωπικότητες τοῦ πέμπτου αἰώνα, εἰδικῶς στὸ χώρο τῆς Ἀντιοχειανῆς σχολῆς, λόγω ὅτι ὑπῆρξε σπουδαῖος ἐρμηνευτὴς τῆς Ἀγίας Γραφῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖος θεολόγος τῆς Ἐκκλησίας. Εἶναι ὁ τρίτος κατὰ χρονολογικὴ σειρὰ κορυφαῖος θεολόγος καὶ ἐκκλησιαστικός συγγραφέας, μετὰ τὸν Διόδωρο Ταρσοῦ καὶ Θεόδωρο Μοψουεστίας, πού ὑπηρέτησε τὴν Ἀντιοχειανὴ σχολή². Γενικά σέ ὅλο τὸ φάσμα τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς χριστιανικῆς Ἐκκλησίας καὶ τῆς πορείας τῆς θεολογίας της, ἀλλὰ ἰδιαίτερα σέ ὅσα διαδραματίστηκαν κατὰ τίς ἀρχές τοῦ πέμπτου αἰώνα, ὁ Θεοδώρητος ἐπαίξε πολὺ σημαντικὸ ρόλο. Ὁ Κύριλλος Ἀλεξανδρείας ἦταν ἀναμφίβολα μιὰ ἀπὸ τίς πληθωρικότερες προσωπικότητες ἐκείνης τῆς ἐποχῆς³, ἀλλὰ οἱ ἀντίπαλοί του βρῆκαν ἱκανὸ ἐκπρόσωπο κατὰ τὴν ὑποστήριξη τῶν θεολογικῶν θέσεων στὸ πρόσωπο τοῦ Θεοδώρητου Κύρου, ὁ ὁποῖος ἦταν ὁ μέγιστος θεολόγος τῆς Ἀντιοχειανῆς σχολῆς μετὰ τὸν θάνατο τοῦ Θεοδώρου Μοψουεστίας καὶ κύριος ἐκφραστὴς τῆς ἀντιοχειανῆς χριστολογίας⁴.

¹ Περισσότερα γιὰ τὴν ζωὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργο τοῦ Θεοδώρητου Κύρου βλέπε, Π. ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥ, *Πατρολογία Δ'*, ἔκδ. Κυρομάνος, Θεσσαλονίκη 1989, 447-464. Σ. ΠΑΠΑΔΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Πατρολογία Γ'*, Αθήνα 2010, 729-779. Theresa Urbainczyk, *The Bishop and the Holy Man*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002, 16.

² O R. Janin ἀξιολογεῖ τὸν Θεοδώρητο, ὡς ἕνα ἐκ «τῶν γονιμωτέρων ἐκκλησιαστικῶν συγγραφέων». Βλ. R. JANIN, *ŌHE* 6 (1965), 192. O J. Quasten τὸν τιμᾷ μέ κολακευτικά σχόλια, «distinguished for its unpretentious learning, felicitous diction and perfect grace of style». Βλ. J. QUASTEN, *Patrology*, 3: *The Golden Age of Greek Patristic Literature from the Council of Nicaea to the Council of Chalcedon*. Westminster: Newman Press 1963, 553. Ἐνας ἄλλος πολὺ γνωστός ἐρευνητὴς γράφει, «Theodoret gehört zu den fruchtbarsten Schriftstellern der griechischen Kirche». P. BRUNS, «Theodoret von Cyrus», ἐν *Lexikon der antiken christlichen Literatur*, ἔκδ. S. DÖPP-W. GERLINGS, Freiburg 1998, 597.

³ Τὸν πέμπτο αἰώνα, τὸν αἰώνα τῆς ἀποκορύφωσης τῆς χριστιανικῆς σκέψης, ὁ Κύριλλος Ἀλεξανδρείας ἦταν κορυφαῖος θεολόγος τῆς Ἀλεξανδρινῆς σχολῆς, ἐνῶ ὁ Θεοδώρητος τῆς Ἀντιοχειανῆς σχολῆς. Οἱ χριστολογικὲς ἀντιλογίες μετὰ τοῦ Κυρίλλου καὶ Θεοδώρητου, ἀπὸ τὴ Σύνοδο τῆς Ἐφέσου (431) μέχρι καὶ Σύνοδο τῆς Χαλκηδόνος (451), δὲν ἦταν κάποιες ἀκαδημαϊκοῦ ἐνδιαφέροντος ἀπλὲς ἀντιπαραθέσεις μετὰ τῶν ἀρίστων τῶν δύο σχολῶν, ἀλλὰ εἶχαν τὸν χαρακτήρα ἐριδίας, μὲ ἀπτὲς συνέπειες σέ ὅλα τὰ ἐπίπεδα τῆς ζωῆς τῆς Ἐκκλησίας καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας. Περισσότερα γιὰ τὴν χριστολογικὴ διδασκαλία τοῦ Θεοδώρητου. Πρβλ. B. P. CLAYTON, *The Christology of Theodoret of Cyrus, Antiochene Christology from the Council of Ephesus (431) to the Council of Chalcedon (451)*, Oxford 2005, v.

⁴ Βλ. B. P. CLAYTON, *The Christology of Theodoret of Cyrus, Antiochene Christology from the Council of Ephesus (431) to the Council of Chalcedon (451)*, Oxford, 2005, v. «Theodoret of Cyrus (c.393–c.466) was the most prominent and able Antiochene theologian in the defence of Nestorius at the Council of Ephesus in 431 and in the two decades following, leading up to the Council of Chalcedon in 451. After the banishment of Nestorius, Theodoret quickly became the leading apologist for Antiochene Christology in the struggle with Cyril and Dioscorus of Alexandria. Although the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius himself largely perished due

Ὁ Θεοδώρητος μεγάλωσε στήν Ἀντιόχεια, ἡ ὁποῖα ἦταν τήν ἐποχή ἐκεῖνη τό κόσμημα τῆς Ἀνατολῆς, μία πόλη γεμάτη μέ λαμπρό πολιτισμό καί τά ὑψηλότερα ἐπιτεύγματα τοῦ ἑλληνικοῦ πολιτισμοῦ⁵. Αὐτό τό γεγονός ἦταν τό προνόμιο γιά τόν Θεοδώρητο, διότι ἐκεῖ ἔλαβε παγανιστική ρητορική ἐκπαίδευση ἡ ὁποία βασιζόταν στά ἔργα τῶν Ἑλλήνων κλασικῶν⁶. Τά ἔργα του δίδουν τήν οἰκειότητα μέ τό καλό κλασσικό ἑλληνικό στυλ τῆς γραφῆς καί τήν γνώση του τῶν γνωστῶν καί σεβαστῶν συγγραφέων τῆς ἑλληνικῆς λογοτεχνίας⁷.

Ὁ Θεοδώρητος Κύρου ἐκτός ὅτι ἦταν λαμπρός θεολόγος καί ἐρμηνευτής, ἐπίσης ἀναδείχθηκε καί σέ ἄριστο ἀπολογητή τῆς Ἐκκλησίας. Κατά τήν γνώμη δύο κορυφαίων πατρολόγων, τοῦ Johannes Quasten καί τοῦ Berthold Altaner, τό ἔργο τοῦ Θεοδώρητου Κύρου, *Ἑλληνικῶν παθημάτων Θεραπευτική*, τό τελευταῖο χρονολογικά σύγγραμμα τῆς χριστιανικῆς ἀπολογητικῆς, ἀποτελεῖ τήν καλύτερη σωζόμενη διάψευση κατά τοῦ κλασσικοῦ παγανισμοῦ τοῦ Ρωμαϊκοῦ κόσμου⁸.

Ἡ χριστολογία τοῦ Θεοδώρητου Κύρου ἦταν καί παραμένει καί στόν 21^ο αἰῶνα ἀντικείμενο μελέτης πολλῶν ἐρευνητῶν. Οἱ θεολογικές του ἀπόψεις γίνονται δεκτές ὑπό προϋποθέσεις καί μέ κάποιες ἐπιφυλάξεις⁹. Ὡστόσο, ὁ Θεοδώρητος κατά τή γνώμη σχεδόν ὅλων τῶν μελετητῶν, παρήγαγε σημαντικό θεολογικό ἔργο στήν Ἐκκλησία καί ὡς ἐκ τούτου, κρίνεται ἀναγκαῖα ἡ ἐκ νέου προσέγγιση τῆς χριστολογίας του καί γενικά τῆς διδασκαλίας του¹⁰.

to their condemnation at Constantinople in 553 or at Ephesus in 431 and presently are extant only in fragmentary form or translations in Syriac or Latin, the voluminous works of Theodoret are largely available to us in Greek and provide an invaluable source for the study of the evolution of Antiochene Christology».

⁵ Μεταξύ τῶν πόλεων τῆς Μέσης Ἀνατολῆς, μία ἀπό τίς πρῶτες σημαντικές ἦταν ἡ Ἀντιόχεια, πρωτεύουσα τῆς Συρίας, ὅπου ὁ χριστιανισμός ἦταν διαδεδομένος ἤδη ἀπό τήν Ἀποστολική περίοδο, καί ἀπό τότε ἐγινε μία ἀπό τίς πρῶτες ἐξέχουσες ἐπισκοπικές ἑδρες. Τόν τέταρτο αἰῶνα, αὐτή καί ἡ Ἀθήνα ἦταν τά δύο σημαντικότερα κέντρα τοῦ ἑλληνικοῦ πολιτισμοῦ καί τοῦ κοσμοπολίτικου πνεύματος. Ἐκεῖνη τήν ἐποχή ὑπῆρξε ἡ τρίτη μεγαλύτερη πόλη τῆς Ρωμαϊκῆς αὐτοκρατορίας, μετά τή Ρώμη καί τήν Ἀλεξάνδρεια, μέ 150.000 χριστιανούς ἀπό τοὺς 250.000 ἐλεύθερους πολίτες. Οἱ δοῦλοι ἀνέρχονταν σέ μισό ἑκατομμύριο, καί δέν γνωρίζουμε πόσοι ἀπό αὐτούς ἦταν χριστιανοί. Βλ. G. HADDAD, *Aspects of social life in Antioch in the Hellenistic-Roman Period*, Diss., Chicago 1949, σσ. 67-73.

⁶ F. YOUNG, "From Nicaea to Chalcedon", 267.

⁷ D. RIDINGS, *Attic Moses: The Dependency Theme in Some Early Christian Writers*, Göteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1995, 197.

⁸ J. QUASTEN, *Patrology* III, 543. Βλέπε ἐπίσης, B. ALTANER, *Patrologie*, Herder, Freiburg 1966, σ. 341. Ὁ Θεοδώρητος στό ἔργο αὐτό ἀντιμετωπίζει πολύ ἔξυπνα τίς ἀδυναμίες τῆς ἑλληνικῆς φιλοσοφίας καί ἰσχυρίζεται ὅτι ὅλοι Ἕλληνες φιλόσοφοι χρησιμοποίησαν στήν πραγματικότητα τοὺς νόμους τοῦ Μωσῆ. Στό ἔργο αὐτό ὁ Θεοδώρητος μνημονεύει περίπου τριακόσια πενήντα χωρία καί ἑκατὸν πενήντα ὀνόματα τῶν φιλοσόφων, ποιητῶν καί ἱστορικῶν. Βλ. P. CANIVET, *Therapeutique des Maladies Helleniques*, par Theodoret Cyr (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1958), 37. Ὁ Θεοδώρητος διακρίνεται ἐπίσης καί ὡς ἀγιολόγος. Στό ἔργο του *Φιλόθεος Ἱστορία* περιγράφει τίς πρῶτες σημαντικές πατερικές καί ἀσκητικές μορφές στό τέλος τοῦ τετάρτου καί ἄρχες τοῦ πέμπτου αἰῶνα. Περισσότερα βλ. D. KRUEGER, «Typological Figuration in Theodoret of Cyrrhus's Religious History and the Art of Postbiblical Narrative» ἐν *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 5 (1997), 393-419.

⁹ Τό πόσο ἰσχυρές εἶναι οἱ προκαταλήψεις ἔναντι τῆς χριστολογίας τοῦ Θεοδώρητου φαίνεται στό σχετικά πρόσφατο καί ἔγκριτο λεξικό *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, 9, Herder, Freiburg 2000, σσ. 1401-1404. Ὁ συγγραφέας τοῦ λήμματος αὐτοῦ εἶναι ὁ πολὺς Albert Viciano, ὁ ὁποῖος ἀσχολεῖται ἐπὶ σειρά ἐτῶν μέ τό ἔργο καί τή διδασκαλία τοῦ Θεοδώρητου.

¹⁰ Ὁ γνωστός μελετητής Bertram, σέ εἰδική μελέτη του πάνω στόν Θεοδώρητο, καταλήγει στό συμπέρασμα ὅτι ἂν ὁ Θεοδώρητος δέν ἐμπλεκόταν στήν νεστοριανική ἔριδα, δέν θά τοῦ ἀπέδιδαν λάθῃ στή διδασκαλία του. Βλ. A. BERTRAM, *Theodoretii Cyrensis, Doctrina Christologica*. Hildesiae 1883, 3.

2. Ἡ σχέση τῆς Ἀντιοχειανῆς ἐρμηνευτικῆς σχολῆς μέ τήν Ἀλεξανδρινή. Υπάρχουν ἄραγε οὐσιαστικές διαφορές;

Πρὶν παρουσιάσουμε ἀναλυτικά τήν ἐρμηνευτική μέθοδο τοῦ Θεοδοωρήτου Κύρου, θά ἦταν σκόπιμο, καί ἀπό κάθε πλευρά χρήσιμο, νά ἀναφερθοῦμε συνοπτικά στή θεολογική ταυτότητα τῆς Ἀντιοχειανῆς σχολῆς καί στή σχέση της μέ τήν Ἀλεξανδρινή, ἀλλά καί στίς διαφορές τῶν ἐξηγητικῶν τους μεθόδων¹¹. Ἀπό τό τέλος τοῦ δευτέρου αἰώνα, τά κύρια πνευματικά κέντρα τῆς χριστιανικῆς σκέψεως ἦταν ἡ Ἀλεξάνδρεια καί ἡ Ἀντιόχεια, ὅπου ἀναπτύχθηκαν δύο Σχολές οἱ ὁποῖες ἔπρεξαν πολύ σημαντικό ρόλο στήν διαμόρφωση τῆς χριστιανικῆς διδασκαλίας. Σύμφωνα μέ τήν γνώμη πολλῶν διακεκριμένων ἐπιστημόνων, οἱ δύο σχολές διέφεραν μεθοδολογικά σχεδόν σέ ὅλα τά θεολογικά ἀντικείμενα, ἀπό τόν τρόπο ἐρμηνείας τῆς Ἀγίας Γραφῆς μέχρι καί τήν ἀσκητική θεολογία.

Οἱ ἀντιοχειανοὶ θεολόγοι χρησιμοποιοῦσαν στήν ἐρμηνεία καί ἐξήγηση τῆς Ἀγίας Γραφῆς μέθοδο διαφορετική ἀπό αὐτή τῶν ἀλεξανδρινῶν¹². Ἐν ἀντιθέσει μέ τήν ἀλεξανδρινή ἀλληγορία, ἡ ὁποία ἀπέβλεπε στήν ἐξήγηση πνευματικῆς ἔννοιας ἡ ὁποία βρισκόταν σέ ἐσκεμμένο βάθος, ὑπό τό γράμμα τοῦ κειμένου τῆς Ἀγίας Γραφῆς, ἡ Ἀντιοχειανή σχολή στηριζόταν περισσότερο στό «ψυλόν γράμμα»¹³. Ἡ Ἀντιοχειανή ἐξηγητική καθιερώθηκε ὡς ἡ κατεξοχήν ἐκπρόσωπος τῆς γραμματικῆς μεθοδολογίας ἡ κατὰ λέξιν ἐρμηνείας¹⁴.

Ἐπομένως, αὐτή ἡ μέθοδος ἀπέβλεπε στήν ἐξήγηση τῆς ἀπλῆς ἔννοιας τῶν κειμένων τῆς Ἀγίας Γραφῆς, καί ταυτόχρονα λειτουργοῦσε ὡς ἐξισορροπιστικός παράγοντας καί ἰσχυρό ἀντίδοτο τῆς ἀλληγορικῆς ἐρμηνείας τῶν Ἀλεξανδρινῶν¹⁵. Ἐνῶ, λοιπόν,

¹¹ Οἱ σχολές ὑπῆγοντο σέ δύο διαφορετικά Πατριαρχεῖα, τῶν ὁποίων οἱ σχέσεις δέν ἦταν πάντοτε καλές ἔνεκα πολλῶν ἐκκλησιαστικο-πολιτικῶν περιστάσεων. Περισσότερα γιά τήν κριτική ἀναδρομή καί παρουσίαση τῶν ἐρμηνευτικῶν σχολῶν τῆς Ἀλεξανδρείας καί τῆς Ἀντιοχείας βλέπε στό J. BRECK, *The Power of the Word in the Worshipping Church*, St. Vladimir's Press, Crestwood 1986, 49-92.

¹² Περὶ τῆς Ἀλεξανδρινῆς ἀλληγορικῆς μεθόδου βλ. I. ΠΑΝΑΓΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Ἐρμηνεία τῆς Ἀγίας Γραφῆς στήν Ἐκκλησία τῶν Πατέρων*, τομ. Α', ἐκδ. Ἀκρίτας, Ἀθῆναι 1991, σ. 363. J. WHITMAN, *Allegory: The Dynamics of an Ancient and Medieval Technique*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, σ. 58. Βλ. ἐπίσης D. DAWSON, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, σ. 16.

¹³ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ, *Ἐκκλησιαστική Ἱστορία*, PG 67,665-668: "Ψυλῶ τῷ γράμματι τῶν θείων προσέχων Γραφῶν, τάς θεωρεῖας αὐτοῦ ἐκτρεπόμενος".

¹⁴ Περισσότερα γιά τή γραμματική μεθοδολογία ἡ κατὰ λέξιν ἐρμηνεία βλ. M. SIMONETTI, *Biblical Interpretation in the Early Church, An Historical Introduction to Patristic Exegesis*, Translated by J. A. Hughes, Edinburgh 1994, σ. 67. Πρβλ. Γ. ΦΛΩΡΟΦΣΚΥ, *Ἀνατολικοὶ πατέρες τοῦ Α' αἰῶνα*, σσ. 402-407. Στήν Ἀντιόχεια λόγω τῆς ὑπάρξεως πολλῶν Ἰουδαίων πού πολεμοῦσαν τόν χριστιανισμό μέ τή γραμματική καί ἱστορική ἐρμηνεία τῆς Ἀγίας Γραφῆς, υἱοθετήθηκε ἡ μέθοδος τῆς ἱστοριογραμματικῆς ἐρμηνείας. Χρησιμοποιοῦσαν τή *Λογική* τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλη, ὡς ἐργαλεῖο ἐρμηνείας τοῦ μυστηρίου τῆς Ἐνανθρωπήσεως τοῦ Λόγου τοῦ Θεοῦ. Μέ βάση τήν ἀριστοτελική ἀρχή ὅτι δύο τέλεια δέν μποροῦν νά γίνουν ἓνα (Μεταφυσικά 1039α, 9-10), θεωροῦσαν ἀγεφύρωτο τό χάσμα μεταξύ Θεοῦ καί κτιστοῦ. Ὡς ἐκ τούτου, κατέληγαν ὅτι εἶναι ἀδύνατον ἡ λύση τοῦ μυστηρίου τῆς Ἐνανθρωπήσεως νά εὐρεθεῖ στήν ἐνότητα τῶν φύσεων στό Χριστό. Πρβλ. Σ. ΠΑΠΑΔΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Πατρολογία Β'*, σσ. 566-574.

¹⁵ Ὁ D. P. Fuller στό ἄρθρο του γιά τήν ἱστορία τῆς βιβλικῆς ἐρμηνείας, κάνει τόν διαχωρισμό τῆς πατερικῆς ἐρμηνείας σέ δύο τάσεις, τόν Ὠριγένη καί τήν Σχολή τῆς Ἀντιοχείας. Ὁ Fuller ἀνάγει τήν ἀλληγορικὴ μέθοδο τῆς ἐρμηνείας τοῦ Ὠριγένη ἀπευθείας στόν Φίλωνα Ἀλεξανδρείας καί τόν πλατωνικὸν τρόπο σκέψεως. Ἀντίθετα, ὑποστηρίζει ὅτι ἡ Σχολή τῆς Ἀντιοχείας μορφώθηκε σέ ἐντελῶς διαφορετικὸ κλίμα. Γράφει χαρακτηριστικά: «The Antiochean school arose in opposition to Origen, and it included such men as Theodore of Mopsuestia (d. 429), the greatest exegete of the early Church, and Chrysostom (d. 407), the greatest preacher of the early Church. Instead of approaching the Bible with Hellenistic presuppositions, these men interpreted the Bible from the vantage point of its own Semitic thought. Theodore stressed the necessity of studying a passage's phraseology, separate clauses, and sequence of thought until the whole is seen as a sum of its parts. He

ή Αλεξανδρινή σχολή είχε ως σκοπό την ανεύρεση του πνευματικού νοήματος του κειμένου της Αγίας Γραφής, ή Αντιοχειανή σχολή προσπαθούσε να έρμηνεύσει την κυριολεκτική έννοια και τό γραμματικό νόημα του κειμένου¹⁶.

Σήμερα θεωρείται δεδομένο ότι οι έρμηνευτές της Αντιοχειανής σχολής χρησιμοποιούσαν τις ίδιες ιστορικοφιλολογικές τεχνικές και τά αυτά εργαλεία στην εξηγητική του κειμένου, μέ εκείνα που χρησίμευαν στους έθνικούς ρήτορες κατά την έρμηνεία φιλολογικῶν και φιλοσοφικῶν κειμένων¹⁷. Η πιστή εξηγητική απόδοση του γραμματικού νοήματος του κειμένου και ή πλαισίωση αὐτοῦ ἐντός τῆς βιβλικῆς ἱστορίας, ἀποτελέσσε γιά ὅλους τούς Ἀντιοχειανούς διδασκάλους και θεολόγους, τήν κατευθυντήρια γραμμή και τό πλέον χαρακτηριστικό γνώρισμα τῆς βιβλικῆς τους ἐξηγήσεως¹⁸.

Οἱ Πατέρες τῆς Ἐκκλησίας, ὅμως, ἐν γένει, και ἀνεξαρτήτως σέ πιά σχολή ἀνήκαν, δέν ἀκολουθοῦσαν ἀπαρέγκλιτα τή μέθοδό της, οὔτε ἀπέκλειαν συλλήβδην τούς ἄλλους τρόπους και μεθόδους έρμηνείας. Γιά παράδειγμα, ὁ μέγας Αλεξανδρινός έρμηνευτής Ὁριγένης, στήν ἐξήγηση στό *Ἄσμα τῶν Ἀσμάτων*, έρμηνεύει τό βιβλικό κείμενο σέ πολ- λαπλά ἐπίπεδα, ἐπιστρατεύοντας, κατά περίπτωση, διάφορους τρόπους έρμηνείας¹⁹.

Τό δεύτερο παράδειγμα εἶναι ή έρμηνευτική προσέγγιση του Θεοδώρητου Κύρου. Ἄν και τυπικός ἀντιοχειανός έρμηνευτής, στήν έρμηνεία του ήταν πίο κοντά στίς ἀρχές τῆς Αλεξανδρινῆς σχολῆς παρά τῆς Ἀντιοχειανῆς. Ὡς ἐκ τούτου, στήν έρμηνεία του *Ὑπομνήματος εἰς τό Ἄσμα Ἀσμάτων* ἀντλεῖ πολλές σκέψεις ἀπό τόν Ὁριγένη, τόν ὁποῖο ἀποκαλεῖ «πατέρα ἁγίων». Έρμηνεύει τό βιβλίο ἀλληγορικῶς, μολονότι δέν χρησιμοποιεῖ τόν ὄρο «ἀλληγορία», ἀλλά προτιμᾷ τή διατύπωση «τροπική ή πνευματική έρμηνεία»²⁰.

was adamant in his rejection of Origen's allegorical interpretation and insisted that the biblical books be understood in their historical setting». Βλ. P. D. FULLER, «Interpretation, History of», ἐν *ISBE 2: 864-65*. Κατά τόν Ζαχαρόπουλο, «διά τούς Αλεξανδρινούς ἕκαστος στίχος τῆς Γραφῆς ὡς και τά ἐν αὐτῇ γεγονότα ήσαν μεστά μυστηρίων και τύπων. Διά τούς Ἀντιοχειανούς οἱ τύποι ἀποτελοῦν οὐχί τόν γενικόν κανόνα τῆς έρμηνευτικῆς των ἄλλα τήν ἐξαίρεσιν, τό δέ μυστήριον τῆς Ἐνσαρκώσεως του Υἱοῦ-Λόγου ὁ Πατήρ είχε προετοιμάσει ἐντός τῆς Παλαιᾶς Διαθήκης, ἀλλά ὄχι εἰς κάθε σελίδα της, οὔτε και εἰς κάθε βιβλίον της». Δ. ΖΑΧΑΡΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Θεόδωρος ὁ Μοινοεστίας ὡς έρμηνευτής τῶν Γραφῶν*, ἐκδ. Ἄρτος Ζωῆς, Ἀθήνα 1999, σ. 58.

¹⁶ Κατά τήν πολύ εὔστοχη γνώμη του π. Γεωργίου Φλωρόφσκυ, ή ιστορική και ή γραμματική έρμηνευτική μέθοδος δέν ήταν τελικά πίο ἀξιοπιστή ἀπό τήν ἀλληγορική. Ὁ Φλωρόφσκυ συμπεριφέρει πλήρως τή συνοπτική ἐκτίμηση του Μπολότοβ ὅτι ή Αλεξανδρινή σχολή διέτρεχε τόν κίνδυνο νά δημιουργήσει τή δική της Αγία Γραφή, ἀλλά ή Αντιοχειανή σχολή, μένοντας πολύ κοντά στό γράμμα τῆς Αγίας Γραφῆς, λησιμόνησε ὅτι θά έπρεπε νά ὑπάρχει μιᾶ θεωρία που νά ἀκολουθεῖ τήν ἱστορία. Γ. ΦΛΩΡΟΦΣΚΥ, *Ἀνατολικοί πατέρες του Δ' αἰῶνα*, σ. 405.

¹⁷ Βλ. F. YOUNG, *Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture*, Cambridge, University Press 1997, 172. Η F. Young σέ ἓνα ἄλλο πολύ σπουδαῖο ἄρθρο ὑποστηρίζει τήν ἄποψη περί ἐπιδράσεως τῶν φιλοσοφικῶν σχολῶν ἐπὶ τῆς Αλεξανδρινῆς έρμηνείας σέ ἀντιδιαστολή μέ τήν ἐπίδραση τῶν ρητορικῶν σχολῶν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀντιοχειανῆς έρμηνείας. Βλ. F. YOUNG, «The rhetorical schools and their influence n patristic exegesis» *The Making of Orthodoxy*, Cambridge University Press 1989, 189-199.

¹⁸ Τή διαμόρφωση τῆς ἀντιοχειανῆς έρμηνευτικῆς μεθόδου, ὑπό τούς ἐπηρεασμούς του φιλοσοφικο-ρητορικοῦ περιβάλλοντος τῆς περιοχῆς, δέχεται και ὁ ἀμερικανός έρευνητής C. Kannengiesser: «The rhetorical and philosophical culture of Antioch inspired the local masters of biblical exegesis with a sense of the value of historical Old Testament narratives, which was different from the treatment of such narratives taught to Christian exegetes on the basis of Philo of Alexandria's legacy». C. KANNENGIESSER, «A Key for the Future of Patristics: The 'Senses' of Scripture», ἐν *In Dominico Eloquentia—In Lordly Eloquence: Essays on Patristic Exegesis in Honor of Robert Louis Wilken* (ed. Paul M. Blowers et al.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 102.

¹⁹ Ὅπως παρατηρεῖ ὁ Jacques Guillet, ὁ Ὁριγένης και ὁ Θεόδωρος Μοινοεστίας εἶναι τῆς γνώμης ὅτι τά βιβλικά κείμενα ἔχουν ἓνα βαθύτερο νόημα κάτω ἀπό τή σημασιολογική ἐπιφάνειά τους. Βλ. J. GUILLET, «Les Exegeses d'Alexandrie et d'Antioche: Conflit ou Malentendu?», *Recherches de Science Religieuse* 34 (1947), 264.

²⁰ ΘΕΟΔΩΡΗΤΟΥ ΚΥΡΟΥ, *Έρμηνεία εἰς τό Ἄσμα Ἀσμάτων*, PG 81,33A: «ὅτι και ἐν τῇ Παλαιᾷ πολλὰ τροπικῶς ή θεία λέγει Γραφή». Ὁ Θεόδωρητος Κύρου κατά τόν Δ. Ζαχαρόπουλο «ὠπῆρε ὁ μετριοπαθέστερος εξηγητής τῆς Ἀντιοχειανῆς σχολῆς». Δ. ΖΑΧΑΡΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Θεόδωρος*, σ. 71.

Μέ τά παραδείγματα αὐτά, ἀλλά καί ὅπως διαφαίνεται ἀπό πλεῖστα ἄλλα πατερικά κείμενα, καταδεικνύεται ὅτι ἡ διχοτόμηση μεταξύ Ἀλεξανδρινῆς καί Ἀντιοχειανῆς ἐρμηνευτικῆς, παραμένει σέ πολλές περιπτώσεις πλασματική καί μὴ ἀνταποκρινόμενη στήν πραγματικότητα²¹. Ἀκριβῶς γιὰ τόν λόγο αὐτό, πολλοί σύγχρονοι μελετητές παραδέχονται καί ἰσχυρίζονται ὅτι δέν πρέπει νά γίνεται σοβαρός λόγος περὶ ριζικῆς ἀντιθέσεως μεταξύ τῆς πνευματικῆς ἐρμηνείας τῶν Ἀλεξανδρινῶν καί τῆς ὑψηλοτέρας τυπολογίας τῶν Ἀντιοχειανῶν, καθότι ἡ παλαιότερη ἀποτίμηση τῶν μεθόδων τῶν δύο σχολῶν χρήζει σοβαρῆς ἀναθεωρήσεως, παρά τήν αὐστηρή καί ὕβριστική κριτική τῶν Ἀντιοχειανῶν ἐναντίον τῶν Ἀλεξανδρινῶν συναδέλφων τους²².

Κατά τή γνώμη τοῦ π. Ἰωάννη Μάγιεντορφ, «στό ἐπίπεδο τῆς ἐρμηνείας τῆς Ἀγίας Γραφῆς δέν θά πρέπει νά δίνουμε ὑπερβολικές διαστάσεις στήν ἀντίθεση μεταξύ Ἀλεξανδρείας καί Ἀντιόχειας – ἡ ὁποία ἐκφράστηκε μέ τόν πασίγνωστο καί βίαιο τρόπο στίς Χριστολογικῆς ἐριδες τοῦ πέμπτου αἰώνα. Οἱ κύριοι πνευματικοὶ ἐκπρόσωποι τῆς Σχολῆς τῆς Ἀντιόχειας – ὁ Διόδωρος Ταρσοῦ (περίπου 330-390), ὁ Θεόδωρος Μοψουεστίας (περίπου 350-428) καί ὁ Θεοδώρητος Κύρου (περίπου 393-466)– δέν ἀρνοῦνταν τή δυνατότητα ὑπαρξῆς ἐνὸς βαθύτερου πνευματικοῦ νοήματος στά βιβλικά κείμενα, ὡστόσο ἀντέδρασαν ἔντονα κατὰ τῆς ἀπάλειψης τοῦ κυριολεκτικοῦ, ἱστορικοῦ νοήματος καί κατὰ ὁποιασδήποτε αὐθαίρετης ἀλληγορικῆς ἐρμηνείας βασισμένης σέ πλατωνικῆς φιλοσοφικῆς παραδοχῆς ξένες πρὸς τὴ Βίβλο. Ὡς ἐκ τούτου, ἡ ἔννοια τῆς θεωρίας («contemplatio»), ἡ ὁποία ὑποδηλώνει τή δυνατότητα εὑρεσης ἐνὸς πνευματικοῦ νοήματος πίσω ἀπὸ τὸ γράμμα τοῦ κειμένου, δέν ἀπορρίφθηκε, ἀλλὰ δόθηκε ἔμφαση στά ὅσα πραγματικά συνέβησαν ἢ εἰπώθηκαν ἐντὸς τῆς ἱστορίας, καθὼς ἐπίσης καί στίς ἡθικῆς ἢ θεολογικῆς προεκτάσεις τοῦ κειμένου»²³.

Κατά τόν ἴδιο τρόπο καί ὁ ἀείμνηστος π. Γεώργιος Φλωρόφσκυ γράφει ὅτι, «τό Βιβλίον (Ἀγία Γραφή) εἰς τὸ σύνολό του ἦταν δημιουργία τῆς κοινότητος, τόσον εἰς τὴν παλαιάν οἰκονομίαν, ὅσον καί εἰς τὴν χριστιανικὴν Ἐκκλησίαν»²⁴. Γιὰ αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους,

²¹ J. W. BURGHARDT, "On early Christian exegesis", *Theological Studies* 11 (1950), 85: «Between the two schools there is no absolute opposition; there is even very broad agreement on an entire traditional exegesis; but there is special emphasis on different points of view. Of Old Testament typism Antioch retains the prophetic aspect, Alexandria preserves the symbolic aspect and the spiritual content. For Antioch the dominant fact of bible history is prophetism; Alexandria finds in sheer prophetism insufficient nourishment for Christian reflection and spiritual life». Ὁ ἱερομόναχος Πατάπιος σέ ἄρθρο του, συγκρίνοντας καί ἀντιπαραβάλλοντας τίς διαφορετικῆς ἐρμηνευτικῆς μεθόδους στήν Ἀλεξανδρινή καί Ἀντιοχειανή θεολογική σχολή, ἰσχυρίζεται ὅτι ὁ βαθμὸς ἀπόκλισης μεταξύ τῆς ἐρμηνευτικῆς παραδόσεως τῆς Ἀντιόχειας καί τῆς Ἀλεξανδρείας ἐξαρτᾶται σέ μεγάλο βαθμὸ ἀπὸ τὸ ποῖο ἀγιογραφικὸ κείμενο ἀνέπτυξαν. Βλ. ΠΑΤΑΠΙΟΣ HIEROMONK, «The Alexandrian and the Antiochene methods of Exegesis: Towards a reconsideration», *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 44 (1999), 187-198, ὅπου καταλήγει νά προτείνει τὰ ἑξῆς: «I am not going to suggest that we jettison the distinction between these two approaches. Nonetheless, I do believe that it needs to be reevaluated from time to time in the light of particular Biblical texts».

²² Σύμφωνα μέ τὴν γνώμη τοῦ J. O' Keefe, παρά τὸ γεγονός ὅτι συνήθως, ἀπὸ τὴν πλευρὰ τῶν σύγχρονων μελετητῶν, ἡ κριτική κατὰ τῆς Ἀντιοχειανῆς χριστολογίας παρουσιάζεται ὡς παρεξήγηση, προσεκτικότερη ἐξέταση μᾶς ἐπιτρέπει νά παρατηρήσουμε ὅτι οἱ ἀρχαῖοι συγγραφεῖς εἶχαν βάσιμους λόγους νά προβάλλουν ἀντιστάσεις καί ἐνστάσεις κατὰ τῆς ἀντιοχειανῆς ἐρμηνευτικῆς πρακτικῆς. Γιὰ αὐτὸ τὸ λόγο ἡ ἐξηγητική μέθοδος τῶν Διόδωρου Ταρσοῦ, τοῦ Θεοδώρου Μοψουεστίας, καί σέ κάποιο βαθμὸ καί τοῦ Θεοδοωρήτου Κύρου, δέχθηκε σφοδρὴ κριτική ἀπὸ τὸν O' Keefe, ὡς μεθοδολογικά περιοριστική καί θεολογικά ἀδύναμη, ἀποδομητική τῶν δεσμῶν Παλαιᾶς καί Καινῆς Διαθήκης, καί ἀποδυναμωτική τῆς ἐνιαίας λειτουργίας τῆς Βίβλου ὡς χριστιανικοῦ κειμένου. J. O'KEEFE, «A Letter that Killeth»: Toward a Reassessment of Antiochene Exegesis, or Diodore, Theodore, and Theodoret on the Psalms», *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 8 (2000), 83.

²³ I. ΜΑΓΙΕΝΤΟΡΦ, *Βυζαντινὴ Θεολογία*, ἔκδ. Ἰνδίκτος, Ἀθήνα 2010, σσ. 62-63.

²⁴ Γ. ΦΛΩΡΟΦΣΚΥ, *Ἀγία Γραφή, Ἐκκλησία, Παράδοση*, Θεσσαλονίκη 1976, σ. 10.

οί σύγχρονοι μελετητές επιχειρηματολογούν κατά των μεγάλων διαφορών μεταξύ των δύο έρμηνευτικών σχολών. Σύμφωνα με τη γνώμη όλο και περισσότερων μελετητών της πατερνικής έξηγητικής, ειδικά των τελευταίων πενήντα έτών, ή παλαιά διάκριση μεταξύ άντιοχειανής και της άλεξανδρινής μεθόδου έρμηνείας είναι άνακριβής και παρωχημένη²⁵.

Είναι σημαντικό και από κάθε πλευρά άναγκαίο νά άναφέρουμε δύο άκόμα άξιο-πρόσεκτες άπόψεις, σχετικά με τό θέμα αυτό. Τό 1986, δύο σπουδαίοι θεολόγοι, Bradley Nassif και Δημήτριος Τρακατέλλης δημοσιεύουν ό καθένας ή μελέτη του πάνω στίς ύποτιθέμενες διαφορές μεταξύ της άντιοχειανής και άλεξανδρινής σχολής. Ό Nassif θεωρεί ότι ή μέθοδος της έξηγητικής των άντιοχειανών ήταν «πνευματική» (spiritual) και όχι «κυριολεκτική» (literal). Στη συνέχεια ύπογραμμίζει ότι ή έννοια της θεωρίας έπέτρεπε στους Άντιοχειανούς νά διερευνήσουν τήν Παλαιά Διαθήκη και ύπό ιστορικής και ύπό χριστολογικής έπόψεως, και νά λάβουν σοβαρά ύπόψη τόσο ή γραμματική, όσο και τήν τυπολογική σημασία των κειμένων²⁶. Ό Δημήτριος Τρακατέλλης γίνεται άκόμη πιό τολμηρός και ύποστηρίζει ότι τό μοναδικό φιλολογικό είδος της έξηγητικής γραμματείας έχει πολλά ύποφέρει από στερεότυπες και ύπεραπλουστευμένες κατηγοριοποιήσεις, φέρνοντας τό παράδειγμα της «βολικής», όπως ή χαρακτηρίζει διαίρεσης της βιβλικής έρμηνευτικής μεταξύ των δύο σχολών της Άντιόχειας και της Άλεξάνδρειας. Ειδικά γιά ή συγκεκριμένη κατηγοριοποίηση, ό Τρακατέλλης γίνεται άυστηρός στους χαρακτηρισμούς της, άποκαλώντας τήν άνεπαρκή, άν όχι παραπλανητική²⁷.

3. Τό έρμηνευτικό έργο τοῦ Θεοδώρητου Κύρου

Ό Θεόδωρτος Κύρου, ό τελευταίος μέγας θεολόγος της Άντιοχειανής Έκκλησίας και κατ' έξοχήν, όπως ήδη άναφέρθηκε, εκπρόσωπος της χριστολογίας της σχολής αυτής, διέπρεψε ως άριστος έρμηνευτής των θείων Γραφών²⁸. Έγραψε πολλά ύπομνή-

²⁵ Ένδεικτικά άναφέρουμε τήν Η. Sherman, ή όποία μελέτησε συστηματικά ή συμφωνία των δύο σχολών σέ πολλά έπιμέρους θέματα βιβλικής έρμηνευτικής. Η. SHERMAN, *Reading Zechariah: The Allegorical Tradition of Biblical Interpretation through the Commentary of Didymus the Blind and Theodore of Mopsuestia*, Paternoster Theological Monographs, Paternoster Press: Carlisle 2004. Αναλυτικά γιά τήν διαφορά μεταξύ της άλεξανδρινής άλληγορίας και της άντιοχειανής θεωρίας άλλά και γιά τήν έννοια τοῦ σκοποῦ ως σημείου άναφοράς τοῦ βιβλικοῦ κειμένου, με σχετική άνάλυση γιά τά κύρια χαρακτηριστικά των δύο σχολών, βλ. F. YOUNG, *Biblical Exegesis*, 161-185. Έπίσης, F. YOUNG, «The Rhetorical Schools and Their Influence on Patristic Exegesis», εν *The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick* (ed. Rowan Williams; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 194-95. Ό Guillet συνοψίζει τίς διαφορές μεταξύ των δύο σχολών, όσον άφορά τήν μεθοδολογία της έρμηνείας, ως έξης: «Antioch retains the prophetic aspect of the typology of the Old Testament, while Alexandria retains its symbolic aspect and spiritual content». J. GUILLET, «Les Exegeses d'Alexandrie et d'Antioche: Conflit ou Malentendu?», *Recherches de Science Religieuse* 34 (1947), 257-302. Γιά ένδεικτικούς και σύντομους όρισμούς των τριών κυρίαρχων έρμηνευτικών μεθόδων στά συγγράμματα των Πατέρων (ιστορική, τυπολογική, άλληγορική) βλ. Π. ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥ, *Έλληνική Πατρολογία, Α'*, Θεσσαλονίκη 1993, σ. 157.

²⁶ Βλ. BRADLEY N., «'Spiritual Exegesis' in the School of Antioch», εν *New Perspectives on Historical Theology: Essays in Memory of John Meyendorff*, ed. Bradley Nassif; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996, σ. 343.

²⁷ Βλ. D. TRAKATELLIS, «Theodoret's Commentary on Isaiah: A Synthesis of Exegetical Traditions», εν *New Perspectives on Historical Theology: Essays in Memory of John Meyendorff*, (ed. Bradley Nassif; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 313. Δ. ΤΡΑΚΑΤΕΛΛΗΣ, «Μία σύνθεση έρμηνευτικών παραδόσεων. Τό ύπόμνημα τοῦ Θεοδώρητου στόν Ησαΐα», εν *Οί Πατέρες έρμηνεύουν. Άπόψεις Πατερικής Βιβλικής έρμηνείας*, έκδ. Άποστολική Διακονία, Αθήνα 1996, 95-150.

²⁸ P. BRUNS, «Theodoret von Cyrus», *Lexikon der antiken christlichen Literatur*, έκδ. S. DÖPP-W. GERLINGS, Freiburg 1998, σ. 597: «Theodoret von Kyros darf als einer der größten Kirchenväter des 5. Jh. gelten. Sein schriftstellerisches Schaffen erstreckte sich auf alle Gattungen der väterlichen Literatur gleichermaßen (Apologien, Kirchengeschichten, biblische Kommentare, Briefe) und trotzdem darf er insbesondere als einer der bedeutendsten Exegeten oder besser als „Erklärer“ der Hl. Schrift dieser Epoche gelten».

ματα στά βιβλία τῆς Παλαιᾶς Διαθήκης, ἐνῶ ἀπό τὰ βιβλία τῆς Καινῆς Διαθήκης ἐρμήνευσε μόνο τίς ἐπιστολές τοῦ Ἀποστόλου Παύλου. Παρά τό γεγονός ὅτι τὰ ἐρμηνευτικά του ἔργα εἶναι σύντομα, ἐντούτοις ἀντικατοπτρίζουν μία πληθώρα τῶν παραδόσεων. Ὁ Θεοδῶρητος συνέταξε ὅλα τὰ ἐξηγητικά του ἔργα μετά τό 433.

Ὁ κορυφαῖος ἐρευνητής τῆς σκέψεως καί τῆς ἐξηγητικῆς του, Jean-Noël Guinot, ἀποδίδει τήν ἐξέχουσα θέση πού κατέχει στήν ἱστορία τῆς ἐλληνικῆς ἐξηγητικῆς, στό γεγονός ὅτι ὁ Θεοδῶρητος βρίσκεται στό τέλος μιᾶς μακρᾶς ἐρμηνευτικῆς παραδόσεως, τήν ὁποία θά διαδεχθεῖ ἡ περίοδος τῶν *Catenae* καί τῶν Συλλογῶν²⁹. Κατά τήν σχεδόν ὁμόφωνη ἀποδοχή ὁ Θεοδῶρητος καθιέρωσε, μετά τούς τρεῖς Καππαδόκες, τόν Ἰωάννη Χρυσόστομο καί τόν σύγχρονό του Κύριλλο Ἀλεξανδρείας τίς γενικές ἀρχές τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς ἐρμηνευτικῆς, οἱ ὁποῖες χαρακτηρίζουν ἔκτοτε τήν ἐλληνική πατερική βιβλική ἐρμηνεία³⁰.

4. Ἡ μετριοπαθής μεσολαβητική στάση τοῦ Θεοδορήτου μεταξὺ τῶν ἀλεξανδρινῶν καί ἀντιοχειανῶν ἐξηγητῶν

Ὁ Θεοδῶρητος Κύρου ὑπῆρξε, ὅπως μαρτυρεῖ ὁ ἴδιος σέ μία ἐπιστολή του, μαθητής τοῦ Θεοδώρου Μοψουεστίας καί τοῦ Διοδώρου Ταρσοῦ³¹, καί εἶναι φυσικό νά τόν ἐπηρεάσαν ὡς πρός τήν ἐρμηνευτική του μέθοδο, ἡ ὁποία ἔχει γίνει ἀντικείμενο μελέτης πολλῶν νεωτέρων βιβλικῶν ἐπιστημόνων. Ἐντούτοις, μεγάλο μέρος μελετητῶν ὑποστηρίζει ὅτι ὁ Θεοδῶρητος ἀκολουθοῦσε πιστά τίς ἐρμηνευτικές ἀρχές τοῦ ἱεροῦ Χρυσοστόμου³², καί ἀπέφευγε ἐπιμελῶς τόν ὠμό, ἀκατέργαστο καί ριζοσπαστικό λιτεραλισμό τοῦ Μοψουεστίας, προτιμώντας τή μέση ὁδό³³.

Σύμφωνα μέ τήν γνώμη τους, παρά τό γεγονός ὅτι ἀκολούθησε τήν ἴδια ἐξηγητική μέθοδο μέ αὐτήν τοῦ Θεοδώρου Μοψουεστίας στήν ἐρμηνεία τῆς Ἀγίας Γραφῆς³⁴,

²⁹ J. N. GUINOT, *L'exégèse de Théodoret de Cyr*, Paris 1995, 811. Ὁ Jean-Noël Guinot ἐξέδωσε τὰ σχόλια τοῦ Θεοδορήτου στόν Προφήτη Ἠσαΐα σέ τρεῖς τόμους, μέ γαλλική μετάφραση καί παχυλό σχολιασμό.

³⁰ Ι. ΠΑΝΑΓΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, *Ἡ ἐρμηνεία τῆς Ἀγίας Γραφῆς στήν ἐκκλησία τῶν Πατέρων*, τομ. Β', 199.

³¹ Γράφει ὁ Θεοδῶρητος: «ἐπειδή δέ ἐπιμέμφεσθέ μοι καί ὡς τοὺς ἁγίους καί μακαρίους καταλειοπότη Πατέρας Διοδῶρον καί Θεόδῶρον ἐν τῷ καταλόγῳ τῶν διδασκάλων, ἀναγκαῖον ἡγήσάμην καί περὶ τούτου βραχέα διεξελεῖν. Πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ὃ φίλη μοι κεφαλὴ, πολλοὺς καί ἄλλους περιφανεῖς ἄνδρας καί λαμπροὺς ἄγαν γεγεννημένους. Ἐπειτα δέ κάκεινο χρὴ συνιδεῖν, ὡς τὸν κατηγορούμενον ἀναμφισβητήτους μάρτυρας προσήκει παράγειν, οἷς οὐδὲ τῶν κατηγορῶν τις ἐπιμέμψασθαι δύναται. Εἰ δὲ τοὺς παρὰ τῶν διωκόντων κατηγορουμένους ὁ διωκόμενος εἰς μαρτυρίαν καλέσῃ, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ἂν ὁ δικάζων ἀνάσχοιτο δέξασθαι. Εἰ μὲν γάρ ἐπαινον Πατέρων συγγράφων τοῦδε τοὺς ἁγίους παρέλιπον, ἡδίκησα ἂν, ὁμολογῶ, καί περὶ τοὺς διδασκάλους ἀχάριστος ἐγενόμην». ΘΕΟΔΩΡΗΤΟΥ ΚΥΡΟΥ, *Ἐπιστολή 16, Εἰρηναῖῳ ἐπισκόπῳ*, *Theodoret de Cyr. Correspondance II*, ἐκδ. Y. Azéma, *SCh* 98, Paris 1964, 58. (=PG 83,1193D). Πρβλ. R. HILL, «Theodoret, Commentator on the Psalms», *Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses* 76 (2000), 88-104.

³² Βλ. Γ. ΦΛΩΡΟΦΣΚΥ, *Ανατολικοὶ Πατέρες τοῦ Δ' αἰῶνα*, σσ. 400-420. Πρβλ. Σ. ΠΑΠΑΔΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Πατρολογία Γ'*, 760. Ἐπίσης, R. HILL, «Old Testament Questions of Theodoret of Cyrus», *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 46 1/2 (2001), 57-73.

³³ Γράφει χαρακτηριστικά ὁ Α. VICIANO, «Theodoret vermied es jedoch, in den radikalen Kritizismus Theodors von Mopsuestia zu verfallen». A. VICIANO, «Theodoret von Kyros als Interpret des Apostels Paulus», *Theologie und Glaube* 80(1990), 312. Καί ὁ J. Quasten δέχεται ὅτι ὁ Θεοδῶρητος Κύρου ἀκολουθεῖ μίᾳ μέσῃ ἐρμηνευτικῇ ὁδῷ («adopts a middle course, avoiding the radicalism of Theodore of Mopsuestia and his excessive literalness and allowing an allegorical and typological explanation, whenever this appears preferable»). J. QUASTEN, *Patrology* III, 531, 539.

³⁴ Βλ. Ι. ΜΑΓΙΕΝΤΟΡΦ, *Βυζαντινὴ Θεολογία*, ἐκδ. Ἰνδικτος, Αθήνα 2010, σ. 63: «Μετά τὸ 553, τὰ ἀγιογραφικὰ σχόλια τοῦ Θεοδώρου, ἐνὸς ἀπὸ τοὺς μεγαλύτερους βιβλικούς ἐρμηνευτὲς τοῦ ἀρχαίου Χριστιανισμοῦ, διατηροῦνταν μόνον κρυφὰ σὲ συριακὲς ἢ ἄρμενικὲς μεταφράσεις, ἐνῶ τὰ ἐλληνικὰ πρωτότυπα διασώθηκαν μόνον σὲ σπαράγματα διασκορπισμένα στὶς ἐρμηνευτικὲς σειρές. Ὅμως ἡ παράδοση τῆς ἀντιο-

ἐν τούτοις, ὅπως μπορούμε νά παρατηρήσουμε ἀπό τὰ ἴδια τὰ κείμενα, κατέληγαν ἄρκε-
τές φορές σέ ἄλλα συμπεράσματα καί σέ ἐντελῶς διαφορετικές ἐρμηνεῖες κειμένων χρι-
στολογικοῦ περιεχομένου³⁵. Ὁ Μ. Simonetti θεωρεῖ ὅτι τό ὑπόμνημα τοῦ Θεοδώρητου
στό Ἄσμα Ἀσμάτων ἀποτελεῖ τό ὕψιστο σημεῖο ἀπόκλισής του ἀπό τόν Θεόδωρο καί
μία μνημειώδη προσπάθεια προσέγγισης τῆς ἀλεξανδρινῆς ἐρμηνευτικῆς παραδόσεως.
Πάρα ταῦτα, στή συνέχεια ὁ Simonetti διαφοροποιεῖ τό ὑπόμνημα τοῦ Θεοδώρητου ἀπό
αὐτό τοῦ Ὡριγένη μέ βάση τήν ἀπουσία πολλαπλῶν ἐπιπέδων ἀνάγνωσης στό ὑπόμνη-
μα τοῦ πρώτου³⁶.

Ὡς ἐκ τούτου, θά λέγαμε ὅτι ὁ Θεοδώρητος ἀπέκλειε τίς ἀκραῖες ἐρμηνευτικές τάσεις
καί τῆς ἀλεξανδρινῆς καί τῆς ἀντιοχειανῆς ἐμπνεύσεως³⁷, καί ἀκολουθοῦσε δική του μέθο-
δο καί τακτική, ἡ ὁποία θεμελιωνόταν στούς προγενέστερους Πατέρες καί φωστῆρες τῆς
Ἑκκλησίας, τούς ὁποίους καί θεωροῦσε γνήσιους ἐκφραστές τῆς παραδόσεως³⁸.

Πράγματι, ὁ Θεοδώρητος διαφοροποιεῖται αἰσθητά ἀπό τούς ἄλλους ἐκπρο-
σώπους τῆς ἀντιοχειανῆς σχολῆς. Στήν ἐρμηνευτική του δέν ἀκολουθεῖ πιστά τή μέθο-
δο τῆς σχολῆς του, κάτι πού ὁμοίως ἔπραξε καί ὁ Χρυσόστομος, ἀλλά ἀκολουθεῖ πολύ

χειανῆς ἐρμηνείας τῆς Ἀγίας Γραφῆς ἐπέζησε στά ἐρμηνευτικά ἔργα τοῦ Θεοδώρητου, τὰ ὁποῖα ποτέ δέν
ἀπαγορεύτηκαν, καί ἀκόμη περισσότερο στά γραπτά τοῦ φίλου τοῦ Θεοδώρητου, Ἰωάννη τοῦ Χρυσόστομου,
ὁ ὁποῖος ἦταν ἀναμφίβολα ὁ πῶς δημοφιλῆς ἀπό ὅλους τούς Ἑλλήνες ἐκκλησιαστικούς συγγραφεῖς». Αντίθε-
τα, κατά τή γνώμη τοῦ Fairbairn οἱ Πατέρες συχνά, παρά τό γεγονός ὅτι προέρχονται ἀπό τήν ἴδια θεολογική
σχολή, στίς ἐρμηνεῖες τούς ἔρχονται σέ πολύ διαφορετικά συμπεράσματα. Βλ. D. FAIRBAIRN, «Historical
and Theological Studies. Patristic Exegesis and Theology: The Cart and the Horse» ἐν *WTJ* 69 (2007), 1-19:
«Patristics scholars have noted is that fathers from the same school, allegedly using the same method, often
come to vastly different conclusions. Here it will be useful to compare Theodore of Mopsuestia (clearly that
most representative of "Antiochene" exegesis) both to his fellow pupil, Chrysostom (the most illustrious
preacher of the early church), and to one of his most devoted disciples (who was also deeply concerned with
exegesis), Theodoret of Cyrus».

³⁵ H F. Young στή μελέτη της γιά τήν ἐξηγητική μέθοδο τῶν δύο αὐτῶν θεολόγων, καί κάνοντας σύγκρι-
ση τῶν κειμένων τους, καταλήγει στό ἀσφαλές συμπέρασμα ὅτι οἱ διαφορές εἶναι μεγάλες καί οὐσιαστικές.
Θεωρεῖ ὅτι ὑπάρχει θεμελιώδης διαφορά στήν ὀπτική. Γιά τόν Θεόδωρο θεωρεῖ ὅτι ἡ διάκριση μεταξύ τῆς
παλαιᾶς κατάστασης καί τῆς νέας εἶναι ριζική καί χαρακτηρίζεται ἀπό μία ἰσχυρή ἐσατολογική προοπτική
πού εὐνοεῖ τήν ἁσυνέχεια μεταξύ τῶν δύο Διαθηκῶν. Αὕτη ἡ στάση τοῦ Θεοδώρου εἶχε ὡς ἀποτέλεσμα νά
ἀρνηθεῖ τό χριστολογικό χαρακτήρα πολλῶν κειμένων τῆς Παλαιᾶς Διαθήκης. F. YOUNG, *From Nicaea to
Chalcedon: A Guide to the Literature and Its Background*, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983, σσ. 285-86.

³⁶ Βλ. Μ. SIMONETTI, *Biblical Interpretation in the Early Church: An Historical Introduction to
Patristic Exegesis*, T&T Clark, 1994, σ. 76. Ὡστόσο, εἶναι λογικό ἡ ἐξηγητική τῶν Ἀντιοχειανῶν θεολόγων
νά ἐρμηνεύεται καταρχήν ὑπό τό φῶς καί πρίσμα τῆς ἀντιοχειανῆς χριστολογίας. Γιά τήν ἀντιοχειανή ἐρ-
μηνευτική ὑπό τό πρίσμα τῆς χριστολογίας βλ. C. HAY, «Antiochene Exegesis and Christology», ἐν *ABR*
12 (1964): 10-23. Πρβλ. Α. R. GREER, *The Captain of Our Salvation: A Study in the Patristic Exegesis of
Hebrews*, BGBE15; Tübingen: Mohr, 1973, σσ. 174-175, καί 228-232. Βλ. Μ. FIEDROWICZ, *Theologie
der Kirchenväter*, Freiburg 2007, σ. 141: «In gewisser Weise besteht eine Beziehung zwischen der Exegese
und der Christologie der Antiochener. So wie sie die menschliche Natur Christi neben Seiner göttlichen ernst
nahmen und die beiden stets getrennt voneinander betrachteten, so hatte bei ihnen auch der historische Sinn
der Schrift seine volle Berechtigung und wurde neben dem geistigen stehen gelassen».

³⁷ Ὁ Robert Hill ὑποστηρίζει τήν ἀξία τῆς μεθόδου καί τῆς θεολογίας τοῦ Θεοδώρητου καί τονίζει ὅτι ὁ
ἀντιοχειανός θεολόγος ἦταν πρόθυμος νά λάβει ὑπ' ὄψην του τὰ προηγούμενα ἔργα καί τῶν ἀλεξανδρινῶν
καί τῶν ἀντιοχειανῶν θεολόγων, ἀποφεύγοντας τίς ὑπερβολές καί τῶν δύο. Βλ. R. HILL, *Theodoret of Cyrus:
Commentary on the Psalms, 1-72* (The Fathers of the Church 101), Catholic University of America Press:
Washington DC, 2000, xvi-xxv.

³⁸ Βλ. Σ. ΠΑΠΑΔΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Πατρολογία Γ'*, σ. 758: «Ἀπό αὐτοῦ κυρίως 'συλλέγει' ἐρμηνεῖες χωρίς
καί πάλιν νά τούς κατονομάζει. Ἡ διακριτική αὕτη τακτική τοῦ Θεοδώρητου, πού σημαίνει πρώτιστα συ-
νειδητή καί μελετημένη ὑπέρβαση τῆς ἀλεξανδρινῆς ἀλληγορίας καί τοῦ ἀντιοχειανοῦ ἱστορισμοῦ, δέν τόν
ἐμπόδισε νά χρησιμοποιήσει, ὅταν ἔκρινε ἀκίνδυνο καί ὠφέλιμο, τούς Ὡριγένη, Θεόδωρο Μοψουεστίας,
Εὐσέβειο Καισαρείας κ. ἄ., τούς ὁποίους δέν θεωροῦσε ἀκραιφνεῖς ὀρθοδόξους ἐρμηνευτές».

συντηρητική γραμμή, θυσιάζοντας τήν παραδοσιακή Ἀντιοχειανή ιστορικό-φιλολογική μέθοδο στὸν βωμό τῆς προσωπικῆς του προτιμήσεως³⁹.

Ὁ Θεοδῶρητος Κύρου, ὅπως καὶ ὁ ἱερός Χρυσόστομος καὶ οἱ περισσότεροι ἐρμηνευτές τοῦ τετάρτου αἰῶνα, δέν εἶχε γράψει ὁμιλίες στὰ βιβλία τῆς Ἀγίας Γραφῆς, ἀλλὰ ἄκρως ἐκτεταμένα σχόλια, κάτι ποῦ τὸν βοήθησε νά ἐπικεντρωθεῖ περισσότερο στὸ ἐρμηνευόμενο κείμενο⁴⁰. Ὁ ἀντιοχειανός θεολόγος οὐδέποτε ἐκθέτει ἰδιαίτερη καὶ προσωπική θεωρία, ἀλλὰ στὰ κείμενά του γίνεται σαφές ὅτι ἐγκαινιάζει μία τακτική, ποῦ θά μπορούσε νά χαρακτηριστεῖ μέ τὸν δικό του ὄρο «συμμετρία»⁴¹. Τοῦτο τὸ πράττει κατὰ δήλωσή του γιατί ἀποφεύγει τὰ ἄκρα, τήν «ἀπιστία» τῆς ἀλληγορίας καὶ τὸν ἰουδαϊσμό τῆς ιστορικογραμματικῆς μεθόδου⁴². Ὡστόσο, διατηρεῖ μεμετρημένη προσήλωση στὴν παράδοση. Δέν θέτει δικές του προϋποθέσεις στὴ μέθοδο ἀνευρέσεως τῶν ἀγιογραφικῶν νοημάτων, ἀλλὰ προσπαθεῖ νά τίς ἀναζητᾷ στὸ πνεῦμα τῶν προκατόχων του καὶ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας, χωρίς ἀξιώσεις πρωτοτυπίας⁴³. Ὡς ἐκ τοῦτου, δέν διστάζει, χάριν πνευματικῆς ωφέλειας καὶ οἰκοδομῆς τῶν πιστῶν μελῶν τῆς Ἐκκλησίας, νά χρησιμοποιοῖ, ἐκεῖ ποῦ εἶναι ἀπαραίτητο, τὴ μεταφορά ἢ τὴν ἀναγωγή⁴⁴.

Ἐπίσης, ὁ Θεοδῶρητος Κύρου δέχεται καὶ χρησιμοποιοῖ ὡς ἐρμηνευτικὸ μέθοδο καὶ τὴν τυπολογία καὶ τὴν ἀλληγορία ἢ τροπικὴ μέθοδο. Θεωρεῖ ὅτι τὰ «γεγονότα» τῆς Καινῆς Διαθήκης, συνεπῶς καὶ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας, ἀποτελοῦν ἐπαρκῆ μαρτυρία γιὰ νά κατευθύνουν τὸν μελετητὴ στὴν αὐθεντικὴ ἐρμηνεία τῶν «προρρήσεων» τῆς Παλαιᾶς Διαθήκης. Ἐπομένως, ὁ Θεοδῶρητος ψηλαφίζει τυπολογικῶς τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τοὺς λόγους τῆς Παλαιᾶς Διαθήκης, ἀλλὰ ταυτόχρονα κατοπτρεῖ καὶ τὴν ἱστορικὴ τους διάσταση⁴⁵.

³⁹ Βλ. B. P. CLAYTON, *The Christology of Theodoret of Cyrus, Antiochene Christology from the Council of Ephesus (431) to the Council of Chalcedon (451)*, Oxford 2005, σ. 9: «Then there were the almost inevitable commentaries on Scripture, the finest produced by the Antiochene party. Of all the Fathers of the period, he seems most congenial to the contemporary mind, for though he highly values the historico-literal exegesis characteristic of the Antiochene tradition, he avoids the excesses to which Theodore of Mopsuestia was wont to take the method and is perfectly willing to allow an allegorical or typological explanation». Καὶ ὁ Alberto Viciano συμφωνεῖ ὅτι ἡ ἐρμηνευτικὴ μέθοδος τοῦ Θεοδορήτου εἶναι συντηρητικὴ καὶ παραμένει πιστὴ στὴν γραμμὴ τῶν προγενεστέρων ἀντιοχειανῶν θεολόγων («stammt in erster Linie aus der antiochenischen Tradition, die über Diodor von Tarsus auf Lukian von Antiochien zurückgeht»). Βλ. A. VICIANO, «Theodoret von Kyros als Interpret des Apostels Paulus», *Theologie und Glaube* 80 (1990), 279.

⁴⁰ W. G. ASHBY, «The Hermeneutic Approach of Theodoret of Cyrrhus to the Old Testament», *Studia Patristica* 15 (1984), 135.

⁴¹ Στὸν Θεοδῶρητο «μποροῦμε νά διαπιστώσουμε τὴν ἀνάπτυξη μιᾶς ἐιδικῆς ἐξηγητικῆς παραδόσεως σχετιζόμενης μέ ζητήματα κειμένου, ἡ ὁποία ξεκίνησε ἀπὸ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρεια, καλλιιεργήθηκε στὴν Ἀντιόχεια, καὶ βρέθηκε ἐν τέλει πλήρως ἐνσωματωμένη στὴν μεθοδολογικὴ ἐρμηνευτικὴ σύνθεση τοῦ Θεοδορήτου». Δ. ΤΡΑΚΑΤΕΛΛΗΣ, «Μία σύνθεση ἐρμηνευτικῶν παραδόσεων. Τὸ ὑπόμνημα τοῦ Θεοδορήτου στὸν Ἡσαΐα», ἐν *Οἱ Πατέρες ἐρμηνεύουν. Απόψεις Πατερικῆς Βιβλικῆς ἐρμηνείας*, ἐκδ. Ἀποστολικὴ Διακονία, Ἀθήνα 1996, 105.

⁴² Σ. ΠΑΠΑΔΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Πατρολογία Γ'*, σ. 757.

⁴³ A. VICIANO, «Theodoret von Kyros als Interpret des Apostels Paulus», *Theologie und Glaube* 80 (1990), 281: «Besonders bei diesem Vater ist sein Bewusstsein in einer Tradition zu stehen, der er verpflichtet ist. Er geht nicht voraussetzungslos an die Schrift heran, sondern versucht sie im Geist seiner Väter, d.h. im Geist der Kirche zu lesen und hat nicht den Anspruch, originell zu sein».

⁴⁴ Ὅσον ἀφορᾷ τὴν ἀλληγορικὴ ἐρμηνεία, αὐτὴ ἐκτός ἀπὸ τὸ *Ἄσμα τῶν Ἀσμάτων*, ἐπιστρατεύεται καὶ στὸ βιβλίον τοῦ προφήτη Ἡσαΐα. Βλ. ΘΕΟΔΩΡΗΤΟΥ ΚΥΡΟΥ, *Ἐρμηνεία εἰς τὸν Προφήτη Ἡσαΐα*, PG 81,252D-253A: «Ἄσω δὴ τῷ ἡγαπημένῳ μου ἄσμα τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ μου εἰς τὸν ἄμπλωνα αὐτοῦ. Ἀγαπητὸς (δὲ) ὁ Μονογενὴς τοῦ Θεοῦ προσαγορεύεται λόγος... Ναφέλας γὰρ τοὺς προφῆτας καλεῖ ὡς ἐκ τῆς πνευματικῆς θαλάττης τὸν προφητικὸν ἔλκοντας ὑετόν. Εἴτα ἐρμηνεύει τὰ τροπικῶς εἰρημένα». Πρβλ. Δ. ΤΡΑΚΑΤΕΛΛΗΣ, «Μία σύνθεση ἐρμηνευτικῶν παραδόσεων. Τὸ ὑπόμνημα τοῦ Θεοδορήτου στὸν Ἡσαΐα», ἐν *Οἱ Πατέρες ἐρμηνεύουν. Απόψεις Πατερικῆς Βιβλικῆς ἐρμηνείας*, ἐκδ. Ἀποστολικὴ Διακονία, Ἀθήνα 1996, 95-150.

⁴⁵ ΠΑΠΑΔΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ Σ., *Πατρολογία Γ'*, σσ. 757-758.

Κατά τήν γνώμη του, αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἵδους ἡ συνδυαστική μέθοδος προσεγγίσεως τῶν γεγονότων τῆς Παλαιᾶς καί Καινῆς Διαθήκης λέγεται *θεωρία*⁴⁶: «ἵκανή γάρ καί τῶν πραγμάτων ἡ μαρτυρία ποδηγῆσαι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς ἐρμηνείας τοὺς ταύτην ἐφιεμένους εὐρεῖν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ χάριν οὐδὲ λίαν ἐπίπονος ἡμῖν ἡ τῆς προρρήσεως ἐρμηνεία· δὴλην γὰρ ταύτην ποιεῖ τῶν πραγμάτων ἡ θεωρία»⁴⁷.

Ἀξιοσημῖωτο εἶναι ὅτι ὁ Θεοδώρητος Κύρου ὡς ἐρμηνευτῆς τῆς Ἁγίας Γραφῆς, στὰ ἔργα του ἀποδίδει πολὺ μεγάλη σημασία στὸ κείμενο καθ' ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἐπίτευξη τοῦ σκοποῦ αὐτοῦ προσπαθεῖ μέ κάθε δυνατό τρόπο νὰ ἀποσαφηνίσαι τὸ νόημά του προστρέχοντας σ' ὅλα τὰ μέσα ποῦ ἔχει στὴ διάθεσή του. Τίς περισσότερες φορές στὴν ἐρμηνεία τῶν παλαιοδιαθητικῶν κειμένων χρησιμοποιοῖ τὸ κείμενο τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς μεταφράσεως *Septuaginta*, χωρὶς ὥστόσο νὰ περιορίζεται σ' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ πολλές φορές ἀναφέρει καὶ ἄλλες μεταφράσεις ὅπως τὸν Ἀκύλα, τὸν Σύμμαχο καὶ τὸν Θεοδοτίωνα. Ὁ σκοπὸς του εἶναι διπλός, εἴτε νὰ βρεῖ τὸ ἀκριβές νόημα ἐνός δύσκολου ὅρου, εἴτε τὸ νὰ συζητήσει μιὰ λέξη ἢ μιὰ φράση, ἡ ὁποία ἐνῶ ὑπάρχει στὸ Ἑβραϊκὸ κείμενο δὲν ἐμφανίζεται στὴν μετάφραση τῶν Ἑβδομήκοντα⁴⁸.

Ἀπὸ τὰ λεχθέντα φαίνεται ὅτι ὁ Θεοδώρητος Κύρου, ὡς γνήσιος Ἀντιοχειανός, ἔδειχνε πολὺ εὐαισθησία καὶ πολὺ μεγάλη σημασία καὶ προσοχὴ σὲ φιλογολικά καὶ ἱστορικά προβλήματα ποῦ σχετίζονται μέ τὸ κείμενο ποῦ ἐρμηνεύει. Δὲν διστάζει νὰ χρησιμοποιήσει καὶ πληροφορίες συνδεόμενες μέ τίς ἐπιστῆμες, τῆς φυσικῆς, τῆς ἱατρικῆς, τῆς βοτανικῆς, τῆς ζωολογίας, ψυχολογίας καὶ ἰδιαίτερα τῆς γεωγραφίας. «Ἡ σπουδαιότερη περιοχὴ ἀπὸ τὴν ὁποία φαίνεται νὰ ἀντλεῖ συνεχῶς ὁ Θεοδώρητος εἶναι ἡ ἱστορία»⁴⁹.

Εἶναι μνημειῶδες τὸ συγγραφικὸ ἥθος τοῦ Θεοδώρητου σὲ θέματα πνευματικῆς ιδιοκτησίας. Δηλώνει ρητῶς ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ἐρμηνεία τοῦ βιβλίου *Ἄσμα Ἀσμάτων* ἀνέτρεξε καὶ ἀξιοποίησε ἐργασίες προγενέστερων ἐρμηνευτῶν καὶ παρακαλεῖ τὸν ἀναγνώστη νὰ μὴν τὸν κρίνει ὡς λογοκλόπο, διότι στὴν Ἐκκλησίᾳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὅλα εἶναι κοινὰ καὶ ἀποτελοῦν «πατρῶαν κληρονομία»⁵⁰. Κατὰ τὸν Θεοδώρητο οἱ προγενέστεροι πατέρες καὶ συγγραφεῖς ἐρμηνευτῆς καὶ ὑπομνηματογράφοι στὸ *Ἄσμα Ἀσμάτων*, ἦταν δεινοὶ γνῶστες τοῦ γλωσσικοῦ ιδιώματος τῆς Ἁγίας Γραφῆς, καὶ ἔτσι κατόρθωσαν νὰ ὑπερβοῦν τὸ κάλυμμα τοῦ γράμματος, νὰ διεισδύσουν στὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ βιβλίου καὶ νὰ δοῦν ὡς ἐν κατόπτρῳ τὸ πρόσωπο τῆς δόξας τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Τὸ ἀντίθετο συμβαίνει

⁴⁶ Γιά τὴν λεπτομερὴ ἀνάλυση καὶ χρῆση τοῦ ὅρου *θεωρία* στὸν Θεοδώρητο βλέπε W. G. ASHBY, *Theodoret of Cyrrhus as Exegete of Old Testament*, Rhodes University Press, Grahamstown 1972, 56-104.

⁴⁷ ΘΕΟΔΩΡΗΤΟΥ ΚΥΡΟΥ, *Ἑρμηνεία εἰς τοὺς Ψαλμούς*, PG 80,860D-861A: «Τὰς δὲ περὶ τοῦ Δεσπότη Χριστοῦ προρρήσεις, καὶ τῆς ἐξ ἔθνῶν Ἐκκλησίας, καὶ τῆς εὐαγγελικῆς πολιτείας, καὶ τῶν ἀποστολικῶν κηρυγμάτων, μὴ ἑτέροις ἀναθεῖναι τιςιν, ὅπερ Ἰουδαίοις φίλον ποιεῖν κακουργία συζῶσι, καὶ τῆς σφῶν ἀπιστίας ἀπολογίαν ὑφαίνουσιν. Ἰκανὴ γὰρ καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἡ μαρτυρία ποδηγῆσαι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς ἐρμηνείας τοὺς ταύτην ἐφιεμένους εὐρεῖν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ χάριν οὐδὲ λίαν ἐπίπονος ἡμῖν ἡ τῆς προρρήσεως ἐρμηνεία· δὴλην γὰρ ταύτην ποιεῖ τῶν πραγμάτων ἡ θεωρία». Πρβλ. M. FIEDROWICZ, *Prinzipien der Schriftauslegung in der Alten Kirche*, Bern 1998, σ. 173.

⁴⁸ Στὸ ὑπόμνημά του εἰς τὸν Ἡσαΐα ὁ Θεοδώρητος «ἀναφέρει καὶ χρησιμοποιοῖ σὲ ἀρκετές περιπτώσεις καὶ τὸ Ἑβραϊκὸ κείμενο τοῦ Ἡσαΐα. Τὸ ἀναφέρει μέ τὴν ὀνομασία *Ὁ Ἑβραῖος ἢ ἡ Ἑβραϊκὴ Γραφή*.. ὅπως καὶ τὴν Συριακὴ μέ τὴν ὀνομασίαν *Ὁ Σύρος*». Βλ. Δ. ΤΡΑΚΑΤΑΛΛΗ, Μία σύνθεση ἐρμηνευτικῶν παραδόσεων. Τὸ ὑπόμνημα τοῦ Θεοδώρητου στὸν Ἡσαΐα, ἐν *Οἱ Πατέρες ἐρμηνεύουν. Ἀπόψεις Πατερικῆς Βιβλικῆς ἐρμηνείας*, ἔκδ. Ἀποστολικὴ Διακονία, Ἀθήνα 1996, 103.

⁴⁹ Βλ. Δ. ΤΡΑΚΑΤΑΛΛΗ, Μία σύνθεση ἐρμηνευτικῶν παραδόσεων. Τὸ ὑπόμνημα τοῦ Θεοδώρητου στὸν Ἡσαΐα, ἐν *Οἱ Πατέρες ἐρμηνεύουν. Ἀπόψεις Πατερικῆς Βιβλικῆς ἐρμηνείας*, ἔκδ. Ἀποστολικὴ Διακονία, Ἀθήνα 1996, 106. Πρβλ. J. N. GUINOT, *Theodoret de Cyr Commentaire sur Isaie, Sch 276*, Paris 1980, I. 61-68.

⁵⁰ ΘΕΟΔΩΡΗΤΟΥ ΚΥΡΟΥ, *Ἑρμηνεία εἰς τὸ Ἄσμα Ἀσμάτων*, PG 81,48D.

μέ αὐτούς πού ἐπέμειναν στή *σαρκική* κατανόηση τοῦ βιβλικοῦ αὐτοῦ κειμένου, καί ὡς ἐκ τούτου «ἐξώκειλαν εἰς τὴν βλασφημίαν»⁵¹.

Ἐπίσης, σέ πολλά ἄλλα ἐρμηνευτικά του ἔργα ὁ Θεοδώρητος ἀντλοῦσε ἀπὸ προγενέστερους Πατέρες τίς σκέψεις. Στό ὑπόμνημα τοῦ βιβλίου τοῦ Προφήτη Δανιήλ ὁ Θεοδώρητος γράφει τὰ ἑξῆς: «εἰ τοῖς ἀγνοοῦσι τὰ θεῖα τούτων συγγράμματα ἔγγραφον παραδῶν διδασκαλίαν, παιδόμεν μὲν αὐτοῖς ἐντραφεῖς, παρὰ πολλῶν δὲ συγγραφέων εὐσεβῶν σμικρὰν τινα γνῶσιν ἐρανισάμενος»⁵². Τὴν ἴδια μέθοδο καί τὴν τακτική συναντάμε καί στὴν ἐρμηνεία τῶν ἐπιστολῶν τοῦ ἀποστόλου Παύλου, ὅπου στό προοίμιό ὁ Θεοδώρητος δείχνει τὸ σεβασμὸ τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς προκατόχους του καί δὲν τολμᾷ, ὅπως χαρακτηριστικά γράφει, νὰ τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστεῖ, ὅπως δὲν θὰ τολμοῦσε τὸ κουνούπι νὰ ἀνταγωνιστεῖ τίς μέλισσες: «Τοὺς τῆς οἰκουμένης φωστῆρας, τῆς ἀποστολικῆς ἐρμηνείας κατατολμώντα. Ἐπιχειρήσω δὲ ὁμῶς, οὐκ ἐμαυτῷ θαρρῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν θεῖαν χάριν ἀντιβολῶν, τῆς ἀποστολικῆς σοφίας ἐπιδείξαι τὸ βάθος, καί τῶν τοῦ γράμματος προκαλυμμάτων ἀπογυμῶσαι, ἵνα τοῖς μεταλαχεῖν βουλομένοις πρόχειρον προσενέγκω τὸ κέρδος... οὐδὲν τοῖν ἄπεικός, οἷόν τινας κώνωπας καί ἡμᾶς σὺν ταῖς μελίτταις ἐκείναις τοὺς ἀποστολικοὺς περιβομβήσαι λειμῶνας»⁵³.

