ΦΙΛΟΘΕΟΣ **9 (2009)** **PHILOTHEOS**
International Journal for Philosophy and Theology

Founding Editor
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Beograd 2009

ISSN 1451-3455 UDC 1:2

ΦΙΛΟΘΕΟΣ

International Journal for Philosophy and Theology

PHILOTHEOS Vol. 9 (2009) pp. 1–370

Jörg Splett: Was haben Religion und Philosophie miteinander zu tun? 3
Wolfgang Speyer: Von der inneren Wahrheit des Christentums auf dem Hintergrund der uns zugänglichen Gesamtwirklichkeit 13
Татьяна Григорьевна Человенко: О возможностях гуманитарной эпистемологии в экзистенциально феноменологическом дискурсе религиозных явлений 21
Christos Terezis, **Kalomoira Polychronopoulou**: The Moral and Ethical Transfigures of Human Entity to a Human Being in the Platonic Dialogue *Alcibiades I* 28
Mostafa Younesie: A Profile of Justice in Plato and Rawls 45
Jean-Michel Charrue: Providence et liberté dans la pensée de Proclus. 57
Vladan Perišić: Platonism and Christianity: Different Approaches 84
Milosav Vešović, **Noel Putnik**: Pagan and Christian Consolation 90
Zoran Djurović: Sant'Agostino: *non posse peccare.* 99
Jovan Milanović: Baptême chez saint Grégoire Palamas 128
Anita Strezova: Hypostatic Union and Pictorial Representation of Christ in Iconophile Apologia 152
Stamatios D. Gerogiorgakis: Eine übersehene Anwendung eines logischen Folgerungsschemas in den Unionsgesprächen auf dem Konzil von Ferrara-Florenz. 173
Katelis Viglas: Principles and Characteristics of George Gemistos Plethon's Philosophy 183
Branko Gorgiev: Metanoia (Fundamental Change of Mind) and Theosis (Deification) in Upbringing and Education 191
Monk Romilo of Hilandar: Restoration –Transformation of the Body of Christ. 201
Alois M. Haas: Die mittelalterliche Konzeption von Seele. 212
Ben Lazare Mijušković: The Argument from Simplicity: A Study in the History of an Idea and Consciousness 228
Richard Wisser: Das Problem des Todes bei Rainer Maria Rilke und die philosophische Frage nach der Wahrheit der Dichtung. 253
Сергей С. Хоружий: Рождение русского философского гуманизма: спор славянофилов и западников 270
М. А. Маслин: «Вехи» как философский бестселлер 300
Predrag Čičovački: The Real, the Rational, and the Ideal: Developing Milton Munitz's Idea of Boundless Existence. 310
Михаил Эпштейн: Атеистический геноцентризм Ричарда Докинза и персоналистический аргумент бытия Бога 325
Bogdan Lubardić: The Crushed Nightingale: *Passio secundum Slavoj* (Critical review essay on Slavoj Žižek, *The Monstrosity of Christ: Theology and Revolution*). 343
Neven Cvetićanin: Postmoderno doba i postmaterijalističke vrednosti 352
Александр Михайлович Страхов: Религиозно-антропологическое измерение полового аспекта «войны цивилизаций» 358
Authors in *Philotheos 1* (2001) – *9* (2009) 363

Philotheos **9** (2009) 3-12

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Was haben Religion und Philosophie miteinander zu tun?

Glück der Pflicht
Simchat Torah[1]

Philosophie hat es mit allem zu tun, also auch mit Religion. Nicht jeder Philosoph indes befasst sich mit allem. Für die thematische Befassung mit der Religion gibt es die Disziplin Religionsphilosophie. Die kann sich unterschiedlich verstehen, vor allem in der Alternative von Beobachter- oder Teilnehmerperspektive. Auch Religion hat es mit allem zu tun; doch nicht jede Religion befasst sich mit allem. Ort thematischer Befassung mit Philosophie ist die Theologie, und sie kann dies aus der Beobachter- oder Teilnehmerperspektive tun. – Es gibt ja weder *die* Religion noch *die* Theologie noch *die* Philosophie; und so zeigen sich geschichtlich unterschiedliche Verhältnisse.

I. Philosophie und Theologie

1. Seit durch die Wiederentdeckung des ARISTOTELES im 12. Jhdt. die patristische und im 14. Jhdt. die thomanische Synthese zerbrach, stellt sich das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Theologie als Antithese konkurrierender Universal-„wissenschaften" dar. Theologen fürchten, der Philosoph löse die unrückführbaren Gegebenheiten des Glaubens transzendental in ihre allgemeinen Möglichkeitsbedingungen auf. Innertheologisch lässt sich das etwa an Polemiken gegen die Transzendentaltheologie KARL RAHNERS ablesen, die befürchten, hier werde Gott vom Menschen vorgeschrieben, wie er sich (nämlich allein im transzendentalen Rahmen) zu verhalten habe; die Besonderheit der biblischen Offenbarung, vollends des Christus-Ereignisses, gehe verloren; Theologie werde auf Anthropologie reduziert.

Umgekehrt haben Philosophen den Eindruck, die Theologie verlange von ihnen einen willkürlichen Frageabbruch. Das vielzitierte „sacrificium intellectus" gehört hierher, wenn nicht gar „credo quia absurdum"; beides ebenso als Parole von engagierten Verfechtern des Glaubens wie als Schreckbild von liberalen Religionsgegnern beschworen.

Zum Teil lässt sich die Antithese auf Missverständnisse zurückführen: Missverstehen des anderen und Selbstmissverständnis. Prominent ist hier die Opposition von Glauben und Wissen, die sogar beim AQUINATEN begegnet (aufgrund aristotelischer Lesart von Hebr 11,1).[2] Aber die Spannung von Glaube und Einsicht besteht – und sollte

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[1] „Glück...": Überschrift des Nachrufs auf den Komponisten J. TAL in der FAZ vom 26.08.2008 (Nr. 199) 37. „Simchat...": Torafreude, Fest am 22. bzw. 23. Tishri.

[2] Wissen muss nicht *wissenschaftliches* Wissen sein (gewusst, warum, gar beweisbar). Außer dem *technischen* (gewusst, wie) gibt es das schlichte (?) Dass/Was-Wissen. Als umfassende Definition schlage ich vor: Sagen können, dass man sagen kann, was ist (woher und mit welchem Durchblick, gehört nicht zur De-

auch von Theologen ausgehalten werden.[3] In Wahrheit sind solche Differenzen ja keineswegs überraschend, stellt Differenz doch eine Grundgegebenheit gerade freiheitlicher Selbsterfahrung dar. – Aber klären wir erst einmal die Begriffe. Zur Religion sind sich bekanntlich die Religionswissenschaftler über ihren Gegenstand nicht einig. Im Sinn des Tagungsthemas geht es jedoch nicht um Religion überhaupt, sondern um Theologie. Die gibt es abendländisch nur jüdisch und christlich. Nehmen wir also eine „alteuropäische" Definition auf: Religion sei *ordo ad Deum*.[4]

Zu Philosophie schlägt ROBERT SPAEMANN als unphilosophische und darum hoffentlich unstrittige Definition vor: „kontinuierlicher Diskurs über letzte Fragen".[5] Die Fragen, die er meint, sind solche,

> die am Ende der normalen Diskurse offen bleiben und auf deren Nichtaufwerfen die konsensuelle Stabilität unserer normalen, persönlichen, sozialen und wissenschaftlichen Lebenspraxis beruht, z.B. also die Frage, was wir meinen, wenn wir von 'Wirklichkeit' reden oder wenn wir etwas 'gut' nennen.

Doch will man philosophieren, kann man es nicht dabei belassen. So bringe ich meine eigene Bestimmung ein und definiere Philosophie als methodisch kritische prinzipielle Reflexion auf Grunderfahrungen.

Methodisch-(selbst-)kritisch: das Wissenschaftsmoment, wenn auch nicht einzelwissenschaftlich im Sinn eines umgrenzten Forschungsgebiets und einer beschränkten Fragestellung, gar noch enger im Sinn SCIENCES. Wissenschaft ist ja nicht das naive Bemühen, *eine* Methode auf alle Bereiche der Forschung zu übertragen, sondern der kritische (=unterscheidende) Wille, jeden Gegenstand in der ihm angemessenen Weise zu befragen.

Gegenstand der Befragung ist unser Erfahren: Grunderfahrung. – Sie meint jenes Innewerden (oder Je-schon-Innegewordensein) meiner selbst, meiner (als unserer) Welt und meines Innewerdens dessen, es meint jenes ursprüngliche Bewusstsein und – sei's „unbewusste" – Wissen um sich und „das Ganze", das als „Mitwissen" (con-scientia) alle Einzelerfahrungen ermöglichend, tragend und qualifizierend „begleitet" – indem es sie nicht nur (in leitendem Rückbezug auf das Ich) als je meine bestimmt, sondern vor allem (im Rückbezug auf die Sinn-Evidenz sich gewährender Wahrheit) als Erfahrung.[6]

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finition). – Und definiert man „Glauben" untheologisch als (mehrdimensionale) Gesamt-Auslegung des Begegnenden, dann ist jede Erfahrung Glaubenserfahrung (kenntlich am hermeneutischen „als" [M. Heidegger, SuZ §§ 32, 33]). E. BENYOËTZ, Jüngsten Tage, in: Drei Religionen – ein Heiliges Land (Hg. C. LÜCKING-MICHEL / S. RAUEISER, FS J. WOHLMUTH), Bonn 2008, 9-39, 12):

> Ich glaube zu wissen, wenn ich glaube,
> weiß ich zu glauben, wenn ich weiß?

[3] Dazu bes. M. SECKLER, Theologie, Religionsphilosophie, Religionswissenschaft, in: ThQ 157 (1977), 163-176; Die schiefen Wände des Lehrhauses. Katholizität als Herausforderung, Freiburg i. Br. 1988, 105-135: Kirchliches Lehramt und theologische Wissenschaft.

[4] J. SP., Religion, in: StL[7] IV 792-799. – E. FEIL, Religio. I-IV, Göttingen 1986-2007. – Wer das zu störend eng findet, mag sich an scholastische Ethiker halten, die (bzgl. naturrechtlicher Pflichten) vom *supremum numen* sprechen. Oder an den Wortgebrauch PLATONS, dem wir die *theología* verdanken: *theós*, *theoí*, *ho theós* und *theîon*. Seit W. WINDELBAND ist vom Heiligen die Rede.

[5] Die kontroverse Natur der Philosophie, in: Philosophische Essays. Erweiterte Ausgabe, Stuttgart 1994, 104-129.

[6] Damit ist eine zweite – weniger formale – Bedeutung des Wortes angesprochen. Gründend ist solche Erfahrung nämlich gerade insofern, als sie Erfahrung von Gründung bedeutet. – In der Erfahrung meiner, der Welt und meines (unseres) Erfahrens erfahre ich zugleich die „Kontingenz", d. h. die Nicht-Selbstverständlichkeit alles dessen, dass nichts sein muss und dennoch dieses „geglückt" ist (contingit): die Geschichtlichkeit und das Gewährtsein alles Genannten – und nochmals das Gewährtsein (das ereignishafte „Es gibt") eben dieses Gewährtseins selbst.

‘Grunderfahrung’ lässt sich derart nicht ontisch, gar psychologisch fassen. Ihr doppelt gerichteter Rück- und Überstieg über die Empirie hinaus ist als er selber seinerseits met-empirisch: nur ontologisch begreifbar. – In einem dreifachen Sinn also zeigt sich die Ersterfahrung als übersteigend. Und dieses ihr Wesen bestimmt auch die gemäße Weise ihrer (Selbst-)Auslegung als übersteigend, oder besser: „überstieglich“. Grunderfahrung ist derart „transzendentale Erfahrung“ (EDMUND HUSSERL).

Insofern die Auslegung dieser prinzipialen Erfahrung ihrerseits prinzipiell ist (oder doch sein will), muss sie selbst zugleich die Hermeneutik für die Interpretation erstellen, die sie ist; wobei eben diese Hermeneutik nochmals jene Interpretation belegt, ja, selber ist, in der das jeweilige Selbstbewusstsein sich versteht und weiß.

2. Dem geläufigen Topos des „hermeneutischen Zirkels“ gemäß ist Philosophie als Daseinshermeneutik also Daseinsinterpretation und umgekehrt. – Allerdings mit fundierendem Vorrang der Interpretation. Dieser Vorrang gründet im Entscheidungs-Charakter der Deutung als Selbstauslegung von Freiheit. Tatsächlich besagt darum, Philosophie als (fundamentale Daseins-)Interpretation bestimmen, sie im fundamentalen „Konflikt der Interpretationen“ zu situieren.[7]

> Ich habe nicht die Absicht – und im übrigen auch nicht die Mittel –, eine vollständige Aufzählung der hermeneutischen Stile zu versuchen. [Der extremste Gegensatz:] Auf der einen Seite wird die Hermeneutik aufgefasst als die Manifestation und Wiederherstellung eines Sinnes, der in der Art einer Botschaft, einer Verkündigung oder, wie es zuweilen heißt, eines *Kerygma* an mich gerichtet ist; auf der anderen Seite wird sie verstanden als Entmystifizierung, als Illusionsabbau (40).

Dieser Gegensatz ist nicht einfachhin der von Verstehen und Erklären, wenn ‘Verstehen’ das Erfassen von Bedeutungen, ‘Erklären’ die Rückführung auf Ursachen bezeichnen soll. Verstehen besagt dann die Auffassung eines Gegebenen als Zeichen, Erklären seine Auffassung als Wirkung, als Effekt. – Die Spaltung des hermeneutischen Feldes, um die es jetzt geht, liegt durchaus innerhalb des Verstehens. Sie verläuft zwischen – ich möchte sagen – ‘einverstehendem’ und diagnostizierendem Verstehen: zwischen der Auffassung des Zeichens als Symbol und seiner Auffassung als Symptom.

Dabei soll ‘Einverstehen’ jenen Mitvollzug bezeichnen, den misslich psychologisch der Terminus ‘Einfühlung’ anzielte, den H.-G. GADAMER als ‘Horizontverschmelzung’ bezeichnet und dessen ontologische Tiefe die Tradition in der Formel benannt hat: *cognoscens et cognitum sunt actu idem*. Diese Formel beschreibt freilich auch das Symptom-Verstehen – als Verstehen. Doch spezifisch ist dieses Verstehen eher als „erklärendes Verstehen“ zu bezeichnen. Als solches entspricht es genau dem Anzeichen des Symptoms; die im Symbol sich eröffnende Freiheit aber wird nicht einmal missverstanden, sie kommt als sie selbst erst gar nicht zu Gesicht.[8]

Natürlich haben beide Hermeneutiken ihr Recht. Sie haben darüber hinaus auch Rechte (und entsprechende Pflichten) an einander, da ja nicht nur Symbole als Symptome behandelt, sondern auch Symptome als Symbole missverstanden werden. Der Kon-

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[7] P. RICŒUR, Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud, Frankfurt/M. 1969, Buch I, Kap. II.

[8] ‘Symbol’ bezeichnet hier die Selbstaussage oder Selbstdarstellung von Freiheit. Symptom ist der Zeichen-Aspekt eines Natur-Effekts. Symptome diskutiert man nicht, sie werden analysiert. Diskutieren lässt sich erst ihre Deutung, insofern darin Freiheit sich ausspricht. Wird jemandes Wort als Symptom aufgefasst, dann ist er selbst allein als Objekt zugelassen; erst als sich im Wort Symbolisierender tritt er als Subjekt und Partner in das Gespräch. Zum Gespräch aber (statt bloßer Verifikation von Feststellungen) wird die Diskussion, sobald zur Geltung kommt, dass im Symbol die Freiheit stets mehr sagen will (und sagt), als sie sagt, nämlich sich selbst.

flikt der Hermeneutiken betrifft demnach bei prinzipieller Anerkennung des Rechts einer jeden dessen konkrete Umgrenzung. Und eben das gibt ihm seine Schärfe (insofern er nicht einfach „struggle for life", sondern Streit um das Recht ist: um das Sein in der Wahrheit).

Sie sind auch in der Theologie zuhause. Deren Bestimmung erfolgt hier nicht aus Selbstverständnis, sondern von außen, seitens der Philosophie; aber sie muss deswegen, zumal wenn sie sich auf authentische Texte bezieht, nicht einfach falsch sein. – Weder mit der ersten Quaestio in der Summa Theologiae des AQUINATEN noch mit den Artikeln in den großen theologischen Wörterbüchern kommt wohl die Bestimmung in Konflikt: Theologie (als Wissenschaft) ist methodisch-kritisches Verstehen(-wollen) der im Glauben als Gotteswort aufgenommenen biblischen Botschaft (und dies wiederum in Theorie und Praxis und in dialogischem Zugleich von individuellem und gemeinsamem Verstehen).[9]

3. Reflexion auf solche Erfahrung ist folgerichtig Selbstreflexion, auch und gerade im Bedenken der Erfahrung anderer. Und prinzipiell schließlich heißt sie, weil nicht nur die reflektierte Erfahrung zentral ist, sondern weil auch die Reflexion auf sie sich nicht mit Teilaspekten begnügt, sondern die Wahrheitsfrage stellt.