Κατὰ τὸν Θεοδώρητο, γιὰ τὴ ὀρθή κατανόηση τοῦ βιβλίου ὑπάρχει μία ὁδός, ἡ πνευματική, τὴν ὁποία ἔχουν καθιερώσει στὰ ἔργα τους οἱ Πατέρες καί διδάσκαλοι τῆς Ἐκκλησίας. «...Τοῖς ἁγίοις Πατράσιν ἀκολουθήσωμεν, καὶ νοήσωμεν μίαν νύμφην ἐνὶ νυμφίῳ διαλεγομένην, καὶ μάθωμεν παρὰ τῶν ἁγίων ἀποστόλων, τίς τε ὁ νυμφίος, καί τίς ἡ νύμφη... Νύμφην γὰρ οἶδεν ὁ θεὸς λόγος τὴν Ἐκκλησίαν· νυμφίον δὲ τὸν Χριστὸν ὀνομάζει»⁵⁴.

Ὁ ἀντιοχείας θεολόγος συμμερίζεται τὴ διδασκαλία τῶν Πατέρων τῆς Ἐκκλησίας, ὅτι ἡ ἐρμηνεία τῆς Ἁγίας Γραφῆς δὲν εἶναι ἔργο ἀνθρώπινο ἀλλὰ θεῖο. Εἶναι ἀναγκαῖα ἡ ἐπίκληση τῆς θείας βοηθείας ὡς ἀπαραίτητης δύναμης προκειμένου νὰ ξανοιγθεῖ κανεὶς στό *πέλαγος τῆς τῶν θείων ῥητῶν θεωρίας*. Ἡ Θεία Χάρη, λοιπόν, γιὰ τὸν Θεοδώρητο εἶναι ἀπαραίτητη καὶ αὐτὴ ἐπικαλεῖται, διότι μόνον αὐτὴ καθιστᾷ ἱκανὸν τὸν ἐρμηνευτὴ νὰ κατανοήσῃ τὰ λόγια τῆς Ἁγίας Γραφῆς. Ἡ Θεία Χάρη διανοίγει τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς του καί τὸν ἐνθαρρύνει στό ἐρμηνευτικὸ του ἔργο: «Ἐπειδὴ τοῖνυν δέδωκεν ὁ τῶν ὅλων Θεός, ὁ σοφίζων τοὺς τυφλοὺς, καὶ ἀποκαλύπτων μυστήρια, ὁ δοὺς στόμα ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ποιήσας δύσκωπον καὶ κωφόν, καὶ βλέποντα καὶ τυφλόν, τούτων αὐτοῦ τῶν θείων λόγων συμπεράναι τὴν ἐρμηνείαν· φέρε τὴν θεῖαν ἐπικαλεσάμενοι χάριν, τὴν ἄγουσαν τυφλοὺς, κατὰ τὴν προφητείαν, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἤδειςαν, καὶ τρίβους, ἃς οὐκ ἐπίσταντο, ὁδεῦσαι παρασκευάζουσιν, καὶ τοῖς πάλαι κωφοῖς τὸ τῶν θείων λόγιων ἐπαίειν παρέχουσιν, καὶ τοῖς ἐν σκότῳ καὶ ὁμίχλῃ διάγουσιν ὀφθαλμοῖς χορηγοῦσιν τὸ βλέπειν, καὶ τῆσδε τῆς προφητείας κατατολμήσωμεν»⁵⁵. Ἐπομένως, τὸ Ἅγιο Πνεῦμα πρέπει νὰ συνδράμει, τόσο τὸν ἐρμηνευτὴ ὅσο καὶ τοὺς ἀκροατές του, ὥστε καὶ αὐτοὶ νὰ κατανοήσουν τὴν ἐρμηνεία τῆς Γραφῆς.

⁵¹ ΘΕΟΔΩΡΗΤΟΥ ΚΥΡΟΥ, *Ἐρμηνεία εἰς τὸ Ἄσμα Ἀσμάτων*, PG 81,32D-33A: «Καὶ τῆς θείας Γραφῆς ἀγνοοῦντες τὰ ἰδιώματα, οὐκ ἠθέλησαν διαδοῦναι, καὶ τοῦ γράμματος ὑπερβῆναι τὸ κάλυμμα, καὶ ἐντὸς γενέσθαι τῷ πνεύματι, καὶ ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ τὴν δόξαν Κυρίου κατοπτρισθῆναι· ἀλλὰ σαρκικῶς νενοηκότες τὰ εἰρημένα, εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν βλασφημίαν ἐξώκειλαν.

⁵² Βλ. ΘΕΟΔΩΡΗΤΟΥ ΚΥΡΟΥ, *Υπόμνημα εἰς τὰς ὁράσεις τοῦ Προφήτου Δανιήλ*, PG 81,1257A, καὶ PG 81,1548A.

⁵³ ΘΕΟΔΩΡΗΤΟΥ ΚΥΡΟΥ, *Ἐρμηνεία τῶν ΙΔ' ἐπιστολῶν τοῦ Ἀποστόλου Παύλου*, PG 82,36B-37A.

⁵⁴ ΘΕΟΔΩΡΗΤΟΥ ΚΥΡΟΥ, *Ἐρμηνεία εἰς τὸ Ἄσμα Ἀσμάτων*, PG 81,44D. Συνεπῶς, ὁ Θεοδώρητος, ὅπως καὶ ὁ Ὑριγένης καὶ ὁ Γρηγόριος Νύσσης, ἐρμηνεύει τὸ βιβλίον *Ἄσμα Ἀσμάτων* χριστολογικά καὶ ἐκκλησιολογικά.

⁵⁵ ΘΕΟΔΩΡΗΤΟΥ ΚΥΡΟΥ, *Ἐρμηνεία εἰς Ψαλμοὺς, Προθεωρία*, PG 80,860BC.

Συνοψίζοντας, θά μπορούσαμε νά ποῦμε ὅτι ὁ Θεοδώρητος Κύρου, μέ τήν ἐξηγητική του προσπάθειά νά ἐπιτύχει μία ἰσορροπία μεταξύ ἱστορισμοῦ καί ἀλληγορίας, νά διακρίνει μεταξύ γράμματος καί πνεύματος, τόσον ἀπό τήν πλευρά τοῦ συγγραφέα ὅσο καί τοῦ ἀναγνώστη, ὥστε τά σχόλια του νά ἔχουν πλέον ἀποκτήσει τή φήμη τοῦ ἀξιόλογου καί τοῦ διαχρονικοῦ. Ὁ Y. Azéma ὑποστηρίζει ὅτι ὁ Θεοδώρητος εἶχε στήν περιοχή τῆς Ἀντιοχείας, καί γενικά στήν Ἀνατολή, ἀδιαμφισβήτητο κῦρος, καί ὅτι ἦταν μία ἀπό τίς πιό σπουδαῖες προσωπικότητες τῆς ἀνατολικῆς Ἐκκλησίας⁵⁶. Ἀναφορικά μέ τή γλῶσσα του, ὁ J. Schulte, χωρίς δόση ὑπερβολῆς, παρατηρεῖ ὅτι τήν ὠραιότητά της ἐπαινοῦν ὅλοι οἱ γνῶστες τοῦ ἔργου του, ἀπό τόν Φώτιο ἕως τόν Glubokovsky, καί ὅτι ὁ Θεοδώρητος εἶχε ὡς πρότυπο τή γλῶσσα τοῦ Πλάτωνα⁵⁷. Σύγχρονοι μελετητές τόν ἐπαινοῦν ὄχι μόνο γιά τό ἔργο του, ἀλλά καί γιά τό ἦθος του. Κατά τόν Newman ὁ Θεοδώρητος ὑπῆρξε μέγας καί ἅγιος ἐπίσκοπος⁵⁸, ἐνῶ ἡ Theresa Urbainczyk τόν συγκαταλέγει στίς κυρίαρχες μορφές τοῦ πέμπτου αἰῶνα καί τόν ἀποκαλεῖ ἅγιον ἄνθρωπο⁵⁹.

The hermeneutical method of Theodoret of Cyrus

An attempt to achieve a balance between historicism and allegory,
between the letter and the spirit

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the hermeneutical method of Theodoret of Cyrus, who was one of the most important Biblical commentators and an influential theologian of the School of Antioch. This paper attempts to point out the fact that in the person of the Blessed Theodoret we find the first attempt of synthesis between the Antioch and Alexandria hermeneutical schools. In his hermeneutical work Theodoret attempted to overcome the contradictions existing up to that point and to follow a middle way, without discarding neither the literal nor the spiritual-allegorical interpretation. It could be argued that Theodoret rejected the extreme hermeneutical trends of both the Alexandrian and Antioch inspirations; he developed his unique methods and tactics, which were rooted in the previous patristic tradition of the Church Fathers.

Keywords: Theodoret of Cyrus, hermeneutical methods, Antiochian school, Alexandria school, allegory.

⁵⁶ Y. AZÉMA, *Theodoret de Cyr. Correspondance I*, Sch 40, 56-63.

⁵⁷ J. SCHULTE, *Theodoret von Cyrus als Apologet*, Wien, 1904, 166-167.

⁵⁸ H. J. NEWMAN, *Historical Sketches*, 2. London 1876, 307.

⁵⁹ Th. URBAINCZYK, *Theodoret of Cyrrhus*, 3.

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Οἱ Σιναῖτες Πατέρες καί ἡ εὐαγριανή διδασκαλία

Abstract: This article deals with the relationship of the Sinaitic Fathers and Evagrius of Pont. On the one hand, their main representative St. John Climacus strongly criticized some Evagrius' fallacies, while on the other hand used the good side of his ascetic teachings. Furthermore, the specificity of location of the Sinai Monastery resulted that God seeing, contemplation and theology exercised through the Sinaitic Fathers became ideals of the ascetical spirituality. All these ideals originate in ascetical teaching of Evagrius whose correct teachings and soul-benefit readings, at first, were acknowledged by the Fathers of Gaza. Later it was passed onto the Fathers from Sinai and ultimately unto the all ascetical tradition primarily unto the Neptic tradition.

Keywords: ascetic teachings, Evagrianism, Origenism, The Ladder of Divine Ascent (Scala Paradisi)

Εἶναι γνωστό ὅτι οἱ Γαζαῖοι Πατέρες¹ συνιστοῦν ἐκεῖνο τόν κρίκο πού συνδέει τοὺς Σιναῖτες Πατέρες (καί τοιουτοτρόπως καί ὅλη τή μεταγενέστερη νηπτική καί ἡσυχαστική παράδοση) μέ τήν εὐαγριανή ἀσκητική διδασκαλία². Αὐτή ἡ ἀντίληψη δέν εἶναι καινούργια· ἀπλῶς κανεῖς μέχρι τώρα δέν ἀσχολήθηκε κατά βάθος μ' αὐτό τό θέμα. Ἐτσι, πρῖν ἀπό πενήντα περίπου χρόνια, ὁ H. G. Beck τόνισε μέ ἔμφαση ὅτι ὁ ἅγ. Ἰωάννης τῆς Κλίμακος, ἐπιφανής ἐκπρόσωπος τῆς σιναϊτικῆς ἀσκητικῆς παράδοσης, εἶναι πιστός ἀκόλουθος τοῦ Εὐαγρίου, ὅταν πρόκειται γιά τή βασική ἀντίληψη τῆς σχέσης μεταξύ τοῦ ἀσκητισμοῦ καί τῆς θεωρίας³. Ὁ W. Völker ἀπέδειξε ἀργότερα, στήν ἀξιωματημένη μελέτη του περί τοῦ Ἰωάννου τῆς Κλίμακος, ὅτι αὐτή ἡ σχέση μεταξύ τοῦ ἀσκητισμοῦ καί τῆς θεωρίας, εἶναι ριζωμένη στά Ἀποφθέγματα καί στή μυστική θεολογία τοῦ Εὐαγρίου, ἔγινε δέ ἀποδεκτή στήν ἐκκλησιαστική ἀσκητική διδασκαλία, ἐφόσον ἤδη τήν εἶχε ἀποδεχτεῖ ὡς ἀσφαλὴ καί ψυχροφελὴ ὁ Μ. Βαρσανούφιος, ὁ ὁποῖος ἐπηρέασε τόν ἅγ. Ἰωάννη τῆς Κλίμακος⁴. Τοῦτο ἰσχύει ἰδιαίτερως γιά τήν εὐαγριανή περί τῶν ὀκτώ παθῶν διδασκαλία, τήν ὁποία γενικῶς εἶχε ἀποδεχτεῖ καί ὁ ἅγ. Ἰωάννης τῆς Κλίμακος⁵, ὁ ὁποῖος ὁμως εὐθέως καί εὐθαρσῶς κατηγόρησε τόν Εὐάγριο, στό 14^ο κεφάλαιο τῆς Κλίμακος του γιά τίς περί

¹ Οἱ Γαζαῖοι Πατέρες (Βαρσανούφιος ὁ Μέγας, Ἰωάννης ὁ Προφήτης καί Δωρόθεος ὁ Ἀββάς) ἄκμασαν κατά τόν 6^ο αἰώνα. Ἀσκήτευσαν στή Μονή τοῦ Σερίδου, ἡ ὁποία βρισκόταν κοντά στή Γάζα τῆς Παλαιστίνης.

² Περί αὐτοῦ τοῦ θέματος βλ. ἀναλυτικότερα στή διδακτορική διατριβή τοῦ συντάκτη αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἄρθρου, μέ θέμα «Εὐάγριος ὁ Ποντικός καί ἡ ἀσκητική ὀρθόδοξη παράδοση τῶν Γαζαίων Πατέρων (Βαρσανουφίου τοῦ Μεγάλου, Ἰωάννου τοῦ Προφήτου καί Δωροθέου)», Θεσσαλονίκη 2013.

³ HANS-GEORG BECK, *Kirche und Theologische Literatur im Byzantinischen Reich*, Munich 1959, σ. 353f.

⁴ WALTHER VÖLKER, *Scala Paradisi*, Wiesbaden 1968, v, vi, 7.

⁵ PG 88, 836· 860· 948· 1023· 1109.

βρωμάτων ἀντίληψεις του: «Ἐδόκησεν ὁ θεήλατος Εὐάγριος τῶν σοφῶν σοφώτερος τῇ τε προφορᾷ καὶ τοῖς νοήμασι γενέσθαι· ἀλλ' ἐψεύσθη ὁ δεῖλαιος, τῶν ἀφρόνων φανείς ἀφρονέστερος· ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν πλὴν καὶ ἐν τούτῳ· φησὶ γάρ· Ὅληνικα διαφόρων βρωμάτων ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐν ἄρτῳ στενούσθω καὶ ὕδατι· ὅμοιον δέ τι προστέταχε τῷ εἰπόντι τῷ παιδί ἐν [αἰ. τῷ] ἐνὶ βήματι πᾶσαν ἀνελθεῖν τὴν κλίμακα· τοίνυν ἀποτρέποντες αὐτοῦ τὸν ὄρον, ἡμεῖς φήσομεν· Ὅληνικα διαφόρων βρωμάτων ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, φύσεως ἴδιον ἐπιζητεῖ· διὸ μηχανῇ πρὸς τὴν παμμήχανον χρησόμεθα· εἴπερ μὴ, βαρύτατος παρέστη [αἰ. |ἀρεστή] πόλεμος ἢ πτώματος εὐθύναι. Περικόψωμεν τέως τὰ λιπαίνοντα· εἴτα τὰ ἐκκαίοντα, εἴθ' οὕτως τὰ ἡδύνοντα· εἰ δυνατόν, δίδου τῇ σῇ κοιλίᾳ τροφὴν ἐμπιπλῶσαν καὶ εὐπεπτον· ἵνα διὰ μὲν τῆς πλησμονῆς τὴν ἄπληστον αὐτῆς γνώμην ἀποστήσωμεν· διὰ δὲ τῆς ταχείας διαπνεύσεως, τῆς πυρώσεως ὡς μάλιστα λυτρωθῶμεν. Ἐπισκεψώμεθα καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν πνευματούντων, καὶ κινούντα εὐρήσομεν»⁶.

Καθὼς συμπεραίνουμε ἀπ' αὐτὸ τὸ χωρίο, ὁ ἅγ. Ἰωάννης τῆς Κλίμακος κατηγόρησε τὸν Εὐάγριο γιὰ τὴν ἀσκητικὴ προσέγγισή του, ὅσον ἀφορᾷ στὸν ἀγῶνα ἐναντίον τοῦ πάθους τῆς γαστριμαργίας. Ὁ Εὐάγριος τονίζει ἐδῶ ὅτι, ὅταν ἡ ψυχὴ μας ἐπιθυμεῖ διάφορα ἀπολαυστικά φαγητά, πρέπει νὰ τὴν ταλαιπωρήσουμε, νὰ τὴν στενέψουμε δίνοντάς της μόνο τὸ ψωμί καὶ τὸ νερό. Αὐτὴ ἡ ἄποψη, κατὰ τὸν ἅγ. Ἰωάννη τῆς Κλίμακος, εἶναι ἀπολύτως ἐσφαλμένη καὶ ἐπικίνδυνη γιὰ τοὺς ἀρχάριους μοναχοὺς, διότι μοιάζει σὰν νὰ λέγαμε σ' ἓνα παιδί νὰ φτάσει στό ἀποκορύφωμα τῆς κλίμακας μόνο μὲ ἓνα ἄλμα. Ἀπορρίπτοντας τοιοῦτοτρόπως τὴν ἐν λόγῳ στάση τοῦ Εὐαγρίου, ὁ ἅγιος Ἰωάννης ὁ Σιναΐτης συνιστᾷ τὸν πῖο ἥπιο, πῖο φυσικὸ (τοῦτο σημαίνει καὶ πῖο ἀνθρώπινο) τρόπο: Νὰ πᾶνουμε νὰ τρῶμε ἀρχικὰ τὰ φαγητά πού παχαίνουν, ἔπειτα τὰ φαγητά πού πυρώνουν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τέλος τὰ ἡδονιστικά, παθογόνα φαγητά. Γενικῶς ὁ ἅγ. Ἰωάννης συνιστᾷ τὰ ἐλαφρά φαγητά πού εἶναι κορεστικά, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐκολοχώνευτα⁷, ἐπειδὴ τὰ βαριά, δυσκολοχώνευτα φαγητά ἀναζωπυρώνουν τὰ πάθη. Ἀλλιῶς, κατὰ τὴ γνώμη του, ἀρχίζει ἓνας βαρύτατος πόλεμος καὶ εὐθύνῃ γιὰ τὴν πτῶση.

Πέραν αὐτοῦ ὅμως ὁ ἅγ. Ἰωάννης ἄσκησε κριτικὴ, στό 5^ο κεφάλαιο τῆς Κλίμακος του, καὶ στὴ διδασκαλία περὶ τῆς ἀποκαταστάσεως τῶν πάντων τοῦ Ὠριγένης, ὁπότε μὲ αὐτὸ τὸν τρόπο κατηγόρησε ἐμμέσως καὶ τὸν Εὐάγριο⁸. Ἔτσι, ὑπογράμμισε πῶς αὐτὴ ἡ ἀντίληψη περὶ τῆς φιλανθρωπίας τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι μία νόσος ἄβη καὶ μιανή, διότι ἔχει καταστροφικὲς συνέπειες γιὰ τὴν πνευματικὴ ζωὴ, ἀφοῦ εἶναι εὐχάριστη καὶ εὐπαράδεκτη γιὰ τοὺς ἡδονιστές. Ὁ ἅγ. Ἰωάννης διασαφήνισε τὴν στάση του μὲ τὴν ἐρμηνεία ἐνός στίχου τοῦ 38^{ου} ψαλμοῦ: «Ἐν τῇ μελέτῃ μου, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῇ μετανοίᾳ μου ἐκκαυθήσεται πῦρ προσευχῆς, καιοῦσης ὕλην»⁹. Ὁ ἅγ. Ἰωάννης τῆς Κλίμακος τόνισε ἐδῶ πῶς

⁶ PG 88, 865BC.

⁷ Παρεμπιπτόντως, καὶ οἱ σημερινοὶ διαιτολόγοι συνιστοῦν τὰ ἴδια φαγητά ὡς τὰ πῖο ὑγιεινά.

⁸ «Προσέχουμε πάντες, ἐπὶ πλεῖον δὲ οἱ πεπτωκότες, μὴ νοσήσαι ἐν καρδίᾳ τὴν τοῦ Ὠριγένης τοῦ ἀθέου νόσον· τὴν γάρ Θεοῦ φιλανθρωπίαν προβαλλομένη ἢ μιανὰ, εὐπαράδεκτος τοῖς φιληδόνους γίνεται», PG 80, 780D. Πῖο ἀναλυτικὰ περὶ τῆς κριτικῆς στάσεως τῶν Σιναϊτῶν Πατέρων ὡς πρὸς τὸν Εὐάγριο καὶ τὸν Ὠριγένη βλ. ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΥ Δ. ΜΑΡΤΖΕΛΟΥ, Θεολογία καὶ πνευματικότητα στὴ Σιναϊτικὴ πατερικὴ Παράδοση, Ἐπιστημονικὴ ἑπετηρίδα Θεολογικῆς Σχολῆς, Τμῆμα Θεολογίας, τόμ. 12, Θεσσαλονίκη 2002, σ. 230. Αὐτὸ τὸ ἄρθρο εἶναι διευρημένη μορφή εἰσήγησής πού παρουσιάστηκε στὰ πλαίσια τοῦ Θ' Διεθνoῦς Οἰκουμενικοῦ Συνεδρίου στὸ Bose τῆς Ἰταλίας (16-18 Σεπτεμβρίου 2001) μὲ θέμα «Ὁ ἅγιος Ἰωάννης τῆς Κλίμακος καὶ τὸ Σινᾶ» καὶ δημοσιεύθηκε στὰ ἰταλικά στὸν τόμο τῶν Πρακτικῶν τοῦ Συνεδρίου (*Giovanni Climaco e il Sinai*, Atti del IX Convegno ecumenico internazionale di spiritualità ortodossa, sezione bizantina, Bose, 16-18 settembre 2001, Edizioni Qiqajon, Comunità di Bose 2002) μὲ τίτλο «Il fondamento teologico della spiritualità dei padri sinaiti» (σ. 73-93).

⁹ PG 88, 780D. Πρβλ. Ψλ. 38, 4: «Ἐθερμάνθη ἡ καρδία μου ἐντός μου καὶ ἐν τῇ μελέτῃ μου ἐκκαυθήσεται πῦρ· ἐλάλησα ἐν γλώσσῃ μου».

ὁ ψαλμωδός Δαβίδ μέ τή λέξη μελέτη ἐννοοῦσε πρωτίστως τή μετάνοια, μέ τήν ὁποία μόνο δύνανται νά ἐξαλειφθοῦν οἱ ἁμαρτίες μας μέσω τοῦ πυρός τῆς προσευχῆς καί τοῦ πνευματικοῦ κόπου, καί ὄχι στά ἔσχατα, ὅπως δίδασκε λανθασμένα ὁ Ὠριγένης, μέσω τοῦ πυρός τῆς ἀγάπης καί δικαιοσύνης τοῦ Θεοῦ¹⁰.

Ἰδιαίτερα ὁμως στό 7^ο κεφάλαιο τῆς Κλίμακος τοῦ ὁ ἁγ. Ἰωάννης ἔλεγε καί τήν ὑπερβολική ἐνασχόληση τῶν μοναχῶν μέ τή θεωρητική θεολογία εἰς βάρος τῆς πρακτικῆς πνευματικῆς ζωῆς, καί τοῦ πένθους, στρεφόμενος ἔμμεσα ἐναντίον τοῦ Εὐαγγρίου καί εὐθυγραμμιζόμενος ἀπόλυτα στό σημεῖο αὐτό μέ τή στάση τῶν Γαζαίων Πατέρων. Ὅπως τόνισε, σ' ἐκείνους πού πενθοῦν, δηλ. στούς μοναχοῦς, δέν ταιριάζει ἡ ἐνασχόληση μέ τή θεολογία, διότι ἔτσι χάνουν τό χαροποιό πένθος¹¹. Κατά τόν ἁγ. Ἰωάννη, ἐκεῖνος πού θεολογεῖ καί ἀσχολεῖται θεωρητικά μέ τά ἀνώτατα μυστήρια τῆς πίστεως εἶναι σάν νά κάθεται σέ διδασκαλικό θρόνο, δηλαδή τοποθετεῖ τόν ἑαυτό του καί τή γνώμη του ὑπεράνω τῶν ἄλλων. Ἀπεναντίας, ἐκεῖνος πού πενθεῖ, περνᾷ τό χρόνο του συνεχῶς «ἐπὶ κοπρίας καί σάκκου»¹², ὅπως ὁ Ἰώβ¹³. Ὅπως ὑπογραμμίζει χαρακτηριστικά, δέν θά κατηγορηθοῦμε κατά τήν ὥρα τῆς ἐξόδου τῆς ψυχῆς μας ἐπειδή δέν θαυματοουργήσαμε ἢ δέν θεολογήσαμε, οὔτε ἐπειδή δέν γίναμε θεωρητικοί, ἀλλά σέ κάθε περίπτωση θά δώσουμε ἀπάντηση στό Θεό γιατί δέν πενθοῦσαμε ἀδιαλείπτως¹⁴.

Εἶναι πάντως ἀξιοσημεῖωτο ὅτι, ἂν καί ὁ ἁγ. Ἰωάννης τῆς Κλίμακος κατέκρινε αὐτές τίς ἀπόψεις τοῦ Εὐαγγρίου, χρησιμοποίησε καί αὐτός ἐν μέρει τήν ἀσκητική διδασκαλία του¹⁵. Αὐτό φαίνεται καί στά τελευταῖα κεφάλαια τῆς «Κλίμακος» του, ὅπου ἔγραψε ἐν συντομία γιά τήν ἡσυχία, τήν ἀπάθεια, τή γνώση τῶν ὄντων καί τή θεωρία τῆς Ἁγίας Τριάδος¹⁶. Ὅπως δέ ὀρθῶς ὑπογράμμισε ὁ J. Meyendorff, στήν Κλίμακα ξαναβρίσκουμε «συχνά τό νοοκρατικό λεξιλόγιο τοῦ Εὐαγγρίου, ἀλλά ἡ ἀμεσότητα τοῦ κειμένου, ὁ ρόλος πού ἀναγνωρίζεται ὅτι παίζει τό ἀνθρώπινο σῶμα στήν ἴδια τήν προσευχή, ἀποδεικνύουν τή βιβλική καί χριστιανική ἔμπνευση τοῦ Ἰωάννου»¹⁷.

Ἀλλά, ἡ πιό ἐντυπωσιακή καί πιό φοβερή μαρτυρία τῶν Συναϊτῶν Πατέρων ἐναντίον τοῦ Εὐαγγρίου εἶναι τό περιστατικό τό ὁποῖο διηγήθηκε ὁ Ἀββάς Ἰωάννης ὁ Κίλιξ, ἡγούμενος τῆς Ραιθῶς¹⁸. Τό περιστατικό συνέβη στήν Ἀλεξάνδρεια, στή Μονή Ἐνάτου, ὅπου αὐτός (ὁ Ἀββάς Ἰωάννης) τότε ἀσκήτευε. Σ' ἐκείνη τήν περίοδο, ἡ Μονή τοῦ Ἐνάτου ἔγινε κέντρο ἐξέγερσης ἐναντίον τῶν ἀποφάσεων τῆς Δ' Οἰκουμενικῆς συνόδου (451). Τόν

¹⁰ ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΥ Δ. ΜΑΡΤΖΕΛΟΥ, Θεολογία καί πνευματικότητα στή Συναϊτική πατερική Παράδοση, ὅπ. παρ., σ. 230.

¹¹ PG 88, 805C: «Οὐχ ἀρμόζει πενθοῦσι θεολογία· διαλύειν γάρ αὐτῶν τὸ πένθος πέφυκεν. Ὁ μὲν γάρ τῷ ἐπὶ θρόνου καθημένῳ διδασκαλικῶ ἔοικεν· ὁ δέ, τῷ ἐπὶ κοπρίας καί σάκκου διατρίβοντι». Πρβλ. ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΥ Δ. ΜΑΡΤΖΕΛΟΥ, Θεολογία καί πνευματικότητα στή Συναϊτική πατερική Παράδοση, ὅπ. παρ., σ. 231.

¹² Ὅπ. παρ., PG 88, 805C.

¹³ Ἰώβ 2, 8.

¹⁴ PG 88, 816D: «Οὐκ ἐγκληθισόμεθα, ὦ οὔτοι, οὐκ ἐγκληθισόμεθα ἐν ἐξόδῳ ψυχῆς, διότι οὐ τεθαυματοουργήκαμεν οὐδ' ὅτι οὐ τεθεολογήκαμεν οὐδ' ὅτι θεωρητικοὶ οὐ γεγόναμεν· ἀλλὰ λόγον πάντως δώσομεν τῷ Θεῷ, διότι ἀδιαλείπτως οὐ πεπενθήκαμεν». Πρβλ. ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΥ Δ. ΜΑΡΤΖΕΛΟΥ, Θεολογία καί πνευματικότητα στή Συναϊτική πατερική Παράδοση, ὅπ. παρ., σ. 231.

¹⁵ Πρβλ. ΙΟΥΣΤΙΝΟΥ Ι. ΜΩΨΕΣΚΟΥ, Εὐάγγελος ὁ Ποντικός, *Βίος – Συγγράμματα – Διδασκαλία*, τύποις «Πυρσοῦ», Ἀθῆναι 1937, σ. 152.

¹⁶ Βλ. PG 88, 631-1164. Ἰδιαίτέρως βλ. τά κεφάλαια 27-30.

¹⁷ JEAN MEYENDORFF, Ὁ ἅγιος Γρηγόριος ὁ Παλαμᾶς καί ἡ Ὁρθόδοξη Μυστική παράδοση, μεταφρ. Ἐλ. Μαΐνας, ἐκ. «Ἀκρίτας», Νέα Σμύρνη 1989², σ. 45-46.

¹⁸ ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΥ Δ. ΜΑΡΤΖΕΛΟΥ, Θεολογία καί πνευματικότητα στή Συναϊτική πατερική Παράδοση, ὅπ. παρ., σ. 232. Πρβλ. ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΥ Γ. ΤΣΑΜΗ, Τὸ Γεροντικὸν τοῦ Σινᾶ, Θεσσαλονίκη 2000, σ. 335 κ.έ.

Ἀββά Ἰωάννη τόν Κίλικα τόν ἐπισκέφτηκε τότε ἕνας Αἰγύπτιος μοναχός, ὁ ὁποῖος τόν παρακάλεσε νά τόν ἀφήσει νά κατοικήσει στό ἐγκαταλειμμένο κελλί τοῦ Εὐαγρίου. Ὁ Ἀββάς Ἰωάννης τοῦ ἀποκρίθηκε ὅτι δέν θά μπορούσε νά μείνει ἐκεῖ, διότι ὁ διάβολος πού ξεγέλασε τόν Εὐάγριο, τοῦ τό ἀπαγορεύει. Ὁ Αἰγύπτιος μοναχός ἐπέμενε τόσο πεισματικά, πού ἀπειλοῦσε ὅτι θά φύγει, ἐάν δέν μείνει στό κελλί τοῦ Εὐαγρίου. Ὅταν εἶδε τήν πεισματώδη ἐμμονή τοῦ μοναχοῦ, ὁ Ἀββάς Ἰωάννης ὁ Κίλιξ τοῦ ἐπέτρεψε νά κατοικήσει ἐκεῖ, ὅμως μόνο μέ δική του εὐθύνη. Τήν πρώτη Κυριακή αὐτός ὁ μοναχός πῆγε στήν ἀκολουθία μαζί μέ τούς ἀδελφούς, ὅμως τήν ἐπόμενη Κυριακή δέν παρίστατο στήν ἀκολουθία. Ὅταν τόν ἔψαξαν, τόν βρῆκαν κρεμασμένο καί διεπίστωσαν ὅτι εἶχε αὐτοκτονήσει¹⁹. Ἡ διήγηση αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐπεισοδίου ἀναμφισβήτητα ἀποδεικνύει τήν ἀντιευαγριανή, ἀλλά καί ἀντιωριγενική στάση στό χῶρο τῶν Σιναϊτῶν Πατέρων.

Στό σημεῖο αὐτό πρέπει νά τονίσουμε μέ ἔμφαση ὅτι οἱ Σιναῖτες Πατέρες εἶναι πραγματικοί ἐκπρόσωποι τῆς προγενέστερης πνευματικῆς, ἀσκητικῆς διδασκαλίας τῶν Πατέρων τῆς Γάζας. Γι' αὐτό τό λόγο εἶχαν ἀρνητική στάση ὡς πρός τίς ἐσφαλμένες ἀπόψεις τῆς εὐαγριανῆς ἀσκητικῆς διδασκαλίας. Ὡστόσο, ὅπως εὐστοχα παρατήρησε ὁ καθ. Γ. Μαρτζέλος, «καίτοι γενικότερα οἱ Σιναῖτες ξεκινοῦν ἀπό τὰ πρακτικά ἰδεώδη τῆς σχολῆς τῆς Γάζας καί ἐνστερνίζονται κατὰ βάση τήν ἀντιευαγριανή τάση τοῦ Βαρσανουφίου, τοῦ Ἰωάννη καί τοῦ Δωροθέου, σύμφωνα μέ τήν ὁποία ἔπρεπε νά ἀποφεύγεται ὡς ἐπικίνδυνη ἡ θεωρητική θεολογία, ἐντούτοις, χωρίς νά καταλήγουν στίς ἀκρότητες τοῦ Εὐαγρίου, χαρακτηρίζονται ἀπό τίς ἔντονες θεωρητικές ἀναζητήσεις τους, ἐπιδιώκοντας τήν ἄνοδό τους στήν κορυφή τῆς θεολογίας καί τῆς θέας τοῦ Θεοῦ»²⁰. Εἶναι πολύ σημαντικό νά σημειωθεῖ ἐν προκειμένῳ ὅτι ἡ ἀνίδα τοῦ κυρίως ναοῦ τῆς μονῆς τῆς ἀγ. Αἰκατερίνης εἶναι διακοσμημένη μ' ἕνα ψηφιδωτό, τό ὁποῖο χρονολογεῖται ἀπό τόν 6^ο αἰῶνα καί ἀπεικονίζει τή Μεταμόρφωση. Δηλαδή, ἤδη ἀπό τήν ἰδρυση τῆς Μονῆς ἀπό τήν ἐποχή τοῦ Ἰουστινιανοῦ, τό ἰδεῶδες τῆς ἀσκητικῆς ζωῆς γιά τούς μοναχοὺς αὐτῆς τῆς μονῆς ὑπῆρξε ἡ συναϊτική ὅραση τοῦ Μωυσῆ, πού συνδέεται μέ τή θεοφάνεια τοῦ ὄρους Θαβὼρ, κατὰ τήν ὁποία ὁ Μωυσῆς ἐμφανίζεται ἐπίσης μέσα στό θεϊκό φῶς τοῦ ἐνσαρκωμένου Λόγου²¹. Σχετικά μέ τή πνευματικότητα τῶν Σιναϊτῶν Πατέρων, καλό εἶναι νά διευκρινιστεῖ πῶς αὐτοί δημιουργήσαν ἕνα πρότυπο τῆς μοναστικῆς ζωῆς μέσα στήν ὀρθόδοξη παράδοση, σύμφωνα μέ τό ὁποῖο «ἡ ἀσκητική πνευματικότητα δέν εἶναι οὔτε διαλεκτικά ἀντίθετη μέ τή θεολογία, ὅπως δεχόταν λόγω τῶν ἀντιευαγριανικῶν προϋποθέσεών της ἡ σχολή τῆς Γάζας, οὔτε ἐκφυλίζεται σέ θεολογικοθεωρητικές ἀναζητήσεις κατὰ τό πρότυπο τοῦ Εὐαγρίου, ἀλλά δένεται ἄρρηκτα καί λειτουργικά μέ τή θεολογία καί τήν ἐμπειρία τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς ζωῆς καί τίθεται ἀποκλειστικά πλέον στήν ὑπηρεσία τῆς Ἐκκλησίας»²².

Ἡ παρατηρούμενη ἐν προκειμένῳ διαφορά μεταξύ Γαζαίων καί Σιναϊτῶν Πατέρων ὀφείλεται στό γεγονός ὅτι οἱ Γαζαῖοι Πατέρες ζοῦσαν σέ μία ἐποχή κατὰ τήν ὁποία ὁ κίνδυνος ἀπό τόν εὐαγριανισμό ἦταν πολύ μεγαλύτερος ἀπ' ὅ,τι ἦταν στήν ἐποχή τῶν Σιναϊτῶν Πατέρων. Αὐτό τό δεδομένο δικαιολογεῖ ἀρκετά τήν πῶς αὐστηρή στάση τους ἀπέναντι στίς λεγόμενες θεολογικοθεωρητικές ἀναζητήσεις τοῦ Εὐαγρίου. Ἀπό τήν ἄλλη

¹⁹ ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΥ Δ. ΜΑΡΤΖΕΛΟΥ, Θεολογία καί πνευματικότητα στή Σιναϊτική πατερική Παράδοση, ὅπ. παρ., σ. 232.

²⁰ Ὁπ. παρ., σ. 229.

²¹ JEAN MEYENDORFF, Ὁ ἅγιος Γρηγόριος ὁ Παλαμᾶς καί ἡ Ὁρθόδοξη Μυστική παράδοση, ὅπ. παρ., σ. 44-45.

²² ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΥ Δ. ΜΑΡΤΖΕΛΟΥ, Θεολογία καί πνευματικότητα στή Σιναϊτική πατερική Παράδοση, ὅπ. παρ., σ. 252.

πλευρά, ὅσον ἀφορᾷ στούς Σιναῖτες Πατέρες, καθώς εἶδαμε ἀνωτέρω, καί ἡ ἰδιαίτερη τοποθεσία τῆς Μονῆς τους στό Σινά συνετέλεσε ἄμεσα, ὥστε ἡ θέα τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἡ θεωρητική ἀναζήτηση καί ἡ θεολογία νά γίνουν τά ἰδεῶδη τῆς ἀσκητικῆς τους πνευματικότητας. Καί ὅλα αὐτά τά ἰδεῶδη προέρχονται, ὅπως εἶδαμε ἀνωτέρω, ἀπό τήν ἀσκητική διδασκαλία τοῦ Εὐαγρίου, τῆς ὁποίας τά ὀρθά σημεῖα ἀποδέχτηκαν πρῶτα οἱ Γαζαῖοι Πατέρες ὡς ἀσφαλὴ καί ψυχωφελή, ἐνῶ τήν παρέδωσαν μετὰ στούς Σιναῖτες Πατέρες, καί τοιοῦτο-τρόπως σ' ὅλη τή μεταγενέστερη ἀσκητική παράδοση, ἰδίως στή Νηπτική.

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Logic and Spirituality to Maximus the Confessor
The divine logoi and uncreated energies
into “onto-tropo-logical” soteriology of the Confessor¹

Introduction

„The mystical experience of unity with God is communication with the transcendent, communication with the completely Other. Such experience is also passed on in a *completely other language*, in the language that ceases to be language at all. The unutterability of that experience is a consequence of God’s transcendence and unknowability. *Wordlessness* (ἄλογία) and *unintelligibility* (ἀνοησία) reign in the “superintelligible darkness”.² Mystique talks about something that cannot be talked about: “All mystique has a *paradox of expression*”.³ God is inexpressible and utterable. J. Quint rightfully writes about “the struggle of mystique against language” (*Kampf der Mystik gegen die Sprache*).⁴ (...) Mystique in fact does not hesitate between speech and silence but it wants to remove their differences⁵, to regard speech and silence in their identity and not in their differences. The very word ‘mystique’ (μυστική) symbolically refers to this. It is derived from the verb *myō* (μύω) – to speak *my* (μυ), namely to utter everything that can be told when we shut our mouth: in this

¹ The short version of this text was read at the conference “Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher”, Colloquium in Berlin (September 26-28, 2014), and organised by the Philosophy Institute of the Freie Universität Berlin.

² Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, *De myst. theol. III* (PG 3,1033C); Dionysius the Areopagite, *On the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology*, by C.E. Rolt (London: SPCK, 1920) 101-102; Pseudo Dionysius, *The Complete Works*, translation by Colm Luibheid foreword, notes and translation collaboration by Paul Rorem preface by Rene Roques introductions by Jaroslav Pelikan, Jean Leclercq, and Karlfried Froehlich (Paulist Press: New York, 1987) 138-140.

³ Karl Jaspers, *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, 6th ed. (Berlin, Heidelberg and New York: Springer, 1971) 87.

⁴ J. Quint, “Mystik und Sprache: Ihr Verhältnis zueinander, insbesondere in der spekulativen Mystik Meister Eckharts” in *Altdeutsche und altniederländische Mystik*, ed. K. Ruh, Hg. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1964) 113-151, here 121. For the whole problem see Alois M. Haas, *Sermo mysticus: Studien zu Theologie und Sprache der deutschen Mystik* (Freiburg, Schweiz: Universitätsverlag, 1989) 136-167 and 301-329; A. M. Haas, *Geistliches Mittelalter* (Freiburg, Schweiz: Universitätsverlag 1984) 181-247; Walter Haug, „Zur Grundlage einer Theorie des mystischen Sprechens” in *Abendlandische Mystik im Mittelalter*, ed. Kurt Ruh, Hg. (Stuttgart: Metzler 1986) 494-508; Kurt Ruh, “Das mystische Schweigen und die mystische Rede” in *Festschrift für Ingo Reiffenstein zu seinem 60. Geburtstag*, ed. Peter K. Stein et alii (Göppingen: Kümmerle Verlag 1988) 463-472.

⁵ A. M. Haas, “Das mystische Paradox” *Das Paradox: Eine Herausforderung des abendländischen Denkens*, eds. P. Geyer, R. Hagenbuchle, Hg. (Tübingen: Stauffenburg Verlag 1992) 273-294, for here 276. See also, A. M. Haas, *Mystik als Aussage: Erfahrungs-, Denk- und Redeformen christlicher Mystik* (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp 1996) 110-133, for here especially 114.

‘m’ speech and silence are together. (...) God is *ontological transcendence* and as a Person He *transcends* (classical Greek) *ontology*. (...) The paradoxes in formulations of mystical experience (thus in metalanguage) and those are *semantic paradoxes*... The mystical statements are semantically realized as a contradiction in terms of the propositional logic (God is He who IS, knowable as unknowable, utterable as unutterable).”⁶

For Bogoljub Šijaković paradox is “*a dynamic corrective against theological systematics and dogmatics*”. The paradox of apophatic theology witnesses to a personal experience of God that cannot be schematized and made a subject of dogmatic knowledge. He thus tells that “the paradox of the mystical knowledge of God is an attempt to resolve the problems of our thinking about God by contradictions. In the ontological sense mystical experience (*unio mystica*) is a unification of ontically different areas: an identity in difference, a surmounting of the ontologically insurmountable distance between man and God. The very possibility of an ontological nearness and ontological closeness with God is paradoxical. It is enabled by that what transcends Greek *cosmological* ontology: Personhood. The mystical paradox is an attempt to formulate a knowledge of the absolute transcendence and otherness, to describe the nature of the communication with a totally Other”.⁷ A paradox is a logical provocation and the old dilemma “Logic or Life?” is always timely.⁸

In this study on the Maximus the Confessor’s logic and spirituality we will try to achieve an image concerning the evolution of the great theologian’s thought, an analysis of the philosophical influences that have determined the structure of his theological work, in one word, a debate over maximienne terminology.

Therefore, Antoine Lévy states that „entire Christological thought of Maximus highlights the subtle interplay between λόγος of nature and hypostatic τρόπος (the hypostatic subject of the rational energeia)”.⁹ On the other hand, by referring to the opponents of the maximian interpretation of Garrigues which sees in his theology „the ultimate and dramatic victory of the order of «tropos» linked to hypostasis on the order of «logos» associated with nature”, himself retains positively that „from ours perspectives, says Lévy, nothing more interesting than the target point by critical J.-M. Garrigues: the notion of physical deification is rejected as inseparable from „théurgisme” would exercise the palamienne theology”.¹⁰ Accordingly, Maximus the Confessor uses two complementary formulas designed to describe the complex and vivid structure of the triad of

⁶ Bogoljub Šijaković, “The Paradox of the Mystical Knowledge of God”, in: Šijaković, *The Presence of Transcendence. Essays on Facing the Other through Holiness, History, and Text* (Los Angeles: Sebastian Press, 2013) 121-123.

⁷ Bogoljub Šijaković, *The Presence of Transcendence*, 124-125. See also: B. Lubardić, “Lav Shestov Philosophy of Faith. Apophatic Deconstruction of Reason and Conditions of Possibility for Religious Philosophy”, *Zbornik radova Filozofskog fakulteta u Pristini* XLIV, 2 (2014) 273-283.

⁸ „And this is eternal life (αἰώνιος ζωή), that they may know You, the only true God (γινώσκωσιν σέ τον μόνον ἀληθινόν θεόν), and Jesus Christ whom You have sent” (John 17:3).

⁹ Antoine Lévy, *Le créé et l’incréé. Maxime le Confesseur et Thomas d’Aquin aux sources de la querelle palamienne* (Sorbonne: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2007) 307-308, especially 311.

¹⁰ The relationship between Palamas and Maximus is correctly narrated: „The fact is that we can not distinguish the forerunners in Palamism Maxime without implicitly recognize some loyalty maximienne in the theology of Gregory Palamas. We understand this hypothesis has aroused misgivings, the fact remains that only allow little reluctant to reject a hypothesis. By taking the latter contrast, it may be possible to establish this maximian Palamas loyalty by showing that the result of a rigorous understanding of Christology of Maximus” (Antoine Lévy, *Le créé et l’incréé*, 316-317)

hypostases in the unity of essence in a way excluding any separation of the unique divine essence or substance from the three divine hypostases. He calls the Holy Trinity: „*hypostatical essentiality of a consubstantial triad*” (ἐνυπόστατος ὀντότης ὁμοουσίου Τριάδος) and „*substantial subsistence of the three-hypostatic monad*” (ἐνούσιος ὑπαρξίς τρισυποστάτου μονάδο).¹¹ In trinitarian theology, it is as important to maintain that a hypostasis ἐνούσιος is not necessarily an οὐσία of its own, as it is in Christology to prove that a φύσις ἐνυποστάτος is not necessarily a hypostasis of its own. Hence, „ἐνυπόστατος and ἐνούσιος describe the relationship of nature and hypostasis a parte naturae and a parte subsistentiae”, and they do not represent a real intermediary between hypostasis and ousia.¹² Maximus developed a coherent trinitarian-christological terminological system attributing to the term ἐνυπόστατος the same function in both theological contexts. Monothelism reporting energy in person to justify their conception of one energy in Christ, the „personalist”. But we can not design modern categories patristic thought¹³. The Parallel of Damascene between περιχώρεσις of the trinitaires hypostases and that of the two natures of Christ, acquires a status of “équation logique”¹⁴ through which unity can be reconciled (nature-hypostasis) with distinction (hypostases-natures).

Achieving agreement between Plato and Aristotle was a reiterated concern from Plotinus until today. That is why firstly we proposed to study the relationship between philosophy and mysticism. the first chapter will have as issue the fulfillment of our reasoning and the poverty of philosophy versus the „Great Disruption” into philosophy, namely the mystical tendency in Neoplatonic henology, a type of “*a immanence mysticism in a metaphysics of transcendence*”.¹⁵ Starting from this in the second chapter, we will make a brief analysis of the philosophical influences received by Maximus and the Confessor’s (especially stoicism, platonism, aristotelianism and neoplatonic henology). We will see how these philosophical terminology are used to create a ‘revive’ language of deification. In order to illustrate in chapter three the movement of the from the neoplatonic aristotelian commentaries to christianization of aristotelian logic, we proceeds to analyze the Maximian’s concept of ἐνούσια and ἐνυπόστασις. In the end, in the last chapter we exhibit relationship between Logoi and the Uncreated Energies. I will attempt to

¹¹ *Amb. 1, 23-31*, Maximus the Confessor, *On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua*, Volume I, Nicholas Constas (Translator), 1 edition (New York: Harvard University Press, 2014) apud Benjamin Gleede, *The Development of the Term ἐνυπόστατος from Origen to John of Damascus*, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, Volume 113 (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2012) 141-142.

¹² Benjamin Gleede, *The Development of the Term ἐνυπόστατος* 147: „The substantiality of a hypostasis can either be unique (in the case of ‘natural hypostases’) or twofold (in the case of Christ), whereas the hypostatical realization of a nature can either be uniform (in case of the natural procreation of species-individuals) or in the form of a hypostatical coexistence with another nature (in case of Christ)”. The rapport between nature and hypostasis (or λόγος φύσεως and τρόπος ὑπάρξεως) referred to by the term ἐνυπόστατος can thus be described correctly as insubsistence, not only in case of the natural, but also in case of the Christological realization of the human nature, provided that any connotation of (quasi-) accidental inherence or asymmetry is ruled out. (Benjamin Gleede, *The Development of the Term ἐνυπόστατος* 155).

¹³ Jean-Claude Larchet, *La théologie des énergies divines. Des origines à saint Jean Damascene* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2010) 415-417.

¹⁴ Emmanuel Durand, *La périchorèse des personnes divines. Immanence mutuelle, réciprocité et communion* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2005) 23-27. „Cependant à s’interpénétrer, préférons en français se compénétrer ou se pénétrer l’un l’autre, expressions restituant mieux les construction grecques” (Durand, *La périchorèse* 24).

¹⁵ Pierre Aubenque, „Plotin et le dépassement de l’ontologie grecque classique”, in *Le Néoplatonism. Colloque international du CNRS* (Paris: Édition du CNRS, 1971) 101-109, here 102.

show how the *logos* constitutes the profound unity and co-existence of essence and energy. therewith the theological foundation for an ascetic spirituality we will be able to close circularly the relation between philosophycal logic and Christian spirituality in St. Maximus' work.

1. A reiterated concern – achieving agreement between Plato and Aristotle.

*The fulfillment of our reasoning and the poverty of philosophy
versus the „Great Disruption” into philosophy*

Early characterisations of *nous* present it as a holistic mode of apprehension. Efforts to emphasise the intuitive function ought to be played down in favour of the holistic functioning of the intellect, and its capacity for complete apprehension. „*The concept of mind as an apparatus for dealing with alien material is quite foreign to a large part of the Greek tradition, which sees mind as akin to that which it receives*”.¹⁶ The radical criticism of anthropomorphism and the apophatic theology of later Platonism, made a significant contribution to later Platonic development of a monotheistic doctrine of transcendent Being. The resultant idea of God is „*the Mind which is the Father and maker of All, whose name Plato cannot tell because he does not know it, whose appearance cannot describe because he cannot see it*”.¹⁷ Plato originated the widespread use of the concept of participation as a means ‘to describe how a sensible particular comes to have an ideal Form’. ‘Participation’ was a technical concept in Greek science which was used to describe relationships of formal causality. For Plato, participation ‘signifies a relation of sharing in a common character, of having communion. The common term for participation in Plato is μέθεξις, concept which express the relation between the particular and the Form, describing an asymmetrical relation adequately. Plato also used the terms κοινωνία and μετέχειν in order to describe the relationship between the Forms themselves. Plato clearly employed the vocabulary of participation. The Neoplatonic school played an important role in mediating the concept of participation to the later church Fathers, who then transposed it for use in a specifically Christian theological context.¹⁸ According to Greek ideas, Plato, by making the Idea of Good monarch of the intelligible world, like the sun in the world of sight, gives it the same divinity as the God of other thinkers, even though he does not actually call it God.¹⁹ For Plato’s ontological realism, the Idea of Good is not an idea in our sense of the word, but is itself good. In fact, it is the Good in its most perfect form. It is only that form of thought which deserves the name of intellect (*nous*). Compared with it, mathematical thought is only

¹⁶ Raoul Mortley, *From Word to Silence, 1. The Rise and Fall of Logos* (Bonn: Hanstein, 1986) 92-93.

¹⁷ Maximus of Tyre, *Who is God according to Plato?* (Discourse 11, 9 c-d; II e), apud Frances M. Young, “The God of the Greeks and the Nature of Religious Language”, in *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition. In honorem Robert M. Grant*, edited by William R. Schoedel, Robert L. Wilken (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1979) 49-50. See also: Werner Jaeger, *The theology of the Greek Philosophers* (Oxford: University Press, 2005), Jacob Neusner (ed.), *Christianity, Judaism and the Greco-Roman Cults* (Leiden: Brill, 1974) 143-166; T.D. Barnes, “Porphyry Against the Christians: Date and the Attribution of Fragments”, *Journal of Theological Studies*, Volume XXIV, Issue 2 (1973) 424-442.

¹⁸ Ruth M. Siddals, “Logic and Christology in Cyril of Alexandria”, *Journal of Theological Studies*, N.S., 38 (1987) 341-367, here 348, for the Neoplatonic mediation of the principles of participation to the Fathers of the Church.

¹⁹ Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, Volume II. In Search of The Divine Centre*, Translated by Gilbert Highet, Basil (Oxford: Blackwell, 1947) 285.

understanding (*dianoia*), while sense-perception of the material world is only opinion (*pistis*). The inmost nature of philosophy is constant struggle to imitate the paradigm, *the pattern that stands in the realm of Being*.²⁰ Such a concern of combining mysticism and philosophy (theology and theosophy or triptych ontology, noetic, henology) becomes a tendency that leads to Eckhart and Böhme.²¹

During late Antiquity, an interesting doctrinal shift can be observed: Aristotelian logic and its Neoplatonic complements, in particular the teachings of Aristotle's *Categories* and Porphyry's *Isagoge*, was progressively accepted as a tool in Christian theology. Various authors - Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, John Philoponus, Leontius of Byzantium, Maximus the Confessor, Theodore of Raithu, John of Damascus and Boethius can be mentioned on different accounts - used concepts which originated in logic in order to support their theological thinking. But, also, the influence of Aristotle is being especially felt in the philosophical underpinnings of the post-Chalcedonian Christology and in the widespread adoption of Aristotelian modes of argumentation (Theodore the Studite, Photios of Constantinople, Michael Psellos, Eustratios of Nicaea, Michael of Ephesus and Nikephoros Blemmydes).²² The debate among Byzantine philosophers and theologians about the proper attitude towards ancient logic is just one episode in the turbulent history of the reception of ancient philosophy in Byzantine thought, but it certainly raises one of the most complicated and intriguing issues in the study of the intellectual life in Byzantium. There is no doubt that ancient logic, and more specifically Aristotle's syllogistic, was taught extensively throughout the Byzantine era as a preliminary to more theoretical studies. This is amply attested not only by biographical information concerning the logical education of eminent Byzantine figures, but also by the substantial number of surviving Byzantine manuscripts of Aristotle's logical writings, in particular Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, and of the related Byzantine scholia, paraphrases, and logical treatises. Katerina Ierodiakonou shows how *„in fact, the predominance in Byzantium of Aristotle's logic is so undisputed that, even when Byzantine scholars suggest changes in Aristotelian syllogistic, or attempt to incorporate into it other ancient logical traditions, they consider these alterations only as minor improvements on the Aristotelian system”*.²³

²⁰ Jaeger, *Paideia* 296.

²¹ Virginie Pektaş, *Mystique et Philosophie. Grunt, abgrunt et Ungrund chez Maître Eckhart et Jacob Böhme*, (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: B.R. Grüner, 2006) 25-88. Herbert McCabe, "The Logic of Mysticism", *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement*, Volume 31 (1992) 45-69.

²² Marcus Plested, *Orthodox Readings of Aquinas* (Oxford: University Press, 2012) 51-52. On Aristotle in Byzantium "In speaking of the dominance of Aristotle in the Byzantine theological tradition some caveats are necessary. Firstly, no one seriously opposed Plato and Aristotle until the very last days of the Empire: they were viewed as complementary and not as antagonistic. Further-more, when I speak of Aristotle' or 'Plato' this is shorthand for a more or less Platonized Aristotelianism or Aristotelianized Platonism. Aristotle was still chiefly encountered through the neo-Platonic prism of Porphyry's *Eisagoge* while neo-Platonism itself was decisively shaped by Peripatetic principle. Eclecticism was the norm." (M. Plested, *Orthodox Readings of Aquinas* 53).

²³ Katerina Ierodiakonou, "The Anti-Logical Movement in the Fourteenth Century", in *Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004) 219. Nevertheless, Byzantine authors are not all unanimous as to the importance of the study of Aristotle's logic, and more generally, as to the importance of any kind of logical training: *„There is plenty of evidence that, in different periods of Byzantine history, some Byzantine philosophers and theologians stress that, when it comes to theology, we should not rely on logical arguments, whereas others insist that we should avail ourselves of logic either in the exposition of Christian dogmas or even in the attempt to prove their truth”* (K. Ierodiakonou, "The Anti-Logi-

Also, another reiterated concern of the Western thinking, is that of achieving *agreement between Plato and Aristotle*: a unity tracing (Plato, the “mystical” attitude) and analyzing of every being property (Aristotle, the “logic” attitude).²⁴ The secret of this reconciliation is kept in the four adverbs of Chalcedonian Christology: “undivided”, “inseparable”, “unmixed” and “unchanged”. Also, says Ghislain Lafont “a suggestive ontological notion is «consubstantial» (*homoousios*). The use of this word implies the choice of a solution to the *aporia*’s problem of One and Being in suspension from Plato’s *Parmenides*: in God, The One is Being and the reciprocal”.²⁵

A general and fundamental problem of the patristic theology is its relationship with hellenistic culture. This is what Endre von Ivanka said: “the phenomenon which entirely characterizing the first millennium of Christian thought... is the use as a form of Platonism for its philosophical expression and the framework image of the world in terms of which it was proclaimed the revealed truths - Christian Platonism in other words”.²⁶ „Christian Platonism” signified many things, but Christianity and Platonism

cal Movement” 220). See also: Basil N. Tatakis, *La Philosophie byzantine* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949); B. N. Tatakis, „La Philosophie grecque patristique et byzantine” *Histoire de la Philosophie* 1 (1969) 936-1005; G. Podskalsky, *Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz: Der Streit um die theologische Methodik in der spatbyzantinischen Geistesgeschichte* (Munich: Beck, 1977); H. Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner* (Munich: Beck, 1978) 3-62; K. Oehler, *Antike Philosophie und byzantinisches Mittelalter. Aufsätze zur Geschichte des griechischen Denkens* (Munich: Beck, 1969), and Klaus Oehler, “Die byzantinische Philosophie”, in *Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey*, VI/2. *Philosophy and Science in the Middle Ages*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, volume 6 (1990) 639-649; G. Weiss, *Byzanz. Kritischer Forschungs und Literaturbericht 1968-1985*. [Historische Zeitschrift, 14 (München: Oldenbourg, 1986); A. de Libera, *La philosophie medievale* (Paris: PUF, 1995); L. Brisson, “L’Aristotelisme dans le monde byzantin” in *Philosophie grecque*, M. Canto-Sperber ed. (Paris: P.U.F., 1997); Lambros Couloubaritis, *Histoire de la philosophie ancienne et medievale* (Paris: Grasset, 1998).

²⁴ Dirk Cürsgen, *Henologie und Ontologie. Die metaphysische Prinzipienlehre des späten Neuplatonismus* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2007) 285-315. The subject of Cürsgen’s study is nothing other than the question of unity (*Einheit* - a ‘fundamental concept’ in Proclus and Damascius) in Neoplatonism. See, also, Sebastian Gertz’ *Reviews* in *The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition* 3 (2009) 194-196. Also, H.J. Blumenthal and R.A. Markus (eds.), *Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought. Essays in honour of A.H. Armstrong* (London: Variorum Publication LTD, 1981) 189-249; Lloyd P. Gerson, “From Plato’s Good to Platonic God”, *The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition* 2 (2008) 93-112; John Rist, *Eros and Psyche. Studies in Plato, Plotinus, and Origin* (Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1964); C. J. de Vogel, “Platonism and Christianity: A Mere Antagonism or a Profound Common Ground?” *Vigilae Christianae* 39 (1985) 1-62; Boris Maslov, “The Limits of Platonism: Gregory of Nazianzus and the Invention of theōsis”, in *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 52 (2012) 440-468.

²⁵ Ghislain Lafont, *Histoire théologique de l’Église catholique. Itinéraire et formes de la théologie* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1994); G. Lafont, *La Sagesse et la Prophétie. Modèles théologiques* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1999); Both books are published in a single volume in romanian translation: Ghislain Lafont, *O istorie teologica a Bisericii. Itinerarul, formele si modelele teologiei*, trans. Maria-Cornelia Ica jr and presentation by Ioan I. Ica jr (Sibiu: Deisis, 2003) for here 41 and 76. In *Peut-on connaître Dieu en Jésus-Christ?* (Paris: Cerf, 1969), Ghislain Lafont tried to develop an issue on placing the substance (being) vocabulary in expressing the Christian faith, in order to utter Trinity in the Itself a and in its report to the economy of salvation. In his conclusions regarding the patristic, Lafont was quite vigorously contradicted by A. de Halleux, in *Patrologie et oecuménisme* (Louvain: Peeters, 1990) and instead supported by B. Studer, in *Theologische Revue* 87 (1991) 483.

²⁶ Endre von Ivanka, *Plato Christianus* (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1964) 19. For a review of research regarding this issue, see: E.J. Meijering, *God Being History: Studies in Patristic Philosophy* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1975); E. Meijering, “Zehn Jahre Forschung zum Thema Platonismus und Kirchenväter,” *Theologische Rundschau* 36 (1971) 303-320; E. Meijering, *Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius: Synthesis or Antithesis?* (Leiden: Brill, 1974); John M. Dillon, *The Great Tradition. Further Studies in the Development of Platonism and Early Christianity* (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 1997); John M. Dillon, *The Golden Chain. Studies in the Development of Platonism and Christianity*, Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum,

primarily met to the mystics level, since in the second century Platonism was characterized by his prevailing religious and theocentric view of the world. Platonism second century is theologically oriented towards beyond. This kind of Platonism, known as „Middle Platonism” was „mystical”: it was concerned with the unmediated search of the soul meeting with God, concern which has intensified to Plotinus and Neoplatonism. For A.-J. Festugière, „*When Fathers «think» mystique, they platonise. There is nothing original in their construction*”.²⁷

Important and fundamental, the mystical trait of Platonism it develops it grows from the concept concerning the essential nature of the human spirit, from the belief of its kinship with the divine. But for Christianity, man is a creature which is related to God, but created from nothing by Him and sustained into existence by addiction to His will.²⁸

The core of mystics seems to be seeking God as the ultimate thing, for His sake and refusing to let satisfied with nothing but himself. The charge that for Christianity mystical trait is foreign to Christianity is an accusation frequently made. The most developed and influential presentation of this thesis is to Anders Nygren in his book *Eros and Agape*.²⁹ For Nygren mystique is an intrusion of the eros motif in Christianity, where it is certainly foreign, since Christianity is based solely on the ground of agape. Festugière, on the other hand, simplifies Christianity by seeing therein nothing more than a moral imitation of Christ. He oppose too much *active* and *contemplative* and he sees the Christian concept of Agape as being essential active. Just as theology and spirituality must not be separated, and they are not separate for Fathers, so we do not need to separate action from contemplation. Because prayer is contemplative, but it flows into acts of love.³⁰

History of the schism between Christian East and West can be summed up as a tightening of their own dogmatic divergences and theological disagreement. Similarly, says E. Lane all reconciliation must pass through „reversing this dialectic”,³¹ which consists, according to him, in the that mystery of communion between God and man was felt and expressed by both sides. The Latin opposition towards Greeks on the issue of knowledge and grace of God was already latent in the tradition of *Augustinianism*

1990; A. H. Armstrong, „Dualism Platonic, Gnostic, and Christian,” in D. T. Runia (ed.), *Plotinus amid Gnostics and Christians* (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1984) 29-52, esp. 29-41 (repr. In A.H. Armstrong ed., *Hellenic and Christian Studies* [Aldershot: Variorum, 1990]). H. J. Blumenthal, „Some Problems about Body and Soul in Later Pagan Neoplatonism: Do they follow a pattern?” in H. D. Blume and F. Mann (eds.), *Platonismus und Christentum. Festschrift für H. Dörrie* (Münster: Verlag 1983) 75-84 (repr. in H. J. Blumenthal, *Soul and Intellect: Studies in Plotinus and Later Neoplatonism* [Aldershot: Variorum, 1993]).

²⁷ *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon*, ed. III (Paris: Vrin, 1967) 5. Winfried Schröder, *Athen und Jerusalem. Die philosophische Kritik am Christentum in Antike und Neuzeit*, frommann holzboog (Stuttgart: Auflage, 2013) 88-109.

²⁸ There is an *ontological gap* between God and his creation, a real difference of being. At this point Christianity and Platonism are irreconcilable, and conflict between them reach a climax in the Arian controversy. Soul searching after God is naturally conceived as a return, an ascent to God. On the other, Christianity speaks of the Incarnation of God, of His descent into the world to give man the possibility to be in communion with God which it's not open by its very nature. And yet man is made in God's image and thus, these ascent and descent movements intersecting each other.

²⁹ Discussions about Nygren's thesis at M.C. D'Arcy, *The Mind and Heart of Love: Lion and Unicorn, A Study in Eros and Agape*, (Whitefish/Londra: Kessinger Publishing LLC, 2007) and John Burnaby, *Amor Dei*, London 1938, chap I: „The Embarrassment of Anti-Mystic”, p. 3-21.

³⁰ Andrew Louth, *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys* (Oxford: University Press, 2007; rom. transl. Sibiu: Deisis, 2002) 11-14 and 249-250.

³¹ E. Lane, „Unité de la foi et pluralisme théologique,” *Irénikon* 46 (1973) 207-213.

towards Cappadocian's traditions. It will crystallized starting from the thirteenth century with the debut of Western schools which have opted for Aristotelianism, while the Byzantine Church will confirm one hundred years later, his fidelity to the Platonic orientation which it had been that of the entire Christianity of the first millennium. To designate the two theological lines, André de Halleux³² uses the terms of "scholastic" and "Palamism" (considered to be for the Western theology, *the revealer of its relativity*).

Unlike scholastic theology, *Greek Fathers created a new „meta-ontology“*. In a personalistic view, ontology is fundamentally „givenness“ exactly onto-givenness. Distinguishing between existence-energy (the fact that God exists), being-nature (what is God) and hypostasis-person (*who* and *how* God is) Cappadocian Fathers and St. Gregory Palamas have done ontology (these categories are ontological).³³ Some still consider an open issue the energies.³⁴

The twentieth century was, par excellence, one of „christian philosophy“ as hermeneutics. The discussions are still developing to the incompatibility of, tangentiality or continuity between philosophy and christian theology, these discussions were started at the beginning of the last century.³⁵ Based on Étienne Gilson's statement by which he

³² André de Halleux, "Palamisme et Scolastique. Exclusivisme dogmatique ou pluriformité théologique?," *Revue Théologique de Louvain* 4 (1973) 409-410. See also: André de Halleux, "Personnalisme ou essentialisme trinitaire chez les Pères cappadociens? Une mauvaise controverse," *Revue théologique de Louvain* 17 (1986) 129-155 and 265-292; André de Halleux, "«Hypostase» et «personne» dans la formation du dogme trinitaire (375-381)," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 79 (1984) 313-369, 625-670; Christopher Stead, "Individual Personality in Origen and the Cappadocian Fathers," in *Arche' e telos: l'antropologia di Origene e di Gregorio di Nissa. Analisi storico-religiosa*, ed. U. Bianchi and H. Crouzel (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1981) 182; Jean Pépin, "Yparxis et Hypostasis en Cappadoce," in *Hyparxis e Hypostasis nel Neoplatonismo: Atti del I Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo (Università degli Studi di Catania, 1-3 ottobre 1992)*, ed. F. Romano and D. P. Taormina (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1994) 76; L. Turcescu, "Prosopeon and Hypostasis in Basil of Caesarea's *Against Eunomius* and the Epistles," *Vigiliae Christianae* 51: 4 (1997) 384-385.

³³ Christopher Stead, *Divine substance* (Oxford: University Press, 1977) 209-210, 214-215 and 218, discusses the idea of the substance of God in theological tradition having as central point the Nicene *homoousios*. So he says, from Origen's *Commentary on Hebrews*, the word *homoousios* is associated with phrases describing the Son's derivation „from the substance“ of the Father. Neo-Platonist writers roughly contemporary with Origen also used the term *homoousios* but only to suggests that the soul is akin to and consubstantial with divine things (*Ennead*, iv. 7.10). Porphyry also appears to have used the term *homoousios* to state the affinity of the human intellect with divine Mind (the second hypostasis of his trinity). However, Origen also used the term *homoousios* to indicate the Son's relationship to the Father; and he was the first greek writer to do so. It is therefore in Origen that we find the first suggestion of the trinitarian use of *homoousios* (being of the same nature with the Father).

³⁴ Bernard Pottier, *Dieu et le Christ selon Grégoire de Nysse* (Namur: Culture et Vérité, 1994) 140-141: „An open question: energies“.

³⁵ See, in this regard: É. Bréhier, „Y a-t-il une philosophie chrétienne," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 38 (1931) 133-162; H. De Lubac, „Sur la philosophie chrétienne: Réflexions à la suite d'un débat", *Nouvelle revue théologique* 63 (1936) 225-253 reprinted in *Recherches sur la Foi* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1979) 125-150; É. Gilson, *L'Esprit de la philosophie médiévale* (Paris: Vrin, 1989); Idem, *Christianisme et philosophie* (Paris: Vrin, 1960); J. Beaufret, „La philosophie chrétienne", in *Dialogue avec Heidegger*, vol. II (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1973) 1973, and „Heidegger et la théologie", in M. Couratier (ed.), Étienne Gilson et nous: *La philosophie et son histoire* (Paris: Vrin, 1980); J. Beaufret, "Energeia et actus", in *Dialogue avec Heidegger, I. Philosophie grecque* (Paris: Minuit, 1973) 109-144. Also: Maurice Blondel, *La Philosophie et l'esprit chrétien*, 2 vol (Paris: PUF, 1944/46), *Exigences philosophiques du christianisme* (Paris: PUF, 1950); Stanislas Breton, *La Passion du Christ et les philosophies* (Paris: Cerf 2011); Gabriel Marcel, *Existentialisme chrétien*, in collaboration with Jeanne Delhomme, Roger Troisfontaines, Pierre Collin (Paris: Plon, 1947); Jacques Maritain, *De la philosophie chrétienne*, in *Œuvres complètes t. V* (Fribourg-Paris: Éditions Universitaires-Éditions Saint Paul, 1982) 225-316; Xavier Tilliette, *Le Christ de la philosophie. Prolegomènes à une*

considers "Christian revelation as an indispensable auxiliary of reason", J.L. Marion says: "*The revelation suggests to reason to rationally approach themes that reason could not, by itself, neither treating them, nor even to intuit them*".³⁶ But Marion begins the challenge of defining «christian philosophy» exclusively as a hermeneutics: the revelation would remain secondary to the philosophy, only doubling its results, there would be no more a «christian philosophy», but only a christian interpretation of philosophy. But Marion shows us that the definition of «christian philosophy» proposed by Gilson, can be read "*not only as hermeneutics, but first and once as heuristic*". *The double function of love-charity, as hermeneutic and heuristic* assumes the faith in Christ who, both in the world itself as well as in the conceptual universe *introduces new phenomena, saturated* with meaning and glory, which contributes to overcoming the metaphysics of the end and lead to the development of phenomenology. In this sense, says Marion "*the whole assembly of philosophy might be called a «christian philosophy»*", in such way is saturated by phenomena and concepts introduced in it, directly or indirectly"³⁷.

Speaking of religion and the poverty of philosophy, William Desmond protest anew that the practice of philosophical thought is essentially agonistic and he advocates for a „sabbath for thought”, a day of being awake, when the rest is entirely energizing: „*I believe the relation between philosophy and being religious is again at issue. Something about being religious awakens us from the sleep of autonomous reason, satisfied with itself. There is no Sabbath for autonomous reason satisfied with itself*".³⁸ Desmond's remarks are searching against a dominant self-understanding of philosophy in relation to religion and he concludes that „*a philosopher without reverence is a thinker defective in delicatessen*”: „*We might have thought we had conceptually consummate(d) religion, even the consummate religion, but instead of finding ourselves within the whole that finally has closed a self completing circle around itself, we are drawn on into a new outside, a new desert even, indeed a new poverty beyond the play of the first poverty and richness. [...] We are saturated with knowings that, so to say, do not save; knowings that seem to make us more and more lost, even though they illuminate many a dark spot in the mysterious cosmos we inhabit. The more light we throw on things, the more things as a whole seem to become dark. The more we know, the more we sink into absurdity.*"³⁹

For David Evans philosophers have a perennial concern with the foundations of religion and the metaphysical status of God as part of what there is. To give his analysis adequate historical scope, he will be concentrated his attention on three philosophers (cosmological argument of Aristotle, teleological argument of Aquinas, and ontological argument of Anselm) „*whose work straddles two millennia and whose philosophical*

christologie philosophique (Paris: Cerf, 1990); Claude Tresmontant, *La Métaphysique du christianisme et la naissance de la philosophie chrétienne* (Paris: Seuil, 1962).

³⁶ Jean-Luc Marion, *The Visible and the Revealed* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008; romanian translation in Sibiu: Deisis, 2007) 121-122: "*In brief, the aid of that has enjoyed «Christian philosophy» is a theological interpretation, possible but not needed, of some purely philosophical concepts*", „*Let us take the most famous sentence of É. Gilson, « the Exodus metaphysics» here «Christian philosophy» required to make of the quasi-Aristotelian concept of actus purus essendi as the equivalent to a purely theological and biblical statement: Sum qui sum (Exodus 3, 14).*"

³⁷ Marion, *The Visible and the Revealed* 138-140.

³⁸ William Desmond, *Is There a Sabbath for Thought? Between Religion and Philosophy* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005) 352-353.

³⁹ Desmond, *Is There a Sabbath* 106-107, 109.

presence is also millennial in the more aspirational sense of the word. These thinkers do much to define the past and to determine how it might develop into the future".⁴⁰ Besides these three logical form of the arguments which he favours concerning the existence of God, fourth philosopher, that Evans lose sight, is Maximus the Confessor with an argument derived from the patristic tradition of a mystical liturgical and ecclesial experience, which otherwise would influence the Western philosophy. Thomas d'Aquinas made a strict distinction between the two orders of the natural and supernatural, of reason and revelation, of metaphysics and theology properly so-called. He makes a special use of philosophy, by opening it to the light of revelation, believing that the absolute transcendence of God can only be properly expressed in a metaphysical language. For indeed *de divinis loquimur secundum modum nostrum* (we speak of divine things in our own way). For Tomas as well as for Gilson's existentialist thomisme „between God and his creation there is discontinuity of being, but also a continuity in the intelligible order".⁴¹ We will not find such an interpretation in Eastern theology. The basic ground for *apophasis* in the Cappadocian system was that the God who was beyond thought was nevertheless not beyond faith. There could not be a fundamental opposition between divine providence and human free will, so also there could not be a permanent contradiction between reason and correct faith. The doctrine of resurrection, for example, was demonstrated by faith and by the authority of Scripture; nevertheless Gregory of Nyssa urged, in requesting Macrina to push her philosophical speculations further: „Since the weakness of the human understanding is strengthened still further by any arguments [*logismois*] that are intelligible to us, it would be well not to leave this part of the subject without philosophical examination." (Gr.Nyssa. *Anim. res.*, PG 46:108). Therefore, „truth and objectivity [*aletheia te kai bebaiotes*]" could be identified as „the basis of faith." (Gr. Nyssa. *Cant.* 14, Jaeger 6:417).⁴² There was, in the perspective of Cappadocian thought, no contradiction or disjunction at all between such a seemingly intellectualistic formula as that and the seemingly more personalistic thesis, „God remains the object of faith" (Gr. Nyssa. *Maced.*, Jaeger 3-1:252-253). For in spite of his radically *apophatic* emphasis, especially in the polemics against Eunomius (Gr. Nyssa. *Eun.* 2.89, Jaeger I:252-53), on the unattainability of any positive knowledge about the divine *ousia*, Gregory of Nyssa also insisted, specifically in opposition to Eunomius, that the two formulas, „What God is" and „What God is also believed to be," had to be identical. That was what was meant by Nazianzen's axiomatic definition of faith as „the fulfillment of our reasoning" (Gr. Naz. *Or.* 29.21 (SC 250:224)).⁴³

⁴⁰ David Evans, *Innovation and Continuity in the History of Philosophy*, in *Reading Ancient Texts. Volume II: Aristotle and Neoplatonism*, Essays in Honour of Denis O'Brien, Edited by Suzanne Stern-Gillet and Kevin Corrigan (Leiden/Boston: Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, Volume 162, 2007) 251-263, here 252.