Diese Reflexion nun weiß sich als Freiheitsvollzug und als Reflexion einer Erfahrung, die ebenso Freiheitsvollzug ist. Freiheitsvollzug letztlich nicht gegenüber Sachwirklichkeiten, sondern ihrerseits in einer Welt von Freiheiten stehend. Grunderfahrung besagt hier im umfassenden Sinne dialogische Erfahrung: „in Begegnung mit". So aber stößt die Reflexion – gerade als Freiheitsgeschehen – auf Faktizität, auf Unableitbares, dessen Möglichkeitsbedingungen zwar (allerdings nicht apriorisch, sondern erst aus dem Geschehen wirklicher Begegnung) aufgehellt werden müssen, das aber nicht mehr schlicht in diese Vorbedingungen aufgelöst werden kann.

Reflexion ist bleibend auf die von ihr reflektierte Erfahrung verwiesen. An der aber sind aus diesem ersten Vorblick wenigstens drei Momente zu unterscheiden: erfahrende Freiheit, erfahrene (ihr begegnende) Freiheit und das different-eine Geschehen des Erfahrens selbst.

II. Freiheit und Wahrheit

Gerade an der Freiheit scheint sich der Antagonismus von Philosophie und Religion zu entzünden. Selbstdenker hieß der Philosoph im 17. Jhdt. und Freidenker nannten sich die von der positiven Religion Emanzipierten. Wie aber, wenn es der Freiheit just um Wahrheit ginge – statt darum, sich „frei" dies oder jenes auszudenken?

1. Dass wir frei sind, wird hier nicht zu erweisen versucht. Erinnert sei nur, dass Freiheit weder (im neuzeitlich zwingenden Sinn) bewiesen noch nur überhaupt erfahren werden kann (erfahren wird das Bios-Phänomen Spontaneität). Für unsere Zwecke darf der Hinweis genügen, dass eine Aussage, die sich selbst als unfrei deklariert (Anm. 8), nicht diskutiert werden kann; denn „*contra facta non valet argumentatio*"; weder mit Uhren noch Waagen wird diskutiert (man kann nur ihre Eichung überprüfen).

Bezüglich der Willensfreiheit nun (denn um sie geht der Streit) möchte ich eine Unterscheidung vorschlagen: zwischen Wahlfreiheit – im Blick auf Güter – und Entschei-

[9] Dass dies die Selbstreflexion einschließt, also Philosophie, wäre im Gespräch mit (vor allem antiphilosophischen) Theologen zu entfalten, steht aber hier nicht an.

dungsfreiheit: gegenüber einem Anspruch, der mich trifft. Aus thematischen und Raum-Gründen sei auch die Wahlfreiheit jetzt samt den Fragen, die sie aufwirft, ausgeklammert. Zumal sie aus sich selbst auf sie zurückführt, wenn es ernst wird: Niemand hat die Wahl, ein(e) andere(r) zu sein; jede(r) vielmehr steht vor der Entscheidung, sich selbst anzunehmen oder nicht.

Anknüpfen möchte ich an den bekannten Satz IMMANUEL KANTS, „ein freier Wille und ein Wille unter sittlichen Gesetzen [sei] einerlei".[10] – Wer immer handelt, z.B. hier mitdiskutiert, hat sich fragen zu lassen, warum er es tue und warum gerade so – Warum sodann die Gründe, die er anführt, für ihn Grunde seien... Diese Frage-Kette kommt irgendwann an den Punkt, wo nur noch zwei Antworten bleiben. Entweder: „Weil ich so bin, wie ich bin, weil ich also *muss* = nicht anders kann" oder: „Weil ich glaube, nicht anders zu dürfen = weil ich *soll*." 'Müssen' und 'sollen', für die nicht bloß das Lateinische keinen Unterschied kennt und zwischen denen auch wir umgangssprachlich oft nicht unterscheiden, sind in Wahrheit also scharfe Gegensätze: Müssen = nicht anders können; sollen = nicht anders dürfen.

Statt der Freiheit wird das Sollen erfahren. Die Freiheit ist dann ein „Postulat", d.h. ein theoretischer Satz – ich bin frei –, der dieser Erfahrung „unzertrennlich anhängt.[11] Aber das Sollen ist nicht bloß der einzige Weg zur Erkenntnis der Freiheit, es ist nicht bloß ihr Erkenntnisgrund, sondern zugleich/zuvor ihr Seinsgrund. „Wer nicht sollen will, muss müssen."[12]

2. Die Freiheit der „freien Kunst" Philosophie gründet im Wahrheitsanspruch, der zu ihr gehört. Wahrheitsanspruch im doppelten Sinn. Erstens erhebt ihn der Philosophierende mit jedem Satz, den er behauptet. Zweitens behauptet er mit seiner Behauptung zugleich, dass er seinerseits dem Anspruch der Wahrheit an ihn zu entsprechen suche. (Das muss selbst der Lügner behaupten, wenn er ernstlich gehört werden will.)

In diesem Anspruch gründet auch die Freiheit der Wissenschaft(en), trotz deren Auszug aus dem philosophischen Geburtshaus. Diese Entwicklung hat dazu geführt, den Wahrheits-Anspruch aufzugeben und für Theorien – die als Hypothesen-Netze weder wahr noch falsch sind – nur formale Richtigkeit und inhaltliche Tauglichkeit zu behaupten. (Ein Sonder-Thema wären – im Zug um sich greifender Verwissenschaftlichung – entsprechende Tendenzen in Philosophie und Theologie selbst.) Das Pathos, mit dem Wissenschaftler – nicht bloß in Fragen des Embryonenverbrauchs – unbeschränkte Freiheit fordern, verlangt darum nach philosophischer Kritik. Und in der Tat mehren sich die Stimmen, die sich nicht mehr auf die Wahrheit berufen – so wenig wie auf die Würde des Menschen –, sondern auf den möglichen Nutzen für Behinderte und Kranke.

Versagt man sich aber diesen Tendenzen – aus Wahrheitspflicht wie um der Menschen willen, für die und mit denen wir philosophieren, dann zeigt sich in der bleibenden Differenz von Glaube und Einsicht doch auch eine Gemeinsamkeit, die biblisch als „hörendes Herz"[13] benannt werden kann, in unserer Sprache als Gewissen-Haben oder auch Gewissenhaftigkeit.

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[10] Grundlegung...: AA IV, 447.

[11] KpV: V, 122.

[12] In diesem Sinn ist G. E. LESSINGS Nathan zuzustimmen: „Kein Mensch muss müssen." (Werke [H.G. GÖPFERT], Darmstadt 1996, II, 219). Mit zwei Ausnahmen: Sterben und Sich-Entscheiden. Doch kann er selber aus der Freiheit seines Soll-Gehorsams in die Muss-Knechtschaft flüchten.

[13] SALOMON, dem Gott zu Beginn seiner Regierung einen Wunsch freistellt, antwortet (1 Kön 3,9): „Verleih deinem Knecht ein hörendes Herz."

3. Der Begriff ist zu erläutern. Zunächst sind damit jetzt nicht bloß die „Sekundärtugenden" von Sorgfalt und Genauigkeit gemeint. (so sehr auch deren Verächter sich diese nicht allein bei ihren Ärzten wünschen dürften). Sodann ist hier nicht an das „Über-Ich" verinnerlichter Eltern-Vorschriften gedacht. SIGMUND FREUDS Programm der Ich-Stärkung gegen das Es[14] bedarf der Ergänzung; nicht minder haben wir uns von der Gängelung durch das Über-Ich – und *political correctness* zu befreien.

Schließlich unterscheidet die Tradition zwei Gewissensbegriffe: Grundlegend ist das Ur- oder Prinzipiengewissen; es konkretisiert sich im Normen- oder Situationsgewissen. Ich möchte lieber von zwei Dimensionen des einen Gewissens sprechen.

Gleichsam vertikal trifft uns der Anspruch zur Entschiedenheit für das Gute. Man könnte ihn in den Imperativ fassen: Tu das Gute, meide das Böse! Mach dir ein Gewissen daraus; gewissenhaft zu leben. Das mag manchem leer und formal erscheinen. So ist „Farbe" leer und formal gegenüber rot, blau, grün. Doch hat sich diese Leere schon gefüllt, wenn man sie Schwarz-Weiß oder Geruch und Geschmack gegenüberstellt. So ist auch die „option fondamentale" für das Gute alles andere als leer „abstrakt". Dies Urgewissen heißt – auf HIERONYMUS zurückgehend – *Synteresis* oder *Synderesis* (griechisch auf der dritt-, lateinisch auf der vorletzten Silbe betont).

Tatsächlich aber haben wir es nie mit der puren Vertikalen zu tun. Die Entscheidung fällt stets in bestimmten Situationen. Die Vertikale begegnet in horizontaler Konkretheit. Diese Dimension spricht der Fachname *Conscientia* an. Während das Urgewissen, die *Synderesis*, eine Grund-Einstellung verkörpert, ähnlich dem Nicht-Widerspruch-Prinzip im Theoretischen, ist das Situations- oder auch (wie heute oft gesagt) das Werte-Gewissen, kulturell bedingt, durch gesellschaftliche Vorgaben und Erziehung geprägt. Hier ist darum auch mit Verkürzungen, Fehlsichten und dergleichen zu rechnen. Zu korrigieren sind die aber aus dem Rückgriff auf die unfehlbare Grundeinsicht im Urgewissen.

Das Urgewissen ist, wie das Nicht-Widerspruchs-Prinzip, zeitüberhoben und kulturübergreifend. Zwar gibt es offenbar Menschen, die es in sich selbst so weit zum Schweigen gebracht haben, dass sie ernstlich erklären, sie wüssten nicht, warum gut sein: *why to be moral*; doch wäre einem je ein Bösewicht begegnet, der sich nicht empört, sobald ihm selbst seiner Meinung nach Unrecht geschieht? Und diese Empörung ist etwas anderes als der Ärger über eine Niederlage. Sie versteht sich vielmehr und äußert sich durchaus moralisch. Wir sollen sittlich und (mit-)menschlich sein – und akzeptieren das auch; ja, wir wollen es unserseits (darum rechtfertigen sich Menschen).

Wem das zu preußisch pflichtmäßig klingt (dass die Erklärung „Naturstreben – *appetitus naturalis*" dem Phänomen nicht gerecht wird, sei hier nicht vertieft[15]), der versetze sich in die Situation totalen Gewissensverlusts. Vielleicht zuerst als Befreiung empfunden, stellt sie sich rasch als Katastrophe heraus: man existierte als *animal bipes*. Darin aber zeigt sich auf dem Grund der demütigenden Erfahrung, gut sein zu sollen,[16] die Erfahrung einer Würdigung: geschenkten Dürfens.[17]

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[14] „Wo Es war, soll Ich werden." (Schluss der 31. Vorlesung zur Einführung, Neue Folge [Stud. Ausg. I, 516])

[15] J. SP., Appetitus naturalis? Erneute Reflexion zu einem alten Thema, in: ThPh 63 (1988) 519-536, Freiheitsgrund Transzendenz, in: ThPh 74 (1999) 545-556.

[16] Doppelt demütigend: 1. als Sollen statt Wollen, 2. als Gesolltsein von schlicht Selbstverständlichem (Menschen- und Wahrheitsliebe) – was offenbar nötig ist, weil wir es nicht von selbst tun.

[17] Vgl. E. LEVINAS: „Er überhäuft mich nicht mit Gütern, sondern drängt mich zur Güte, die besser ist als

III. Religion?

1. An dieser sittlichen Erfahrung hat DIETER HENRICH vier Züge benannt:[18]

a) handle es sich nicht um bloße Konstatierung, sondern um ursprüngliche Billigung – nicht Setzung. „Obwohl das Gute nur in der Zustimmung sichtbar wird, ist es doch nicht durch diese gut" (84). b) müsse darum das moralische Bewusstsein sehr wohl als Einsicht beschrieben werden statt nur als Betroffensein. (A. SCHOPENHAUER in seinem Rekurs auf das Mitleid übersieht, dass der Mitleidige *recht* handeln soll. Unabschaffbares Leid z. B. stellt vor die Alternative, entweder – beteiligt – mit zu leiden oder den Leidenden abzuschaffen.) c) sei die Zustimmung eine spontane Leistung des Selbst. Mit S. KIERKEGAARD kann man darin sogar dessen Konstitution erblicken. d) stünden wir damit nicht bloß in einer Sphäre von „Geltung" und „Werten", sondern im Sein. Das Bewusstsein soll nicht bloß, es *ist* – wie das „Du sollst" und dessen Erfahrung und die Welt überhaupt, in der das Bewusstsein sich findet, die eben nicht »an und für sich« bloß aus kruden Fakten besteht. „Die sittliche Einsicht folgt zwar nicht aus einem Gedanken von der Struktur des Seins des Seienden, ist ohne einen solchen Gedanken aber auch unmöglich" (88).

Ich möchte diese vier Punkte nochmals auf zwei konzentrieren, um das Gemeinte vielleicht noch klarer zu machen: Es geht *erstens* um *Einsicht*, um *Vernunft*-Erfahrung. Dies gegen alle Spielarten des Dezisionismus, der heute die Diskussion beherrscht, weil man Vernunft auf wissenschaftliche, nur konstatierende Rationalität reduziert und diese dann bloß durch das „Emotionale" als Bezirk des Ästhetischen, Ethischen und Religiösen zu ergänzen vermag. *Zweitens* ist diese Einsicht nicht rein objektiv theoretisch; vielmehr *lässt* man *sich* (in *praktischer* Vernunft) *ergreifen*[19]: nicht durch ein Gefühl, sondern von einem *Anspruch*. Dies gegen den Intuitionismus und alle Formen des Rationalismus, für welche Sittlichkeit zuletzt aus der Erkenntnis der Zuträglichkeit (oder auch [transzendentalen] Unvermeidlichkeit) des Guten entspringt. *Beide* Momente in ihrem Zusammenghören, Einsicht(igkeit) und Unbedingtheit des Essei, ohne dass eins auf das andere zurückzuführen wäre, bilden die einzigartige Gegebenheit der sittlichen Erfahrung.

Es geht nicht bloß um das, was man will, sei es auch „eigentlich" oder „im Grunde"; sondern darum, was gewollt werden *soll*. Darum ist es mit dem Guten als dem Zuträglichen nicht getan. Die Griechen verdeutlichten es als „kalón k'agathón" = das Schöne-und-Gute. Philosophen wie geistliche Lehrer von PLATON bis FICHTE, von den biblischen Autoren bis HANS URS VON BALTHASAR, haben immer wieder zum Bildwort des Lichtes gegriffen, um die einleuchtende Selbstverständlichkeit des Gesollten und zugleich das Selbstgerechtfertigtsein und die Hoheitlichkeit des Du-sollst auszudrücken. Wer wirklich gut = sittlich handelt, verhält sich eben nicht bloß klug (geschweige denn klüglich), auch nicht „auf die Dauer und im Ganzen". Sondern er

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alle Güter, die wir erhalten können." – Gott und die Philosophie, in: Gott nennen (Hg. B. CASPER), Freiburg/München 1981, 81-123, 106f. – „Il ne me comble pas de biens, mais m'astreint à la bonté, meilleure que les biens à recevoir." De Dieu qui vient à l'idée, Paris 1982, 114.

[18] Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht und Kants Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft, in: Die Gegenwart der Griechen im neueren Denken (Hg. D. HENRICH u.a., FS H.-G. GADAMER), Tübingen 1960, 77-109.

[19] R. LAUTH hat so neben den Evidenz-Begriff den der Sazienz gestellt (von [mittellat.] *sacire* = ergreifen [saisir]: Ethik in ihrer Grundlage aus Prinzipien entfaltet, Stuttgart-Berlin 1969, 31). Ergreifen aber lässt sich der Gewissenhafte, wie LAUTH vorschlägt, nicht einfach vom Richtigen, sondern vom „Doxischen". *Doxa* bedeutet außer Meinung, Anschein, wie geläufig, auch: Willensentscheid, schließlich Aufschein, Ruhm und Herrlichkeit.

„gibt der Wahrheit die Ehre“ und sucht, der „Herrlichkeit“ des Guten zu entsprechen. Er öffnet sich in „Sazienz“ dem „Doxischen“.

2. Wird von hier her nicht verständlich, dass – mit KANTS Worten – Moral „unumgänglich zur Religion [führt]“?[20] In diesem Sinn hat F. W. J. SCHELLING das Gewissen den „einzigen offnen Punkt“ genannt, „durch den der Himmel hereinscheint“.[21] Und in seiner Freiheits-Schrift findet sich zur „Gebundenheit“ der Selbstheit „an das Licht“ die Passage:[22]

> Es sei uns erlaubt, dies, der ursprünglichen Wortbedeutung nach, durch Religiosität auszudrücken. Wir verstehen darunter nicht, was ein krankhaftes Zeitalter so nennt, müßiges Brüten, andächtelndes Ahnden, oder Fühlenwollen des Göttlichen. Denn Gott ist in uns die klare Erkenntnis oder das geistige Licht selber, in welchem erst alles andre klar wird, weit entfernt, dass es selbst unklar sein sollte; und in wem diese Erkenntnis ist, den lässt sie wahrlich nicht müßig sein oder feiern.

Markige und obendrein bedenkenswerte Worte. Doch bei ihnen stehen zu bleiben hieße, Religion wie Menschsein um entscheidende Dimensionen verkürzen. Damit würde ein nicht erst heute, doch heute besonders verbreitetes Fehlverständnis festgeschrieben: die Moralisierung von Religion wie Humanität. Auf hohem Niveau ist das bei Kant und Fichte zu diskutieren. Alltäglich zeigt es sich etwa in Außen- wie Innensicht unserer Kirchen; wo (nur leicht übertrieben) Seelsorge als Sozialarbeit gilt.

Man kann es am Gebrauch des Wortes ‘christlich’ zeigen, das im Alltagsverständnis „menschlich“ bedeutet. Dudens großes Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache[23] führt unter dem Wort an: „a) *auf Christus oder dessen Lehre zurückgehend:* die christliche Taufe [...]; b) *der Lehre Christi entsprechend*: christliche Nächstenliebe; [...] christlich handeln; Übertragung sie hat die Schokolade christlich (so dass der andere ein größeres Stück bekam) mit ihm geteilt; c) *sich zum Christentum bekennend*: die christlichen Kirchen; d) *im Christentum verwurzelt, verankert:* die christliche Kunst); die Kultur des christlichen Abendlandes; e) *der christlichen Kirche entsprechend, kirchlich:* ein christliches Begräbnis...“

Also b): statt „Orthodoxie“ „Orthopraxis“. Dazu gebe ich unter Verzicht auf eigenen Kommentar YESHAYAHU LEIBOWITZ das Wort:[24]

> Religion is not a human necessity. Of course paganism – and maybe Christianity – is a human necessity. But belief in God – not an idol but God – goes counter to all human feelings und human interests.“ Auf die Frage nach der Liebe zu Gott: The meaning of the love of God is just fulfilling the Law. In the Bible there is only one person who is called a lover of God – that is Abraham. He took his son and went so sacrifice him to God, against all human sentiments...
>
> Judaism is a theo-centric religion. Therefore Christianity is the opposition of Judaism – Christianity is an anthropo-centric religion. Christianity’s God is for the sake of Man. Judaism’s Man is for the sake of God.

SCHELLINGS Passage schloss mit „feiern“ – und zwar in dem Sinn, wie man ihn heute auch bei uns mit Sonn- und Feiertagen verbindet. Aber ist das Religion?

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[20] Religion innerhalb der Grenzen... (AA VI, 6).

[21] Über den Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt: Sämtl. Werke, Stuttgart-Augsburg 1860ff, Abt. I/9, 17.

[22] Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: SW Abt. I/7, 392.

[23] 1, Mannheim 1976, 463, unter Auflösung der Abkürzungen zitiert.

[24] MOSE BEN MAIMON, Acht Kapitel. Eine Abhandlung zur jüdischen Ethik und Gotteserkenntnis (M. WOLFF / F. NIEWÖHNER), Hamburg 1981, VII*-VIII* (Auszug aus einem Interview von 1971).

3. KANT hatte bei seinen drei bzw. vier großen Fragen der dritten: „Was darf ich hoffen?“, die Religion zugeordnet, und heutiges Religionsdenken sieht als Ziel- und Spitzenbestimmungen Begriffe wie Sinn(frage) und Heil. LEIBOWITZ hingegen spricht vom Dank für's Danken-dürfen.[25]

Auch die große Doxologie der römischen Liturgie dankt Gott ob seiner Herrlichkeit. Dann wäre Religion zuhöchst Lobpreis des Heiligen. Und ihre Mitte wären Fest und Feier.[26]

Doch uns geht es nicht um Religion, sondern darum, was sie mit Philosophie zu tun hat. In der Tat. (Übrigens hätte es auch der Religion nicht um die Religion zu gehen.) Es geht um den Menschen. Er stellt die Sinn-Frage, d. h. die Frage nach dem Wozu seines Lebens. Wie aber, wenn die Frage nach dem Sinn für ihn in eigener Konsequenz sich wandelte zur Frage nach seinem Sinn, dem Wozu seiner selbst?

Wer will nicht annehmbar und angenommen sein? Wem ist nicht lebensnotwendig die Zusage, es sei gut, dass er/sie sei? Wer will nicht dienlich, gebraucht sein? Wo anderseits findet sich ein Dienst, der uns nicht versklavt? – In diesem Sinne ist für mich die Christophorus-Legende ein Mythos von der Menschenwürde: der Suche eines Menschen nach dem höchsten Dienstherrn. So wie jemand im Disput nur dann ein vollgültiger Gesprächspartner ist, wenn es ihm um nichts weniger geht als um die Wahrheit und darum, ihr „die Ehre zu geben“, so sei im Blick auf Gott nur das Wort SENECAS zitiert: „Deo parere libertas est – Gott gehorchen ist Freiheit.“[27]

Gerade im Blick auf den Sabbat mit seinen Vorschriften, die sich um das Arbeitsverbot gruppieren, sprechen die Rabbinen davon, dass er dem ärmsten Juden eine königliche Seele verleihe. Reich ist ja nicht, wer viel besitzt, sondern wer großherzig schenkt.

Und gilt das nicht ebenso, ja erst recht, für die Philosophie? Gäbe es die Wirklichkeit und ihre Wahrheit, um unserem Erkennen und Bedenken Material zu liefern? Oder haben wir umgekehrt Erkenntnisfähigkeit, um dem, was ist, zu entsprechen? – So wie wir PLATON zufolge unsere Augen dazu besitzen, um die Sterne zu sehen, für die Astronomie.[28]

* * *

Jerusalem, Athen und Rom sind die Quellorte des Abendlands. Bewusst war nicht von der umstrittenen „christlichen Philosophie“ die Rede. Ich verstehe darunter ein Philosophieren, zu dessen *Präsuppositionen* das Christentum zählt, in dem das Christentum zwar keine Begründungen: Prämissen, liefert (denn es geht nicht um Theologie), doch eine *Entdeckungsperspektive* für Fragen und Probleme bildet.

Das kann es auf verschiedene Weisen geben. KARL JASPERS sieht drei mögliche Bedeutungen dieses Namens:[29] a) als historische Bezeichnung für das noch nicht tren-

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[25] So liest er den Lobpreis des „Gottes der Danksagungen“ im *Schemone Esre* (statt der üblichen Übersetzung: „dem Dank gebührt“.

[26] J. PIEPER, Kulturphilosophische Schriften (Werke, Hg. B. WALD, 6), Hamburg 1999, 1-44 (Muße und Kult), 152-216 (Glück und Kontemplation), 217-285 (Zustimmung zur Welt. Eine Theorie des Festes).

[27] De vita beata XV 4. – Welch andere Erklärung außer der theistischen erklärt die unbedingte Achtungswürdigkeit des Gewissens, ohne sie wegzuerklären? (J. SP., Gott-ergriffen, Köln ^{4}2006, Kap. 2: Gotteserfahrung im Gewissen) Selbstverständlich fehlte im marxistisch philosophischen Wörterbuch ein Artikel Gewissensfreiheit (die ja nicht bloß für den Kriegsdienstverweigerer gilt).

[28] Republ. VII 530 d 6.

[29] Der philosophische Glaube angesichts der Offenbarung, München 1962, 61f.

nende Bewusstsein eines AUGUSTINUS, ANSELM, CUSANUS; b) als Name für die thomistisch-scholastische Philosophie, der er freilich den philosophischen Ernst abspricht, da sie ihren Ernst im kirchlichen Offenbarungsglauben habe; c) als Kennzeichnung der abendländischen Philosophie als solcher, sofern sie im Gegensatz zur griechischen oder gar indischen und chinesischen Philosophie – von der alldurchdringenden Atmosphäre des Christlichen bestimmt ist.

Hier ging es um c). – Doch auch, wenn man den Namen enger als in der dritten und weiter als in der zweiten Bedeutung fassen würde: im Blick auf den hier vorliegenden Beitrag selbst: als Bezeichnung für ein Denken, das seine historische Christlichkeit, die ihm genau so bewusst ist wie andere ethnische, historische, soziale Bestimmtheiten (und ebenso, wie ein nicht-christlicher Philosoph sich seiner vielfachen, auch „weltanschaulichen" Bedingtheiten bewusst zu sein hat) *positiv*, bejahend übernimmt, kann ich nicht sehen, wieso dies ein „hölzernes Eisen" sein sollte (MARTIN HEIDEGGER).[30] – Statt ein christliches Philosophieren als Un-Philosophie zu verdächtigen, könnte man auch umgekehrt, mit JOSEF PIEPER, vom „Dilemma einer Philosophie" sprechen, „die weder Mythos noch Theologie kennt, und die dennoch, noch immer, das zu sein beansprucht, was Pythagoras-Platon-Aristoteles 'Philosophie' genannt haben".[31]

Wem es um die Wahrheit zu tun ist, sollte sich durch nichts bornieren lassen; am wenigsten durch antireligiöse oder antichristliche Affekte, nicht einmal durch antirömische. Israel nahm aus Ägypten Silber und Gold mit (Ex 12,35 f); *spolia Aegyptiorum* hieß danach in der theologischen Tradition die Rezeption heidnischer Wissenschaft.[32] In der Gegenrichtung sprachen Marxisten – etwas vorschnell – von „Beerben". Geht es nicht darum, gemeinsam zu leben?[33]

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[30] J. SP., Hölzernes Eisen – Stachel im Fleisch? Christliches Philosophieren, Münster 2001.

[31] Schriften zum Philosophiebegriff (Werke 3), Hamburg 1995, 300-307: Über das Dilemma einer nicht-christlichen Philosophie, 304. – Verwunderlich so, dass etwa O. HÖFFE – zudem im Kontext der Einforderung verlorener Fragen – von jüdisch-christlicher Philosophie meint, sie sei „eingeengt" und nicht auf „interkulturelle Gültigkeit" verpflichtet – gegenüber einer „Philosophie *tout court*" (F. W. J. Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, Hg. O. HÖFFE / A. PIEPER [Klassiker Auslegen], Berlin 1995, 22 u. 15). Als könnte es diese (präsuppositionsfrei, ohne Standpunkt?) wirklich geben, und als griffe nicht (wie etwa beim Projekt „natürlicher Religion") bereits das Bemühen darum „zu kurz".

Anderseits ist die christliche Grunderfahrung bislang wohl noch nicht wirklich (denk)formbildend geworden. Ich stimme MAX SCHELER zu, es sei „zu einem philosophischen Welt- und Lebensbild, das *originär und spontan* aus dem *christlichen Erlebnis* heraus entsprungen wäre, überhaupt niemals gekommen [...] es gibt in diesem Sinne und gab nie eine 'christliche Philosophie', sofern man unter diesen Worten nicht, wie üblich, eine griechische Philosophie mit christlichen Ornamenten, sondern eine aus der *Wurzel* und dem *Wesen* des christlichen Grunderlebnisses durch selbstdenkerische Betrachtung und Erforschung der Welt entsprungenes Gedankensystem versteht." Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre (GW 6), Bern-München 21963, 87 (Liebe und Erkenntnis).

[32] Z. B. AUGUSTINUS, De doctrina christiana, II, XL. 60.

[33] Man kennt den alten Joke: „Gott ist tot!"
Friedrich Nietzsche
„Nietzsche ist tot!"
Gott
Doch weiß man auch, dass er alles andere ist als christlich? Christlich nämlich hieße die Replik:
„Nietzsche lebt!"
Gott

Philotheos **9** (2009) 13-20

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Von der inneren Wahrheit des Christentums auf dem Hintergrund der uns zugänglichen Gesamtwirklichkeit

1. Zur Grundstruktur von Mensch und Welt

In allem, was der Mensch sinnenhaft wahrnimmt, sich gefühlsmäßig aneignet, verstandesmäßig verarbeitet und willensmäßig bejaht oder verneint, ist der Ausgangspunkt aller dieser Aktivitäten ein nicht mehr analysierbarer zu sich selbst erwachter Punkt der Einheit, bewusste Identität[1]. Diese Einheit kann als die in sich ruhende Personalität beschrieben werden, die als eine seelisch-geistige Gestalt in ihrem Selbststandsein zeit- und raumlos zu sein scheint und sich als religiös und sittlich geprägt erweist[2]. Diese Deutung des Menschen, der seinerseits nach der Einheit des Heiligen, Guten, Wahren und Schönen strebt – bei aller möglichen und partiellen Verfinsterung –, ergibt sich aus seiner Geistes- und Kulturgeschichte, die sich bei allem Bedingtsein als eine selbstverantwortete und damit zugleich auch als eine selbstauferbaute, also aus Freiheit gestaltete geistige Größe erweist. Dabei war der Ausgangspunkt für diese Kulturentstehung die Erfahrung der religiösen Dimension der Gesamtwirklichkeit[3].

Bei seiner Selbstreflexion erkennt sich der Mensch zunächst als fremdbestimmt. Er besitzt nicht von und aus sich seine Leibesgestalt und seine seelisch-geistige Ausstattung. Die Möglichkeiten zu fühlen, zu wollen und zu denken scheinen ihm von einer geheimnisvoll bleibenden Macht geschenkt. Trotzdem erlaubt ihm als einzigem Wesen, das wir kennen, dieses Vorgedachtsein einen Freiraum der Selbstbestimmung und der Selbstauferbauung. Diese folgen aus der ihm verliehenen Freiheit und der Phantasie, die eine Analogie zum Göttlichen und zu dessen frei wirkender Schöpfermacht zeigen[4].

In dem der Kultur vorausliegenden und sie ermöglichenden personalen, also seelisch-geistigen, Bewusstsein liegt ein Urphänomen vor, das nicht auf eine einfachere Form oder Gestalt rückführbar ist, sondern den Ausgangspunkt für alle weiteren Be-

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[1] Die Verwandtschaft von Gott und Mensch gründet wesentlich im Prinzip der Einheit. Zur Bedeutung und Geschichte der Erkenntnis von Einheit und dem Einen W. BEIERWALTES, Art. Hen (ἕν): Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum (=RAC) 14 (1988) 445-472 und die übrigen Schriften dieses Verfassers; zuletzt: Procliana. Spätantikes Denken und seine Spuren (Frankfurt, M. 2007) Reg.: ‚Eine, das'.

[2] H. HEIMSOETH, Atom, Seele, Monade. Historische Ursprünge und Hintergründe von Kants Antinomie der Teilung = Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz, geistes- und sozialwiss. Kl. 1960 Nr. 3; R. SPAEMANN, Personen. Versuch über den Unterschied zwischen ‚etwas' und ‚jemand' (Stuttgart 1996); W. M. NEIDL / F. HARTL (Hrsg.), Person und Funktion. Gedenkschrift J. Hommes (Regensburg 1998).

[3] W. SPEYER, Religionsgeschichtliche Studien = Collectanea 15 (Hildesheim, Zürich, New York 1995) IX-XIX.

[4] H. BREMOND, Mystik und Poesie, deutsche Ausgabe (Freiburg, Brsg. 1929).

trachtungen, Feststellungen und Erkenntnisse über die Gesamtwirklichkeit abgibt. Es kann daher als solches auch nur erfahren, aber nicht analysiert werden. Insofern bleibt jede Erkenntnis, sei sie theologischer, philosophischer oder einzelwissenschaftlicher Art, an den individuellen, der Welt gegenüberstehenden Menschen mit seinem Ich-Bewusstsein als an den Ausgangspunkt einer jeden Erkenntnis gebunden und ist dadurch stets auch eingefärbt.

Damit ist das Problem von Subjekt und Objekt, von Subjektivität und Objektivität gestellt, wobei das Subjekt nicht nur als ein erkennendes, sondern auch immer zugleich als ein fühlendes und wollendes Subjekt mitzubeachten ist. Ein von Fühlen und Wollen losgelöstes Denken gibt es nicht. Je mehr Denken und Erkennen an die Wortsprache und zwar in ihren völkisch-kulturellen Brechungen der Einzelsprachen gebunden sind, umso tiefer wirken das völkisch-kulturelle und das individuelle Fühlen und Wollen in die Ergebnisse des Denkens ein. Wenn es wahr ist, dass der Mensch als fühlendes, denkendes und wollendes Wesen und die Gesamtwirklichkeit, in der er steht und der er zugleich gegenübersteht, engstens aufeinander bezogen sind, wofür das antike Denken die Begriffe ‚Makrokosmos' Welt, und ‚Mikrokosmos' Mensch gefunden hat, dann enthalten auch beide einen Grundgegensatz in sich, den Grundgegensatz von Rational und Irrational[5]. Dabei geht das Irrationale als das Unbewusste dem Rationalen als dem Bewussten voran wie die Finsternis dem Licht, oder es übersteigt das Rationale, wie die intuitive und die poetische sowie die mystische Erfahrung[6].