⁴¹ Etienne Gilson, *Christian Philosophy*, translated by Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1993) 87-88.

⁴² Jaroslav Pelikan, *Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993) 117-119.

⁴³ Pelikan, *Christianity and Classical Culture* 220, 229. In their celebration of the uniqueness of faith, therefore, the Cappadocians could emphasize that no amount of philological learning was sufficient for the correct understanding of Scripture, which was accessible only „through spiritual contemplation [*dia tes pneumatikes theorias*]" and true faith. Yet that did not keep them from exploiting a natural knowledge of philology to the fullest;

2. *The philosophical influences received by Maximus and the Confessor's and the 'revive' of deification language*

In matters of the spirit Maximus the Confessor writes, Robert Louis Wilken says that „his language is more scholastic than Augustine's”.⁴⁴ The most profound modern interpreter of Maximus's thought, Hans Urs von Balthasar⁴⁵, believed, however, that Maximus was much too original to be dependent on Augustine. For Maximus the Incarnation is likewise the real starting point for trinitarian theology. While upholding and developing the apophatic theological tradition of the Cappadocian Fathers and Ps.-Dionysius, wherein the essence of God remains utterly ineffable and incomprehensible, Maximus asserts that the incarnate Logos is giving creatures access to the mystery of the Tri-Unity and the personal, or hypostatic Godhead. It is the Son consubstantially related to the Father and the Holy Spirit, and eternally sharing with them a common activity (*energeia*), who assumes flesh. Like Paul M. Blowers stresses „Maximus sketches some definitive outlines of his theology in the earlier set of his *Ambiguities*, where he develops a Christocentric cosmology countering the radically platonized worldview of Origenism”.⁴⁶

For Maximus God does not fit in the scheme of Aristotelian and Stoic categories (*Ambigua ad Iohannem* 7, 1081B), but He is characterized by „lack of any relation to any”: „God is, in the proper sense, also beyond being” (*Ambigua ad Iohannem* 10, 38, 1180B-D). Taking advantage of Stoic distinction, states that any knowledge of our about God refers only to „what it concerns God”, but it is not identifiable with God himself. The *logoi* of all things are located in God as „a unique, simple and unitary inclusion of all things” (*Ambigua* 7, 1077 sqq.), doctrine that comes through the Gregory of Nyssa right to the Stoics doctrine of the Logos which penetrate everything.⁴⁷ The rhythm of the entire process of the world (the procession, the output into existence, the multiplicity, from simplicity of God, and the return, returning from multiplicity to unity – *Ambigua* 7, 1081C), finds its correspondence to Dionysius the Areopagite (*Div. Nom.*, 11, 2, 949C). Maximus's conception concept is however innovative as far as that in the mutual relations between the sensible and the intelligible world: first shown in the second as „footprints”, while the second one is in the first by *logoi* (*Questiones ad Thalassium* 63, 685D).

The simultaneous presence of Plato and Aristotle's motives is characteristic to Maximus. He is the final link of a large chain beginning with Philo and reach him through Alexandrian theologians, Cappadocian Fathers and Dionysius. Just as shown Claudio Moreschini, „*St. Maximus the Confessor had an extraordinary ability to combine*

⁴⁴ Robert Louis Wilken, *The Spirit of Early Christian Thought. Seeking the Face of God* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2003) 305.

⁴⁵ Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie* (Einsiedeln: Verlag, 1988) 408–409. Apud, Wilken, *Seeking the Face of God* 310.

⁴⁶ Paul M. Blowers, art. „Maximus the Confessor (580–662)” in *Biographical Dictionary of Christian Theologians I*, edited by Patrick W. Carey and Joseph T. Lienhard (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000) 355–356.

⁴⁷ Michel Spanneut, *Le Stoïcisme des Pères de l'Église: De Clément de Rome à Clément d'Alexandrie*, Patristica Sorbonensia, 1 (Paris: Le Seuil, 1957) 296–324 and *Permanence du stoïcisme. De Zénon à Malraux* (Gembloux: Duculot, 1973) 130–178. See also: R. Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation* (Oxford: University Press, 2000) 337–339; J. Mansfeld, „Resurrection Added: The interpretatio christiana of a Stoic Doctrine,” *Vigilae Christianae* 37 (1983) 218–233, reprinted in J. Mansfeld, *Studies in Later Greek Philosophy and Gnosticism* (London: Variorum, 1989); R. Sorabji, „Stoic First Movements in Christianity,” in S. K. Strange and J. Zupko (eds.), *Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations* (Cambridge: University Press, 2004) 95–107: on the “first movements” (*propatheiai*) in Evagrius; A. Long, “Soul and Body in Stoicism,” *Phronesis* 27 (1982) 34–57.

metaphysical requirements with the effort of defining the faith dogma, and the monastic experiences with the depth thinking, succeeding to propose a new conception in which converge all cultural and religious influences".⁴⁸

St. Maximus the Confessor synthesized Aristotelianism influences with those of Platonism in order to exceed the daring speculations of cosmology origeniene. Thus, he formulates the triad birth-movement-immobility, polemizing with Origen's conception concerning hennade by resorting to Aristotelian concepts which was balanced by the Christian and platonic doctrine: „*Maximum corrects Aristotle, considering that God is the author of any movement: indeed, he speaks of the cause as a «working power» whose providence carries every single thing to its purpose. Thereby, the Aristotelian doctrine of motion is examined from Christian premises, being related to God's and reckoned as being his providence's effect, and these Aristotelian and Christian concepts are combined with those of Dionysius the Areopagite*”.⁴⁹

In *Epistole* 12 (PG 91, 488B-C) Maximus put in opposition to „the principle of substance” (which is similar to the principle of nature) with the broader concept of „the principle of being”. Since the first substance in the Aristotelian meaning tends to disappear at Maximus, the element of individuality and particularity must be correlated with *ousia* in the second meaning. The consequence of compenetration between soul and body is the fact that the man, in its entirety, constitutes a form (*Ambigua* 42, 1324A), which corresponds to the Aristotelian doctrine. Therefore, body and soul must appear at the same time. „*He explains the close mutual belonging of soul and body with the help of Aristotelian philosophy in the sense that the soul gives the body the vital activity*”.⁵⁰

Also it is a Stoic conception that the soul completely penetrates the whole body, in every member of its, to assure life and motion, also as to make it one with himself. In the spirit of Plato's Maximus divides the soul into concupiscent part, in the irascible and the rational one (*Ambigua* 10, 43, 1196A). The soul has two aspects, namely a contemplative aspect called mind (*νοῦς*), and an active (‘practical’) aspect (*τὸ πρακτικόν*) called reason (*λόγος*), which are the primary powers of the soul (*Myst.* 5, PG 91: 673c-676c). The primary activity (*ἐνέργεια*) of the mind is wisdom, while the primary activity (*ἐνέργεια*) of the reason is prudence. In *Mystagogia* chapter 4, Maximus speaks of the Church an image of man, and man as an image of the Church. Man is composed of body, soul, and mind;⁵¹ the Church consists of nave, sanctuary, and the divine altar. Body and nave, soul and sanctuary, mind and the divine altar mutually mirror one another. These three pairs are respectively connected with the three stages of development, namely the first pair with ethical philosophy, the second with natural contemplation ‘spiritually interpreted’, and the third pair is connected with mystical theology.⁵²

⁴⁸ Claudio Moreschini, *Storia della filosofia patristica* (Brescia: Morcelliana Edizioni, 2004, traslation by Alexandra Cheșcu, Mihai-Silviu Chirilă și Doina Cernica, Iași: Polirom, 2009) 705, 709.

⁴⁹ Moreschini, *Storia della filosofia patristica* 715. Also in the triad: being, well-being, and eternal well-being, were combined the Aristotelian expressions „by potency” and „by act”.

⁵⁰ Moreschini, *Storia della filosofia patristica* 720. Moreover, Maximus notes that the sensitive perceptions constitutes a parallels to the act of thinking (*Ambigua* 17, 1229A).

⁵¹ According to Lars Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor*, Second Edition (Chicago: Open Court, 1995) 107-113, this triad seems to have replaced the Pauline triad of spirit, soul, and body in Church Fathers after Evagrius Ponticus.

⁵² Torstein Theodor Tollefsen, *Activity and Participation in Late Antique and Early Christian Thought* (Oxford: University Press, 2012) 170-171.

Stoic, negative evaluation of concupiscence and fury is combined with the biblical influence on the one hand, and the Peripatetic, on the other, which allows a positive judgment concerning the lower parts of the soul. Maximus employs the stoic term „dominant part” (*Ambigua* 10, 2, 1112B) with reference to the intellect, which does not conceive it only as faculty of thinking, because it appears also as an transrational, intuitive organ, sole able to obtain knowledge and „gnostic” contemplation and capable to unite with God. Maximus assigns intellect the condition of being the image of God in man: „*image through the intercession of imitation holds the entire form of the original*” (*Quaestiones ad Thalassium* 55, 548D; 10, 288D). This he divides into intellect (νοῦς) and reason (λόγος). First, intellect is a contemplative faculty through which the soul can be united to God. It is a static and receptive faculty at the summit of the human construction. The intellect can function as a kind of landing area for God. Through the intellect the soul becomes luminous when in communion with God, and the soul in turn illumines the body. But this can happen only when the human ‘architecture’ is restored to its right hierarchical structure. Reason, again, is a practical faculty which governs the activity of the soul. It is the charioteer which drives the ‘two horses’, that is, the desiring and the incensive parts of the soul (*Ambig.* 15, PG 91, 1216AB).⁵³

Regarding passion and its effects, Maximus uses the old Stoic tripartition in imagination, impulse (or passion) and consent. Through this concept of consent, Maximus understands the fall of intellect from its true nature, which should always be characterized by a „unitary identity”. In this context, we must recall the prologue of the *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* where it is said that „evil was not and will not be in subsistence in his own nature”. This expression of „secondary subsistence” represents „*a commonplace of late Neoplatonism, Stoics and Philo’s*”.⁵⁴

Jean-Claude Larchet⁵⁵ particular emphasis on the concept of „deification” (*theosis*) of man and the world. According to Saint Maximus, deification therefore corresponds to an immutable plan of God. At the end of time, God will unite with the all people (*Capita on love* I, 71), „unique divine power will be manifested in all things, a real and active presence, the same for everyone”, God will become everything for those who will be saved (*Mystagogy* 24, PG, 91, 709C). Thus God, united with humans at the end of the times, will deify their nature with His presence of the deifying energies, which does not mean that all will be deified.⁵⁶

Deification is a reintegration of man and a restoration of his being for the development into the divine pattern of the logos of eternal well-being. According to the terminology of *Ad Thalassium* 60, man, in the deified condition, enjoys God beyond rational and conceptual knowledge, in experience and sensation (πειρα and αἴσθησις). This must be the condition in which man no longer conceives of God as an object of reason or mind, but rather enters the union of love with the one that is loved. Maximus defines this sensation

⁵³ Melchisedec Törönen, *Union and Distinction in the Thought of St. Maximus the Confessor* (Oxford: University Press, 2007) 167.

⁵⁴ Moreschini, *Storia della filosofia patristica* 723.

⁵⁵ Jean-Claude Larchet, *La divinisation de l’homme selon saint Maxime le Confesseur*, Théologie et sciences religieuses. Cogitatio fidei, 194 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1996) 83-124.

⁵⁶ Larchet, *La divinisation de l’homme* 663-664.

as the experience through “participation of the good things beyond nature”.⁵⁷ In deification man executes his natural activity by resting in the mode of the divine activity: the divine activity carries the human activity. According to Maximus there are three *logoi* that describe a triadic pattern, i.e., a unity in distinction, indicating that man is created as an image of the divine being (the Trinity), namely: the *logos* of being, the *logos* of wellbeing, and the *logos* of eternal well-being (*Cap. gnost.* 1,37-50, PG 90: 1097c-1101b). The three *logoi* then belong together and they constitute a single triadic conception in God. Man participates in God in accordance with this triad of *logoi*, but not in all three immediately. In *Chapters on knowledge* 1, 47-50 Maximus shows that the divine activity (*ἐνέργεια*) *ad extra* is manifested in ‘works without beginning’, and these are participated beings (ὄντα μεθεκτά). Tollefsen highlights: “As man moves on in accordance with his *logos* of eternal well-being, his receptive capacity is further expanded by divine grace, and the human being becomes a recipient of deification. At the highest level (the Sabbaths of Sabbaths, cf. *Cap. gnost.* 1, 39) one finds the spiritual stillness, or rest (ἡρεμία -πνευματική) of the rational soul, the mind being withdrawn even from the more divine *logoi* of higher contemplation. The soul dwells wholly in God alone in loving ecstasy, and it has become unmoved (ἀκίνητον) in God by mystical theology”.⁵⁸

St. Maximus characterized the deification as an «*enhypostatically enlightenment*», thus emphasizing its uncreated character because subsistence in / through the eternal hypostasis of the Word.⁵⁹ Also for St. Gregory Palamas God’s work or energy is not hypostasis, but in hypostasis, is not being, but in being, it’s not self-subsistence, but subsistence in being or in hypostasis (ἐνοῦσιος, ἐνυπόστατος, ἐνυπαρκτός): “just as Basil, who is great in every way, says, *The Holy Spirit is a sanctifying power which is substantial, real and enhypostatic. Also in his treatises on the Holy Spirit he demonstrated that not all the energies derived from the Spirit are enhypostatic; and thereby he in turn clearly distinguished these from creatures, for there are realities derived from the Spirit which are enhypostatic, namely, creatures, because God made created substances*”.⁶⁰

The mystical experience of deification reduces the *gulf* through existential fullness. While the Cappadocians bridged the ontological *gulf* through an ethical and an ecclesiological approach to deification, Dionysius and Maximus seemed to resolve the problem of the ontological *gulf* by highlighting the fullest possibilities of *being* in Christ.⁶¹ This

⁵⁷ Tollefsen, *Activity and participation* 180-181. His dynamic concept of participation is basically the presence of divine activity in created being.

⁵⁸ Tollefsen, *Activity and participation* 181-182.

⁵⁹ *Questions to Thalassius* 61, (PG 90, 644D-645D) in *On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ*, Selected Writings from St Maximus the Confessor, translated by Paul M. Blowers and Robert Louis Wilken (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003) 131-143 [also in *Phil. rom.* vol. 3 (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2005) 304]: “He gives as a reward to those who obey Him the uncreated deification”, and “the uncreated deification is calling «the enhypostatically enlightenment» which has no creation”; “We suffer deity as beyond nature, but we don’t produce it”, because “no thing which is by nature does not produce deification” [cf. *Thal.* 22 cf. *On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ* 115-118; also in *Phil. rom.* vol. 3 (ed. cit.) 84].

⁶⁰ Gregory Palamas, *The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters*, 122 in R. E. Sinkewicz ed. and trans. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1988) 225. Basil the Great, saying that not all works are hypostasis, has shown that some works are created or they are themselves as creatures.

⁶¹ Nicholas Bamford, *Deified Person. A study of deification in relation to Person and Christian Becoming* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2012) 14. „Communion is not *being* in itself, but allows the ground of *being* to be fulfilled. This ontological context to communion does not mean that communion has substance in itself but that it is generated by the uncreated activity established from the *enhypostatic* source of the

notion of union through participation was echoed by Dionysius and Maximus who considered that the Divine revelatory *deification* experience had significant ontological implications to human *being-ness* and existence. Patristic theology did have an essentialist context visible in St Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, St Maximus the Confessor, and later expressed through the energetic theology of Gregory Palamas of Thessaloniki. This energetic model provided the means to the affirm place for a focus on “Higher-Essence” in God which becomes inaccessible and provides the need to assert a participation in uncreated acts which restore the whole *being*.⁶² In the Greek Fathers *deification* represented one of the basic features to express the relationship of God and the world (human beings), yet there was systematic approach to *deification*. Sometimes *deification* was understood sacramentally, at other times eschatologically and at others times it was understood through a personal experience.⁶³

By the late fifth century the language of deification and its underlying conceptuality were not much in use in theological discourse, for the appeal to deification as a metaphor for salvation was no longer in vogue. The reason for this is mainly to be found in the suspicion surrounding the teachings of Origen and those who shaped theological reflection along similar lines. It was against this background that Ps-Dionysius the Areopagite and Maximus the Confessor ‘revive’ the language of deification.⁶⁴ The renaissance of the *theosis* theme in contemporary systematic theology is a measure of the Western theologians’ willingness to engage constructively with a typically “Eastern” idea. Clearly, the *notion of theosis is no longer “owned” by the Christian East*.⁶⁵

tri-hypostatic Godhead.” (Bamford, *Deified Person* 29). Also, see Andrew Louth, “The Place of Theosis in Orthodox Theology,” in M. J. Christensen, *Partakers of Divine the Nature* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2007) 34; N. Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition*, (Oxford: University Press, 2004) 115- 205; N. Russell, “Theosis and Gregory Palamas: Continuity or Doctrinal Change,” *SVTQ* 50/4 (2006) 357-379; This understanding of *deification* in relation to participation was developed by Clement of Alexandria (Russell, “Theosis and Gregory Palamas” 122) and Athanasius through the term *theopoio* (Russell, “Theosis and Gregory Palamas” 176). Russell argues, that “participation” referred in the works of Gregory of Nazianzen, to the attaining the “imitation of Christ” (Russell, “Theosis and Gregory Palamas” 214). Later *deification*, as Russell shows, became more expressly related to the personal experience in Pseudo-Dionysius (*ibid.* 260), Maximus (*ibid.* 262) and in the monastic tradition which becomes the focus in Gregory Palamas. See also Paul Collins, “Event: The How of Revelation,” in *Trinitarian Theology West and East* (Oxford: University Press, 2001) 7-33; Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov (eds), *Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology*, 2 vols (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co, 2006/2008); M. J. Christensen and J. A. Wittung (eds), *Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Tradition* (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2007).

⁶² Bamford, *Deified Person* 37. „Gregory Palamas’ need to focus on the Divine uncreated energies, for the superior “Higher Essence” remains ontologically far beyond the realm of human experience while the operational *hypostases* do not: we cannot partake of the Divine essence, we can only know the *hypostatic* operations.... Nevertheless, the focus on the Divine essential-*Esse* to explain how the Divine nature relates to the very *Being* of God in a substantialist model is supported through a Pseudo-Dionysius and Palamite focus on Higher Ousia and even Lossky also argues that for Palamas the Divine Essence was the “superior divinity,” while the operations were inferior.” (*Ibid.*)

⁶³ Bamford, *Deified Person* 110.

⁶⁴ Collins, *Partaking* 102.

⁶⁵ Paul L. Gavrilyuk, ‘The retrieval of deification: how a once-despised archaism became an ecumenical desideratum’, *Modern Theology* 25 (2009) 657. See also: Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, eds., *Union With Christ: The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998); J. Todd Billings, *Calvin, Participation, and the Gift: The Activity of Believers in Union with Christ* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); A. M. Allchin, *Participation in God: A Forgotten Strand in Anglican Tradition* (Wilton, CT: Morehouse-Barlow, 1984); John Anthony McGuckin, *Standing in God’s*

As might be expected, for Paul L. Gavrilyuk the claim to have a special form of perception that makes “direct human contact with God possible is both epistemologically and metaphysically problematic”. As a mental act, intellectual vision is less overtly tied to the body. The non-Christian Platonists as a rule treated embodiment as hindering, if not altogether blocking, the vision of the divine. “*Christian theologians ‘baptized’ the ‘Platonic’ version of intellectual vision with different results, tending to maintain an ambivalent attitude towards the role of the body in the contemplation of God. This ambivalence is already evident in Origen, who in some cases views embodiment as an impediment, and in other cases construes it as instrumental to the contemplation of God*”.⁶⁶ For Pseudo-Dionysius, the height of mystical contemplation presupposes the rising above all cognitive powers in the ultimate unification and simplification of the self. By comparison, Maximus’s incarnational vision is more comprehensive, with the body being more consistently integral to contemplation.

This is manifestly a metaphysics of mystery, in every sense of the term: antinomy, mystical union, and sacrament. And yet we must never forget that the entire doctrine flows from the principle of radical rationalism: to be is to be intelligible. Thus we find that total radicalism leads inexorably to total mysticism. For Eric Pearl „any philosophy which does not include mysticism will be false as *philosophy*, that is, as an account of reality. If reason impels us to mysticism, then our metaphysics must be mystical in order to be rational”. In Maximus’ doctrine, then, Christ comes not to destroy but to fulfill the metaphysics of mystery elaborated by the philosophers. For him there can be no separation between philosophy and theology, or between natural and revealed theology. Thereby, Christology and liturgical mysticism are not additional to a neoplatonic, aristotelian, and other metaphysics. Pearl hopes that will serve him to reclaim Maximus as “*thoroughgoing eastern Christian Neoplatonist, neither a proto-Thomist nor a proto-existentialist*”: “*Because this is the entelechy of reason, it is no surprise that similar mystical philosophies of identity and difference may be found elsewhere. But this theory reaches its fulfillment in Maximus’ Christological Neoplatonism. What is unique to Maximus is the anchoring of this ontology in the mystery of Christ. In Maximus, as in none of the comparable metaphysics outside the Christian tradition, the doctrine of universal theophany, of cosmic incarnation, is centred and grounded in the particular, historical incarnation. Maximus does not attempt to rationalize the mystery of Christ by expaining it in terms of an independently established theory of participation, nor does he regard it merely as the supreme instance of a general metaphysical principle. Rather, he sees all ontology summed up in that mystery, which is itself the first principle of metaphysics. And it is precisely this Christocentric doctrine that allows maximus, not to reject, but to retain and perfect the Neoplatonic metaphysics*”.⁶⁷ Eric Perl states that Maximus accepts the principle that the hypostasis of union which is Christ is the Logos and the idea of enhypostasization, and makes these central to his Christology.⁶⁸

Melchisedec Törönen skillfully attends to the subtleties and nuances in Maximus’s logic of union and difference. Törönen’s sets out the “logic” of union-and-distinction not only

Holy Fire: The Byzantine Tradition, Traditions of Christian Spirituality (New York: Orbis Books, 2001).

⁶⁶ Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley, *The Spiritual Senses. Perceiving God in Western Christianity* (Cambridge: University Press, 2011) 7-8.

⁶⁷ Eric David Perl, *Methexis: Creation, incarnation, deification in Saint Maximus Confessor* (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1991) 314-315.

⁶⁸ Perl, *Methexis* 188.

in Trinitarian and Christological contexts but in Maximus's cosmology, ecclesiology, anthropology, hermeneutics, and spiritual doctrine. Törönen's monograph throws into question the time-honored thesis, developed both by Hans Urs von Balthasar and Lars Thunberg, that the Chalcedonian Definition of 451, with its grammar of union without confusion in Jesus Christ, ultimately inspired in Maximus the Confessor a thoroughgoing logic of union and distinction running the full gamut of his theology. Chalcedonian Christology factors into that logic but is not exhaustive of it („pan-Chalcedonianism” and „mystification of Chalcedon”⁶⁹), Törönen argues. Maximus's pervasive emphasis on “union and distinction” and “unity and difference” finds its roots in a variety of sources („Porphyrian telescope logic”⁷⁰).

There is, however, a philosophical tradition which stands out in Maximus' works, that of the Neoplatonic Aristotelian commentaries,⁷¹ a tradition Maximus knew directly. Unlike Boethius or Abelard in the Latin-speaking world, or the fifteenth-century Greek patriarch Gennadius Scholarius, Maximus was not an Aristotelian commentator himself. He, nevertheless, was acquainted with this tradition and made a considerable use of it as a tool to serve his own primarily theological and exegetical purposes. His concern, we should not forget, was to continue, not the philosophical tradition of the Aristotelian commentators, but the theological one of the Fathers. In *Opusculum* 21, in which he discusses the notions of property, quality, and difference, Maximus makes a point characteristic of his stance: „*The meaning of these terms in the secular philosophers is very complex, and it would take [too] long to expound [all] their subdivisions. One would have to extend the account so much that it would no longer comply with letter-writing but would become a business of book-writing. In contrast, the explanation of these [terms] by the divine Fathers is compact and brief, and is not done in relation to some substratum, that is, essence or nature, but in relation to the things that are considered in essence, and indeed, in hypostasis*” (*Opusc.* 21, PG 91, 248BC). Clearly, Maximus knew what the ‘philosophers’ were saying, although he abstains from expounding their doctrine.⁷²

Maximus counts the four adverbs in the definition of faith from Chalcedon (ad 451) as a basic logical tool (*Ambiguum* 5 confirms this) for describing the relation between uncreated and created being: without confusion, without change, without division, and without separation (ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιάφετως, ἀχωρίστως). 214. At this point Tollefsen disagree with Törönen (2007) who, in the introduction to his book, complains about the pan-Chalcedonianism making these adverbs basic logical concepts in Maximus. Tollefsen agree with Törönen that union and distinction are basic logical concepts in Maximus' thinking, but is not the so-called Chalcedonian logic a special application of these concepts?⁷³

⁶⁹ Melchisedec Törönen, *Union and Distinction in the Thought of St. Maximus the Confessor* (Oxford University Press, 2007) 138.

⁷⁰ Törönen, *Union and Distinction* 161.

⁷¹ Richard Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and their Influence* (London: Duckworth, 1990); Klaus Oehler, „Aristotle in Byzantium”, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 5 (1964) 133–46; Linos G. Benakis, „Commentaries and Commentators on the Logical Works of Aristotle in Byzantium”, in R. Claussen and R. Daube-Schackat (eds.), *Gedankenzeichen: Festschrift für Klaus Oehler zum 60. Geburtstag* (Tübingen: Stauffenburg Verlag, 1988) 3–12.

⁷² Törönen, *Union and Distinction* 19. See also: Christopher Stead, *Doctrine and Philosophy in Early Christianity. Arius, Athanasius, Augustine*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), especially chapter XX: Logic and the application of names to God (Stead, *Doctrine and Philosophy* 303–320).

⁷³ Tollefsen, *Activity and participation* 179, n. 75.

3. The logos constitutes the profound unity and co-existence of essence and energy. A theological foundation for an ascetic spirituality – relationship between Logoi and the Uncreated Energies

Recent studies on Maximus the Confessor relationship with Gregory Pamas's theology are centred around the Maximus' theology of *logoi* and Palamas' doctrine of the *energies* of God.⁷⁴ Maximus has to do with vision of the world and for him the *logoi* are the divine „ideas” or „intention” of creation.⁷⁵ In *Ambigua* 7 (PG 91, 1080A, 1081A, 1085A) he attacks the platonic and origenistic concept of the pre-existence of Soul, and stresses that the creation is eternally rooted in God. The Confessor develops his doctrine of the *logoi* especially within the context of his teaching of the *knowledge of God* called by him *physike theoria*, as a mystical contemplation of the *logoi* of creation which leads to the knowledge of Divine Logos. This *physike theoria* has to be distinguished from the immediate union with God or *theoria*, the *mystike theologia*. He interprets the bones of the Logos, which he had identified with the „*logoi* around the Godhead”, as the divine power through which we receive deification. Palamas makes a sharp distinction (that Maximus does not seem to do so) between a knowledge of God which is given to us through the contemplation of creation and the direct vision of God as the real union with Him. Like Maximus, Palamas speaks about the divine *energies* as the divine *ideas* of creation (Tr. 3.2.25) and therefore, as stated by Joost van Rossum, it is, indeed, possible to draw a comparison between the theology of Palamas and Maximus' doctrine of the *logoi*, but „*Palamas' scope and interest was different from that of Maximus. It was not his aim to develop a theology of creation and to analyze the different stages of man's ascent to God. His theology is first of all a theological justification of the direct vision of God, the contemplation of the taboric Light.*”⁷⁶

Maximus holds that not only is man deified by the penetration of the fullness of the divine activities into his natural functions; the incarnated God Himself is humanized by the penetration of the activity of the human nature into the divine nature. The idea of mutual interpenetration (περιχώρησις) have a soteriological importance. So, the divine activity penetrates into the human nature of Christ, but this nature is preserved, secured by its natural logos in God. What is changed is the so-called ‘mode’ of being (*tropos*), i.e. the way in which the human nature exists and executes its natural functions. Therefore, the human nature of Christ is deified by *participation* in the divine activity. Maximus sees this glorification and deification as the divine purpose for the whole created world. According to *Ambiguum* 7 the Logos with His *logoi* is the unparticipated source, but even so, every creature participates in (μετέχει) God proportionally.⁷⁷

This christological ratio between divine *logoi* and uncreated energies is brought straight by Karayiannis in his comment regarding the ontology of divine energy:

⁷⁴ This discussion has been started earlier by Policarp Sherwood, *The Earlier „Ambigua” of Saint Maximus the Confessor and his refutation of Origenism* (Rome: Herder, 1955) 177-180.

⁷⁵ See I.H. Dalmais, “La théorie des *logoi* des creatures chez S. Maxime le Confesseur” *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 36 (1952) 248-249.

⁷⁶ Joost van Rossum, „The *logoi* of Creation and the Divine *energies* in Maximus the Confessor and Gregory Palamas”, in *Studia Patristica* vol. XXVIII (Leuven: Peeters, 1991) 214-215.

⁷⁷ *Amb.* 7, PG 91: 1080b. Nicholas Constas (ed.) *On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua*, vol. 1, Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library Series, Volume 28 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).

„Christology gives to the divine energies the soteriological dimension, because Christ works salvation through the synergy between divine energy and his human energy”.⁷⁸

From the works of Gregory Palamas, as well, the primary sense of *energeia* is activity. The *energeia*, he says, quoting St John of Damascus, is ‘the essential motion of nature’ (ἡ οὐσιώδης τῆς φύσεως κίνησις).⁷⁹ This resounds with Maximian terminology.⁸⁰ Palamas denies that the activities could be hypostasized. Rather they are the processions, manifestations, and natural activities of the Spirit.⁸¹ This resounds with Dionysian terminology. Gregory several times stresses the uncreated character of the activity. God’s activity is not something that begins and ends, but is a permanent expression of the divine being itself. Palamas does not seem to have developed a doctrine of *logoi* as acts of will, in the way St Maximus did, but, rather, Palamas identifies the activities and the *logoi*.⁸²

Certainly Maximian idea of a dyophysite reciprocity between God and man that is the key to his soteriology. The text of *Ambigua*, 10 describes a double movement and the term “theandric” becomes his preferred expression of the divine-human reciprocity in action: “*They say that God and man are exemplars (paradeigmata) one of another; and that God makes Himself man for man’s sake out of love, so far as man, enabled by God through charity, deified himself; and that man is wrapped up by God in mind to the unknowable, so far as man has manifested through virtues the God by nature invisible.*” The goal of the Incarnation is precisely to make possible a communion between energies, which alone can bring into being the divinization that is the final goal of human life. That expresses this reciprocity in action (is what L. Thunberg might call an “*onto-tropological*” kind).⁸³

God the Logos with all His *logoi* is the transcendent cause of all creatures. He is not participated in by anything. But there is a divine activity which is manifested for the creation and redemption of the world. This activity is the object of participation. Thereby the divine activity presents God as a simple undivided whole to each participant. When God so wills, creatures emerge into the presence of being by the actual reception of the divine activity to the degree delimited by the *logoi*. The created essence does not exist by a created being (*esse*), but by the reception of God’s activity (ἐνέργεια) as Being. Likewise, the created being is not deified by the reception of a created perfection, but by

⁷⁸ Vasilios Karayiannis (archim.), *Maxime le Confesseur, Essence et Énergies de Dieu*, Théologie Historique 93 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1993) 169-173, 488.

⁷⁹ *Capita* 143 (Sinkewicz ed., Toronto: 1988) 249.

⁸⁰ Palamas, *Triads* 3.2.6 and 7 (Gregory Palamas, *The Triads*, Edited with an Introduction by John Meyendorff

translation by Nicholas Gendle, Preface by Jaroslav Pelikan [Mahwah, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1983] 93-94); cf. Maximus, *Cap. gnost.* 1.48, PG 90: 1100c [“Chapters on Knowledge” in Maximus Confessor, *Selected Writings*. The Classics of Western Spirituality, Translation and notes by G.C. Berthold, Introduction by J. Pelikan, Preface by I.H. Dalmais (New York-Mahwah-Toronto: Paulist Press, 1985) 135]

⁸¹ *Capita* 71 (Sinkewicz ed., Toronto 1988) 167.

⁸² *Capita* 87 (Sinkewicz ed., Toronto 1988) 185; *Triads* 3.3.10 (Gendle ed., Mahwah 1983) 107.

⁸³ Lars Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos. The vision of St Maximus the Confessor* (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985) 53-54, 72. Based on Thunberg’s statement according to which even the Incarnation itself may be described as a perichoresis (Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos* 27), Michael E Butler argues that deification itself is defined as a perichoresis in Maximus, but he wonders if there’s a „unidirectional or reciprocal perichoresis” (Michael E Butler, *Hypostatic union and Monotheletism: The dyothelite christology of St. Maximus the Confessor* [New York: Fordham University Press, 1994] 164-166);

the reception of God's activity as Eternal Being.⁸⁴ However, according to St Maximus, the uncreated and the created are kept within their proper spheres according to the ontological 'logic' of His *logoi*. An adequate understanding of St Maximus' doctrine of divine *logoi* presupposes that we see clearly both the distinctions between divine essence, activity (energies), *logoi*, and created beings, and the ways these elements are connected with one another. So there is a distinction between the divine *logoi* and the activities. Relating to the assertion that Maximus is a pre-Palamitic Palamist I agree with T. Tollefsen who noticed the anachronism of such interpretations: "*I shall not, however, take for granted, says Tollefsen, that Maximus is a pre-Palamitic Palamist, even though he, in the end, may be found to develop a doctrine of divine essence and activities that is largely equivalent to the teaching of St Gregory Palamas... it could be highly tempting to describe the path from the Cappadocians via Maximus to Gregory Palamas as a teleological development towards a natural conclusion... earlier thinkers struggled with the problems of their own days, and not with problems belonging to fourteenth-century Byzantium.*"⁸⁵

Maximus expresses doctrine of deification in *Ambiguum* 10, where he says the deified person has become without beginning and end (ἀναρχος καὶ ἀτελεύτητος), and that he possesses the divine and eternal life of the indwelling Logos.⁸⁶ Man becomes interpenetrated by God, and he becomes God even he is a creature. Maximus states that man is made God, except for identity of essence (χωρὶς τῆς κατ' οὐσίαν ταυτότητος).⁸⁷ His character as God is neither by his own nature, because as a creature he has his beginning from non-being, nor by participating in God's very nature, but by grace and participation in the divine activity: "*In Christ who is God and the Logos of the Father there dwells in bodily form the complete fullness of deity by essence (ὅλον κατ' οὐσίαν οἰκεῖ τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς); in us the fullness of deity dwells by grace (ἐν ἡμῖν δὲ κατὰ χάριν οἰκεῖ τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος) whenever we have formed in ourselves every virtue and wisdom, lacking in no way which is possible to man in the faithful reproduction of the archetype.*"⁸⁸ St Gregory Palamas repeats the Maximian idea and even strengthens it when he says that those who attain deification 'become thereby uncreated, unoriginate, and indescribable (ἀκτίστους, ἀνάρχους καὶ ἀπεριγράπτους).'⁸⁹

Utilization of St Maximus' thought and the integration of the Saint's *logoi* doctrine with that of the uncreated energies as elaborated by St Gregory Palamas, signify an issue which has yet to receive a definitive clarity among St Maximus' many commentators.⁹⁰ For David Bradshaw it's clear that in the minds of Maximus the rational princi-

⁸⁴ Torstein Theodor Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor* (Oxford: University Press 2008) 220.

⁸⁵ Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology* 139.

⁸⁶ *Amb.* 10, PG 91: 1144c (Andrew Louth, *Maximus the Confessor* [London&New York: Routledge, 1996] 91-152).

⁸⁷ *Amb.* 41, PG 91: 1308b (Louth, *Maximus* 153-160).

⁸⁸ *Cap. gnost.* 2.21, PG 90: 1133d (Berthold ed., Toronto 1985) 152.

⁸⁹ *The Triads* 3.1.31, trans. by Gendle (1983), 86. Cf. Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology* 212-213.

⁹⁰ The issue is treated very briefly by Lars Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos* (New York: SVS Press, 1985) 137-43; Vasilios Karayiannis, *Maxime le Confesseur: Essence et Energies de Dieu* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1993) 215-22; and Jean-Claude Larchet, *La Theologie des Energies Divines: Des origines a saint Jean Damascene* (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 2010) 392-5. Key texts from St Maximus on this question include: *Amb.* 7.12, PG 91:1276A-1277B (energies, not *logoi*); *Amb.* 7.15-21 PG 91:1077C-1084B (*logoi*, nor energies); *Amb.* 22.2, PG 91:1256D-1257C (both energies and *logoi*); *Amb.* 42.14, PG 91:1328B-1329D (*logoi*); *Cap. Gnost.* 1. 47-

ples (*logoi*) play a role similar in many aspects to that of energy (*energeiai*) to Cappadocian, but „this functional similarity should not lead to the identification of *logoi* with the energies”.⁹¹ The reason that the term *logos* is used instead of *energeia* is to highlight the fact that God is present in the beings not only as the creator and sustainer of them, but as their meaning and purpose.

The question of how the *logoi* are connected with the uncreated energies of God in Maximus's theology has been a „thorn in the flesh”⁹² for Western scholars. Sherwood directly criticizes this interpretation of Lossky's, saying that the latter “understands the *logoi* in an Areopagitic and Palamite sense.”⁹³ Riou stands alone among the Western scholars in that, without entering into discussion about Palamism, he simply remarks, “Maximus himself calls the *logoi* ‘divine energies’ in Chapter 22 of the *Ambigua*.”⁹⁴ By contrast, an Orthodox theologian such as Bulović can say that the divine energies are the “*logoi* of things”: “*The doctrine of the ‘logoi of things’ makes no sense and cannot stand in the absence of the doctrine of a real distinction between essence and energy, nature and will. And on the other hand, without the doctrine of the ‘logoi of things’ the Christian dogma of the creation of the world would become shaky and vulnerable, being unable to explain how it is that the world has a beginning, while the creative power and energy of God is without beginning. So this doctrine concerning God’s ‘logoi’ and ideas is essentially identical to the doctrine of the divine energies*”.⁹⁵

The *logos* constitutes the natural energy within an essence. The principle is the profound unity of essence and energy and their co-existence: “We all possess both *logos* and its natural energy.”⁹⁶ Loudovikos see the uncreated essential principle functioning as a “limit”

50,55, PG 90:1100C-1104C; II.60, 88, PG 90:1106A, 1120C. On the other hand, Thunberg (*op. cit.*, 140), J. Farrell (*Free choice in St. Maximus the Confessor*, St. Tikhon's, 1989, p. 139), Karayiannis (*op. cit.*, 215) and Larchet (*op. cit.*, p. 395) cite the one text that includes both *logoi* and energies (*Amb* 22.2, PG 91.1257 AB) – a text not cited by Balthasar, Sherwood, or Lossky, as notes Karayiannis, *Maxime le Confesseur* 219 n. 285.

⁹¹ David Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom* (Cambridge: University Press, 2004) 216. „The common outlook for many centuries has been that the Hellenistic teaching about *logos* found an heir in the Christian *logos*” (Vladimir Cvetkovic, *Ontologies of freedom and necessity: an investigation of the concepts of logos in Greek philosophy and Christian thought* [Durham University, 2001 <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/>] 108).

⁹² Nikolaos Loudovikos, *A Eucharistic Ontology. Maximus the Confessors Eschatological Ontology of Being as Dialogical Reciprocity*, Translated by Elizabeth Theokritoff (Brookline, Massachusetts: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2010). Here Loudovikos analyzes the „direct hermeneutic connection in Maximus between the *logoi* of entities and eucharistic theology”. This means that the Eucharist remains the *locus par excellence* of this dialogical/synergetic encounter of human *logos*/will with the divine logical providence/judgment, which asks for this dialogue (Loudovikos, *A Eucharistic Ontology* 93). The concept of “mode of existence” in Maximus's theology has decisive consequences for his theory of the *logoi* of entities. The inner principles of entities attain substantive existence only as concrete modes of existence, manifesting personal otherness. The “eucharistic doctrine of the person” is the „communal reciprocity between man and God through the inner principles of entities, which function as gifts” offered and bestowed, forming the foundation for the communion of persons between God and man, a communion ultimately expressed as a „eucharistic reciprocity” of “offering” and “partaking” (Loudovikos, *A Eucharistic Ontology* 96-97).

⁹³ Vladimir Lossky, *Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church*, (New York: St Vladimirs Seminary Press, 1997) 95 and Sherwood, *The Earlier „Ambigua”* 178-179. Cf., Loudovikos, *Eucharistic Ontology* 97.

⁹⁴ Alain Riou, *Le Monde et l'Église Selon Maxime le Confesseur* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1973) 60. Cf., Loudovikos, *Eucharistic Ontology* 98.

⁹⁵ Irenei Bulović, *To Mysterion tis en ti Triadi diakriseos* (Analekta Vlatadon) 153-154. The identification of energy and force in God (in the theology of Mark of Ephesus) into the Bulović's thesis is cited by Loudovikos, *Eucharistic Ontology* 199, 113.

⁹⁶ *Opuscula Theological et Polemica*, PG 91: 36B-37A: „If He received the essential *logoi* of which He Himself was the hypostasis, then presumably He also had the natural animate energy of the flesh, the energy

and “definition” for the uncreated energy: „Anyway, we see that in Maximus the doctrine of a distinction between essence and energies in God cannot be understood without the doctrine of the uncreated *logoi* of entities in God, which in turn expresses and promotes the distinction between essence and will in God made by Athanasius and the Cappadocians.”⁹⁷

Palamas is making use of this teaching of Maximus’s when he grounds the reality of the uncreated energies in the personal/hypostatic character of the living God of Holy Scripture. The theory of the essential principles of entities in its connection with the theology of the uncreated energies of God is what explains the “personal” character of those natural energies and „leads us to the eucharistic foundation of the theology of the uncreated energies in Maximus, as also in Palamas”, says Loudovikos.⁹⁸

As it was emphasized by Calinic Berger St Maximus provided the core of Stăniloae’s synthesis and his discovery of St Maximus came at the apex of his work on St Gregory Palamas: “Palamas explicated theological aspect of our union with God through His uncreated energies, the Philokalia elucidated the human aspect by providing practical guidance in prayer and life, and St Maximus placed the path, the goal, the world, and the Church, in a synthetic and all-encompassing vision, which was notably and outstandingly Christocentric.”⁹⁹

Therefore, readers of Fr. Stăniloae’s work cannot but take note of his widespread and systematic use of Maximus’ doctrine of the *logoi*, which he closely relates to doctrine of the uncreated energies of St Gregory Palamas.

First, while Stăniloae maintains the ontological connection established by St Maximus between the one Logos and the many *logoi* in his overall doctrine of participation, he creatively draws out the implications contained in the Confessor’s teaching that the one Logos is the hypostatic or *personal* Logos of God.¹⁰⁰ Due to this fact, in Stăniloae’s view, the *logoi* of things possess ontological and existential (that is, personal) dimensions simultaneously. From the ontological perspective, the *logoi* are the unchanging models and goals of all things, according to which God creates, sustains, and guides them to Himself. The *logoi* pre-exist in an eternal, undifferentiated, and unchanging unity in God the Logos, and without departing from this simple unity, become differentiated and dynamic in the act of creation.¹⁰¹ More specifically, they are

whose essential principle is spread throughout our nature. And if as man He had the natural energy constituted by the principle of [human] nature, then clearly as God too He had a natural energy, which was manifested by the principle of the supra-essential Godhead” (Loudovikos, *Eucharistic Ontology* 100).

⁹⁷ Loudovikos, *Eucharistic Ontology* 100.

⁹⁸ Loudovikos, *Eucharistic Ontology* 101, 121, n. 228.

⁹⁹ Calinic Berger, „A Contemporary Synthesis of St Maximus’ Theology: The Work of Fr. Dumitru Stăniloae”, in Bishop Maxim (Vasiljević) ed., *Knowing the Purpose of Creation through the Resurrection* (Los Angeles/Belgrade: Sebastian Press & The Faculty of Orthodox Theology - University of Belgrade, 2013) 389-405, here 395, 398.

¹⁰⁰ “Moreover, would he not also perceive that the many *logoi* are one Logos, seeing that all things are relating to Him without being confused with Him, who is the essentially and personally distinct (ἐνοῦσιόν τε καὶ ἐνυπόστατον) Logos of God the Father, the origin and cause of all things...” (*Amb.* 7.15, PG 91:1077CD, in Calinic Berger, „A Contemporary Synthesis” 398-399); see, also, *On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ*, Selected Writings from St. Maximus The Confessor, Translated by Paul M. Blowers and Robert Louis Wilken (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003) 54-55;.

¹⁰¹ “... the one Logos is many *logoi* and the many are One. According to the creative and sustaining procession of the One to individual beings... the One is many” (*Amb.* 7.20, PG 91:1081C [Blowers ed., Crestwood, New York 2003] 57-58); „...every divine energy indicates through itself the whole of God, indivisibly

divine "wills" or the "thoughts of God, in conformity to which things are brought into existence through the divine will."¹⁰²

One consequence of Stăniloae's personal-ontological interpretation of the *logoi* is that the contemplation of nature, which is the ability to see the *logoi* of things unaffected and undistorted by passionate attachment, becomes clearly a form of personal dialogue between God and the human person. Through ascetic purification and the seeking of the *logoi*, Stăniloae's emphasis on the *personal* aspect of the Logos-*logoi* doctrine and highlights his notion that "person" or interpersonal communion, is always the goal (of the contemplation of nature), and „nature" is the means and irreducible ground of this communion. In this manner, „the Logos-*logoi* doctrine allows Fr. Stăniloae to establish a theological foundation for an ascetic spirituality which leaves no aspect of reality outside of the divine-human dialogue".¹⁰³

Stăniloae deftly integrates the *logoi* and uncreated energies, all the while remaining within the framework established for the *logoi* by St Maximus. It could be said that Stăniloae sees the *logoi* and energies as complementary, which can be demonstrated by drawing attention to some of Stăniloae's basic distinctions in this regard.

First, each logos, while clearly pre-existing and uncreated, is always identifiable through a *specific* created thing or *specific* attribute of God. The uncreated energies, on the other hand, are not integrally connected to specific beings or attributes. Therefore, the *logoi*, to an extent, have become intelligible through their manifestation in particulars; the energies are not associated with particulars and thus remain beyond intelligibility.¹⁰⁴ However, this does not mean that uncreated energies cannot be mediated through created things.

Secondly, this distinction can be seen in the fact that the uncreated energies reveal the *logoi* in things and the attributes of God „in motion." This becomes especially clear in natural contemplation, in which the ascent through created things to see their *logoi* occurs not only through ascetic purification, but with the help of "grace", which Stăniloae identifies as the uncreated energies.¹⁰⁵ The energies serve to *illumine* the mind to see the *logoi* in things and lead the mind through the *logoi* to their source, the one, personal Logos of God.

present in each particular thing, according to the logos-through which that thing exists in its own way... [God] is truly all things in all things, *never going out of His own indivisible simplicity* (Amb 22,3, PG 91:1257BC). Cf Dionysius, DN 4.13 „[He is in] all things through a superessential and ecstatic power whereby *He yet stay within Himself*..." (Pseudo-Dionysius, *The Complete Works*, Translation by Colm Luibheid, Foreword, Notes, and Translation Collaboration by Paul Rorem, Preface by Rene Roques, Introductions by Jaroslav Pelikan, Jean Leclercq, and Karlfried Froehlich [Mahwah, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1987] 82).

¹⁰² St. Maximus, following Dionysius, calls the *logoi* „wills" [θέλήματα] in Amb. 7.24, PG 91:1085BC (Blowers ed., Crestwood, New York 2003) 61-62; DN 5.8, 824C (Luibheid ed., Mahwah 1987) 102.

¹⁰³ Berger, „A Contemporary Synthesis" 398-399.

¹⁰⁴ The *logoi* can in turn become transparent to the energies, as St Maximus states in Amb. 22.2 (PG 91:1257 AB), and Stăniloae said, „the *logoi* are seized with the mind, but their energetic character with our entire being" (*Ambigua*, 226, n. 295; „Commentaire des Ambigua," translated by Père Aurel Grigoras, in *Saint Maxime le*

Confesseur: Ambigua, Trans. Emmanuel Ponsoye (Paris: Les Éditions de l'Ancre, 1994); Berger, „A Contemporary Synthesis" 400-401.

¹⁰⁵ It could be argued that St Maximus also equates „grace" and „divine energy," both of which convey „deification" after the cessation of natural powers (compare *Cap. Gnost.* 1.47, PG 90:1100C and 2.88, PG 90:1166D; Also compare, Amb 7.12, PG 91:1076CD with *On the Lord's Prayer*, 90:877A). In his description of Melchizedek, St Maximus refers to the „divine and uncreated grace, which exists eternally and is beyond all nature and time" (Amb. 10.44, PG 91:1141B), which Stăniloae notes alludes to Palamas' teaching long before Palamas (*Revista Teologică* 34: 3-4 (1944) 141, n. 164); Berger, „A Contemporary Synthesis" 401.

The distinction between the *logoi* and energies is also evident in Stăniloae's description of the difference between contemplation in this present life and in the future age. In the present life, we look directly at created things and through them we behold their *logoi*, which reveal the one Logos. However, in the future age we will see the *logoi* directly in the one Logos, because they will become transparent in the infinite light of the uncreated energies.¹⁰⁶

A final note should be made regarding the fact that on a few occasions Stăniloae states that the *logoi* are uncreated energies.¹⁰⁷ These instances should be seen in their context: in each, Stăniloae is referring specifically to the creation and sustaining of things, which in his interpretation occurs through the divine will of God, in accordance with the *logoi*, and by means of the uncreated energies. By referring to the *logoi* as energies in this context, Stăniloae is not disregarding the distinction between the *logoi* and the divine energies, which is clearly articulated and maintained throughout his works. Instead, he is emphasizing that the *logoi*, as „divine wills” or „creative, volitional powers of God”¹⁰⁸ thereby also possess an “energetic character”.¹⁰⁹ Certainly, St Maximus does not call the *logoi* „energies” and neither does he assign them a directly energetic aspect, though he does refer to the *logoi* as *θελήματα*, citing Dionysius. Therefore, it would appear that, in this instance (of assigning an energetic character to the *logoi* as *θελήματα*, and thereby calling them „energies”), Stăniloae is interpreting the *logoi* not entirely based on the Confessor's own writings, but also in the light of Dionysius.¹¹⁰ Stăniloae establishes the relationship between deification, *logoi* and energies and their common roots in Christology, and express it in the following way, saying: „*The incarnation of the Word... gave man the possibility to see in the human face of Logos, concentrated anew, all the logoi and divine energies. This final deification will consist of a contemplation and experience of all the divine logoi and energies conceived in and radiating from, the face of Christ.*”¹¹¹

Maximus' doctrine of the *logoi* deals with the *world* and its eternal root in God Himself, while Palamas presents to us a *doctrine of God*, which is based on a particular

¹⁰⁶ In other words, when we contemplate God directly we will contemplate the *logoi* of things in Him Himself, nor in things, as now. Then we will see them so much better illuminated, more profoundly, more clearly” (*Quest. ad Thal.* 55, PG 90.536). ”Thus, if in this life we first behold created things and only through them, with great difficulty, God, then we will see first God and transparently in His light all created things, in a manner all the more clear and complete, and more deeply, than we see them in an earthly objectivity...” This light Stăniloae calls the „energies of God, more infinite than an ocean” (Comment on *Cap. Gnost.* 2.88, PG 90:1165D [Philokalia 2:160, a text in parallel with Amb. 7.12, 91:1077AB], Filocalia, 2:201, n.1); Berger, „A Contemporary Synthesis” 402.

¹⁰⁷ Calinic Berger, *Teognosia - sinteza dogmatica si duhovniceasca a parintelui Dumitru Staniloae* (Si-biu: Deisis, 2014) 135-142.

¹⁰⁸ Dionysius the Areopagite in *DN* 5.8, 824C (Luibheid ed., Mahwah 1987) 102, affirmed that the *logoi* are divine wills. The *logoi* are not inert models, but creative, volitional powers of God, but that does not imply that they have an ontic existence, do not have self-existence.

¹⁰⁹ Calinic Berger, „A Contemporary Synthesis” 403.

¹¹⁰ Here is the passage from Dionysius (*DN* 5.8, PG 1:824C) which give the *logoi* an active/energetic aspect: „But we say that the being-making (οὐσιοποιὺς) *logoi* of all beings, which pre-exist uniformly in God, are paradigm (παραδείγματα), which theology calls predeterminations, and divine beneficent volitions (θελήματα), determinative and creative (ἀφοριστικά καὶ ποιητικά) of beings, according to which the Super-Essential both pre-determined and produced all beings.”

¹¹¹ Dumitru Stăniloae, *Spiritualitatea Ortodoxă* (București: EIBMBOR, 1992) 319; *Orthodox Spirituality*, Trans. Archim. Jerome (Newville) and Otilia Kloos (South Canaan, Pennsylvania: St. Tikhon's Press, 2002) 374.

experience of God and the way he explained the earlier Fathers, including Maximus, in the light of that experience.¹¹²

Conclusion

We ended our study with analyzing the relationship between *logoi* and *energeia* (the intentional or “logical” *energeia* and the ontology of divine energy as ontological “logic”) within the maximian cosmology, by referring to the palamite theology. The concept of *logoi* for St. Maximus play a role similar in many respects to that of energy (*energeiai*) in Cappadocian Fathers, but the functional similarity it should not lead to the identification rationales with the energies. Because the St Maximus’ development of the doctrine of divine essence and activities is largely equivalent to the teaching of St Gregory Palamas, it could be highly tempting to describe the path from the Cappadocians via Maximus to Gregory Palamas as a teleological development towards a natural conclusion. From the works of Gregory it is easy to see that the primary sense of *energeia* is activity. The *energeia*, he says, is ‘the essential motion of nature’. This resounds with Maximian terminology (Palamas, *Triads* 3.2.6 and 7; cf. Maximus, *Cap. gnost.* 1.48). Also, we saw the Maximus’ influence on Palamas and the direct references in which Palamas employs Maximus’ definitions describing the *reciprocal perichoresis* into the process of the divinisation. Therefore, Maximian idea of a dyophysite reciprocity (onto-tropological) between God and man (*Ambiguum*, 10) is the key to his soteriology (L. Thunberg). Palamas comes to a definition proper of *theosis* who is actually a quotation from Maximus (*Thalas.* 61, PG 90, 636C, and from the *Scholia* 6, PG 90, 644C). „Deification is an enhypostatic and direct illumination which has no beginning”, „a mystical union with God beyond intellect and reason” (*Triads* III. 1.28).

Therefore, connecting the theology of the uncreated energies with that of the uncreated *logoi*, simply proving the “personal” character of the uncreated energies to save us from lapsing into neo-Platonism, into impersonal energies or emanations. *The ontological dialogue between divine logoi and human logoi, accomplished in Christ, is the only natural context of the circulation of energies*, which proves also the personal/enhypostatic character of the uncreated energie. This rational principles which produce the substance of beings and preexist in a unified way in/around God, are the taboric luminous garment of Christ, as we can found in the analysis of the texts of *Ambigua* 26.

The holistic anthropology of deification through the enhypostatically illumination in Palamite hesychasm was easily able to assimilate the St. Maximus theology of uncreated *logoi* which provides a comprehensive framework for hesychastic cosmology of the uncreated light. Hermeneutical key here is the uncreated light (linking divine *logoi* of St. Maximus to the uncreated *energeia* of St. Gregory Palamas) and Christological anthropology (which connects palamite pneumatology of grace [*charis*] with the maximian christological dyothelism).

I chose instead old dilemma “Logic or Life”, the couple „Logic and Spirituality”, in which philosophy functions as hermeneutics and heuristics towards mystical experience. The association of aristotelian-neoplatonic logic with Christian mysticism in this analysis dedicated to Maxim, is a partnership understood as struggle of mystique against/for (at once) language/terminology, which actually represent a dynamic corrective against theological systematics.

¹¹² Rossum, „The *logoi* of Creation and the Divine energies” 217.

St. Maximus the Confessor synthesized Aristotelianism influences with those of Platonism in order to exceed the daring speculations of cosmology origeniene. He had an extraordinary ability to combine metaphysical requirements with the effort of defining the faith dogma, and the monastic experiences with the depth thinking, succeeding to propose a new conception in which converge all cultural and religious influences.

So, giving justice to Maximus any philosophy wich does not include mysticism will be false as *philosophy*. Our metaphysics must be mystical in order to be rational. In Maximus' doctrine, then, Christ comes not to destroy but to fulfill the metaphysics of mystery elaborated by the philosophers. For him there can be no separation between philosophy and theology, or between natural and revealed theology. Thereby, Christology and liturgical mysticism are not additional to a neoplatonic, aristotelian, and other methaphysics. Maximus concern was to continue, not the philosophical tradition of the Aristotelian commentators, but the theological one of the Fathers. He was not an Aristotelian commentator himself. The union and distinction are basic logical concepts in Maximus' thinking, but the Chalcedonian logic is the application of these concepts. Only in this way one can talk about christianization of aristotelian logic.

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The Prophet of the Uncreated Light?

The Image of the Prophet Elijah in Gorički zbornik and the Hebrew Tradition

1. The Hesychasm and Prophet Elijah

“There is something that shakes the heart during the prayer, something that the Prophet Elijah feels as “earthquake” and the Prophet Isaiah as “inner being” (Isaiah 16:11) [קרבני in Hebrew]”¹ – in this way actual Metropolitan of Montenegro Amfilohije Radović paraphrased Gregory Palamas in his Hesychast-centered account of biblical exegesis. Paraphrasis continued: “What is that if not the result of the personal encounter with God, testimony of the mystery of knowing God, the knowledge gathered from the touch with God.”² It is assumed that this personal encounter with God in Hesychasm comes from the way how Justin the Martyr understood the Scriptures: “We are learned it by the Holy Spirit of the prophecy which witness through Moses.”³

Therefore, the event of Transfiguration (Matthew 17:1–9, Mark 9:2–9, Luke 9:28–36) is the central biblical reference for the Hesychast doctrine, as it is witnessed in the liturgical books of the Orthodox Church. Written in the biggest part by the forefathers of Hesychasm, John of Damascus and Cosmas of Mayum, the service of Transfiguration show Moses and Elijah “counted worthy of this glory brighter than light” (“Μωϋσῆς καὶ Ἡλίας γενόμενοι, καὶ τῆς ὑπερφώτου δόξης ἀξιώθεντες”).⁴ Jesus revealed for Moses and Elijah the very mystery of Creation and “showed them the nature of man, arrayed in the original beauty of the Image;” moreover, “calling Moses and Elijah to be witnesses of this exceeding grace, He made them sharers in His joy”.⁵

This splendor image of Elijah will be underlined by the choice of the part of Third Book of Kings (1 Kings 19:3–9, 11–13, 15–16), where is described how Elijah met God

¹ Interesting enough, this place in *The Septuagint* is different: “καὶ τὰ ἐντός μου ὡς τεῖχος ἐνεκαίνισας” is translated in English as “Thou hast repaired my inward parts as wall” – *The Septuagint With Apocrypha: Greek and English*, translated by Sir Lancelot C. L. Brenton, Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999, p. 851.

² Митрополит [Црногорско-приморски] Амфилохије [Радовић], *Историјски пресјек њумањења Сѡарої Зајејѡа* [*The Short Historical Account of the Interpretation of The Old Testament*], Nikšić: Jasen-Bijeli Pavle, 1996, p. 66.

³ Justin the Martyr, *The First Apology*, cited from Марк Гиршман, *Еврейская и христианская интерпретации Библии в поздней античности* [Mark Hirshman, *Jewish and Christian Biblical Interpretation in Late Antiquity*], Jerusalem-Moscow: Gesharim-Mosty kultury, 2001, p. 19.

⁴ *The Festal Menaion*, translated by Mother Mary and Archimandrite Kallistos Ware, St. Tikhon Seminary Press, South Canaan, 1990, p. 469. The original text comes from *Μηναιόν τοῦ Ἀγίουσπου*, Athens: Fos, 1970, p. 65.

⁵ *The Festal Menaion*, op. cit. 476. In the Greek original: “ἔδειξε τὸ ἀρχέτυπον κάλλος τῆς τοιαύτης χάριτος, μάρτυρας παραστησάμενος Μωϋσῆν καὶ Ἡλίαν, κοινωνοὺς ἐποιεῖτο τῆς εὐφροσύνης” (*Μηναιόν τοῦ Ἀγίουσπου*, op. cit. 70).

at mount of Horeb, to be read during the Vespers of Transfiguration feast. In this way for the Hesychasts Elijah become their biblical forefather in Theophany, i.e. in seeking the Uncreated Light of God's Face, defined by Gregory Palamas as the Divine Energies or the Grace of God (ἐνέργεια τοῦ Θεοῦ in Greek; also the Grace of God, Greek χάρις, Slavonic благодать).⁶ Since this light is the same primordial one that preceded Creation and shone again in his presence, this image of Elijah as the Prophet of eschatological light is comparable with the image of the same Prophet given in *Apocalypse of Daniel*. There, "The Messiah will have Elijah blow the trumpet" and "the primal light, which shone before the week of the Creation, will reappear;" Moreover, at the same time the Shekhinah – term for God's presence which similarities and differences with the Divine Energies should be discussed – "will become visible to all;"⁷

In the attempt to contribute to the research of the relationship of these two images of Elijah – one from the Hebrew oral tradition and second from liturgy of the Orthodox Church – here will be presented a short case study of Elijah's image in the Serb-Slavonic manuscript *The Gorica Compilation* (*Gorički zbornik*) written in 1441/42 by the Serbian monk named Nikon of Jerusalem. The manuscript was written in the Serbian southern medieval province of Zeta (today's Montenegro) within the community of monks from the Lake of Skadar, strongly affiliated with the Serbian Orthodox Monastery of St. Archangels in Jerusalem and by that heavily influenced by the Palestine monasticism.

Nikon of Jerusalem is considered as a typical writer of the second Hesychast wave, although difference usually has been made between his two compilations.⁸ The first one, *Hexaemeron* is one year older, more concentrated on prayer and almost absent of his original works. *The Gorica Compilation* contains a large amount of Nikon's writings, still not completely recognized and separated from the biblical parts – very often coming from the oral tradition – and the almost unanimously reworked patristic parts.

Tomislav Jovanović was the first scientist who paid attention to the oral biblical tradition and apocryphal elements in *The Gorica Compilation* in his work on the tale of Melchizedek preserved in the book on the sheets 72 verso–75 recto.⁹ In his work Jovanović underlines especially kind of an diachronic Eros that Melchizedek as a biblical character had for the interpreters of the Bible throughout the history of exegesis.

That history within its Jewish frame seems not to be unknown for Nikon of Jerusalem: for example, on the sheet 56 recto he quotes Methodios of Patras on the expul-

⁶ On Nikon's relationship with Hesychast doctrine see our text *Nikon of Jerusalem and the Hesychast Tradition* [Јеромонах Јован (Ћулибрк) Никон Јерусалимац и исихастичко предање], in: Свети Григорије Палама у историји и садашњости [*Saint Gregory Palamas in the Past and Today*], Srbinje: Duhovna akademija Svetog Vasilija Ostroškog, 2001, pp. 151–160.

⁷ Louis Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews IV*, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 5707–1947, p. 234.

⁸ For the synthetic overview on Nikon and the bibliography see: Boško I. Bojović, *Nikon le Hiérosolymitain* and *Le Recueil de Gorica* in his book *L'Idéologie monarchique dans les hagio-biographies dynastiques du moyen age Serbe*, Roma: Pontificio istituto orientale, 1995, pp. 209–220 and 221–238; also, collected papers *Никон Јерусалимац Вријеме-личност-дјело* [*Nikon of Jerusalem Time-Person-Work*], edited by Hieromonk Jovan Ćulibrk, Cetinje: Svetigora, 2004; and meticulous contribution by Borivoje Marinković, in his book *Hidden World of Vladimir Ćorović* [Скривени свет Владимира Ћоровића], Bileća-Gacko: SPKD "Prosvjeta", 2006, pp. 551–569.

⁹ *Апокриф о Мелхиседеку у препису Горичког зборника* [*The Apocryphal on Melchizedek in the Transcript of The Gorica Compilation*], in: Jovan Ćulibrk (ed.), *Nikon Jerusalemac*, pp. 223–233.

sion of Adam from the Eden: въ лѣто прѣвое сътворень адама ѡ(ѣ)ца мартїа ке д(е)нь, въ час[']ъ, и сътворень рая лѣт[']ъ з, филонь евреннь рет(е), прѣбыст['] адама въ рая;” (“In the first year Adam was created, in the month of March, day 25th, in the Sixth hour, and after [God] created Paradise, 7 years, Philo the Jew said, dwells Adam in Paradise”). We were unable to locate this quotation neither in Philo’s works nor in pseudoepigrapha preserved under his name as given by Charlesworth. Moreover, in Scholer’s edition of C. D. Yonge’s translation of Philo’s collected works,¹⁰ only works of Eusebius of Caesarea and John of Damascus out of all the Church fathers are considered as if they contain fragments of Philo’s texts; Methodios of Patras is not even mentioned. The search for Philo in the works of Methodios of Patras ended without results too. Even on the last pages of his work *On Creation* (Τοῦ αὐτοῦ περὶ τῶν Γενητῶν – Ἐκλογή κατὰ Σύνοψιν) where Methodios discusses some temporal issues about Adam, there is no discussion about how long he lived in Paradise.¹¹ Nevertheless, even if the quotation is from some secondary source, it is obvious that Nikon of Jerusalem is aware of the Jewish exegetical tradition.

Our task here is to check if the Hebrew biblical or oral tradition influenced the image of the Prophet Elijah as given in *Gorički zbornik*.

2. The Images of Elijah

Within 273 leafs (546 pages) of *Gorica Compilation*,¹² Prophet Elijah is mentioned twelve times. Rather than gathered in one narrative – a biblical paraphrase or a Life of a saint for example – those parts are scattered all over the manuscript. Since *Gorički zbornik* is very specific in its texture, the fragments in which Elijah appears will come from various narratives and their role will differ. Therefore *Gorički zbornik* even within a limited space offers a whole scale of variations of images of Prophet Elijah, as if to confirm that his “removal from earth, so far from being an interruption to his relations with men, rather marks the beginning of his real activity.”¹³

2.1. For the first time Elijah appears in *Gorički zbornik* on the sheets 13 verso-13 recto within the First Epistle of Nikon of Jerusalem to his spiritual daughter, princess Jelena Balšić. The Epistle itself is a long ascetic discourse on the virtues, probably sermon, of unassigned origin. There, from the sheet 12 recto begins the New Testament story preserved in Luke 7:11–16, about the resurrection of the son of the widow from Nain. The story here expanded from original six verses to almost three pages and it ends on the sheet 14 verso with a mother’s lament as the most important addition.

While in the Gospel the mother is silent, here she loudly invokes Elijah and Elisha, asking: “да бѣ Нїа бѣль, да бѣ ѡм даь тако и сарфѣннстѣн вдовци с(н)нь” (sheet 13 verso: “If Elijah will be [here], to give me son as to the widow of Zarephath”). This

¹⁰ *The Works of Philo Complete and Unabridged*, Translated by C. D. Yonge, Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2002. On this matter we consulted also Peder Borger, Kåre Fuglsæth, Roal Sharsten, *The Philo Index*, Grand Rapids-Cambridge: William B. Eerdmann Publishing Company, 2000.

¹¹ We tried in Migne, *Patrologiae cursus completus*, PG Tomus 18, 1857, pp. 1–107. *On Creation* is on the pages 331–344.

¹² For the textology of *Gorički zbornik* one can use work of Nadežda Sindik, *Кодикологија Горичког зборника* [*The Codicology of Gorički zbornik*], in: Jovan Ćulibrk (ed.), *Nikon Jerusalemac*, pp. 185–198.

¹³ Louis Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews IV*, op. cit., p. 202.

evocation of the resurrection of boy “who was later to be known as the prophet Jonah”¹⁴ from 1 Kings 17:17–24 led to Jesus’ also inserted answer: “нѣ ли ищешн? Се зде есмь азъ, вл(а)д(ы)ка егѡ” (sheet 13r): “Elijah is the one you are asking for? This one here is to be me, his Lord”. A similar answer is given concerning Elisha.

What is the reason for this addition? No doubt, there is in our case development of the biblical text typical for Byzantine hymnography, especially in the way that New Testament dialogues were added and developed in the hymns of the Holy Week. But, there could be an inner biblical reason too: in the Gospel according to Mark 8:27–28, on Jesus’ question, “Who do men say that I am?” Apostles answered: “John the Baptist; but some say, Elijah: and others, one of the prophets.” Therefore, people already mix Jesus with Elijah and the resurrection of the son of widow from Nain could just add to confusion: not mentioning the resurrection of Jonah, Elijah in the Hebrew oral tradition gained the power over the Angel of Death and applied it many times on behalf of the poor and righteous. Therefore, Elijah gave a chance to reveal Jesus as the New Adam: the woman had to ask for Elijah and Elisha and had to get the answer of Jesus’ Divine identity.

We can conclude that the ascetic discourse written in XV century showed here contains the part that could come from the Hebrew source and that deals with the matter typical for the early community of the Jerusalem Church when Christians used to come from the Jews.

2.2. On the last sheet of the First Epistle in *Gorički zbornik*, sheet 15 recto, there is a blessing from Nikon to his spiritual daughter Jelena. In the middle of the blessing, Nikon says: “око н се д(8)хъ Нлїе на Елнсен н на текѣ почнше с(вѣ)тых(’) оутрѡбы, яко славѣ Б(о)жїи д(8)хъ на вас(’) почїеть” (“As the spirit of Elijah on Elisha, so the inner [being] of the holy be on you, as the spirit of the glory of God on you”). This should be an usual blessing in the spiritual fatherhood of the biblical tradition, since after Elijah’s translation Elisha’s prophetic powers, as it is depicted in 2 Kings 2:1–14 and forward, “were strengthened, as a reward for the unhesitating readiness with which he obeyed Elijah’s summons, and parted with the field he was ploughing, and with all else his possessed, in favour of the community.”¹⁵ But the stress on “the spirit of the glory of God” is surely of the Hesychast origin, because that term was widely recognized and used in the theology of the time as a synonym for the Divine Energies. Here we for the first time in *Gorički zbornik* have a hint of a Hesychast image of the Prophet, because the spiritual fatherhood is given as the *masoreth* and continuation of the Divine Energies. Jelena is to follow Nikon as Elisha followed Elijah and she will receive the spiritual gifts in the form of the Divine Energies.

2.3. In Nikon’s Second Epistle to Jelena the image of the Prophet Elijah will be developed more toward a Hesychast worldview. Namely, on the sheet 46 recto Nikon is answering Jelena’s question: “What way of life is better: to suffer and practice tolerance among the many or the solitude of the life of the martyrs?” She asks in fact what kind of a monastic life Nikon prefer, the coenobitic or hermitage (anchoretic), and the classic as-

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 197. Ginzberg for this tradition cites Yerushalmi Sukkah 5, 55a, PRE 33, same as Jeronim’s introduction to the book of Jonah where he uses midrashic interpretation. (Louis Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews VI*, p. 318).

¹⁵ Louis Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews IV*, op. cit., p. 239.

cetic expression for a monk as “a martyr of consciousness” is used for the later. Nikon will answer with the biblical example: “Мѡϣѣн же съ мнозѣмъ сп(а)се се, Илїа же въ безм(ь)лвн живеше, и оба Б(о)гѣ 8годнста” (“Moses was saved among the many, and Elijah lived in the silence and prayer – Greek ἡσυχία, Slavonic безмълвнє – and the both of them pleased God”).

Thereafter, Nikon will quote a story from *Patericon*: the same question about the best way of life has been asked one of the monks who lived with Anthony the Great, the founder of ascetic life in recluse. The monk considered every way as the way of one specific virtue by which fulfilment God will be with the man. As the examples he underline four biblical persons: “Іако Авраамъ страннолюбе(є)ць бѣ, и Б(о)гѣ бѣ съ нимъ. И Илїа любляше безмълвїє и Б(о)гѣ бѣ съ нимъ. И Д(а)в(и)д(ѣ) бѣ смиренъ и Б(о)гѣ бѣ съ нимъ. И Мѡϣѣн бѣ кроткъ и Б(о)гѣ бѣ съ нимъ. (sheet 47 verso: “Because Abraham loved strangers and God was with him. And Elijah loved the silence and prayer and God was with him. And David was humble and God was with him. And Moses was tame and God was with him”).

Obviously, virtues are the ways to realize the unity with God, which is the main concern of both Nikon and Jelena. In both cases, Elijah is stressed as an outstanding ascetic who dwells in безмълвнє, ἡσυχία, where from comes the very name “Hesychast”. Being a symbol of the Hesychasm, even the psychosomatic method of prayer is directly taken from 1 Kings 18:42, where “Elijah put his face between the knees”.¹⁶ According to WR 31.4 by that way “he besought God to remember the sign of the covenant”¹⁷ and this mystical connection of Elijah and Moses will find its expression in *Gorički zbornik* as if they are forefathers of monasticism.

This expression is heavily loaded with the Elijah’s mystical aura where “it is safe to say that what Moses was to the Torah, Elijah was to the Kabbalah”¹⁸ and with his Mesianic activity as well, in which in echnaton “his relation to Moses will be the same Aaron once held.”¹⁹ In both cases, finally, we have also load of the their secret fate, and in this picture “the miracle of Elijah’s immortality thus reaches us through back door”.²⁰

2.4. Next time we will meet the Prophet Elijah after the aforementioned Apocryphal on Melchizedek, which is discontinued in the very moment of his meeting with Abraham on the Mount Tabor. A piece is missing and today the manuscript continues at the sheet 76 verso by developing the life of Melchizedek into the New Testament typos of the Church. But, at the end of the page and on the next one, the new typos will be revealed as well, in which Nikon uses Mount Tabor as the connection of the meeting of Abraham and Melchizedek with the event of Transfiguration, and says: И кыст(ъ) гора въ образъ

¹⁶ To switch to more recent sources, one can use a famous Russian book from the end of XIX century *Сказания странника духовному отцу* (usually translated as *A Way of a Pilgrim*) as a compendium of Hesychast practice and the introduction in the classic Hesychast five volume collection *Φιλοκαλία* (*Philokalia*) compiled by Nikodimos Agiorithis and Paisie Velitchovsky at the end of XVIII century.

¹⁷ Louis Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews VI*, op. cit., p. 318. Elijah’s ascetic image was probably one of the reasons why his name is attached to the *Apocalypse of Elijah*, where introductory chapter is dedicated to fasting and prayer. Winterrmute’s introduction for this pseudoepigraph in Charlesworth’s edition miss that point (*Apocalypse of Elijah, A New Translation and Introduction by O. S. Winterrmute* in: James H. Charlesworth (ed.), *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha Volume I*, Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers 2010, pp. 721–754.

¹⁸ Louis Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews IV*, op. cit., p. 229.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 233.

²⁰ Yair Zakovich, *The Concept of the Miracle in the Bible*, Tel Aviv: MOD Books, 1990, p. 100.

Ц(Е)РКВН, И СЪВЪКЪПИ СЕБѢ Х(РИСТО)С() ОБОЕ ЗАПОВѢДИ ТАЖЕ ПРИЕТЕ Ц(Е)РКВН, И ПОКАЗА НАМЪ ЯКО ТЪ ЕСТ() ДАВЦЪ ОБОИХЪ. ЕДИНА ПОЕТЕ ТАИНСТВІА ЕГО А ДРУГА ТАКН СЛОВОУ ДѢЛА ЕГО” (“And the mountain was the image of the Church and Christ gathered to him both commandments that Church received and showed to us that He is the giver of both. One of them praise his mysteries and the second reveals the glory of His deeds”).

Although the names of Moses and Elijah are not mentioned, two of them are with Christ on Tabor as the symbols of two most important Commandments, as Matthew 22:37–39 and Luke 10:27 interprets Deuteronomy 6:5, 10:12 and 30:6: Elijah as love for God and Moses as love for neighbour. Moreover, in the second sentence Elijah becomes a symbol of a contemplative and Moses of an active ascetic life in the way that Great Canon of Andrew from Crete interprets the relationship between Sarah and Hagar as well. Elijah here is the one who by the asceticism ascended to *θεωρία*, to the knowledge of the Divine mysteries (Slavonic *ωзерцаніе*), which is in fact the same image of the messenger who “revealed the mysteries of universe” to Rabbi Isaac Loria, “father of Kabbalistic Renaissance”.²¹ At the same time for Nikon the mountain is “the image of the Church” which is to be understood here as the eschatological reality as it will be revealed at the end of time. Here the mystical Hesychast interpretation of the image of the Prophet Elijah reached its peak, being the closest with his image in the Jewish mystical tradition. And by it not only the Scriptures but the oral tradition too is used to confirm both Jesus’ Divinity and his role: strengthened by Elijah’s miraculous presence in the Transfiguration, “faith in God brings about the recognition of His emissary.”²²

2.5. In the Third Epistle, “on the sheets 85 recto–87 recto Nikon returns to the question of Jelena’s Church she built at the Lake and he comments *the place* where it was build – ‘silent and on the island in the same time’ – which allows him to interpret the subject of ‘desert’ as the place for the opening [of the inner being of man] to God.”²³ On the sheet 86 recto Nikon says: НЪ ИЛІА ЖЕ ПРѢЖДЕ И ИОАННЪ СЕМОУ ПОСЛѢДОВАШЕ ЗАКОНЪ, И ОВЪ ОУБѢ ВЪ КАРМИНІИ БЕЗМЛЪКІА ПРОХОЖДАШЕ, ПОДВИГЪ СЕБЕ ПРИСКЛАЕ” (“But first Elijah and [after] John followed this law, and the first one practiced the prayer and life in silence on Carmel, [and by that] acquired asceticism”).

The aforementioned law is the law of the ascetic life in desert. This image is similar to the one we described in the third case, from the sheets 46 recto–47 verso, and it has as source the same biblical portion, 1 Kings 18:42, on Elijah’s prayer on Mount Carmel. Here, as following the culmination in the symbolism of Transfiguration, we are descending down the Mount Tabor, back from *θεωρία* to asceticism. The difference in the recipient of the image: instead of a message to Jelena alone, now it is sermon on ascetic life in desert to the brotherhood and sisterhood of monks and nuns gathered on the islands of the Lake of Skadar, where at least one of the churches on the top of island Moračnik is supposed to be consecrated in the name of Transfiguration or the Prophet Elijah alone.

²¹ Louis Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews IV*, op. cit., p. 231. Therefore in the service of the Transfiguration Elijah is called “the wise” (*The Festal Menaion*, op. cit., p. 484); to add to the mystical image of the Prophet Elijah, him and Moses were “caught up in ecstasy” in the event of Transfiguration (*Ibid.*, p. 487).

²² Yair Zakovich, *The Concept of the Miracle in the Bible*, op. cit., p. 131.

²³ Nina Gagova, *Горицкият сборник в контекста на южнославянските владетелски сборници от 14 и 15 в.* [*The Gorica Compilation Within the Context of South-Slavic Compilations for Aristocracy from XIV and XV Century*], in: Jovan Culibrk (ed.), *Nikon Jerusalem*, p. 211.

For those monks and nuns the Prophet Elijah in his ascetic dimension is as present as for “Kiddushin 70a, which reads: Every marriage is recorded in writing by Elijah (...), and God affixes His seal to the marriage record.”²⁴ This pedagogical image of Elijah who is watching over the virtues of the people or over the asceticism of the monks its archetypal form has in his presence during the circumcision.

2.6. For the next time in *Gorički zbornik* we will meet the Prophet Elijah in the introduction to the Lives of the Serbian saints Symeon the Myroblyte and Sava the First Archbishop, Jelena's forefathers. It begins on the sheet 102 recto and immediately turns into the Old Testament account of the meaning of the number seven, ending on sheet 105 verso. On the sheet 104 verso is the largest piece of text in whole *Zbornik* concerning Elijah: “ѡкож(ѣ) н седмѡе ѡбращенїѣ, Нѡѣ прор(о)ка заревѡѣ в[ъ]дохнѣ с(н)нѣ еже живѡу быти, вѣдѣхнѣхше. Н тог(о) жде равнѡчисльнѡе на колѣна призыванїѣ егда огнемь в(о)госланнымь жртѡѡ пояде н стѡдныѣ пророкы ѡсѡди; равнѡе невѣзлѡгшїѡ(ѡ) ѡ призыванїѡ. Такожде н седмѡрнѡе сѡмѡттрѣнїѣ облака отрошїѡх покелѣннѡ. (“same as the seventh turn of the Prophet Elijah to the son of the widow from Zarephath to inspire him to be alive. And of the same (Prophet) the invocation on the knees same by the number, when the Godsend fire ate the sacrifice and condemned the shameful prophets; who (the prophets) were not able to do it by the same number of invocations. Also, seven time to watch the clouds ordered to the kid.”).

Two biblical events are referred to here. The first is again 1 Kings 17:17–24, the resurrection of the son of the widow from Zarephath: but, the Bible here in the verse 21 reports that Elijah “stretched himself out on the child three times” (פּטַמִּים וּיְתַמֵּד עַל-הַיֵּלֶד שְׁלֹשׁ) instead of seven times as Nikon reported. It doesn't seem that Nikon used some other source for this part – it is much more likely that Nikon simply wrote without the Bible in front of him and unconsciously adapted the biblical event to his own purpose. Though, it would be important to see if in the oral tradition there is an example of this narrative from 1 Kings where the number was turned from three to seven.

This is an important thing in the research of *Gorički zbornik* because it shows how Nikon made the book. Opposite of his first book, *Haexameron*, which is meticulous composition of translations without his intervention, *The Gorica Compilation* clearly reveals use of oral traditions and often Nikon's hand in rewriting patristic and biblical texts as well. But, in rewriting Isaac the Syrian's 16th Sermon, for example, we can follow interpolation of other patristic texts within the work of one Church father; here the mistake is obvious.

The second biblical event is the slaughter of the false prophets done by Elijah and the end of the drought, described in 1 Kings 18. Here Nikon says that the number seven is applied three times: a. seven times Elijah prayed before God burned the offering; b. seven time the false prophets tried to do persuade Baal to do the same; c. finally, seven times send Elijah send his servant to see if the clouds are rising from the sea to end the drought. Only the last one is supported by the biblical text (1 Kings 18:43): for the false prophets is said only that they “called on the name of Baal from morning even till noon” and “when midday was past, they prophesied until the *time* of the offering of the *evening* sacrifice” (1 Kings 18:26, 29). For Elijah is given only his prayer “at the *time* of the offering of the *evening* sacrifice” (וַיְהִי בַעֲלִית הַמִּנְחָה – 1 Kings 18:36–37) – and if that service included seven prayers on the knees it will be surprising knowledge even for Nikon. So we suppose

²⁴ Louis Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews VI*, op. cit., p. 324.

that here Nikon maybe used some oral tradition that we are not aware of, because it is hard to believe that he would adapt so much of the biblical text – and that tradition in turn affected the event of the resurrection of the future Prophet Jonah.

The purpose of dealing with number seven will be clear after the passage on the sheet 105 recto: “И д(с)хъ въсхытихъ Илію на колесниці” (“And the Spirit ascended Elijah on the chariot”) says Nikon. The whole introduction is about the sanctity of the Serbian royal dynasty of the Nemanjići to whom Jelena belongs, and in the Serbian iconography of the time the Tree of Jesse was very often juxtaposed with the Tree of Nemanja in the aim to acquire biblical roots for the dynasty. Thus, Elijah here is used as a person with the gifts of the Holy Spirit, seven by number, and his ascension (2 Kings 2:1–14) is the classical example of the acquisition of the Spirit of God.²⁵ Therefore, the dynasty of Nemanjići is a continuation of the same biblical line of the Spirit and in a way – the continuation of the same influence of Elijah that started when “seven years after his translation, he wrote a letter to the wicked king Jehoram, who reigned over Judah.”²⁶

By that, Nikon is trying to persuade Jelena to devote her last years to spiritual life and ascetism similar to the one practiced by the Prophet Elijah, invoking and promising the same gifts of spirit received in her family throughout the time. Here, the mystical image of Elijah is underlined by his “historical right” to intervene in the matters of the morality of a royal family. Jelena’s turn to ascetic life is compared in *Gorički zbornik* with the biblical encounter of Abraham and Melchizedek with idols, as if the matters of this world are idols compared to Hesychast life. As a conclusion in this case we may say that the image of Elijah here is descending again from the theoretical and theological peak into maybe mystical but surely applied field of the life of the people, even of the nation.

2.7. It is even more obvious on the sheet 213 recto where the liturgical calendar of the monastic community on the Lake of Skadar includes “к + с(вє)т(а)го прор(о)ка Иліѣ” ([In the Month of July] 20th [is the feast of] Saint Prophet Elijah). The same calendar will on the next page mention the feast of Transfiguration on the 6th of August.

2.8. At the end of *Gorički zbornik* Prophet Elijah will appear once more – in the Nikon’s travelogue of the Holy Land, well known in the world of Byzantine Studies as his original work.²⁷ The travel account begins at the sheet 265 recto and continues to the sheet 271 verso, and on the sheet 268 recto it is written: “Видѣхъ() же пещерѣхъ крѣстн[тє] ли прѣднѣте блнзъ ес(ть) Иліѣ Ѳезкїтєнна. И тѣи ермонь, еже ѳансею яви се, и въ огнѣи колесниці ѡзрѣвъ его” (“And I saw the cave of the Baptist [and] Forerunner, it is close to Elijah the Tishbite. And there is Hermon, where he appeared to Elisha, and [Elisha] saw him in the chariot of fire”); and on the sheet 269 recto: тамо ес(ть) пещера Иліѣ Ѳезкїтєнна. Тамо врань напита чюднаго прор(о)ка” (There [on Mount Sinai] is the cave of Elijah the Tishbite. There the raven fed the marvellous Prophet”).

²⁵ In the same way Elijah’s ascension is mentioned twice in the Service of the Transfiguration. See *The Festal Menaion*, op. cit., pp. 476 and 485.

²⁶ Louis Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews IV*, op. cit., p. 202. He quotes here *Seder ‘Olam* 17 and makes comparison with Josephus, *Antiqui.*, IX, 5.2. (Louis Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews VI*, op. cit., p. 325).

²⁷ With already related general literature on Nikon, the most relevant is still the work of Đorđe Trifunović, *The Two Epistles of Jelena Balšić and Nikon’s ‘Tale of Churches of Jerusalem and Holy Places’* [Две посланице Јелене Балишић и Никонова ‘Повест о јерусалимским црквама и светим местима’], in: “Književna istorija” V/18 (1972), pp. 289–326.

Those two sentences may be understood at first as a geographical confusion because the cave of John is near Ein Kerem, and Elijah's is near Haifa; oral tradition the connects Elijah the Prophet with a cave in Wadi Qelt near Jericho; in that one he is supposed to hide and be fed by the raven and not at Sinai as it is told in the second quoted sentence. But what we have here is a narrative in a manner of a liturgical ἀνάμνησις, recollecting the biblical and Church history by similarity and fulfilled typology, taken by form from the service of the Eucharist, as described in the study on the travelogue by Đorđe Trifunović.

Interesting is that Nikon uses Hebrew word הרמון (Hermon, Ἑρμων) for a place wherefrom Elisha watched Elijah's translation. Namely, in Slavonic translation of the Bible the word Ἑρμωνίμλ (Hermons) is used for a hilly place, turning a proper noun into the common one.²⁸

But, generally, what is important there is that at the end of *Gorički zbornik* Nikon in the form of coda repeats three of the archetypal Hesychast images of the Prophet Elijah, and by choosing them among all the other biblical images of Elijah Nikon undoubtedly emphasises his own Hesychast statement. First image (connection with John the Baptist, discussed already on page 9) is related here for the second time, and the second (the translation of Elijah, 2 Kings 2:1–14) for the third time. The event with the raven (1 Kings 17:1–7) is for the first time mentioned in *The Gorica Compilation*, just to add a well-known nuance to the Prophet's anchoretic image.

3. Conclusion

So, at very end of Nikon's manuscript we have eventually all of three elements of Hesychast reading of the Prophet Elijah: the biblical typology, the mysticism and the ascetics. By first, he was the typos of John the Baptist; by second, he is the prophet of the Uncreated Light of God, which shone in the Creation and the Transfiguration respectively; by third he is forefather of the prayer of heart and mind which asks for the recluse, ἡσυχία. Therefore, we can conclude that *Gorički zbornik* in way that created the image of the Prophet Elijah sticks very strict to the Hesychast doctrine and worldview.

At the same time, it is easy to draw the parallel of this splendour image of this Prophet being concentrated on prayer and Theophany with Elijah who "had not no fear of man, and did not flee to the desert to escape Jezebel, but to ascertain his fate at the Holy Mount of Horeb".²⁹ The latter got its final form in *Zohar* but as a conclusion of a long process of transformation.

Both traditions showed here prefer this enlightened image of the Prophet to Elijah who slaughtered false prophets and zealously fought Ahab and prayed for his own people to be punished. Of the special importance for *The Gorica Compilation* is the fact that Elijah is not subject in any linear narrative but appears from the margins as illustration or a symbol, thus Nikon have more freedom to "read" and shape its image according to his personal encounter with Elijah, the Bible and both Hebrew and Hesychast tradition.

²⁸ Grigoriy Dyachenko, *Полный церковно-славянский словарь* [*The Complete Church-Slavonic Dictionary*], Moscow: Izdatelskiy otdel Moskovskogo patriarchate, 1993, p. 176; R. M. Ceytlin, R. Vecherko and E. Blagova (eds.), *Старославянский словарь* [*The Old-Slavonic Dictionary*], Moscow: Izdatelstvo Russkiyazyk, 1999, pp. 210–211.

²⁹ Louis Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews VI*, op. cit., p. 321.

However, it shows that Nikon was aware of the oral and written tradition of Judaism, and this connection could be traced to his time spent in Jerusalem of the Mameluks, at the end of XIV and beginning of XV century. At the time, Torah and Talmud were widely studied in Jerusalem and the Holy Land, before the Jewish community was impoverished and downsized by heavy taxation in 1440, and somebody as interested in the biblical history as Nikon was, could easily find collocutors and gain knowledge of both.

“In which way we can interpret it (=The Scripture) at all, if we forgot the original language in which it was produced,”³⁰ asked himself George Florovsky in 1951, at the time when research of *Gorički zbornik* begin. Similar to another non-conventional biblical scholar and the writer of *The Great Code* – Northrop Frye, he assumed that process of reaccepting of the norms of the biblical mind requires not only the scholarship but also the living and existential encounter with God and personal responsibility towards His word also. In their relationship with the Prophet Elijah *The Gorica Compilation* and its writer, Nikon of Jerusalem, are good examples how the Hesychasts of XV century in their own time understood and realized demands of a great Russian scholar.

The Gorica Compilation

Selected pages

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13 RECTO

³⁰ Утрата библейского мышления [*The Lost Scriptural Mind*], in: *Избранные богословские статьи*, Moscow: Izdatelstvo "Probel", 2000, p. 211.

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268 RECTO

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269 RECTO



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On Artistic Genius and the Main Function of Art (Two Lectures*)

Lecture 1: *Artistic Genius: Before Kant, According to Kant, and After Kant*

I. Introduction

In this lecture I will present a brief history of the concept of genius in Western aesthetics. Besides the obvious issue concerning how to understand the nature of artistic genius, I will address the following questions concerning its relevance: When exactly did this concept come into prominence? Why is it that the concept of genius became so important in the eighteenth century? Finally, why doesn't the concept of artistic genius play any significant role in today's aesthetics?

Before we look at our topic in more detail, let us first say what will *not* be the object of our consideration. In the West, the word genius is frequently used for scientists like Einstein, but we will ignore scientific genius for the moment. Sometimes, but less frequently, the word is also used for extraordinary achievements in ethics – for example, Socrates is sometimes considered an ethical genius – but we will set aside this use as well. Our focus will be artistic genius.

The usual meaning of the term artistic genius is associated with the following attributes: originality, innovation, creativity, individuality, spontaneity, inborn gift, and production of a magnificent work of art. The characteristics that a genius does not have and that stand in opposition to it include: what is average or mediocre, what is conventional and usual, what is the result of much effort and training, and what is the result of an acquired skill or technique.

Some commonly accepted examples of geniuses in the Western World in the field of art are: Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, and Wagner in music; Michelangelo and Rodin in sculpture; Raphael, Leonardo, Rembrandt, and Picasso in painting; Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe, and Dostoevsky in literature.

In popular opinion, Mozart (1756–1791), is considered to be the greatest, or at least the prototypical, genius of all time. The reasons for that are easy to understand: at a very early age of 5, Mozart could already play well two instruments: clavichord (a predecessor of today's piano) and violin. More importantly, he started composing music at that early age as well. This suggests that his talent was inborn, not the result of many years of practice and education. He composed numerous pieces (over six hundred), many of which become the canonical works of the Western culture – often performed and wide-

* This is an edited version of the lectures presented in at Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China (2009), and China East University, Shanghai, China (2015).

ly known even by those who do not know much about classical music. His works are for this reason associated with musical perfection, and his early death, at the age of thirty-five, only contributed to his legend. According to the popular presentation of Mozart's life, he composed without making corrections; when he was inspired, the music simply poured out of him. Even at his deathbed, Mozart could compose music that was as complete as it was beautiful.

As we know well, what is taken for granted in popular opinion need not correspond to truth. To grasp the concept of artistic genius proper, we need to undergo a careful historical analysis. But here a warning is necessary. Like virtually all other topics in Western aesthetics, the concept of genius cannot be completely understood by looking at the aesthetic phenomena and experience alone. This is so because in Western culture and consciousness, aesthetics is a discipline of secondary importance. As such it is always influenced by something considered more important, be it religion, or philosophy, or science, or politics, or perhaps (in our age) economy. Let us then attempt a historical explanation of the concept of genius, by dividing the presentation into four historical periods: 1. Pre-modern period, beginning from the times of the Roman Empire until the full blossom of the Renaissance (the first half of the sixteenth century). 2. Early modern period, lasting roughly from the second half of the sixteenth century until the end of the seventeenth century. 3. The eighteenth century, including Kant as the most important representative. 4. Post-Kantian and post-modern period, from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the present time.

II. Pre-Modern Understanding of Genius

In its original and primary meaning, the word genius had nothing whatsoever to do with art. The word was introduced in the Roman times, and the Latin word "*genius*" means the guarding deity or spirit of a person (or a place). The Romans believed (like the Greeks before them, who used the word "*diamon*" instead of genius) that a guarding spirit is assigned to every person at birth. Such a genius could be good or evil; it is someone who strongly influences one's life's decisions and destiny. In this meaning, then, genius may be a divine being in us, or a deity outside us that guards and directs our lives.

Only in its secondary meaning did the Romans think of genius as a natural gift, as our inborn intellectual or imaginative power. We do not have to be conscious of this gift, nor do we need to understand exactly how it works and what inspires it. In this secondary meaning, genius can be understood as something that produces, creates, or even gives life. This second meaning will later become important for the conception of artistic genius.

III. Early Modern Period

The end of the fourteenth century and the beginning of the fifteenth century had brought a complete turnaround in the religious, intellectual, and artistic life of Western Europe. The all-powerful Church had lost much of its influence due to the internal struggles and division of Western Christianity into two large camps: Catholics, who assigned to the Pope and the Church the ultimate authority for interpreting the Bible and all religious disputes, and Protestants, who protested against the authority of the Pope and the Church and claimed that every person, every believer, is an equally good authority for the interpretation of the Bible. Intellectuals all over Europe used this opportunity to question various religious dogmas and search for truth, based on scientific evidence and rigorous rea-

soning. They proclaimed reason, not religious faith, as the ultimate authority of what is true and what is false. Arts blossomed to an unprecedented degree as well. While many artists still depicted religious themes in their works, they were more and more interested in examining and portraying human beings and various aspects of their lives. The period of the Renaissance produced such extraordinary artists, such as Dante, Raphael, Michelangelo, and Leonardo, the works of which surpassed in beauty virtually everything that was created before. It is those extraordinary artists and their extraordinary works that prompted the change in the original meaning of genius. (Among the first to use the term genius in that way were the two important Western intellectuals, Pico della Mirandola [1463–1494] and Desiderius Erasmus [1466–1536].) The inspired creations of those artists were considered as much above the human capacity and their works were described as “divine.” Their works clearly surpassed any imitation of nature and were compared to God, to the Creator. (The first to use the word “creation” in connection to arts with Torquato Tasso [1544–1595].)

Such phrases and praises of human creativity were quite impossible during the previous period in the European history, known as the Middle Ages. While the religious dogma was still holding firm at that time, it was considered that only God is the Creator. Human beings are not creators; at their best, they can discover what God had already created; they can reveal to others something that had already been set in reality, as God created it. From the Renaissance on, the modern age changed its ideal from that of a discoverer (of the already established work of God) to that of an original creator. The highest ideal of this new aspiration of the mankind is called “genius.” Genius is not a craftsman, nor does he only imitate the work of God. Genius is a “second maker.” While like a craftsman genius needs diligence and learning, his creativity is inborn and spontaneous.

IV. Modern Period – Including Kant

The eighteenth century is the period in which the concept of artistic genius, as we usually think of it today, was fully shaped. With the further decline of the role of religion in Western culture, the role of human authorship and creativity became rapidly increased. In this period, especially toward the end of the eighteenth century, God was relegated further and further into the background of human affairs. Humanity, in the role of a creative artist (together with a creative intellectual) usurped God’s position. In a somewhat exaggerated and oversimplified manner, we can say that Man became the Creator and his task was to recreate God’s creation, to recreate the world in the image of Man.

In England, a related concept of genius was advanced by Lord Shaftsbury (1671–1713). He was neither interested in the created object, nor in the spectator’s subjective experience of art. For him, the beautiful signified a revelation of quite different sort. In the contemplation of the beautiful, we turn from the world of created things to the world of the creative process. The center of the beautiful was not to be found in the process of perception and enjoyment, but in the process of forming and creating. Shaftsbury considered as genius a person who is able to create as nature does; and nature is a revelation of the universal spirit. Enthusiasm is a condition of creation; nevertheless, a man of genius should not infringe the rules of art. He needs knowledge and good sense. Shaftsbury thought that in the creative process man is similar to God, yet he still considered an inspired artist as “a second Maker.” [God is the first, the original, and the most important Creator.]

This concept of creative genius was further intensified by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) in France. For Rousseau, the creative activity of genius was engendered by enthusiasm, imagination, and, above all, the ability to feel passionately. In Rousseau's famous words from his *Dictionary of Music*, "Don't ask, young artist, 'What is genius?' Either you have it – then you feel it yourself, or you don't have it – then you will never know it. The genius of the musician subjects the entire universe to his art. He paints all pictures through tones; he lends eloquence even to silence. He renders the ideas through sentiments, sentiments through accents, and the passions he expresses he awakens in his listener's heart.... That is what makes the genius – and the tears that your masters elicited from you. But should the charms of this great artist leave you cold, should you experience neither delirium nor delight, should you find that which transports only 'nice', do you then dare ask what is genius? Vulgar man, don't profane this sublime word. What would it matter to you if you knew it? You would not know how to feel it."

Rousseau puts too much emphasis on emotions and passions – not only in the artist but also especially in the spectator. He did not discuss the element of originality, not did he define genius in opposition to imitation. This point, however, was clearly introduced and analyzed in Germany by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who offered the most systematic treatment of genius in his *Critique of Judgment*. In order fully to appreciate the monumentality and significance of Kant's contribution to the concept of genius, let us first briefly present the most important points of his aesthetic theory.

Before Kant, aesthetics really existed only in fragments and without any systematic exploration of most issues relevant for the aesthetic consideration. Kant was the philosopher who established aesthetics as a legitimate philosophical discipline (although of secondary importance). Following the spirit of his age (modernity), Kant's aesthetics was not turned toward the analysis of the aesthetic object (whether natural beauty or a work of art), but on the aesthetic subject. His analysis begins with an examination of aesthetic experience, that is, with the spectator's judgment of something as beautiful. Kant distinguished four defining characteristics of any such judgments.

First, aesthetic judgments are not cognitive judgments, nor are they judgments of what merely pleases us (of what is "agreeable"). The beautiful is experienced as beautiful regardless of any desire to know or possess the object of its consideration. Kant's technical way of expressing this idea was to say that in aesthetic judgments there is "disinterested interest" – they please us without our cognitive or possessive interest in their objects, yet we are interested in them insofar as they are beautiful.

Second, aesthetic judgments claim "subjective universality." Although aesthetic judgments, which he also calls judgments of taste, are subjective in the sense of reflecting the subject's experience, they are such that any subject can and should agree on their validity. What is judged as aesthetically beautiful must please universally. This universal validity Kant called "taste."

Third, beauty is experienced and perceived as something that has purpose (goal), although such a purpose is not objectively posited. Although beauty is experienced by the subject in an encounter with an object, we must assume *as if* ("als ob") beauty were an objective and previously posited property of things. Kant called this characteristic of aesthetic judgments "purposiveness without purpose."

Fourth, Kant attempted to show that aesthetic judgments must pass the test of being necessary, which for him meant that they are formed and assessed in accordance with

some principles or fundamental rules. Although made by individuals and thus subjective, aesthetic judgments are never arbitrary. Judging is a rule-governed activity, an activity that is performed in accordance with some objective rules. The rules that underlie this activity are based on what Kant called *sensus communis* – “common sense” – the sense which we all share and on the ground of which we demand that everyone must perceive a certain object as beautiful.

Thus far, Kant’s main focus had been on nature and natural beauty. He then turned to art. He assumed that the aesthetic judgments involved in judging beautiful works of art are similar to those that we use in judging natural beauty. The problem that is new to the discussion of art is thus not how to judge something as beautiful, but how something beautiful is created. His solution of this puzzle involved the concepts of genius and aesthetic ideas.

Kant defined genius in the following way: “Genius is the talent (natural gift) that gives rule to art. Since talent is an innate productive ability of the artist and as such belongs itself to nature, we could also put it this way: Genius is the innate mental predisposition through which nature gives rule to art.” In defining genius in this way, Kant had first to break through the traditional prejudice that gave priority to science over art, and to reason (which attempts to discover the universally valid laws of nature) over imagination (which creates something beautiful in the form of a work of art). For Kant, Newton or any other scientist, however accomplished, is not a genius – it is only a talent developed to the greatest possible height. The word genius properly applies only to artists. Scientists do not create anything; artists do. And an artistic genius creates in the same way in which nature does. While we cannot understand how nature creates, in the case of an artist we can assert that he creates through the faculty of imagination or, as Kant called it more precisely, “creative imagination.” Creative imagination is the foundation of the artistic creativity and originality. Yet the word genius is applied to an artist only when his creation is exemplary, when it is worthy of being imitated. Kant thereby wanted to distinguish genuine artistic originality from unrestrained imagination. This is why he insisted that genius gives rule to art. What cannot be regulated in any way or subsumed under rules is not art but unrestrained fantasy. And unrestrained fantasy does not produce art; such fantasy is not a characteristic of genius.

When Kant insisted that genius gives rule to art he did not want to say that such a rule should be imitated. Nor did he want to say that others, who do not possess the same innate gift and who follow such a rule, can also produce works of art. Kant’s point was that such a rule must be followed but not imitated; genius is the talent for creating what cannot be taught nor learned. The rule supplied by an artistic genius is really a rule governing *what* to produce, rather than *how* to do so. The work of art produced by a genius is unique and exemplary, and it is worthy of being imitated, but it can never be reproduced mechanistically by means of any such rules.

Kant’s definition of art was that it is “the beautiful representation of a thing.” By this he meant that every work of art is something singular and unique. Nonetheless, for Kant, art was more than that. In every work of art we are presented with a new whole, a new image not only of the external reality but of the internal world as well. As Kant put it, a work of art is a presentation of aesthetic ideas, that is, of something that lies beyond all concepts and all ordinary understanding of reality. Aesthetic ideas are not the usual cognitive or moral ideas. For Kant, art stands between knowledge and morality and can-

not be reduced to them. As the ideas created by artistic genius, we are usually missing appropriate words and concepts for the aesthetic ideas. Kant claimed that they are manifested through symbols. Even more often, he claimed that aesthetic ideas are manifested through the harmony of our various faculties of the human spirit. The experience of beauty is then the experience of harmony of the two basic human faculties: understanding and imagination. A genius is ultimately a manifestation of this vivifying spirit. Its creativity is opposed to the pedant's rigid adherence to rules. Genius, in contrast to a pedant, exhibits a free sweep of inventions and through its originality creates new examples of beauty. Genius elevates art to the level of natural beauty.

Since Kant related art to ideas, especially aesthetic ideas, he thought that he could also establish a strict hierarchy of all arts. Since of all arts poetry comes closest to the expression of ideas, he raised poetry to the highest rank, to the head of all arts. Since music, by contrast, seems to be the furthest removed from any ideas, music ends up belonging to the lowest rank of all arts. Such evaluations were not considered too controversial during Kant's time, for two reasons. First, for over a century, poetry had been accomplishing magnificent results and producing outstanding works of art; thus the belief that poetry was the highest of all arts was quite widespread in Kant's time. Second, the unprecedented ascent that music was making was not yet fully appreciated, either by Kant or by the general public. Yet in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries the accomplishments of the composers like Bach and Mozart, together with those of Beethoven, Schubert, Liszt, Chopin, and Wagner (to mention only a few) reached such heights that a reevaluation of Kant's assessment was necessary. This was also the time when Kant's conception of genius was severely challenged.

V. Post-Kantian and Post-modern Period

Kant's life overlaps both with a full development and the early sign of decline of the Enlightenment and with the emerging of Romanticism. In fact, in Kant's aesthetics we find frequent wavering between the ideas of the Enlightenment and the enthusiasm of Romanticism. For the Romanticists, art is not regarded any more as a refined pleasure of the senses, nor as an ornament of civilized existence (as Kant still occasionally thinks). The Romanticists take art to be one form of the deepest possible reflections on life. In the description of the prominent historian Jacques Barzun (*From Dawn to Decadence*), "the arts convey truths; they are imagination crystallized; and as they transport the soul they reshape the perceptions and possibly the life of the beholder. To require this feat requires genius, because it is not a mechanical act. To be sure, all art makes use of conventions, but to obey traditional rules and follow set patters will not achieve that fusion of idea and form which is properly creation."

Because of the further development of Romanticism, Kant's philosophical successors had to take a more definitive stand with regard to the nature and significance of genius. The first great aesthetician after Kant, George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), did not endorse Kant's conception of genius. Hegel was more interested in aesthetic ideas, and even more in symbols and art as a symbolic representation. This symbolic representation of art is not that of nature, as in Kant, but of man himself. According to Hegel's *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics*, the function of art is to confront man with himself. In his words, "Hence the universal need of the work of art is to be sought for within human thought, in that it is a way of showing man what he is." Hegel thereby

denied an independent significance of art: art is just one of the ways in which man – or human spirit – comes to know itself and realizes its full potential.

Hegel's great opponent, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), turned back to the consideration of genius. Schopenhauer was always more inspired by Kant than Hegel, yet in his conception of art and genius he was also very critical of Kant. In his central work, *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer minimized the role of imagination in art. For him, the main faculties in every human being are the will and the intellect. The will is that primordial energy and drive which pushes us to live on and try to preserve our existence. Yet this existential drive is also a source of suffering and frustrations. For Schopenhauer, who besides Kant was inspired by Hinduism, all life is suffering. Art is our best chance to escape from the world of suffering, and this is possible only when the intellect dominates the will. (In normal life, in the life of almost all people, the will dominates the intellect.) This predominance of the intellect over the will allows the genius to create artistic (or philosophical, or scientific) works that are objects of pure, disinterested contemplation, which for Schopenhauer was the primary criterion of aesthetic experience. The work of art, as a product of genius, connects us with a different layer of reality, of which ordinary people (whose lives are left to the mercy of the will) are not even aware. In Schopenhauer's words, "Talent hits a target no one else can hit. Genius hits a target no one else can see."

Schopenhauer's ideas were further modified and developed by Albert Schweitzer (1875–1965). Schweitzer was not only a philosopher, but also an accomplished organ player, an author of the monumental book on Johan Sebastian Bach, as well as a theologian and a physician. Because of his outstanding accomplishments in such diverse fields, one could even consider Schweitzer as an example of a universal genius.

Contrary to Schopenhauer, Schweitzer maintained an optimistic outlook on life and believed that art, especially music, strengthens our ties to the world and enhances our existence. Art in all forms develops good taste, and good taste, Schweitzer hoped, will enhance our capacity for loving and understanding all living creatures. Art can enhance our sense of unity with the world and other human beings. This concept of unity is central for understanding the nature of all art and the nature of genius.

In his first philosophical work, *Kant's Philosophy of Religion*, Schweitzer maintained that Kant's consideration of genius may be the least satisfactory aspect of his aesthetics. Kant understood genius too narrowly, and in two different ways. First, the artistic production is not a characteristic mark, but only a result of genius. Second, there can be genius in every sphere of human existence, not just in art. Not just aesthetics, but every aspect of human experience deals with the world of appearances, and genius is related to our ability to bring this wealth of appearances into a unity. According to Schweitzer, "genius in art denotes progress in that art, and progress in art consists in the fulfillment of its principle of unity. Genius is, thus, characterized as a unique ability to accomplish an aesthetic unity in a field of appearances at a point where it had not been accomplished up to that time, or to accomplish it in a scale or manner as would not be possible with the customary means of unification." Genius is thus a unique faculty of seizing the aesthetic unity of objects, a new unified way of perceiving them. By proposing a new way of perceiving the world, genius is almost never understood right away, but eventually this way becomes the dominant way of seeing and unifying the world of appearances.

Schweitzer believed not only in the coexistence of the various forms of art – e.g. music and poetry (as in Bach and Wagner), but also in the interconnectedness of different forms of genius: “The common element of geniuses in all fields is that genius accomplishes a new unity according to the determination of its subject as a person. The ascent from the aesthetic to the moral and religious genius takes place to the extent to which a person becomes a moral person and, in turn, a religious person.”

Schweitzer’s conception of genius not only reduced the emphasis on genius, but also the relevance of art. It seems that there is always something more important than art and artistic genius, or that the relevance of art and artistic genius consists only in leading toward or contribution to something else: a development of the moral sense (in the case of Kant), or of a self-realization of the spirit (in the case of Hegel), or of an escape from the suffering world (in the case of Schopenhauer), or of a religious sentiment (in the case of Schweitzer).

The development of the concept of genius, as described above, led to two contradictory directions. On the one hand, the idea of genius became firmly established in popular culture and among ordinary people. One can even say that the popularity of this idea led to a sense of idolatry of everything extraordinary, and the word genius was applied all too lightly to almost anyone with any special ability. On the other hand, and partially as a result of this vulgarization of the notion of genius among the general public, among intellectuals and artists the value and significance of genius dropped down. The philosopher William James (1842–1910), whose brother was Henry James, one of the greatest American writers, captured this sentiment when he wrote in *Pragmatism: A New Way for some Old Ways of Thinking*: “Genius, in truth, means little more than the faculty of perceiving in an unusual way.” (Think of Andy Warhol’s endless color-variations of a photograph of Marilyn Monroe.)

A second reason for the decline of the relevance of genius is to be found in the spread of industry and mass-production. They are based on the mechanical process and its planned outcome, rather than on individuality, uniqueness, and unpredictability of the creative process by which genius operates. How deep was this shift we can see even from the often-quoted words of the inventor Thomas Alva Edison (1847–1931): “Genius is one percent inspiration and ninety-nine percent perspiration.”

A third reason for the decline of genius is also related to this mass production; it deals with the spreading of consumerism. The attention in the consumer-oriented society shifts from the creator to the consumer, to the one who experiences the product of any kind of fabrication, the artistic creation included. In our world of mass production and obsessive consumerism, the relevant thing is not who produces what and in what way, but what a consumer buys and makes of it. In the case of aesthetics, this means a shift of attention from the concept of genius to the problem of the proper interpretation of a work of art. It means little what the author – the artist, the creator, the genius – intended with a work of art; he may not know that anyway, but even if he does, it looks more important what the receiver makes of it. As a result of this shift, we have a development of the so-called “hermeneutics,” an intellectual discipline focused on interpretation of various texts, including works of art.

The fourth and most important reason for the decline of the role of genius was the general re-orientation of values and the loss of faith in the power of human creativity. In the twentieth century that creativity led to the production of (among other things) chem-

ical and biological weapons, as well of an atomic and a hydrogen bomb. Such products are the extremes, yet they are also a convincing illustration that human beings are better at creating what is destructive and negative, rather than of constructive and positive things. The whole modernity was motivated by the inability of human beings to trust God and his creation, and by the subsequent self-promotion of human beings into the creators of a better world. The final downfall of modernity consisted in the realization that, if humans cannot trust the creativity of God, even less can they trust their own creativity. With this fear and uncertainty, the idea of genius also lost its prestige in the contemporary world. In perhaps the most important – and certainly the most neglected – work of Western aesthetics in the twentieth century, the five-hundred page masterpiece *Aesthetics* (1950) by Nicolai Hartmann (1822–1950), there is no consideration of genius whatsoever. The concept of genius is purged – temporarily or permanently – from Western aesthetics. Is this a gain or a loss?

VI. The Future of the Idea of Genius

One of the most important representatives of Western aesthetics, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002), argued that, largely under the influence of Kant, aesthetic theory had become alienated from the actual experience of art. Following Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), Gadamer tried to establish a hermeneutical aesthetic, an aesthetic that will pay a much closer relation to our actual experience of art and outline more clearly and systematically how such an experience differs from other forms of human experience, especially cognitive experience. In Gadamer's seminal book, *Truth and Method* (1960), the concept of genius is barely touched, and that only in the criticism of Kant.

There is, however, a deeper problem to consider. From the early Renaissance on, Western aesthetics has always been *less* preoccupied with the object (work of art) than with the subject (whether artist or spectator). Within this “subjectivist” tradition – especially in its Romanticist bent – the concept of genius will always play some role. We are too fascinated by extraordinary men – geniuses in particular – to completely neglect considering the role of originality in the process of artistic creation. Yet it may be that this investigation need not belong to aesthetics, or not to aesthetics in any narrow sense. Perhaps in connection with a branch of psychology which deals with the phenomenon of the extraordinary, there will continue to be further investigations and newer insights into the always fascinating issue of genius and creativity. Furthermore, since the idea of genius is frequently connected with insanity – think of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky – this is another reason why psychology may be the most natural venue for the further exploration of genius.

If aesthetics is really going to undergo a needed transformation, if it is really going to start looking not just at our actual experience of art, but at the structure of aesthetic object, then the whole concept of genius will most likely become peripheral, almost irrelevant for aesthetics. This path of aesthetic development was proposed by Hartmann. He argued that aesthetic analysis can focus on (A) aesthetic subject or (B) aesthetic object. If it focuses on the subject, it can attempt to analyze (1) the productive art of the artist/creator/genius, or (2) the receptive act of the spectator. If it by contrast focuses on the aesthetic object, it can attempt to analyze (3) aesthetic experience in terms of the relevant values, or (4) the structure of the work of art. Hartmann argued that (1) cannot be properly analyzed; thus, genius could not be the subject of aesthetic analyses. He suggested that

(2) be further divided into (a) the moment of perception; (b) the experience of pleasure; and (c) the aesthetic evaluation of something as beautiful or ugly. Hartmann thought that Kant collapsed all of them into one and the same aspect of aesthetic judgment and thereby made aesthetic analysis more difficult than it should be. Hartmann's main recommendation, however, was that aesthetics should focus on the aesthetic object, especially the aesthetic structure of a work of art. He had done some significant preliminary work in this regard, but his suggestions had not been followed or developed.

My own conviction is that, by not following Hartmann's recommendation, we have lost more than we have gained. It is finally our chance to turn away from the modern obsession with a subject and turn toward works of art as the objects of our aesthetic experience – they are what makes it possible for us to experience something as beautiful or ugly; they are ultimately matters for aesthetics. While Mozart's life and his genius are indeed fascinating, the most important thing from the point of view of aesthetics is to return to works of art themselves. We should be less concerned with *how* an artistic genius creates than with *what* he (or she) creates. Let us therefore conclude this lecture by listening together to an excerpt from one of Mozart's most important works, *The Requiem*.

Lecture 2: *Art and Entertainment: On Various Functions of Art*

I. Introduction

In the history of Western civilization, art has served various functions. To mention a few, it was used as a form of entertainment, it was used for the transmission of religious ideas, it was used for the popularization of political ideas, and it was sometimes used just as "*l'art pour l'art*" (art for the sake of art). In today's world, art is increasingly seen as a form of entertainment. In fact, one can argue that art is nothing but a form of entertaining. Against this view, which is defended (among others) by the mighty movie industries of Hollywood (in America) and Bollywood (in India), I will argue in favor of the independence of art from entertaining and in favor of the authenticity of art. As examples, I will use four movies: "Casino Royale," "Hero," "The Road Home," and "Girl with a Pearl Earring."

The lecture will consist of three parts. In the first, I will take a closer look at various functions of art. In the second part, the focus will be on entertainment, insofar as it is similar and different from art. In the third and the last part, I will try to develop further my thoughts about the authenticity of art, insofar as it goes above and beyond entertainment. This third part is the most difficult and the most important. What I will offer there are not decisive answers but some insights which I hope would lead us closer toward the proper understanding of the nature and function of art.

II. On Various Functions of Art

Let us continue where we finished our lecture on genius. We have concluded that nowadays the concept of genius does not play any significant role in contemporary aesthetics, certainly nothing even comparable to the role this concept played in the eighteenth century. Instead of focusing on genius, various other ways of distinguishing extraordinary human beings and artists have been proposed. Let us look at one of them, as defended by Howard Gardner (1943-), a psychologist from Harvard University. In his book, *Extraordinary Minds*, he offers a four-fold division: 1. Master; 2. Maker; 3. Introspector;

and 4. Influencer. (1) A master is someone who displays an utmost mastery of the existing forms of art (and science), and as an example Gardner lists Mozart. (2) A maker is someone who introduces a new way of looking at the world, or a new scientific discipline, or a new form of art. As an example Gardner mentions Sigmund Freud, who introduced a new discipline called psychoanalysis. If we were to pick an artist as in illustration, we could perhaps choose Pablo Picasso, who introduced radically new ways of painting. Or we could select Richard Wagner in music, since he created a new form of opera, which he called “a musical drama.” (3) An introspector is someone who gains deep insight into the inner world of human beings, into their psyches and souls. As an illustration, Gardner mentions Virginia Woolf, a British writer. Many other writers could have been listed in this category, for example Marcel Proust, Hermann Hesse, and, perhaps the deepest introspector of all, Fyodor Dostoevsky. (4) An influencer is someone who has an extraordinary influence on other individuals. Gardner thinks primarily about political influence and mentions Gandhi as an example. But an artist, or a group of artists, could also belong to this category – one can, for example, think of the influence that the British rock band, *The Beatles*, exerted on the popular culture in the last several decades of the twentieth century.

This fourfold division has important advantages over trying to capture all the great artists through one category – that of genius. Gardner agrees that Mozart may be the greatest artistic genius of all times, but he also points out that there are many misconceptions with regard to his extraordinary gifts in the popular imagination. For example, although Mozart composed about six hundred pieces, strictly speaking he is a master rather than a creator, because he did not throw off the dominant genres of his era in order to create new forms of musical expression. Instead, Mozart was a genius who mastered the existing forms of musical expression and subdued his personal preferences and his individuality to the existing forms of music. He could equally well compose a symphony that reveals the tragic strains (Symphony No. 40, G minor), as he could compose a symphony full of triumphant bars (Symphony No. 41, C major; “Jupiter” Symphony).

Another misconception about the genius of Mozart was that, when he was inspired, he could simply sit down and compose music. This corresponds to the idea that genius is inborn and does not require schooling and training. Although Mozart started composing at the age of five, in his later life he studied his predecessors very carefully. For example, before and while composing a set of six string quartets [K. 387, 421/417b, 428/421b, 458, 464, and 465], for three years Mozart studied the string quartets of his older contemporary Franz Joseph Haydn (1732–1809). In contrast to popular opinion, in composing these string quartets, Mozart worked on numerous drafts and even made changes in the already printed version of the quartets.

Yet another important point is that, like most extraordinary artists, Mozart did not belong to only one of the four above mentioned categories. Although he was clearly a master, he was also an influencer – he exerted enormous influence on the further development of classical music. It is similar with many other first-rate artists: Beethoven was in some regards a master, and in some other a maker; Dostoevsky was a maker and an introspector; Leonardo da Vinci and Richard Wagner were both the makers and the influencers; Johann Sebastian Bach and Virginia Woolf were both the masters and the introspectors.

These overlaps are important because, far more closely than the single-minded focus on genius, they reveal the complexity and multi-dimensionality of art. If we look

back at the history of art, we can recognize not only various functions of art, but also that many works of art serve more than one isolated or well-defined function. Numerous paintings and frescos in Western churches decorate these buildings, but they also function to disseminate religious ideas. Many theater plays and operas entertain the audience, but they also function as the ways of revealing higher truths about humanity. Historically based movies can have an educational purpose, but they may also serve as political propaganda. Beautiful vases can be useful for holding flowers, but they also please with their designs.

There are many more examples that could be mentioned of the multiple functions of works of art, but there is no need to multiply them. Instead, if we tie these functions of art to the specific values that they contribute to, following Max Scheler (1874–1928) and Nicolai Hartmann we could come up with the following list: there are values of (i) pleasant, (ii) useful, (iii) decorative, (iv) vital, (v) good, (vi) true, (vii) divine, and (viii) beautiful. The pleasant is what pleases. The useful is what can be used for various purposes. The decorative is what makes something appear more beautiful. The vital is what enhances our existence, our well-being and health. The good is what is morally valuable. The true is what is cognitively valuable. The divine is what reveals the presence of the divine being or a relatively unknown higher force. The beautiful is what pleases because of its form. By keeping these values in mind, let us now turn to a closer examination of the relationship between entertainment and art.

III. Art and Entertainment

Entertainment is an activity designed to give people pleasure or relaxation. As such, entertainment is as old as the human race. Entertainment responds to the need we all have. In terms of the values listed above, entertainment is directly related to the value of pleasure, but it is also connected with the vital values – it is good for our physical and mental health to relax and laugh. It is good to enjoy ourselves after long working hours and thereby revitalize ourselves.

Many centuries ago, the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 BC) asked: Do we work in order to relax and rest, or do we relax and rest in order to work? While many of my students readily answer that we work in order to relax and enjoy ourselves, Aristotle [correctly] thought just the opposite. The answer that my students [incorrectly] give reveals not only the characteristics of our younger generations and of our age, but it also indicates how and why entertainment can become a problem. Entertainment becomes a problem when it is assumed that it is the goal, not a means. It becomes a problem when our lives are turned toward entertainment as the best and most valuable we can experience in life. Because the entertainment industry is so developed and powerful, it exerts an enormous influence on the younger generations. The entertainment industry presents its own products as works of art. Sometimes, it claims even more strongly that there are no other relevant forms of art but those created by the entertainment industry. Thus Hollywood makes us think that the movies it produces are the best movies in the world, and that those participating in the production of its movies are the greatest artists in the world. The culmination of this illusion, readily propagated by TV networks and other social media, is the Academy Awards [i.e., the Oscar] ceremony, watched by hundreds of millions of viewers across the globe. This brainwashing, a bit more subtle than any that

the propaganda machines of many backward political systems could come up with, is enormously effective. Yet such brainwashing of the generations of especially young people is far more dangerous than any “opiate of the masses” of which Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) warned in their criticism of capitalism and its exploitation of workers. This brainwashing is one of the deepest problems of our age. For this reason, in order to understand this phenomenon, let us take a closer look at the similarities and differences between entertainment and art.

It cannot be doubted that many works of art are entertaining. But art need not be entertaining. Similarly, entertainment need not be artistic. What is it that art and entertainment have in common to allow for their (frequent) overlap?

Two elements are common for both art and entertainment: appearing and feelings. In every form of art and every piece of entertainment, something appears in front of the audience. That which appears is a form of art, or of entertainment, or of both. In the case of entertainment, what appears usually exhausts what is. To paraphrase Hannah Arendt (1906–1975), entertainment is not deep; it has not depth. It only has a surface, and that surface is funny, relaxing, enjoyable... Art, by contrast, has more than a surface. Nicolai Hartmann bases his whole aesthetic theory on the analysis of the structure of works of art, and in all works of art he distinguishes between a foreground and a background. In the case of each form of art, he shows what the foreground and the background are like, how many distinguishable layers they contain, and how they are related to each other. (In cases of some of Rembrandt’s self-portraits, for example, Hartmann distinguishes and discusses six different layers in the same work of art.) We cannot go into the details of his five-hundred page analysis here; for us, and for now, the important difference is the presence of the foreground and the background in art, and an almost uniform absence of any background layers in the case of entertainment. If we relate this distinction to the list of various forms of values mentioned earlier, we can say that entertainment would be closer to the simpler (and lower) values, such as pleasure, usefulness, decoration, and eventually vitality. The presence of the background layers in art points by contrast toward the values that are more complex (and higher), such as the values of the good, of the true, and of the divine. We shall return to these points in the next section.

The second structural similarity between entertainment and art is in terms of feelings: both entertainment and art incite feelings. In fact, through what appears in the cases of entertainment and art, the feelings are more intense than the feelings we get through the usual cases of appearances. Put differently, both entertainment and art provoke stronger feelings and reactions in us than the vast majority of our perceptual experiences, when we simply register what appears in front of us. What differentiates entertainment and art are the sorts of feelings they incite. Let us look at some examples from a few recent movies to illustrate this difference. The first movie is one of the very popular series of movies on the British secret service agent, 007, James Bond. The movie in question is “Casino Royale” (2006; directed by Martin Campbell) and the scenes we are going to discuss take place in Venice, Italy. Against this beautiful scenery, what we see is James Bond in an action typical for him (and many other Hollywood movies): he is chasing bad guys, and doing so in a violent manner. To spice up the whole scene, there is a presence of a beautiful woman as well. This scene sums up what is the most secret and most magic formula of Hollywood: (violent) action and romance (almost always involving scenes

of nudity and sex). The action that we follow is so fast and breath-taking, that we lose track of time, or ourselves, and of our life problems (tiredness; lack of success in life; lack of money; lack of love, or any other). The hero is larger than life. His actions border on superhuman; James Bond is a superhero, even more so than any artistic genius. Through our identification with this superhero, our attention is totally diverted from who we are and what our human limitations and realities are like. Through our close attention to the actions of a superhero like James Bond, we escape from reality. Sharing his wild ride with him relaxes us and makes us feel refreshed. It makes us feel as if for a while we have participated in a dream, so much more exciting than our ordinary, profane reality.

Let us look at one more example from another recent action movie, a movie I am sure you are all familiar with: "Hero" (英雄; 2002). The movie director, Zhāng Yímóu (张艺谋), is not only fully aware of the Hollywood formula of spectacular action combined with a romance, but he succeeds in outdoing the Hollywood entertainers by presenting the action (and the accompanying romance) in a more artistic manner. While James Bond acts in a beautiful setting, the action in "Hero" involves an equally beautiful setting in a more artistic way: the beautiful environment provides not only a stage for action but it appears to participate in the action and influences the course of the action and its outcome. The camera takes account of the environment in which the action takes place to such an extent that it signals to us that the action itself may be of secondary importance. The drops of water are so masterfully captured by the camera that they become the participants in the action as well. Although our feelings after watching this scene are aroused as much as they are after watching the scene from "Casino Royale," different kinds of feelings are aroused. While in "Casino Royale" the action in which Bond engages is virtually impossible, but presented as quite possible, the impossible action in "Hero" is intentionally so presented to emphasize the elements of dream or fantasy. The music, which plays a far more important role in "Hero" than in "Casino Royale" is not just a background screen but significantly contributes to the feelings aroused. The effect on the audience is that we identify not with the action itself, but with something else. With what? To make that clearer, let us look at one scene from a third movie, one of my favorites, which is in English called "The Road Home" (我的父亲母亲; literally "My Father and Mother"; also directed by Zhāng Yímóu [张艺谋]; 1999).

Here again we have an absolutely beautiful setting, again a natural beautiful setting (as in "Hero," and unlike "Casino Royale," where the setting is urban and so well-known to every Western viewer, so that each of them would recognize it instantly and not pay too much attention to it). The music playing in the background is also of great significance for the experience of the movie in general, and the selected scene as well. In "The Road Home" we also have a romance; in fact, the romance is the very heart of action. More precisely, the action – the external action – is really a smoke-screen for an internal action, that is, of something that occurs in the souls of the participants. (This is one illustration of something that we mentioned before: the appearance in the foreground [external action] as a manifestation of what happens in the directly invisible but indirectly present and revealing background [internal action]). In "Casino Royale," as a typical work of entertainment, the action is extremely fast. In "Hero," it is slowed down even more than its usual pace, to allow us to focus on something else besides the external movements of the protagonists. In "The Road Home," the action is further slowed

down, almost reduced to non-action. What matters are the feelings that a village girl has for a new teacher, and how overwhelming they are. In “The Road Home,” the external action is almost entirely due to internal factors; there are no good guys and bad guys, no weapons, no external fighting. The only fighting, the only action, is the struggle that takes place within the heart and soul of the main character in the movie, played by the outstanding Zhāng Ziyí (章子怡). As we watch this scene and begin to reflect on it, it becomes increasingly irrelevant that the action takes place in China, in the rural setting, sometime around 1958... What does matter is that this scene brings us back to ourselves, to our own experiences of love, of shyness in the presence of the loved one, of the innocence and purity of youth.

To emphasize this movement toward the internal, toward the hidden background, let us see one more movie scene. This time, it is from the movie “Girl with a Pearl Earring” (directed by Peter Webber; 2003). The movie is a story about how a well-known painting, “Girl with a Pearl Earring,” by the seventeenth century Dutch painter Johann Vermeer (played by Colin Firth) was inspired by a peasant girl, a maid working in the painter’s household (played by Scarlett Johansson). The relationship between the painter and the maid is a complex one: she understands his art far better than anyone else in his family. The painter cannot but appreciate that, and he cannot but be attracted by the inner beauty and purity of the maid. She is also fascinated by him. Not only that she has never met anyone like him, but he has a genuine interest in her. He wants to teach her not just how to prepare colors for his painting, but how to look at the world with different eyes. The painter and the maid have strong feelings for each other, but any (open manifestation of) love between them is not only forbidden but virtually impossible. This tension is further illuminated in the scene which first brings the piercing of her ear [think about what this may symbolize!] and then, as she poses for his painting, by the interplay of light (in the foreground) and darkness (in the background), together with the interplay of various colors. In the whole movie, there is very little action and even less dialogue between the two main protagonists. Just like in this selected scene, in the movie as a whole the maid rarely speaks. She indicates her feelings through facial expressions and body language. The intensity of the scene is heightened by beautiful background music. The feelings aroused are extremely powerful, all the more so for not being displayed directly and shown explicitly.

We can now draw certain conclusions with regard to the differences between entertainment and art. While entertainment imposes a certain image, or a stream of images on us, calculated to produce certain reactions and emotions, such impositions are far more subtle, or subdued, in the case of art. Entertainment and art both deal with appearances and show us something – yet even when they show us the very same things, objects, or actions, *how* they do it is very different. Truly speaking, however, to claim that they show us “the very same things, objects, or actions,” can be done only as long as we stay on the surface level relevant for entertainment. When we get to art, the dimension of depth becomes increasingly important. But it simultaneously becomes increasingly difficult to understand and describe *what* it is that art reveals to us. This is the topic of our next section.

IV. Art Beyond Entertainment

It is far easier to talk about art in comparison to entertainment, or in comparison to some other function of art, than about art itself. When we attempt to describe the authenticity of art, it appears as if we have arrived at a wall that we can neither see through, nor climb over. For a while, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century, there was a movement that called itself "*l'art pour l'art*." Its name clearly indicated what the movement is about – it indicated that art should not and does not serve any other "master," but is something independent and authentic. The problems again began when it came to explaining what it is that makes art independent and authentic. Based on how short-lived this movement was, we can conclude that its advocates did not succeed in doing so.

Yet why exactly did they not succeed? There seem to be two possible answers. One is that although art really is independent and authentic, the advocates of this movement failed in singling out what makes it independent and authentic. The second possible answer is that this movement failed because art is *not* independent and authentic; although we can clearly distinguish art from religion, or morality, or science, or politics, or entertainment, art is so deeply interwoven with other aspects of life that it can never be fully separated from them and, thus, that there is nothing independently authentic about art.

There may, however, be a third answer as well, and it is a mixture of the previous two. Art is indeed deeply integrated with other forms of life, and yet there is an independent and authentic core that belongs to art and distinguishes it from anything else. This is the answer I will try to articulate in the remainder of my lecture.

When we briefly go over the history of Western aesthetics, we find many attempts to separate and single out the authenticity of art. But although many of them have some good points, they do not seem to get the whole picture. I will here present only a few of them, from various artists and aestheticians. In the beginning of the twentieth century, Benedetto Croce (1866–1952), an Italian aesthetician, thought that the most important task of aesthetics is to separate art from knowledge and rationality. In the history of the West, rationality, science, and knowledge are usually treated as the highest accomplishments of humanity; in order to be found valuable, art is expected to contribute something to our better cognition of reality. Croce rightly criticizes this view and points out that art deals not with abstract theoretical concepts, but with intuitive, concretely manifested ideas. Art does not have to serve cognition; its chief function is to make something appear in front of us in all of its concrete fullness.

A few decades later, two female writers and philosophers, Simone Weil (1909–1943) and Iris Murdoch (1919–1999), advanced this line of thought even further. They developed the concept of *attentiveness* to reality as the key moment of art. In her essay "On 'God' and 'Good'," Murdoch insists that "the greatest art is 'impersonal' because it shows us the world, our world and not another one, with a clarity which startles and delights us simply because we are not used to looking at the real world at all.... It is important too that great art teaches us how real things can be looked at and loved without being seized and used, without being appropriated into the greedy organism of the self.... Beauty is that which attracts this particular sort of unselfish attention."

I find this view very fruitful but incomplete. Let me thus interpret it in my own way. In our ordinary life, we are used to seeing things in a certain definitive way. It is the satis-

faction of practical tasks and practical needs that forces us to see the world in this “boxed-in” way. The whole educational system, our daily practices, political and economic forces, and even our language, reflect this practical way of looking at the world and dealing with it. This is the way of common sense, and its advocates called it “realism.”

What Weil and Murdoch suggest is that this “realism” is very partial, and even blinding to many aspects of reality that do not serve any direct practical purposes. When art is art, and not a handmaiden of politics, economy, or religion, it precisely allows us to see the real world not in its impoverished and firmly entrenched version that serves our practical purposes, but the world as it is. In our practical dealings with the world, in our ordinary lives, we know – or we think we know – what the world is like and do not need to pay much special attention to it. This normal and ordinary world is both something that grounds and supports our existence, yet at the same time drains our energy and resources in our efforts to sustain that existence. Both entertainment and art divert us from this normal and ordinary world, yet in a very different, even fundamentally opposed ways.

Entertainment diverts us from this normal world and helps us restore our energy and vitality. While in our normal, ordinary lives, we are just hard-working and average people, watching James Bond in action gives us a sense of power we will never have in real life. It transposes us, however temporarily, into the world of different possibilities: of enormous physical abilities, of fast cars, of endless supplies of money, and of beautiful women who fall in love with us at the first sight. Entertainment is like a fantastic dream – it brings excitement, and thus makes us forget for a while the normal, ordinary world. This forgetfulness, this escape from the world, makes it possible for us to normally function tomorrow again in this ordinary world, in the same way in which we functioned in it yesterday, and a day before yesterday...

While entertainment is the forgetfulness of the normal, ordinary world, art is the heightened attentiveness to the world as it is. It demands paying far closer attention to the world in its most diverse aspects (including those that do not serve any practical purpose). While this normal, ordinary world supports us, it also limits us and shrinks our vision and possibilities. It closes the world and makes it small, predictable, and firmly entrenched. Art opens up this world; it allows us to see reality with fresh eyes. Art also forces us to describe this freshly seen world in a different (=symbolic) language.

If the normal world is the world of ordinary people, the world of art demands extraordinary people. This is one of the reasons why we are so fascinated by genius. But, as we have already seen, genius is not only a rare phenomenon but also something that is marred with misconceptions and misunderstandings. We should look in a different direction for an explanation of the uniqueness and authenticity of art. To illustrate what this direction may be, let us first look at a quote from Aldous Huxley (1894–1963), a British writer and philosopher, from his book, *Ends and Means*: “The finest works of art are precious, among other reasons, because they make it possible for us to know, if only imperfectly and for a little while, what it actually feels like to think subtle and feel nobly.”

Huxley’s quote is so important because he is both right and wrong. He is right because the finest art really allows us to learn about the subtle and the noble. He is wrong because the subtle and the noble need not be something in us and directly related to us. Huxley’s quote reveals the deep obsession of Western aesthetics (and culture in gener-

al) with the subject and diverts our attention from the object, from what is experienced in works of art as subtle and noble. Yet the attentiveness, to which Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch point us, is not the attentiveness to the subject but the attentiveness to the object, to the extraordinary aspects of the world captured in the great works of art.

In this regard, I find most useful the thoughts of Albert Schweitzer, who was not only a philosopher, but an author of a nine-hundred page book on Johan Sebastian Bach (1685–1750) and an accomplished organ player. Schweitzer's view resonates with what Weil and Murdoch are saying by pointing out that our world is not fully transparent. In other words, our world contains far more than what meets the eye and what is captured through the ordinary perception and language. The world is multi-dimensional and has different layers of depth. The attentiveness that works of art evoke is the attentiveness to these different dimensions of reality for which ordinary life has no need, for which it has no appropriate language, and of which it often does not even know that they exist.

Schweitzer argues that the easiest way to escape the bounds of the ordinary and penetrate into these deeper layers of reality is by means of the form of art which least resembles the normal and the ordinary. This form of art is music. He does not fully separate music from other forms of art, for they are all interconnected for him. In music, as in all other forms of art, we find aesthetic ideas and their associations. As Schweitzer says in his book on Bach, "Any work of art stands for a certain aesthetic association of ideas which the artist conveys to us through this medium. The artistic form is merely the vehicle for such aesthetic associations. Not the ideas themselves are to be expressed, but the associations that arise in the artist together with them."

In Schweitzer's aesthetics this is the decisive point. He does not expect from any art the explicit translation of concrete ideas; were an artist to do this, he would injure the inner capacity of art and transform art into something else [for example, a piece of political propaganda]. The crucial point in the expression of the associations of aesthetic ideas is played by symbols (by which Schweitzer understands the inner meanings which various signs carry within themselves). The further away from the ordinary, commonsense means of communication the symbol lies, the more suggestive and aesthetically fruitful it becomes. In this way Schweitzer differentiates the arts from each other by the degree of their capability of being symbolical. Hence (written and spoken) language, common to both poetry and daily life, is the least capable of symbolism – because it is most bound by the usual and already well-known associations of ideas. Pictures and visual images are more richly symbolic than words, which is why paintings and movies are such good media for art. But the symbols that are the furthest removed from the ordinary and commonsense means of communication are tones and rhythms of music. As symbols, they abound in meaning. In music, everything is symbolic, everything is full of pure, non-common, and aesthetically relevant associations.

To what do music and its symbolism give expression? Schweitzer's answer is that they give expression to what is directly inexpressible. He liked to quote one of his favorite composers, Richard Wagner (1813–1883): "The greatness of the artist can be best measured by what he refrains from saying, in order to let the inexpressible itself speak to us in secrecy."

We can now understand why it is so difficult, if not impossible, to explain the uniqueness and authenticity of art. In great works of art, we encounter a double boundary: on the one hand, we can not fully grasp and explain the layers of reality which the great works of

art make appear in front of us. Yet through symbols and the association of aesthetic ideas, art manages to give expression to the inexpressible. When we come to this “wall,” we must at least for a while stop our efforts to explain and articulate everything rationally. We simply have to listen, or watch, or read, and let the inexpressible come to us in some impossible to articulate ways.

On the other hand, we can never fully understand the creative power of the extraordinary minds, who produce such works and which we call artistic geniuses. Many artists explicitly reject any attempt of at rational explanations of their creativity and prefer to speak of their artistic talent and their works in terms of the symbolic meanings of a gift: their artistic gift is possible through another gift of an unknown yet indirectly felt giver, the gift of seeing the unseen and expressing the inexpressible.

While arguing in this way those artists redirect us, consciously or not, toward the original meaning of “genius.” As the poet Mark Nepo (1951-) elucidates in his *Book of Awakening*, in its original sense, “genius means attendant spirit – being in the care of something unseen but near. It is really another definition of wholeness or God, another way of acknowledging the Tao, the unseeable stream we all swim in.” When, for example, Socrates spoke of his protective “genius,” he insisted that his *daimon* always spoke to him in times of crises, to warn him not to follow a certain course of action. “The purpose of crises (if there is one) is not to break us as much as to break us open.” Thus, according to Nepo, genius is, then, not the artist who creates something, but a voice of the inexpressible being that enables us to open to the reality as it is, in all of its mundane and mystical aspects. An artist, argues Nepo, is not a genius but a messenger, the one who finds the right medium to deliver the message to us.

The pendulum containing our understanding of genius has now shifted to the opposite extreme: genius is not to be associated with a creative artist but with a force, ultimately unknown to us and only indirectly accessible, that inspires an artist to become a medium for the revelation of an aesthetic idea. But perhaps this view goes too far and is as one-sided and of as little explanatory value as the one that mystically assigns the creative power to an artist. To come closer to the truth of the matter, we may need to investigate carefully yet another central topics: the nature of *human* creativity (as opposed to the creativity in nature, or the creativity of God), but this discussion must be left for another occasion and another lecture.

Let us for now finish this lecture and our present considerations by listening to one of the greatest artistic messages ever delivered to us, Johann Sebastian Bach’s “Toccatina and Fugue, D-minor, BWV 565,” as performed by another messenger, Albert Schweitzer. Schweitzer said that, “For Bach, music is above all the most effective way of glorifying God.” Let us, then, have this music illustrate for us how art can give expression to the inexpressible and thereby show us what truly may be the most important function of art.

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Some Critical Reflections on Rahner's Philosophical Project

Introduction

Critical reflections concerning Rahner's philosophical project that I am going to offer in this paper will not be exhaustive. A minute examination of the argumentation he developed within his two famous philosophical books reveals a vast range of grounds on which particular arguments could be criticised. Whether it is unclear what precisely Rahner wants to say, or the argumentation he offers seems (to me or to more experienced and relevant Rahner scholars) not to be convincing enough, in any case – no detailed account of his system will be attempted here, because an adequate treatment of all the disputable points would, literally, take hundreds of pages. The project to be conducted in this paper will, therefore, be moved in another direction. I do not intend to estimate whether and to what extent every single one of the (even most important) arguments Rahner uses is correct, nor to examine precise reasons for which the unsuccessful ones fail. Formally incorrect reasoning, inadequate interpretation of the ideas of other philosophers he refers to, as well as failing to mention at all the sources from which he implicitly draws, which (sources) we must be aware of in order to be able to understand the proposed argumentation – these are all weaknesses that, in different measure and different places, are to be found in Rahner. In this paper I will, however, restrict myself to casting light on several general problems running through (almost) all individual difficulties. More importantly, I will try to point at the reasons for which these difficulties occur. The few concrete examples of Rahner's arguments I will refer to will all come from his second, smaller philosophical work *Hearer of the Word* (*Hörer des Wortes*)¹. I find this book more convenient for drawing conclusions about Rahner's philosophy, as he sums up there all the most important arguments from the previous, capital book *Spirit in the World* (*Geist in Welt*)² and tries to develop them further in order to offer us a

¹ The book is a collection of the series of lectures Rahner gave in Salzburg in the summer of 1937. It was first published in 1941. I will refer here both to the English translation and the German original text, i.e., its first version before the revision by J. B. Metz. English edition I used is the following: Karl Rahner, *Hearer of the Word. Laying the Foundation for the Philosophy of Religion*, Andrew Taloon (ed. and Introduction), Joseph Donceel (trans.), Continuum, New York, 1994. German text will be quoted according to the edition of Rahner's collected works: Karl Rahner, *Hörer des Wortes*, in: *Sämtliche Werke*, Band 4, *Hörer des Wortes. Schriften zur Religionsphilosophie und zur Grundlegung der Theologie*, Benziger, Herder, Solothurn, Düsseldorf, Freiburg in Breisgau, 1997, 2-281.

² This book is Rahner's famous (unsuccessful, i.e., unaccepted) doctoral dissertation in philosophy. It was handed in in 1936 and first published in 1939. Now it is to be found in 2nd volume of Rahner's collected works: Karl Rahner, *Sämtliche Werke*, Band 2, *Geist in Welt. Philosophische Schriften*, Albert Raffelt (прир.), Benziger, Herder, Solothurn, Düsseldorf, Freiburg, 1996, 3-300.

complete and authentic philosophical anthropology. Given that the main form of argumentation Rahner uses in both these books is the same and the difficulties I am going to mention consider mainly this form (and not the precise content of each particular argument), all the drawn conclusions, in my opinion, hold for both books, i.e., for the whole of Rahner's philosophical project.

Identifying Problem(s)

If one tried to abstract a formal pattern of reasoning Rahner uses, one would easily notice that the most often and most important type of argument that occurs is the so-called *transcendental* one. More precisely, this argument takes the following form: in order for a certain reality (A) to exist, another reality (B) must necessarily exist as the condition of the possibility of (A). In other words, (A) is correct *exclusively* in the case of (B). It is, however, possible to ask the following question: how do we know that (B) is the only possible condition for (A)? It seems logical that we could make such a conclusion only after having excluded all the other possibilities, i.e., if we have realised that in every other case (A) is impossible, except in the case of (B). Somewhat surprisingly, Rahner not only fails to list *all* the alternatives and prove that they are impossible, but he usually does not mention any single one of them. It looks as if he wanted to put his reader's imagination before an implicit challenge to try and come up with any other case in which (A) would be possible. This, however, does not seem as a legitimate and satisfactory strategy. For, even if Rahner proved his point, i.e., even if we were not able to figure out any other acceptable solution, as is rightfully noticed by Kilby, this would still not be enough, because the boundaries of the imaginable are not the same as the boundaries of the possible. Our imagination is conditioned by our experience and things get even more complicated when we remember that what Rahner writes about are not some simple, every-day topics, but some extremely complex and abstract ideas, which is why the possibility that we are simply unable to imagine some of the actually possible cases comes as no surprise at all.³

This critique could, in my opinion, be additionally enhanced, as follows: the problem is not (only) that Rahner has not showed clearly enough that (A) is possible exclusively in the case of (B), but he has not showed that it *has to be* (A) in the first place. For example: as he declared the question about being, as one that is necessarily asked, for a kind of Archimedean point⁴ of the whole of metaphysics, Rahner said:

"If we have no right to presuppose that this question is really and necessarily asked by all human beings, then to refuse to ask it, or to admit that we do, would have done away with every "whence" of an answer and made the answer itself impossible."⁵

³ More about the issues concerning transcendental arguments see in Karen Kilby, *Karl Rahner. Theology and Philosophy*, Routledge, London, New York, 2004, 40-48 (especially 43-48). It is interesting that Kilby noticed that the objection we stated against Rahner's argumentation is subject to the same critique! We criticised Rahner for postulating (B) as the condition of possibility of (A), without formerly excluding all the other possibilities. Reproaching him for acting like this, we are actually falling in the same trap, for our claim takes the following form: The condition of possibility of a certain reality (A) can be determined only if we exclude all the other possibilities (B). By claiming this, we ourselves have not excluded all other possibilities for (A), but have just stated that the only way for achieving it is (B).

⁴ The idea that the question about being is being constantly and necessarily asked had the same foundational role within Rahner's philosophy, as Descartes' *cogito* had within his famous system.

⁵ K. Rahner, *Hearer of the Word*, 25 / *Hörer des Wortes*, 54.

It seems that, having in mind this argument of his, we could legitimately ask him the following question: So what? In other words, who says that the question about being must have a ground and an answer? If we aspire after neutrality of our research, as well as after its purely philosophical character, then we must admit to ourselves that it is entirely possible that the result of our research will turn out to be contrary to our wishes and expectations. Rahner's argumentation is problematic, for its structure could be drafted as follows: I do not call into question the veracity of (A), for, if it proved to be false, other things I care about and believe in would also have to be false. From a purely philosophical point of view – such manner of reasoning is utterly unacceptable.

(An Attempt at) Explaining the Difficulties

In order to understand better how and why such an oversight could happen to such an exceptionally intelligent and educated man as Rahner indubitably was, I find it useful to draw a parallel between him and another great spirit – René Descartes. As it is well known, Descartes became famous for his method of doubt. This doubt, unlike the sceptical one, was not “only for the sake of doubting”, but a means for gaining certitude, which (certitude) Descartes never really doubted. The fact that his doubt has never been a ‘real’ one contributed to the fact that the philosophical project he undertook was not as radical as Descartes wanted it to be and believed to have made it. Thus scholars mostly agree that *ergo* in his famous *cogito* is not the logical, syllogistical *ergo*, but merely intuitive. Furthermore, when it comes to his proofs of God's existence, Descartes was also criticised for “reasoning in circle”, i.e., he was accused of assuming realities that were yet to be proved.⁶ This, too, was a practical consequence of the fact that Descartes never really had doubts about God's existence. In other words, he obviously failed to sufficiently abstract (=put in brackets) his beliefs.

Let us now return to Rahner. He is primarily a Christian, priest and theologian. His philosophising is always crucially determined by and in function of this fact. By analogy with Descartes we could, in my opinion, state that Rahner's philosophy is “methodological”, i.e., not a philosophy for the sake of philosophising, but a philosophy for the sake of theology. Although he tried to keep the research he conducted in *Hearer of the Word* at a purely philosophical level, he never actually doubted its outcome. He was completely convinced he would reach precisely the conclusion he wanted to reach. This, in my opinion, has similar consequences as in Descartes – although he wanted to be completely neutral and objective – he failed to do it. Against his will, Rahner's prejudices and beliefs remained an inseparable part of his philosophical argumentation, i.e., they have formed and guided it. This is where, in my opinion, we could find the explanation of many weaknesses of Rahner's philosophical project. In other words, the answer to the questions such as “Why would things have to be precisely as Rahner claims they are?”, “Where did he get this assumption from?” etc, would be: Because that is the content of

⁶ Cf. Hans Küng, *Existiert Gott? Antwort auf die Gottesfrage der Neuzeit*, Piper, München, Zürich, 2010, 55–6. Descartes' proofs of God's existence, in my opinion, provide us with additional arguments to compare him with Rahner. His famous “causal” proof, namely, claims that the only possible source of the idea of a perfect being, i.e., of God, that we find in our minds could be this being (=God) itself, given that we ourselves have qualities completely opposite to this being, so our own self could never be a source of such an idea. If we take a look at the form this argument takes, it immediately becomes clear that we are dealing with the same, transcendental, type of argument Rahner uses, as Descartes also searched after the condition of the possibility (of the existence of the idea of God in our minds).

Christian revelation in which he absolutely believed and could not abstract it sufficiently. This revelation, therefore, is a necessary precondition for understanding his arguments.⁷

How great the problem really is?

Finally, we could ask ourselves to what extent is the fact that Rahner's philosophy is shaped and conditioned by Christianity really problematic? If we, for example, were to make an isolated judgment concerning *Hearer of the Word*, the problem really would be great. That is to say that, if we wanted to evaluate this book from a purely philosophical point of view – the assessment would have to be negative.⁸ Rahner commentators (although they offer different reasons for this conclusion) agree on this point with (almost) no exception. Strictly (philosophically) speaking, he failed to offer sufficiently convincing, irrefutable argumentation for the theses he developed. Rahner himself, however, would not see this as a big issue. He has never considered himself a great philosopher, or a philosopher at all. He believed he was a theologian, that is the only thing he claimed.⁹ In later years he did not hesitate to admit weaknesses of his earlier, philosophical works and he insisted that he did not accept to be judged solely on the basis of these works.¹⁰ Only one question remains, then: how big a problem does the failure of Rahner's philosophical project represent for the whole of his thought? We could say that the problem would be substantial, if we accepted a foundational position, claiming that Rahner's philosophy is a ground from which originated all his further (theological) thought. But, this does not have to be the case. Moreover, based on the convincing argumentation offered by Kilby,¹¹ I even dare say that this really is not the case. It is possible and advisable to read Rahner in a different, non-foundational, manner. This, of course, is not to say that his philosophy could be neglected and rejected as irrelevant. Quite on the contrary, all Rahner scholars agree that it is extremely important, given that some of the ideas that marked his entire career and determined his further interests were developed precisely within his philosophical project. This is simply to say that we do not have to claim that Rahner's theology has his philosophy as a (logically) necessary ground, for, the failure of his philosophical project would then necessarily imply the failure of the rest of his

⁷ Ann Carr seems to be of the same opinion, as she claims that *Hearer of the Word* and *Spirit in the World* are actually theological works that "only look like philosophy". Ann Carr, *The Theological Method of Karl Rahner*, Scholars Press, American Academy of Religion, Missoula, Montana, 1977, 4.

⁸ Although, truth be told, we must not lose sight of the fact that Rahner himself had very modest expectations from *Hearer of the Word*. He considered it a mere outline of a philosophy of religion and was completely aware of the fact that many things remained unclarified, as well as that he took certain things for granted (especially Thomistic metaphysics). (Cf. K. Rahner, *Hearer of the Word*, 102-103 / *Hörer des Wortes*, 188) Unfortunately, Rahner has never elaborated these ideas any further, so, whether we like it or not, *Hearer of the Word* objectively remained the only available material, if we want to assess Rahner's ideas concerning these specific issues.

⁹ See Rahner's letter to Eicher in: P. Eicher, *Die anthropologische Wende. Karl Rahners philosophischer Weg vom Wesen des Menschen zur personalen Existenz*, Universitätsverlag Freiburg Schweiz, Freiburg, 1970, ix,

¹⁰ Cf. Peter Fischer, *Der Mensch als Geheimnis. Die Anthropologie Karl Rahners*, Herder, Freiburg, Basel, Wien, 1974, 220.