Das Bewusstsein des Einzelnen von sich selbst als einer ‚geprägten' Größe, einer Gestalt im Sinne Goethes, bestimmt den Lebensgang des Betreffenden und hält sich trotz aller geschichtlich, also zeitlich bedingten Wandlungen durch[7]. Diese Bewusstseinsstruktur des Menschen dürfte mit der mythischen Struktur der Welt zusammenhängen; denn beide gehen der geschichtlichen Dimension sachlich und zeitlich voraus. Diese mythische Struktur zeigt sich noch an den Anfängen unserer geschichtlichen Überlieferungen. Die Anfänge des menschlichen Bewusstseins sind mythisch geprägt. Die mythische Bewußtseinsstufe ist ursprünglicher und älter als die geschichtliche und bildet die Bedingung dafür, dass diese überhaupt entstehen konnte. So folgt dem Mythos mit seinen intuitiv gewonnenen archetypischen Bildern, die auf die Grundstrukturen der Wirklichkeit hinweisen und sie erhellen – man denke an die kosmo- und anthropogonischen Mythen – das diskursive Begriffsdenken. Die ältesten Geschichtsdarstellungen beginnen mit mythischen Überlieferungen, und die religiösen griechischen Philosophen des 6. Und 5. Jahrhunderts folgen den mythischen Dichtern und den Mythologen des myth-historischen Zeitalters. Wie am Anfang unserer frühen literarischen Überlieferungen mythische Inhalte stehen, so auch mythische Verfasser, seien diese als Gottheit oder als göttlicher oder heiliger Mensch gedacht. Man denke an die Musen, Orpheus, Homer oder an Mose[8]. In der mythischen Struktur von Welt und Mensch zeigt sich wohl auch die Verwandtschaft beider mit dem göttlichen Urgrund. Dieser ist die Bedingung für die Möglichkeit der im Unbedingten und Ewigen wurzelnden raum-

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[5] W. SPEYER, Frühes Christentum im antiken Strahlungsfeld, Bd.3 = Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 213 (Tübingen 2007) Reg.: ‚Makro-/Mikrokosmos-Gedanke'.

[6] BREMOND a. O. (o. Anm. 4); W. SPEYER, Zur theologisch-philosophischen Bedeutung des Lichtes: Philotheos, International Journal for Philosophy and Theology 7 (2007) 115-123.

[7] W. STRUBE/W. METZGER, Art. Gestalt: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 3 (1974) 540-548.

[8] SPEYER, Frühes Christentum 3 a. O. (o. Anm. 5) 89-101: ‚Gottheit und Mensch, die Eltern des Kunstwerkes'.

zeitlichen Welt mit Einschluss des Menschen. Über diesen göttlichen Urgrund ist deshalb auch nur mythisch und mystisch zu sprechen[9].

Wir erfahren die Welt, in der wir leben, als einen stetigen Wechsel von Werden und Vergehen, von Leben und Tod, von Aufgängen und Untergängen, also von Gegensätzen[10]. Die Pole dieser und anderer das Ganze bestimmender Grundgegensatzpaare stehen sich nicht nur getrennt und einander abweisend gegenüber, sondern sind für uns geheimnisvoll miteinander verschränkt: Aus Totem entsteht und erhält sich Lebendes, aus Lebendem folgt Totes. Ein Dualismus zweier einander feindlicher Urprinzipien, wie ihn einige theologische und philosophische Systeme, wie der iranische Dualismus, der Manichäismus und gnostische Systeme, annehmen, dürfte aus einer vereinseitigenden Weltdeutung entstanden sein. Diese beruht nicht zuletzt auf der falschen Voraussetzung, dass die Grundgegebenheiten der Wirklichkeit ausschließlich dem logischen Gesetz der Widerspruchsfreiheit folgen. Tatsächlich ergibt sich aber auf allen Gebieten der Natur und auch der menschlichen Kultur eher eine logisch nicht verrechenbare Vereinigung gegensätzlich angelegter Grundgegebenheiten, aus der notwendig die Uneindeutigkeit der einzelnen Phänomene und auch der Gesamtheit aller Erscheinungen der uns zugänglichen Wirklichkeit folgt. Aus dieser als paradoxal zu bezeichnenden Grundstruktur der Welt, die aus Chaos und Kosmos, aus Widersinn und Sinn, aus Dunkel und Licht, aus Tod und Leben und aus Unbewusstem und Bewusstem, aus Irrationalem und Rationalem gemischt erscheint, folgt wohl auch der logisch nie beizulegende oder auflösbare Streit der rivalisierenden Weltdeutungen in der nachreligiösen rationalistisch geprägten Kulturepoche [11].

Auch die Gegensatzpole des Allgemeinen und des Einzelnen durchdringen sich; denn jeder Mensch ist als Einzelner Angehöriger des Art- und Gattungswesens Mensch, zugleich aber ist er als fühlendes, erkennendes und wollendes Individuum ein personales Subjekt. In seinem Erkennen durchdringt sich seine individuelle Struktur mit der Art- und Gattungsstruktur. Darin liegt auch die Voraussetzung für einen Dialog unter den Einzelnen und für deren subjektiv-objektives Erkennen; sie ist begründet im subjektiven Logos des Einzelnen und im objektiven Logos des Art- und Gattungswesens Mensch. Auf diesem Dialog in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart beruht die Denk-, Problem- und Erkenntnisgeschichte der Menschheit.

Solange die Menschen die in die Geschichte hineinsprechende Offenbarung Gottes, wie sie das Alte Testament enthält, nicht kannten, konnten sie den sich ihnen in der Natur zeigenden immerwährenden Kreislauf von Werden und Vergehen, von Geburt und Tod, von Anfang und Ende nicht durchbrechen. Vielmehr drängte sich ihnen die Grundüberzeugung auf, dass es ohne Tod kein Leben geben könne[12]. Sie sahen, dass ohne Nacht kein Tag entsteht und ohne den Winter kein Frühling möglich ist. Unter dem Symbol des Uroboros, jener göttlichen Schlange, die ihr Schwanzende in ihrem Munde hält, konnte diese Wirklichkeit in ihrer Janusköpfigkeit und immerwährenden Wiederkehr intuitiv/bildlich gesehen und gedeutet werden[13]. In diese Richtung weist in

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[9] Auch die diskursiv vorgehende Theologia negativa endet in der Mystik, im mystischen Schweigen.

[10] W. BEIERWALTES, Art. Gegensatz I: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 3 (1974) 105-117.

[11] W. SPEYER, Vom Paradox der Wirklichkeit. Eine philosophisch-theologische Skizze: Philotheos. International Journal for Philosophy and Theology 3 (2003) 31-39.

[12] DERS., Frühes Christentum im antiken Strahlungsfeld, Bd.2 = Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 116 (Tübingen 1999) 15-49: ‚Töten als Ritus des Lebens. Zum Sinn des Opfers'.

[13] RED., Art. Uroboros: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 11 (2001) 367 f.

Grillparzers Libussa Primislaus der Pflüger, den die priesterliche Fürstin Libussa zur Herrschaft berufen hat. Ihn fragt die weise Dienerin Dobromila nach dem, was das Erste in der Welt gewesen sei. Darauf entgegnet er: „Das Letzte, Frau! Im Anfang liegt das Ende“[14]. Diese Antwort ist aber auch umkehrbar; denn im Ende liegt auch ein Anfang. Deshalb erschien den alten Völkern der Kreis bzw. die Kugel als das Grundsymbol dieser unserer Wirklichkeit[15].

Der Pendelschlag der Zeit von einem Anfang zu einem Ende und wieder von einem Ende zu einem Anfang drängt sich dem Betrachter unserer Welt auf. Wenn aber das Viele in seiner Differenzierung auf das Eine verweist, so verweisen auch Anfang und Ende auf jenen geheimnisvollen Punkt der Einheit, der die Kräfte des Anfangs und des Endes in sich bindet[16]. Dieser erschließbare Punkt der Einheit erscheint als eine Größe, die über Anfang und Ende steht und damit zugleich über Zeit und Raum; denn nur in Zeit und in Raum beginnt und endet etwas in dieser uns zugänglichen Wirklichkeit. Der geheimnisvolle Punkt der Einheit, der als das Eine oder der Eine alle Vielheit der Erscheinungen und damit auch alle Gegensätzlichkeiten unserer Welt in sich vereint, übersteigt sie damit zugleich. Wir berühren in diesem Einheitspunkt von allem die Wirklichkeit des göttlich/schöpferischen Prinzips und des Transzendenten[17]. Damit werden Anfang und Ende, die in Zeit und in Raum begegnen, als etwas Bedingtes und Nachgeordnetes, weil Getrenntes, erkennbar. Das Eine steht in der Seinsordnung über dem Vielen, wie nach dem Vorgang älterer für uns namenloser Denker Heraklit aus Ephesos formuliert: „Alles ist eines“[18]. So weist das Viele der Erscheinungen und der der sich in den Erscheinungen zeigenden Gegensätze auf den einen und einzigen geheimnisvollen Punkt des Göttlichen hin und ist in ihm zentriert. Dieser enthält virtuell alles, was in unserem sinnenhaft zugänglichen Wirklichkeitsganzen erscheint, in sich.

Punkt, Kreis und Kugel können einmal als Bilder für die Einheit und die relative Geschlossenheit des Wirklichkeitsganzen gelten, zum anderen aber auch für jene Wirklichkeit, aus der die Wirklichkeit der Gegensätze, Vielheiten und Uneindeutigkeiten kommt, die göttlich-transzendente Wirklichkeit[19]. Da aber Schöpfer und Schöpfung im Verhältnis von Urbild und Abbild zueinander stehen, das bald als Ebenbildlichkeit, bald als unähnliche Ähnlichkeit oder Analogie aufgefasst wurde, ist auch hier wieder eine Einheit vorgegeben. Diese ist jene Einheit, die den einen transzendenten Schöpfer und seine Schöpfung miteinander verbindet. Aus dieser Einheit kann somit kein einmal ins Sein Eingetretenes gänzlich fallen. Die Einheit durchzieht als Prinzip die gesamte Wirklichkeit, die uns zugängliche und die transzendente.

Punkt, Kreis und Kugel können auch als Sinnbilder für die Einheit und relative Geschlossenheit des Wirklichkeitsganzen im Hinblick auf seine räumlich-zeitliche Entfal-

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[14] F. Grillparzer, Libussa 4. Aufzug, 1. Szene.

[15] F. KRAFFT, Art. Kreis, Kugel: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 4 (1976) 1211-1226.

[16] BEIERWALTES, Hen a. 0. (o. Anm. 1).

[17] A. P. BOS, Art. Immanenz und Transzendenz: RAC 17 (1996) 1041-1092.

[18] Vorsokratiker 22 B 50 (DIELS / KRANZ); E. NORDEN, Agnostos Theos. Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede [2](Leipzig 1923, Ndr. Darmstadt 1974) 246-250.

[19] S. o. Anm. 6. In diesen Zusammenhang gehört der den antiken Religionen geläufige Gedanke vom göttlichen Zentrum im Raum, dem Nabel der Erde, Omphalos; W.H. RÖSCHER, Der Omphalosgedanke bei verschiedenen Völkern, besonders den semitischen = Berichte und Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Kl. 70, 2 (Leipzig 1918); H.-U. HERRMANN, Omphalos = Orbis antiquus 13 (Münster, W. 1959); L. I. J. STADELMANN, The Hebrew conception of the world = Analecta Biblica 39 (Rom 1970) 147-154.

tung gelten. Diese Sinnbilder weisen zugleich auch auf die sich in dieser Einheit unserer Welt vollziehende immerwährende Wiederkehr des in der Struktur Gleichen hin, wobei dieses in der Struktur Gleiche in den Verwandlungen auf dem Hintergrund des bleibenden Gegensatzes von Sein und Werden, von Dauer und Wandlung erkennbar bleibt.

Die soeben beschriebene Grundstruktur der Wirklichkeit begegnet als der wesentliche Inhalt der echten, gewachsenen Mythen und der Riten sowie der Mysterien in den Religionen der Früh- und Hochkulturen; denn die aus der menschlichen Seele hervorgegangenen Religionen spiegeln die Wirklichkeit, indem sie deren Wesen deuten und bewusst machen. Sie bringen nichts wesenhaft Neues zur bestehenden Wirklichkeit hinzu, sondern offenbaren diese nur[20]. So bindet wieder das Prinzip der Einheit die Kultur, deren wesentlicher Ursprung in der Religion liegt, an die Natur oder Schöpfung und damit an den Schöpfer[21].

Während die Natur in allem dem Willen ihres göttlichen Schöpfers folgt und folgen muss, vermag der Mensch aufgrund seiner personalen Freiheit in seiner Schöpfung, der Kultur, dem Willen des Schöpfers mehr oder weniger zu entsprechen. Ja, er kann, wenn er will, sich auch geradezu gegen die Übereinstimmung von Natur/Schöpfung und der eigenen Kulturleistung wehren und so dem Schöpfer Widerstand leisten. Der Wert oder Unwert einer Kultur bestimmt sich aus der Übereinstimmung oder dem Widerspruch zur Schöpfungsordnung; denn eine Kultur, die diesen Namen verdient, sollte eine religiös-sittlich gebundene vergeistigte Umwandlung, Metamorphose, der Natur sein. Auch hier gilt der thomistische Grundsatz, dass das Sein das Sollen bestimmt. Wie der Mensch als Geschöpf auf den Schöpfer verwiesen ist, so sein Werk, die Kultur, auf die Gesetze der gottgewirkten Schöpfung[22].

Das Neue der göttlichen Offenbarung im Alten und Neuen Testament besteht in der nicht durch Denken zu gewinnenden Wahrheit, dass diese Welt Schöpfung des einen transzendenten, d.h. diese Welt übersteigenden, personalen Gottes ist, und zwar Schöpfung aus dem Nichts[23]. Das Verhältnis zwischen Gott und seiner Schöpfung ist das der Ähnlichkeit und zugleich der Unähnlichkeit, wobei diese Kategorien nur Hilfskonstruktionen sind, da Gott eben nicht ein Wesen ist oder ein Wesen hat wie sein Geschöpf, die Schöpfung und alles, was sie enthält. Insofern können auch die Aussagen der ähnlichen Unähnlichkeit oder der unähnlichen Ähnlichkeit nur unter Vorbehalt auf Gott, den alles Begreifen und Definieren Übersteigenden, angewendet werden. In jedem Denkakt, der sich auf den Inhalt der Vorstellung Gott bezieht, wird dieser Inhalt vergegenständlicht. Dies ist aber sachlich unmöglich, da Gott alles bedingt, alles umfasst, also auch das Denken und Erkennen und selbst noch die Freiheit des Menschen.

Erscheint dem menschlichen Betrachter die uns unmittelbar zugängliche Wirklichkeit, die wir nach der Offenbarung des Alten und Neuen Testamentes als Schöpfung bezeichnen dürfen, als ambivalent, so ist diese Ambivalenzstuktur nicht auf Gott anzuwenden, der jenseits aller Gegensätze steht. Dies ist ja gerade das Geheimnis Gottes,

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[20] SPEYER, Frühes Christentum, Bd.3 a. O. (o. Anm. 5) 103 -119: ‚Zu den antiken Mysterienkulten'.

[21] DERS., Zum Verhältnis des Menschen zur Natur in Antike und Christentum: Bezugsfelder. Festschrift G. Petersmann = Grazer Beiträge, Suppl. Bd. 11 (Salzburg 2007) 124 -136.

[22] DERS., Verlöschen der Antike heute?: S. DÜLL/O. NEUMAIER/G. ZECHA (Hrsg.), Das Spiel mit der Antike = Arianna 1 (Möhnesee 2000) 3 -16.

[23] G. MAY, Schöpfung aus dem Nichts (Berlin, New York 1978); H. KESSLER, Art. Schöpfung IV. Theologie- und dogmengeschichtlich: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche 9^3 (2000) 226-230; DERS., Art. Schöpfung V. Systematisch-theologisch: ebd. 230 -236.

dass er nicht in den Kategorien seiner Schöpfung beschreibbar ist. Hierin liegt gerade der tiefgreifende Unterschied zur Gottesvorstellung der sogenannten Volks- und Naturreligionen. Die Menschen dieser Religionen glaubten, dass die mit dem Kosmos oder der Natur gleichzusetzenden göttlichen Mächte zugleich die Macht besäßen, Leben zu schenken und zu töten, Segen zu stiften und Fluch zu bringen[24]. Die Ambivalenz der menschlich erfahrbaren Wirklichkeit war für die Menschen des mythischen Zeitalters zugleich die Ambivalenz der göttlichen Mächte, die sich in den Erscheinungen und Wirkungen dieser Welt auszusprechen schienen. Hier bestand ein Verhältnis zwischen dem Göttlichen und seiner Wirkung wie zwischen Urbild und Abbild oder Spiegelbild.