¹¹ See 2 chapters concerning the non-foundational reading of Rahner (*op. cit.*, 70-115). In short, Kilby believes that none of Rahner's key concepts and arguments needs grounding in his philosophy. All of them can be successfully defended (and inferred) by means of theological arguments. It is important to note that Kilby does not claim that her reading of Rahner is the only possible and the only correct one. She openly admits that one (semi-)foundational reading is also completely legitimate. However, Kilby's proposal is better, precisely because it is possible and, at the same time, it presents Rahner in the best possible light (i.e., it sets his thought free of unnecessary internal tensions and inconsistencies).

thought, i.e., the crash of his theology. If, however, that is not the case, if, that is to say, Rahner's theology does not require the validity of his philosophy as the condition of its possibility, then we can remain completely satisfied with the fact that, although he did not quite accomplish what he promised, Rahner still managed to demonstrate within his philosophy the extraordinary perspicacity and greatness of his mind. He has not left us a ready-made solution, but he has left us very interesting and inspiring ideas that can (and must) serve as an impetus for our Christian life and further (theological) work. That this precisely was Rahner's main intention can be anticipated from the way in which he, in *Hearer of the Word*, writes about the relationship between philosophy and theology. The Christian philosophy, in his opinion, is one that makes itself capable of being baptized, i.e., brings itself in the state of readiness for being "sublated" (German: aufgehoben, from "Aufhebung") in the threefold meaning which Hegel gives to this word. Firstly, philosophy is being sublated in the sense of coming to an end (schafft sich selber ab), after having successfully finished its task to provide an adequate basis for human hearing of revelation. Secondly, philosophy is sublated in the sense of being lifted to a higher level (hebt sich auf eine höhere Ebene) in so far as it, as the condition of the possibility of our receiving revelation, finds its own fulfilment at the higher level at which revelation has really occurred. Finally, philosophy is being preserved (bewahrt), for, even in the actual hearing of revelation that takes place in theology, philosophy, as the condition of the possibility of this hearing, remains preserved and actualized ever again.¹² Although Rahner speaks here precisely of the Christian philosophy, it is obvious that he believes this is the right way for every philosophy (his own included), for, if philosophy rejected to take this task of pointing towards theology, it would, according to Rahner, remain a highly academic, but existentially completely irrelevant discipline.¹³ In his other texts, as well, whenever Rahner explicitly touches upon the relationship between philosophy and theology, he does it in this same manner. Thus he speaks of philosophy as of an "inner moment"¹⁴ of theology, while he considers theology as "the highest entelechy"¹⁵ and the norm of philosophical knowledge. We could say that philosophy¹⁶ is for him some kind of substrate, a foundation that needs to be upgraded into theology. However, although bare grounds do not represent a finished building, they still are the necessary substrate, without which any further upgrade would be impossible. In this sense, philosophy and theology are, for Rahner, mutually dependant.

¹² K. Rahner, *Hearer of the Word*, 17-18 / *Hörer des Wortes*, 40-42.

¹³ K. Rahner, *Hearer of the Word*, 18 / *Hörer des Wortes*, 42.

¹⁴ K. Rahner, "Philosophy and Theology", y: *Theological investigations*, vol. 6, Darton, Longman and Todd, London, 1969, 71-81, 73 / K. Rahner, „Philosophie und Theologie“, y: *Sämtliche Werke*, Band 12, *Menschsein und Menschwerdung Gottes. Studien zur Grundlegung der Dogmatik, zur Christologie, Theologischen Anthropologie und Eschatologie*, Herbert Vorgrimler (прип.), Herder, Freiburg, Basel, Wien, 2005, 216-225, 217.

¹⁵ K. Rahner, "Philosophy and Theology", 74 / „Philosophie und Theologie“, 218.

¹⁶ He does not, of course, mean any particular philosophy or argumentation without which theology would be impossible (as this would deny the possibility of a non-foundational reading of Rahner, that we have just proposed). Within the debate regarding the relationship between theology and philosophy, Rahner understands the latter very broadly, claiming that it is a "transcendental as well as historical self-comprehension of the man" (ibidem, 73 / 218). Rahner was well aware of the fact that such a definition might seem too loose and imprecise, yet he claimed: "Whether or not this self-understanding may already be called philosophy in the technical sense is quite immaterial in the final analysis, as long as one admits that even philosophy in the strictest sense cannot be anything other than the methodically exact, reflected and most expediently controlled representation and articulation of this original and never quite attained self-understanding." (ibidem, 73-74 / 218).

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Annunziiazione – Mariä Verkündigung

Nicht eben ein leichtes Thema, weil es über die Anthropologie und Kunstgeschichte hinaus nicht bloß in die religiöse Sphäre führt, sondern in den Kernbereich christlichen Glaubens, tiefgreifend dem Judentum wie dem Islam entgegengesetzt, zugleich in einen Dissens zwischen den christlichen Konfessionen (katholisch beginnt hiermit Jesu persönliches Leben) bzw. (quer dazu) innerhalb ihrer. Quelltext ist das Lukasevangelium (Lk 1,26-38), wonach der „Engel Gabriel von Gott in eine Stadt in Galilea namens Nazaret zu einer Jungfrau gesandt“ wird, um ihr die Geburt eines göttlichen Sohnes anzukündigen.¹ Darauf stützt sich die dogmatische Aussage des dritten Ökumenischen Konzils, 431 zu Ephesus, dessen Väter es unternommen haben, „die heilige Jungfrau Gottesgebärerin zu nennen – θεοτόκον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἁγίαν παρθένον (theotokon eipein ten hagian parthenon).“²

In einem Dreischritt sei zuerst ein Blick auf die Geschichte des Festes geworfen, vor allem auf dessen reiche Feier in der bildenden Kunst. – Sodann steht Theologie an: zum Festgeheimnis, dem erlösenden Wirken des dreieinigen Gottes. – Was sagt das, drittens, anthropologisch, für den Menschen vor Gott?

I. Festfeier und Ikonographie

1. Die Festfeier dieses Geschehens ist seit dem 5. Jhdt. bezeugt, seit dem 6. für den 25. März, neun Monate vor dem Weihnachtstag. „Seit Anfang gilt der Augenblick der Zustimmung Mariens zu Gottes Ratschluss der Erlösung als Augenblick der Inkarnation. Daher ist die Darstellung der Verkündigung der des Beginns des christologischen Heilsgeschehens und der Darstellung der Geburt Christi ebenbürtig oder kann sie vertreten (z.B. in Santa Maria Maggiore, wo keine Geburtsszene erscheint, wohl aber Maria, die Engel-Thronassistentin hat, die sonst nur der Mutter Gottes mit Kind oder der *Nikopoia* [= Ikone der Siegbringerin] zusteht).“³

Außer dem Lukas-Text ziehen die Künstler auch apokryphe Texte heran. So hört im Protoevangelium des Jakobus (Kap. 11) Maria zuerst (ohne jemand zu sehen) den Engel-Gruß, als sie am Brunnen Wasser schöpfen will, und erst, als sie wieder im Haus an

¹ Vgl. dazu Mt 1,18-25.

² Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen (Hg. H. DENZINGER / P. HÜNERMANN (Freiburg i. Br. 371991), Nr. 251. Die beiden anderen Religionen weisen die Gottesmutterchaft ab, das Judentum auch die Jungfräulichkeit. Den interkonfessionellen Dissens entschärft eine sich ausbreitende Ökumene antidogmatischer Reserve und „symbolischen“ Verständnisses beider Glaubensaussagen.

³ J. H. EMMINGHAUS, Verkündigung an Maria, in: Lexikon der christlichen Ikonographie (LCI), Freiburg 1990, 4, 422-437, 419; daraus auch die folgenden Zitate (Seitenzahlen im Text).

der Purpurwolle für den Tempelvorhang spinnt, erscheint der himmlische Bote und wiederholt seinen Gruß.⁴ Noch heute gibt es in Nazaret, nicht weit von der neueren großen Verkündigungsbasilika der Franziskaner, bei der „Quelle unserer lieben Frau Maria“ die griechisch-orthodoxe Kirche des Hl. Gabriel, die ebenfalls Verkündigungskirche heißt.

2. Die meisten Bilder indes zeigen Maria im Haus: spinnend, lesend, betend. Der Engel, fast immer links vor ihr stehend oder im Kniefall.⁵ Dann steht auch Maria ihm gegenüber. „In der Gruppe der im intensiven Zwiegespräch von Handgesten und Augen einander zugewandt Stehenden gelingen der Kunst um 1000 feierlich monumentale und statuarische Gestaltungen“ (426). Das Mittelalter bringt den „Übergang vom früheren Symbolismus über einen transzendentalen Realismus [?] zu Symbolistik und Allegorese und schließlich die liebevolle Schilderung von Idyllischem und Intimem“ (430). Zugleich wirkt sich die scholastische Systematik aus: „Die Korrespondenz von himmlischem und irdischem Geschehen wird durch vom Vater ausgehende Lichtstrahlen angezeigt, die auf den Kopf oder speziell auf das Ohr der Jungfrau zielen [...] Der Heilige Geist als Wirkprinzip wird nunmehr fast regelmäßig in Gestalt einer Taube [...] angeführt [...] Beliebt ist einige Zeit auch die Einfügung des als Kleinkind schon ausgebildeten Jesusknaben [...] sei es als eines Bambino in den Händen des Engels ... sei es als eines bäuchlings auf dem Lichtstrahl oder auch einem schlauchartigen Gebilde – vielfach mit geschultertem kleinem Kreuz – Herabgleitenden“ (430f.).

Über die Renaissance, den venezianischen Manierismus und Barock kommt EMMINGHAUS zum Rokoko. Dessen „Gipfelpunkt“ bildet eine Plastik IGNAZ GÜNTHERS: „die überschlank, prinzeßinnenhafte, ganz der Botschaft ergebene Jungfrau und der tänzelnd schwirrende, kavalierhafte Engel im silbergeschuppten Panzerkorsett“ (436). Seit dem 18. Jhdt. tritt das Thema „zusehends stärker zurück, zumal gegenüber den Darstellungen der Immaculata“ (436).⁶ Wie als Gegenbild zu GÜNTHER wird „als göltiges Beispiel“ der letzten dreißiger Jahre RUTH SCHAUMANNs Gruppe genannt „mit der ergebenden, in die Knie gesunkenen Jungfrau und dem groß über ihr stehenden Gottesboten“.

II. Theologie (Karl Rahner)

1. Theologisch geht es um die Gottesmutterchaft. Damit ist jedoch, wie etwa KARL RAHNER nachdrücklich darlegt, nicht so sehr der leibliche Vorgang gemeint, sondern „das Mutterwerden in freier, personaler, ja gnadenhaft glaubender Tat“.⁷ RAHNER greift auf die Schöpfungsbotschaft zurück, womit indes noch nicht entschieden ist, ob die Welt „in einem unendlichen Abstand“ von ihm oder „ganz in sein eigenes göttliches Leben hineingezogen“ wird (55). In einem „Drama zwischen Gott und Welt“ (55) nun hat Gott „sein letztes, endgültiges, allumfassendes, nicht mehr rückgängig machbares Wort [...] wirklich in die Welt hineingesagt“ [...] so dass er selber im Fleische dieser Menschheit ein Stück dieser Welt selbst geworden ist“ (57)

⁴ Neutestamentliche Apokryphen (Hg. E. HERNNECKE / W. SCHNEEMELCHER). Bd. I Evangelien, Tübingen 1959, 284; Das Neue Testament und frühchristliche Schriften (Hg. K. BERGER / CHR. NORD), Frankfurt/M. 1999, 1286.

⁵ Die erste christliche Engeldarstellung (ein bartloser Mann ohne Flügel) findet sich in der Priszillakatakomben. Die Szene wird unterschiedlich gedeutet, doch auch als Verkündigung.

⁶ D.h., der ohne Erbsünde Empfangenen. Gefeierte wird dieses Dogma am 8. Dezember, neun Monate vor dem Geburtsfest Mariens am 8. September.

⁷ K. RAHNER, Maria – Mutter des Herrn, Freiburg i. Br. (1956) ⁵1965, 53; weitere Zitate im Text).

„Nicht das Gericht ist das letzte Wort Gottes, sondern sein Erbarmen [...] Das Wort aber ist dadurch Fleisch geworden, dass eine Jungfrau aus unserem Geschlecht niederkniete vor der Botschaft des Engels und in der Freiheit ihres Herzens mit der ganzen restlosen Hingabe ihres Wesens sprach: Mir geschehe nach deinem Wort [...]. Darum ist Maria, ein Mensch unseres Geschlechtes, das Tor des ewigen Erbarmens, die Pforte des Himmels“ (58).

„Natürlich ist diese Freiheit [...] selbst wieder eine Gnade Gottes, [aber] je höher die Gabe Gottes ist, je restloser (menschlich gesprochen) sie von ihm abhängt, um so mehr wird sie [...] unser Eigentum“ (58f.). „Die Gottesmutterchaft der heiligen Jungfrau ist also Gottes reine Gnade und ihre Tat, beides in einem“ (60). So kommt es zu dem, worauf es über Kulturgrenzen hinweg in jedem Hochzeitsritus geht (seine Vollgestalt wird auch in polygamen Gesellschaften „im allgemeinen nur einmal vollzogen“⁸): zum Mit-Eins von Himmel und Erde.

2. Diese Mutterchaft wird nun von Anfang an als die einer Jungfrau bekannt. – Es hat „keinen Sinn, die gottgeweihte Jungfräulichkeit in sich und im allgemeinen schon als selbstverständliches Ideal aufzufassen und von da aus Maria die Jungfrau zu rühmen“ (64f.); denn das liefe wohl auf eine Minderung von Sinn und Bedeutung der Ehe hinaus und vergäße, dass eheliche Liebe und Fruchtbarkeit „geweiht sind durch ein Sakrament Christi“ (65). Wir müssen sie also von ihrer Mutterchaft her denken. „Warum wollte der Sohn Gottes, das ewige Wort, Mensch werden, ohne einen irdischen Vater zu haben?“ (66). Nicht wegen des Vaters im Himmel, sondern „damit mitten in der greifbaren Realität der Welt sichtbar werde: ich bin derjenige, der ganz aus Gottes Verfügung und nicht aus der Welt kommt“ (67). Und Maria gibt sich in dieses [J.S.] „Vertikalgeschehen“.

Statt damit, wie immer wieder zu lesen, Geschlechtlichkeit und Ehe abzuwerten (töricht, gerade der Religion der „Einfleischung“ Leibfeindlichkeit zu unterstellen⁹), gibt es ihnen vielmehr, gegenüber den Ambivalenzen und Schlüpfrigkeiten mythologischer Erzählungen – von herzloser Entwürdigung und Vergewaltigung zu schweigen – den Adel des Geheimnisses im Blick auf die schwierige Ehe Gottes mit Israel und vollends die Jesu Christi mit seiner Kirche.¹⁰

3. So weit die theologischen Informationen. Sie sind vonnöten, weil man heute bis in theologische Kreise hinein auf erstaunliches Unwissen und peinliche Missverständnisse trifft. Beweisen, erst recht im neuzeitlich-wissenschaftlichen Verständnis von (zwingendem) Beweis, lässt sich hier selbstverständlich nichts. Doch wie steht es um die Selbstverständlichkeit, mit welcher Zeitgenossen diese Glaubenslehren abtun – und um die Erklärungen, die sie für solche „Absurditäten“ meinen vorschlagen zu sollen?

Hier ist nicht der Ort für Apologetik oder Diskussionen zum Thema Wunder (u. a. zur Zirkularität von DAVID HUMES Argumentation).¹¹ – Berufung auf den Zeitgeist

⁸ C. H. RATSCHOW, Art. Ehe und Hochzeit religionsgeschichtlich, in: RGG ³1957ff, II., 316.

⁹ Sie findet sich anstatt im Christentum in der Christenheit, weil Christen Menschen sind – und damit die Befähigung dem Sexuellen gegenüber teilen, die in allen höheren Kulturen begegnet, wo man Menschenrang von Bewusstsein und Freiheit her denkt.

¹⁰ Jes 54; Jer 3; Ez 16; Hos 2,4-3,3; HI; – Eph 5,23-32.

¹¹ Nur zwei Lesehinweise: C. S. LEWIS, *Miracles*, Glasgow ²1960: Wunder. möglich – wahrscheinlich – undenkbar? (B. MÜLLER-OSENBERG), Gießen ²1980 (dazu: N. FEINENDEGEN, *Denk-Weg zu Christus*. C. S. Lewis als kritischer Denker der Moderne, Regensburg 2008, 413-461); biblisch: K. BERGER (nach zwei Büchern über Wunder), *Die Bibelfälscher*, Regensburg 2013.

aber¹² zählt im philosophischen Disput grundsätzlich nicht. Kaum brauchbarer sind Hinweise auf religions geschichtliche „Parallelen“, ob in der angesprochenen griechischen Mythologie oder bei den Pharaonen.¹³

Statt dessen sei jetzt der Versuch einer anthropologischen Besinnung unternommen. Von der Gott-Rede sind wir ja zum Menschen vor Gott gekommen.

III. Anthropologie

1. Wie erscheint hier der Mensch in dieser Begegnung? – Nicht bloß in den unernsten Mythologien, auch in den ernsten religiösen Überlieferungen werden solche Widerfahrnisse zumeist?, jedenfalls oft genug als Gewalt-Erfahrungen beschrieben: gewaltsam überwältigend.

Derart schmerzhaftes Geschehen kann mythische Namen erhalten und mag so dann, in mythischer Umkehr, als Wirkung und *Tat* eben dessen erscheinen, was zuvor als Ereignis benannt worden war. Man kennt diesen Vorgang aus der griechischen Religion. Bei EURIPIDES ruft Helena aus (V. 560): „O Götter! – Denn (ein) Gott ist auch [adjektivisch zu lesen, wie: „gotthaft“] die Lieben zu erkennen.“ Achtzig Verse später (642) ist aus dem Prädikat ein handelndes Subjekt geworden: „Nun lenkt Gott zum Ausgleich das Glücksspiel des Zufalls.“¹⁴

In diesem Sinn schreibt RAINER MARIA RILKE¹⁵ in einem Widmungsgedicht von 1923¹⁶:

... auf einmal bricht
der große Herzschlag heimlich in uns ein,
so daß wir schreien –,

Noch schärfer formuliert ein Pariser Entwurf von 1909, der Gott anruft:¹⁷

¹² So kürzlich K. FLASCH, Warum ich kein Christ bin (er führt auch die LXX-Übersetzung (Jes 7,14) des hebräischen אַלְמָנָה (alma – junge Frau) durch παρθένος (parthenos) an (für Gläubige ebenso inspiriert). – Zur Erhellung der Fakten: CH. TAYLOR, A secular Age, Cambridge/Mass. 2007: Ein säkulares Zeitalter (J. SCHULTE), Frankfurt/M. 2009 (dazu: Unerfüllte Moderne? [Hg. M. KÜHNLEIN / M. LUTZ-BACHMANN], Frankfurt, M. 2011).

¹³ Es sind a) meist keine; b) selbst wenn, bewiesen sie nicht die Entlehnung. Sie könnten sich auch einem tief-allgemeinen Sehnen verdanken (so kommt B. WELTE religionsphilosophisch zum „Apriori eines personalen Heilandes“: Heilsverständnis, Freiburg i. Br. 1966, 228). Dazu nochmals C. S. LEWIS: Fern-seed and Elephants, Glasgow (1975) ¹⁹⁸¹: Geblök eines Laien, in: Was der Laie blökt (M. GISI), Einsiedeln 1977.

¹⁴ Jesus Christus ist kein Halbgott, und schon gar nicht ist der Hl. Geist sein Vater. Den fasst man am besten als die Person göttlichen Empfangens: in Gott wie im Menschen. „In“ ihm nur können Menschen Gottes Wort erfassen (1 Kor 12,3) und dessen Weisung in ihrem Denken, Reden und Tun „Fleisch“ werden lassen. Schlechthin einzigartig geschieht das im Verkündigungsgeschehen. Das Inkarnationsgeschehen ist das Werk des dreieinigen Gottes. Näher Interessierte darf ich hinweisen auf: J. SP., „Verstehst du auch, was du glaubst?“ Überlegungen zum Geheimnis von Gottes Dreieinigkeit, in: Lebendiges Zeugnis 56 (2001) 305-317; DERS., Gottes Dreieinigkeit denken? In: Geist und Heiliger Geist (Hg. E. DÜSING / W. NEUER, H.-D. KLEIN), Würzburg 2009, 87-104.

¹⁵ Siehe dazu K. KERÉNYI, etwa: Die griechischen Götter, in: Der Gottesgedanke im Abendland (Hg. A. SCHÄFER), Stuttgart 1964, 13-20; oder: Griechische Grundlagen des Sprechens vom Gott, in: Weltliches Sprechen von Gott (Hg. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Weltgespräch), Freiburg 1967, 9-15.

¹⁶ Vgl. H.-G. GADAMERS Aufsatz zur mythopoietischen Umkehrung in den Duineser Elegien: Ges. Werke 9 (Ästhetik und Poetik II), Tübingen 1993, 289-305.

¹⁷ Wir sind nur Mund...: SW, Frankfurt/M. Wiesbaden 1955ff., 2, 144, 253.

¹⁸ Ach, in der Kindheit, Gott, wie warst du leicht: 2, 367-369.

du Feuerschein, du Krieg, du Hunger: töte:
denn du bist unsere Gefahr.

...

Damit entstehe, was du endlich stillst,
mußt du uns überfallen und zerfetzen;
denn nichts vermag so völlig zu verletzen
wie du uns brauchst, wenn du uns retten willst.

Mühe los ließen sich (biblisch sei nur der „Überfall“ auf Mose genannt: Ex 4,24-26) christliche Stimmen gleichen Sinnes zitieren. Man beachte den Doppelklang des Wortes „Heimsuchung“, das zunächst den jubelerfüllten Besuch Mariens (nach der Verkündigung) bei ihrer Base Elisabeth meint (Lk 1,39-56) und dann jegliches Unglück.¹⁸ In den Ausrufen zu Gott der großen TERESA klingt es ähnlich wie bei RILKE: „Mein Gott und mein Schöpfer, warum schlägst du Wunden und gibst nicht das Heilmittel dazu? Du verwundest, doch sieht man die Wunde nicht; tötest...“¹⁹

2. Allerdings fährt TERESA fort: „... und gibst noch mehr Leben. Letztendlich machst du; mein Herr, was du willst, mächtig, wie du bist.“ Und so kommt auch RILKE dann im Briefwechsel mit ERIKA MITTERER auf das Bild vom Verstecken spielenden Kind, das sein Entdecktwerden zugleich fürchtet und wünscht (Juli 1924). Bewegend und denkwürdig schreibt er vom „erhofftesten Schrecken... der Findung“ (2, 294).

Vollends über Kinderspiel hinaus geht die Aussage des AQUINATEN, dass Gott mit großem Respekt – *cum magna reverentia* – über uns verfüge.²⁰ Das Geschöpf, der Mensch wird angesprochen – und fragt zurück. Die geistlichen Lehrer haben in Mariens Verhalten vier Schritte unterschieden: von anfänglicher Verwirrung über das Nachdenken zur Rückfrage. Auf die Antwort hin dann demütiges Einverständnis. Einer der Namen des Festes war daher „*ancilla* – Magd“. Jahrhundertlang war es allgemein verbreitete Übung, dreimal am Tag den/das „Angelus – Der Engel des Herrn“ zu beten, wozu das Angelusläuten aufrief. (Der Papst spricht das Gebet jeden Sonntag und an Hochfesten mittags öffentlich vom Fenster seiner Wohnung aus und erteilt anschließend den Apostolischen Segen.)

Dabei verlangt das Wort „Demut“ Klärung gegenüber Missverständnissen.²¹ Griechisch wie lateinisch ist von Niedrigkeit die Rede; *ταπεινός* (*tapeinos*) heißt: niedrig gelegen, sodann: gering, schlecht; *humilis*: niedrig, kleinmütig, gemäßiger wohl *submissus* = untergeordnet). Das deutsche *dio-muoti* besagt wörtlich „dienstgewillt“.

Zugemutet wird von Gott dem Geist- und Freiheitsgeschöpf in der Tat nicht wenig.²² – Der bei uns immer noch zu wenig bekannte und unterschätzte CLIVE STAPLES LEWIS²³ klärt zunächst ein Dilemma in unserer Frage nach Gottes Gutheit. Das begrenzte (zudem gefallene) Geschöpf kann nicht davon ausgehen, dass seine Vorstellung von

¹⁸ Zu der zerstörend rettenden Weise, in der das Göttliche uns „braucht“, vergleiche auch die Interpretation zum 27. des 2. Teils der *Sonette an Orpheus* (I, 769) von H. MÖRCHEN, Rilkes Sonette an Orpheus, Stuttgart 1958, 391-405, sowie GADAMER, Anm. 15: 282-288 (Poesie und Interpunktion).

¹⁹ Ges. Werke 3 (U. DOBHAN / E. PEETERS), Freiburg i. Br. 2004, 154f. – Dass sie Gott (oder Jesus) die Behandlung seiner Freunde vorgehalten habe, liest man zwar immer wieder über sie, doch ohne Beleg.

²⁰ THOMAS V. AQUIN, *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, 112, nach Weish 12,18.

²¹ Abschreckendes Beispiel: C. AUFFARTH'S Elf-Zeilen-Artikel im Metzler Lexikon Religion, Stuttgart 1999, I, 242 (dazu meine Rezension In: ThPh 75 [2000] 607f. sowie J. Sp., Vor Gottes Angesicht, München 2014, 13-19 [Demut]).

²² Wie steht Maria vor ihrem Verlobten da? Und was wird Simeon ihr verheißen (Lk 2,33-35)?

²³ C. S. LEWIS, *The Problem of Pain* (1940): Über den Schmerz (H. u. J. PIEPER), Köln & Olten 1954, Kap. 2.

Gott und Göttlichkeit sowie von wahrer Güte überhaupt und Gottes Güte im Besonderen der Wirklichkeit gerecht wird. Wenn andererseits das Urteil Gottes sich von unserem so unterschiede wie Schwarz und Weiß, dann hätte es keinerlei Sinn, ihn überhaupt gut zu nennen. Wir müssen also das selbe meinen, wenn auch auf erheblich andere Weise, dies aber so, dass der Unterschied a) einer des Niveaus ist und b) von Norm- und Ziel-Charakter. Der Fachausdruck lautet *Analogie*.²⁴

„[E]s ist nicht ein Unterschied wie der von Weiß und Schwarz, sondern wie der zwischen einem vollkommenen Kreis und dem ersten Versuch eines Kindes, ein Rad zu zeichnen. Wenn aber das Kind zeichnen gelernt hat, wird es wissen, dass der Kreis, den es nun macht, eben das ist, was es von Anfang an zu machen versucht hat“ (47).

„Unter dem guten Gott verstehen wir heutzutage fast ausschließlich den ‚lieben‘ Gott; und wir mögen damit auch recht haben. Aber mit Liebe meinen die meisten von uns in diesem Zusammenhang so viel wie Gutherzigkeit, d.h. den Wunsch, jemand anderen glücklich zu sehen, nicht glücklich in diesem oder jenem Sinn, sondern einfachhin glücklich [...]. In der Tat, wir möchten nicht so sehr einen Vater im Himmel als vielmehr einen Großvater im Himmel – einen greisen Wohlmeiner, der es, wie man sagt, ‚gerne sieht, wenn die jungen Leute sich amüsieren‘, und dessen Plan für das Universum einfach darauf hinausläuft, dass am Abend eines jedes Tages gesagt werden kann: ‚Es war für alle wundervoll.‘ Nicht viele Leute, das gebe ich zu, würden ihre Theologie mit genau diesen Worten formulieren; aber eine Vorstellung ungefähr der Art verbirgt sich im Hintergrund nicht weniger Köpfe“ (47f.)

3. Eine Reaktion auf frühere Verzeichnungen? Einerseits hat man hier (um eine Redeweise K. RAHNERS aufzunehmen) „vulgär-christlich“ allzu oft einen Gegensatz zwischen Judentum und Christentum vertreten. Schärfer und schlimmer wurde er als Gegensatz zwischen dem Gott des Alten Testaments und dem Gott Jesu Christi statuiert. So schon in der Mitte des 2. Jahrhunderts durch den bedeutendsten Ketzler: MARKION; aber wirksam bis heute.

Andererseits hat der verhängnisvolle Heilspessimismus eines AUGUSTINUS dunkle Spuren in die Verkündigung eingeschrieben, bis man sich endlich von ihm verabschiedet hat. Um aber den umfassenden Heilswillen Gottes mit der unbestreitbaren Unmenschlichkeit der Menschen zusammenzudenken, verwerfen heute Theologen die Rede von Sünde und Schuld überhaupt. Vielmehr bestehe die Verlorenheit des Menschen in seinem Menschsein als solchem. Erlösung sei nicht als Sündenvergebung zu denken, sondern als Befreiung aus dieser „condition humaine“. Das bricht zwar ein falsches Exklusivverständnis von Gnade auf, entkleidet sie andererseits aber ihres Gnadencharakters. Hat nämlich der Mensch sein Unheil nicht selbst zu vertreten, dann nimmt er zu Recht den Schöpfer in Pflicht. – Damit aber treffen sich auf bezeichnende Weise „postulatorischer“ Atheismus und „humanitäre“ Theologie. – Maria demgegenüber?

Gott ist in seinem Gut-sein nicht so sehr darauf aus, dass es uns gut geht, sondern dass wir gut seien. Er schafft Engel und Menschen, „quia vult condiligentes – weil er Mitliebende will.“²⁵ Und je liebender die sind, desto mehr mutet er ihnen zu.

Angenehm mag diese Auskunft nicht sein, aber sie ist der Kern der christlichen Botschaft, nach den Offenbarungsurkunden wie nach Erfahrung und Lehre vorbildlich

²⁴ Siehe Kap. 7 in: J. Sp., Gotteserfahrung im Denken. Zur philosophischen Rechtfertigung des Redens von Gott (Freiburg-München 1973), ⁵München 2005.

²⁵ J. DUNS SCOTUS, Op. Ox. III 32, 6 (VIVES XV, 433)

ernsthafter Christen (der „Heiligen“) durch die Jahrhunderte hin. Doch sind damit keineswegs alle Fragen geklärt. Ist es die Wahrheit: Warum muss sie und all das so weh tun? Und fraglos dient nicht aller Schmerz. (Warum hätte sonst Jesus geheilt?) Damit indes stünden wir vor einem neuen eigenen Thema.²⁶ Jedenfalls ist Gott statt „Höchstes Gut“ (das man erlangen wollte/sollte) die höchste Güte: die uns sendet (= wegschickt – ἀποστέλλω [apostello]: siehe die vierte Exerzitienwoche).

4. Anzumerken ist schließlich noch, dass inzwischen – ganz im Sinne Mariens – das Fest nicht mehr Mariä Verkündigung heißt, sondern Verkündigung des Herrn – *Annuntiatio Domini*. Der alttestamentlichen Lesung (Jes 7,10-15), die dem Festevangelium nach Lukas voranging, folgen jetzt Verse aus dem Brief an die Hebräer (10,4-10). Danach (der Text [5-7] zitiert – frei – Ps 40,7-9) „spricht Christus bei seinem Eintritt in die Welt: An Schlacht- und Speiseopfern hast du kein Gefallen, doch einen Leib hast du mir bereitet [...]. Da sagte ich: Siehe, ich komme – in der Buchrolle steht’s über mich geschrieben – zu tun, Gott, deinen Willen.“ Mariens „Fiat – mir geschehe“ wird so entschieden umfasst und bestätigt: „Siehe, ich komme.“

Und zuletzt folgt als Anhang („Corollarium“) auf diese Ergänzung zur Liturgie ein Rückblick nochmals auf die Ikonologie.

* * *

Zwei Bilder nämlich (anmerkungswise ein drittes) rufen nach einem eigenen Hinweis. Die erste ist das große Fresco FRA ANGELICOS (1387-1455) im Florentiner Kloster San Marco, das den Besucher im ersten Stock an der Treppe zum Nordkorridor erwartet.²⁷ Die zweite ist eine kleine Holztafel (61 x 62 cm) aus der Hand LORENZO COSTAS (ca. 1460-1535), der man in der Dresdner Gemäldegalerie alter Meister begegnen kann.²⁸ Maria („Lesende Maria“) sitzt, ganz in ein Buch vertieft, auf dem Boden, im Halbprofil nach links gewandt, von wo ihr eine Taube zufliegt. Der Maler rückt ihr im Aufblick von rechts so nahe, dass der Bildrand nicht bloß Kleidung und Füße, sondern auch ein Stück des Vogelkörpers abschneidet. Handelt es sich um das rechte Seitenstück einer Verkündigung, so dass auf einem linken Pendant der Heroldsengel zu denken wäre? Mein Kalenderblatt im Arbeitszimmer zeigt noch die Spuren der Beschädigung, die das Gemälde während seiner Kriegs-„Evakuierung“ im Stollen erlitten hat, (eine horizontale Risslinie im untersten Drittel); doch am Original ist davon nichts mehr zu sehen.

Hier entfällt also der vieldimensionale und facettenreiche Dialog mit dem himmlischen Boten. Die Taube verweist dafür auf Gott selbst. Und dies zugleich so, dass dabei das biblische Bilderverbot gewahrt bleibt, das ansonst, offenbar ohne schlechtes Gewissen, seit über einem Jahrtausend verletzt wird.²⁹ Gemeint ist nicht die (ihrerseits

²⁶ Erlaubt sei der Hinweis auf J. Sp., Gott-ergriffen. Grundkapitel einer Religionsanthropologie, Köln (2201) ⁵2010, Kap. 3: Und der „Fels des Atheismus“? – Zudem erneut C. S. LEWIS (Anm. 23: dt. 121) mit der Frage-Umkehr, das wirkliche Problem laute nicht: „Warum müssen einige demütige, fromme, gläubige Menschen leiden, sondern: warum müssen einige *nicht* leiden?“, mit dem Hinweis, dass Jesus selbst (Mk 10,27) die Rettung dieser Glücklichen allein durch Gottes unerforschliche Allmacht erklärt.

²⁷ Besondere Empfehlung: Fra Angelico. Das Licht der Seele. Altarbilder und Fresken des Klosters San Marco in Florenz (J. u. M. GUILLAUD, dt. I. KUHN), Stuttgart 1987 (die Abbildungen – 106-109 [S. 204-212] – auf sogenanntem „Zwiebelhaut-Papier“).

²⁸ Siehe (außer im Internet) etwa Kindlers Malerei Lexikon, München 1982, 3, 78.

²⁹ Seit Illustrationen zu Ps 110 (Vulg. 109: „Es sprach der Herr zu meinem Herrn“) und dann dem „Gnadenstuhl“, der als eine „der genialsten Bildschöpfungen des Abendlandes“ gelobt wird (F. BUCHHEIM, Der

umkämpfte) Darstellung Jesu, sondern die des Vaters, den zuvor nur seine Hand, das Auge oder das Tetragramm (יהוה [JHVH]) symbolisierten. Der Vater „wohnt“, von Wesen unsichtbar, „in unzugänglichem Lichte“ (1 Tim 6,16). Gottes Bild (!), sein Gesicht ist daher – wie das Wort als Verlauten des Denkens – nur der Sohn:³⁰ in „Versichtbarung“ des Unsichtbaren.

Demgemäß gibt es bei COSTA weniger zu sehen als in der Tradition und vor dem herrlichen Spätwerk FRA ANGELICOS. Wie aber, wenn der Betrachter eben dadurch sich aus der Zuschauer-Rolle hinaus gerufen erführe; wenn ihn in solch ästhetischer Distanz die Frage träfe, ob er gewillt sei, sich von der Einladung zur Kontemplation ergreifen zu lassen?³¹

Annunziazione / Verkündigung: ein faszinierendes Gespräch zwischen Himmel und Erde, in wechselseitiger Zuvorkommenheit. Die geistlichen Lehrer haben immer wieder meditiert, wie atemlos die himmlischen Chöre den Austausch verfolgt haben mögen. Die Schrift wie der Reichtum der Bilder erschließen auch uns Irdischen den Zugang zum Geschehen.

Vielleicht indes werden dieser Faszination Einzelne entrissen durch eine Zettel-Notiz LUDWIG WITTGENSTEINS:³² „Gott kannst du nicht mit einem anderen reden hören, sondern nur, wenn du der Angeredete bist.“

Gnadenstuhl. Darstellung der Dreifaltigkeit, Würzburg 1984, 11). Den Höhepunkt wohl stellt die Decke der Sixtinischen Kapelle dar. (Siehe besonders die Erschaffung der Pflanzen [Rückenansicht]!)

³⁰ Anstatt dass er (Kol 1,15 Einheitsübersetzung) das *Ab-* und „*Ebenbild* des unsichtbaren Gottes“ wäre (siehe dazu Joh 14,9). Das erst würde auch dem Geist und seiner göttlichen Gleichrangigkeit gerecht, während er jetzt in Tiergestalt zwischen einem alten und einem jungen Mann figuriert.

³¹ So auch vor einer modernen Variante, farblich fast ganz auf Blau in Blau reduziert (160 x 134 cm): dem Wandelbild „Verkündigung“ von EGBERT VERBEEK im Siegburger Edith-Stein-Haus (das nach Altenberg umzieht). Im Internet über den Namen des Künstlers zu finden wie auch, mit einem Begleit-Text von Pfr. Bernward Granel, unter:

^hhttp://tagen.erzbistum-koeln.de/edith_stein_exerzitienhaus/01_haus/08_Verbeek/01_Verkuendungig.

Bei geschlossenen Seitenflügeln: „von außen zu sehen: ein Kreuz – Christus, der Sohn Gottes, verborgen, unerkant im Schoß seiner Mutter.“ Geöffnet zeigt es Maria, in T-Shirt und Jeans auf einem Stuhl zwischen Flurwänden sitzend, verunsichert, fragend. Um sie herum in kreisförmigem Hellstblau „der Widerschein des Engels.“ „Und sie blickt [nicht mehr ins Buch auf ihrem rechten Knie,] auf diesen Boten Gottes. Blickt auf mich – als BetrachterIn des Bildes, und vielleicht auch als einen Boten, der Gottes gute Botschaft zu den anderen bringen kann.“

³² L. WITTGENSTEIN, Schriften 5, (Frankfurt/M. 1970, 429. Zettel, Nr. 717 (Schluss-Text des Bandes). Die Anführungszeichen stammen von Wittgenstein, es handelt sich also um ein Zitat. Er schließt an (nun meine Zeichen): „– Das ist eine grammatische Bemerkung.“ Womit (Philos. Unters. § 373 [Schriften 1, 422]) gemeint ist: es sagt, „welche Art von Gegenstand etwas ist.“ Wie also davon – hier Gott – zu reden sei.

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“Theory-ladenness” in Thomas F. Torrance’s Epistemological Realism

Realism can be understood both as an ontological and epistemological standpoint. In the former sense, it implies claims on the existence of reality *extra mentem*, that is, independently of us and our act of cognition.* In the latter, it asserts the possibility of cognition of the independently self-existing reality *per se*. Thomas F. Torrance is, for various reasons, considered as a typical representative of realism in theology – both ontological and epistemological. The paper is concerned with his epistemological realism. The tenets of realism-related standpoint presented in the paper Torrance holds to be pertinent both for science and theology.

The idea of scientific observations being always ‘theory-laden’ is not commonly related to realistic position – on the contrary. Without going into any further analysis, the paper is concerned with the idea in its most basic meaning: in terms of the claim that an observation deprived of theory does not exist *per se*.¹ This claim has been widely recognized in various disciplines dealing with the issue of human knowledge (philosophy of science, cognitive sciences, sociology, etc.) and it has been most commonly related to a form of antirealism: constructivism, instrumentalism or phenomenism. This gives rise to the following question: Is it possible to adopt the concept of ‘theory-laden’ observations while advocating realism? Notwithstanding his advocacy of realism Torrance proves to appreciate and, in some form, adopt the concept.² The aim of the paper is to analyze the way the concept of ‘theory-laden’ observations has been incorporated in the framework of Torrance’s epistemological realism, as well as to present the basic structure of his epistemology through the analysis.

I.

Torrance tends to postulate his own realistic position as the one that transcends the traditional opposition between idealism and realism. He views realism as the standpoint not opposite to idealism, but to the standpoint that lies in the roots of the opposition between

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¹ This concept was originally promoted by Norwood Hanson (in his *Patterns of Discovery*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958). Afterwards, it became well-known thanks to the work of Thomas Kuhn (Cf. his *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) and developed in a radical way by Paul Feyerabend (Cf. his *Realism, Rationalism, and Scientific Method*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

² Although some postliberals would argue that realists have failed to do so. Cf. Sue Patterson, *Realist Christian Theology in a Postmodern Age*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 4.

realism and idealism – which is *dualism*. Torrance understands dualism as a danger manifested in cosmology, anthropology and epistemology.³ As our concern is primarily with his epistemological dualism, we shall focus on it below. Therefore, let us begin with the passage which demonstrates Torrance's view that dualism, and not idealism, is the problem the solution for which is offered by realism:

“... we shall use the term [realism], not in an attenuated dialectical sense merely in contrast to idealism, nominalism, or conventionalism, but to describe the orientation in thought that obtains in semantics, science, or theology on the basis of a nondualist or unitary relation between the empirical and theoretical ingredients in the structure of the real world and in our knowledge of it.”⁴

Realism, understood in ‘attenuated dialectical sense’, according to him, is the standpoint converging to one side of the dichotomy which should have never been considered at all. Within such a dichotomy, in which the proper relation between the sign and the reality which it signifies is broken, extreme positions alternate and merge. Ontological primacy is alternately attributed to either empirical experience (reality) or its theoretical description (idea).⁵

Proper understanding of Torrance's view of realism in epistemology implies the standpoint which rejects the dualism between empirical and theoretical ingredients in knowledge. His realism claims that subject is not the creator of theory but its recipient, because theory itself is contained in reality. Within any dualistic theory of cognition, be it idealistic or realistic, theory is interpreted either as transcendental reality existing independently of the domain of the sensory experience, or as a product of the subject who uses it in order to categorize and describe its experience. Contrary to this, Torrance argues that theory is inseparable from experience yet not because theory presents an *a priori* assumption through which subject's experience is filtered, but because theory itself is an integral component of reality, as it is stated in the cited passage above. Theory is identified with intelligibility, i.e. *rational order* that is inherent in reality.⁶ This fact makes Torrance imply the impossibility of experiencing reality independently from the experience of order contained in it. No experience of reality could be separated from the experience of its inherent order. It is in this sense that Torrance views the empirical and theoretical to be inseparable. To argue for the concept of ‘theory-ladenness’ understood in this way is to argue for realistic standpoint. The dualism which separates theory from observation is the very opposition to realism.

In order to explain Torrance's standpoint, which is, at times, blurred by highly complex discourse, I will use an analogy.⁷ Let us imagine a bookcase with books sorted

³ For his broad definition of dualism cf. Thomas F. Torrance, „Notes on Terms and Concepts“, in: Thomas F. Torrance (ed.), *Belief in Science and in Christian Life: The Relevance of Michael Polanyi's Thought for Christian Faith and Life*, Edinburgh: The Handsel Press, 1980, 136.

⁴ Thomas F. Torrance, *Reality and Evangelical Theology*, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1982, 60.

⁵ Ibid. 59.

⁶ Thomas F. Torrance, *God and Rationality*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971, 16; id., *Reality and Scientific Theology*, Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2001, 3.


⁷ Torrance developed his discourse against dualist epistemology and the consequent argument for the ‘unitary way of thinking’ in almost every book he wrote. Besides the above cited, cf. especially his *Theological Science*, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1969; *The Ground and Grammar of Theology*, Belfast: Christian Journals Limited, 1980; *Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge: Explorations in the Interrelations of Scientific and Theological Enterprise*, Belfast: Christian Journals Limited, 1984.

on the bookshelves *alphabetically*, according to the first letter of the authors' last name. The fundamental feature of dualistic approach is not to perceive theory – in Torrance's sense inherent (*rational*) order – as a component of reality. In our analogy, a researcher looking at the bookcase would ignore the fact that the books have already been sorted according to certain order. So, instead of looking for the inherent order, the researcher would see his task to be sorting the books, in his mind, according to some predetermined order. Having assumed that the order is in his mind, and not in reality itself, he would treat the bookcase as a pile of books which need to be sorted according to some order. He might, for example, start mentally sorting the books according to the *Cyrillic script alphabetical* order, instead of *alphabetically*, thus placing the letter C after the letter H, instead of placing it after the letter B.⁸ Our researcher might get even more tempted to attribute this order to the reality itself, that is, to start thinking that the reality is *necessarily* subjected to the order of the letters in the Cyrillic script alphabet. He might think that the books are necessarily sorted out according to the Cyrillic script alphabet within which the letters themselves are necessarily ordered. In this way the empirical reality is necessarily inferred from the theoretical: the order of the books on the bookshelves is perceived as a necessary manifestation of the (transcendental) Cyrillic script alphabetical order. As a result, according to Torrance, a logical bridge is established between empirical reality and its theoretical conceptualization, which are perceived as two completely distinct realities. Our researcher's would conclude that the *Cyrillic script alphabetical* order presents a necessity to which all books submit including the books in front of him – C *necessarily* comes after H, so it must apply to these books as well.

The research conducted in this way goes as follows. Subject faces reality equipped with predetermined epistemology subjecting it to empirical research in order to, by means of logical induction, infer certain theoretical concepts. The researcher looks at the bookcase, realizes that the surname of each of the authors starts with a letter and sorts the books according to the Cyrillic script alphabet order, which is predetermined. For Torrance, the order, that is, theoretical concepts established this way represent closed structures given their lack of openness to the 'compulsion' of reality which should be revealed through them. They are artificial constructs of the mind which tends to theoretically systematize whatever it has previously cognized through senses. What follows is that further implications are inferred by means of logical analysis of these concepts and thus new scientific theories are produced. The researcher, having concluded that the order of the books necessarily reflects the order of the letters in the Cyrillic script alphabet, in fact infers the order according to which the books should be sorted. This is how a false impression of scientific progress is created. Later on, these theories are tested on the reality they are expected to correspond with whereby a 'logical bridge' is established between the two opposite realities. It turns out, in our analogy, that the M shelf is followed by the N shelf,⁹ which makes our researcher conclude that the books in the bookcase are *necessarily* subjected to the order he attributed to them and that by means of logical analysis of the order he can discover which shelf must follow which one. Torrance's understanding of such epistemological model is presented in Scheme 1.

⁸ In the Cyrillic script alphabet letter C follows after letter H.

⁹ This is the case in Cyrillic script alphabet as well.




Scheme 1

On the other hand, realism, which is the basis of the *unitary* mode of thinking, draws from the assumption that the order is inherent in reality itself. Thus, the researcher who adheres to such approach treats the world as a bookcase with the books already sorted according to some order. His task is not to construct the order out of the pile of books, but to *discover* the one already present in the bookcase. The order of the letters (as well as the shelves and the books) is not an assumption from which one should start and draw conclusions regarding the order that (necessarily) exist among the books – it is disclosed from the very state of affairs. The order of the letters according to which the books are really sorted is not necessary, but *contingent*. It does not depend on the order of the letters in alphabet or Cyrillic script alphabet, but on the order of the books on the bookshelves. Thus, the researcher would not conclude that the books with authors' last name starting with the letter C be necessarily found after those with the letter H, but would discover that they would follow the B books. Order of the letters in the alphabet discovered this way would not be necessary. It is not constructed by our mind, nor is it transcendental order to which the empirical reality is bound to subject. The ordering of the letters in the alphabet is derived from the ordering of the books, i.e. shelves in the bookcase. Also, no progress in knowledge could be achieved by means of logical analysis of the order comprehended this way. The order of the shelves and their inter-relation must be *discovered* by exploring the very reality and not by assuming that it will necessarily subject itself to the assumed order. Thus, the theoretical (alphabet) and the empirical (perception of the bookcase) do not represent two ontologically distinct realities between which one establishes a necessary relation, in which the latter is necessarily subjected to the former. On the contrary, they represent *unique* reality: the alphabetical order of the letters is inherent in the bookcase. The order of the letters in alphabet is not the matter of the mind's necessity, but of the experiential contingency.

Within such approach, instead of fixed a priori epistemology the subject is using *preliminary* questions in order to examine reality. Within this scenario, the researcher might assume that the books in the bookcase have been sorted according to the Cyrillic script alphabet while allowing the possibility that it could be otherwise. During the investigation, the subject gives space for the reality to act creatively via 'compulsion' which allows for the very structures inherent in reality to be formed in subject's mind. This leads to change of the order of the letters (in his mind) on the grounds of it having been inferred from the order of the books in the bookcase. Knowledge formed in subject's mind under the compulsion of objective reality (the effect of which the subject is amenable to) is *correlated* with the reality. The inferred theoretical knowledge is not the result of posterior action of the mind on the material obtained through sensory percep-

tion; it is an imprint of the intelligible structure of the reality itself. This cognition is formulated within the 'disclosure models' the nature of which implies 'openness' to constant critique and revision. Thus reality is enabled to act compulsively and change both the models and the epistemological frames wherefrom the subject approaches it. Torrance's understanding of this unitary model of thinking is shown in Scheme 2.



Scheme 2

As has already been said, Torrance considers theory to be an ingredient of reality which we allow to be disclosed within our models. Torrance, however, considers that subject; social factors as well as language also have a role in articulating and formulating knowledge.

2.

Torrance recognizes the fact that any knowledge is the knowledge of the subject. Within the process of forming knowledge, subject, by all means, plays an important role. It objectifies the object of his research and shapes the investigation it subjects it to. For this reason, the content of our knowledge always has an *impress* of the subject, i.e. the procedure and the form of research of the object. This mark is impossible to be eliminated from the content of our knowledge:

"... the very nature of our inquiry, by which we create certain conditions within which we force nature to disclose itself to us according to our will, affects the content of our knowledge, and gives it an unavoidable ambiguity. It bears the impress of our questions and analysis."¹⁰

Although subject's impress in the knowledge remains, the awareness of the need for critical revision of the process of acquiring knowledge – the questions we pose to reality and the models we use to describe it – serves the purpose of reducing subject's contribution in cognition to the minimum. Therefore, for Torrance, subject's contribution in cognition is inevitable. Subject should take a realistic approach to reality. It should enable uninterrupted and adequate compulsion of object. It also must constantly critically revise its participation in the process of cognition. For knowledge to be scientific, the conditions of its examination and the questions posed to the object must be determined and constantly questioned by the very object. The mode of examining the object and the questions we ask must conform to the nature of the object. As Torrance puts it:

"It is only through the unremitting questioning of our questions and of ourselves the questioners, that true questions are put into our mouths to be directed to the object for its disclosure to us."¹¹

¹⁰ *Theological Science*, 94.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 120.

Due to the impress of subjectivity that any cognition bears, the scientific statements speak both of the object of knowledge and of its subject. Hence Torrance views scientific laws as “expressions of our modes of cognition as well as of realities in themselves”.¹² Having this in mind, subjectivity of our cognition may (though it should not) be ignored, but it could not be excluded.

This leaves Torrance open to the objection that he also conceives theory as a product of subject and not as an objective structure inherent in reality. However, Torrance resolves this by introducing the principle of *kinship* between the rationality (intelligibility) in creation and the rationality of subject. As is evident in the cited passages, Torrance claims, following Einstein, that as much the world is amazingly open for our cognition so is cognition admirably open for the world. Between mind and universe there is a ‘pre-established harmony’ without which science would be impossible.¹³ Thus, theory (as well as entire knowledge) represents a noetic structure that reflects the ontic one. Theory is a noetic structure wherein the ontic one, akin to it, is reflected.¹⁴ There is no necessary correspondence between them, only *correlation* which is contingent by its nature. This way Torrance avoids the possibility for theory to be ‘ontologized’, to be conceived as existing independent of reality, a transcendental structure to which reality (necessarily) subjects. Theory is a component of reality which can be articulated by subject on the grounds of kinship between the realities of the world and subject.

Furthermore, Torrance asserts that the content of our knowledge is modelled also by inter-subjectivity or, as Torrance calls it, ‘social coefficient of knowledge’.¹⁵ Torrance holds that, apart from subjective consciousness, there is social consciousness as well. The later is generated through participation in joint ‘semantic frame’, ‘the network of meaning’ which is mediated by language. Language itself is not the cause of social consciousness; it is the mechanism of its realization. The cause lies in the fact that any subject exists only as an inter-personal being. Torrance’s concept of ‘social coefficient’ indicates existence of a non-reflected cognitive matrix shared by members of a society or a scientific community within which and thanks to which knowledge is possible to be acquired. The cognitive pattern does not represent positive, propositional knowledge, but, rather, subconscious, non-articulated pre-understanding necessary for acquiring explicit knowledge in every science:

“In itself it is a non-formal apprehension of reality, but it constitutes the necessary ground or condition for all explicit knowledge such as we develop in the various sciences.”¹⁶

Although admitting to the social conditionality of cognition, Torrance does not see it as an impediment in advocating realism. On the contrary, he views the social coefficient of knowledge as the very precondition of realism. How so?

Torrance views the social coefficient as the enabler of openness of the subject for reality since it cherishes a *natural relation* with reality which, briefly put, stands on the position of realism. This entails that scientific research is nothing but rational articulation and rigorous application of this same approach to reality. Having a natural relation with reality, social consciousness, in a way similar to rationally articulated knowledge, reflects the in-

¹² Ibid. 94.

¹³ Einstein borrows this expression from Leibniz (Cf. his *The World as I see It*, London: John Laene, 1935, 125-126).

¹⁴ *Theological Science*, 94-95.

¹⁵ He develops his understanding of this concept thoroughly in *Reality and Scientific Theology*, 98-130.

¹⁶ Ibid. 112.

telligible structure of the universe. Knowledge about the structure of reality is, according to Torrance, in some form already present in the pre-understanding that a scientist shares with others. Eventually, he brings it to rational articulation by deploying rigorous and disciplined research. Likewise, social consciousness is oriented towards reality thus cherishing the approach which places truth within the domain of reality. Our knowledge is not the habitat of truth; it can only be in true or false relation with the truth which is reality itself. It is precisely the social coefficient of knowledge that maintains this focus on reality by indicating that reality itself is the ultimate instance of truth and not the statements about it. Moreover, social consciousness is a guarantee of the objectivity of knowledge because only the knowledge shared and available to others can be considered objective.

The role of social consciousness as the 'cognitive matrix of pre-understanding' is multiple. It (1) names the openness of social consciousness for the reality that transcends it thus maintaining semantic focus on the later; (2) contains inner reflection of the intelligible structure of the universe; (3) guarantees the objectivity of knowledge. Unless it performs all of the listed functions, the 'social coefficient' becomes an impediment for authentic knowledge. While discussing the role of the social coefficient of knowledge, Torrance's emphasis is not on the fact that our cognition is determined by social environment and practices entailing from it, but on the fact that it is this very environment and practices that *enable* us to acquire real cognition, provided their function is properly understood. Social factor, understood as the consciousness of a social or scientific community, becomes the guarantee of the reality of cognition, not an impediment, because the cognition shared within the community is objective and takes advantage of the reflection of the rational order which is inherent in reality. Likewise, with its openness, which Torrance views as its intrinsic component (which may be overlooked), the coefficient represents a reminder of the realistic imperative according to which the knowledge itself is not our ultimate goal, but the reality it refers to.

3.

It is evident that Torrance manages to incorporate the concept of 'theory-ladenness' within his framework of epistemological realism. He does so by showing that rational order is inherent in reality, and not just in the subject's mind or in the 'eternal' structures to which the empirical reality merely points. It cannot be excluded from our understanding of reality and it is for this reason that observation cannot be deprived of theory. Likewise, our cognition of reality cannot be deprived of the influence of subject, nor of the influence of social consciousness and language use. However, these influences do not represent theoretical frames which scientific observation could be inserted in. Our knowledge is real only when it is modelled by subject and its social context. The non-reflected social consciousnesses, as well as the articulated rationality of subject, express the very rationality inherent in reality. This is possible due to the existence of fundamental kinship between rationality present in human mind and the one inherent in nature. Torrance proves that the understanding, which is based on 'theory-laden' observations, that follows the line of argument that subject and social reality shape our knowledge, is a true argument in favour of realism, not anti-realism as is commonly held. I would say that Torrance demonstrates the possibility of the 'third way' – the way to advocate realism capable of incorporating ideas deployed by anti-realism. Such creativity deserves commendation as well as criticism which will come in due time.

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Žižek, Chesterton and Job: The Question of Suffering
Essay on Žižek's and Chesterton's Non-classical Exegesis
of The Book of Job

“The present importance of the book of Job cannot be expressed adequately even by saying that it is the most interesting of ancient books. We may almost say of the book of Job that it is the most interesting of modern books. In truth, of course, neither of the two phrases covers the matter, because fundamental human religion and fundamental human irreligion are both at once old and new; philosophy is either eternal or it is not philosophy.”

G. K. Chesterton

Non-classical Biblical Exegesis

Although the *non-classical* Biblical exegesis has “thousands of faults” and most of the time, presents an irritating matter for the professional theologians, it has to be admitted, that it has contributed a great deal to, what is considered to be one of the key tasks of Christian theology, and that is – (re)actualization of the Biblical message, precisely, therefore, that which is of the crucial importance for the church theology, something that most of modern theologians did not accomplish (apart from a few exceptions, whose number, rather, resembles a statistical error). This is a clear signifier of deep crisis, the Christian theology, finds itself in (which is, as a matter of fact, something that we have to bear in mind, a spiritual crisis as well). Anachronism and insensibility for reality, or at least incomprehension regarding the problems of the modern world, or academic indifference, are all the features of the modern *classical biblical theology*. On the other hand, the non-classical biblical exegesis is inventive and up-to-date. It speaks the language everyone can comprehend, it uses perceptive thinking, and it discusses the topics that are relevant to the modern world. Avoiding the conventional forms of expression, and utilizing the accomplishments of the modern philosophy (not projecting the ancient modes of the Biblical exegesis and repeating the outdated solution of the old problems), the non-classical exegesis succeeded in avoiding the anachronisms. It is able to find a new path which the biblical thought might utilize, as well as to illuminate many insights and events. It is able to set up the old questions in a new and fresh mode, but also to articulate some new problems. Non-classical exegetes, approached the dilemmas of the modern world, relying (and) on the Biblical tradition, although, for most of them this tradition was not compulsory, nor were the results of the Biblical criticism, although not entirely ignored, of the crucial importance for them. These factors, provided them with enough space for the exegetical maneuver, and enable them to reach significant results, despite frequent oversights, that are neither harmless nor negligible.

The modern readings of the Pauline corpus or The Book of Job, can serve as the best example of what is previously mentioned. By this occasion, I would like to reflect on some of the non classical readings of the latter, considering one of the “eternal and cursed questions,” as they were called by Dostoyevsky, that the modern history so brutally inaugurated. It is about *the meaning of suffering*. Unlike many of the Christian theologians, some of the modern readers of The Book of Job, not abided by the ancient canons of the Biblical exegesis, succeeded to discover in the text of the book, neglected layers of thought, that are of the special importance for the comprehension of the phenomenon of suffering. The modern man did not escape suffering. On the contrary, in the “history of suffering”, the modern civilization occupies a high position. For that reason, the theologians of today are often asked to deliver an answer regarding the meaning of suffering. The Biblical tradition clearly answers the question, although, the answer is not adequately presented by the classical biblical exegetes. On the other hand, those that are called here the non-classical theologians succeeded, and adequately answered the question. I have in mind Slavoj Žižek and his reading of The Book of Job. So I will dedicate much of this essay to his books: *The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox of Dialectic*, London, 2009 and *God in Pain*, New York, 2012. Nevertheless, in addition, I will consider the Chesterton’s reflection on the Job’s problem (formulated in his text “Introduction to the Book of Job” [1916]). On several occasions, Žižek explicitly praised the creativity of this English Christian philosopher and writer. In his “theological” works, which are frequent lately, he often quotes and elaborates many of Chesterton’s insights and motives. In Žižek’s exegesis on The Book of Job, Chesterton’s influence is even crucial. His interpretation of this Old Testament book is rather based on Chesterton. That’s why I have decided, not only to expose Žižek’s vision of Job, but to elaborate Chesterton’s as well.

The Suffering God

Why is The Book of Job so important for Žižek? In the book *The Monstrosity of Christ*, for the Superstar of philosophy, The Book of Job becomes important, in the moment he engages with the Christian theology that speaks of the *suffering God*. According to Žižek, the assumption that the good God that wage war against the evil of the world, is actually in the war with Himself, represents the climax of the pagan theological thought. In another words, it is a matter of an internal struggle, i.e. on the level of speculative, that there is homology between good and evil. According to Žižek’s opinion, the tension that exists between the idea of a good, and the idea of an evil God, is resolved in the biblical theology that speaks of the suffering God. In relation to the paganism, it is an entirely new idea, something that is uniquely Christian.

In his article: “Only a Suffering God Can Save Us”, published in the book: *God in Pain*, Žižek argues that the theological answers, related to the problem of how to reconcile the existence of a good and just God with the fact of the Holocaust, or any other excessive evil, build a succession of Hegelian triads. Namely, those that want to leave divine sovereignty unimpaired, and do not question His existence, despite the Holocaust and the similar manifestations of the radical evil, offer the answers that can be, according to Žižek, arranged in Hegelian triads. The following theories are counted in the *first of these triads*: 1. *Legalistic sin and punishment theory* (The Holocaust is a punishment for the sins of humanity, i.e. the Jews themselves); 2. *The Moralistic character-educa-*

tion theory (The Holocaust is to be understood as the test of our faith in God, if we survive it, our character will stand firm); 3. *The Divine Mystery theory* (The Holocaust bear witness to the unfathomable abyss of divine will). *The second triad*, mentioned by Žižek, is composed by the answers of those theologians who, unable to combine the Holocaust with the existence of absolutely sovereign God, are not ready to accept the traditional notion of God's omnipotence. The structure of the second triad appears like this: (1) Determine that the God is not omnipotent, that He is overwhelmed by the dense inertia of his own creation, then (2) this limitation is reflected back into God himself, as an act of His free will. (God constrained his power in order to leave the room open for human freedom. Men, possessing the free will, are thus, fully responsible for the evil in the world. In short, the Holocaust is the price for freedom). (3) At the end, the dualistic solution: self-limitation is eternalized, the two moments are posited as autonomous – God is embattled, becomes a counterweight, opposite force of demonic Evil active in the world. Žižek, following these two triads, introduces the third position, which is, as he rightly claims, above and beyond the idea of the sovereign God and the idea of the finite God. It is the idea of suffering God. In passing, Žižek's insistence on the triads is altogether unnecessary. As a matter of fact, we are dealing here with an artificial construction that is introduced in the polemic, just in order to give it a sort of Hegelian note. Luckily, the form did not jeopardize the content, and we will soon reflect on it.

Žižek is less interested to contribute to the general field of theology, as to the question of the socio-political consequences of the faith in God who is in pain. (He, as a matter of facts, abuses the (Christian) theology, in order to apply it to his political philosophy, i.e. in order to criticize different ideologies. Nevertheless, his reflections are of great importance for the Christian theology itself. More, I am of the opinion that Žižek's reading contributes to the construction of a meaningful and engaged theology. That is the reason why he ought not to be ignored by the church thinkers). In any way, above mentioned Slavoj Žižek's theological innovation of the Biblical scholarship, bring us, quite surprisingly to The Book of Job. I used the word *surprisingly*, since it is far more plausible for one "non-theologian", intrigued in the idea of God in pain, to direct his interests toward the Christology of the New Testament. (This might be the first indicator, not to take Žižek for granted). Further reading of this article, will hopefully clarify, although, it can be anticipated even now, why is The Book of Job in the centre of Žižek's attention.

Increases of Riddle as its Solution

According to Žižek's "teacher" of theology G. K. Chesterton, The Book of Job is among the other Old Testament books both a philosophical and a historical riddle. Here, it is the philosophical riddle that concerns us. According to Chesterton, the Old Testament collection of the books is only to be understood, if we bear in mind, that all people are just instruments in the hands of a higher force. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that "the idea of the Old Testament was more a common-sense idea, that strength is strength, that cunning is cunning, that worldly success is worldly success, and that Jehovah uses these things for His own ultimate purpose, just as He uses natural forces and physical elements." Chesterton is convinced that all heroes of the Old Testament are not the sons but are the slaves of God. He even considers that the central idea of great part of the Old Testament is the loneliness of God. In other words, "God is not the only chief charac-

ter of the Old Testament; God is properly the only character in the Old Testament.” This conclusion is deduced from the fact that contrary to God’s, the goal of all desires is an automatic one. Only God concretely knows what He is doing. On the other hand, man has something of the vagueness, the unreason. His behavior, according to the brilliant definition of this English sage, seems as “the vagrancy of the beasts that perish.” It is the same in all other instances. The Old Testaments glorifies the superiority of God’s, and naughtiness of man’s will, in all but one case, in the case of Job. The Book of Job stands alone, since it asks the following questions: “But what is the purpose of God? Is it worth the sacrifice even of our miserable humanity? Of course, it is easy enough to wipe out our own paltry wills for the sake of a will that is grander and kinder. But is it grander and kinder? Let God use His tools; let God break His tools. But what is He doing, and what are they being broken for? It is because of this question,” Chesterton concludes, “that we have to attack as a philosophical riddle the riddle of the book of Job.”

The enigma of suffering of blameless Job is placed before God by the protagonist himself. However, He, no one else but God himself, gives, if nothing else, an inappropriate answer. That is why The Book of Job is of such philosophical and religious excellence. Not only that God doesn’t answer the question: What is the meaning of Job’s passion? He even strengthens the question. He answers the most direct question, using a contra-question. He asks Job who is he?, and Job answers that he does not know. The answer, according to Chesterton, represents all human skeptics routed by a “higher skepticism.” This is the basic philosophical position of The Book of Job. Not only that God frustrates the Job’s skepticism, it seems that He even encourages it further. It is done in order that Job can understand, that what at the end remains, is a riddle that even God himself is not able to resolve. When the One, in whom the all hopes are placed, the One that ought to have the answer for all questions, instead to find a solution for the problem, He even increased it further, confessing indirectly, that even He doesn’t possess the solution. Now we are witnessing yet another turn, this time, a religious one. It is not that job became furious or depressed. He is comforted. It seems that “the enigmas of Jehovah seem darker and more desolate than the enigmas of Job; and that Job was comfortless before the speech of Jehovah and is comforted after it. Therefore, the riddles of God are more satisfying than the solutions of man.”

According to Chesterton, the dialogue between Job and God, boils down to the fact that “Job puts forward a note of interrogation” and “God answers with a note of exclamation,” and “Instead of proving to Job that it is an explicable world, He insists that it is a much stranger world than Job ever thought it was.” As it is expected, Slavoj Žižek interprets Chesterton’s description of the situation, with the help of Jacques Lacan. According to Žižek, the reaction of God corresponds to what Lacan calls *point de capiton*. In The Book of Job, God resolve the riddle by radicalizing it, doubling it, by taking it out from the Job’s mind, and placing it in the *thing itself*. In other words, God himself shares the Job’s horror, when faced with the chaos that prevails in the universe, manifested, among the other things, as the suffering of the innocent. Unlike his friends, who came to comfort him, offering the (theological) explanation for the situation he founded himself in, Job ascribes no deeper meaning to the sufferings he was going through. When God, at the end appears, he shows that the truth is on Job’s and not on the side of his friends.

Simply, *the riddle of Job* has no rational final explanation. Suffering is meaningless. It has no theological meaning. Therefore, the question: "What is the meaning of suffering?" equals the question: "What is the sense of nonsense?" However, the mentioned riddle has no irrational explanation either. If there is the explanation to it, God would surely have known it. The problem, therefore, does not belong to the sort of questions that will receive its answer at the end of history, as it is mentioned by Apostle Paul in *Hymn to Love*. The fact that we know now "in part", because "we see only a reflection as in a mirror" (1Cor 13:12), and that at the end of the world, we will have full knowledge, has no impact on *the enigma of Job*. Therefore, even from the eschatological perspective we will not be able to find an answer to the question that is unknown to us, even now, in this world.

God in "Auschwitz", "Chernobyl" and Similar Places

Efficiency test of Chesterton's (and Žižek's) thesis, that claims that the Book of Job is current even today, is thematisation of the human sufferings in the horrors of First, and specially Second World War, in the pandemics, or during the ecological disasters etc. (Apropos, in the title of this paragraph, I put the name of the Nazi Concentration camp under the quotation marks, since I use its name here, not to denote a place of mass destruction, but as a symbol. Because of the monstrous atrocities launched in Auschwitz, its name, particularly after T. Adorno, is used in the literature, not only as a metaphor for the sufferings of the Jewish people, but as a symbol of suffering of all innocent victims of World War Two. Similarly, the name of Chernobyl is used to denote nuclear catastrophe of incalculable proportions). The question is: What is the meaning of suffering of million innocent victims in all *world, cold* and other wars; the victims in contaminated regions after the nuclear catastrophes; the victims of pandemics, etc., and the like?

Slavoj Žižek considers that Job's resistance to appoint any sense to suffering is crucial, when "we are confronting potential or actual catastrophes, from AIDS and ecological disasters to the Holocaust." He categorically claims that catastrophes "have no *deeper meaning*." The legacy of Job, as underlines the Slovenian philosopher, call in question, that God is a transcendent Master of the creation, who knows the meaning of what appears to us to be a meaningless catastrophe, and "God who sees the entire picture in which what we perceive as a stain contributes to global harmony of the Whole." God can't any longer be asylum for the claims that there is meaning to all accidents that take places on the daily basis. Žižek rhetorically asks: "When we are confronted with an event like the Holocaust, or the death of millions in Congo in recent years, is it not obscene to claim that these stains have a deeper meaning in that they contribute to the harmony of the Whole?" And then he asks the crucial question: "Is there a Whole which can teleologically justify, and thus redeem/sublate, an event like the Holocaust?" The Job's experience dictates a negative answer.

The Job's God "is no longer an excellent God, who at the end wins, since he holds all strings in His hands (even though He moves in a mysterious way), nor is He God that coldly delivers justice, since He is, according to the definition, always right. It is Christ that suffers on the Cross, God in agony, who takes the burden of suffering and sympathizes with human misery." Therefore, Žižek considers that is not only Job's theological legacy that dictates such approach to the question, but also, and we have to bear this in

mind, Christ's death on the Cross dictates us the same, since it rejects the idea of God as a transcendent guarantor of fortunate outcome of all our efforts. "Christ's death on the Cross is the death of *this* God, it repeats Job's stance, it refuses any "deeper meaning" that obfuscates the brutal reality of historical catastrophes." (Parenthetically, the interpretation of Job's and Christ's suffering inside a hermeneutical circle, tells us that, although Žižek's acquaintance with the theological literature is not satisfying, however, his intuition should not be underestimated. Of course, intuition can't replace erudition, nor can erudition replace intuition. Therefore, we should be cautious with Žižek's interpretations and conclusions, but we should never *a priori* reject them).

This indicates, as stated by Žižek, that there is but one answer the Christians should provide to the question of all questions: "Was God present in Auschwitz?" or "How could he allow such immense suffering? Why didn't he intervene and prevent it?" According to his opinion, the answer is neither that we should withdraw from earthly vicissitudes in the blessed peace of God, who transcendent all our misfortunes, since, as humans we are aware of the ultimate nullity of our human concerns (pagan answer), nor that God is the one who, unlike us, knows what he is doing, and will at the end recompense us for all our suffering, heal our wounds and rightly punish the guilty (standard Christian answer). What answer, therefore, the Christians should provide to the question: "Was God present in Auschwitz?"

Žižek, in his recognized manner, answers the question, referring to a movie, which deals with Rwanda's genocide. It is about *Shooting Dogs*, a 2005 film. Žižek refers to the final scene of the film: in the moment, when a group of Tutsi refugees hidden in a Christian school, wait to be slaughtered by Hutu tribesmen, a young British teacher asks the elder priest: Where Christ is now to prevent the slaughter, the priest answers: Christ is now present here more than ever, *He is suffering here with us*.

The answer that Žižek quotes is a correct one. Unfortunately, his concept of God's presence is not. Namely, he writes that term "presence" from the film's scene, in other words, presence of God in the human sufferings, should be interpreted as "the presence of a spectral *objet a* which adds itself to objects which are here in reality: when a Christian is caught in a situation like the one in the film, objects in reality around him are *present*, but the *presence* is that of Christ."

Here, Žižek pays the price of his Lacanianism, as well of his insufficient familiarity with theological literature. Simply, he is not familiar with the Christian theology, in order to make a move from his statement regarding the presence of God in the human sufferings. Orthodox Christian theological phenomenology tells us that the world is, in the ontological sense, symbolic. It is not a "pure" matter but the synthesis of the created and the divine. Whether we are aware of it or not, i.e. believing it or not, God is present in the world, in two following manner: passively and actively. On the other hand, man decides about the immanency of God. If man acts as free being of love, he achieves the relationship of synergy with God (active presence of God). Otherwise, if man denies himself as a free creature of love, he pacifies divine activity (passive presence of God). Simply put, when man sins, God sustains the world, but when man has a virtuous life, God participates in his living. God does not violate the human freedom intervening each time when something is not according to His will, since the human freedom is regulative principle of the world's existence. Whether a man will exist as a true man or as a

parasite depends on his free will. Consequently, it can be concluded that the God is most (i.e. personally) present in the sufferings of the innocence. This presence gives comfort to those who suffer, if he is aware of it (as it is case of Job), while He is passive related to the one who does evil.

Although the pain *per se* is devoid of the meaning, although it is a parasite phenomenon, its manifestation has immense consequences for the history, as well as for the theology, since in the sufferings, the suffering God is himself present. Any way, it is a new topic, and it needs to be treated separately. Here, I will reflect yet on another level in relation, mentioned by Žižek as well, that exits on the line Job-Jesus.

God's suffering reaches its peak in Jesus' suffering. Žižek has this in mind, and at the end of his reflection on the Book of Job, in his book *The Monstrosity of Christ*, he speaks of the relation that exists between Job's and Christ's sufferings. Unfortunately, his interpretation is not in the line with Orthodoxy, he is still not precise. (Žižek lacks the general theological knowledge and frequently, he pays high price of his theological immaturity, particularly when he interprets the most sensitive parts of the biblical text – when there is a need to create connection between The Old and The New Testament. For the hermeneutical maneuver of that kind, the talent for the theoretical speculations is not sufficient.) Job is silent due the realization that God impotent. His not comforted by the presence of omnipotent but of impotent God. Žižek argue that "God is neither just nor unjust, but simply impotent." However, as it is improper to speak about "omnipotent", it is also meaningless to speak about "impotent" God, since He has restrained Himself in order not to desecrate the holy of holies, the human freedom. The self-restrain of God is what we call suffering of God. But in His impotence, His omnipotence is revealed, i.e. suffering of God is the proof of His absolute omnipotence.

Further, Žižek states: "What Job suddenly understood was that *it was not him, but God himself who was in effect on trial in Job's calamities*, and he failed the test miserably." It seems that Žižek forgets that in sufferings of each and every one of us, God is present as co-sufferer. Therefore in Job's case, as in the similar cases, "miserable" are all (God, as well those who suffer). God suffers, as Job suffers, as much Job is miserable, miserable is God himself. Everyone who participate in these sufferings is simple "miserable", since it the price of (misuse) the human freedom.

Žižek further makes hastily conclusions... From the fact that Job is comforted, although he didn't receive a direct answer, Žižek conclude: "Job foresaw God's own future suffering — "Today it's me, tomorrow it will be your own son, and there will be no one to intervene for him. What you see in me now is the prefiguration of your own Passion!" What is important, and what Žižek overlooks, since he resorts to psychoanalysis, is the fact that Job can't be comforted. It is about Job the just, and not Job the vindictive. I even dare say that it is not either about Job the righteous, the one who exults since the same suffering will befall on the one who was able to prevent his sufferings, but did nothing. Job wasn't in position to know that, but God was. From our perspective, we can, as Žižek, suppose, that He is his answer to Job wanted to say: "You see, there are pointless things going on in this world. Simply, it is as it is. Even when I come incarnated, I will not be immune on it.

Job and the Critique of Ideology

Žižek is not quite skilled for theological questions (but there is chance that he might acquire some skills in the future). Nevertheless, we have to admit that he has skills that enable him to analyze and criticize different sorts of ideologies. That is his main contribution to the general history of philosophy and Christian theology. The Christian theology is often indifferent to everyday and political life of modern man, and it is not able to approach it critically. Anyway, Žižek in his book *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, as well in some interviews, notice rightly, that The Book of Job is “the first exemplary case of the critique of ideology in human history.” This conclusion is deduced from the assumption that there are some events that lack “any deeper significance.” Therefore, from so called “Job’s position”, we are further able to build a healthy critical premise toward different ideological constructions.

It should be noted in particular, that what is mentioned, is related to all ideologies that (falsely) try to present themselves as related to Christianity. If Job’s position is to be accepted from its philosophical and religious point, it becomes temptation for the very faith of the Christians. For Christians, it is hard to except, that the phenomena of suffering that is so important to the human existence, is meaningless. This is even more true for those among the Christians that are burdened with prejudice regarding the concepts such as “Church life”, “God’s will”, “God’s providence” etc. Nikolai Berdyaev noted that the world is full of “Job’s comforters,” since “for humans it is hard to give up the idea, that everything has its purpose.” This is the very reason, why Žižek, in his book *The Parallax View*, wrote that the Job’s story represents “the most radical test of our faith in God,” and he skillfully added: “If we survive the temptation, our character will remain unshaken.” Therefore, Job’s position is of the crucial importance for the demythologization of the official Christianity. This process is needed, since during the two millennia long history, far too many things, which have nothing to do with Christ, became part of the official Christianity.

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***Eschatological realism:
A Christian view on culture, religion and violence***

It was already Hannah Arendt, who, referring to Kant, emphasized the difference between truth and meaning, between practical common sense and opinions¹. It is interesting that the common sense approach is still completely dominant today, even among theologians, who are so often accused of irrationality – or perhaps just because of it. Theology seems to feel compelled to appeal to common sense, to show the modern world, that it is *useful*, or at least that it is not harmful. Our discussion in this essay concerns the relationship between religion and violence. We will try and explore the problem on the fundamental level, with no pretensions to offer yet another proposal in the style of “how to ...”, that modern requirements for practicality require and expect.

First, we will take a very brief look at the underlying reasons for the insistence on practicality and applicability of theology. It was already Ratzinger who showed that the replacement of *Verum est ens* with *Verum quia factum*² is the path to the establishment of the modern secular thought. Between truth and factuality an equality sign was drawn, so that eventually *factum* became *faciendum* – *Verum quia faciendum*³. *Factum* has proven to be insecure and inaccessible, subject to interpretation and interpretation – only *faciendum* remained. So the man became *faciendum*, a “technical” being, managed by the technique, or which can be controlled by using different techniques. The term τέχνη, which originally meant artistic skill, is reduced to the technology as an “organization of knowledge for practical use”.⁴ So religion had to find its technical place in the technical world. Because of the questionable effectiveness, the place of religion can not be other than marginal and controversial.

On the other hand, violence, especially physical, warrior-like and criminal – is very effective, and has taken an honorary place in many accounts. These considerations have, however, as Hannah Arendt observed, mainly dealt with the use of violence and not with violence as such⁵. Religion is in such examinations subordinate – it must show and actually needs to convince a skeptical listener, that it still has some potential to reduce violence, to heal wounds, to repair the damage that has brought violence. In this

¹ Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, 1981, p. 57.

² Ratzinger, *Einführung in das Christentum: Vorlesungen über das Apostolische Glaubensbekenntnis*, 2005, p. 23.

³ Ratzinger, *Einführung in das Christentum*, p. 28.

⁴ Mesthene, “The Role of Technology in Society”, 1997, p. 74.

⁵ Hannah Arendt, *On Violence*, 1970, p. 8.

way religion is supposed to justify its own existence. On the other hand, religion is accused of fueling, that it is certainly an accomplice if not the main instigator of violence.⁶

We consciously ignore this way of posing the problem, and we will not enter into a debate with *pro et contra* arguments in terms of responsibility and the positive potential of religion in relation to violence. After all, these arguments are sufficiently well known, but ultimately do not give a satisfactory answer.

In addition to these external reasons, there are internal reasons for insisting on the practical applicability of the Christian theological discourse. In addition to the reasons quoted referring to Ratzinger's analysis, we will present another, which we believe to be crucial, and it concerns the self-understanding of the Church. The eschatological dimension that has so strongly determined the Christian identity in the ancient Church, suffered a *moving to the back*. The faith in the presence of the eschaton here and now, although still "mirror, dimly" (1 Cor 13,12) is faded or blurred. The eschatological reality of the Kingdom the faithful lived as a messianic rest in the mode *ὥς μὴ* (1 Cor 7: 29–32)⁷, has grown into a life in the Kantian mode *als-ob* (as if) from where it easy became *let us*. Eschatology was moved to the back, transcended from history, so that the eucharistic service began to be perceived as abstract by the world and man, and more and more frequently the question arose of what we *really* can do here and now specifically. *Here and now* – apart from *that and there* – has become a measure of Christian life, from whence an autonomous, moralistic, pietistic ethics emerged, theoretically loosely and practically almost not at all related to the event of the Eucharist and the Kingdom. *Maranatha* (1 Cor 16, 22) has lost its multi-temporality and moved to the area of the mythical conceptions of the future in a deist key.

The terms "religion" and "violence", at first glance seem clear and self-determined. We all know what religion is and we all know what violence is. These are concepts that we use regularly. What do we really mean when we say *religion* and what do we really mean when we say *violence*? Trying to give a most general definition of religion leads us to the conclusion that things are not at all simple. Perhaps it is comforting that, as Kolakowski notes, even terms like "art", "society", "history", "culture", are not in a better position⁸. There are many attempts to find a proper definition of the concept of religion. The number of attempts is so great that it we could establish a sort of history of defining the concept of religion⁹. One of the most common definitions of religion would be the one in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, which states that it is "human beings' relation to that which they regard as holy, sacred, absolute, spiritual, divine, or worthy of especial reverence."¹⁰

⁶ Selengut believes that although religion can be misused, it still carries an assumption of conflict. „Each religious community is convinced of the truth and legitimacy of its theological claims and is, on occasion, ready to wage war and engage in violence in support of what it takes to be an absolute religious truth (Selengut, *Sacred Fury: Understanding Religious Violence*, 2003, p 224).

⁷ Agamben, *The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans*, 2005, p. 23 *et passim*.

⁸ Kolakowski, *Religion: If There Is No God: On God, the Devil, Sin, and Other Worries of the So-Called Philosophy of Religion*, 2001, p. 9.

⁹ Jensen and Rothstein, *Secular Theories on Religion: Current Perspectives*, 2000; Kunin, *Religion: The Modern Theories*, 2003.

¹⁰ Religion. 2015. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Retrieved 18 February, 2015, from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/497082/religion>

Kolakowski offers a definition according to which the phenomenon of religion described as “socially established worship of eternal reality”¹¹, which is a somewhat narrower definition. And the broad-based definition as in Britannica could be further expanded since it does not involve a multitude of other, equally accurate characteristics of religion. Moreover, as we will see later, secularization offers some turnovers in the understanding of religion, which, however, is not essential though it seems to be. Even in a secular society that denies the value of religion, or at least its publicity, religiosity is very much present, but it occurs in the form of political parties, football games, national ideas, scientism or psychotherapy sessions.¹² Religion was suppressed in his usual expression, but its “mechanics” continue to function. The development of secularization in the Christian West is described in detail by Kantorowicz. In his analysis of the development of the idea of the the king’s two bodies, the process of transferring the religious matrix to the secular ones is showed in detail. Kantorowicz proves that secular doctrines of modern society have their roots in the medieval development of the legal system where the learned men, mostly lawyers, were raised to the level of a social group of their own. Simultaneously with the heavenly knighthood of the clergy (*militia coelestis*), armed chivalry of the aristocracy (*militia armata*), originated the learned chivalry, or doctoral knighthood (*militia doctoralis*)¹³. Secularization did not consist of denying the attributes of holiness on either the practical or theoretical level, but they were *passed* on to the secular level. It was this transfer that was crucial to the process and the was of secularization in the contemporary Christian society. Interestingly, the process of secularization here includes creating structures that are taken for granted as secular today. Thus, the royal religious mediation, as Kantorowicz notes, suffered apparent secularization. The King was less and less regarded as *rex iustus* in the rank of Melchizedek and was increasingly losing his messianic and biblical designation. The eschatological picture of the king – “it survived at the price of being transferred from the altar to the bench.”¹⁴ The secularization of the course took place on the property field, too, which leads to the equalization of property rights of the Church and the King. Not only had the relationship *Christus/fiscus* become equal in legal terms, but the *fiscus* received eternal and impersonal (*persona ficta* – a fictitious person) characteristics very similar to those that now has our fiscal system, from which it got its name.¹⁵ In this process, the *fiscus* turned into something quasi-sacred, becoming a goal in itself, starting to represent the state and its ruler, which eventually led to the equalization of the terms *fiscus* and *patria*.¹⁶

Bearing all this in mind, let us return to the definition of religion itself: the broadest definition would be that it is a fundamental sense, or the search for meaning. This way, we leave space to secular and religious practices labeled as religious. Religion – or rather

¹¹ Kolakowski, *Religion*, p. 12.

¹² Additions to this list could be very broad, especially in the field of different ideologies. Fascism was certainly one of the forms of secular religion with the most drastic consequences (Cf. Benjamin, *Secular Salvations*, 1965).

¹³ Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, 1997, p. 124.

¹⁴ Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, 1997, p. 140.

¹⁵ Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, 1997, p. 178.

¹⁶ Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, 1997, p. 189. It is no coincidence, and not only for pragmatic reasons, that tax evasion is considered one of the worst offenses in the West, even betrayal of the country, for which severe penalties are enforced.

the man himself – can never really be relieved of that what is transcendent. But the platonic ἐπέκεινα can change the place in the ontological orbit. Transcendent becomes immanent – or put another way, what is claimed as a human rises to the point where it becomes transcendent.

We mentioned that today there are plenty of religious practices that those who practice them usually refuse to identify them as religious. This way an entirely new species of an otherwise known religious pathology is created. Addressing this issue would lead us away from our subject. We will satisfy ourselves by citing a passage from the excellent book by Ernst Becker – *The Denial of Death*, where he analyzes a specific problem of the end of the psychoanalytic process, where he clearly indicates the religious mode of this secular practice. Becker says: For generations now, the psychoanalysts, not understanding this historical problem, have been trying to figure out why the “termination of the transference” in therapy is such a devilish problem in many cases. Had they read and understood Rank, they would quickly have seen that the “thou” of the therapist is the new God who must replace the old collective ideologies of redemption. As the individual can not serve God as he must give rise to a truly devilish problem. Modern man is condemned to seek the meaning of his life and psychological introspection, and with his new confessor has to be the supreme authority on introspection, the psychoanalyst. As this is so, the patient’s “beyond” is limited to the analytic couch and the world-view imparted there. In this sense, as Rank saw with such deep understanding, psychoanalysis actually stultifies the emotional life of the patient. Man wants to focus his love on an absolute measure of power and value, and the analyst tells him that all is reducible to his early conditioning and is therefore relative. Man wants to find and experience the marvelous, and the analyst tells him how matter-of-fact everything is, how are clinically explainable our deepest ontological motives and Guilts. Man is thereby deprived of the absolute mystery he needs, and the only omnipotent thing that then remains is the man who explained it away. And so the patient clings to the analyst with all his might and dreads terminating the analysis.¹⁷ This quote is primarily interesting for us as a good example of “secular religion”. Far from it that our goal is simple criticism of such practices. Its proponents could definitely easily find sufficient counter-arguments in the classical religious expression, or at least enough of pathology. This is not about what is better for man – to be classically or secularly religious; our observations lead in the direction of the religious practices that are not necessarily identical to the conventional ones, precisely because they are fundamental to the very definition of man. The proliferation of meanings of the term religion, creates the illusion of substantive secularization of modern man and his social relations just for the careless eye. This assertion is easily recognized as the thesis of man as *homo religiosus*¹⁸. The goal is not originality of insight *per se*, but an attempt to create the meta-narrative on the matrices of religion and violence.

It is clear that the naive denial of the religious matrix in secular religious systems actually refers only to the old religious structure, embodied in the “enchanted” world and objects laden with divine power. New religious structures do not provide enough new things to be able to differentiate themselves from religion. On a general societal level, as

¹⁷ Becker, *The Denial of Death*, 1973, 194–195.

¹⁸ Psychological research shows that religiosity (and, we would add culture in general) are quite inseparable from man, it is even immanent in the infantile level of development.

noted by Schmidt, modern concepts of the secular state are secularized theological concepts, and we would say the manifestation of religious matrix. The whole process is successfully described by Kantorowicz through the Christus/Fiscus dialectic. Rene Girard has, in his inevitable study "Violence and the Sacred," offered some answers, which are, however, only partially satisfactory. Girard sees the necessity of transcendence only in the context of his view, according to which violence is the cause of religion, which aims to restrain it, preventive or curative, in order to prevent anarchic and socially destructive revenge.¹⁹ This view is too one-sided. There's more than violence (and revenge), which represents the core of the need for transcendence, and that is particularly the need for meaning. We see how the concept of religion is complex, and from the above it is clear that it can easily be problematized further. The answer to the question of why religion is so difficult to define, lies in the fact that religion until recently – and in many societies today – was inseparably united with all the expressions and manifestations of human social existence. Charles Taylor described this oneness well, namely the identity of religion to the structure of human society, so that it makes a fundamental anthropological component. If we accept religiosity, widely specified as confidence in the ontological and ethical purpose, as an anthropological constant, it will be easier for us to understand the deep complexity of the issues before us, as well as the unacceptable superficiality of various pro and anti attitudes that often play parts in the public discourse.

The definition of the term violence is not easier. Today we are accustomed to talking about violence as something exclusive, something that is connected with war – which for most Western countries represents distant events on the TV screen – or something strictly pathological, such as violence in the family or violence against animals. However, the immanence of violence was not missed by many researchers.

And the violence has received its sophisticated shape. This sophistication is best seen in the development of the war technology, which minimizes the participation of more troops, although, paradoxically, increases the number of civilian casualties. On the domestic non-war plan, the violence is even more camouflaged in the form of actual enslavement of broad masses of the people who are forced to work all day, caught in a tangle of credit indebtedness caused by the creation of a consumer mentality. It is clear that violence can not be just physical. But in the end all violence is *physical*. Even if the beating stick is not used, it always stands behind the door, ready to be used should the need arise. As indeed many researchers have confirmed, the state is an expression of power and power is ultimately violence²⁰. Violence, inseparably connected with the powers can be transformed by the brutal use of force over qualified or institutionalized force, coming to technocratic rule of bureaucracy in which Nobody is a tyrant, a tyrant scariest of all.²¹ Here we can draw a parallel between religion as a relationship with God and the supernatural and secularized religious matrix on the one hand and classic violence and its contemporary, so to speak, alienated expression. Alienated religiosity that is not recognized as such and alienated violence (estranged expression of power) that is not recognized as

¹⁹ Girard, *La Violence et le sacré*, 1972, p. 43.

²⁰ Cf. Mills, *The Power Elite*, 2000: 171. Drawing on Bertrand de Jouvenel, Hannah Arendt rightly raises the question of whether the end of the war would lead to the dissolution of the states and whether the disappearance of violence between states meant the disappearance of power? (Arendt, *On Violence*, 1970.p. 37).

²¹ Arendt, *On Violence*, 1970, p. 38.

such are elements of the alienated world of the modern man who still lives in the modes of religiosity and violence, but it does no longer recognize them.

How then should really understand our topic on relationship between religion and violence – or how to ask the question? If both religion and violence are anthropological constants, if they build humanity itself, how it is possible to analyze them as independent or at least sufficiently separate phenomena? Here we return to Girard and his thesis on the fundamental violence. In his argument certainly there is a lot of truth. Yes, violence is inherent to man as well as culture, which is by definition religious. In this sense, religion *is* certainly an answer to violence. But the question is what is behind the violence? Girard himself says that in the animal world there is no threat of mutual annihilation. The existence of such dangers is inherent in the human species. It is obvious that in man natural (instinctive) mechanisms that regulate the level of violence are not functioning enough so that it provides security and not endanger the survival of the species. What is hiding behind the uncontrolled violence that has to be reined in by religious introduction into the symbolic order of reality? Here we come to what Girard failed to analyze sufficiently, and that are the funeral customs, which indicate the relationship to death. In the act of burying our loved ones – in relation to the death – hides the real foundation of religion and violence. It is burials that represent a specific human feature, which shows the man as the one who does not accept, who is not at peace with death. The earliest expressions of religiosity, and thus culture, were not rituals of sacrifice, but burial ceremonies. It is certainly not a coincidence that the Tumulus de Barnenez, the oldest known human structure, is actually a cemetery.²² It is this “moment” when a man buries his loved one, when he lays stones around his head while burying him in the ground, is the basis of man’s religion and culture. It is a transformation, or perhaps a manifestation of the spirit of God blows into our nose. The sacrifice here has the function of maintaining or restoring a dead man in the community – that is a *function of denial of death* and striving to *overcome it*. Sacrifice is sharing with the dead one,²³ communion with him, which is essentially the negation of his death as the final – biological – cessation of existence.

This radically dislocated encounter with death, actually the relocation of the death out of the natural order, forms the basis for the transformation of violence from natural to cultural. Cultural violence has objectives that differ from the natural. Education of the social order, including the order of sacrifices, is based in the relocation of death or rather its negation. Because it denies death, the man forms a society that is different from the horde, pack or herd. Because he does not want to accept death, man establishes the society as a means to fight against death. As Baudrillard notes, no death was natural for primitive peoples, but it is always a social act and the act of opponent will and not biology.²⁴ The foundation of human society is the tomb of a loved one. When people first gathered to bury a neighbor, then their communities structured, of course, not intentionally, but spontaneously. We must be careful with this “first time”. This “first” is the only thinkable but not really available. It is rather in the realm of the Lacanian Real, which we had to forget to be people.²⁵ This is a basic step, connected with the phenomenon of reflection

²² Cf. Le Roux et Lecerc, *Le grand cairn de Barnenez – Mausolée néolithique*, 2003.

²³ Cf. Baudrillard, *L'échange symbolique et la mort*, p. 203.

²⁴ Cf. Baudrillard, *L'échange symbolique et la mort*, p. 251.

²⁵ If we stick to Lacan, then we would say that it is impossible to imagine the origin of language or what

Chardin²⁶ was talking about, equated with cognition of man as one who knows. When the neighbor is buried, when his death was denied, the regulated relations between people are constituted: family, genus, tribe. Through the funeral rites the dead not only remain in communion with the living, but structure their relationships²⁷. Only if the death by exchange was introduced in a social relationship, then the relationship can be real. This reality is based just on the fact that displaces real/realistic²⁸ from man's existential horizon. Only when death is seen as outdated, human relations can be structured. This structuring is manifested as the creation of family and kinship relations, and the emergence of the first elements of the law by prohibiting murder, incest, etc²⁹. As noted Zsolt Lazar³⁰, over time society deposits taboos, customs and social norms that seem meaningless, but which have their roots in the establishment of the original order. Only in a society that is already structured and in which the symbolic order is used to protect from the real one, there is the possible emergence of a real fundamental violence as described by Girard and its overcoming through the sacrificial crisis. Fundamental violence is essentially biological, driven by a common biological motifs (meeting basic needs, the struggle over women, the desire to dominate), but it is only in a structured community that it occurs in its frantic version that endangers the biological survival of the whole group. Cultural violence hides the potential to "go wild" just because it's always repressed by the cult, which includes at least some kind of law. Structuring the human community is unnatural and therefore the natural regulators of violence can not adequately function in human society. Structuring human society is pervasive. Its roots go back to the very beginning and define the man, changing his biological givens. In contrast to the animal world food must be prepared, children are born without the ability to self-survival, violence is restrained by cult and legally (although this is not separable). Fundamental violence, therefore, is not fundamental at all, it is implied by the structuring of communities that is enabled by the attitude towards death or the dead. The occurrence of such violence is a reaction to the unnatural structuring of the human community. Going into the symbolic order of the human world is what makes a man a man, but the price is paid at the level of animality.

it was before language, as we can imagine only within the symbolic order. In other words, how much are we as listed in the symbolic order in general able to imagine human reality that was pre-symbolic? Specifically, how human would such a reality be at all?

²⁶ de Chardin, *Le Phénomène Humain*, 1956, p. 181–182.

²⁷ With this structuring occur phenomena that we consider anthropological constants. Structures are materially changed even in the elements which seem to us as the most fundamental. But the content of structure is not the most fundamental. It is a variable while the structures themselves are secure. On the transformation of cultural and ethical structural content in ancient Greece see Dodds (Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 1973, p. 28–64). What always remains is the structure of religion/culture.

²⁸ Cf. Baudrillard, *L'échange symbolique et la mort*, p. 204.

²⁹ So, sexuality is not the ground on which nature and culture first met, as Baumann claims citing Lévi-Strauss. This view is based on nineteenth-century *Scientia Sexualis* based on Freudian generalization of specific cultural patterns of certain social circles of the epoch. Bauman himself notes that Freud's conception according to which in the civilized sexual morality the original sexual goal of is sublimated into a socially useful goal, today no longer stands since sexual objects and aspirations no longer masquerade as socially useful, because "It seems that the link between the sublimation of sexual instincts and its repression, deemed by Freud to be indispensable condition of any orderly social arrangement, has been broken." As Baumann himself notes (Bauman, *Liquid Love: On the Frailty of Human Bonds*, 2003, p. 54–55.) sexuality is not a fundamental element which forms a cultural reality. In the 19th century it seemed that this is so, but today we can see that it is not. It is obvious that something else is the *ἀρχή* of human culture.

³⁰ Lazar, *Značaj primitivne magije, Antropološko-sociološki pristup*, 2008, p. 164.

Man's natural self has to suffer in its entirety, man is torn between the two laws, the laws of biological needs and desires and laws of social structure that often stands against those needs and desires. That frustration creates the basis for the emergence of frenzied violence that causes unclear ἄτη described in the Homeric writings³¹. Frantical violence occurs as a rebellion against the structured order of the community. Through the denial of death, through a non-natural attitude towards death, violence is transformed into something non-natural. It no longer serves only to maintain life or fight about women, but expresses the aspiration of the individual towards authenticity. The attitude towards death changes the perspective of self-understanding. A man "does not live on bread alone" anymore. Once he expressed his belief in immortality by burying his neighbor, he expressed his belief in his own immortality and uniqueness. This uniqueness, as noted by Gorazd Kocijančič, the *idividuum ineffabile* (unutterably individual) is ontological by nature. Being what I am is for me to be at all, in which there is no exterior, and each reflection and introspection is mediated by hypostasis as being³². Death is not the final point anymore, but that point which can, which must be overcome. Violence becomes one of the fields of authentication. Violence is a way for a bully to impose himself as unique, as the one who is. This applies to internal violence in the group but also for outside. The war was also relocated from the natural order of battle for resources. Therefore, the war is often being led without real biological reasons. In the history of mankind wars waged because of the pressing need for survival, are the exception and not the rule.

War is an expression of the ambivalent need to preserve the social structure at all costs – since it is based on the non-biological notion of death – and to confirm the authenticity of their own through the negation of the structure. The individual, in order to overcome this ambivalence, identifies with his group, and for the confirmation of his uniqueness seeks to destroy another group or by imposing their own identity onto someone else. War is because of that both natural and unnatural. What we are afraid of and to what we have been so inclined. War represents both affirmation and negation of social order and identity. Through the negation of another's social order and identity the own is determined because we take our charge against our own symbolic order out on the enemy, without adverse consequences. On the contrary, the own social structures and identities are confirmed and determined. War has always been a motor that brought together and united a society at war. Not only did the war confirm the identity and social structure but also created them, they were created in the war. Πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, as Heraclitus spoke. Throughout the war the identity and state organization are determined and confirmed but created, too. Foucault reversed the famous aphorism of Clausewitz showing that politics really is war by other means, which implies that after the war the actual political power has a role in society that maintains a kind of silent war, or that the balance of power acquired in the war is enrolled into existing institutions. But not only in institutions, but also in language, in economic relations, primarily in inequality. "Politics is the confirmation and renewal of the imbalance of forces that participated in the war."³³ This tells us that the violence of war is actually immanent to every society. When a society is in crisis, when its structure is dysfunctional and when it can not maintain internal

³¹ Cf. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 1973, p. 3–5.

³² Kocijančič, *Razbiče: sedam radikalnih eseja*, 2013, p. 32 et passim.

³³ Foucault, *Il faut défendre la société : Cours au Collège de France (1975–1976)*, 1997, p. 21.

equilibrium, it is prone to war, which appears as a cathartic means to re-establish order. In this sense, Heraclitus argued that “war is the father of all things” because “things” are the social structure that is – it should be noted – quite inseparable from man’s “second nature,” which he defines as Aristotelian ζῷον πολιτικόν (social animal). War is an essential horror to achieve peace, constitute and preserve identity.

It has already been pointed out that religion and violence can not be seen as separate phenomena. Actually in general can not be regarded as phenomena, much less as objects, as already Heidegger claimed³⁴. Both religion and violence are at the core of humanity. Here we can look back at the eschatological realism of St. Basil the Great, who says that being a man is not something given but set as a goal. The only optimism can be eschatological. Violence is impossible to overcome in the human world as we know it, it is in its very foundation. It more or less can not hide its face (behind the TV, the moral indignation or bow tie and briefcase), but, as the writer Bukowski says, it always shows “that behind paper masks is that old dad.” The Christian faith is hoping for the new heavens and new earth, when the religious matrix will really cease to exist because the reason for their existence will cease to exist – and this is essentially a death. The same is true for violence. There is no use to build an optimistic picture of the world with false hopes. Violence has been there and will be until the end of time. Christians, even when they are the majority, are still the “little flock, the chosen people”, the rest who manifest something that still isn’t there because religion is the “hypostasis of things we hope for and assurance about what we do not see” (Heb 11: 1). In the Christian experience there is no room for optimism in this world, but there is room for optimism for the future, when the truth will show itself as identical with the life and structure with freedom. Our hope is that the last enemy – death – will be abolished and our mission is to preach “until that comes”. Of course, this approach is extremely impractical from the viewpoint of the world. But practical advice should not be expected from theologians, at least Christian. Being impractical at the present time is unpopular, perhaps even dangerous – in fact, it was always so. Christ himself is condemned because it was not practical. Impracticality should not be declared for quietism because it is not the same. Christian action is the right action but not by the standards of this world.

Concerning the practical tools that are available to us, they are generally known. Increasing awareness among the people about the value of every man, instilling strong moral beliefs, democratic control of government through free media, etc. This is all so familiar, though, and so ineffective. If violence, at least in mediated form can not be overcome, perhaps, just perhaps, the correct approach lies in Žižek’s proposal to replace the meaningless reasons for hatred with less meaningless: “The way to fight ethnic Hatred effectively is going through its immediate counterpart, ethnic tolerance; on the contrary, what we need is even more hatred, but proper political hatred: hatred directed at the common political enemy.”³⁵ But this approach remains within the boundaries of this world and is bounded by its possibilities and impossibilities. The impossibility is hidden in the fact that the violence, whatever its motive, at the end shows that it has no true reason – it will prove to be a goal itself in itself. In this regard, all violence is in the final analysis wild, no matter how strongly it is disguised in the face of reason. The only

³⁴ Heidegger, *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*, (II. Abteilung, Vorlesungen 1919–1944), 1995, p.

³⁵ Žižek, *The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For?*, 2000, p. 11.

(Christian) response is eschatological charity, accepting that “maybe” as the sole determination of the other, the other as a possible but not certain. As Derrida notes, “some possible that would only be possible (but not impossible), a safe and a certain, acceptable in advance as possible, it would be bad possible, possible with no future, one possibility already put aside, if you could call it that, is doomed to life. It would be a program, i.e., it would be a causality, a development, a reeling without event.”³⁶ Or, to use Kožev’s remark that theology without teleology is nothing but causality³⁷. The eschatological love presupposes eschatological freedom. But as the eschaton is made present in history although “in the mirror and dimly”, so is freedom. Accepting the other as a unique and irreplaceable necessarily makes our future uncertain. As Zygmunt Bauman observes, “making someone else determined by means presenting an indefinite future.”³⁸ And that ambiguity and uncertainty of future is pledged to death as the ultimate separation as “death is suffering brought to the most intense peak of Solitude” as noted by Lubardić interpreting Shestov³⁹. Now we come to the point where we can answer the question of what is an authentic Christian action?

The eschatological orientation towards the heavenly Jerusalem as the only true city does not mean that Christians have no other social responsibility in a historical world except that the preaching and manifestation of the Kingdom of God. Christian eschatology is not passive, it is not reduced to waiting for the end. It involves the active participation in the event of the realization of the Kingdom which is through the Holy Spirit present here and now in history. This preaching and manifesting of the Kingdom is a key action and main service of the Christians as a rest, which gives them an identity, making them what they are. The offering of the Eucharistic gifts to God the Father is to introduce the world to a new mode of existence that changes his *τρόπος τῆς ὑπαρξεως*. This is an act that no one except the Church of Christ can do. This change in the way of the existence involves a change of structure as the last enemy that is death will be abolished. With the abolition of the death, all structures and modes of existence will be transformed, since death was the cause of structuring the “old man”. Due to death, man’s mode of existence is disrupted. Every struggle for a better world if not Eucharistic is essentially doomed to failure. In the best case. At worst it is an apocalyptic scenario of nuclear or other disasters. It is not necessary to have special knowledge of history to know that the tendency of mankind to such failures proved almost as a rule.

But to even be able to exercise their mission, Christians must be human, which, let us remember again st. Basil the Great, has not been given but set out as a goal. The Eucharistic service of the world is given to *man*, and to be a man means social responsibility and sensitivity. More precisely, the lack of concern for others, for their misery and despair, agony and suffering brings into question our own humanity, and thus our service to the Sacrament of Christ. The good Samaritan is the paradigm of Christ, and the Christian paradigm of acting here and now – “let your light shine before men, that they may see your good deeds and praise your Father in heaven.” (Mt 5, 16). The lack of charity

³⁶ Derrida, *Politiques de l’amitié: Suivi de L’oreille de Heidegger*, 1994, p. 46.

³⁷ Kožev, *Kant*, 1976, p. 117 (serbian translation).

³⁸ Bauman, *Liquid Love: On the Frailty of Human Bonds*, 2003, p. 20.

³⁹ Lubardić, *Filosofija vere Lava Šestova: Apofatička dekonstrukcija razuma i mogućnosti religijske filozofije*, 2010, p. 221.

or worse hatred of one's neighbor, prevents Christians to exercise their mission of "royal priesthood". Christians are not of this world (Jn 15, 18), but their service for the life of the world. Peace will be realized only when Christ comes but peacemaking is a manifestation of humanity. If you are not a Christian peacemaker then you can not inherit the land which shall transform. That is why Christians are "doomed" to actively participate in the things of this world, because this meets the basic precondition of their mission, and it is to be human, to be people who are still in this world. Humanity is not biological, but a moral and ontological category. And here we have in mind the ontology which is relational and dynamic and not static and hermetical. The ontology includes man's relationship with God through a relationship to man, and that relationship fortifies the special ontological Christian ethics.

Christian action, to the extent that it is authentic will never be effective. Efficiency is inconsistent with authenticity, because to be effective we have to forget the specific nature of our service. Those who are outside will always be more efficient because the "children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light." (Lk 16: 8). But the presumed inefficiency should not be an obstacle to the operation, because taking action (or inaction) determines the ecclesial identity. Christians must not forget that they are not of this world and that their service to the world is different. On the other hand it must not be forgotten that the lack of concern for one's neighbor, or even causing a neighbor pain, calls into question their service and very ecclesiality, since "God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham." (Lk 3:8).

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Is it Possible for a Nation to be Christian and for the Church to be National?

Nationalism: old or new phenomenon?

It is not the case that the Church is meeting nationalism for the first time now or in the near past. Actually, at her very beginning the Church met the challenge of “nationalism”. Indeed, the encounter with and uncompromising rejection of “nationalism” (in Paul’s conflict with Judaizers) was one of the constitutive elements of the primitive Church. Although he was a Jew himself, Paul saw Judaism (understood as gaining its identity from circumcision and the observance of the Law) as the obstacle for accepting trans-national (or super-ethnic) Christianity. Paul understood very well that national (ethnic) tensions represent a fundamental danger for the unity of the newly born Church. That is why he relativized the significance/relevance of Jewish self-understanding through their fidelity to the Law and the practice of circumcision, and introduced a new (trans-national) criterion of identity – belonging to the body of Christ through baptism (regardless of national affiliation).¹

The same old temptation came again in a new vesture, only this time the Church succumbed. Well, maybe not the whole Church, but almost every orthodox as well as the Catholic Church in at least some countries² are nowadays considering themselves as national, which means that every one of them sees itself as a religious expression and projection of a particular nation, moreover as a bearer of the “national” identity. Although the idea of “national church” is not a product of the theology but of the ideology of the Church, in all these churches it is a common opinion, taken for granted almost like a dogma, that the Church is a part of the national identity which serves the national unity.

How the Church found herself in a situation like this is a very long story. In this paper we can only give several hints in this regard. One of the crucial factors is the appearance of national states (18–20th century). From the end of the 18th century, there existed a romantic-nationalistic idea about a holy trinity of language, nation and state. As a consequence, language is even today frequently seen as the main characteristic of nation, helping to divide different nations into different states. However, as scientific investigations have shown, language is not an inherent characteristic of nation, but autonomous

¹ Compare Christos Karakolis, “Church and Nation in the New Testament: The Formation of the Pauline Communities”, *St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly* 57:3–4 (2013) 361–380.

² In the catholic world one can find similar examples of bond between nation and religion (Poland, Croatia, Ireland, ...). So this kind of relationship is not orthodox specialty.

and independent from it.³ As a rule, the borders of states do not match with that of languages. Such is the case in Europe,⁴ as well as in the rest of the world.⁵ Therefore, “full synchronization of the language borders, national borders and state borders can be only (nationalistic) utopia.”⁶ We should remember that the identifying of nation, state and language culminated in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany (and their satellite states) in the formula “one state, one nation, one language”.

At the end of the nineteenth century it became clear to some scientists that a definition of ethnicity which would be acceptable to all and simultaneously founded on the characteristics such as language, territory, state or the like cannot be found. That is why these scientists accepted that ethnicity cannot be described by cultural or social terms, which has become a widespread standpoint in the second part of the twentieth century.

Two theories

Generally speaking, there are two different, even mutually opposed, theories about ethnicity or nation.⁷ The first one we could call *essentialist*. According to this view, nation is determined by a fixed cluster of characteristics which are (almost) unchangeable and which give nation a tone of natural datum. Nation is an organic reality which is given by nature or even by God, but anyway it is above its members, who have to subject themselves to it, as to something self-understandable.⁸ This approach is common in the popular understanding of nation (but also in enthusiastic representatives of newly born nations, as was the case with J. G. Fichte⁹ at the beginning of the 19th century Germany). The second theory we could name *constructivist*. This approach, which is the fruit of the modern social anthropology claims that nations are not natural but appear through the process of negotiation among different social groups. As a result, nation is not so rigid

³ Compare H. Haarmann, “Kriterien ethnischer Identität”, *Language Problems and Language Planning* 7/1, (1983) 21–42, 28; “language and nation are by themselves independent from each other”, D. Blum, *Sprache und Politik*, Heidelberg (2002), 4.

⁴ “language borders and state borders in Europe never coincided”, G. Schubert, “Einzelaspekte neuer Mehrsprachigkeit im ehemaligen Jugoslawien”, *Sociolinguistica* 11, (1997) 83–93, 86; “in Europe they never had been synchronized and they are not today”, H. Haarmann, *Sociologie und Politik der Sprachen Europas*, München (1975), 81. “Nations of Western Europe – for example French, German, Austrian, Swiss, Holland, Spain, British – are not formed on the basis of coinciding language, religious, ethnic or state borders”, Snježana Kordić, *Jezik i nacionalizam*, [Language and Nationalism], Durieux, Zagreb (2010), 213. Many of the citation in this paper concerning nationalism are borrowed from this excellent book.

⁵ “most of the states in the world include more than one language community; therefore multilingualism is a normal condition”, M. Buchler, *Sprachplanung im Schafspelz?!*, Bochum (2002), 21. According to M. Payer, “Sprache als Ausdruck von ethnischer und nationaler Identität”, (<http://www.payer.de/kommkulturen/kultur033.htm#13>.) only 12 out of 132 states are linguistically homogenous, in 50 states there is a major language which is mother tongue for about 75% of inhabitants, whereas in 39 states the largest language group makes less than a half of the population.

⁶ H. Haarmann, *Sociologie und Politik der Sprachen Europas*, München (1975), 83.

⁷ These two are synonyms here. If we wanted to make a difference between them, then we could perhaps say that “ethnicity tends to emphasize beliefs in descent from a supposed common ancestor or ancestors as if the ethnic group were an extended family, while the focus of the nation is territorial descent ... Usually any nation contains within it numerous ethnic groups”, Steven Grosby, *Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005), 14.

⁸ “Distinctive of nationalism is the belief that the nation is the only goal worthy of pursuit – an assertion that often leads to the belief that the nation demands unquestioned and uncompromising loyalty”, Steven Grosby, *Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005), 5.

⁹ Compare his *Adresses to the German Nation* (1808) which could be interpreted as containing the nationalistic hatred of other nations.

but a rather flexible reality. According to this theory, all European nations are relatively new constructs.¹⁰ This concept of nation we could call political.

It seems that contemporary research generally lead to the conclusion that nations are socio-political, rather than natural, constructs.¹¹ Moreover, it seems that it is nationalism that invented nations and not *vice versa*.¹² That is why there are neither scientific nor even objective criteria for determining nations. We could almost speak of nation as of a myth, and a very firm myth indeed,¹³ when we realize that nation is not real but only an “imaginative community.”¹⁴

One of the fundamental preconditions for the nation-formation is (selective) *forgetfulness*.¹⁵ Everything which really happened, but does not fit into the idealized picture of (our sinless, noble, holy) nation should be left to oblivion. By means of selective memory, nation become the supreme value – every other value in comparison with it is lower, which implies that e.g. moral values (such as truthfulness) should be subordinated to the loyalty to nation. In addition, according to the nationalistic ideology individuals cannot exist independently of nation to which they owe not only their identity but their very life. In the minds of these ideologists, the socio-political and cultural being of each individual depends on their nation. They think that even the language (mother tongue) they have exists thanks to the nation. This absolute dependence upon nation is manifest in every facet of society. Educational systems could serve as an example: “the purpose of education is entirely political – to subjugate the will of the young people to the will of the nation. [in that way] schools are means of state politics like army, police or state finances ... The purpose of such schooling is to occupy the brains by the love towards the state, and that is why what is taught and how it is taught, what is suppressed and what is changed is matter of state policy.”¹⁶ That is why “a nation has famously been defined as a society that nourishes a common delusion about its ancestry and shares a common hatred for its neighbors. Thus the bond of caring in a nation hinges on false memory (delusion) and hatred of those who do not belong.”¹⁷

¹⁰ See e.g. B. Gröschel, *Das Serbokroatische zwischen Linguistik und Politik. Mit einer Bibliographie zum postjugoslavischen Sprachenstreit*, München (2009).

¹¹ “nations do not come into being by themselves but are made by states and nationalists”, E. Gellner, *Nationalismus*, Berlin (1999), 10; “national identity is not given (i.e. through entities like ‘nature’, ‘character’, ‘mentality’ or ‘subconscious’ of peoples or individuals), but made”, E. J. Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”, E. J. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge (1984), 1–14; “nations are constructs. They do not exist naturally, but are made”, R. Rürup, “Zur Einführung”, B. Faulenbach/H. Timmermann (eds), *Nationalismus und Demokratie*, Essen (1993), 32–34, 34. Therefore “nations are human creations”, Steven Grosby, *Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005), 27.

¹² “nationalism invents nations, and state elite is making and shaping them”, C. Esbach, *Nationalismus und Rationalität*, Berlin (2000), 71.

¹³ “every nation is a lie to which time and history – as to the old myths and classic legends –gave only illusion of the truth. No one nation appear naturally”, M. V. Llosa, *Nationalismus als neue Bedrohung*, Frankfurt am Main (2000), 56; “all nations came into being by political self-will, plunder, intrigues of the rulers, bare economic interests, combination of the rude violence and chance”, *ibidem* 55.

¹⁴ M. Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, London (1995), 24.

¹⁵ Compare “Collective amnesia can be equally important as collective memory”, U. Altermatt, *Das Fanal von Sarajevo*, Paderborn etc., (1996), 55.

¹⁶ E. Kedourie, *Nationalism* (1993), Oxford, 78. That is why “making of the nationalistic consciousness is the matter of intellectuals”, G. Konrad, “Von den Schwierigkeiten der Scheidung”, D. Schlagel (ed), *Derr neue Nationalismus*, Schwalbach (1994), 36. Compare Fichte’s *Nationalerziehung*.

¹⁷ Avishai Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory*, Harvard University Press, 76.

Therefore, every nationalism includes a myth¹⁸ about primordial nation, congruent with the present one, which is by nature different and separate from the surrounding nations.¹⁹ In the nationalistic ideology nation function like a mythical being which exists almost from the beginning of time and will continue to exist in the remote future (in some interpretations it will exist even in the future Kingdom of God). In these myths a nation glorifies itself (claiming that it is specially honest and generous towards the others), it glosses over its own guilt (refusing to recognize injustices which have been done to others), it blackens others (by saying that they are culturally indifferent or responsible for past crimes or that they even now have evil intentions towards our nation).²⁰ In other words, our nationalism is patriotism, theirs is chauvinism.

Likewise, there is no national continuity in terms of biology. When this was realized, biology was replaced by culture. That is why all national ideologists now speak about cultural identity. However, similarly as biology, culture too has been proved not to be the basis on which nations are born. So, for example, cultural borders do not correspond neither with language nor with national nor with geographic borders.²¹ As a consequence, there are cultures which embrace more nations, but also there are nations which embrace more cultures.²² Besides, in contrast with the political concept of nation, the cultural one (just like language) proved to be source of endless conflicts.

Further, every nationalism has pseudo-religious elements: "it functions with similar means as the church and has sacral-liturgical forms. People hail national flag as something most sacred, they sing state hymn as if it is Te Deum, they gathered on mass rallies as in religious celebrations, they have processions to national shrines as believers have to the places of pilgrimage."²³ Such situation perhaps results from the fact that religion is sometimes used in such a way, that it contributes mightily to the socio-cultural unity of nation.²⁴

National Unity

Therefore, national unity can exist only as a discursive construct. There are many theories about what this unity consists of. I will mention three of them. According to the one

¹⁸ Compare "Nationalism provides perhaps the most compelling identity myth in the modern world", Anthony D. Smith, *National identity*, London etc., (1991), Introduction.

¹⁹ "Nations are communities which, owing to the historical delusion, believe in common origin and have common enemy", U. Altermatt, *Das Fanal von Sarajevo*, Paderborn etc., (1996), 42; "there cannot be 'us' without 'them'", M. Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, London (1995), 78.

²⁰ S. van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and the Causes of Wars", C. Kupchan (ed), *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, Ithaca, Cornell University, 1995, 136–157, 150. "Typical myth of every nationalism is that its own nation was sufferer, victim exposed to historical unjustness which today are necessary to be corrected", S. Kordić, *Jezič i nacionalizam*, 347.

²¹ Compare U. Ammon, *Die deutsche Sprache in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz: das Problem der nationalen Varietäten*, Berlin/New York, 1995.

²² E. Lemberg, *Nationalismus*, I–II, Reinbek (1964), II, 45. The similar situation is with nation and state: "it is historically rare for one nation to have a state and for one state to have a nation", Steven Grosby, *Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005), 22.

²³ Compare U. Altermatt, *Das Fanal von Sarajevo*, Paderborn etc., (1996), 110. It would not be wrong at all to say that "nation as understood by nationalists is replacement for God" (ibidem, 465).

²⁴ See Steven Grosby, *Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005), 24: "This is apparent in East Orthodoxy, a tradition in which each nation has its own saint and church, such as Saint Sava for the Serbian Orthodox Church."

(S. Hall), this construct implies five aspects.²⁵ The first one is the *narrative of the nation* (in literature, media, and generally in everyday culture aiming to create a network of shared experiences and concerns, triumphs and defeats so as to tie everyday life to 'national destiny'). The second one is the *emphasis on origin, continuity, tradition, and timelessness* (in short, national character is pictured as unchanging and uniform and national identity as existing in the very nature of things, yet sometimes dormant, waiting to be awakened from this slumber). Third is the *invention of tradition*²⁶ (by which a disorder is transformed into a community). The fourth one is the *myth of origin* (or *foundational myth* which, by putting the origin of nation so far back into the 'mythical' times (in the 'time before time'), plays one of the leading roles in the invention of national culture). And the fifth one is the fictitious idea of a *pure, original people* or *folk* (which strongly supports national identity). National identity made by means of this five elements exists only as a discursive construct. This analysis is by all means incomplete and deficient,²⁷ because, to mention only this, it could be shown that the last four elements are all dependent on the first one.

That is why the following analysis (L. Kolakowski), which also makes national identity dependent on five elements, is perhaps more successful.²⁸ First comes *national spirit* (or '*Volkgeist*', which is not an object of historical experiences, but nevertheless guides the mind and behavior of many people, especially in the moments of crisis). Secondly, there is *historical memory*²⁹ (which is *conditio sine qua non* for national identity, irrespectively of whether its content is truth or legend, or a mixture of the two). The third one is the *anticipation and future orientation* (another *sine qua non* of national identity: nations are future-oriented trying to survive and worrying about what may become of them). The fourth element is *national body* (which shows itself in discussions of national territories, size and limitation of state, as well as the number of its members and the like). Finally, there comes the nameable beginning (i.e. legends about a founding event or of the 'founding fathers', both without precise date, which refers to the beginning of historical time – *exordium temporis*).

According to the third categorization (A. D. Smith) there are six elements of national identity, or "six main attributes of ethnic community."³⁰ First, there is a *collective proper name* (which expresses the 'essence' of community). Secondly, a *myth of common ancestry* (which produces illusion of family ties, which form a nation as 'super-family' (Horowitz) – perhaps the crucial one of all these elements).³¹ Thirdly come *shared*

²⁵ See: Stuart Hall, (1996a). "The Question of Cultural Identity". In Hall, Stuart, Held, David, Hubert, Don and Thompson, Kenneth (eds). *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies*. Cambridge, Mass. and Oxford, pp. 595–634.

²⁶ Hall apparently took it from Eric J. Hobsbawmand and Terence Ranger, (eds) (1983), *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge, 1.

²⁷ Hall himself points out that his list is in no way exhaustive, see e.g. Ruth Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl and Karin Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, Edinburgh University Press (1999, 2nd eds 2009), 24–25.

²⁸ See: Leszek Kolakowski, "Über kollektive Identität." in Krzysztof Michalski, (ed.). *Identität im Wandel: Castelgandolfo-Gespräche* (1995), Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. Stuttgart, pp. 47–60.

²⁹ Similar to 'collective memory' of Maurice Halbwachs, *La mémoire collective*, Paris (1997).

³⁰ See Anthony D. Smith, *National identity*, London etc., (1991), 21.

³¹ "The sense of 'whence we came' is central to the definition of 'who we are'", Anthony D. Smith, *National identity*, London etc., (1991), 22. "Often the continuity of the nation is thought to be a result of a supposed

historical memories (about heroes from the supposed glorious past). The fourth aspect refers to *one or more differentiating elements of common culture* (like customs, religion or language). The fifth one is an *association with a specific 'homeland'* (which can be only symbolic as in the case of diaspora). And lastly, there is a *sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population*.

As it is obvious, the different elements of these three theories overlap and there is significant concurrence regarding the main idea of what makes the identity and unity of a nation.

Nation and Church

But what if 'national identity', as so many analyses demonstrate, is not a natural given but a social construct and if 'national unity' is nothing but an artificial construct, made by nationalistic elites with a claim that it should be understood as 'natural' or even everlasting property of human beings? If so, where is the role of the Church in all of this? As we all can testify, to such (imaginary, artificial, mythical, false) construct (called nation), the Church is supposed to serve by becoming 'national church'! Thus, for church to contribute to the national unity³² would, in the last analysis, mean to contribute to the political (and economic) power of the ruling elite.

As regards the Church, contrary to the present situation, she was always, from her very beginning, defined by *geographical* borders (the Church in Corinth, the Church in Rome etc.) and that principle was written in her canons. Never was she defined by means of language, culture, nation and the like. Now, this geographical determination (or the principle of territoriality) is *external* (i.e. it does not tell as what the Church is, but only where we can find her). The same holds for the determination of primacy: the Church in Rome had primacy because Rome was the capital (and thus, politically, the most important city) of the empire. (The claim that the execution of Peter and Paul was the reason for the primacy belongs to the tradition beginning at the end of the second century. It is secondary and also not mentioned as the reason for primacy in the canons). If some other city had been the capital, then the church residing in that city would have had primacy over other churches. Likewise, the Church of Constantinople was the second in range, because that city was considered the New (i.e. the second) Rome. In both of these cases there are no traces of *theological* reasons. Only external, non-theological reasons were taken into account, which means that these things (borders of the Church, primacy³³ etc) were considered to be of lesser value for the Christian identity.

It could be interesting to ask where we should search for the criterion of whether nation is a natural or an artificial product: in protology or in eschatology? If in protology, we should admit that we are ignorant of how exactly things looked like at the begin-

descent from a common ancestor, examples of which are the ancient Israelite belief that the Israelites were descendants of Abraham, the belief that the Japanese are descendants of the first emperor, the Romanian belief that the Romanians are descendants of the ancient Dacians, and, for China, the belief that there is a Han race."

³² And all these three theories about the elements or aspects of national unity show that this unity is an artificial construct conceived by nationalistic intelligentsia.

³³ Such beliefs in a supposedly common descent are in many cases without factual basis; yet they appear repeatedly throughout history", Steven Grosby, *Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005), 12.

I am well aware that many theologians consider the problem of primacy being of utmost importance, but still I think the opposite.

ning. Nevertheless, I doubt that God created nations. Things do not get any easier if our criterion lies in eschatology, about which we are even more ignorant. However, what interests us here is whether there would exist nations or only nationless individuals in the Kingdom of God? Although many theologians urge for the existence of nations, I am inclined to hold the opposite.

On the other hand, we could ask ourselves: if the characteristics of nations are arbitrary, then why certain Christian features would not be some of them? For example, if, hypothetically, the nationalistic elite started to urge that truthfulness should be one of the characteristics of its nation, and if this urge were repeated from generation to generation, then truthfulness could perhaps become a recognizable element of that particular nation. Only, truthfulness is not an exclusively Christian virtue: one can be extremely truthful and still not be a Christian. The same holds for honesty, loyalty and all other virtues. So, the question remains: what exclusively Christian characteristics a nation should have in order to be recognized as a Christian nation? One answer immediately comes to mind: Baptism and Eucharist? That is true, but the subject of Baptism and Eucharist is an individual, not a nation. When could we say that not only some individuals, but the whole nation is Christian? Putting aside that there is no situation in which absolutely all members of a society are baptized and regularly take communion, maybe it would suffice that most of the population are members of the Church. But even if all members of the society are Christians, it seems that even that would not be sufficient for a society to be Christian (except in some remote, metaphorical way). We can understand this from a parallel situations: even if the whole population of a nation is blond, we still cannot say that the nation is blond; or even if every member of a nation has mother, we still cannot say that the nation has a mother, and so forth. It seems that these realities (individual and nation) belong to different orders. Therefore, it seems that there is no sense in which we can justifiably say that a nation is Christian.

Of course, here we could add historical arguments against the claim that there are Christian nations, asking what exactly is Christian in so many actions different nations (or national or trans-national states) have been undertaking against their opponents, like torture or persecution or execution (of Christians and non-Christians)? What exactly is Christian in undertaking wars or in plundering members of other nations? What exactly is Christian in all of these and in many other similar things which are common to almost every nation? How a nation can be Christian if its members do such things? The answer cannot be that the culprit for these crimes are governments or rulers, because, even if everything starts with them – Christians should refuse to participate in similar actions.

What remains is to ask what does it mean for a church to be national? At all events, for a church to be national means to serve the nation, especially by contributing to the (allegedly spiritual) unity of the nation.³⁴ In that way, the church is granted the role of the guardian of national mythology. In this matrimony, nation is always the head and the church is the body, nation is the purpose and the church its means. In one word, in this relationship the church is by no means what she should be, and whatever she should be

³⁴ Whether the nation is a natural or an artificial entity (according to the essentialist and constructivist theory respectively), national church is, in both cases, something which understands itself as having a role to contribute spiritually to national unity. In the first case to contribute to the unity of a God-given (natural) being, in the second to a being as discursive or social construct.

– she should not be a maidservant of any nation. Nevertheless, we are witnesses that innumerable churchmen willingly or even gladly play this role of maid with the deepest conviction that they (armed with their national pride) serve the most sacred purpose. As to this kind of pride it is already noticed that “the most inexpensive type of pride, conversely, is national pride, because it betrays in the person afflicted by it a lack of individual characteristics of which he could be proud, so that he would not have to resort to that which he shares with so many millions of others. One who has meaningful personal characteristics will far more be able to recognize the faults of his nation most clearly, because he sees them constantly. But every miserable twit who has nothing in the world to be proud of reaches for the last resort, pride in the nation to which he belongs; this allows him to recover, and he is gratefully willing to defend all of his nation’s faults and foolishness [...] with his hands and feet. For this reason, you will hardly find more than one in fifty Englishmen, for example, who will agree when you speak of the stupid and degrading bigotry of his nation with due contempt: that one, however, is wont to be a man of mind.”³⁵

Perhaps it could be interesting to ask what should happen to my nationality when I enter the Church. Should it remain and be saved or should it be annulled? It looks to me that nation could (which is not same as should) remain in the Church just as other natural (blue eyes, red hair, etc.) and artificial (particular language, particular culture, etc.) characteristics, providing that it does not contribute substantially to my new identity. Nation could remain, but it should not have any substantial role in my Christian life. In other words, nation should be transcended. It could be present, but as if it were not. It could be present only as a signpost, whose only role is to point to something indefinitely superior to it.

After all, it seems to me that we can say that nationalism is a more inferior way of human existence than non-nationalism. If it is true that God, in his providential economy, revealed himself to one nation first, and only then (in the higher phases of human development and respectively of divine revelation) to all humanity, this maybe can be explained by the mentioned inferiority. If natural differences (e.g. between male and female) are transcended in Christ, how much more transcended should be the non-natural ones like nation? At the end, the principal question, on which everything depends, remains: Do I really live in Christ or not? And also, wherefrom I gain my true identity? If Christ himself (as the Creator and Redeemer of the universe) is not sufficient to give me my whole identity, then my baptism failed. And my nation will not straighten this out.

³⁵ Arthur Schopenhauer, *Sämtliche Werke Band 4: Parerga und Paralipomena I* (2nd edn). Frankfurt am Mein (1989), 459.

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Die Orthodoxe Kirche in Unitatis redintegratio

Am 21. November 2014 wurde an der Universität Gregoriana (Rom) das Jubiläum anlässlich der 50 jährigen Promulgation vom Dekret über den Ökumenismus *Unitatis redintegratio* gefeiert.¹ Das Dekret selbst, seine Rezeption und seine Bedeutung für die Gestaltung der ökumenischen Beziehungen wurden aus drei Perspektiven – katholische, protestantische und orthodoxe – erhellt.² In allen drei Vorträgen wurden die große ökumenische Relevanz und ebenso das noch nicht erschöpfte Potenzial des Dekrets hervorgehoben. Obwohl das Dekret keine ökumenische Wende in der katholischen Theologie herbeigeführt hat, sondern eher als eine Frucht der bereits bestehenden Wende war, konnte man mit gutem Gewissen behaupten, dass das Dekret als große Öffnung der Katholischen Kirche gegenüber den anderen christlichen Kirchen zu betrachten ist. Andererseits ist es wohl bekannt, dass die gegenwärtige orthodoxe Theologie dem Dekret gegenüber eher reserviert ist.³ Der Grund dafür ist nicht im Dekret selbst zu suchen, sondern vor allen in der Art und Weise, wie er in der kirchlichen Praxis und Lehre umgesetzt wurde.

In diesem Artikel werde ich deswegen genauer untersuchen, was das Dekret von der Orthodoxen Kirche aussagt. Dabei werde ich mich nicht nur auf den Text des Dekrets konzentrieren, sondern auch auf die Dokumente, die die inhaltlichen Punkte des Dekrets weiterhin expliziert und erläutert haben. Für die gegenwärtigen ökumenischen Beziehungen ist nämlich vor allem die Tatsache wichtig, wie wir heute bestimmte Dokumente lesen und verstehen und wie sie sich heute auf die zwischenkirchlichen Beziehungen auswirken.

„Mehrere Elemente der Heiligung und der Wahrheit“⁴

Im ersten Kapitel des Dekrets⁵ werden die (neuen) katholischen Prinzipien des Ökumenismus ausführlich dargestellt und bereits am Anfang werden die von der katholischen Kirche

¹ Vgl. dazu L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO, Anno CLIV n. 267 (46.809), sabato 22 novembre 2014.

² Teilaspekte dieses Aufsatzes wurden auf diesem Feier vorgetragen.

³ Vgl. z. B. Ioan Moga, „Verhaltene Öffnung, verhaltene Freude? Zur orthodoxen Rezeption des Ökumenismuskrets“, in: Jan-Heiner Tück (ed.), *Erinnerung an die Zukunft. Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil*, Freiburg – Basel – Wien 2012 [weiter im Text: Moga, „Verhaltene Öffnung, verhaltene Freude?“]

⁴ „Dogmatische Konstitution über die Kirche *Lumen gentium*“ 8, in: Heinrich Denzinger (Hrsg.), *Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen*, Freiburg/Basel/Wien 422009 [weiter im Text Denzinger, *Kompendium*], 1964.

⁵ Vgl. „Dekret UNITATIS REDINTEGRATIO über den Ökumenismus“, auf: http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decree_19641121_unitatis-redintegratio_ge.html [weiter im Text *Unitatis redintegratio*] (zuletzt angesehen am 15. 04. 2015)

getrennten Gemeinschaften angesprochen. In klarer Anlehnung an die Dogmatische Konstitution über die Kirche *Lumen gentium*, die jedenfalls den theoretischen Hintergrund des Dekrets darstellt, wird ohne expliziten Nennung irgendeiner Gemeinschaft gesagt: „Hinzu kommt, dass einige, ja sogar viele und bedeutende Elemente oder Güter, aus denen insgesamt die Kirche erbaut wird und ihr Leben gewinnt, auch außerhalb der sichtbaren Grenzen der katholischen Kirche existieren können: das geschriebene Wort Gottes, das Leben der Gnade, Glaube, Hoffnung und Liebe und andere innere Gaben des Heiligen Geistes und sichtbare Elemente.“⁶ Anbetracht der früheren katholischen Auffassung über die von ihr getrennten Gemeinschaften kann man diesen Absatz kaum überbewerten.⁷

Erst rückblickend auf die Vorgeschichte kann die ökumenische Wende der Katholischen Kirche richtig beurteilt werden. Hier werden die „Akatholiken“, die die katholischen Dogmen nicht akzeptieren, nicht als Häretiker bezeichnet.⁸ Ebenso ist hier keine Rede von „Nichtkatholiken“⁹, sondern von „getrennten Brüdern“¹⁰, deren liturgische Handlungen „ohne Zweifel tatsächlich das Leben der Gnade zeugen können und als geeignete Mittel für den Zutritt zur Gemeinschaft des Heiles angesehen werden müssen“¹¹. Darüber hinaus werden von Rom getrennten Kirchen¹² und Gemeinschaften, die nach dem katholischen Verständnis mit gewissen Mängeln behaftet sind, auch soteriologisch relevant: „Ebenso sind diese getrennten Kirchen und Gemeinschaften trotz der Mängel, die ihnen nach unserem Glauben anhaften, nicht ohne Bedeutung und Gewicht im Geheimnis des Heiles. Denn der Geist Christi hat sich gewürdigt, sie als Mittel des Heiles zu gebrauchen.“¹³ Eine größere Aufwertung der einstigen Schismatiker und Häretiker durfte man von der Katholischen Kirche in jener Zeit kaum erwarten. Lukas Vischer, der als Beobachter am Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil anwesend war, schreibt von der *Unitatis reintegratio*: „Der Text legt Zeugnis davon ab, wie sehr sich die Haltung der römisch-katholischen Kirche gegenüber den übrigen Kirchen geändert hat.“¹⁴

⁶ *Unitatis reintegratio* 3.

⁷ Vgl. auch Theodor Nikolau, „Das Dekret über den Ökumenismus und die orthodox-katholischen Beziehungen“, in: *Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift*, Heft 1/2 (1985), 113: „Die ökumenische Öffnung, die das Dekret einleitet, ist die der katholischen Kirche und setzt deshalb zu Recht die Ekklesiologie dieser Kirche voraus. Nach der Konstitution über die Kirche ist die römisch-katholische Kirche ‚die einzige Kirche Christi‘, was nicht ausschließt, ‚daß außerhalb ihres Gefüges Elemente der Heiligung und der Wahrheit zu finden sind, die als der Kirche Christi eigene Gaben auf die katholische Einheit hindrängen‘. Dieser ekklesiologische Grundsatz ist auch im Ökumenismusdekret das tragende Moment; allerdings wird hier differenzierter geurteilt.“

⁸ Vgl. Reinhard Frieling, *Der Weg des ökumenischen Gedankens: eine Ökumenekunde*, (Zugänge zur Kirchengeschichte, Bd. 10) Göttingen 1992, 126.

⁹ Vgl. *Mortalium animos*, auf http://www.theologische-links.de/downloads/oekumene/mortalium_animos.html (zuletzt angesehen am 17. 04. 2015): „Daraus geht hervor, ehrwürdige Brüder, aus welchen Gründen der Apostolische Stuhl niemals die Teilnahme der Seinigen an den Konferenzen der Nichtkatholiken zugelassen hat. Es gibt nämlich keinen anderen Weg, die Vereinigung aller Christen herbeizuführen, als den, die Rückkehr aller getrennten Brüder zur einen wahren Kirche Christi zu fördern, von der sie sich ja einst unseligerweise getrennt haben.“

¹⁰ *Unitatis reintegratio* 3.

¹¹ *Unitatis reintegratio* 3.

¹² Diese Unterscheidung wird streng durchgehalten. Der Gebrauch des Wortes „Kirche“ ist in der Anmerkung näher erläutert. Vgl. Denzinger, *Kompendium*, 1419: „Vgl. 4. Konzil im Lateran (1215), Konstitution IV (MaC 22,990 / COeD2211f; COeD3235f); 2. Konzil von Lyon (1274), Glaubensbekenntnis des Michael Palaiologos (MaC 24,71E); Konzil von Florenz, 6. Sitzung, 6. Juli 1439, Dekret für die Griechen »Laetentur caeli« (COeD2500–504; COeD3524–527 / MaC 31,1026E“.

¹³ *Unitatis reintegratio* 3.

¹⁴ Lukas Vischer, „Nach der dritten Session des Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzils“, in: ÖR 14 (1965) 97–116, hier 101.

Obwohl die Katholische Kirche das eigene Kirchenverständnis keinesfalls relativiert und bereits in demselben Kapitel den Exklusivitätsanspruch erhebt¹⁵, ermöglichte die gezeigte Aufgeschlossenheit die Entwicklung eines ganz anderen ekklesiologischen Verständnisses von den anderen christlichen Kirchen und Gemeinschaften. Für die weitere Gestaltung der ökumenischen Beziehungen war das Grundprinzip der „baptismalen Ökumene“ von besonderer Bedeutung.¹⁶ Aufgrund der Taufanerkennung der anderen christlichen Gemeinschaften wird im Ökumenismusdekret das Model einer gestuften Kirchenzugehörigkeit angenommen: „Denn wer an Christus glaubt und in der rechten Weise die Taufe empfangen hat, steht dadurch in einer gewissen, wenn auch nicht vollkommenen Gemeinschaft mit der katholischen Kirche.“¹⁷ Damit begründet die Katholische Kirche ihre ökumenischen Bemühungen einerseits und zieht andererseits die klaren Grenzen der ökumenischen Tätigkeiten.¹⁸

Orthodoxe Kirche oder Kirchen?

Den grundsätzlichen katholischen Prinzipien des Ökumenismus (Kapitel 1) folgen im dritten Kapitel die Darstellungen der von Rom getrennten Kirchen und kirchlichen Gemeinschaften. Das Dekret teilt alle geschichtlichen Spaltungen vom römischen apostolischen Stuhl in zwei Kategorien: a) die Spaltungen im Orient aufgrund der dogmatischen Entscheidungen der Konzilien von Ephesus und Chalcedon und die Aufhebung der Kirchengemeinschaft zwischen den alten Patriarchaten; b) die Spaltungen aufgrund der Reformation.¹⁹

¹⁵ Vgl. *Unitatis redintegratio* 3: „Dennoch erfreuen sich die von uns getrennten Brüder, sowohl als einzelne wie auch als Gemeinschaften und Kirchen betrachtet, nicht jener Einheit, die Jesus Christus all denen schenken wollte, die er zu einem Leibe und zur Neuheit des Lebens wiedergeboren und lebendig gemacht hat, jener Einheit, die die Heilige Schrift und die verehrungswürdige Tradition der Kirche bekennt. Denn nur durch die katholische Kirche Christi, die das allgemeine Hilfsmittel des Heiles ist, kann man Zutritt zu der ganzen Fülle der Heilmittel haben.“

¹⁶ Vgl. Kurt Koch, „Ökumene im Wandel. Zum Zukunftspotential des Ökumenismusdekrets *Unitatis redintegratio*“, in: Jan-Heiner Tück (ed.), *Erinnerung an die Zukunft. Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil*, Freiburg – Basel – Wien 2012, 335–368 [weiter im Text: Koch, „Ökumene im Wandel“], hier 337.

¹⁷ *Unitatis redintegratio* 3.

¹⁸ Vgl. Koch, „Ökumene im Wandel“, 339: „Aus der grundlegenden Bedeutung der Taufe für alle ökumenischen Bemühungen folgt von selbst die gegenseitige Anerkennung der Taufe als Fundament der Ökumene und dass folglich mit ihr wahrhafte Ökumene steht oder fällt. Dieser ökumenische Basalsatz muss auch heute in Erinnerung gerufen werden, weil es auf der einen Seite noch immer orthodoxe Kirchen gibt, die bei einer Konversion erneut die Taufe spenden, und weil auf der anderen Seite einzelne protestantische Kirchen in der Taufe nicht mehr die Voraussetzung für die Teilnahme am Abendmahl und teilweise sogar nicht einmal für die Kirchenmitgliedschaft sehen. Dabei handelt es sich zweifellos um Verhaltensweisen, die das Fundament aller ökumenischen Bemühungen in Frage stellen.“ Die ekklesiologische und ökumenische Relevanz der Taufe wird im *Unitatis redintegratio* besonders im Hinblick auf die aus der Reformation hervorgegangenen Kirchen, die das Weihesakrament und somit die ursprüngliche Wirklichkeit des eucharistischen Mysteriums nicht bewahrt haben. Vgl. *Unitatis redintegratio* 22: „Die Taufe begründet also ein sakramentales Band der Einheit zwischen allen, die durch sie wiedergeboren sind. Dennoch ist die Taufe nur ein Anfang und Ausgangspunkt, da sie ihrem ganzen Wesen nach hinführt auf die Erlangung der Fülle des Lebens in Christus. Daher ist die Taufe hingeordnet auf das vollständige Bekenntnis des Glaubens, auf die völlige Eingliederung in die Heilsveranstaltung, wie Christus sie gewollt hat, schließlich auf die vollständige Einfügung in die eucharistische Gemeinschaft. Obgleich bei den von uns getrennten kirchlichen Gemeinschaften die aus der Taufe hervorgehende volle Einheit mit uns fehlt und obgleich sie nach unserem Glauben vor allem wegen des Fehlens des Weihesakramentes die ursprüngliche und vollständige Wirklichkeit (substantia) des eucharistischen Mysteriums nicht bewahrt haben, bekennen sie doch bei der Gedächtnisfeier des Todes und der Auferstehung des Herrn im Heiligen Abendmahl, dass hier die lebendige Gemeinschaft mit Christus bezeichnet werde, und sie erwarten seine glorreiche Wiederkunft. Deshalb sind die Lehre vom Abendmahl des Herrn, von den übrigen Sakramenten, von der Liturgie und von den Dienstämtern der Kirche notwendig Gegenstand des Dialogs.“ Vgl. dazu auch Koch, „Ökumene im Wandel“, 339.

¹⁹ Vgl. *Unitatis redintegratio* 13.

Da alle Spaltungen aus der strengen romzentrischen Perspektive betrachtet wurden, sind auch die Kriterien für solche Aufteilung klar. In der ersten Gruppe kommen die östlichen Kirchen und kirchlichen Gemeinschaften und in der zweiten Gruppe die westlichen Kirchengemeinschaften, die sich von Rom getrennt haben. Trotz dieser klaren Kriterien darf man sich jedoch mit Recht wundern, dass die Orthodoxe Kirche zusammen mit den vorchalcedonischen und „nestorianischen“ Kirchen behandelt wurde, als ob es zwischen denen keinen Unterschied gäbe. Die Orthodoxe Kirche als Ganzes wird eigentlich gar nicht erwähnt, sondern im Dekret ist die Rede von „den orientalischen Kirchen“, bzw. von vielen Teilkirchen oder Ortskirchen im Orient: „Mit Freude möchte die Heilige Synode neben anderen sehr bedeutsamen Dingen allen die Tatsache in Erinnerung rufen, dass im Orient viele Teilkirchen oder Ortskirchen bestehen, unter denen die Patriarchalkirchen den ersten Rang einnehmen und von denen nicht wenige sich ihres apostolischen Ursprungs rühmen.“²⁰ Dass zwischen einigen von diesen Teilkirchen eine Kirchengemeinschaft existiert, darf man aus der Fortsetzung des Textes erschließen: „Deshalb steht bei den Orientalen bis auf den heutigen Tag der Eifer und die Sorge im Vordergrund, jene brüderlichen Bande der Gemeinschaft im Glauben und in der Liebe zu bewahren, die zwischen Lokalkirchen als Schwesterkirchen bestehen müssen.“²¹

Der Begriff „Schwesterkirchen“ wird in *Unitatis reintegratio* auf die östlichen Ortskirchen bezogen. Nach dem Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil benutzte man aber den Begriff „Schwesterkirchen“ für die Beschreibung des Verhältnisses zwischen der (einen!) Orthodoxen Kirche und der Katholischen Kirche.²² Diesen Begriff hat erstmals (in der jüngsten Vergangenheit) Ökumenischer Patriarch Athenagoras I. in dem Brief an Kardinal Bea vom 12. April 1962 verwendet.²³ Durch den Gebrauch dieses ökumenisch geprägten Begriffs wollte der Patriarch sein Wohlwollen gegenüber der Wiederherstellung der Kircheneinheit zum Ausdruck bringen.²⁴ Diesen Begriff hat Papst Paul VI. angenommen und in der offiziellen Korrespondenz für die Bestimmung der Beziehung zwischen der Katholischen Kirche und der Orthodoxen Kirche benutzt.²⁵ Prokschi findet, dass Johannes Paul

²⁰ *Unitatis reintegratio* 14.

²¹ *Unitatis reintegratio* 14.

²² Die ekklesiologische Bedeutung der gegenseitigen Anerkennung als „Schwesterkirche“ schätzen Ernst Christian Suttner und Anastasios Kallis als sehr groß. Vgl. Jutta Koslowski, *Die Einheit der Kirche in der ökumenischen Diskussion: Zielvorstellungen kirchlicher Einheit im katholisch-evangelischen Dialog*, Berlin / Münster 2008, 290–292.

²³ Vgl. Rudolf Prokschi, „Schwesterkirchen – ja, aber... Zum Verhältnis der Katholischen Kirche zur Orthodoxie“, in: Jan-Heiner Tück (ed.), *Erinnerung an die Zukunft. Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil*, Freiburg – Basel – Wien 2012, 396–404 [weiter im Text: Prokschi, „Schwesterkirchen – ja, aber...“], hier 396.

²⁴ Vgl. Pro Oriente (Hrsg.), *Tomos Agapis. Dokumentation zum Dialog der Liebe zwischen dem Hl. Stuhl und dem Ökumenischen Patriarchat* 1958–1976, Innsbruck 1978, Nr. 10, 16: „Mit großer Freude haben wir persönlich und in der Sitzung unseres Heiligen Synods, den Brief vom 28. Februar dieses Jahres, Nr. 65/60, Eurer sehr geliebten und geschätzten Eminenz empfangen und mit Genugtuung gelesen, wodurch Sie die Eindrücke zum Ausdruck brachten, die vor kurzem der geliebte Msgr. Herr J. Willebrands von seinem Besuch bei uns und von der Kommunikation mit uns gewonnen hatte. All das, was Eure geehrte Eminenz bezüglich des im allgemeinen gezeigten Wunsches zur Annäherung der Schwesterkirchen und zur Wiederherstellung der Einheit in der Kirche anführt, kann uns nicht anders, als zutiefst berühren. Wir haben bereits unsere Absicht zum Ausdruck gebracht, daß wir, so weit es uns möglich ist, mit allen Kräften zu dieser Wiederherstellung beitragen werden.“

²⁵ Vgl. Prokschi, „Schwesterkirchen – ja, aber...“, 396f: „In der darauffolgenden Wirkungsgeschichte des Konzils, im sogenannten „Dialog der Liebe“ zwischen Rom und Konstantinopel, der schon vor dem Konzil begonnen hatte, war es vor allem Papst Paul VI., der diesen Terminus aufgriff und eindeutig auf

II diese Praxis fortgesetzt hat und deswegen stellt er fest: „Seit dem Pontifikat Papst Pauls VI. wird der Terminus ‚Schwesterkirchen‘ im Verhältnis der römisch-katholischen Kirche und der orthodoxen Kirche (Singular!) eindeutig verwendet, um einerseits deutlich zu machen, in welchem engem Verwandtschaftsverhältnis die beiden Kirchen stehen (in fast vollkommener Gemeinschaft) und andererseits zu zeigen, dass es sich in den gemeinsamen Gesprächen um einen ‚Dialog auf Augenhöhe‘ (par cum pari) handelt.“²⁶

Ohne diese Behauptung grundsätzlich in die Frage zu stellen, muss jedoch bemerkt werden, dass in der Ökumene-Enzyklika von Johannes Paul II. der Begriff „Schwesterkirchen“ eigentlich auf die Lokalkirchen bezogen ist: „Nach dem II. Vatikanischen Konzil und im Zusammenhang mit jener Tradition wurde die Gepflogenheit wiedereingeführt, den um ihren Bischof versammelten Teil- oder Ortskirchen die Bezeichnung ‚Schwesterkirchen‘ zuzuerkennen.“²⁷ Der Papst teilte diesem Begriff zwar einen Ehrenplatz zu und charakterisierte ihn in einem ausgesprochen ökumenischen Kontext als „die traditionelle Bezeichnung“²⁸, aber bezog ihn m. E. nicht direkt auf die Katholische Kirche und Orthodoxe Kirche. Andererseits wird in *Ut unum sint* ausdrücklich „die Orthodoxe Kirche“ (Singular!) erwähnt²⁹ und als das Ziel des Dialogs mit der Katholischen Kirche die volle Gemeinschaft zwischen „den beiden Kirchen“ angegeben.³⁰

Der Gebrauch und die somit verknüpfte ekklesiologische Relevanz des Begriffs „Schwesterkirchen“ waren in der katholischen Theologie nicht unumstritten. Den verschiedenen (Fehl)Interpretation suchte die Kongregation für Glaubenslehre ein Ende zu setzen und veröffentlichte am 30. 06. 2000 die *Note* über den Ausdruck „Schwesterkir-

das Verhältnis von römisch-katholischer Kirche und orthodoxer Kirche bezogen hat. In seinem Breve *Anno ineunte* vom 25. Juli 1967, das er dem Patriarchen Athenagoras übergab, heißt es: „Dieses Leben von Schwesterkirchen haben wir jahrhundertlang gelebt und miteinander die Ökumenischen Konzilien gefeiert, die das Glaubensgut gegen jede Veränderung verteidigten. Nun schenkt uns nach langen Meinungsverschiedenheiten und Zwickigkeiten Gott die Gnade, dass unsere Kirchen sich wiederum als Schwesterkirchen erkennen, trotz der Schwierigkeiten, die in früherer Zeit zwischen uns entstanden sind. Von Jesus Christus erleuchtet, sehen wir ohne weiteres, wie sehr es notwendig ist, diese Schwierigkeiten zu überwinden, und dahin zu gelangen, dass die bereits so fruchtbare Gemeinschaft, die beide Teile verbindet, voll und vollkommen wird.“

²⁶ Vgl. Prokschi, „Schwesterkirchen – ja, aber...“, 399.

²⁷ Vgl. Papst Johannes Paul II., *Ut unum sint. Über den Einsatz für die Ökumene* 57, auf: http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/de/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25051995_ut-unum-sint.html (zuletzt angesehen am 20. 04. 2015) [weiter im Text: *Ut unum sint.*]. Vgl. auch *Ut unum sint*: „Wie Papst Paul VI. wünschte, ist es unser erklärtes Ziel, gemeinsam wieder zur vollen Einheit in der legitimen Verschiedenartigkeit zu finden: »Gott hat uns gewährt, dieses Zeugnis der Apostel im Glauben zu empfangen. Durch die Taufe sind wir einer in Christus Jesus (vgl. Gal 3, 28). Kraft der apostolischen Sukzession verbinden uns das Priestertum und die Eucharistie enger; durch die Teilhabe an den Gaben Gottes an seine Kirche sind wir in Gemeinschaft mit dem Vater durch den Sohn im Heiligen Geist 3. In jeder Ortskirche verwirklicht sich dieses Geheimnis der göttlichen Liebe. Ist nicht vielleicht das der Grund für den traditionellen und sehr schönen Ausdruck, mit dem sich die Ortskirchen gern als Schwesterkirchen bezeichneten (vgl. Dekret Unitatis reintegratio, 14)?“

²⁸ Vgl. *Ut unum sint* 56.