2. Zur Grundstruktur der alttestamentlichen und neutestamentlichen Offenbarung

Der sich in der Bibel offenbarende Gott zeigt sich gegenüber der Wirklichkeit, die wir unmittelbar kennen, als transzendent, d.h. er ist mit seiner Schöpfung verwandt und verbunden und von ihr getrennt und ihr überlegen. Sein Selbststand ist nicht auf sein Werk, die Schöpfung, angewiesen, sondern diese auf ihn. Sein Wesen ist Liebe, da er nicht in sich selbst verharren wollte. Aus dieser seiner Liebe folgte seine Schöpfung, die als nicht-göttlich der Geschaffenheit und damit der Bedingtheit, Begrenztheit und Endlichkeit in Raum und Zeit, der Gegensätzlichkeit und der Vielheit unterworfen ist.

Mit Recht fordert der Apostel Paulus die Menschen dazu auf, zu suchen, was über ihnen ist, d.h. den transzendenten Gott zu suchen[25]. Wir können ihn aber nur suchen, weil er sich uns bereits im Seelengrunde sowie in der sichtbaren Schöpfung und ferner in der Offenbarung des Alten und Neuen Testamentes mitgeteilt hat. Mit Hilfe der Offenbarung in Schöpfung und Heiliger Schrift erkennen wir, dass er der Schöpfung mit ihrer Gegensätzlichkeit in den strukturierenden Kräften und ihren vielen Erscheinungen, die sich gegenseitig begrenzen, auch wiederum ganz unähnlich sein muss.

Jesus von Nazareth und sein Leben als das Leben, Sterben und Auferstehen des ‚Menschen- und Gottessohnes' zeigen zunächst die Dimension der Ambivalenz in ihrer ganzen Schärfe und dies sowohl wesensmäßig als ‚Menschen- und Gottessohn' als auch lebensmäßig: vom ewigen Leben beim göttlichen Vater in das todgeweihte Leben des Menschen Jesus und wiederum durch den Kreuzestod zum wahren neuen Leben des Auferstandenen[26]. Dabei ist das Leben Jesu nicht eines unter den übrigen, sondern geradezu die Verdichtung des Menschen an sich in seiner religiös-sittlichen Höchstform: Jesus als der neue Adam oder als die erneuerte Form des Menschen als eines erhabenen Gottesgedankens.

Die Struktur der Wirklichkeit in Schöpfung bzw. in Natur und Kultur heißt: Ohne Tod kein Leben. In mannigfachen Mythen und Riten, vor allem in der rituell vollzogenen Tötung, dem Opfer, hat der Mensch diese Struktur ausgedrückt und immer erneut wiederholt[27]. Eben sie ist auch der Inhalt von Jesu Bewährung durch seine Selbsthingabe oder sein Selbstopfer am Kreuz: ohne Karfreitag kein Ostern. Das Erlösungsmysterium des Lebens Jesu Christi spiegelt dieses die Wirklichkeit bestimmende Wandlungsritual wider.

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[24] SPEYER, Frühes Christentum, Bd.3 a. O. (o. Anm. 5) 15-33: ‚Zur Erfahrung der göttlichen Macht in der Religionsgeschichte des Altertums', und Reg.: ‚Ambivalenz'.

[25] Col. 3,1 f.; NORDEN a.O. (o. Anm. 18) 272 f.

[26] C. COLPE, Art. Gottessohn: RAC 12 (1983) 19-58, bes. 41. 43.

[27] SPEYER, Frühes Christentum, Bd.2 a. O. (o. Anm. 12); DERS., Das Märchen von Amor und Psyche und Goethes ‚Selige Sehnsucht': Festschrift F. Felten (--------2008).

In der Einzigartigkeit des vorhergesagten leidenden Gottesknechtes und Gerechten bei Deutero-Jesaia, d.i. des Erwählten Gottes, des exemplarisch heiligen Menschen in Gestalt des Gottessohnes Jesus Christus, wird die soeben beschriebene Grundstruktur der Wirklichkeit virtuell bereits in das Eschaton dieser Erde geführt[28]. Tatsächlich beginnt die letzte Periode der Geschichte mit der Gottesoffenbarung an Abraham, mit der Geschichte der ‚Väter' und Israels und wird über Mose zu den Propheten bis zu Johannes dem Täufer und schließlich bis zu Jesus Christus und dem Zeitalter seiner Kirche geführt.

Statt des immerwährenden Kreislaufes von Leben und Tod, Sieg und Niederlage, Erfüllung und Enttäuschung, von Auf und Ab gibt es nach der jüdisch-christlichen Offenbarung nur einen einzigen Kreis, der nicht auf eine Ebene beschränkt ist, sondern als eine offene Spirale anzusehen ist: an deren Anfang und an deren Ende steht der transzendente Gott. Dieser Spiralkreis führt in einer Steigerung von der Schöpfung am Anfang durch Umwandlung zur Rückführung der Schöpfung aus der Geschichte in die Ewigkeit Gottes, in der dann die alte Schöpfung aufgehoben ruht.

Wenn der Tod Jesu als Opfer und zwar als freiwillig vollzogenes Opfer für die Menschheit von der frühen Kirche gedeutet wurde, so ist damit auch der ursprüngliche Sinn des Opfers, wie er aus den Volks- und Naturreligionen erhebbar ist, bewahrt geblieben: Die gewaltsame Tötung mit Vergießen von Blut, herbeigeführt durch Menschen, die gegenüber ihrem Opfer, das passiv bleibt, aktiv handeln, stellt eine neue Kraftquelle, eine neue Wirklichkeit für die Gemeinschaft her, schafft ihr neues Leben[29]. Im Falle des Opfertodes Jesu Christi ist dieses neue Leben aber nicht wieder vom Tod überschattet, sondern ist neues und zwar ewiges Leben, das virtuell bereits der gesamten Schöpfung zukommt. Damit die Menschen dieses verstehen, hat Gott die Sprache der Menschen angenommen, ist zum *Logos embiblos* geworden, zum Wort der Heiligen Schrift, so wie er in Jesus von Nazareth als fleischgewordenes Wort, als *Logos ensarkos*, wohnt. Auf dem Hintergrund der Heilsgeschichte als des Erlösungszusammenhangs kann der Tod des einzelnen Menschen auch niemals nur Ende sein, sondern bedeutet wieder Anfang ähnlich der Geburt und zwar Rückkehr zum transzendenten Schöpfergott, der als der Allgütige nicht will, dass etwas seiner Werke und Taten verlorengeht und damit ins Bodenlose falle; denn Gott ist; er ist alles in allem[30], das Nichts aber ist nicht. Insofern trifft die Lehre des Parmenides die Wahrheit, aber nur annähernd[31]; denn Gottes Sein ist nicht das kontingente Sein, das verursachte, geschöpfliche und damit das zweitursächliche Sein, das uns unmittelbar zugänglich ist und an dem wir auch selbst teilhaben, sondern vielmehr das transzendente Sein des Schöpfers, Erhalters und Erlösers, der personal, d.h. in einer Personalität, die die unsrige um ein Unendliches übersteigt, zugleich auch in seiner Schöpfung anwesend ist.

Erkennen wir, dass Gottes Geist in allem Erschaffenen wirkt, und das Erschaffene fortwährend ins Sein führt und im Sein erhält, so müssen wir zu der Einsicht gelangen, dass die Schöpfung unmittelbar mit Gott verbunden ist. Sie ist nicht nur von ihm verursacht, sondern hat in ihrem verliehenen Sein nur durch Gott Bestand. Seinen Geist, das ist den Heiligen Geist, hat er in die Schöpfung entlassen, damit dieser sie führe und erneuere.

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[28] Jes. 42, l-4 (5-9); 49, l-6 (7-13); 50, 4-9 (10-11); 52, 13-53, 12; E. HAAG, Art. Knecht Gottes: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche 6^3 (1997) 154 -156.

[29] S. o. Anm. 12.

[30] 1 Cor. 15, 28.

[31] Vorsokratiker 28 B 6 (DIELS/ KRANZ).

Der Mensch als das einzige über Selbstbewusstsein verfügende Wesen dieser raum-zeitlichen Welt, von dem wir wissen, ist allein befähigt, Gottes Wirken, seinen Geist in allem Geschaffenen zu erkennen. Die Unmöglichkeit, dass es für die von Gott aus Liebe in seine Schöpfung hineingelegten Geistfunken, dass es für die Schöpfung und den Menschen vollständige Nichtung geben könne, ist damit zugleich ausgesprochen.

Die Möglichkeit, dass die Welt wieder zu Gott zurückkehrt, ist mit der Tatsache ihrer Geschöpflichkeit zumindest angedeutet. Insofern stehen das erste Buch des Alten Testamentes und das letzte Buch des Neuen Testamentes, die Apokalypse des Johannes, in Korrespondenz zueinander. Schöpfung am Anfang dieser Wirklichkeit und verwandelte Schöpfung am Ende dieser Wirklichkeit bedeuten dann Ausgang von Gott und Rückkehr zu Gott.

Wer die Schöpfung durch Gott anzunehmen bereit ist, muss zum Glauben an das Weiterleben nach dem Tode sowie an die Umwandlung des Lebens gelangen. Wenn Gott bewusster Geist ist, so hat er in den Menschen etwas von sich hineingebildet, das über das Übrige der Schöpfung hinausragt. Dieser Gottesfunke der Geistseele, der nach Gottes Willen sich verleiblicht hat, wird das Welken des Leibes überstehen. Der Verleiblichung der Seele am Anfang entspricht ihr Herausgehen am Ende, wie es bereits die Orphiker, Pythagoreer und Platon sowie die Platoniker angenommen haben. Die beiden Rite de passage im Werden der Zeugung und der Geburt sowie im Sterben und Tod sind Wandlungen des von Gott geschaffenen Seelen-, Geist- und Lichtfunkens. Die Ewigkeit dieser Seelen- und Geistfunken folgt aus ihrer Herkunft aus dem Zentrum, das Gott ist. Ihre Verwandlung ergibt sich aus der Tatsache ihres Eingesenktseins in eine raum-zeitliche Dimension, also ihrer Verleiblichung, und damit ihres sinnenhaften In-Erscheinen-Tretens.

Die Zeitdauer dieses Innewohnens der Seele im Leib ist die Zeit der Bewährung. Die Lebensspanne des Menschen bedeutet dann die Möglichkeit, die mit der Geschöpflichkeit gegebene Wirklichkeit seines Selbst und dessen Auftrag zu verstehen und zu nutzen: Dann ist Schöpfung und zwar Geschöpflichkeit des je Einzelnen Auftrag, wie es das Buch Genesis mit dem Hinweis auf Gottes Befehl ausdrückt[32]. Die ungeheure Dynamik, die mit der Schöpfung ins Dasein trat, zeigt den Willen Gottes zur Gestaltung und zur Umgestaltung, um zu höheren und reineren Formen zu gelangen[33]. Der Mensch ist hier aufgerufen, Gott nachzuahmen. Darin träte dann wieder die von der Genesis behauptete Verwandtschaft zwischen Gott und Mensch zu Tage, aufgrund derer der Mensch seinen schöpferischen Kulturauftrag zu erfüllen hat[34]. Gerade dieser Gedanke der Verwandtschaft des Menschen mit Gott trägt die gesamte Verkündigung Jesu. Sie bildet den Ausgangs- und den Zielpunkt seines Erscheinens und Lehrens. So bilden die Gedanken Schöpfung, Verwandtschaft von Mensch und Gott, Erlösung durch den Menschen- und Gottessohn Jesus aus Nazareth eine einzige Kette, deren Anfang und Ende Gott ist.

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[32] Gen. 1, 28.
[33] J. W. Goethe, Faust, 2. Teil, 1. Akt Vers 6287 f.
[34] Gen. 1, 26; 5, 1; 9, 6 par.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 21-27

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О возможностях гуманитарной эпистемологии в экзистенциально феноменологическом дискурсе религиозных явлений

Современные подходы к изучению религиозных традиций предполагают когнитивное умение исследователя «соотносить религиозный феномен с его объектом как он обозначен и как дан в культуре и в вере, в ритуале и мифе»[1]. В этом случае мы сталкиваемся с эпистемологическими проблемами включения в официальный философский дискурс не только социо-культурных и исторических факторов, но и личностного уровня осмысления религиозного опыта. Наше обращение к гуманитарной эпистемологии вызвано её традиционным вниманием к субъекту как целостному человеку познающему, реконструкция которого и, соответственно, приёмы его познания научнообоснованно сопрягаются с культурой и социумом, и, что не менее важно для изучения религиозного феномена, с типическими индивидуально-личностными характеристиками. С другой стороны, современное философское понимание истины, как продукта конвенций, выводит познание за пределы его логико-методологического прочтения и позволяет творчески включить когнитивный потенциал экзистенциально-антропологической традиции в построение новой эпистемологии интегративных стратегий исследования объектов повышенной сложности, к которым относится религия.

Русской философской традиции всегда было присуще неприятие сциентизма, отвергавшего гуманитарные науки как не имеющие познавательного значения. Развитие этой темы мы находим и у современных авторов, например, в практической концепции познания Лекторского В. А., стремящегося преодолеть узкий научный натурализм[2], во взглядах Ильенкова Э. В. на объективность идеальных феноменов, которые характеризуют, по его мнению, не просто способ существования человека в локальной среде, а являются предусловием отношения субъекта с миром[3], в идеях Микешиной Л.А. о синтезе когнитивных практик и диалоге двух традиций – рассудочно-рациональной (картезианской) в её современном виде и экзистенциально-антропологической[4], в философии Бахтина М.М., рассматривавшего эпистемологический акт как тренарное отношение, где субъект относится к объекту через систему ценностных или коммуникативных отношений и т.д.. Центральный замысел этих авторов – обоснование точки зрения, согласно ко-

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[1] Рикёр П. Конфликт интерпретаций. Очерки о герменевтике. Москва. 2002. С. 394.
[2] См.: Лекторский В.А. Субъект, объект, познание. Москва: Наука. 1980
[3] См.: Ильенков Э.В. Философия и культура. Москва: Политиздат. 1991.
[4] Микешина Л.А. Философия познания. Москва: Прогресс-Традиция. 2002.

торой идеальные феномены типа причин, оценок и смыслов могут существовать объективно, т.е. независимо от сознания и воли индивидуумов, поскольку человек живёт и в естественном мире, и в области безграничного смысла[5].

Изменившийся «образ науки», её приближение к реальности, к изменяющемуся, творческому человеческому познанию, предполагает расширение канонов и принципов научной рациональности. Проблема ценностей стала широко рассматриваться в контексте философии науки и эпистемологии, что по-новому актуализирует онто-гносеологическую проблематику, о которой мы поговорим ниже.

В тоже время экзистенциально-антропологическая познавательная традиция несёт в себе не отрефлексированные «официальным» философским дискурсом возможности обновления эпистемологических характеристик религиоведческих исследований. К сожалению, гуманистическая и когнитивная значимость экзистенциально-антропологической традиции ещё не стала общепризнанной в эпистемологии, хотя Лихачёв, Бахтин, Ухтомский и др. представители русской гуманитарно-философской мысли дали блестящий пример онто-гносеологического анализа проблемы бытия субъекта, рассматривая обладание истиной не только как его онтологическую характеристику, но и как «условие возможности» его бытия.

Малоисследованными являются возможности экзистенциально-феноменологического дискурса, расширяющего границы реальности, доступной познанию[6] не столько за счёт понятий и категорий в привычном для нас смысле, сколько благодаря *концептам (например, субъекта, жизни, опыта, веры и т.д.), содержащим в себе некий феномен, не редуцируемый к строго логической форме, но имеющий глубокое, культурно-историческое и гуманитарное содержание.* Если рассматривать концепты как когнитивные сущности (Микешина Л.А.), предстающие в виде «смыслообразов», а также сложных структурных образований, состоящих в том числе из элементов дологической и довербальной природы, то мы сможем выйти за границы абстрактных схем и понятий традиционной гносеологии, увлечение которыми приводит к излишней схематизации и теоретизации религиозных явлений, превращая знания о религии в «музей понятий» (слова П. Рикёра). В тоже время исследование концептов открывает уникальные возможности развития рациональной модели целостного познания без построения наукообразных иррационалистических теорий магико-герметического толка, а эпистемологическая актуализация текстов и языка с его структурными формами в «человекоразмерных» технологиях экзистенциально-феноменологического и герменевтического дискурсов расширяет содержание нашего представления о рациональности, придавая ей форму «гибкой» или «открытой» рациональности.

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[5] В истории человеческой мысли известный науке и философии парадокс человеческой субъективности имеет разные прочтения; см. подробнее: Человенко Т.Г. Философия Э. Гуссерля как источник феноменологических исследований в религиоведении // Философия науки: актуальные историко-научные и методологические проблемы. – Белгород. 2007. С. 238-265.

[6] Историю расширения «предельных» условий возможности обретения субъектом объективного опыта можно проследить на изменении трактовки понятия феномен: Кант в традициях классической философии резко разделяет явление и сущность, феномен и ноумен; Гуссерль с переходом на неклассическую парадигму философствования, коррелирует феномен и сознание, придавая ему уже онтологическую окраску; Хайдеггер, развивая фундаментальную онтологию, определяет феномен как структуру индивидуированной экзистенции; современные авторы в духе посттрансцендентальной онтологии феномена и реалистической феноменологии, коррелируют его с опытом (например, Сафронов П.А.), выходя в область личностного (но не личного) измерения, где познание производится не неким чистым разумом, а лицом, попадающим в ситуации, где возникают задачи, указывающие на феномены.

В этом смысле нам представляется плодотворной идея «парадоксальной» рациональности, поскольку продуктивно само противоречие, заложенное в ней: «…любая точка зрения, претендующая на обобщение (всеобщее), сама моментально опознаётся как особая, укоренённая в контексте (среде) “здесь и теперь”. Границы этой среды задаются многообразием конфликтующих друг с другом и дополняющих друг друга научных и философских претензий на всеобщее»[7]. Осознать взаимную дополнительность «претензий на всеобщность» можно только с выходом на метауровень по отношению к каждой из рациональных «точек зрения». Поэтому «“опыт предельного” – это опыт рационального мышления, которое остаётся самим собой благодаря тому, что *трансцендирует, “превосходит себя”,* чтобы создать себе новую перспективу, осознавая “предельность” и этой перспективы и необходимость нового выхода за её пределы. Эта череда *умираний* и *воскрешений* рациональности осуществляется через работу индивидуальных сознаний, поэтому она имеет и экзистенциальное измерение»[8].

Развивая данный подход, мы сталкиваемся с проблемой возможной степени абстрагирования. Стремление к преодолению предельной абстрактности логико-гносеологического анализа не должно неоправданно «снижать» уровень абстракции, поскольку может привести к психологизму, растворяющему субъект познания в его конкретных свойствах.

Очевидно, что это проблема конструктивного взаимодействия методологии и конкретных методов исследования с осознанной экспликацией ценностных принципов. Другими словами – *нахождения границы, меры или формы синтеза абстрактного и чувственно-конкретного, так называемого экзистенциального обоснования абстракций.* Эта тема фундаментальна и постоянна не только в гуманитарных, но и в философских, и тем более присутствует в современных богословско-антропологических исследованиях. Но в истории философии и науки она проблематизируется по-разному, поскольку экзистенция как модус человеческого бытия, и феномен, как структура индивидуированной экзистенции, раскрывающей смысл бытия, являются не только характеристиками наших «глубинных» познавательных возможностей, но и теми уровнями бытия, где «высвечивается» пограничное пространство, доступное нашему предельному восприятию реальности.

Наше обращение к экзистенциализму объясняется его способностью сопрягать индивидуацию и трансценденцию через сопряжение смысла бытия и смысла экзистенции. Отсюда родство теологии и фундаментальной онтологии, которое традиционно мы усматриваем в западноевропейском философском понимании феномена как «само-по-себе-себя-кажущего» (Хайдеггер), но которое присутствует и в русской философии, где религиозный феномен рассматривается как то, что «даёт возможность» познания «сущего в себе», когда познавая религиозное явление в его внешних характеристиках, мы имеем некоторое приближение к постижению, «схватыванию» самого сущего. Религиозный феномен приобретает здесь совсем некантовское основание, так называемое «метафизическое существо» как абсолютную основу всех религиозных явлений.

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[7] Киященко Л.П., Тищенко П.Д. Опыт предельного – стратегия «разрешения парадоксальности в познании // Синергетическая парадигма: Когнитивно-коммуникативные стратегии научного познания. Москва. 2004. С. 233.

[8] Порус В.Н. У края культуры. Москва. 2008. С.370.

Хайдеггер пытаясь восстановить «истинное», досократовское понимание метафизики, синтезирует его с трансценденцией, которую он не мыслит теологически, но понимает её как зияющую пустоту и мрак хаоса[9]. В отличие от него русские философы, используя неоплатоническую основу для своего философствования, ищут пути трансцендирования в такую пустоту, где открывается благодать и свет[10], тем самым по своему решая одну из самых острых проблем теории познания: как, выходя в мир всеобщего и необходимого путём абстракций, сохранить «мир живой становящейся человечности», оставаясь при этом в сфере философского (а не психологического) размышления и не попадая в замкнутый круг релятивизма[11].

С этой же проблемой сталкивается современная эпистемология, обращаясь к наработкам гуманитарной науки. Меняется само понимание рациональности, её традиционные характеристики (логичность, последовательность, каузальность, когерентность) дополняются глубинными составляющими, т.к. динамичность, изменчивость, подвижность. Для того, чтобы отрефлексировать этот новый для эпистемологии глубинный уровень рациональности необходимы абстракции, которые создаются не формально-логическими средствами, а средствами гуманитарных наук: метафорами, аналогиями, повторами или умолчаниями, аллегориями, символами, «возвышением» стиля, применением установки-стереотипа, созданием эмоционального настроя с помощью построения самого текста, способом изложения[12] и т.п.. Эти способы абстрагирования характеризует не столько предельная степень общности, сколько сохранение содержательной стороны абстракций, рефлексия ценностных факторов. И интересуют они нас не с точки зрения их общеметодологического характера, а с точки зрения зависимости характера и уровня абстракций от мировоззренческих целей и предпосылок.

Приёмы абстрагирования применялись в древнерусской и средневековой церковной литературе: предельное «возвышение» стиля и языка путём исключения бытовой лексики, повторов синонимов, сочетания сходных сравнений, стирающих все видовые отличия и сохраняющих лишь самое общее, абстрактное; повторение эпитетов, однокоренных слов и других элементов текста; проявление таинственности и невыразимости явления; наконец своеобразный «абстрактный психологизм» при описании действующих лиц. Подобные приёмы отражали стремление «найти общее, абсолютное и вечное в частном, конкретном и временном, невещественное в вещественном, христианские истины во всех явлениях жизни»[13]. Разрушая конкретность и материальность мира, поднимая события жизни действующих лиц над

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[9] Подобное Ничто способно вызвать у человека «фундаментельное настроение ужаса» и тоски, подчёркивает Нижников С.А., и возвратить его даже не к досократовской философии, а к ещё более древней хтонической мифологии; ср.: «Чем-то непреодолимо пустым веет на меня от такого понятия бытия», см. подробнее: Бубер М. Затмение Бога. Мысли по поводу взаимоотношений религии и философии // Два образа веры. Москва. 1999. С.494; он же. Проблема человека. Киев. 1998.

[10] Русские религиозные философы, содержательно соотнося явление с понятием «сущность», придали метафизике персоналистическую окрашенность через категорию веры, которая “требует от человека некоего усилия воли, определяемого нравственным решением искать то, что имеет ценность”; см.: Франк С. Л. С нами Бог. Три размышления. Париж. 1964. С.80.

[11] Разработке метафизике веры в контексте русской религиозной философии посвящены работы Нижникова С.А.. См., например: Нижников С.А. Проблема духовного в западной и восточной культуре и философии. Москва. 1995; Метафизика веры в русской философии. Москва. 2001; Философия Канта в отечественной мысли. Москва. 2005.

[12] См. подробнее: Микешина Л.А. Указ. соч. С.102-122.

[13] Лихачёв Д.С. Исследования по древнерусской литературе. Ленинград. 1986. С. 26-28.

обыденностью, рассматривая их под знаком вечности, они тем самым переводили объект познания, как бы мы сказали сегодня, на трансцендентальный уровень.

Новые методы рефлексии философско-мировоззренческих компонентов мы находим в трудах Д. С. Лихачёва, который опирался на принципы историзма и целостности. Например, его исследования о влиянии балканского юга на древнерусскую культуру XIV – XV вв. учитывали мировоззренческие и культурно-исторические предпосылки. Эти влияния и взаимовлияния он видит в самых разных областях культуры (не только в текстах), что позволило ему сформулировать некоторые теоретические обобщения, и, прежде всего, «явление единого умственного движения». Изучая конкретные проявления этого феномена, он исследует его идейную и философскую сущность, выясняет ценностные предпосылки и основания. Например, изучение скрытых, неявных философско-мировоззренческих предпосылок переводческой деятельности Константина Философа позволили Лихачёву сделать вывод, что в основе его особого внимания к слову, букве, графике и орфографии лежат его воззрения на язык церкви, богослужения, Священного Писания. За этим стремлением к буквализму Лихачёв видит глубинные религиозно-философские предпосылки, которые шли от исихазма – учения, отождествлявшего слово и сущность явления, имя Бога и самого Бога.

Эти же ценностные предпосылки, считает Лихачёв, лежат и в основе сложившегося в России XVI в. стиля «плетения словес», для которого характерны внимательное отношение к звуковой, этимологической стороне слова, к тонкостям семантики, поиски выразительности, адекватной передачи сущности изображаемого. Чувство, подчёркивает Лихачёв, «каким бы сильным оно ни было, само по себе, без связи с мировоззрением, не может ещё определить собою всех особенностей стиля»[14].

Таким образом, на место узко текстологического рассмотрения древнерусской литературы приходит объёмное исследование, в котором учитываются не только внешние, вербализованные в текстах особенности бытия и стиля, но и скрытые глубинные процессы самих культур, их взаимодействия и взаимопроникновения на уровне философско-мировоззренческого «умственного движения». Кстати сказать, именно такой подход позволил Лихачёву поставить фундаментальную проблему восточноевропейского Предвозрождения, возникшего на основе «единого умственного движения» – общения славян в XIV – начале XV века. Одновременно меняется образ научной текстологии: история письменного памятника стала пониматься как история создавших его людей, т.е. в тесной связи с мировоззрением, идеологией авторов, с общими проблемами культуры, «человековедения» в целом. Изменения текста памятников стали изучаться не только по внешним признакам, но и в связи с изменением содержания памятников, их идейной направленностью.

Аналогичный поиск мы видим и в трудах современных православных богословов, которые в своём стремлении объёмно исследовать феномен святоотеческого богословия, рассматривают и социокультурные аспекты его познавательной активности. «Адекватная оценка всякого вообще явления возможна только изнутри того контекста, в котором оно появилось и развивалось, – утверждает епископ Иларион Алфеев. И богословие каждого отца Церкви должно изучаться с максимально возможным для нас приближением к той исторической, богослов-

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[14] Лихачёв Д.С. Указ. соч. С. 25.

ской, культурной и языковой обстановке, в которой он жил»[15]. Этим объясняется общее исследовательское внимание к экзистенциальной рефлексии духовной тематики, к таким её средствам как повторяемость образов, сочетание сходных сравнений, метафор, эпитетов, использование традиционных сочетаний, в которых отражаются сложившиеся богословские представления, указания на религиозное понимание сущности явлений. Благодаря этим средствам достигается не только отвлечённость богословской мысли, но и отвлечённость чувств, стираются все ощутимые признаки и сохраняется лишь эмоционально-возвышенное описание[16]. Использование подобного рода абстракций помогает достичь и чисто мировоззренческих, философско-богословских результатов – утверждения приоритета духовного над материальным, а также глубины, таинственности и невыразимости духовного. Зыбкость всего материального и телесного при повторяемости и извечности всех духовных явлений – таков мировоззренческий принцип, становящийся одновременно и принципом стилистическим, подчёркивает Д.С. Лихачёв. Анализ неявных предпосылок и оснований применения абстракций в древнерусской литературе позволил Лихачёву сделать методологически значимый вывод: «Абстрагирующие приёмы стиля конца XIV – XV вв. лежат в тесной связи с теми задачами, которые ставили себе писатели того времени, находятся в строгой зависимости от их мировоззрения…», т.е. от их системы ценностей[17].

Примечательно, что парадоксальность стиля древнерусской литературы «второго южнославянского влияния», заключающаяся в его новом отношении к человеку, в признании ценности индивидуальных переживаний, перекликается с общими рефлексивными задачами современной гуманитаристики. Внутренний мир человека не подлежит полной рефлексии и вербализации, поэтому вместо статичности описаний, что мы наблюдаем в схоластических текстах, древнерусской литературе присущ крайний динамизм, хотя сам стиль остаётся при этом абстрагирующим. Таким образом, изображение человека остаётся «абстрактно психологическим», наиболее соответствующим религиозному миросозерцанию.

В тоже время современные философско-эпистемологические исследования метафоры и других проявлений «гибкой рациональности» подчёркивают их возможности в восстановлении единства смыслового поля, размежёванного разными понятийными структурами[18]. Поскольку смыслопорождающее начало присуще экзистенции (Хайдеггер), наши поиски эпистемологического выражения «новой рациональности» акцентируют наше внимание на особенностях экзистенциального дискурса. Но сама экзистенция неопределима, т.к. она не выводится из чего бы то ни было, не имеет оснований и предпосылок, её нельзя объяснить. Но она может переживаться и констатироваться по своим следствиям. Выражение в слове чувств, эмоций возможно только через использование метафор, которые в отличие от понятий в большей степени приспособлены выражать экзистенцию. Метафора ука-

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[15] иг. Иларион Алфеев. Святоотеческое наследие и современность // Православное богословие на пороге третьего тысячелетия. Материалы богословской конференции РПЦ. Москва. 2000. С. 88.

[16] Лихачёв Д.С. Указ. соч. С. 29-30, 34.

[17] Лихачёв Д.С. Указ. соч. С. 34, 35-36.

[18] См. подробнее: Порус В.Н. Рациональность, наука, культура. Москва. 2002; От теории научной рациональности к философской антропологии // Рационализм и культура на пороге третьего тысячелетия. III Российский философский конгресс. Ростов-на-Дону. 2002. Т. 4. С. 63-73; Рациональность философии как ценность культуры // Полигнозис. 2003. №2. С. 3-21; Порус В.Н. У края культуры. Москва. 2008.

зывает на то, что за границами логического дискурса есть поле целостного (до-дискурсивного) смысла, на то, что есть глубины, где, собственно, и происходит действие ratio. Внутренняя иррациональность мышления обнаруживается не в столкновении метафоры и рациональности, а в том, что сама рациональность раскрывается как «препарированная метафоричность», когда способность понимания «ссыхается» в рациональных процедурах, по выражению Поруса, приобретая удобную для хранения и трансляции форму. Отношения метафоры и рациональности поэтому имеют не соподчинённый характер (в смысле господства и подчинения), а сопряжённый, поскольку они связаны общими функциями и служат общим целям.

Таким образом, приёмы гуманитарной эпистемологии существенно расширяют традиционные приёмы абстрагирования и диапазоны их применения, т.е. принципы историзма, ценностного подхода и социокультурной обусловленности вводятся в основные специально выбранные или созданные абстракции. Эти средства широко используются в герменевтике, феноменологических, экзистенциальных текстах и должны быть включены, на наш взгляд, в «официальный» философский дискурс применительно к исследованиям религии.

Конечно, экзистенциально-антропологическая традиция познания и понимания истины до сих пор не имеет в европейской философии и культуре такого значения как логико-методологическая: не сложился понятийный базис, не отрефлексированы многие концептуальные идеи и, главное, гуманистическая значимость традиции ещё не стала приоритетной по сравнению с застарелым опасением впасть в когнитивный релятивизм. Но наличие в современной культуре тупика, связанного с моральным релятивизмом[19], заставляет признать, что господствующая логико-методологическая традиция, удалив «хирургическим» путём вместе с психологизмом и релятивизмом человека и «человеческое измерение» из научного познания, превратила духовно-нравственные ценности в абстракции, предуготовив им жизнь отдельно от человека и человеческих поступков.

Сейчас уже стало общим местом, что по отношению к религии формально-логическая дефиниция через указание рода и видового отличия не даёт желаемых научных результатов, но в содержании понятия религии имеются компоненты, фиксирующие её наиболее глубинные, фундаментальные качества, высвечивающиеся в сущем, в существовании, в бытовании и которые можно раскрыть на экзистенциально-феноменологическом уровне. Здесь мы сталкиваемся с трудностями и коллизиями в решении проблемы универсального // уникального, которые многократно возрастают, если исследователь работает в жёсткой матрице предельных абстракций и схем, таких как «рациональное-иррациональное», «логическое-интуитивное», «когнитивное-ценностное» и т.д. Для преодоления схематизма и вульгаризации проблемы необходимо изменение нашего представления о структуре эпистемологического акта, раскрытие его собственно философской природы, необходимо преодоление абсолютизации теоретизированного подхода, разнообразие понятийного аппарата, способного существенно расширить приёмы абстрагирования и диапазоны их применимости. Поэтому философская рефлексия синтеза характеристик, фиксирующих различные стороны религии, может осуществляться и в экзистенциально-феноменологического дискурсе, имеющего уникальную историю в русской философии.

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[19] См. подробнее: Порус В.Н. У края культуры. Москва. 2008.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 28-44

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The Moral and Ethical Transfigures of Human Entity to a Human Being in the Platonic Dialogue Alcibiades I

Within the framework of the ancient Greek tradition, the relationship between tutor and tutee was one of the most interesting issues, from both theoretical and practical points of view. In fact, it should be noted that it had not just a pedagogical perspective but was also directly related to social and political issues. It was a relationship substantially reflecting an aspect of the creative political presence of a responsible citizen who obtained the necessary skills to transcend individualism and passivity through the personality and commitment of his tutor. The pedagogical relationship, which is represented significantly by Socrates who, through his dialectic method[1], by teaching his students to become responsible political beings, is for the pedagogical Anthropology one of its main issues. Socrates attempts through ethics and political deontology[2] to form beings by developing its consciousness. One aspect of this pedagogical attempt is shown in the Platonic dialogue *Alcibiades I*[3], a text par excellence valued for its representation of both Mid-Platonism and Neoplatonism[4].