²⁹ Vgl. *Ut unum sint* 60: „Vor kurzem hat die gemischte internationale Kommission in der so heiklen Frage der Methode, die bei der Suche nach der vollen Gemeinschaft zwischen der katholischen Kirche und der orthodoxen Kirche befolgt werden solle, einer Frage, die oft die Beziehungen zwischen Katholiken und Orthodoxen verschlechtert hat, einen bedeutsamen Schritt vollzogen. Sie hat die lehrmäßigen Grundlagen für eine positive Lösung des Problems gelegt, die sich auf die Lehre von den Schwesterkirchen stützt.“

³⁰ Vgl. *Ut unum sint* 59: „Die Gemischte Internationale Kommission für den theologischen Dialog zwischen der katholischen Kirche und der orthodoxen Kirche in ihrer Gesamtheit hat seit ihrer Einsetzung im Jahr 1979 intensive Arbeit geleistet, wobei sie ihre Forschung zunehmend an jenen Perspektiven orientierte, die in gemeinsamem Einvernehmen mit dem Ziel festgelegt worden waren, die volle Gemeinschaft zwischen den beiden Kirchen wiederherzustellen.“

chen“³¹. In der Berufung u.a. auf *Unitatis reintegratio* die Kongregation schreibt verbindlich vor: „Im eigentlichen Sinn sind Schwesterkirchen ausschließlich Teilkirchen (oder Teilkirchenverbände, wie etwa Patriarchate oder Kirchenprovinzen) untereinander. Es muss immer klar bleiben, auch wenn der Ausdruck Schwesterkirchen in diesem richtigen Sinn verwendet wird, dass die universale, eine, heilige, katholische und apostolische Kirche nicht Schwester, sondern Mutter aller Teilkirchen ist. Man kann von Schwesterkirchen im eigentlichen Sinn auch im Zusammenhang mit katholischen und nicht katholischen Teilkirchen sprechen; deshalb kann auch die Teilkirche von Rom Schwester aller Teilkirchen genannt werden. Wie jedoch bereits betont wurde, kann man richtigerweise nicht sagen, dass die katholische Kirche Schwester einer Teilkirche oder eines Teilkirchenverbandes ist. Es handelt sich dabei nicht nur um eine terminologische Frage, vielmehr geht es darum, eine grundlegende Wahrheit des katholischen Glaubens zu beachten: die Wahrheit von der Einzigkeit der Kirche Jesu Christi. Es gibt nur eine einzige Kirche, darum ist der Plural Kirchen nur auf die Teilkirchen anwendbar.“³² Dem katholischen Kirchenverständnis nach hat also der Begriff „Schwesterkirchen“ eine eklesiologische Relevanz auf dem regionalen Niveau, während er auf dem universalen Niveau – falls er überhaupt gebraucht werden darf – eine bloße Höflichkeitsformel darstellt. Um die Missverständnisse zu vermeiden, schrieb die Kongregation zusätzlich vor, dass die Formulierungen wie „unsere beide Kirchen“ in der Zukunft zu vermeiden sind, weil der Plural „Kirchen“ nur auf der regionalen (Teilkirchen) und keinesfalls auf der universalen (Eine Kirche nach dem Glaubensbekenntnis) Ebene existieren kann.³³

Dieser strengen theologisch-terminologischen Unterscheidung folgen auch die Erklärung *Dominus Iesus*³⁴ und das Dokument „Antworten auf Fragen zu einigen Aspekten bezüglich der Lehre der Kirche“³⁵. Zusammenfassend dürfe man behaupten, dass die Eklesiologie von *Unitatis reintegratio* eigentlich keineswegs relativiert wurde, währenddessen sich die terminologische und jedenfalls ökumenische Aufgeschlossenheit aus den ersten Jahrzehnten des ökumenischen Dialogs eher zurückziehen musste.

³¹ Vgl. Kongregation für die Glaubenslehre, *Note über den Ausdruck „Schwesterkirchen“*, auf: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000630_chiese-sorelle_ge.html (zuletzt angesehen am 18. 04. 2015) [weiter im Text: *Note über den Ausdruck „Schwesterkirchen“*].

³² *Note über den Ausdruck „Schwesterkirchen“* 10–11.

³³ Vgl. *Note über den Ausdruck „Schwesterkirchen“* 11.

³⁴ Vgl. Kongregation für die Glaubenslehre, *Erklärung „Dominus Iesus“ über die Einzigkeit und die Heilsuniversität Jesu Christi und der Kirche*, auf: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000806_dominus-iesus_ge.html (zuletzt angesehen am 19. 04. 2015): „Es gibt also eine einzige Kirche Christi, die in der katholischen Kirche subsistiert und vom Nachfolger Petri und von den Bischöfen in Gemeinschaft mit ihm geleitet wird.“⁵⁸ Die Kirchen, die zwar nicht in vollkommener Gemeinschaft mit der katholischen Kirche stehen, aber durch engste Bande, wie die apostolische Sukzession und die gültige Eucharistie, mit ihr verbunden bleiben, sind echte Teilkirchen. Deshalb ist die Kirche Christi auch in diesen Kirchen gegenwärtig und wirksam, obwohl ihnen die volle Gemeinschaft mit der katholischen Kirche fehlt, insofern sie die katholische Lehre vom Primat nicht annehmen, den der Bischof von Rom nach Gottes Willen objektiv innehat und über die ganze Kirche ausübt.“

³⁵ Vgl. Kongregation für die Glaubenslehre, *Antworten auf Fragen zu einigen Aspekten bezüglich der Lehre der Kirche*, auf: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20070629_responsa-quaestiones_ge.html (zuletzt angesehen am 19. 04. 2015): „Das Konzil wollte den traditionellen Gebrauch dieser Bezeichnung übernehmen. „Da nun diese Kirchen trotz ihrer Trennung wahre Sakramente besitzen, und zwar vor allem kraft der apostolischen Sukzession das Priestertum und die Eucharistie, wodurch sie in ganz enger Gemeinschaft bis heute mit uns verbunden sind“, verdienen sie den Titel „Teil- oder Ortskirchen“ und werden Schwesterkirchen der katholischen Teilkirchen genannt.“

„Die Aufhebung der kirchlichen Gemeinschaft“³⁶

Ungeachtet des katholischen Verständnisses von der Orthodoxen Kirche auf dem Universalniveau muss die Tatsache, dass das Dekret von den orthodoxen Kirchen mit besonderer Hochachtung spricht, betont werden. Es ist nicht nur von historischer sondern auch potenziell von dogmatischer Bedeutung, dass im Dekret die Trennung zwischen Ost und West nicht als Abspaltung vom Römischen Stuhl charakterisiert wird (wie im Fall der Reformation³⁷), sondern als „die Aufhebung der kirchlichen Gemeinschaft zwischen den Patriarchaten des Orients und dem Römischen Stuhl“³⁸. Wenn das Schisma zwischen der westlichen und östlichen Kirche als die Aufhebung erfasst wird, die „nicht ohne Schuld der Menschen auf beiden Seiten“³⁹ passierte, muss die Frage gestellt werden, ob dies das Ende des klassischen Konzepts der „Rückkehrökumene“ bedeutet? In der Tat deutet vieles im Dekret daraufhin.

Das Schisma wird nicht nur anders benannt, sondern auch in einen historischen Kontext gestellt, ohne dass die Schuld dafür der einen oder anderen Seiten zugeschrieben wird. So steht im Dekret, dass die Kirchen des Ostens und des Westens „ihren besonderen Weg“⁴⁰ gegangen sind, obwohl sie in der sakramentalen Gemeinschaft standen. Diese Besonderheit des Weges wird weiterhin eingehender expliziert: „Das von den Aposteln überkommene Erbe aber ist in verschiedenen Formen und auf verschiedene Weise übernommen, und daher schon von Anfang an in der Kirche hier und dort verschieden ausgelegt worden, wobei auch die Verschiedenheit der Mentalität und der Lebensverhältnisse eine Rolle spielten. Dies alles hat, neben äußeren Gründen, auch infolge des Mangels an Verständnis und Liebe füreinander zu der Trennung Anlass geboten.“⁴¹ Diese Darstellung des Schismas entbehrt völlig des polemischen Charakters, der in der vorkonziliaren katholischen Theologie stark präsent war.⁴² Dass die Katholische Kirche durch diese Änderung vor allem den ökumenischen Dialog vorantreiben bzw. öffnen möchte, wird aus der Fortsetzung des Textes klar: Die im ökumenischen Dialogen involvierten katholischen Kirchenvertreter und Theologen sollen sich der historischen Entwicklungen und der Art der Trennung zwischen Ost und West bewusst sein, um so zum Erfolg des Dialog bestens beizutragen.⁴³ In diesem Lichte fördert das Dekret die ökumenische Perspektive in der akademischen Theologie, weil die zukünftigen Priester ihre Gläubigen nicht mehr in der alten polemischen Theologie unterweisen sollen.⁴⁴

³⁶ *Unitatis redintegratio* 13.

³⁷ Vgl. *Unitatis redintegratio* 13: „Andere Spaltungen entstanden sodann mehr als vier Jahrhunderte später im Abendland aufgrund von Ereignissen, die man die Reformation nennt. Seither sind mehrere nationale oder konfessionelle Gemeinschaften vom Römischen Stuhl getrennt.“

³⁸ *Unitatis redintegratio* 13.

³⁹ *Unitatis redintegratio* 3.

⁴⁰ *Unitatis redintegratio* 14.

⁴¹ *Unitatis redintegratio* 14.

⁴² Dieser Änderung der Perspektive haben sehr wahrscheinlich auch die Arbeiten von Yves Congar beigetragen. Vgl. Yves Congar, *Neuf cents ans après - notes sur le schisme oriental*, Éditions de Chevetogne, Paris, 1954.

⁴³ Vgl. *Unitatis redintegratio* 14: „Deshalb ermahnt das Heilige Konzil alle, besonders diejenigen, die sich um die so erwünschte Wiederherstellung der vollen Gemeinschaft zwischen den orientalischen Kirchen und der katholischen Kirche bemühen wollen, daß sie diese besonderen Umstände der Entstehung und des Wachstums der Kirchen des Orients sowie die Art der vor der Trennung zwischen ihnen und dem Römischen Stuhl bestehenden Beziehungen gebührend berücksichtigen und sich über dies alles ein rechtes Urteil bilden. Die genaue Beachtung dieser Frage wird zu dem beabsichtigten Dialog im höchsten Maße beitragen.“

⁴⁴ Vgl. *Unitatis redintegratio* 10: „Die Unterweisung in der heiligen Theologie und in anderen, besonders den historischen Fächern muss auch unter ökumenischem Gesichtspunkt geschehen, damit sie umso genauer

Die legitime Verschiedenheit

Der Gedanke von den „besonderen Wegen“ der östlichen und westlichen Kirchen wird im Absatz 16 des Dekrets konkretisiert und auf die verschiedenen Kirchenordnungen bezogen. Da in der alten Kirche eine Vielfalt von lokalen Sitten und Gebräuchen ohne die Beeinträchtigung der Kircheneinheit herrschte, dürfte die Verschiedenartigkeit der Traditionen heute kein Hindernis auf dem Weg der Erlangung der sichtbaren Einheit der Kirchen darstellen.⁴⁵ Die praktische Umsetzung dieses Prinzips ist im „Dekret *Orientalium ecclesiarum* über die katholischen Ostkirchen“⁴⁶ und in *Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium*⁴⁷ bezeugt. Im *Orientalium ecclesiarum* wird die Verschiedenheit der östlichen und westlichen katholischen Teilkirchen „durch ihre sogenannten Riten, d. h. Liturgie, ihr kirchliches Recht und ihr geistiges Erbgut“ als durchaus legitim charakterisiert.⁴⁸

Diese Verschiedenheit wird nicht als Hindernis für die Anerkennung der Sakramente der Orthodoxen Kirche angesehen. Im Dekret wird (m. E. überraschenderweise) den Orthodoxen Kirchen eine gewisse Möglichkeit der Gottesdienstgemeinschaft angeboten: „Da nun diese Kirchen trotz ihrer Trennung wahre Sakramente besitzen, vor allem aber in der Kraft der apostolischen Sukzession das Priestertum und die Eucharistie, wodurch sie in ganz enger Verwandtschaft bis heute mit uns verbunden sind, so ist eine gewisse Gottesdienstgemeinschaft unter gegebenen geeigneten Umständen mit Billigung der kirchlichen Autorität nicht nur möglich, sondern auch ratsam.“⁴⁹ Eine ähnliche Anordnung befindet sich auch im *Orientalium Ecclesiarum*, wo die Gläubigen der Orthodoxen Kirche in bestimmten Fällen den Sakramenten der Buße, der Eucharistie und der Krankensalbung zugelassen werden können.⁵⁰ Umgekehrt gilt dasselbe für die katholischen Gläubigen in den Kirchen,

der Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit entspricht. Denn es liegt viel daran, dass die zukünftigen Hirten und Priester über eine Theologie verfügen, die ganz in diesem Sinne und nicht polemisch erarbeitet wurde, besonders bei jenen Gegenständen, die die Beziehungen der getrennten Brüder zur katholischen Kirche betreffen. Von der Ausbildung der Priester hängt ja die notwendige Unterweisung und geistliche Bildung der Gläubigen und der Ordensleute ganz besonders ab. Auch die Katholiken, die in denselben Ländern wie andere Christen im Dienst der Mission stehen, müssen gerade heute erkennen, welche Fragen sich hier ergeben und welche Früchte für ihr Apostolat der Ökumenismus heranreifen lässt.“

⁴⁵ Vgl. *Unitatis reintegratio* 16: „Schon von den ältesten Zeiten her hatten die Kirchen des Orients ihre eigenen Kirchenordnungen, die von den heiligen Vätern und Synoden, auch von ökumenischen, sanktioniert worden sind. Da nun eine gewisse Verschiedenheit der Sitten und Gebräuche, wie sie oben erwähnt wurde, nicht im geringsten der Einheit der Kirche entgegensteht, sondern vielmehr ihre Zierde und Schönheit vermehrt und zur Erfüllung ihrer Sendung nicht wenig beiträgt, so erklärt das Heilige Konzil feierlich, um jeden Zweifel auszuschließen, daß die Kirchen des Orients, im Bewusstsein der notwendigen Einheit der ganzen Kirche, die Fähigkeit haben, sich nach ihren eigenen Ordnungen zu regieren, wie sie der Geistesart ihrer Gläubigen am meisten entsprechen und dem Heil der Seelen am besten dienlich sind. Die vollkommene Beobachtung dieses Prinzips, das in der Tradition vorhanden, aber nicht immer beachtet worden ist, gehört zu den Dingen, die zur Wiederherstellung der Einheit als notwendige Vorbedingung durchaus erforderlich sind.“

⁴⁶ Vgl. „Dekret *Orientalium Ecclesiarum* über die katholischen Ostkirchen“, auf: http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decree_19641121_orientalium-ecclesiarum_ge.html (zuletzt angesehen am 27.04.2015) [weiter im Text: *Orientalium Ecclesiarum*].

⁴⁷ Vgl. *Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium*, auf: <http://www.kirchen-recht-online.de/kanon/ccao.html> (zuletzt angesehen am 27.04.2015).

⁴⁸ Vgl. *Orientalium Ecclesiarum* 3.

⁴⁹ *Unitatis reintegratio* 15.

⁵⁰ Vgl. *Orientalium Ecclesiarum* 27: „Unter Wahrung der erwähnten Grundsätze können Ostchristen, die guten Glaubens von der katholischen Kirche getrennt sind, wenn sie von sich aus darum bitten und recht vorbereitet sind, zu den Sakramenten der Buße, der Eucharistie und der Krankensalbung zugelassen werden. Ebenso ist es Katholiken erlaubt, dieselben Sakramente von nichtkatholischen Geistlichen zu erbitten, in deren Kirche

wo die Sakramente gültig gespendet werden. Dass diese Regeln kein Ausbruch der ökumenisch aufgeschlossenen konziliaren Stimmung sind, lässt sich aufgrund des Canons 844 (*Codex Iuris Canonici* 1983) erschließen, wo die Anordnungen von *Unitatis redintegratio* und *Orientalium Ecclesiarum* wiederholt werden.⁵¹ Von allen orthodoxen Kirchen ist nur die Russische Orthodoxe Kirche 1969 diesem Angebot entgegengekommen. Da die anderen Orthodoxen Kirchen nicht mitfolgten, suspendierte sie jedoch 1986 diese Regelung bis zur Formulierung einer panorthodoxen Stellungnahme. Die Gemischte Internationale Kommission für den theologischen Dialog zwischen der Römisch-Katholischen und der Orthodoxen Kirche bestimmte wiederum 1987 im Dokument „Glaube, Sakramente und die Einheit der Kirche“ die Möglichkeit der Teilnahme an der eucharistischen Feier: „Die Identität des Glaubens ist also wesentlicher Bestandteil der Kirchengemeinschaft in der Feier der Sakramente. Aber eine gewisse Unterschiedlichkeit der Formulierung gefährdet nicht die Gemeinschaft unter den Ortskirchen, so lange jede Kirche unter den verschiedenen Formulierungen den einzigen echten von den Aposteln herkommenden Glauben erkennen kann.“⁵² Die legitime Verschiedenheit schließt also die Gottesdienstgemeinschaft keinesfalls aus, wobei die Grenzen der Verschiedenheit nicht klar gesetzt wurden.

Von der besonderen Bedeutung für den Dialog der Katholischen Kirche mit der Orthodoxen Kirche und ebenso mit den reformatorischen Kirchen ist die Tatsache, dass die legitime Verschiedenheit nicht nur die Ritten sondern auch die verschiedenen Arten der Lehrverkündigung umfasst: „Was oben von der legitimen Verschiedenheit gesagt wurde, dasselbe soll nun auch von der verschiedenen Art der theologischen Lehrverkündigung gesagt werden. Denn auch bei der Erklärung der Offenbarungswahrheit sind im Orient und im Abendland verschiedene Methoden und Arten des Vorgehens zur Erkenntnis und zum Bekenntnis der göttlichen Dinge angewendet worden. Daher darf es nicht wundernehmen, dass von der einen und von der anderen Seite bestimmte Aspekte des offenbarten Mysteriums manchmal besser verstanden und deutlicher ins Licht gestellt wurden, und zwar so, dass man bei jenen verschiedenartigen theologischen Formeln oft mehr von einer gegenseitigen Ergänzung als von einer Gegensätzlichkeit sprechen muss.“⁵³ Diese Worte bezeugen eine neue – nicht nur ökumenische sondern auch innerkatholische – Perspektive in der katholischen Theologie. Entgegen den vorkonziliarischen Tendenzen, die auf das Konzil von Trient und das Erste Vatikanische Konzil zurückgehen, wird die Verschiedenheit nicht mehr als die Bedrohung für

die Sakramente gültig gespendet werden, sooft dazu ein ernstes Bedürfnis oder ein wirklicher geistlicher Nutzen rät und der Zugang zu einem katholischen Priester sich als physisch oder moralisch unmöglich herausstellt.“

⁵¹ Vgl. *Codex Iuris Canonici*, Canon 844, Paragraph 2, 3, 4: „Katholische Spender spenden erlaubt die Sakramente der Buße, der Eucharistie und der Krankensalbung Angehörigen orientalischer Kirchen, die nicht die volle Gemeinschaft mit der katholischen Kirche haben, wenn diese von sich aus darum bitten und in rechter Weise disponiert sind; dasselbe gilt für Angehörige anderer Kirchen, die nach dem Urteil des Apostolischen Stuhles hinsichtlich der Sakramente in der gleichen Lage sind wie die genannten orientalischen Kirchen. Wenn Todesgefahr besteht oder wenn nach dem Urteil des Diözesanbischofs bzw. der Bischofskonferenz eine andere schwere Notlage dazu drängt, spenden katholische Spender diese Sakramente erlaubt auch den übrigen nicht in der vollen Gemeinschaft mit der katholischen Kirche stehenden Christen, die einen Spender der eigenen Gemeinschaft nicht aufsuchen können und von sich aus darum bitten, sofern sie bezüglich dieser Sakramente den katholischen Glauben bekunden und in rechter Weise disponiert sind. Für die in den §§ 2, 3 und 4 genannten Fälle darf der Diözesanbischof bzw. die Bischofskonferenz nur nach Beratung zumindest mit der lokalen zuständigen Autorität der betreffenden nichtkatholischen Kirche oder Gemeinschaft allgemeine Bestimmungen erlassen.“

⁵² Johann Marte / Faustyna Anna Kadzielawa (Hrsg.), *Herausforderung sichtbare Einheit. Beiträge zu den Dokumenten des katholisch-orthodoxen Dialogs*, Würzburg 2014, 190.

⁵³ *Unitatis redintegratio* 17.

die Kircheneinheit betrachtet, sondern vielmehr als eine Bereicherung dargestellt. Innerhalb des Konzeptes der legitimen Verschiedenheit versuchen die Kirchen die alten Vorurteile abzubauen und einen Konsens in den kirchentrennenden Fragen zu erreichen.

Der ökumenische Dialog nach dem Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil hat jedoch die Grenzen der Tragfähigkeit dieser Formel gezeigt. Dass die verschiedenen Arten der Lehrverkündigung im Einklang gebracht werden können, bezeugt die *Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre*, in der der Konsens in Grundwahrheiten der Rechtfertigungslehre zwischen dem Lutherischen Weltbund und der Katholischen Kirche niedergeschrieben ist.⁵⁴ Anhand der unterschiedlichen Kirchenverständnisse und somit der unterschiedlichen Zielbestimmungen des ökumenischen Dialogs wird andererseits klar, dass die legitime Verschiedenheit keinen tragbaren Ausweg aus der heutigen ökumenischen Situation anbieten kann. Nach wie vor bleibt die Hauptfrage: Wie viel Verschiedenheit ist legitim?

Die geistlichen Reichtümer

Im Dekret wird der liturgischen und geistlichen Tradition der Orthodoxen Kirche besondere Achtung geschenkt: „Alle sollen um die große Bedeutung wissen, die der Kenntnis, Verehrung, Erhaltung und Pflege des überreichen liturgischen und geistlichen Erbes der Orientalen zukommt, damit die Fülle der christlichen Tradition in Treue gewahrt und die völlige Wiederversöhnung der orientalischen und der abendländischen Christen herbeigeführt werde.“⁵⁵ Die orientalische Vorliebe für den Gottesdienst und vor allem für die Eucharistiefeier⁵⁶ und die geistliche mönchische Tradition werden beispielhaft gelobt.⁵⁷ Darüber hinaus wird die Verwurzelung der östlichen Tradition in der apostolischen Tradition und in der Lehre der Kirchenväter betont: „Gerade gegenüber den authentischen theologischen Traditionen der Orientalen muss anerkannt werden, dass sie in ganz besonderer Weise in der Heiligen Schrift verwurzelt sind, dass sie durch das liturgische Leben gefördert und zur Darstellung gebracht werden, dass sie genährt sind von der lebendigen apostolischen Tradition und von den Schriften der Väter und geistlichen Schriftsteller des Orients und dass sie zur rechten Gestaltung des Lebens, überhaupt zur vollständigen Betrachtung der christlichen Wahrheit hinführen.“⁵⁸

Ökumenisch relevant ist die Aussage, dass „die ganze geistliche und liturgische, disziplinäre und theologische Erbe mit seinen verschiedenen Traditionen zur vollen Katholizität und Apostolizität der Kirche gehört.“⁵⁹ Aus der heutigen Perspektive betrach-

⁵⁴ Vgl. *Die Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre*, <http://www.theology.de/religionen/oekumene/evangelischerkatholischerdialog/gemeinsameerklarungzurrechtfertigungslehre.php> (zuletzt angesehen am 28. 04. 2015)

⁵⁵ *Unitatis redintegratio* 15.

⁵⁶ Vgl. *Unitatis redintegratio* 15: „Es ist allgemein bekannt, mit welcher Liebe die orientalischen Christen die liturgischen Feiern begehen, besonders die Eucharistiefeier, die Quelle des Lebens der Kirche und das Unterpand der kommenden Herrlichkeit, bei der die Gläubigen, mit ihrem Bischof geeint, Zutritt zu Gott dem Vater haben durch den Sohn, das fleischgewordene Wort, der gelitten hat und verherrlicht wurde, in der Ausgießung des Heiligen Geistes, und so die Gemeinschaft mit der allerheiligsten Dreifaltigkeit erlangen, indem sie, der göttlichen Natur teilhaftig“ (2 Petr 1,4) geworden sind. So baut sich auf und wächst²⁶ durch die Feier der Eucharistie des Herrn in diesen Einzelkirchen die Kirche Gottes, und durch die Konzelebration wird ihre Gemeinschaft offenbar.“

⁵⁷ Vgl. *Unitatis redintegratio* 15: „Deshalb wird mit Nachdruck empfohlen, dass die Katholiken sich mehr mit diesen geistlichen Reichtümern der orientalischen Väter vertraut machen, die den Menschen in seiner Ganzheit zur Betrachtung der göttlichen Dinge emporführen.“

⁵⁸ *Unitatis redintegratio* 17.

⁵⁹ *Unitatis redintegratio* 17.

tet ist es verwunderlich, dass die unierten Christen als eine Art Vermittler zwischen zwei Traditionen hier erwähnt wurden.⁶⁰ Die Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen der unierten Kirchen und der Orthodoxen Kirche hat unmissverständlich gezeigt, dass die unierten Christen eher als Hindernis auf dem Weg der Erlangung der Kircheneinheit zu betrachtet sind. Die mühsame Arbeit der Gemeinsamen Kommission und das daraus entstandene Dokument von Balamand⁶¹ konnten daran wenig ändern. Bernd Jochen Hilberath merkt dazu: „In der aktuellen ökumenischen Situation hätten die Beobachter aus den Orthodoxen Kirchen vermutlich die Konzilsaula nach der Verabschiedung dieses Textes aus Protest verlassen.“⁶²

Fazit

Vor dem Hintergrund der vorkonziliaren katholischen Theologie sollte die *Unitatis redintegratio* als die bedeutende Öffnung der orthodoxen Kirche gegenüber betrachtet werden. Viele orthodoxe Theologen haben deswegen das Dekret mit Recht als einen „gewaltigen Schritt nach vorne“ bezeichnet.⁶³ Andere orthodoxe Theologen haben aber viele Aspekte des Dekrets kritisiert und darunter besonders das Exklusivismus der Katholischen Kirche.⁶⁴ Die unterschiedlichen orthodoxen Beurteilungen des Dekrets beruhen gewiss auf vielen Erwartungen an das Ökumenismusdekret.

Die richtige Perspektive, aus der dieses Dokument angesehen werden soll, ist jedoch nicht die orthodoxe sondern die innerkatholische. Aus dieser Perspektive betrachtet sind die Orthodoxen Kirchen echte Teilkirchen, mit der großen geistlichen und theologischen Tradition und denen eine gewisse Gottesdienstgemeinschaft angeboten wird. Für den Anfang der ökumenischen Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Kirchen war das ganz viel. Für die erfolgreiche Fortsetzung des theologischen Dialogs heute eher wenig. Dadurch sollte jedoch nicht die Tatsache vergessen werden, dass das Dekret ein neues ekklesiologisches Verständnis von der Orthodoxen Kirchen aufbrachte und den Weg für den Dialog öffnete.

⁶⁰ Vgl. *Unitatis redintegratio* 17: „Dieses Heilige Konzil erklärt, dass dies ganze geistliche und liturgische, disziplinäre und theologische Erbe mit seinen verschiedenen Traditionen zur vollen Katholizität und Apostolizität der Kirche gehört; und sie sagt Gott dafür Dank, dass viele orientalische Söhne der katholischen Kirche, die dieses Erbe bewahren und den Wunsch haben, es reiner und vollständiger zu leben, schon jetzt mit den Brüdern, die die abendländische Tradition pflegen, in voller Gemeinschaft leben.“

⁶¹ Vgl. „Uniatismus – eine Überholte Unionsmethode – und die derzeitige Suche nach der vollen Gemeinschaft“, in: Johann Marte / Faustyna Anna Kadzielawa (Hrsg.), *Herausforderung sichtbare Einheit. Beiträge zu den Dokumenten des katholisch-orthodoxen Dialogs*, Würzburg 2014, 225–234.

⁶² Bernd Jochen Hilberath, „Theologischer Kommentar zum Dekret über den Ökumenismus *Unitatis redintegratio*“, in: Peter Hünemann und Bernd Jochen Hilberath, *Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil*, Band 3, Freiburg / Basel / Wien 2005, 69–223, hier 175.

⁶³ Vgl. Athanasios Vletsis, „Quo vadis Ökumene? 40 Jahre Ökumenismusdekret und der orthodox-katholische Dialog. Rückblick und Perspektiven aus orthodoxer Sicht“, in: Christoph Böttigheimer / Hubert Filser, *Kircheneinheit und Weltverantwortung* (Festschrift für Peter Neuner), Regensburg 2006, 689–708, hier 691.

⁶⁴ Vgl. Moga, „Verhaltene Öffnung, verhaltene Freude?“, 384–389.

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Gesundheit und Krankheit in philosophischer Betrachtung

I.) Einleitung:

Die naturwissenschaftliche und die philosophische Betrachtungsweise

In allen Krankheits-Erfahrungen von Patienten ist immer schon eine anfängliche Erkenntnis dessen enthalten, was Krankheit überhaupt ist: Man erlebt, dass das Geschehen an einzelnen Organen auch das Ganze des Organismus betrifft und letztlich auch der ganze Mensch irgendwie gestört ist. Damit aber ist *indirekt* auch ein Gespür für die Ganzheit verbunden, für den „heilen“ Zustand, der nun beeinträchtigt ist und den wir „Gesundheit“ nennen. Am schmerzlichen Mangel dessen, was eigentlich sein sollte, wird das, was hier fehlt, bewusst und nun vielleicht ausdrücklicher ersehnt; durch das Erleiden von Krankheit erlangt die Gesundheit in unserem „emotionalen Bewusstsein“ ein schärferes Profil. So kann durch die Erfahrung von Krankheit auch etwas Gutes entstehen: ein bewussteres und aktiveres Verhältnis zur Gesundheit und zum Leben im Ganzen.

Mit dieser Erkenntnis beginnt schon eine philosophische Besinnung, die für den praktischen Umgang mit Gesundheit und Krankheit von eminenter Bedeutung ist. Denn die Bemühungen zur Überwindung von Krankheit und zur Wiederherstellung von Gesundheit werden umso effektiver sein, je mehr man sich dabei leiten lässt von einer klaren und angemessenen Vorstellung dessen, was Krankheit und Gesundheit in ihrem Wesen sind.

Die Frage nach dem eigentlichen Wesen von Gesundheit und Krankheit und ihrem Bezug zur Ganzheit des Menschen fällt aber nicht mehr in die Blickrichtung der Naturwissenschaft und einer heute vorwiegend naturwissenschaftlich ausgerichteten Medizin, sondern ist genuin philosophischer Natur. Denn die Naturwissenschaften betrachten nach modernem Verständnis die Wirklichkeit unter dem Blickwinkel, wie sie sich in ihren Strukturen und Funktionen der Erfahrung meßbar darstellt, um sie rational zu beherrschen und im Falle einer Erkrankung wieder herzustellen. Demgegenüber versteht sich Philosophie als das Bemühen, die Erfahrungsgegebenheiten in ihrem tieferen Wesen und Sinn zu erschließen.¹

¹ Ursprünglich war das Anliegen von „Erkenntnis“ ein philosophisches: Man wollte den aus der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung vernehmbaren Sinngehalt der Natur „auf den Begriff bringen“, um sich „natur-sinn-gemäß“ verhalten zu können. Die Ausrichtung des Erkenntnisinteresses auf „rationale Beherrschung der Natur“, das die moderne Naturwissenschaft kennzeichnet, kam im Abendland erst am Ende des Mittelalters mit der neuzeitlichen Technik herauf: Um die Wirklichkeit praktisch und technisch beherrschen zu können, musste man sie zuerst theoretisch, nämlich „wissenschaftlich“ beherrschen. Dahinter steckte ein damals neu aufbrechender Freiheitsdrang: Durch die Konstitution der Natur als „bestimmbares Objekt“ erstrebte der Mensch seine Selbstkonstitution als „freies und bestimmendes Subjekt“; er suchte sich als „Herr der Welt“ in seiner „Herrlichkeit“ zu erfahren. Das hat, wie wir erfahren haben und weiterhin erleben, durchaus zwei Seiten: Insoweit der Mensch seine so gewonnene „wissenschaftliche und technische Macht“ sinnvoll und verant-

Hier zunächst einige *Beispiele*: Die moderne *Physik* sucht die materielle Welt als ein „C-G-S-System“ zu beschreiben, das heißt als ein Gefüge von messbaren Einheiten der räumlichen Ausdehnung (Centimeter), der schweren Masse oder des Gewichtes (Gramm) und der zeitlichen Dauer (Sekunde). Darin ist aber notwendigerweise ein Begriff von Raum, Masse und Zeit vorausgesetzt. Dieser wird nun nicht durch die *Natur-Wissenschaft* reflektiert, sondern durch die *Natur-Philosophie*. Wenn man einen Physiker z. B. fragt, was „Zeit“ ist, so hört man meist die Antwort: „Sie ist das, was man mit der Uhr misst!“ Aber was ist das, was man mit der Uhr misst? Physik fragt nach heutigem Verständnis nur nach dem „Wie“: Wie ausgedehnt ist etwas im Raum, wie schwer an Gewicht, wie lang dauert es in der Zeit? Thema der Philosophie sind die Fragen: „Was ist Raum, Masse, Zeit? - und was ist die Welt im Ganzen, ihr Ursprung und ihr Sinn?“

Oder: Die *Biologie* beschränkt sich auf eine (möglichst exakte) Erfassung der Strukturen und Funktionen des organischen Lebens, die *Psychologie* auf die der Psyche usw. - und verweist die Frage nach Wesen, Grund und Sinn des Lebens bzw. der Seele, das heißt die Frage nach dem Ganzen und Letzten, in die *Philosophie*. Diese steht hiermit gewiss vor einer unbegrenzten Aufgabe, der sie aber wenigstens begrenzt nachkommen kann.

Dieser grundsätzliche Zusammenhang bedeutet nun *für unser Thema*: In der Blickrichtung einer rein naturwissenschaftlich denkenden Medizin liegt allein die Frage: „Wie, durch welche molekular-physiologischen Prozesse funktioniert Gesundheit?“ und: „Wie kann man diese Funktionen unterstützen bzw. bei Störungen technisch wiederherstellen?“ Darin ist aber eine Vorstellung dessen, was Gesundheit überhaupt ist, impliziert; denn alles „Wie“ ist immer das „Wie“ eines „Was“. So verlangt die naturwissenschaftlich ausgerichtete Frage: „Wie funktioniert und wie reproduziert man Gesundheit?“ zur Klärung ihrer Grundlagen die philosophische Frage: „Was *ist* denn das in seinem Wesen, Sinn und Ursprung, das da so oder anders funktioniert?“, „Was ist Gesundheit, was Krankheit, was ist überhaupt der Mensch?“

So bedeutsam und unerlässlich die naturwissenschaftliche und technische Betrachtungsweise für den Arzt auch ist – sie genügt nicht für seine Aufgabe; denn der Arzt hat es nicht nur mit isolierbaren Funktionen zu tun, sondern ist mit dem Patienten als einem konkreten Menschen konfrontiert. Als rein naturwissenschaftlich denkender *Mediziner* würde er z. B. sagen: „In diesem Krankenzimmer liegt ein Beinbruch!“, als *Arzt* aber: „Hier habe ich es mit einem vom Beinbruch betroffenen Menschen zu tun!“ Man darf als Patient aber - Gott sei Dank! - immer wieder erfahren, dass man von Ärzten nicht nur als Objekt von naturwissenschaftlich identifizierbaren Abläufen betrachtet wird, wobei man sich als „wissenschaftlicher Laie“ dem Urteil der „Fachleute“ fraglos zu unterwerfen hätte, sondern dass man als Partner auf eine konstruktive Zusammenarbeit angesprochen ist.

Den selben Einsatz muss aber auch der Patient aufbringen: Nicht das *blinde* Vertrauen des Patienten ehrt den Arzt und den Patienten, sondern ein Vertrauen, das sich auch um ein Verstehen bemüht und sich in der Auseinandersetzung mit der eigenen Krankheit und der Behandlung des Arztes profiliert. Dann ergäbe sich vielleicht sogar die Chance, durch die Krankheitserfahrung in seinem Mensch-sein weiterzukommen.

wortlich einsetzt, bedeutet sie tatsächlich einen Fortschritt zum Guten, andernfalls aber bewirkt sie Entfremdung und Zerstörung. Damit zeigt sich mit der heute rasanten Weiterentwicklung von Naturwissenschaft und Technik die Menschheit immer dringlicher auf Orientierung am Wesen und Sinn der Dinge angewiesen – der ja gerade die Philosophie dienen will. Vgl. zum Zusammenhang vom *Verf.*: Kulturphilosophie der Technik. Perspektiven zu Menschheit – Technik – Zukunft, Trier 2. Aufl. 1979.

Allerdings ist nicht zu übersehen, dass es für den Patienten zunächst bequemer erscheinen mag, alle Verantwortung den „Fachleuten“ zu überlassen und rein vordergründig zu handeln, indem man z. B. nicht fragt, ob auftretende Kopfschmerzen vielleicht ein Warnsignal einer ungesunden Lebensweise darstellen, sondern versucht, sie durch eine einfache Technik, wie einen entsprechenden Tablettenkonsum, schnell „wegzumachen“.

Ein solches Verhalten wäre Ausdruck unserer technischen Industriekultur, die die Frage nach dem tieferen Sinn des Geschehens ausklammert, also sich die Mühe einer philosophischen Reflexion auf das Ganze nicht machen und gleich zu praktischem Handeln übergehen möchte, das so natürlich im Vordergründigen bleibt, das eigentliche Übel womöglich überhaupt nicht angeht und unter Umständen sogar zu verhängnisvollen Fehlhandlungen führen kann.

Es zeigt sich: Unser Thema hat auch eine kulturkritische Dimension und verlangt die Arbeit an der Entwicklung eines Verantwortungsbewusstseins, das jeden Arzt und jeden Patienten persönlich betrifft, das aber auch allgemeine gesellschaftliche Aspekte hat und sich z. B. Gedanken über eine Reform des universitären Medizinstudiums machen muss, in dem nicht nur naturwissenschaftliche, sondern auch grundlegende philosophische Fragestellungen zum Zuge kommen.

Unsere philosophische Betrachtung von Gesundheit und Krankheit wird nun weiterhin vorgehen wie folgt:

Nach dem bereits vollzogenen *I.) und grundlegenden Schritt*, in dem wir das Spezificum und die Bedeutung der philosophischen Fragestellung in den Blick nahmen, soll nun in einem *II.) Schritt* versucht werden, aus philosophischer Sicht einige Aussagen über *Wesen und Sinn von Gesundheit und Krankheit* zu gewinnen.

Auf dieser Grundlage ist dann in einem *III.) Schritt* der Frage nach dem *Ursprung von Gesundheit* nachzugehen. Dabei wird sich herausstellen, dass Gesundheit letztlich ein Geschenk darstellt, das der Mensch von der Natur und ihrer göttlichen Quelle her empfängt.

Dies darf aber nicht etwa als ein „Placet“ zu einer passiven Haltung missverstanden werden. Sondern die „Gabe der Natur“ bedeutet vielmehr auch eine „Auf-gabe“. Sie ist dem Menschen anvertraut; er antwortet auf die Gabe, indem er verantwortlich seine Gesundheit pflegt. Dies soll ein *IV.) Schritt* zeigen.

Ein *V.) und letzter Schritt* versucht eine *Zusammenfassung* des Gedankengangs seiner Ergebnisse.

II.) Zu Wesen und Sinn von Gesundheit und Krankheit

Was ist Gesundheit? Und wozu soll sie dienen, was ist eigentlich der Sinn von Gesundheit?

In philosophischer Sicht, die auf das Ganze geht, das den einzelnen Erscheinungen zugrunde liegt, ist *Gesundheit* der Zustand oder „Habitus“ eines Lebewesens, der seiner *Natur*, das heißt der *in ihm angelegten sinnvollen Grundstruktur seines Seins* entspricht. In der Verfassung der Gesundheit kann das Lebewesen sein Leben angemessen vollziehen; sie ermöglicht ihm ein naturgemäßes, volles und freies Dasein und ist so sein „natürlicher“ und „guter“ Habitus. So wird z.B. die Niere als „gesund“ bezeichnet, wenn sie sich in einem Zustand befindet, in dem sie die Aufgabe, auf die sie angelegt ist und für die sie „da“ ist, gut ausführen kann. Entsprechendes gilt für den Gesamtorganismus. Der Sinn, das Ziel seiner Gesundheit ist sein optimaler Lebensvollzug.

Wenn aber das Organ bzw. das Lebewesen sich in einem Zustand befindet, in dem es seiner „natürlichen Aufgabe“ nicht mehr nachkommen kann, so spricht man von „*Krankheit*“. Sie ist das Fehlen von Gesundheit, ihr „privativer Gegensatz“. Es handelt sich um einen Zustand, der von der Anlagestruktur des Lebewesens her gesehen eigentlich nicht sein sollte, um einen „schlechten Habitus“.²

Wie verhalten sich nun die „Natur“ eines Lebewesens, z. B. des Menschen, und ihr guter bzw. schlechter Zustand?

Hier lässt sich ein *Dreifaches* sagen:

1. Die „Natur“ eines Lebewesens bezeichnet die in ihm angelegte „*sub-stantielle*“ (lat.: zugrunde-liegende) Wesensstruktur; ihr guter oder schlechter Zustand, also Gesundheit oder Krankheit, macht ihre „*ak-zidentelle*“ (wörtlich: zu ihr noch hinzu-kommende) konkrete Verfassung aus.

2. Diese kommt allerdings nicht von außen hinzu, sondern bedeutet *die angemessene bzw. defizitäre Verwirklichung* der Natur.

3. Die angelegte und zugrundeliegende Sinnstruktur der Natur gibt den *Maßstab* ab für ihre angemessene oder ihre abweichende und fehlgehende Verwirklichung; sie ist das *ontische Kriterium* für Gesundheit oder Krankheit.

So zeigt z. B. die Gelbsucht an, dass die Leber sich nicht in einem Zustand befindet, der ihrer Aufgabe, also der dem Organ und dem Organismus immanenten Sinnordnung entspricht; sie gilt daher als Ausdruck einer Funktionsstörung und Erkrankung, eines schlechten Habitus des Organismus.

Der gute Habitus heißt in alter philosophischer Tradition „*Tugend*“. Dieser Begriff war ursprünglich nicht auf einen spezifisch moralischen Sinn eingeschränkt, sondern bedeutete ganz allgemein „Tüchtigkeit“, das heißt das entwickelte Vermögen und die ausgebildeten Fähigkeiten der Natur. So wird bei *Plato* die körperliche Gesundheit in Analogie zur geistigen Tugend und Tüchtigkeit als eine „*somatische Tugend*“ bezeichnet (von griech. „soma“, der Körper); also: Gesundheit ist nach *Plato* eine körperliche Tugend, ist körperliche Tüchtigkeit - wie umgekehrt die geistigen Tugenden (nämlich vor allem: Klugheit, Gerechtigkeit, Tapferkeit und Maß) die „*Gesundheit der Seele*“ ausdrücken.³

Auch nach *Aristoteles* ist die Gesundheit eine „Tugend“. Er versteht sie in seiner teleologischen Wirklichkeitsschau als das Natürliche und Naturgemäße, auf das die Natur von vornherein angelegt ist, als das „Telos“ oder „Sinnziel“ der Natur und die „Vollendung“ der Natur. In der Gesundheit erreicht die Natur ihre höchste Identität und ganze Fülle, ihre „volle Wirklichkeit“. „Gesundheit“ bedeutet somit die Verwirklichung der sinnvollen Ordnung der Lebensvollzüge, auf die das Lebewesen angelegt ist und auf die es von Natur aus abzielt.⁴

² Um den Gegensatz von Gesundheit und Krankheit richtig zu verstehen, muss man sich bewusst machen, dass es *wesentlich verschiedene Arten von „Gegensatz“* gibt. Hier ist es vor allem wichtig, den Unterschied von konträrem bzw. „polarem“ und „privativem“ Gegensatz zu sehen. Beim ersteren sind beide Gegensatzglieder etwas Positives und darauf angelegt, sich gegenseitig zu ergänzen; sie machen erst zusammen die „Sinn-Einheit des Ganzen“ aus. Beispiele sind Mann und Frau, aber sicher auch die Generationen und die verschiedenen Kulturen der Menschheit. Anders jedoch verhält es sich beim privativen Gegensatz (von lat. privatio, Beraubung): Hier ist nur das eine Gegensatzglied etwas Positives; es meint das integrale „Sinn-Ganze“. Das andere Gegensatzglied stellt nur dessen Beeinträchtigung und Schädigung, eben seine „Beraubung“ dar. Beispiele sind Gut und Böses, Gerechtigkeit und Ungerechtigkeit, Frieden und Krieg, oder Gesundheit und Krankheit.

³ Vgl. *Platon*, *Der Staat* 444 c ff.

⁴ Vgl. *Aristoteles*, *Politik* I, 1, 8 ; 1252 b 33-35: „Die Natur (wir übersetzen hier zutreffender: „Natürlichkeit“) ist ein Sinnziel, dementsprechend wir den Vollendungszustand eines jeden Dinges die Natur (resp.

Demgegenüber bedeutet Krankheit eine „habituelle Unordnung“ dieser Lebensvollzüge. Ihr Charakteristikum ist, wie an unserem Beispiel einer Lebererkrankung wohl bereits deutlich wurde, dass einzelne Gliedteile und Teilfunktionen sich nicht mehr sinngemäß dem umfassenden Ganzen ein- und unterordnen, sondern

- entweder (1.) sinnwidrig sich verändern,
 - oder (2.) nachlassen bzw. ausfallen,
 - oder auch (3.) sich abgespalten und gewissermaßen in sich selbst verabsolutieren,
- wie bei einer Krebserkrankung.

Krebs erscheint so als der „Prototyp“ von Erkrankung im Sinn von „Störung der Ganzheit“. - Übrigens, um hier nochmals auf die Analogie von Physis und Psyche zu rekurrieren: Wie beim physischen Organismus, so spricht man auch von „Krankheiten“ bei einem sozialen Organismus; man spricht z. B. von einer „Krebserkrankung eines wirtschaftlichen Betriebssystems“, wenn dessen untergeordnete Organe den Dienst verweigern und so das Ganze zerfällt.

Gesundheit hingegen bedeutet in jedem Falle, dass die Teile unter sich und mit dem Ganzen zusammenstimmen. Sie liegt, wie es z. B. *Plato* formuliert hat, in der sinngemäßen „Harmonie und Ergänzung der Gegensätze“.⁵

Im Sinne der analogen Entsprechung des Physischen und des Geistig-Sozialen könnte man auch sagen: Gesundheit bedeutet „Frieden“ auf biologischer Ebene - wenn man z.B. mit *Augustinus* Frieden als „Ruhe in der Ordnung“ (*tranquillitas ordinis*) versteht. Bei einer schweren Krankheit hingegen befindet sich der Organismus wie in einem inneren „Kriegszustand“, die Lebensprozesse sind in Disharmonie, die Lebenskraft wird angegriffen.

Dabei ist durchaus zu sehen, dass eine partielle Krankheit oder Behinderung, z. B. im physischen Bereich, für die Psyche und das umfassende Ganze des menschlichen Lebens eine sinnvolle Herausforderung zu weiterer Reifung darstellen und so in einem noch existentielleren Sinne schicksalhaft im Dienste von Gesundheit stehen kann. Diesen Zusammenhang haben in neuerer Zeit, wie bekannt, besonders die Psychopathologie und Existenzphilosophie von *Karl Jaspers* und die Logotherapie von *Viktor Frankl* durchleuchtet.

Demnach ist der Sinn von Gesundheit (wie auch von Krankheit) letztlich auf den *Sinn des Lebens* zu beziehen. Worin aber kann dieser gesehen werden?

Der *Sinn des Lebens* liegt zweifellos in den *Wertdimensionen der Wahrheit, der Schönheit und des Guten*, wie vor allem von *Gerechtigkeit* und *Liebe*.

Diese geistigen Sinnwerte sind *unvollkommen* bereits in *unserem Dasein in Raum und Zeit* zu erfahren und zu verwirklichen; dies vermittelt Freude und Erfüllung - wobei normalerweise die Gesundheit die natürliche Grundlage darstellt. - Die Aufgabe des Lebens kann aber auch eine Akzeptanz von Leid und Krankheit erfordern. Damit verweisen die Sinnwerte zu ihrer *vollkommenen Erfahrung* letztlich in die „*Transzendenz*“.⁶

Natürlichkeit) eines jeden Dinges nennen.“. – Dazu auch vom Verf.: Der Begriff der 'Natur' als Grundlage einer naturgemäßen Ethik und Lebenskultur, in: *Salzb. Jahrb. für Philos.* XXX(1988)101-111, hier bes. S. 111. - Vgl. dazu auch: Thomas Beck, Zu den Grundlagen von Naturheilverfahren und Komplementärmedizin, in: *Forschende Komplementärmedizin und Klassische Naturheilkunde* 2001; 8:24 - 32.

⁵ Vgl. *Platon*, *Symposion* 188 a.

⁶ Die philosophische Begründung durchläuft genau besehen drei Schritte:

Die erörterte Frage nach Wesen und Sinn von Gesundheit und Krankheit leitet nun zu einer wichtigen Einsicht. Wie deutlich wurde, ist es für den Arzt und den Therapeuten unerlässlich (und übrigens auch für den Patienten ratsam), sich um ein Verständnis der im Seienden substantiell angelegten Sinnordnung zu bemühen. Das praktische Wissen um diese Sinnordnung, die das Körperliche wie das Seelische und Geistige umfasst, macht aber das Kennzeichen von „Weisheit“ aus. Denn „Weisheit“ versteht sich als die Fähigkeit, alle Dinge nach ihrer Sinn-stellung im Ganzen des Lebens richtig einzuschätzen, also z. B. das körperliche Wohl weder zu vergötzen noch zu verachten, sondern es vielmehr im Bezug zu den geistigen Wertdimensionen und zur seelischen Harmonie zu sehen. Der Arzt und Therapeut hat sich daher stets um „Weisheit“ zu bemühen.

Damit hat er aber essentiell am Anliegen der Philosophie teil, die sich als „Liebe zur Weisheit“ definiert. Ja, er ist nach *Hippokrates* insofern auch selbst Philosoph und sogar „den Göttern gleich“.⁷ Er darf sich als Vermittler von Heilung und im Dienste des menschlichen Heil-seins verstehen – im Sinne der ursprünglichen Wortbedeutung von „gesund“ als „vollständig“, „heil und ganz“.

Damit sind wir nun vorbereitet, die philosophische Frage nach der „ontischen Quelle“ von Gesundheit anzugehen.

III.) Die Frage nach dem Ursprung von Gesundheit.

Wenn Gesundheit sich einstellt – woher kommt sie, was ist ihr Ursprung, die „Quelle ihres Seins“? Ist der Mensch selbst der Urheber seiner Gesundheit? Wird sie von ihm, etwa durch eine vernünftige Lebensführung, erschaffen? Oder vom Arzt, wenn sie verloren war, durch entsprechende Kunst und Technik neu erschaffen?

Besonders die *westlich-abendländische Kultur*, welche die sogenannte neuzeitliche „Apparatemedizin“ hervorgebracht hat, scheint zu einer „Ideologie der Machbarkeit“ zu neigen, wonach der Mensch durch immer weitere Perfektionierung der Technik alles bewerkstelligen zu können glaubt. Dabei macht er allerdings die paradoxe

Zunächst – 1. - wird festgestellt, dass wir auf diese Sinnwerte von Natur aus ausgerichtet sind. Denn unser Leben ereignet sich in der Sprache und wir zielen in jeder Frage und Antwort wesentlich auf die Erkenntnis von Wahrheit; ebenso zielen wir in aller Begegnung mit Natur und Kunst auf das Erleben von Schönheit; und in bezug auf den Mitmenschen und die Gesellschaft zielen wir auf die Erfahrung und Verwirklichung von Gerechtigkeit, Verständnis und Liebe.

Wir erfahren ferner – 2. - , dass ihre Realisierung hier und jetzt geschehen soll; insofern liegen die Aufgabe und der Sinn unseres Lebens bereits in dieser Welt.

Zugleich aber – 3. - erkennen wir, dass eine Erfüllung hier nur begrenzt möglich ist; damit zielt unsere natürliche Ausrichtung auf die Sinnwerte notwendig und wesentlich über die Welt hinaus – und so kommt in philosophischer Perspektive „Gott“ in den Blick: als „die Wahrheit, die Schönheit, die Gerechtigkeit und die Liebe in Person“. Wenn man aber „Gott“ und das „Göttliche“ so sieht, dann läßt sich erahnen: In der Vereinigung mit Gott erreicht unsere natürliche Ausrichtung auf die Sinnwerte ihr absolutes Ziel und die umfassende Quelle der Gesundheit.

Vgl. vom Verf.: *Natürliche Theologie. Grundriss philosophischer Gotteserkenntnis* (2. Aufl. 1988), 181 Fn. 22, sowie 184 – 191; mit besonderem Bezug auf die Problematik von Gesundheit und Krankheit: Ders.: *Sucht nach Transzendenz? - Über unseren Umgang mit Drogen und Drogenproblemen*. Siebtes Würzburger Symposium der Universität Würzburg (1994), und: Matthias Beck, *Seele und Krankheit. Psychosomatische Medizin und theologische Anthropologie* (2000).

⁷ Vgl. *Hippokrates*, *De Honest.* 5. – Vgl. Ferner: *J. Schumacher*, *Der Anfang der abendländischen Medizin in der griechischen Antike* (1965) und *C. v. Korvin-Krasinski*, *Tibetische Medizinphilosophie* (2. Aufl. 1964), sowie *ders.*: *Trina Mundi Machina. Die Signatur des alten Eurasien* (1986).

Erfahrung, dass die teilweise gigantischen Fortschritte in der Bekämpfung von speziellen Krankheiten mit einem zunehmenden Schwund der Gesundheit im Ganzen einhergehen – was sich z.B. in der verheerenden Ausbreitung der Krebsanfälligkeit und der Immunschwäche Aids anzeigt. Dieses Phänomen wird aber bei uns meist als rein technische Herausforderung verstanden, als Ruf nach noch besserer und noch mehr „Technik“.

Demgegenüber gab es bei uns aber auch immer schon die Auffassung, dass *nicht der Arzt, sondern die Natur heilt* – im Sinne des Satzes: „*Medicus curat, natura sanat*“. Die Aufgabe des Arztes sei lediglich, die im kranken Organismus noch vorhandenen Heilungskräfte der Natur anzusprechen und zu stärken.

Diese Geisteshaltung ist für den *afro-asiatischen Kontinent* geradezu kennzeichnend: Nach Auffassung der *indischen Ayurveda-Heilkunst* liegt die Ursache einer Erkrankung nicht so sehr in von außen hinzukommenden Faktoren, als vielmehr in einer Störung des inneren „kosmischen Gleichgewichts“ der Person.

Ähnlich zielt auch die *chinesische und tibetische Methode der Akupunktur* darauf ab, die harmonisierenden Energien im Organismus anzuregen.⁸ Diese Heilweisen finden seit einigen Jahren auch zunehmend im Westen Eingang.

Allein, es muss hier die philosophische Frage gestellt werden: Woher erwachsen letztlich die heilenden, die gestörte Ganzheit wiederherstellenden Kräfte, wenn doch die Natur so sehr angegriffen und geschwächt ist, dass sie nicht mehr in voller Kraft, im Habitus der Gesundheit, ihr Leben vollziehen kann? Die heilenden Kräfte müssen offenbar aus einer Tiefe kommen, die den faktischen Zustand der Natur transzendiert !

Dieser Grund, von dem her die Natur sich erneuert, ist *einerseits* der Natur selbst *immanent*; denn es handelt sich ja, wie man sagt, um „Kräfte der Natur“. *Andererseits* aber muss er zugleich von ihr *verschieden* sein, denn er beinhaltet ja das volle Leben der Natur, das diese nun nicht mehr besitzt, sondern aus ihm wieder empfangen soll.

So legt es sich philosophisch nahe, zwischen einer *hervorbringenden* und einer *hervorgebrachten* Natur zu unterscheiden, einer „*natura naturans*“ und einer „*natura naturata*“. Die erstere bezeichnet die Quelle der letzteren, gleichsam das schöpferische Urbild, die göttliche Idee, aus der sie fortwährend erströmt.

Diese Argumentation hat im *europäischen Denken* eine reiche Tradition. Sie knüpft bereits an *Aristoteles* und den arabischen Aristoteleskommentator *Averroes* an, wird dann unter Aufnahme von neuplatonischen Motiven verschieden weitergebildet durch die bedeutendsten Denker des christlichen Mittelalters und reicht über *Spinoza*, *Fichte*, *Schelling* und *Hegel* bis in die Neuzeit und Gegenwart.⁹

Dieser philosophischen Sicht begegnet eine weit verbreitete Tradition in *afrikanischer Religiosität und Weltanschauung*. Nach ihr drückt Krankheit ein Nachlassen der Lebensenergie aus, die der einzelnen Person als Glied des Kosmos und der menschlichen Gemeinschaft aus der göttlichen Quelle her zufließt. Wenn daher der Zustrom gestört ist, so sind zunächst die „Kanäle“ zu reinigen; das bedeutet z. B. das Erfordernis, mangelnde Dankbarkeit und Liebe oder verletzende Egozentrik in den Beziehungen zur Natur, zum Mitmenschen und zum unsichtbaren geistigen Hintergrund des Daseins bewusst zu

⁸ Vgl. hier vor allem die in Anm. 7 genannten Schriften von Korvin-Krasinski.

⁹ Vgl. dazu z.B. *H. Siebeck*, Über die Entstehung der Termini *natura naturans* und *natura naturata*, Arch. Gesch. Philos. 3(1890)370-78; *H. A. Lucks*, *Natura naturans – Natura naturata*, The new Scolast. 9(1935)1-14.

machen und zu korrigieren, um so die Empfänglichkeit für das Leben aus Gott wieder neu zu öffnen. Hierin ist vor allem auch die Bedeutung des sozialen Bezugs für das Heilungsgeschehen betont – ein Aspekt, der sich im europäischen Bewusstsein wenn überhaupt, so doch nur recht mühsam durchsetzt.¹⁰

So artikuliert sich in jeweils verschiedenem kulturellen Kontext die Auffassung, dass Gesundheit zutiefst ein Geschenk der Natur aus ihrem göttlichen Grunde her bedeutet, das der Mensch annehmen, schützen und pflegen soll.

Diese Überzeugung lebt auch aus der Erfahrung, dass Gesundheit nicht beliebig verfügbar und nicht durch menschliche Vorkehrungen und Techniken erzwingbar ist; sie muss vielmehr – unter der Voraussetzung, dass durch eine entsprechende Lebensweise oder auch durch ärztliche Hilfe die erforderlichen Bedingungen gesetzt sind – sich von sich aus einstellen. Da die Gesundheit und die sie tragende Lebenskraft dabei aber nicht allein aus dem kranken Organismus kommen kann, wo sie so nicht mehr ist, verweist die Erfahrung von Gesundung auf das immanente Wirken einer heilen und heilenden, zutiefst göttlichen Wirklichkeit.

So stellt sich nun abschließend in einem IV. Schritt unserer Betrachtung die Frage, wie sich mit diesem göttlichen Angebot angemessen und kooperativ umgehen lässt. In welchem Sinne ist die Gabe der Gesundheit gleichzeitig eine Aufgabe?

IV.) Gesundheit als Aufgabe.

Zunächst: Es besteht wohl kein Zweifel, daß die Erhaltung und Wiederherstellung von Gesundheit eine Fülle von konkreten Maßnahmen erfordert. Sofern sie eine Tugend bzw. Tüchtigkeit der Natur darstellt, bedeutet dies die Aufgabe einer kontinuierlichen „Ertüchtigung“, das heißt einer naturgemäßen Lebensweise im sinnvollen Wechsel von Anstrengung und Entspannung, von sportlicher Bewegung und Erholung, verbunden mit einer naturbezogenen Ernährung und Diätetik.

Dies schließt *im Grenzfall* die unterstützende Behandlung mit Arzneien, ja den chirurgischen Eingriff, nicht aus. Dabei muss das *Prinzip* leiten, *so wenig wie möglich zu verletzen und dem mildesten Mittel den Vorzug zu geben*; der noch gesunde Kern des Organismus sollte nach Möglichkeit nicht angetastet, sondern vielmehr angesprochen und in seinen heilenden Kräften geweckt und aktiviert werden.

So wird aber deutlich: Wichtiger als alle konkreten Maßnahmen, die im einzelnen zu ergreifen sind, ist die Besinnung auf den Maßstab selbst, an dem das Maß zu nehmen ist, nämlich letztlich auf die Sinngebung der Gesundheit – auf das, worin das volle Leben der Natur besteht und wofür das Leben überhaupt da ist, auf sein Sinnziel. Bei einer rein materialistischen Lebenseinstellung wird man mit Gesundheit und Krankheit anders umgehen als wenn man von einem Geist der Achtung gegenüber seinem Leben und der Dankbarkeit für es getragen ist.

Dabei mag es gelingen, vielleicht gerade auch unter der Provokation von Krankheit, die persönliche „Verantwortung“ für die Gesundheit zu einem inneren Dialog mit der göttlichen Lebensquelle zu vertiefen. Daraus könnte sich eine Freude und Kraft der

¹⁰ Vgl. dazu: J. S. Mbiti, *Afrikanische Religion und Weltanschauung* (1974); Cl. Oniang'o, *The relation to nature, time and individuality as the fundament of the African concept of harmony and peace*, in: Heinrich Beck, Gisela Schmirber (Hrsg.), *Kreativer Friede durch Begegnung der Weltkulturen* (1995) 191–213; und vom Verf.: *Europa – Afrika – Asien: Komplementarität der Weltkulturen*, in: Erwin Schadel (Hrsg.), *Ganzheitliches Denken* (Festschr. Arnulf Rieber), (1996) 51–82, bes. S. 60 f., dort auch weitere Literaturhinweise.

Lebensbejahung ergeben, die auch unter schwierigen Umständen durchhalten lässt oder sogar eine Wiedergesundung schenkt.¹¹

Die helfende und begleitende Zuwendung des Arztes und Therapeuten ist dabei unerlässlich und ist sicher oft mit der Aufgabe eines Seelsorgers zu vergleichen. Dies beschreibt freilich mehr oder weniger nur ein Ideal, das eine Richtung vorgibt; die Realität wird wohl zwangsläufig immer ein Kompromiss sein.

Dabei ist zu hoffen und zu wünschen, dass durch die philosophische Betrachtungsweise, die sich um ein tieferes Sinnverständnis bemüht, die Erkrankung als „Störung der Ganzheit“ in den Blick gefasst und die Diagnose und Therapie entsprechend ausgerichtet wird.

V.) Zusammenfassung.

Abschließend sollen durch Hervorkehrung von Anliegen und Leitlinien unserer philosophischen Betrachtung noch einige Akzente für das Gespräch gesetzt werden.

Im Allgemeinen wird im Sinne der naturwissenschaftlichen Betrachtungsweise zunächst nur die Frage gestellt: „Wie funktioniert Gesundheit?“ Einer Klärung der Grundlagen dieser Frage dient die philosophische Fragestellung: „Was ist das in seinem Wesen und Sinn, das da so oder anders funktioniert, – was ist Gesundheit?“

In der Geschichte des philosophischen Denkens wurde die Antwort erarbeitet: Gesundheit liegt dann vor, wenn die Lebensvollzüge der sinnvollen Ordnung entsprechen, die in der Natur angelegt ist, und das heißt: Gesundheit ist „der gute Habitus der Natur“. Krankheit ist der „privative Gegensatz“ zur Gesundheit und bedeutet einen „schlechten Habitus der Natur“.

Der „Sinn“ von Gesundheit besteht daher in der Ermöglichung eines optimalen Lebensvollzugs. Er ist die „Erfüllung“ der Natur, die „volle Wirklichkeit“ der Natur – die zutiefst auf das Göttliche hinweist.

Dieser Zusammenhang leitet zu der weiteren philosophischen Frage über: Woher kann Gesundheit wieder kommen, wenn sie – im Falle der Krankheit – gestört oder verloren ist? Offenbar nur aus einer Seinstiefe, die den faktischen Zustand der Natur transzendiert.

Entsprechend unterscheidet europäische philosophische Tradition zwischen „hervorbringender Natur“, in der gewissermaßen „die göttliche Idee“ der Natur liegt, und „hervorgebrachter Natur“, zwischen „natura naturans“ und „natura naturata“. Dem entsprechen Vorstellungen aus dem afro-asiatischen Kulturbereich, wonach Krankheit einen Zustand ausdrückt, in dem die Lebensenergie aus ihrer göttlichen Quelle nicht mehr angemessen einströmen kann.

So wird verständlich, dass sich Heilung nicht durch Perfektionierung medizinischer Technik erzwingen lässt, wie eine zeitgenössische „Ideologie der Machbarkeit“ zu glauben scheint. Grundlegend gefordert ist vielmehr eine sinnvolle Stärkung und Pflege der Natur – worin sich nicht ein eigenmächtiger Verfügungswille über Leben und Gesundheit, sondern vielmehr eine „innere Empfänglichkeit für Gesundheit“ ausdrückt, das heißt eine Haltung der Achtung und der Dankbarkeit.

¹¹ Dazu vgl. vom Verf.: *Natürliche Theologie*, a.a.O., S. 22 ff. und 233 ff..

Literaturhinweise

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Über Wesen und Würde des Menschen. Von Skeptizismus und Relativismus zu einer anthropologisch – ethischen Grundlegung, in: Heinrich Beck, *Dialogik – Analogie – Trinität. Ausgewählte Beiträge und Aufsätze des Autors zu seinem 80. Geburtstag. Mit einer Einführung herausgegeben von Erwin Schadel (Schriften zur Triadik und Ontodynamik, Bd. 28)*, Frankfurt/M. u.a. 2009, 185-200.

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Liturgical Poetics between Improvisation and Interpretation

1.

In the time when oral tradition was predominant, reminding of the past was the only way of preservation – memorizing and transferring historical experience and accumulated knowledge of generations. The most important role in this way of transferring tradition played the fund of poetic means of expression (verse, meter, rhyme, melody, etc). Speaking and singing in the ancient times as well as today was one and the same thing, because poetics meant musical creation, as well. Greek word λέγω and Latin word *dico* mean both “I speak” and “I sing”.¹ This unity of poetics and music is most obvious in folk music tradition, in which lyrics and melodies never appear as something independent, but always as indivisible parts of a specific and unique whole. A word is equally important as a tone, because rhythm of a language determines the flow of music. Therefore, the psalmody of religious canticles (texts) might be considered as a prototype of logogen music.²

Concerning the oral transmission of tradition, one needs to be cautious considering such terms as: *writing*, *book* and *literature*, because they are not necessary for poetic creativity.³ Poetics in itself possesses, more or less, enough mechanisms on which basis it can exist and transfer itself on its own (without literacy). That is why the *reading* of (some other’s) poetic creations as an artistic skill is not something familiar, especially because textual (but musical, as well) notation disables the performer to personally improve the existing canticle.

Tolstoy also writes of this phenomenon, and argues that poetics and mysticism cannot exist without each other, because mysticism without poetry remains within the boundaries of superstition, and poetry without mysticism is nothing else but prose.⁴ Poetic expression, as a unique melodious speech, makes not only a fruitful unity with music but is, whatsoever, inseparable from it. Particularly because music, in modern sense, is nothing but emphasized and transposed melody and rhythm, which are latently pres-

¹ Evgeny Gertsman, *Jazycheskie i khristianskie muzykalnye drevnosti*, “Lebedushka”, Sankt Petersburg, 2006, 452.

² Fritz Bose, *Etnomuzikologija*, Univerzitet umetnosti u Beogradu, Beograd 1989, 66.

³ Since we consider that creativity includes musical creativity, there is no need to add prefix (melo)poetics. All the forms of art, such as singing-poetics, dancing, playing..., once were a part of the art of the Muses, and therefore they are generally referred to as music.

⁴ Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy, *Voskresenie*, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, Tom 32, Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo “Hudozhestvennaya literatura”, Moscow 1936, 96.

ent in words and their pronunciation. The church poet or cantor testifies and manifests this new way of the existence, to which Christian belief gives meaning, by singing, i.e. by his voice and words, which are conceived and united in the most effective poetic and creative means of expression – *verse*.⁵ Verse is also important because words, which are not carefully chosen, can hardly be freely and by random put in or out of it. Hence, the words in verse receive additional sublime meaning and importance. However, the more the verse is sensitive to the chosen words, the greater width it gives to our imagination and is open to melody, because only melody can successfully and additionally enrich it. In that way the message of the verses is transferred from the profane into mystical and holy reality, and its memorisation and transmission becomes guaranteed, with no need even to be written down!

Although the voice symbolism does not come to the fore only in poetry, poetry is extremely important for us, first of all because the dynamic link of sound and meaning is realised in it.⁶ In addition, shaping liturgical poetic creativity, the poet first uses his knowledge as a result of his personal experience, the fruits of traditions and cultures in which he exists, and especially his feelings. Only with his feeling, the poet transcends himself and his being, since the meaning arises from the feelings, and in this case the meaning cannot be viewed on the basis of experience and opinions.

2.

Books of the Old Testament allow us an insight into the oldest Jewish poetic (and music) tradition. It is especially important to keep in mind the fact that the Jewish biblical heritage was first passed down orally. The only way which at that time allowed for the reliable transmission of collective memory was poetics – singing, based on *verse* and its irresistible meter and rhyme. Later when the Old Testament tradition was recorded, clerical letters (i.e. Old Testament books) appeared. Since their contents were only sang and not read, to this day the Old Testament books are available as written or printed entirely in verse.⁷ The translation the Old Testament books in Greek language enabled the expansion of Jewish culture, as well as the realization of synthesis with significant traditions that had hitherto existed separately.

Old Testament Scripture and tradition give us basic information about the history of the Jewish people, their life, culture and religion. Centuries of slavery enabled the Jews to learn and accept many civilizational achievements of the superior people of that time (Babylonians, Egyptians, etc). In the empires of tempting, developed, irresistibly appealing pluralism of every kind, which used to be called polytheism, the Jews managed to survive only thanks to the strong will and abstinence of the numerous offers of the developed world. Jews decided for one preferential meaning of life and for one goal. It is presented as a belief in *one God*, which gave them a sufficient basis to organize and become a *covenant nation*. For that reason they successfully resisted foreign influences, which were often devastating for many civilizations in history. Through their long history they were often without the metropolitan territory – the mother country, and

⁵ Verse (στίχος) means: row, furrow, series, combat line, jewelry, comb like, beautiful.

⁶ Roman Jakobson, *Lingvistika i poetika*, Nolit, Beograd 1966, 316.

⁷ Biblical books are still printed in verses, regardless of the fact that, due to the translation in foreign languages, the former verses have become ordinary, asymmetric and deformed short sections.

that destiny created in them a vital, unbreakable hope and expectation of their *Promised Land and kingdom*. In other words, the Jews never remembered their past without sadness and pain. For them, this memory was only realization of suffering, pain, exile, suffering, bondage, whip and death. That is why their existence was *looking ahead* to the future. The poems which most vividly represented their relationship with God, neighbors and the world can be found in the book of the Old Testament Hebrew Bible known as the תְּהִלִּים (*tehillim*), which means a book that contains hymns, i.e. canticles or praises.⁸ Although the authorship of these 150 poems was mainly attributed to King David, their real authors are mostly unknown.⁹ Each of these poems was called מִזְמֹר (*mizmor*) which in Hebrew language means: the song sung to the string instrument, usually the harp, that is, to the accompaniment of music.¹⁰ The root of the word מִזְמֹר (*mizmor*) is the verb זָמַר (*zamar*) which means *singing*.¹¹ It should be pointed out that the singing of these poems, commendable in their character, was not only accompanied by an instrument, but also by dancing. The technique of playing the string instruments implied the use of hands only, that is of the fingers, which enabled the artist to sing and even dance at the same time.¹² Of great importance in these songs is the use of a word which expressed a special way of celebrating and ascribing glory to the Lord הַלְלוּ־יָהּ (*hal^e lu-Jah*), from הלל (*halal*)¹³ which means: to praise, glorify, thank, show respect and admiration, celebrate the feast of the new Moon with dancing, to shine, learn, to be out of one's mind in ecstasy;¹⁴ and יהוה (*Yahweh*) which means: the Lord. In other words: exalt and glorify the Lord. This Hebrew word (*hal^e lu-Jah*), which expresses a kind of ecstasy, was not translated into Greek but remained an important marker that indicates the continuity of the Christian and Greek heritage to Jewish heritage: ἀλληλοῦσα. It presented a general exclamation of joy and celebration, especially during the Liturgy.

The Jewish tradition did not remain isolated but had the privilege to be fruitfully united with the Greek tradition. When the Seventy Apostles were translating the Hebrew Bible, they named the book, which contained the above mentioned 150 hymns, according to a Greek string instrument called Ψαλτήριον (*psalterion*).¹⁵ The verb ψάλλω

⁸ James Limburg, "Psalms Book of", in: *The Anchor Bible Dictionary* V, editor-in-chief David Noel Freedman, New York 1992, 523-536;

⁹ *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, second edition, Volume 14 Mel-Nas, Fred Skolnik, editor-in-chief; Michael Berenbaum, Thomson Gale, Detroit-New York-San Francisco-London 2007, 387.

¹⁰ James Limburg, "Psalms Book of", in: *The Anchor Bible Dictionary* V, editor-in-chief David Noel Freedman, New York 1992, 523-536.

¹¹ Marchand Ennery, *Dictionnaire hebreu-français*, Librairie colbo, Paris 1981, 58, 126.

¹² In the Serbian epic folk heritage (collective memory) there is still a perception, in which the one, called "guslar" (the gusle player), therefore the one who, when playing music on the instrument "gusle", at the same time *sings*. This type of performance is known as a *guslanje* (which involves singing), or *singing to the gusle* (which means playing the instrument gusle at the same time).

¹³ In the language of the Balkan peoples one still can hear the phrase "alal mu vera" ("well done"), which is the consequence of Semitic influence, originated most likely from the time of the rule of the Ottoman Empire.

¹⁴ Wilhelm Gesenius, *Hebräisches und Aramäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament*, in Verbindung mit Prof. Dr. H. Zimmern, Prof. Dr. W. Max Müller u. Prof. Dr. O. Weber, bearbeitet von Dr. Frants Buhl Professor an der Universität Kopenhagen, Unveränderter Neudruck der 1915 erschienenen 17. Auflage, Springer-Verlag, Berlin / Göttingen / Heidelberg 1962, 182.

¹⁵ Johan Lust, Erik Eynikel, Katrin Hauspie, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint*, Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, Stuttgart 2003, 1290.

(*psallō*) in ancient Greek tradition meant a way of playing: plucking the strings with the fingers, i.e. playing, but also singing to the accompaniment to this instrument. Therefore, the Hebrew Old Testament song מִזְמוֹר (*mizmor*) when translating into Greek was also named after the aforementioned Greek string instrument. This song has remained known as ψαλμός (*psalmos*), and the one who performed the *psalms*, i.e. sang and played them at the same time on the psaltirion was named ψάλτης (*psaltis*). The technique of playing the psaltirion was similar to that of the Jews, which meant that the player was able to play and sing at the same time. While in the early Church there were Judeochristians, the psaltirion was used during the early Christian worships. Later that name with the Greeks began to refer only to the Old Testament book of psalms. However, the former music playing, singing and playing the psaltirion, known as ψάλλω (*psallō*), became the term which today refers only to singing (interpretation of the existing) church liturgical poems, without instruments.¹⁶ Throughout the history, the psalms have more than any other book inspired many Christian writers and poets. These are the songs which often have a solemn character, glorifying God's help in some (historical) events or expressing gratitude for a good result which was attributed to the *Divine intervention*.

3.

The situation with the Greeks, unlike the one with the Jews, was completely opposite. Their mythology reveals most directly their understanding of the poetics and art. Namely, for the Greeks, the art was inseparable from the nymphs who were called Muses. Although each of the nine Muses was responsible for one artistic skill, the term *music* came from their name, which refers generally to all types of art. The Muses were the daughters of the supreme god Zeus. However, at this moment the role of their mother Μνημοσύνη (*Mnemosyne*) is more important. The identity of Muses is determined by the very meaning of the root of their mother's name (μνῆα, μνεῖα, ἡ μνήμη) which means: *memory, mentioning, memorial, remembrance, glory*.¹⁷ These meanings indisputably indicate that art, as an activity of Muses, was primarily based on the mentioning and consulting the heritage, i.e. the tradition that already exists and which roots naturally date back to history.¹⁸ This means that when creating (new) works of art, certain conditions were to be met, and they prescribed that the new work of art, in relation to the previous known ones, should contain minimum of similarities and also minimum of differences. Thus, the poetic form in particular is found with the Greeks, and is especially based on the *memory* to some meritorious person, his work, accomplishment or sacrifice, which is why he was worthy of being *praised*. This poetic form is better known as ὕμνος – *hymnos* – *hymn*.¹⁹ The most sublime artistic dignity belonged to that poet who, in a moment of inspiration, was able to create the new hymn or song of some other kind. Creating a hymn did not mean that it necessarily should be sung in today's terms. It could be just pronounced artistically. However, since proper pronunciation implies the use of proper and precise stress (diction), this means that the elements of music were inseparable from poetry.

¹⁶ Δημήτριος Δρίτσας, Δημήτριος Μπαλιάτσας, Δημήτριος Καραμάτσκος, *Λεξικό πρωτοχριστιανικῶν βυζαντινῶν καὶ νεότερων ὀρθοδόξων ὁρῶν*, Ἑννοια ἐκδοσεῖς, Αθήναι 2005, 360.

¹⁷ Henry George Lidell, Robert Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996, 1139.

¹⁸ Evgeny Gertsman, *Jazycheskie i khristianskie muzykalnye drevnosti*, 25.

¹⁹ Henry George Lidell, Robert Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 1849.