When studying the intercourse between Socrates and Alcibiades, one can simultaneously detect both an opportune anthropological intent and an existential one; that is, how Alcibiades, a student of Socrates, is to discover the deepest core of his entity, his

[1] Socrates develops his own dialectical approach while he is teaching his students. He intended to formulate his students to mature political entities. Such an intention is always a essential and important issue of political and ethical education, since every paideutical system has to face the crucial question to develop beings to mature political entities, which again protects from a materialistic view of life.

[2] Within the whole framework of the deontology towards ethics and politics the issue of the constitution of the Principles which refer to intellectual activities in a whole city-life is coming up to the surface and enlight their strict relation to the acquisition of knowledge about the self.

[3] See, Plato, *Alcibiades* (edited by Nicholas Denyer), Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 10: "The dramatic context of *Alcibiades'* arguments gives the bearest thing we have to Plato's own indication of what he takes their force to be. Some arguments, like the tricky ones in 113d–116d concluding that justice is expedient, are presented at a point in the drama when Alcibiades needs, more than anything else, to learn other things, such as, for example, the expeciency of justice."

[4] About the importance of the dialogue among Platonists and Neoplatonists, see Fetz Reto Luzius, *Dialektik der Subjektivität: Die Bestimmung des Selbst aus der Differenz von Ich und Mein, Sein und Haben: Alkibiades I, Epiktet, Meister Eckhart*, in: Geschichte und Vorgeschichte der modernen Subjektivität, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1998, pp. 182-183: „In der Platonischen Akademie galt sie seit dem Lehrkatalog des Albinus, d. h. seit dem nachchristlichen Jahrhundert als die Einführungs- und Läuterungsschrift für den angehenden Philosophen, Jamblich, Proklos, Olympiodor sehen sie darüber hinaus als jene Grundschrift an, die am besten das gesamte Platonische Denken erschliesst." See also the notes of A. P. S. Segonds about *Alcibiades I* in the introduction of the book *Alcibiades I*, Tome I, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1985, pp. VII-CXLVIII.

intellectual potential, his ethical controversy and his substantial interest in life which provides the platonic Socrates as the educative aspects of an ethical and spiritual manipulation.. Consequently, this will help him to acquire self-knowledge and to realize the paths he has to follow in order to give meaning to his existence. From the viewpoint of Socrates, the student, before he is taken under the wing of his tutor, is not only a maladroit and unshaped being but also a source of inexhaustible yet simultaneously latent abilities[5].

In the following study, we shall attempt to present the phases followed by the dialectic of Socrates that lead Alcibiades to self-knowledge and knowledge of the world about him. For him to succeed in this requires great effort, in accordance with the internal catharsis of the student. The text of the Platonic dialogue we intend to study is included in paragraphs 110c-135e.

A. The distinction between common right and authentic right

Firstly, Alcibiades is instructed by his tutor to challenge himself through the study of the issue of substantial knowledge. This issue is expressed at the beginning of the dialogue: "So you thought you knew, even as a child, it seems, what was just and unjust" [Ὤιου ἄρα ἐπίστασθαι καὶ παῖς ὤν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα] (110 c3).

Therefore, the student is hereby introduced to the general issue regarding the theory of knowledge. This is to be closely examined in relation to the specialized detection of the nature of right and wrong which, as we shall ascertain, is indirectly part of the knowledge of human cognizance or conducive to its acquisition. From his reply: "I did; and I knew too" [Ἔγωγε καὶ ἠπιστάμην γε.] (110c 3), it can be seen that Alcibiades believes that he has already matured and obtained the appropriate political education and training long before he meets Socrates and has a conversation with him. Consequently, he feels ready and well equipped to enter the political scene[6]. At this point, we investigate whether the vital dividing line between knowledge and ignorance, self-knowledge and confusion has or has not been detected before he meets the philosopher who later becomes his tutor[7]. He claims that he has past experience of dealing with this issue. Thus, he appears to believe that he is an integrated and whole personality, with no

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[5] From this point of view the main purpose for the student is to activate his inner potential. The student is able to acquire the knowledge of his inner self and of its metaphysical presupposes by following his deliberatative master, i. e. by following the cosmological aspects of an ethical and spiritual life which reveal each human being as a microcosmos.

[6] For Socrates, self-knowledge is a presupposition for becoming a mature intellect and ethical being. Self-knowledge is therefore describing the on going process of beings to reach such as ontological and mental state. Socrates intents to manipulate the intellect powers of the beings in order to transform them to powerful personalities.

[7] Compare also with the following fragments of *Alcibiades I*: 105d 5, 105e 4-5. For J. Kerschensteiner such statements reveal the oriental origins of the Platonic Philosophy which has been transformed into a Neoplatonic philosophical tradition. J Kerschensteiner mentions therefore the following: „Darum schätzten ihn auch die Neoplatoniker sehr hoch ein, weil er mit seiner Forderung der Erkenntnis des θεῖον als Grundbedingung der Selbsterkenntnis gerade nach der ihnen eigentümlichen Richtung wies und gleichzeitig eine Art Kompendium der platonischen Gedankengänge darstellt. Doch ist er in einem Schematismus durch eine weite Kluft getrennt von der lebendigen heißatmigen Erörterung in platonischen Dialogen verwandten Inhalts und Ziels, wie Charmides und Gorgias" (J. Kerschensteiner, *Platon und der Orient*, Stuttgart, 1947, S. 202). Compare also and with *Gorgias* 513 c, 521 a. Socrates mentions there that self-knowledge is a ontological and deontological Principle which lead the entities to a perfect and total state of being. Superior ontological categories support this process.

need for further input, and therefore he does not intend to proceed to self-examination[8].

Socrates continues the checking of the credibility and validity of the allegations made by his young student, who nonetheless avoids proposing arguments that could possibly be proved void and groundless. This is the reason why Socrates insists on this investigation, posing a number of questions regarding the same issue (111e-116e), that is to say, the definition of right. In any case, Alcibiades believes that he acquired his knowledge of justice a long time before, as a child playing with other children, and that he then felt the injustice, not because he knew what was right but because he had instinctive contact with its substance[9]. At this point, it seems that, regardless of his outward appearance, Alcibiades believes that nature has gifted him with social and political skills to such an extent that he feels that he has already obtained the appropriate social and political education-knowledge to enter politics[10].

On his tutor's instigation to reveal the exact point of time when transition from ignorance to knowledge and from delusion to the truth began, the way in which Alcibiades replies with respect to himself shows his lack of pedagogical methodology: "Upon my word, Socrates, I really cannot say" [Μὰ τὸν Δί᾽α, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔκουν ἔχω γ᾽ εἰπεῖν.] (110c)[11]. This once again demonstrates – as in another topic of this dialogue – the superficial and unthinking way in which Alcibiades dealt with himself in a non intensively and hardly way[12]. At the same time, this gives us a preview of the very attitude he is to develop in the near future towards the Athenians as a politician. Consequently, from a political viewpoint, this issue takes on crutial proportions. Therefore, at this point we confront a tragic irony similar to those which on a number of occasions both Plato and his readers experienced in the political limelight, that of the irresponsible, hesitant and insulting behavior of the son of Klinias and Dinomachi. Alcibiades' exclamation, in a way demonstrating both his youth and his adulthood, is the first sign of his indirectly negative judgment of himself and his personality. He accepts in his own words his inability to provide valid information regarding his own credibility, his education and training and his suitability with respect to what he intends to do. In addition, he is not yet aware of the necessary intellectual and mental abilities that will prove to be most appropriate and useful in his political career. Thus, young Alcibiades seems to be confused, a fact that is verified by the dead end at which he finds himself attempting to date the tutorial training process in terms of his own education[13].

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[8] Compare with Plato's *Charmides* 167a 1-2: "The only temperate person will know himself, and be able to discern what he really knows and not know" [Ὁ ἄρα σώφρων μόνος αὐτός τε ἑαυτὸν γνώσεται καὶ οἷος τε ἔσται ἐξετάσαι τί τε τυγχάνει εἰδὼς καὶ τί μή.]. See also and G. Vlastos, *Socratic Studies*, C. University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 17: "Now for point (4) in my analysis of standard elenchus: the most ovel of my proposals. I must begin with the position I had reached in my arier Socratic studies – the extreme opposite of the view. I wish to defend now. Explicitly in that brief introduction to the Protagoras (1950) to which I alluded above (n. y.), implicitly in the essay on the "Paradox Socrates" (1958) written around the same time, I maintained that Socrates never went beyond (3) in his elenctic arguments – that their object was simply to reveal to his interlocutors confusions and muddles within themselves, jarring their adherence to some confident dogma by bringing to their awareness its coallision with other, no less confident, presumptions of theirs. This is Plato's later picture of the sophist of noble lineage" in the *Sophist* (230a-e), whose service to his interlocutors is simply therapy ("purgation") by enhanced selfknowledge.

[9] See *Alcibiades I*, 110a 5: "Well, I thought I knew" [Ἀλλ᾽ ᾠμην εἰδέναι.], in:Oxford University Press.

[10] See *Alcibiades I*, 110e 1-2.

[11] Compare with *Charmides*, 166d 1-2: "…from a fear of carelessly supposing, at any moment, that I knew something while I knew it not?" [φοβούμενος μή ποτε λάθω οἰόμενος μέν τι εἰδέναι, εἰδώς δέ μή].

[12] Compare with Plato's *Republic VI* (433a-b): (τά) αὐτοῦ πράττειν.

[13] See *Alcibiades I,* 110, c 6-8*:* "At what sort of time did you discover it? For surely it was not while you thought you knew. No, indeed" [ἐν ποίῳ χρόνῳ ἐξευρών; οὐ γάρ δήπου ἐν ᾧ γε ᾤου εἰδέναι. – Οὐ δῆτα.].

Given that Alcibiades could not state the exact timing, Socrates tries to illuminate the issue of proper general education and specialized education from another aspect. His course of questions reveals the way in which the young and ambitious politician, offspring of a noble Athenian family, acquired knowledge – his intellectual abilities – and his inner capabilities, that is to say, his mental skills. This is described by Alcibiades himself as follows: "I learnt it, I suppose, in the same way as eneryone else" [Ἔμαθον οἶμαι καὶ ἐγὼ ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.] (110d). With this phrase Alcibiades affirms that he is no different from the majority. His knowledge of society and justice results from an occasional, coincidental and formal procedure, which consists a common usus. It is the knowledge that is given in the way of εἴθισται (usually) and ὡς εἴθισται (as usually), and it is not based upon individual initiative or particular instinctive inclination.

Therefore, Alcibiades had not been compelled to obtain systematic, specific and scientific knowledge by any internal impulse. Moreover, he verifies the propriety and suitability of his education, using the example of his sufficient knowledge of the Greek language, which he learned in the same way as the majority. Likewise, he states that he is aware of or that he has already become acquainted with the idea of right and the wrong, justifying himself for not seeking other ways of obtaining more specific knowledge. Obviously, it is an unfortunate example, as he places the linguistic dialect on the same level as – positive and negative – political virtues, which are being acquired by several moral criterias in specific educative moments.

B. The distinction between moral as habit and moral as way of living

The tutor, faced with the above confusion, introduces for discussion the issue of knowledge as being prerequisite for the proper and appropriate guidance of others. He characteristically states the following: "You know that those who are going to teach anything should first know it themselves, do you not?" [Οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι χρὴ τοὺς μέλλοντας διδάσκειν ὁτιοῦν αὐτοὺς πρῶτον εἰδέναι; ἢ οὔ;] (111a 12-13). Socrates is trying to draw his student's attention to cognitive skills being the essential prerequisite for an expert to exercise his leadership, whether he is a professional or a scientist. In his reply to this question[14], Alcibiades does not seem to disagree with the way in which we are to comprehend the role of the leader in any given situation[15].

However, this is not evidence that he will abide by and put into practice, a fact that casts doubt upon whether he has substantial knowledge and awareness of the extent of his own cognitive skills. Consequently, does he have the cognitive capability to be aware of his competence in issues regarding the political career he soon intends to follow and his suitability for it? In addition, comprehension of the meaning and significance of his upcoming role as a politician have not been profoundly analyzed – neither from the aspect of Alcibiades' personal uneasiness and exploration nor from the aspect

[14] Compare with *Alcibiades I*, 106c 12 - b 2: "Alcibiades, on what subject do the Athenians propose to take advice, that you should stand up to advice them? Is it something about which you have better knowledge than they? What you would be your reply?" [Ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τίνος Ἀθηναῖοι διανοοῦνται βουλεύεσθαι, ἀνίστασαι συμβουλεύσων; ἆρ' ἐπειδὴ περὶ ὧν σὺ ἐπίστασαι συμβουλεύσων; ἆρ' ἐπειδὴ περὶ ὧν ὧν σὺ ἐπίστασαι βέλτιον ἢ οὗτοι ἀποκρίναιο; – Εἴποιμ' ἄν δήπου, περὶ ὧν οἶδα βέλτιον ἢ οὗτοι.]

[15] About the intellectual adequacy compare with *Gorgias*, 495e 1-2 and to *Republic I*, 337c 9-10. Plochmann and Robinson In their study entitled *A Friendly Companion to Plato's Gorgias*, Carbondale, Illinois, 1988, pp. 289 mention the following: "The aim of Socrates in the Gorgias is quite evident: to raise the interior awarenessof this three opponents […] involving them in the very process whereby he himself has been able to elevate his own thinking."

of taking into consideration his environment – to the degree where such interest could be inculcated in him. In fact, the way in which he comprehends not only his personal individuality but human nature in general is revealed through his improper comprehension of his role and lack of specific and comprehensive knowledge. However, the tutor is not content to raise such issues – regarding the nature of not just one but every human being – only from the aspect of personal responsibility towards oneself, but also from the aspect of social responsibility towards others. For this reason, Alcibiades has to probe deeply into the question to contemplate whether or not conflicts and disputes among experts could be defined only on the basis of their distinct individuality as subjects and whether or not it is ultimately our human nature that guides us to do the right thing, without there being a need for any other kind of education. The answer given by Alcibiades: "It seems I do" [Ἔοικα.] (112d 6) does not seem to come so easily and obviously as at the beginning of the conversation. His answer is now rather more uncertain and the first signs of conflict with his view of himself are gradually revealed. We could therefore say that uncertainty succeeds certainty, his rigid comprehension of himself has been loosened, and that this could advance to another level the revelation of the degree of authenticity he has as a person.

At this point it is worthwhile defining the notional framework of self-knowledge on the basis of the conditions and preconditions outlined in our explanatory approach. Generally, the comprehension of γνῶθι σαυτόν (know theyself)[16] as moral obligation and the degree of awareness we have of ourselves presuppose conceiving mentally the exact composition of human nature, both in intellectual terms and at a mental level, but also correctly estimating and soundly judging the possibilities relative to its self-existence. During the dialectic process, the above framework is introduced and consistently observed by the tutor, who wants his student to comprehend both human nature and his self with respect to their intellectual and mental content[17]. The combination of general and specialized knowledge does not only ensure the observance of common anthropological merits but also that the individual will not necessarily be subjected to making fixed generalizations.

For the above reason, Alcibiades is then instructed to develop and substantiate through arguments an issue related to human cognizance: whether right and interest are

[16] Th. C. Brickhouse in P. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy: Two types of argumentation in early Greek thought*, Cambridge 1965, p. 65 defines this term in similar way by mentioning the following: "We have argued that Socrates rejects Polu's supposition that we are psychologically transparent of ourselves in favor of view of our psychology according to which what is most importantly true for us may be hidden to us if we do not lead he examined life. What we are is brought to light by Socratic examination which reveals what we really believes, intend, regard and desire. If Socrates does not explicitly call such beliefs, intentions, regards, and desires states of our "true self" with any other self in the *Gorgias*, it may only be because he regards the "true self" as truly the only self. This, perhaps, is why when Socrates attributes psychological states to his interlocutors, he persists in attributing only those we believe are states of the "true self". The Delphic inscription "Know Thy self" makes its exhortation in oracular fashion: its meaning is obscure because it refers darkly to a self of which we might be unaware. But proper interpretation of the exhortation shows that it does not exhort us to know one of our selves, as if there were many, but rather our only self.

[17] This content is the human essence, which is the question for every human entity. Think about the metaphor about the stone which would be an entity and a better entity in comparison to a god or a divine nature, which has not an entity, in: R. B. Blakeney, *Meister Eckhart*, a modern translation, N. Y., 1941, p. 172. And again about self-knowledge and its content see Steven Ford, *On the Alcibiades I,* in: Ten forgotten Socratic Dialogues, Cornell University, Ithaca & London, 1987, p. 237: "Our first, sanguine impression is somewhat tarnished by the recollection that the whole argument concerning self- knowledge depends on the questionable proofs of the soul."

identical or different from each other[18], a question that is a natural continuance and expansion of the reasoning about right. Consequently, it is obvious that the above issue also presupposes interpretative distinctions.