Therefore, to sing primarily meant to create verses (poems) and pronounce them at the same time vocally or musically. Since the music, more or less, latently exists in speech, it cannot remain as such in poetry at this level. Poetry gets its fullness when its potential and latent music evolves into a real one. This process bearing the meaning of *poetry* (ποίησις – *poiesis*) better known as: creation; bringing to concrete existence; creation from nothing, as it were.²⁰

The meeting of the Jewish and Greek traditions led to constructive achievements only with the advent of Christianity. The Greeks upgraded their own artistic creations, based on memory, with the utterly opposite Jewish indication which was directed towards the future. Among many types of poetry and poetic forms, psalms and hymns are for Christians the most important. The starting point of memory, as the basic precondition for artistic creation, was these events that occurred most rarely. The key events in a person's life are birth and death. However, a man could not remember his own birth and death, but he could remember the death of his ancestors (and the birth of his offspring). By its nature, the human ability to remember always directs us to the "other". Also, speaking about the personal experience of love and marriage, as the event that a man remembers all his life with happiness, it is again the relationship with the "other". So remembering his ancestors the man confirmed another man, but also himself by committing his offspring to do the same. Therefore, the memory conditioned both man's creative potential and his sense of responsibility and morality.²¹ In the aforementioned poetic genre, which was based on memory (hymn), the (melo)poetic creativity and creative inspiration was most properly manifested. Therefore, hymns could not have its strictly prescribed form or content. The hymn was ecstatic, euphoric pronunciation of commendable verses. It could be pronounced, but also sung. The early Christian period is remembered because Christians of the time created many hymns modeled after the ancient tradition. The main condition for the creation of new hymns was the inspiration imbued with the meaning of existence in which Christianity in the first centuries did not lack. Creating new hymns was the best way to build a new Christian tradition. Each hymn (with its poetic means) initiated the memory of the past times, which as the cult of effective speech was very valuable in transmitting and spreading the Christian way of existence and experience.

However, since the Christian tradition eventually became more extensive, the need for writing it down became more prominent. Therefore, the poetic freedom and improvisation gradually became undesirable. The Church soon began to insist that the new poems should be based on accurate and approved Christian tradition, which became increasingly transposed into written form and *prescribed*. First, the New Testament of the Holy Bible was censored and declared canonical, while its numerous other (more free) variants were considered apocryphal. In these new conditions, the hymns were the first among liturgical songs to suffer the consequences of this. Since they were most often based on free paraphrases and not on the words of the Holy Scripture alone, "there was an orthodox reaction against them in the middle of the third century".²² Only certain

²⁰ *Ibidem*, 1429.

²¹ Andrey Tarkovsky, *Sculpting in time*, University of Texas Press, Austin 1998, 58.

²² Egon Wellesz, *A history of byzantine music and hymnography*, Second edition revised and enlarged, At the clarendon press, Oxford 1998, 40.

hymns that were in the Holy Scriptures survived this time, then those that were based strictly on tradition, or those which were created by an indisputable authority (a Byzantine emperor or a Patriarch).

Regardless of such ecclesiastical and administrative censorship of hymns, the liturgical and Eucharistic assembly proved to be the most appropriate community based on memory. It was based on the form of the Last Supper that the Christians upgraded by combining Jewish synagogal assembly with the ancient tragic experience and oriental poetic tradition of singing out loud. Therefore, during the service of the Liturgy remembrance is mentioned several times.²³ However, although it is based on memory, the Liturgy has never been a mere reconstruction of the past, but primarily the construction of the future based on the (free) dialogue with the “other”, that is, the assembled people. Only in the community, as well as in the theater, the collective memory could get its form, place, depth and meaning.²⁴ Without the sense of catholicity we can hardly say that the liturgical rite reaches its reality.

4.

The earliest forms of Liturgical synaxis are formed in the apostolic epoch and handed down orally, as well as the Christianity itself, which spread through the Universe. In IV century, when this tradition was written down, different texts appeared revealing the existence of different variants of the Liturgy. Although most often they were the result of an unbalanced extending or shortening, they remained in essence faithful to the original core.²⁵ Because of its brevity and the balance between content and form, words and action, the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom has become the most common ceremony of this kind in the liturgical use in the Church. The main event in the liturgical rite is offering the sacrifice, which is, modeled after the ancient tragedy, accompanied by appropriate prayers and (sung) hymns. The tragedy is an experience built on the basis of the inevitable conflict between human consciousness and the desire for freedom and dignity of his godlike being, with the inevitable necessity – the fate. Therefore, Orthodox Christianity preserves in itself the memory of the tragedy, because (Orthodoxy) was created and is constantly being created by the continuous *overcoming* of the tragic experience.

In the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom we find in many forms and in many places the call to remember, either in prayers or in the singing of the choir – the people.

The call to remember in the form of hymn we find for the first time in the prayer which precedes the Trisagion Hymn (Thrice-holy Hymn): “O Holy God, who restand in Thy Holy Place: who art *hymned* (ἁνυμνούμενος) by the Seraphim with a *thrice-holy* cry... O Master, accept even from the mouths of us sinners the Hymn of the Trisagion (ὑμνον)...” After the prayer, the choir sings: “*Holy God...*”

Transferring the offering from the Table of Oblation to the Altar Table is performed during the “Great Entrance” (arrival). This action is accompanied by singing the “Cherubimic Hymn”, which was allegedly created in the sixth century in the Byzantine Em-

²³ It is necessary to bear in mind that the early Christian Liturgy was served on the basis of memory, inspiration and improvisation. In contrast to this, today Liturgy is served from appropriate books (based on texts), which means that in its form and content the Liturgy has become strictly formal and established worship.

²⁴ Hans Thies Lehmann, *Postdramatisches Theater*, Frankfurt am Main 1999, 346.

²⁵ Ιωάννου Φουντούλη, *Λειτουργική Α' – Εἰσαγωγή στή Θεία λατρεία*, Θεσσαλονίκη 1993, 183-186.

pire during the reign of Justin II.²⁶ In its verses the faithful proclaim that they are called to praise God in “Thrice-holy Hymn”: “We who mystically represent the Cherubim and sing to the life-giving Trinity the *Thrice-holy Hymn* (τρισάγιον ὕμνον προσάδοντες), let us now lay aside all earthly care...” The words “sing to the life-giving Trinity the *Thrice-holy Hymn*” do not refer to the *Thrice-holy Hymn* (*Holy God...*), but to the biblical: *Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord of Sabaoth...* which is to be sung a little later. The Great Entrance may represent the last appearing of Christ before He sacrificed Himself for us.

What follow is the main and the most important liturgical prayer anaphora (offering of the gifts), which has dialogic character: “*It is proper and just to hymn (ὕμνεῖν) Thee, to bless Thee, to praise Thee, to give thanks unto Thee, and to worship Thee...*” Due to the content of this prayer the liturgical congregation is known as thanksgiving – the *Eucharist*. Since in this part of the ceremony the thanksgiving is based on the singing of hymns, this service is therefore known as the *Liturgical* or *Eucharistic celebration*.

The singing of victory hymns (τὸν ἐπινίκιον) is a part of the ancient tradition. That kind of hymn was connected with the thanksgiving for the successful military and defense campaigns. In the Liturgy it refers to the Christian triumph in the eschatological perspective: “*Singing the Triumphal Hymn* (Τὸν ἐπινίκιον ὕμνον ἄδοντα), shouting, proclaiming, and saying”. The laity responds to the invitation by singing Jewish Old Testament song that is attributed to the angels: *Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord Sabaoth...*, thus ascribing the glory and gratitude to God. As if the presence of memory in the Liturgy becomes more intense, since the one leading the congregation (the priest) at every Liturgy has the duty to remind the people, by his actions and words, more specifically of the saving commandments, of everything that happened and what will happen for us: “Having in remembrance (Μεμνημένοι), therefore, this commandment of salvation...” This invitation refers to the fact that God deserves much more than just the mere bloodless offering, gift. And what occurs after the offering is a hymn which says that we sing (to) God: “We praise Thee (Σὲ ὑμνοῦμεν), we bless Thee, we give thanks to Thee, O Lord, and we pray to Thee, O our God”. By chanting (reciting) the lyrics of this song we pledge to sing the hymn, panegyric to God – that is to praise Him in hymns. Although a hymn is not based on dialogue, while singing *We praise Thee...*, it becomes a dialogic response that introduces the gathered believers (the Church) into the singing of a hymn. Unlike the epic narrative which through hymns reveals the collective emotional state, the liturgical dialogue states the will and initiatives of men. The Liturgy, as a specific form of drama, becomes the poetry of will, of conscious volitional effort, which affirms the man as the conscious executioner of volitional decisions. After the gifts are offered, the people as a congregation are call to express gratitude with one mouth and one heart, to glorify and “praise (ἄνυμνεῖν) Thine all-honorable and majestic name...” There is another mentioning of hymn at the last giving thanks to the Lord. Here the faithful are called to recognize and celebrate the risen Christ in the Liturgy. The priest addresses to Christ in the name of the faithful saying: “... we praise (ὕμνοῦμεν) and glorify Thy holy resurrection...”, and then he calls the people: “Blessing the Lord always, let us praise (ὕμνοῦμεν) His resurrection...”

From the aforesaid we see that the nouns *hymn* and the verb derived from it have been most frequently used in the Liturgy. Namely, Christians are always called (especial-

²⁶ Zoran Ranković, “Pashalna heruvimska pesma u srpskoslovenskom prevodu”, *Arheografski prilozi* 29-30, Beograd 2007-2008, 267-271.

ly in the Liturgy) to create new hymns, poems. Thanks to responding to this call, a number of liturgical songs have been created in the course of history. Many of them did not survive different censorship, and those that gained popularity (appreciation of the liturgical communion) were later found in the liturgical books through which they are available to us, as well.

The understanding of poetics is burdened by what it never was in the past. If it had been, it would not be called poetics. Writing hymns caused the emergence of the term *hymnography* which is today unfortunately identified with poetic creation, wrongly believing that literacy and writing are an indispensable condition for poetic creativity. Following the example of the Greeks, who were not fond of poets and muses only because the emergence of poetry was not subject to rational proof or to thought-check, prose became the preferred form. Both poetry and prose occur in the language. Regardless of the fact that poetry was “bottomless and polysemic”²⁷, prose has set the norms that were based on the possibility that the grammar of the language could grow into the logic of thinking. It was in this victory of prose that philosophy recognized itself. However, the victory of prose and philosophy over the poetics has led to the current identification of the Truth with the truth of one media, i.e. the media of a prose *tangible* sentence.²⁸ Therefore, today we seek the Truth, sense, essence and the meaning of church chanting in old music manuscripts or in inaccessible and lost old tonal bases. But we overlook the fact that the music notation (even the mere newly discovered ones), and our memory of the ancient tonal basis are just the media which we cannot identify with the truth. We can find the truth and the meaning of church chanting, as a kind of poetic creations, in the poetics itself and in the singing/chanting as a creative process based on improvisation and not just on the process of constant and elusive interpretation! It is evident in the Liturgy as the only worship, which in its entirety, is based not only on memory and singing, but also on poetic imperative. Therefore, its primary goal is not only in a sung prayer, but also in the inspiring, unique, new and creative (melo)poetical creation, during which the meaning of man’s creative (poetic) existence becomes prominent which enables him to affirm himself as a (unique) personality.

²⁷ Bogoljub Šijaković, *Mit i filosofija* (Ontološki potencijal mita i početak helenske filosofije), Institut za teološka istraživanja PBF, Beograd 2012, 94.

²⁸ Sead Alić, “Čemu filozofija / ako nije filozofija medija”, *Kultura*, Beograd 2011, 26–41, 27.

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Pastoral Psychology in Greece: The case of Professor Ioannis Kornarakis

*Abstract*¹: I have decided to write this paper for the late Professor Ioannis Kornarakis² mainly for two reasons: (1) Professor Kornarakis was the first to attempt an interdisciplinary preoccupation between the branch of Patristics and Modern Psychology; (2) Because he worked on this interdisciplinary perspective with innovation and creativity. For Professor Kornarakis's work what is worth to be mentioned, above all, is that it was a struggle and an effort towards an unusual project: that of seeing the writings of the Church Fathers and of Scriptures in ways which could be relevant to modern human problematism so that a fruitful understanding to be attained, as to what we can do with them on a personal, interpersonal and social level. Though Professor Kornarakis did not use the empirical method in his scientific research - *observation-hypothesis-experiment-support, or refutation, of ideas tested-replication of the study conducted*, etc. - he came across very important insights as to the human condition, that even today can elicit discussions as to the salience of his endeavours for modern pastoral psychologists.

In this theoretical paper, what I am doing is to refer to Professor Kornarakis's work historically and systematically. Historically, in terms of the development of it, since its inception, in the theological literature; systematically, in terms of the presentation of it in relation to the main ideas this was based upon. The historical preoccupation with Kornarakis's work is being exhausted in the realm of an interview I conducted of him, when I was collecting information relevant to what he wrote, discussed and envisaged as to the association between Patristics and Psychology. The systematic preoccupation with Kornarakis's work refers to the content and context his works were conceptualized and composed.

Through both these perspectives -the historical and the systematic- Kornarakis's work is actually put in the framework it belongs to, which is that of the theoretical foundations needed for the construction of a mode of thought in the pastoral understanding of the writings of the Fathers, and those of the Bible, in relation to what modern psychology studies in detail. Kornarakis's work can be exhausted in terms of its chronological framework; however, it can also appear inexhaustible as to the kind of contingencies one can find in it, which are both situation-driven and hermeneutically-specific. Situation-driven, for they refer to events the modern man is bothered by; hermeneutically-specific, for they refer to issues, the exegesis of which can help the modern man's condition to be improved.

Keywords: Pastoral psychology, psychologismus, archetypes, psychological types, sin, individualization, enantiodromy, refinement

¹ I dedicate this paper as a tribute to the late Professor Emeritus Ioannis Kornarakis, by whom I was inspired to start working on issues of human fallenness and integration in an interdisciplinary research and focus between the Anthropology of the Orthodox Church -Old & New Testament and the writings of the Church Fathers- and Modern Psychology.

² In the Appendix, the reader can find in Greek the letter of acceptance Prof. Kornarakis posted to me with regards to the questionnaire I asked him to reply related to his life and works.

I. Introduction



In the past decades there has emerged in Greece a new branch in Patristics, called Ποιμαντική Ψυχολογία (Pastoral Psychology). This branch investigates the writings of the Church Fathers -particularly, those of the ascetic tradition- by articulating the anthropological elements sustaining their teaching. Pastoral psychology aims to reveal the psychological patterns of Fathers' anthropology, whereas looks forward to applying them in everyday life. The framework in which pastoral psychology operates, deals with

interdisciplinary approaches between pastoral theology and modern psychology, as well as with comparisons of convergence and divergence taken place within the scientific realm both topics represent and are aspired by.

II. Main Part

II.1 Professor Ioannis Kornarakis: A short biography

The person who coined the term 'pastoral psychology' in Greek was Professor Ioannis Kornarakis. Ioannis Kornarakis was born in Piraeus-Attiki/Greece in 1926. After he graduated from high school he attended the Kapodistrian University of Athens where he studied theology. By the time he was a student, he was attracted to depth psychology. He studied various schools and became familiar with many of its prominent representative figures: *Sigmund Freud*, *Carl Gustav Jung*, *Alfred Adler*, *Erich Fromm*, to name but a few. In 1954 he gained a scholarship for a year and went to *Innsbruck* in *Austria* where he attended a course taught by Professor *Urban* at the *University Psychiatric Clinic*. There, he became familiar with the *Rohrschachtesten*³ diagnostic techniques. After *Innsbruck*, he attended another course at the *University of Straßburg-France* titled *Pedagogy Issues and Patristics*. In 1959-60 he attended a course on *Pastoral Psychology* at the *Marienthal Mental Hospital* of the *University of Münster* in *Germany*. At this hospital he worked on *patients' observation (shadowing)* under the supervision of the *Professors Dr Nisters* and *Dr Heinen*. From 1955 to 1958 he was appointed lecturer for Orthodox Theology at the Church School of the Island of Patmos/Greece.

After Patmos, in 1960, he enrolled as a postgraduate student in the department of theology in Athens, where he worked on his doctoral thesis titled: *The experience of*

³ This test has been characterised as the *grandfather of all projective tests*. It has been designed and developed by the Swiss psychiatrist *Hermann Rohrschach (1884-1922)*. Fundamental principle of that test is considered to be the following idea: a structured interview using a series of ten standardised, bilaterally symmetrical inkblots. Five of the blots are chromatic, two have some colour and the other three are in various colours. Each blot is presented to the subject (participant), who is requested to state freely what he, or she, sees either in the blot as a whole, or in any part of it. The objective of that is to be taken out responses, with reference to the colour, which reflect the emotional responsiveness of the subject on the environment. Also, there are taken into account any form and location responses as indices of overall orientation to life. Also, movement responses are assumed to reflect tendencies towards introversion. This test asks for originality in observation among clients. It is believed that it reflects intelligence which sometimes may be investigated as indicative to neurotic attitudes and distorted experiences. Comp. *Arthur S. Reber's, Dictionary of Psychology*, Penguin Books, London, 1985, p. 652.

*pathos according to the Scriptures: Contribution to pastoral psychology*⁴. In 1966, he wrote a treatise titled: *Neurosis as Adamian Complex*⁵ and was appointed senior lecturer at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. Dr Kornarakis had taught the discipline of pastoral psychology at the department of theology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki between 1967 and 1978. In 1978 he was elected Professor in the branch of Patristics of the department of theology at the Kapodistrian University of Athens, where from he retired in 1993. Professor Kornarakis had taught pastoral psychology at the University of Athens for more than thirty years. After his retirement, he continued to work on pastoral psychology and further advanced the experience he acquired both from Fathers' literature and Modern Psychology.

II.2 Kornarakis and the Church Fathers

Professor Kornarakis studied the ascetic fathers in a different way. He thought of their anthropology as a topic that should be seen under an innovative perspective, which then far hadn't been examined. His understanding of their anthropology was meant to create new foundations in orthodox theology. Before Kornarakis, the anthropology of the ascetic fathers used to be approached in one-dimensional way; that is to say, in a way purely patristic. Kornarakis deviated this method of approach and he sought other levels of investigating ascetic fathers' writings. He examined their anthropology by attempting to discover the psychological issues being latent in their works, which could be able to subscribe to the modern world a contemporary humane contribution. The anthropology of ascetic fathers contained for Kornarakis concepts deeply intuitive, that if properly elaborated, can provide the modern man with sufficient answers to his questions. Dr Kornarakis proceeded on that course and what he discovered in the psychology of neptic (ascetic) fathers was that the issues from which they began to form their anthropology were ideas concerning one's alienation from God and from others. For Kornarakis, the psychological basis upon which their ideas were formed was of a framework related with one's estrangement of oneself. In ascetic fathers, the aspect that attracted Kornarakis to consider their anthropology, as being maintained upon psychological interests, was the aspect of self-love. That was something that constituted psychological ideas of a chief importance. What indeed Kornarakis found out was that the notion of self-love was a concept containing a manifold of other psycho-compulsive phenomena, which were either deriving from, or aiming at this passion itself.

For Kornarakis, the ascetic fathers' writings were particularly psychological works. They talk about the inner self of man and how can be afflicted by disturbing experiences imposing upon one's psychosomatic realm. Dr Kornarakis in working on the ascetic fathers contemplated that their teaching was an incentive point for the modern man to tackle modern anthropological features through past psychological patterns. Kornarakis's preoccupation with the fathers commenced in 1958 when he published his work on *Saint Isidor of Pelusium*, titled as: *The pastoral psychology in the epistles of St Isidor of Pelusium*⁶. Professor Kornarakis studied the writings of the fathers in a very

⁴ Η βίωσις τοῦ πάθους κατὰ τὴν διδασκαλίαν τῆς Ἀγίας Γραφῆς: Συμβολή εἰς τὴν Ποιμαντικὴν ψυχολογίαν.

⁵ Η νεύρωσις ὡς ἀδαμικὸν πλέγμα.

⁶ Η ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς Ἰσιδώρου τοῦ Πηλουσιώτου περιεχομένη Ποιμαντικὴ Ψυχολογία.

thorough way. In all his works, there are references concerning various matters of their anthropology, which he scrutinised under the perspective and objective of pastoral psychology. We could briefly mention some of Dr Kornarakis's works that preoccupy with thematic material similar to the above presentation of his involvement with the fathers. In 1959, he worked on *St Gregory of Nyssa* and wrote an article titled: *St Gregory of Nyssa's Canonical Epistle to Letoius, seen under a pastoro-psychological perspective*⁷. He continued his preoccupation with the fathers by working on *Philokalia* and by publishing his work: *Elements on Neptic Psychology*⁸ in 1963. In 1979 he published a work on *St John of Sinai* under the title: *The crisis of identity, according to St John of Sinai*⁹. After 1979, and indeed in 1980, he published another work on the fathers, and in particular on St Makarius the Egyptian, which had the title: *Intellect "in the grave"*¹⁰. In 1981, he published a work on *St Nilus the Ascetic* with the title: *St Nilus's psychological viewpoints under the prism of modern aspects*¹¹. Ten years later, in 1991, he published a work on *St Photius*, Patriarch of Constantinople, titled as: *The psychological argument in the interpretative method of Holy Photius*¹².

II.3 Kornarakis's starting-points with psychology

Dr Kornarakis's first encounter with modern psychology was back in 1957, when he studied a writing by Professor *Spyros Kaliafas*, that brought the title: *Depth Psychology*¹³. In that book, he became familiar with Jung's idea of the Unconscious. Kornarakis attempted to approach in modern psychology the various concepts and notions regarding the *inner self of man*. Concepts, such as *ideal self*, *instinct theory*, *introjection*, *projection*, *inflation*, *transformation*, were among his preferences, for to understand in elaborate ways what psychology wishes to investigate and clarify in the modern world as far as the betterment of man's psychological situations are concerned. However, though he was studying modern psychology, he did not forget that the point of view through, he was willing to approach, was that of a lay-theologian's and not of a psychologist's. Dr Kornarakis thought of psychology as an honest humane attempt of the 20th century that may bring about a culmination to modern human psycho-spiritual disorders -unlike the fact that sometimes they emerge being as impervious as insoluble- as well as submitting fruitful suggestions towards a better investigation of one's problems, whilst recommending methods towards a fair facing of them. Dr Kornarakis understood that all modern psychological ideas constitute conceptual starting-points aiming at seeking balancing factors against the turmoils of man. He took into account that all psychological ideas have been developed in accordance with what their representative founders were struggling for -in themselves- or, otherwise speaking -in accordance with what they were obsessed about, or tormented by, when they were examining themselves. For Dr Kornarakis all modern psychological concepts reflect at one another. They are interlinked and dependent upon themselves. They

⁷ Ἡ πρὸς Λητόϊου κανονικὴ ἐπιστολὴ Γρηγορίου τοῦ Νύσσης ἐξ ἐπόψεως Ποιμαντικῆς Ψυχολογίας.

⁸ Στοιχεῖα Νηπτικῆς Ψυχολογίας.

⁹ Ἡ κρίση ταυτότητος κατὰ τὸν ὅσιον Ἰωάννην τὸν Σιναΐτην.

¹⁰ Νοῦς ἐν τάφῳ.

¹¹ Νεΐλου τοῦ Ἀσκητοῦ ψυχολογικὲς προοπτικὲς ὑπὸ τὸ πρῖσμα σύγχρονων γνώσεων.

¹² Τὸ ψυχολογικὸν ἐπιχείρημα εἰς τὴν ἐρμηνευτικὴν μέθοδον τοῦ ἱεροῦ Φωτίου.

¹³ Ψυχολογία τοῦ Βάθους.


express relatedly alike notions that spend efforts towards relieving one from imperfect psychological conditions, which prove problematic and difficult to be treated. That was the inceptive framework in his thought and thus he aimed to acquire the knowledge provided by psychology, without being enmeshed in notional cul-de-sacs. In line to the latter, he was discussing every psychological concept having considerable scientific interest and important anthropological interpretations to patristic issues.

Dr Kornarakis investigated modern psychology in order to tackle aspects that could be able to facilitate his effort towards establishing the topic of pastoral psychology on ideas, that, if were to be seen under a theological point of view, and in this case, under an ascetic anthropological perspective, to be adequately applied to concepts that are suggested by modern psychology, so to construct an interrelating interface among these two disciplines. He therefore began his research accordingly, and indeed without being influenced by preconceived ideas of any overlapping convergence or divergence, but instead, his intention was to scrutinize both disciplines accurately. On the other hand, he did not also consider that psychology offers ready-made solutions against disturbances, the modern man is immensely haunted by, but aspects that are able to provide one with sufficient knowledge regarding oneself. For Kornarakis, pastoral psychology was interlinked to depth psychology by drawing useful material from it, and by studying in a modern way the reasons and motives of man's behavioural grounds. Through this way, Kornarakis maintained that pastoral psychology was interested in becoming aware of man's behavioural motivation in order that to properly guide oneself out of one's personal distortions¹⁴. For Kornarakis, there exists a very serious obstacle to the work of psychology. It operates against its efforts and it is considered as a from-within inability that hampers psychology from being efficiently advanced. This inability was termed by Dr Kornarakis as *ψυχολογιαρχία* (*psychologismus*). By this, he meant that modern psychology in order to reinstate itself, it presents its principles as *absolute outlets* and *vendors* that support and harmonize one with oneself, on the one hand, whilst on the other, it wishes to be regarded as an *over-valuable effort* that functions as a foundation to every science¹⁵. *Psychologismus* obstructs psychology from its perspectives whereas sometimes entraps its concepts from providing proper resolutions against the man's psychological problems. Dr Kornarakis by discussing the aspect of *psychologismus* in his writings, wondered whether psychology is advantageously benefited by its *spreading-out* to other scientific grounds and notions, or not. If this aspect is meant to operate as a widening effort towards other investigative interpretations, then psychology involves itself in fields, the boundaries of which are difficult to be scanned, or be left un-intruded from false and pointless analyses. If this is *achieved*, psychology complicates its work to help humans and renders itself responsible before their very needs, for it *animates* things and concepts harbouring imbalance and disorientation over the man's weaknesses. Accordingly, any *progress*, or forwarding of the course of psychology entails the attachment of personality into patterns, the features of which do not assist towards an effacement of the experiences that really impose upon oneself and afflict one's attempted restoration.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

¹⁵ As to this aspect, we compare the interpretation provided by *Friedrich Dorsch* in his dictionary on Psychology: *Psychologisches Wörterbuch*, *Hans Huber Publications*, Kösel-Kempten 1987, p. 529.

II.4 Kornarakis and Jung



Kornarakis during his stay in Patmos studied all works by Carl Gustav Jung. He liked studying Jung and the concepts he discovered considerably influenced him and the development of his thought on patristic matters. Concepts like the *Unbewußte* (*Unconscious*), the *Selbst* (*Self*), and the *Compositio Oppositorum*, or *Enantiodromie* (*Enantiodromy* or *Convergence of Opposites*) were some of the aspects he went through and investigated during his career. Dr Kornarakis in his research on modern psychology, discovered that Jung appears being a distinctive psychoanalyst whose work on man reveals aspects of man's personality that had been insufficiently examined, or have never been approached before. Such aspects were mentioned by

Dr Kornarakis the Jungian *Unconscious*, the *psychological types or forms*, the *existing psychological character of male (animus) and female psyche (anima) in man*, the character of the *oppositional composition (composition oppositorium)* and the concept of *archetypes*. Kornarakis by studying Jung came to the conclusion that his ideas on man demonstrate a constructive practical value, which might well be applied to the pastoral work of the Church. Dr Kornarakis became impressed by Jung's work by the time he came across a phrase saying: "People nowadays prefer visiting the soul-doctor than the soul-carer (*Heutzutage gehen die Leute zum Seelenarzt, anstatt zum Seelsorger*)"¹⁶. This phrase was regarded as a key-point for him. He started occupying with Jung's work and examining his ideas on matters concerning the topic of pastoral psychology. He also discovered in Jung's writings, aspects concerning innovative approaches in relation to what psychology is, or what ought be. Dr Kornarakis considered Jung not only as a psychoanalyst, but also as someone whose aim was to unveil the shakable foundations upon which the various schools of psychology had established their theories. Jung's conviction that the various psychology schools had caused an inevitable chaos to psychology itself, to the effect not to be regarded as efficient as they should be, attracted Kornarakis's attention on what the Jungian psychological *Weltanschauung* was preoccupied with¹⁷.

In 1956, Kornarakis wrote his first work, titled: *The problem to the relationship between pastoral care and psychotherapy under an orthodox viewpoint*. In 1958, he published his first work on him under the title: *C. G. Jung's psychological contribution to pastoral psychology*¹⁸. In this work, Kornarakis, first mentions the need of creating a new

¹⁶ Die Beziehungen der Psychotherapie zur Seelsorge, Zürich, Leipzig, Stuttgart 1932, p. 11. Comp. Τό πρόβλημα τῶν σχέσεων ποιμαντικῆς φροντίδος καὶ ψυχοθεραπείας ἐξ ἐπόψεως ὀρθοδόξου, Πάτμος 1956, reprinted by Kyriakidis Bros, Thessaloniki 1986, p. 5.

¹⁷ C. G. Jung, *Das symbolische Leben*, Freiburg im Breisgau, reprinted in 1981, p. 143.

¹⁸ Ἡ συμβολὴ τῆς ψυχολογίας τοῦ Κάρλ Γκούσταβ Γιούνγκ ἐν τῇ ποιμαντικῇ ψυχολογίᾳ. Other works that discuss Jung's contribution to pastoral and psychological issues, were Kornarakis's writings:

a. *Ekklesia Journal*: Religion and Psychotherapy in Austria, (Opinions on Jung by Alfred Niedermeyer), Nos. 22-24, p. 351, edited on 20.12.1955.

b. *Ekklesia Journal*: The interpretation of the Unconscious by Jung, Nos 1-2, 15-1-1955, p. 24.

c. The problem to the relationship between pastoral care and psychotherapy under an orthodox viewpoint

branch in theology that should be able of relating the disciplines of theology and psychology to an extent of an apt preoccupation of them, whilst he termed this new topic as *ποιμαντική ψυχολογία*¹⁹. In addition, he also mentions that should be very useful if theology could discuss the effort that psychology spends towards the discovery and resolution of an individual's many psychological problems and disturbances, so an endeavour of proper applications to appear which will help the work of theology to attaining acceptance in the modern world²⁰. Dr Kornarakis explored in that work various concepts of Jungian psychology and he aimed at unveiling the ideas being hidden in Jung's theory. He, therefore, discussed the concept of the *Unconscious* (*das Unbewußte*) and how is this developed in Jung's thought. He stressed that this idea defines and deepens the theory of Jung on man's inner reality, whilst it is also connected to all other aspects that operate as prerequisites, or as consequences of it. Dr Kornarakis investigated the unconscious as an actual experience and attitude, whereas he reckoned that it conditions the functioning and development of all repressed procedures as a determinative leading factor.

The unconscious derives from personal, or collective experiences. The psychological contents of the personal unconscious are acquisitions of one's individuality, or factors which under a given chance can render themselves conscious. It is not easy, though, for someone to distinguish the boundaries between the personal and the collective unconscious. The reason is because many times the personal unconscious is engendered by the collective one. According to Jung, psychological contents, such as the dreams can be examined as patterns of the collective unconscious that, occasionally provided, may be manifested either as symbols, or as incompatible psychological elements to what an individual considers as reality. In this cohesion, Dr Kornarakis conceived a distinction between personal and collective unconscious, involving one to the field work of the other, by maintaining that there are factors afflicting the inner world of the man and resulting to experiences of instinctual manifestations, to an extent of imposing upon both the personal and collective unconscious. These factors establish accordingly within one's psychic apparatus accomplished facts of unconscious content, which do not assist one's person-

-ibid- pp. 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 34.

d. The experience of *Pathos* according to the teaching of Holy Scriptures. Contribution to pastoral psychology -also mentioned above- pp. 10, 60.

e. Τό πρόβλημα της ψυχολογικής ποικιλίας των τύπων και ἡ ὑπὸ τὸ πρῖσμα αὐτοῦ θεώρησις τοῦ ἔργου τῆς χριστιανικῆς ἀγωγῆς. (The problem of the psychological variety of forms under the prism of Christian education), Thessaloniki 1963, pp. 6, 8 (note 10), 9 (note 13), 11, 13, 14, 16, 20, 23-26 (C. G. Jung's typology), 39, 40.

f. Ἡ θρησκευτικὴ λειτουργία τοῦ Ἐγὼ (The religious function of Ego), Thessaloniki 1963, pp. 32 (note 19), 47 (enantiodromy), 48 (note 21), 54, 58, 59 (notes 18, 19, 21), 63 (note 25), 71.

g. Ψυχολογικὴ θεώρησις τοῦ χριστιανικοῦ παιδαγωγικοῦ ιδεώδους (Psychological investigation of the Christian pedagogic ideal), Thessaloniki 1964, pp. 11, 12, 19, 20, 41.

h. Neurosis as Adamian Complex -mentioned above- pp. 16ff (neurosis according to Jung), 34-39, 41, 48, 54, 58, 63-66, 69-72, 74, 78, 80, 84, 89, 90.

i. Ἡ ἐπίδρασις τοῦ θρησκευτικοῦ συμβόλου ἐπὶ τῆς προσωπικότητος τοῦ ἐφήβου. Μεθοδικὴ θρησκευτολογικὴ ἔρευνα ἐπὶ ἐφήβων μαθητῶν (The influence of the religious symbol to adolescents' personality. A methodical religious psychological research on adolescent pupils), Thessaloniki 1968, pp. 6ff (The Jung's 'symbol theory'), 13.

k. Διάγραμμα τοῦ μεθοδολογικοῦ προβλήματος τῆς θρησκευτοψυχολογικῆς ἐρεῖνης. Ἡ μεθοδικὴ ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἀποκαλυπτικοῦ ψυχολογικοῦ τύπου (A diagram on the methodological problem of the religious-methodological research. The methodological principle of the *apocalyptic psychological type*), pp. 152, 154.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 8.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 12.

ality towards a fruitful development. The unconscious is experienced in man as a bipolar manifestation. It is expressed either as a complementary, or as a compensating factor to non-realised actions. Likely, it functions independently and affects one's psychospiritual realm. For Kornarakis, the unconscious can be experienced also through imaginations and sexual desires. The unconscious draws its starting-points from repulsive experiences that have been stored in the psychic apparatus of man. These experiences may vary in counteraction, but are considered as strong as turbulent when come onto the surface of consciousness. The unconscious is related to many psychologically morbid factors that are as much disturbing as conflicting. Dr Kornarakis considered that Jung's concept of the unconscious offers to pastoral psychology important elements. Above all, it functions as the *entrance door* to the secret behaviour and motives of man²¹. It provides pastoral psychology with the flexibility to interpreting in a systematic way the impetus of the soul's malfunction. Pastoral psychology discovers in Jung's interpretation of the unconscious that there exist un-approached psychological factors upon which are based various dysfunctioning experiences of the inner man, creating thus many fundamental psychological disturbances and affecting the man's inner and outer profile irretrievably²². For Dr Kornarakis, the aspect of the unconscious is closely associated to man's moral life. It leads towards a fair criticism of the mischief the modern man is entangled by through explaining in an utter way one's actions and their moral profiling. In other words, the unconscious is presented by Kornarakis's interpretation to Jung's equivalent definition as a reality demonstrating moral presuppositions. Accordingly, the unconscious acquires a psychological morality in man, because it expresses ethical weaknesses that have been already carried out from past moral omissions, which influenced the inner life of man to an extent of creating, or renewing, experiences deriving from unconscious circumstances, thereby operating as repressed tendencies. At this point, Kornarakis stresses the argument that by employing Jung's theory of the unconscious, a pastoral psychologist or priest, attains a better understanding on various neurotic expressions, the unconscious foundations of which are deeply repressed, whilst becoming capable towards counseling people that require careful and constructive treatment²³.

An aspect really important for the development and fixation of the unconscious in man's life is for Dr Kornarakis the character of sin. The character of sin, according to him, should be considered as a drive ensuing from unconscious conditions and images. It is a stimulus affecting impulses and feelings that are based upon knowledgeable and volitional foundations of the *Mutterboden* (*motherfield*) of the psychological life of oneself. Kornarakis, in investigating sin as a drive, takes into account its existing unconscious purposefulness that afflicts one's potentials and transgresses one's moral life from the proper practicing and forwarding of one's inner freedom. Dr Kornarakis regards that sin constitutes a vital reality in man that depends on experiences being immanent in humanity since the first man's fallenness. The character of sin consists of such experiences, the features of which tend to be unconscious elements operating as actual events in a person's life. Apart from the destructive traits sin may produce and stabilize in one's psychosomatic entity, that what is in the best interest of the Church, for Dr Kornarakis,

²¹ Ibid, p. 24.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid, p. 27.

is the sinner's sincere disposition which influences the sinner's psycho-spiritual life. Accordingly, the pastoral relationship that is created between the fallen man and his confessor, or one's pastoral psychologist, attempts to focusing itself towards that disposition so that to adapting its pastoral preoccupations to the specific needs, necessities and expectations of the person being under the aforementioned circumstances²⁴. In relation to this, Kornarakis underlines the fact that the experience of the Church has already proved that the better pastoral treatment to a sinner is always through the aspect of dispensation; an aspect that Christ Himself first applied to people being under immense psychological tension(s)²⁵. To avoiding any misapprehension, Dr Kornarakis points out that Jung's concept of the unconscious cannot be examined by pastoral psychology as an idea that vindicates the phenomenon of sin, but as something, that contributes towards a deeper understanding of human fallenness²⁶.

Another aspect that Kornarakis scrutinized in his book is Jung's idea of *archetypes*. In order that this concept to be adequately understood, Dr Kornarakis highlights that archetypes constitute psychological characteristics being inherited in oneself by one's ancestors. A particular inherited archetype in oneself is the heredity of the religious functioning, which happens to be an immanently operating disposition of the soul²⁷. In conceding the existence of that disposition, one may clearly speak about, Dr Kornarakis considers, the notion of the religious experience in man that could also be investigated as an archetypal trait of one's inherited past. In continuing with this Jungian concept, Dr Kornarakis examines another archetypal feature of Jung's psychology, that of the male part in woman (animus) and the female part in man (anima). In pastoral psychology these two aspects, if are to be investigated as a whole, attract one another and bring in close relationship both sexes. For pastoral psychology, the male part in woman turns her more approachable to man and vice versa. It assists towards an appropriate concourse of both, if they are willing to creating an affair. For Dr Kornarakis, this concourse, whether or not occurring, owes not to be repressed so that not to be turned against one's psychological elements when repelled into the unconscious²⁸. Such characteristics, which develop as archetypal presuppositions, are for pastoral psychology: tenderness, compassion, mercyfulness and sensitivity. It can be maintained that apart many immanent and destructive traits, which sometimes evolve through inherent elements, one may also discover wholesome features, that if properly forwarded, may potentially prosper and cultivate merits of usefulness for the spiritual advancement of soul.

The psychological types in Jung's theory have also been carefully studied by Professor Kornarakis. He inspected the extrovert type as a significant pastoral-psychological idea, which if appropriately scrutinized may fruitfully guide those who experience such behaviour. In other words, for pastoral psychology, this type may be guided to participating into external manifestations and functions of worship, so that one's psychological and spiritual course to be in parallel with one's extrovert tendencies²⁹. Such manifes-

²⁴ Ibid, p. 29.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 30.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 38.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 45.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 53.

tations could be maintained that are: the temple, the various vessels in it, the priest, the chanting, the feasts, the sacraments, the icons, the incense. For the introvert type, who does not like being or communicating with others, considerable support to one's need may offer the aspect of prayer. The pastoral psychologist, Dr Kornarakis stresses relatedly, can recommend to oneself ideas towards an accurate self-observation and means to a fruitful meditation, so one's efforts to restoring oneself to be on an accessible path³⁰. In addition to this, Jung's introvert type provides constructive chances towards an equivalent overlap to pastoral psychology's same type, by inspiring oneself - having augmented such a character -to studying the holy scriptures, to be in touch with a constant spiritual guidance and to be aware of one's personal malfunction. Thus, one, Dr Kornarakis concludes, employs one's introversion towards being inwardly fulfilled and psycho-spiritually forwarded. In parallel to this, Professor Kornarakis contemplates a very constructive pastoral interconnection, by investigating Jung's idea of *persona* (*Maske-mask*), which to his opinion is many times interwoven to both psychological types. A person living a life under a mask, easily operates as an individual manifesting psychological disguises that run one's existence through pretexts and pretenses. In pastoral psychology, this Jungian idea acquires a specific importance, for it defines better the reasons of a person's falsified behaviour. The pastoral psychologist is able to discern successfully a person's various psychological illustrations, so to uncover them and lead an individual towards a realization of one's true self, i.e. of one's healthy characteristics and elements that may enable a person to fight back the self that impersonates and not advances and benefits oneself whatsoever. An experienced priest-psychologist through this aspect will pursue to discover the healthy personality of oneself³¹. He will restore and reinstate it on a better psychological basis, whilst he will simultaneously reveal to the faithful the spiritual void and emptiness such disguise has led him to.

II.5 Kornarakis and St Isidor of Pelusium

Pastoral psychology gains, according to Dr Kornarakis's opinion, great benefits from Jung's psychology for it attains the experience to how confronting moral problems, that in many accounts spring from the man's self-alienated tendencies which in turn operate as *repressed starting-points* towards estrangement from others. His indication is that such repression may also be well combated against and faced through the idea of repentance. Through this aspect, a faithful examines oneself, recognizes and admits one's failures; shoulders one's mischief onto the surface of one's psycho-spiritual life and consequently alleviates oneself by casting off one's personal repressed aberrations that have been created by one's sinful behaviour. In 1958, Professor Kornarakis published a book on St Isidor of Pelusium that had the title: *The pastoral psychology in the epistles of St Isidor of Pelusium*. For Dr Kornarakis, St Isidor provides in his pastoral psychology a wealth of psychological and anthropological knowledge, for he approaches the varieties of human character and the multifariousness of human personality. In this way, St Isidor interprets many manifestations and features of an individual, as well as he describes passions and traits that betray one's disorders and disclose the structure of one's psychic apparatus³². Pastoral psychology

³⁰ Ibid, p. 57.

³¹ Ibid, p. 69.

³² Ibid, p. 26.

is considerably benefited by St Isidor's anthropological teachings, stresses Professor Kornarakis, for thus acquires ideas that advantage its humane edifice. In this book, Dr Kornarakis investigated concepts that define St Isidor's epistles as of a great value, regarding issues of important anthropological and pastoral implications. We might mention in particular the aspect of *free will* which is a fundamental notion in St Isidor's writings. For Dr Kornarakis, the idea of free will possesses for pastoral psychology a specific significance for it considers that the needs of each person, even if they seem to be of a similar investigative procedure, they are however of a different value and weight. Pastoral psychology is constructively benefited by this idea, because individuals are different from one another and hence they need to be treated according to their individual differences. This, in turn, forwards a person towards spiritual uplifting and thus one learns how to be influenced by external objective factors, not negatively but positively instead. In pastoral psychology, one is treated not as a sinner but as a man whose motives, actions and reactions are connected to sinful behaviours. Accordingly, one may be called 'sinner' if one's intentions are willingly orientating one towards sinning. The attitude mentioned above, characterizes oneself as a fallen personality, for it develops psychologically disturbed experiences which consequently create an imbalanced self, subject to many frustrated trends and tendencies³³. Dr Kornarakis by examining St Isidor's aspect of free will concludes that this idea constitutes a very serious precondition towards exercising a fruitful pastoral care, so that the person who will put oneself under this care to be sufficiently guided and treated, in order to be efficiently freed by one's fallen experiences. St Isidor's prime understanding was that human beings demonstrate psychological characters and types, the varieties of which are at many accounts inexhaustible. The inherent traits of those characters and types are basically virtuous and aim at uplifting one's personality. One's entity is spiritually upwarded through virtues. A person possesses merits in oneself that advance and upgrade one's life, though one, many times, gives in to experiences that lower oneself and deviate one from one's healthy demeanour. Once an individual exhibits a strong specific feature in one's character, then all other traits are holding back and operate through the stronger one. Individuals, irrespective of their common elements and spiritual progress tend to be different and unique.

Professor Kornarakis, in continuing his preoccupation with St Isidor, presents that father's consideration about the necessity and vitality of a proper education and how this may guide oneself fruitfully and constructively. He stressed the fact that one must learn to accept other persons and help them in every possible way. Humans are virtuously good-willing and thus the priest, or the pastoral counselor owes embracing and advising them in moderation, for in oneself are found the seeds of virtues ready to be cultivated and grow. For Dr Kornarakis, St Isidor's aspects on man's spiritual indoctrination need to start from childhood³⁴. Since a person's spiritual 'schooling' begins from that period of age, one is protected from oncoming treatments and futile restoring attempts. One is constructively guided and beneficially developed. St Isidor's anthropological considerations led Kornarakis to discover in that father's writings the principle of individualization. According to Kornarakis, this principle assists pastoral psychology to distinguishing adequately a person's needs, dysfunctions, failings, expectations. Under this prism, pastoral

³³ Ἡ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς Ἰσιδώρου τοῦ Πηλουσιώτου περιεχομένη ποιμαντικὴ ψυχολογία, Athens 1958, pp. 18-21.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 33.

psychology operates as pastoral counseling that beyond its perspective to approach an individual, it appears also serving humans under a pedagogic point of view, which refers not to mass psychological prospects, but to personal anthropological interests, thus becoming a discipline that evolves itself in accordance to what peoples' demands are about; conclusively, not prescribing, but caring in love and taking over other individual's necessities, aiming at relieving them. Kornarakis considered that through St Isidor's aspect of individualization, pastoral psychologists, priests and lay-theologians acquire the knowledge to discern unto an individual:

- i) one's opinions and motives
- ii) one's values in life, i.e. one's social demeanour towards others
- iii) an occasional ignorance at the sinful character
- iv) hereditary reasons capable of defining behavioural instability
- v) temporary or incurable disorders
- vi) a person's degree of repentance or callousness

For St Isidor and Dr Kornarakis, as well as for pastoral psychology, a person's sinful tendency and attitude is to be investigated in its quality, quantity and enormity. Professor Kornarakis concludes his book on St Isidor's pastoral psychology by attempting a comparison between him and Jung. In this comparison he is referring to the following points: First of all, he discovers in Jung's idea of *forgetfulness* or *unconscious* many psychological phenomena that take place in oneself; a convergence to what St Isidor considers as "λανθάνοντα τῆς ψυχῆς κινήματα (latent movements of the soul)"³⁵ in comparison. For St Isidor that what is characterized as latent and therefore repressed, is the soul's unconscious psychological content; the soul's unknown inner traits; the soul's distorted experiences. For Dr Kornarakis, St Isidor's writings on the unconscious witness the pastoral idea that in man there exist a multitude of psychological phenomena, whether by affecting or constructing the man's psychic features, that operate and function beyond any reasonable supervision of the intellect to an extent not to be realized as conscious experiences. For Dr Kornarakis, that what St Isidor manifests in convergence to Jung's corresponding notion, is that this inner potential -apart from being non-diminished or controlled- is both an unacquainted and involuntary event. It controls and manipulates the behaviour of oneself towards effects of turbulence and spiritual degradation. Another aspect between the two, that testifies a convergence is Jung's idea of projection (*Assimilationsvorgang*) that interprets an already transformed psychological and subjective content as a reflection at another object through the activity of assimilation. For Jung, the character of projection can be distinguished either as passive or an active procedure. Projection is a process that can be identified to both psychologically disturbed personalities as well as to wholesome individuals.

Assimilationsvorgang is a psychological concept that mainly converges with arbitrary and uncontrolled patterns ensued from the unconscious part of the soul. Dr Kornarakis stressed the point that the kind of projection highlighted in St Isidor's teachings is that of a passive content and agrees that the same is found in Jung's writings too. For Kornarakis, both St Isidor and Jung illustrate this part of projection in order to interpret better the inner psychic status of oneself that is haunted by deceptions of wholesomeness and delu-

³⁵ PG 2, 109.

sions of spiritual maturity. In addition, St Isidor considers that those who project their intrapsychic characteristics unto the psychological patterns of others, build up images, behaviours or attitudes *assumed to be externalized features of themselves*. “Ἀνθρώποι ἐκ τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰς ψήφους ἐκφέρουσιν (Human beings because of themselves express opinions about other people that are similar to their manners)”³⁶.

St Isidor and Jung, for Kornarakis, explain the aspect of projection as a neurotic syndrome that overshadows the life of oneself and impedes one’s development. Both maintain that the psychological health of a person needs to be evolved away from experiences that provide oneself with features of imaginary patterns. The resolution is seen by Kornarakis to the cultivation of self-understanding as an attempt one to know oneself more accurately. This is to bring about a psychological balance and a demeanour towards a personal psycho-spiritual fulfilment. One, by following a moderate path, away from projection, one develops a psycho-spiritual harmony, the foundations of which are capable to creating the spiritual enhancement needed, and the restored self that it is searched for.

The phenomenon of *repression* is an additional convergence between Jung and St Isidor. The holy father contemplates that consideration as the unconscious ‘retained’ representation that ‘fell’ into the soul, where “τὰ δυσχερῇ διαδιδράσκειν οἰόμεθα (running off from uncomfortable deeds is considered)³⁷, which are absorbed and repelled. That opinion is maintained as well as by Jung who thinks that this experience is generated because of a person’s inability to adapt oneself to an external reality; thus avoiding it and creating inner conflicts that tend to become repressed traits.

Another convergence found both in Jung and St Isidor, for Dr Kornarakis, is the aspect of inflation. This aspect is the result of a person’s megalomania that is cultivated after one’s experiencing of feelings of superiority or inferiority. One who maintains megalomaniac attitudes in one’s life, one regards oneself as a person determined to fulfil great and unrepeatable things in life. Furthermore, one pursues to impose upon others in various ways. For the person who behaves as such and under the tendency to harm others, Jung considers one is a personality that experiences feelings of conceit and revenge. For St Isidor, a person is inflating oneself because of being into the state of an egotistic process; in the state of οἰησις (presumptuousness) that engenders προκοπής ἢ γκοπήν (hindrance to progress)³⁸. A person by exhibiting features of pride, arrogance, competitiveness, or such alike tendencies, automatically becomes inflated, and therefore avaricious, vainglorious and greedy. For St Isidor, this inflation is a swelling trauma that deactivates the soul’s ‘immune system’ and turns it turbulent and malfunctioned.

In parallel to these aspects, Professor Kornarakis considered that Jung and St Isidor appear also having an overlap to their ideas of *enantiodromy* (*convergence of opposites*) and *refinement*. In regard to the first, Jung illustrates as *enantiodromy* each psychological extreme that contains in itself its opposite manifestation. *Refinement* is for him an intense inherent potential that purges the self from conflicting experiences. The psychological extremes are intense at their manifestations and affect one’s spiritual and psychic capabilities. Dr Kornarakis believed that both psychological interpretations reflect one another. Whether *enantiodromy* or *refinement* constitute useful anthropologi-

³⁶ PG 5, 530.

³⁷ PG 2, 197.

³⁸ PG 4, 6

cal elaborations regarding the inner status of oneself. They refer to characteristics that embrace one's self holistically and contribute to the extraction of aspects that are truly needed for the detection of one's concealed attitudes. The intensiveness of *refinement* is always a dynamic process because it contains in itself the capacity to *refine* ideas, facts and characters. Dr Kornarakis in elaborating this concept, stressed that the intensiveness of *refinement* can become the beginning for the treatment of oneself. In other words, that what benefits one who exercises *refinement*, is to realise one's distressing and dangerous psychological situations as hurdles that estrange one from the objective of one's self-purification and inner balance. For St Isidor, the aspect of enantiodromy, i.e. the aspect of εἰς τοῦναντίον τὰ πράγματα μεταχωρεῖν (withdrawing things to their opposites)³⁹, is a physical law and expression. Each idea, image or material consists of its retrogression to an opposite illustration. That turns man to a cyclothymic personality that merits and demerits retrospectively, values, characters and demeanours. Alongside the above idea, both are coming to investigate the aspect of refinement which, apart from the aforementioned, is also connected, for Jung, to the archetypes that bring in themselves symbols operating as reformers and transformers of all experiences existing in oneself. Thus, one attempts to refine oneself by altering the way symbols operate, so that to provide oneself with fruitful psychological growth. In St Isidor, the aspect of refinement is interpreted as the μεταρρύθμισις τοῦ ἀμειλίκτου εἰς τὸ ἐμμελές (the reformation of the unsoftened to harmonious)⁴⁰ that is seen as a person's tendency to alter and reconstruct the ambivalent character of one's instincts. In this way, one not only refines one's instincts, but one recomposes them as well. As a result one becomes able to controlling one's motives and drives towards transforming them into useful and godlike actions without any malfunction or frailty whatsoever. For Kornarakis, St Isidor and Jung do not reiterate one another, but on the contrary, they show in unmistakable terms that their aspects are relevant and interchangeable. Their interface is of a twofold value: first, the *enantiodromy* aspect is the precondition for the creation of *refinement*, whilst secondly *refinement* is an idea that transforms dysfunctional acquisitions of the self to wholesome psychological traits. It alters the retrogression of the self unto advantageous elements that may affect towards benefiting and enhancing one's inner and outer furtherance.

II.6 Summary to Dr Kornarakis' pastoral psychology

Summing up Dr Kornarakis' aspects on pastoral psychology one might highlight the following:

1. Pastoral psychology constitutes a systematic topic in patristics. It assists towards the development of the pastoral work of the Church and focuses the concentration of theology on matters that are of an interdisciplinary preoccupation.
2. Pastoral psychology consists of fundamental principles that dictate and recommend the use of modern psychological aspects towards discovering the anthropology of the fathers and vice versa.
3. Pastoral psychology is an auxiliary topic to practical theology. It was founded to contribute to the awareness of the subjective familiarisation of redemption. In its deep

³⁹ PG 3, 52.

⁴⁰ PG 3, 82.

interpretation guides towards a more sufficient knowledge of Faithfull's' idiosyncrasy, in order that one's uniqueness to be individualised and to experience the soul's restoration as a personal asset towards salvation.

4. C. G. Jung's contribution to psychology is seen by pastoral psychology as a decisive factor that helps the psychology of the Fathers to be encountered under a modern scientific terminology that is useful, so their teaching to be accurately applied into the modern world and help modern man to discover new psychological dimensions never been contemplated before.

5. C. G. Jung, irrespective of his personal ideas on religious issues - which are not part of the interest of pastoral psychology - worked honestly on man, attempting to approach considerations that were taboos in past times. Hence, he answered questions that had not been resolved and entered into the very depths of the human existence, which he elaborately developed. Pastoral psychology, according to Kornarakis' writings, respects Jung's work and 'projects' aspects that can be reflected and investigated under a pastoral point of view.

6. Depth psychology is that what preoccupies with the man's inner realities. Pastoral psychology is the topic that examines those realities under an overlapping point of view to the aspects of psychology. That overlap whether of convergence or divergence, demonstrates the reflecting realm of the Fathers' anthropology, which corresponds to their effort in revealing the weaknesses of man so that integration to be brought upon.

7. Pastoral psychology is a guide to modern psychology towards perceiving Fathers' anthropology and how that operates. On the other hand, it becomes a very helpful tool because it provides modern psychology with a different tool, which though of another use, it is however efficient on new interpretations and approaches in comparison to what modern psychology has explored about man and established throughout the decades.

Dr Kornarakis' tentative elaboration of the anthropology of the Fathers, resulted to a double contribution. The one relates to the branch of Patristics and the other to Modern Psychology. His preoccupation with the ascetic tradition was somehow confronted as a 'heretic' or 'deviating' at the time of his involvement with the texts of the Neptic (Ascetic) Fathers. He spent a lot of personal effort in order that to make clear his points about the anthropology of the fathers to his contemporaries. His ideas on the fathers were not believed as innovative but as irrelevant instead, in terms of how the branch of Patristics used to investigate them.

What Kornarakis was concerned about, was to contribute towards an expanded scrutiny of the writings of the fathers. For him, their works revealed significant psychological approaches to man, useful to be argued and implemented. Throughout his work, Dr Kornarakis develops many anthropological aspects of the fathers and uncovers their psychological considerations. He works on a broad range of them and examines their pastoral ideas on man, the man's relation to others, the man's psycho-spiritual status and how man is developed according to the needs and expectations one presents, or acquires in life.

Dr Kornarakis' contribution to patristics and theology is in general an elevating process. In investigating the writings of the fathers he did not merely introduce their aspects, but instead he penetrated into the concepts they deal with, by psychologically interpreting them. In this way, he upgraded the teaching of the Church unto levels of greater anthropological value; he disclosed the fathers' innovative viewpoints on man and

creation and he, finally, channeled their intuitive insights unto pastoral approaches never being tackled before. In addition, he suggested that a careful preoccupation with the writings of the fathers unveils the hidden pursuits, they (the fathers) as interpreters of the Faithfull's experiences endow for the restructuring of the Christian's life.

Professor Kornarakis is among the first theologians in Greece who contributed to the creation of a new patristic consideration and movement about man: that of Pastoral Counselling. Dr Kornarakis was interested in uplifting one's personal potentials. Under his supervision and assistance, this contribution is continually developing in parishes throughout Greece. This aspect deals with the advices and suggestions the pastoral counsellor provides to those suffering either from mental malfunctions, or from difficulties concerning problems of personal, emotional, social and/or religious character. Great amount of such problems relate to marriage complications, children's upbringing, grief, sorrow, sickness, pain, guilt feelings, faith, as well as queries referring to the aspect of bereavement.

On such issues, Dr Kornarakis attempted to apply the wisdom of the anthropology and philanthropy of the fathers to those being in need of constant emotional support, whilst he also cared to alleviating others, by teaching them how to correct one's interrelationships to others through inspiring unto one the notion of the functional self-offering. Dr Kornarakis contributed to that by organising and participating to meetings with the clergy, to discussing with the people afflicted and to co-operating with parishioners towards a better understanding of the pastoral objectives of the Church. Thus, he coordinated towards the extraction of many healthy psychological elements of oneself that balance one's course in life and assist towards integrating one's psychodynamic patterns.

On the other hand, his contribution to psychology, introduced modern perspectives to its the preoccupation with man. These perspectives though deriving from a patristic background, they, however, offer a better understanding on the problems modern man is endlessly haunted by. Kornarakis provided to modern psychology a broader understanding of the anthropological matters dealt by the fathers.

For Kornarakis, psychology needs to deepen its knowledge on man via humanistic issues of a wider psychological range. Kornarakis offers such assistance to modern psychology by discussing aspects of pastoral interest in life with matters that are concerned by psychology. In this coherence, we can mention the aspect of faith which is of a great importance, for it provides the faithful with emotional security, feelings of self-identity and a sense of belonging into a wider perspective of the human existence.

II.7 In relation to the thoughts above, Dr Kornarakis' contribution to modern psychology, tackles the following two ideas:

II.7.1 Consider God as your lone confidence and not as your psychoanalyst

Under this idea, Dr Kornarakis elaborated the psychological importance of the aspect of faith and introduces to modern psychology an alternative consideration about the relationship should be built between the psychologist-psychoanalyst and his client. As far as Dr Kornarakis was concerned, there exists a close link between the two, that many times is developed into a relationship of depending roles. The client 'sticks' to his psychoanalyst, he does not undertake the weight of his personal treatment, but instead re-

mains a weak-willed being in the hands of his counsellor. On the other, the psychoanalyst does not investigate the problem of his client as something that afflicts him distortedly, but instead he turns him a dependant personality upon himself.

The counsellor, for Kornarakis, by cultivating the aspect of faith at his client's life, contributes against any psychological dependence that may appear - if stimulated - among the two. One learns to confide oneself unto God. One experiences that the lone mediator between him and God is Christ Himself Who for the sake of ourselves became man. One by showing confidence unto God, one acquires the patterns needed to be established in one's inner reality for not considering his counsellor as an individual that is capable of achieving the objectives he himself owes to struggling for, in order that to become more and more independent from him, and by extension from others as well.

II.7.2 Every moral problem ensues from religious quests

Modern psychology should comprehend better the moral imperatives of individuals' deeds. Those deeds derive from spiritual pursuits. Dr Kornarakis demonstrated that man is becoming a slave upon oneself, because one does not acknowledge the nature of one's actions and the preconditions that lead towards one's dysfunctioning psychological dispositions.

A person's psychological imperfections are basically moral imperfections for Kornarakis. They affect and afflict one's inner status, consolidating obstacles that erect an intra-psychic wall which impedes the wholesome development of oneself. A person's psychological weaknesses derive for Kornarakis from the religiously existing chaos within societies.

Since Christ's robe has been torn into many parts, humans spend their lives in compartmentalizing experiences. The wisdom hidden in the Gospels lies undetected and people seek for inner truth unto other sources, mainly mischief ones. Humans cannot cope with their turmoil and fall over into experiences which misguide them even more. Dr Kornarakis contemplated that modern psychology is unfortunately unable to assist humans to their needs and believes that its inability can be avoided, if it pursuits to clarify the inner strivings that influence the inner world of oneself and to place them onto a proper anthropological understanding. That understanding in order to be a fruitful one, needs to deal with one's religious and spiritual expectations and searches. Thus, modern psychology achieves not only to unveil that what one's personality in its very depths seeks for, but also perceives that human weaknesses are in themselves *bruised spots* which defile a person's orientation towards God.

II.7.3 Dr Kornarakis's aspects on modern and pastoral psychology, as well as the contributions he pursued towards them, could be pointed out through the following remarks:

II.7.3.a. Psychology in its deeper sense is the science of mind and behaviour which investigates not only the here and now of human cognitions and attitudes, but also attempts to providing a clear understanding what unconscious experiences are about. In its investigation, psychology has been entangled by many obstacles regarding the interpretation it offers when dealing with man. Dr Kornarakis scrutinises such investigative obstacles and in his writings he contributes towards ventures of broader psychological perspectives.

II.7.3.b. Depth psychology is for Kornarakis the investigation regarding neurosis. For him, the aspect of neurosis is not properly approached by psychology, once it is merely examined as a pattern that triggers one's inner and outer imbalance, for it is a problem that derives from personal malfunctioning traits of one's inner demeanour and spirituality, without taking into serious account one's intra-psychic structural foundations that cause such psychological toil and turbulence.

II.7.3.c. Kornarakis contemplated that this speculation constitutes a from-within inability from the side of psychology, for it does not adequately tackle one's psycho-spiritual causes that unavoidably lead towards this phenomenon. It does not also approach the neurotic elements needed to be overall scrutinised, whilst it results to an accomplishing ineffectiveness of the discrepancies should be overcome.

II.7.3.d. The reason for that should be sought for Kornarakis in the understanding that psychology does not examine the neurotic phenomenon as part of the inner dialogue should be undergone by the neurotic person, in order that one's weakness to be successfully fought back. The treatment over neurosis needs not to be contemplated as an attempt to resolving one's psycho-compulsive cul-de-sacs, but as an effort one's psychosomatic entity to be cured from the repulsions the neurotic phenomenon had caused. The former, for Kornarakis, induces movements of vicious circles of rationalisations, whilst also naturalistic interpretations - i.e. neurosis is a normal phenomenon and not a dysfunction of the mind - regarding the neurotic imperative. The latter, on the other, recommends solutions that embrace oneself as a whole and awakens the neurotic person before the existential agony this phenomenon produces.

II.7.3.e. Kornarakis in his works considered that this agony is a constructive factor that urges one to pursue one's psychological betterment, whilst making one vigil as to one's inner mischief and how these should be confronted, so one to be guided towards an obliteration of the neurotic reality and its imperatives.

II.7.3.f. In pastoral psychology, the neurotic symptom constitutes for Kornarakis an existential impact which results out of impassioned experiences. One acquires the alleviation of that symptom through the experience of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge consists of wholesome contents that lead one towards self-evaluating efforts which reinforce the healthy elements existing in oneself. Dr Kornarakis considers that self-knowledge is a pastoral-psychological concept that not only interprets one's inner imbalance, but also benefits it as a restoring procedure.

II.7.3.g. Modern psychology can also be benefited from this aspect. It can alter its misleading findings and accept that one's individuality constitutes in itself one's personality, which although being under compulsively conflicting trends, it nevertheless may undergo treatments awakening the sustaining factors of one's intuitive insights against one's psychologically disturbed experiences. Intuition and insight ensue from self-knowledge and are capable of reviving within oneself conscientious experiences about one's spiritual frailties and their efficient overturning.

II.7.3.h. Through this idea, modern psychology may realise itself as an anthropological science, whilst by employing the psychological ideas of pastoral counselling, should be able to improve and enhance its preoccupation with man. In connection with that, it may also be advantaged by Dr Kornarakis's writings, whether by reconsidering how far psychoanalysis can lead the way for the discovery of the self, acknowledging the limitations

being inherent to that course, or dealing with the subject 'psyche' as something that really reveals ontological preconditions as well as reflecting repercussions within the inner status of man. What Kornarakis implied under 'limitations' is the non-well-comprehended perception that psychology as an attempt is not of an unlimited capacity, both in its theory and practising. If so, psychology entraps itself in false understandings and interpretations, whereas its pursuits to uncover all psychological phenomena and manifestations tends not to be frequently progressed.

II.7.3.i. Kornarakis in agreeing with that, thought that any preoccupation with the human soul constitutes, by virtue of, inherent limitations. The imperatives of such limitations may be seen in the analysis of psychological phenomena that though present common features on a theoretical basis, however, they emerge different ramifications as much in practising as in duration. They also depict elements which may change from time to time and influence the apparatus of man in whole.

II.7.3.j. If psychology accepts its limitations in research, then it admits that the range and function of many psychological characteristics are deep and unfathomable, whereas also difficult to be accurately traced down. Human soul is for Kornarakis an existential reality with great ontological value and importance. In modern psychology, this value is more or less approached as an intellectual quality without existential traits. It is examined as an epistemological pattern which contains features of rational perspectives. Those features are investigated by psychology as aspects of the functionality of an individual. Such aspects for psychology are: the self-consciousness, an operational dynamism, the position of an individual into the social status, as well as one's emergence as a personality. Thus, psychology works towards a 'scientific self-realisation', having methodological and investigative practicalities, whilst being conditioned by rules and principles of many structural implications.

II.7.3.k. The way, modern psychology illustrates its preoccupation with man, reveals for Kornarakis its conflicting nature. For him, the applications of psychology in the modern world are projections of its incapability to approach the problems of personality in a constructive way. Dr Kornarakis wishing to contribute towards a better interpretation of psychology to the modern world, pointed out in his writings that psyche must be overall demonstrated as psychology's main concern. What he suggested about this, is that psychology needs at first to realise the need to sufficiently clarify the motives of the inner man and in which way to search for them in the man's psychic environment.

II.7.3.l. Modern psychology in order to accomplish a proper research about psyche, it needs for Kornarakis to evaluate clearly the determination under which its work is described and whether it considers that the investigation that provides about the soul and its phenomena is adequately conditioned. Thus, psychology will be able to interpret the ways by which such phenomena operate and influence the entity of a man as a whole, as well as to set about the principles that would be able to scrutinise the psychological implications sustained by a personality. Modern psychology may forward and advance its work successfully, if it starts dealing with people as individualised personalities which present different inner structure all the time, so to cope with each one personally and separately. Modern psychology acquires the skills of a coherent and honest humane contribution, if its theories are inspired and be put into an everyday testing and practising for the sake of the humans concerned.

II.7.3.m. In parallel to the above, Dr Kornarakis argued that the effort towards obliterating as much as many inner psychological compulsions that might be existing, is in the position to assist the work of psychology towards the scanning down of man's distorted behaviour. Psychology can proceed its research in a sufficient way through observing, correcting and freeing itself from misapprehending and misleading guidelines. Thus, it obtains the presuppositions for a hetero-observation; in other words, of an observation of others. In this way, psychology, Kornarakis stresses, sets away its conflicting functional character and builds up new boundaries for the investigation of man. As an outcome, psychology comprehends the value of humans as persons and not as research objects and contributes towards a better illustration of the characteristics of man's personality without being enmeshed into notions of futile content and impenetrable investigations.

III. Summary

III.1 Professor Kornarakis's contribution to both modern and pastoral psychology elucidates his objectives. In order to sum up his interpretations on the anthropology of the fathers we refer in conclusion to the following:

III.1.a. In his work, Dr Kornarakis considered that the branch of pastoral psychology may benefit in a modern way the effort either of the clergy or theologians or psychologists, so to come in touch with the living tradition of the Church that elaborates the anthropology of the Fathers under a modern point of view. This point of view is concerned to provide an integrated and detailed clarification on man's psychological potentials and weaknesses. As a result, pastoral psychology is able to developing more penetrating methods in connection with the psychological status of man, for, this to be in entirety investigated towards the point of an adequate and coherent scrutiny of its constituent parts.

III.1.b. The idea that is mainly under a constant exploration in pastoral psychology, is the idea of restoring the inner and outer reality of man before God. In the psychology of the Fathers this is something immensely questioned and investigated. The pastoral psychologist is the person who could bring onto the surface the experience of the Neptic (Ascetic) Anthropology about man, whilst also providing consequently an efficient counselling and treatment. In addition to this, the theologian who will undertake this difficult task should always be in the position to advice the sufferer that one's unconscious traits can be sufficiently unveiled and confronted through a frequent and constant partaking to the Sacraments of the Church and in particular to those of Confession and the Eucharist.

III.1.c. Healthy interrelationships between fellow human beings is another aspect that, according to pastoral psychology, creates a wholesome psycho-spiritual self in man and restores one from any deficiency or imbalance. In other words, that what is stressed about is the idea of the loving disposition towards others. One by being in a proper relationship to one's fellow humans, one attains - pastoral psychology considers - the asset of not being subject into experiences that alter one's inner constructiveness and disorientate one's course from encountering God.

III.1.d. One to become aware of one's sinfulness is another idea that is developed in the writings of the Fathers and illustrated as chief aspect - among others - by pastoral psychology. What indicates the above aspect is the awareness of one's estrangement to oneself. For such awareness to become a sufficient and efficient feature in a person's life,

one owes to acknowledge one's own malfunctioning attitudes, to an extent of a proper confrontation and remedy of them.

The aspects, pastoral psychology acquires from the anthropology of the Fathers and the current psychology are very helpful towards this aim. Sinfulness holds back one's developmental efforts, whereas it impedes one's inner and outer spiritual uplifting. Pastoral psychology re-establishes one's psychosomatic characteristics upon patristic foundations and discusses one's psychological dysfunctions under neptic (ascetic) considerations. Dr Kornarakis had discovered in the anthropology of the Fathers that their preoccupations with man are thoughtful and useful; he revealed them and expands their theological implications, for he believed that the answers our contemporaries seek, are existent and available for the sake of anyone's restoration and fulfilment.

As students of his writings we all pray to God to rest his soul!

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15. Idem, *Ψυχολογία και πνευματική ζωή*, Θεσσαλονίκη 1980.
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 26.b. Idem, *Ἡ πατερικὴ πνευματικὴ φτώχεια*, 46, Λευκωσία-Κύπρος 1995.
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F. Other publications by Professor Ioannis Kornarakis

1. KORNARAKIS, Ioannis K., *Articles on the 'Religious and Ethical Encyclopedia' with the following entries:*
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Appendix

1. Κορυφαία
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Book Review

The Christian Heritage of Kosovo and Metohija: The Historical and Spiritual Heartland of the Serbian People, ed. by Bishop Maxim Vasiljević, Los Angeles: Sebastian Press, 2015, 1008 p., ISBN: 978-86-82685-39-5.

A group of Muslim extremists has recently caused a massive exodus of Christians from their historic lands and settings. Several hundred thousands of people took refuge in the North and in Western countries. These extremists declared their own independent state and purposefully destroyed sites and artifacts that presented cultural heritage of the world which had endured for centuries, many of which are officially listed on the UNESCO World Heritage List. They hammered statues and graves, destroyed ancient monuments and burned shrines. Of course, this is a description of the events which happened in Kosovo and Metohija between 1999 and 2008. If you think that it resembles the events caused by ISIS in the Middle East, happening as you read this review, you are right. This resemblance should not come as a surprise since, according to the Kosovo media, more than 300 extremists from Kosovo are fighting for ISIS. But the resemblance of these events – those that have happened in Kosovo and happening now in the Middle East – is absent when it comes to the reaction of the Western-world public and media. The proportion of the reaction in both cases is shaped by the particular narratives of the events. When it comes to Kosovo and Metohija this narrative tells a simplifying story of Milošević's regime conducting an organized crime over the population of Kosovo, consisting mostly of Albanians, which resulted in the just rebellion of the people and the consequent NATO bombing of Serbia. Civilian casualties of the bombing are recognized, but not as 'unproportionate' (as Noam Chomsky stresses)

and the side-effects of the Albanian uprising – such as massive exodus of the Serbian people and the destruction of the Christian churches – are put aside on the grounds of its allegedly justified cause. What *The Christian Heritage of Kosovo and Metohija*, among other things, intends to do is to challenge or even reshape this narrative which is common in the Western societies.

The book is edited by Maxim Vasiljević, Bishop of Western American Diocese of the Serbian Orthodox Church, who is also a professor of patristics at the Faculty of Orthodox Theology of the Belgrade University (Serbia). The book represents a new and fresh portrait of the Christian historical and cultural heritage in Kosovo and Metohija, which is based on the book *The Endowments of Kosovo – Monuments and Testimonies of the Serbian People*, edited by Bishop Atanasije Jevtić and Živorad Stojković, published in 1987 (in Serbian) by The Faculty of Orthodox Theology in Belgrade. *The Christian Heritage of Kosovo and Metohija* draws certain amount of material from the 1987 edition, but it also brings a great amount of new studies, historical maps, translations of the medieval charters, photographs and scholarly papers.

The book contains more than 90 texts of different genre, written by more than 50 contributors, which include scholarly articles, essays, political and historical studies, artistic impressions as well as poems. Some of the most famous are: Steven Runciman, Sima Ćirković, Saint Nikolaj of Žiča, G. K. Chesterton, Bogoljub Šijaković, Bishop Atanasije Jevtić, Rebecca West, Al-

exander Hilferding, Branislav Nušić, Dušan Bataković, Ivo Andrić, F. W. Harvez, Fr. Sava Janjić etc. Also, it contains more than nine hundred illuminations: maps, photographs, drawings, fresco paintings etc. The book is in full color, printed on high quality paper, equipped with a slip case and it comes in a cardboard box. It is made to last long, thus reflecting its intention with regards to the cultural heritage of Kosovo. It is divided in eight chapters which are organized as follows.

Chapter I, entitled *Spiritual Endowments and Aesthetic Insignia of Kosovo and Metohija*, offers historical and artistic studies of the most important churches and Monasteries of Kosovo and Metohija. It gives an account of the profound value of the Byzantine-style frescoes and architecture, enriched by the influence of the western Romanian art provided by the hands of the craftsmen from the West.

Chapter II, entitled *The Kosovo Covenant and Serbia's Historic Destiny* portrays a mythic and symbolic significance of the Battle of Kosovo (1389) for the Serbian people. The (Kosovo) 'covenant' which is a synonym for the 'testament' in Serbian, is seen as a mythological embodiment of the Christ's sacrifice, this time reenacted by the last medieval Serbian prince, St Lazar of Kosovo. This mythological imagery is conceived as a crucial factor in the shaping of the common consciousness of the Serbian people that determined their future destiny.

This theme is elaborated also in the Chapter III, entitled *The Battle of Kosovo*, in which the battle itself is explored in its historic setting. Its reflections in the Serbian epic poetry are presented as well.

Chapter IV presents an integral text of the *Memorandum on Kosovo and Metohija* issued by the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church in 2003. The *Memorandum* elaborates on the history of Kosovo and the relations between Serbs and Albanians, listing the churches and monasteries destroyed, and Serbian civilians killed, by the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK). An account of the Pogrom that occurred in the March of 2004 written by Fr. Sava Janjić is added to the *Memorandum*. The Pogrom, as Fr Sava de-

scribes, resulted in the killing of nineteen people, exodus of an estimated number of four thousand people, and the desecration and destruction of 31 churches many of which dated back to the 14th century.

Chapter V maps *Serbian Christian Sites and Holy Shrines of Kosovo and Metohija* and explores their individual history.

Chapter VI, entitled *History, Identity, Legacy* examines thoroughly the importance of the profound understanding of the history of Kosovo and Metohija as a prerequisite for the engagement with its contemporary reality.

Chapter VII follows this line of argument offering a comprehensive study on the history of *Serbia After the 1389 Battle of Kosovo*.

The last Chapter, entitled *Contemporary Accounts of the Renewed Martyrdom*, offers various reflections on the present state of affairs in Kosovo. Its complex and harsh reality is depicted as well as hopes and proposals for its bright future.

The book ends with a comprehensive bibliography on Kosovo, followed by the Epilogue and Acknowledgments.

Can this book radically reshape the Western narrative on Kosovo? By all means, not. But it can challenge the narrative by giving an account on behalf of those on the other side of the story, told from the perspective of the Serbian people. The potential of the book should not, however, be reduced to its 'political' aim. It is primarily a comprehensive guide to the history of Kosovo and the beauty of its Christian heritage which can be used by historians, students of art history, as well as theologians and other scholars. Some might object the fact that the book represents a mixture of poetry, historical studies, fresco paintings, documents, maps and political analysis, in which careful scientific reasoning is conjured with poetic outcries for justice and joyful renderings of artistic artifacts. But, one might respond that the reality – and especially that of Kosovo and Metohija – is exactly the same. And to a great extent, that is exactly what the reader gets from this book – the reality of Kosovo as it is.

Andrej Jeftić

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