Alcibiades acknowledges his failure to come up with an answer, or even better, an explanation for his failure of not having been acquired the presuppositions to prove whether right and interest are identical: "But I am not sure I should be able, Socrates, to set it forth to you" [Ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδα εἰ οἷός τ' ἄν εἴην, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ διελθεῖν] (114b 5-6). Alcibiades, undoubtedly under the influence of what had gone before, admits that he is not so wise, as he is not able to process the question and does not have the appropriate knowledge to provide his tutor with cogent and substantial arguments. Indeed, he does not know if he even has such a capability[19] and therefore there is now conflict with his initial claim regarding specific knowledge. Thus, there is further conflict with the stereotyped self-perception he had previously formulated and the student of the wise Athenian develops a new reflective attitude towards his own cognitive and mental skills. Thus, he realizes anew his limits, capabilities and by extension his personal range or the effect of his abilities, elements that form the concept of prestige for an entity with moral, social and cognitive solidity, that is an entity with metaphysical restlessness, an entity that cannot be entrapped by a world of transient values[20]. The path towards self-knowledge seems to be heading in the right direction. Socrates still continues to subject his student to meditation that leads to reconsideration and re-examination of interpretative issues and criteria[21]. Alcibiades is no longer an arrogant young know-it-all, but self-controlled and reserved in what he says and maintains. This change indicates that he realizes he must think and speculate thoroughly and seriously.

C. The idea of the beauty and the idea of good as categories of the right

At this point, the interlocutors judge it necessary to analyze the nature of the beautiful and of the good[22] as a state of "self itself" and to compare both states with a furthermore ideal state. According to Alcibiades, the relationship between these two values seems to be based upon and grounded upon their genuine and substantial identity[23]. The student is inverting the sequence of the purposes based on the question and sets as presupposition

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[18] Compare with Plato's *Gorgias* 474c and Plato's *Republic* 353e.

[19] Compare with *Alcibiades I*, 110e 1-3: "From the many. – They are no very serious teachers with whom you take refuge, if you ascribe it to the many!" (Παρὰ τῶν πολλών. – Οὐκ εἰς σπουδαίους διδασκάλους καταφεύγεις εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀναφέρων.) and also with Plato's *Protagoras*, 319e 3–320 3: ἐπεὶ Περικλῆς, ὁ τουτωνὶ τῶν νεανίσκω πατήρ, τούτους ἅ μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο καλῶς καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς σοφός ἐστιν οὔτε αὐτὸς παιδεύει οὔτε τῷ ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ περιιόντες νέμονται ὥσπερ ἄφετοι, ἐάν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν τῇ ἀρετῇ.

[20] See *Alcibiades I*, 117b 2-7: "Then is it the case that when a man does not know a thing he must needs be bewildered in spirit regarding that thing?" [Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἔχει· ἐπειδάν τις μή εἰδῇ, ἀναγκαῖον περὶ τούτου πλανᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχήν.] Self-knowledge is related to the world of Metaphysics. Soul is described as a flying object, which is looking to find its ld and familiar place. For Socrates, the insight supports such a necessity. Compare also with Plato's *Timaius* (90a 2-b1).

[21] About the cultivation of consideration and hypothetical thinking see Plato's *Republic* VI 511a-d.

[22] See about selfconscience in K. Oehler, *Subjektivität und Selbstbewusstsein in der Antike*, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg, 1997, pp. 37: „In *Charmides* wird gefragt, ob es ein Wissen gibt, und der sich daran anschliessenden Erörterung, die ansatzweise die Erfahrung des Selbsbewusstseins in den Horizont der Aufmerksamkeit rückt. Dabei kommt es zu der Entdeckung, dass der Urtypus der Selbstbeziehung ist, die das Wesen des Lebendigen ausmacht."

[23] Compare with *Alcibiades I*, 116c 1-6.

for the relevance the self it self of each state. Nevertheless, he is reserved in his answer, so as not to deviate from truth. However, his answer to Socrates seems to be based on deception and illusion of the perceptible and visible, which he acknowledges and interprets as something that is subject to a scientific approach. However, he is no longer as sure and categorical as in his previous answers. Progress towards knowledge now originates from inner intellect, that is to say, intuition. Of course, the student's knowledge is still based upon the visible world, which reflects everything we see, and surely it is far removed from the essence of 'being' approach and its purity as well as the issues related to its definition. At this point a first change is coming up to the light.

In any event, the evaluation of the student's progress to date, with respect to the pursuit of truth on a personal basis with cognitive and existential proportions, leads us to the conclusion that he continues to answer waveringly[24]. Alcibiades himself, the young man who in previous paragraphs maintained that he believed in the completeness and adequacy of his skills, now through his replies to his tutor resembles a man confused in one way or another. Therefore, the former balance with reality that he maintained is now disturbed because of his becoming aware of his failure to prove the adequacy, completeness and appropriateness of his intellectual and mental skills. In addition, his most recent self-reflection does not show or prove that he is a human being that can fulfil the requirements of his political ambitions, a fact that makes him wonder, worry and be concerned about his future, among other things. It is therefore reasonable that his educational and personal progress to date be judged as improper and inappropriate. Self-conflict gradually leads him to self-criticism. The blinders of what is 'visible' and the mask of superficial impressions give way to the thorough analysis of his 'being' and reveal a genuine and real person.

D. The right in the Platonic metaphysics

Using his favorite tool, that is the cognitive method, Socrates, the interior sculptor of an aesthetic soul, helps and encourages his student to shape his rough nature and to give it an aesthetic inner intellectual and mental form[25]. At this point, his being will be totally fulfilled and of ultimate significance. The moment to set such a goal has come if we take into consideration the personal uneasiness and insecurities of the young man, who confides them to his tutor. The transient self is being succeeded by the inner self in a kind of metaphysical – or more reasonably, existential – uneasiness and quest, and this can be found in the words of Alcibiades in which he acknowledges that: "I begin to have misgivings about myself, but still I think I should make the same answer." [Δέδοικα μὲν ἔγωγε ἤδη περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, οἶμαι μέντοι τὰ αὐτά.] (117a 1-2).

At this point, the method that Alcibiades uses to approach himself changes and his superficial vision is replaced by reflective intuition. Therefore, it would not be unrea-

[24] See *Alcibiades I*, 116e 2-5: "So if anyone stands up to advise either the Athenians or the Peparethians, imagining that he understands what is just and unjust, and says that just things are sometimes evil, could you do other than laugh him to scorn, since you actually say yourself that just and expedient are the same?" [Ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἔοικα ἀτόπως ἔχοντι· τοτὲ μὲν γάρ μοι ἕτερα δοκεῖ σοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, τοτέ δ' ἄλλα.] Alcibiades is making a painfull selfcriticism by describing his confusion. This fact focuses on the special way he is producing his thoughts. Alcibiades concedes that he is not able to present hisself as a whole intellectual being. His image disappears slowly-slowly, since he has not prove that he is ready for a political activation.

[25] About self-knowledge and self curiosity, see Plato's *Apology*, 29d and especially: δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελῇ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις;

sonable if we maintained that both his self and his value as offspring of a noble family with social, financial and political prosperity are hereby redefined. The outward beauty or charm, as well as noble birth and political tradition of his family, no longer seem to be the solid and exclusive foundation upon which the nephew of Pericles could form a powerful and strong personality. On the contrary, they were most likely the very characteristics that formed a simplistic portrait of autobiography and self-knowledge, as has been shown in a previous, extensive part of the dialogue[26]. And this is proved by the fact that he seems troubled and reaches deadlock every time he tries as a student to take a serious and responsible position on the issues raised by his tutor. The confidence and certainty that the student derived from the initial view of his self is now shaken by the insecurity and uncertainty of this second view of his self[27].

At this point, the tutor introduces an additional method of inquiry, upon which the conversation and whichever specific reference to the issue of ignorance are to be based and developed. Ignorance is specifically and explicitly shown as being the lack of appropriate mental and intellectual skills, and this is acknowledged by the young man himself. "Very likely" [Εἰκός γε] (117a 7) is Alcibiades' response to Socrates, when he refers to the following declaration: "Then if you involuntarily give contradictory answers, clearly it must be about things of which you are ignorant" – Περὶ ὧν ἄρα ἄκων τἀναντία ἀποκρίνῃ, δῆλον ὅτι περὶ τούτων οὐκ οἶσθα (117a 5-6). Therefore, the unquestionable certainty of lack of knowledge, which is implied during the conversation, is to be examined on the basis of the unintentional cognitive errors made by Alcibiades. Both tutor and student entirely agree on the mode of knowledge and self-knowledge. The tutor detects a substantial capacity for knowledge in his student through the very fact that he can discern gaps and weaknesses in his knowledge. In addition to gradually demonstrating this capacity for self-criticism, the student simultaneously – indeed through the encouragement of his tutor – reveals a change in scope. A turn away from self-knowledge towards the metaphysical world is observed (117b). Therefore, the tutor's next question is well-timed: "Well now, do you know in what way you can ascend to heaven?" [Τί οὖν; οἶσθα ὅντινα τρόπον ἀναβήσῃ εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν;] (177b)[28], as is the moment when Alcibiades gives his answer: "On my word, not I" [Μά Δι' οὐκ ἔγωγε.] (117b)[29].

The above search for personal truth or comprehension of one's self, integrated through self-knowledge, is extended to the metaphysical world which, according to Platonic teaching, is the source of the intellectual characteristics and acts of human beings. It is therefore inevitable that self-knowledge as source or motivation will place the pursuit of knowledge in a metaphysical framework. The course towards the superlunary

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[26] Compare with *Alcibiades I*, 104b 4-9. Such characteristics as the ascribed above compose a human nature which has more an instrumental use. In addition, the paideutical issue, which is put forward is the question about being or having.

[27] Compare with *Alcibiades I*, 117a 1-2: "I begin to have misgivings about myself, but still I think I should make the same answer." The philosophical discurs consists to the destructure of the confused state of the self. The dialectics becomes the paideutical middle for the reconstructering of the self. The new paideutical approach comes across with the previous paideutical state which again refers o the congruence between the conventional purposes of the education according to common believes and to the idealistic education according to the principles of the ethical and spiritual duties and obligations.

[28] As mentioned before, Socrates is being examined the issue of self-knowledge in relation to Metaphysics. The purity of consciousness is for Socrates the presupposition for the real development of the intelligible beings.

[29] Self-knowledge is related to the world of Metaphysics. Soul is described as a flying object, which is looking to find its old and familiar place. For Socrates, the insight supports such a nessecity. Compare also with Plato's *Timaius*, 90a 2-b1.

world is actually determined by the search for and naming of 'forms' as the highest level of orderliness. Therefore, this procedure is implemented through connecting personal life with the world of 'forms' and consequently with the supreme ontological Principle, that is to say, absolute Good.

E. The ontological validity of the right in the platonic Metaphysics

During this journey towards self-knowledge, the student seems to participate more actively, as can be seen by comparing his progress with the requirements and procedures for the preparation of a dish (117c). The comparative method is judged to be necessary in order to guide our thoughts towards achieving even more effective, demonstrative and explanatory results. Indeed, it should be pointed out that here Alcibiades acknowledges with absolute certainty and surety his ignorance regarding procedures and dealings in politics, in a way relevant to that where he stated his ignorance regarding the preparation of a dish. Therefore, knowledge here is related to the comprehension of means, procedures, methods and techniques as well as the consequences that might result from their implementation.[30] As a result, Alcibiades admits with certainty his ignorance of the aforementioned factors, which are however necessary skills for any effective cognitive procedure.

F. The acquisition of the right

However, in addition to the cognitive aspect, there is also that of experience. Therefore, we should not omit the psychological and moral aspects of the issue. For example, the psychological aspect is necessary since the extent to which one's inner maturity has developed, in combination with his intent, influences him to choose one procedure over another. Therefore, self-knowledge appears to consist of three levels and includes not only having complete and specialized knowledge of the issues we intend to investigate but also the internal intentions and positions leading us to this. Consequently, it includes: a) the degree of one's theoretical training[31], b) the extent of one's knowledge and awareness of the subject – with regard to his capability to adjust and promote the procedures and the mechanisms of his actions according to the requirements of the occasions and circumstances – and c) the degree to which one is aware of his moral principles through self-criticism with respect to his choices[32]. The process of attaining self-knowledge, as it nears its end, results in high-level personal activation and completeness.

If we bear in mind the supreme point of analysis, we are led to agree, from an interpretative aspect, with the thoughts of Socrates as summarized in the following phrase:

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[30] About the relationship: science and craft see A. Motte, *Pour l'authenticité du "Premier Alcibiade"*, in: L'antiquité classique, v. 30, p. 15: "Si l'art doit servir se dupport à toutes les techniques courantes, c'est cepedant sur leur patron que Socrate désire le bâtir. Il réclame, en effet, pour sa les mêmes exigances scientifiques que l'on attend de tout art exact. La science que possède l'artisan ne laise aucune place à l'erreur et c'est dans la mesure oú il se conforme aux normes objectives qu'elle lui impose, que rien en lui n'entrave son succés dans les enterprises. Socrate croit de la méme manière à un art qui dirige infailliblement la conduite morale."

[31] See Th. Szlezák: *Psyche – Polis – Kosmos*, in: E. Rudolph, *Polis und Kosmos: Naturphilosophische und politische Philosophie bei Platon*, Darmstadt: Philosophische Buchgesellschaft, 1996, p. 28.

[32] See *Alcibiades I*, 117e 11 – 118a 2: "But since it is neither those who know, not those of the ignorant who know that they do not know, the only people left, I think, are those who do not know, but think that they do". Compare also too with Plato's *Republic*, 341c-d, 346 a and Plato's *Gorgias* 464b. About the effect of the Good see Plato's *Charmides*, 165c-d-e and 166 a, *Republic* 341e and *Gorgias* 465a, 500e–501b. About the lectures towards the material world, its extention and its limits see Plato's *Laches*, 184 d-e· *Krito* 47a-b and *Protagoras* 311b-c, 318b-c, 319b-c, 361b.

"Then this ignorance is a cause of evils, and is the discreditable sort of stupidity?" [Αὕτη ἄρα ἡ ἄγνοια τῶν κακῶν αἰτία καὶ ἡ ἐπονείδιστος ἀμαθία;] (118a 1-5). This means that not being aware of one's knowledge and capacity to develop adaptable procedures for the effective implementation of plans and intentions – in combination with neither being aware of nor abiding by moral principles respectfully and consistently – results in a detrimental situation. This is negative for all three basic areas of self-awareness that constitute human self-knowledge.

G. The spiritual awakening

The student of Socrates is then instructed to describe the difficulty of attaining self-knowledge as he himself comprehends it. This moment is certainly one of the most significant steps in the progress of Alcibiades. His description is vivid and stands out:

> "That if they were educated, I suppose anyone who undertook to contend against them would have to get some knowledge and practice first, as he would for a match with athletes: but now, seeing that these men have gone in for me to practise and have the trouble of learning? For I am sure that my natural powers alone will give me an easy victory over them" [Εἰ μὲν ἦσαν πεπαιδευμένοι, ἔδει ἄν τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα αὐτοῖς ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι μαθόντα καὶ ἀσκήσεις ἰέναι ὡς ἐπ' ἀθλητάς· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ οὗτοι ἰδιωτικῶς ἔχοντες ἐληλύθασιν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, τί δεῖ ἀσκεῖν καὶ μανθάνοντα πράγματα ἔχειν; ἐγὼ γάρ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι τούτων τῇ γε φύσει πάνυ πολὺ περιέσομαι.] (119b).

Practice and development of self-awareness can be achieved through constant and strenuous efforts as well as through education and training. Not only did Socrates encourage Alcibiades to obtain self-knowledge, but he also sent a diachronic message to all tutors throughout time to investigate and study such important issues. This means that they, in turn, should initially begin with self-analysis and attempt to improve their own abilities. Only then can they properly turn towards helping their students. Therefore, Socrates, who has already obtained self-knowledge, promptly turns his attention towards the young Alcibiades so that he can discover his nature; the speed with which he is able to do so might also be seen as a lesson for all current tutors. It can also be seen as a reminder that current needs and also societal changes should not obscure our interest in crucial diachronic anthropological issues, the most important of which is probably the discovery of our personal nature, limits, capabilities and choices. It is an issue which necessarily comes to the fore in any era, even under new conditions that prevail at any one time.

H. The moral awaking

Although the dialogue progresses smoothly, intense anxiety with respect to what has been achieved to date causes a crucial syllogistic turning-point, shedding new light on this form of self-knowledge developed through the dialogue between tutor and student[33]. Although the young man from Athens has agreed to implement the before mentioned course of inquiry with strict consistency, he does show some moments of interpretative deviation and failure to evaluate. He is led to compare the generals of Sparta and Persia as being equal to the others and fails to detect any differences between them. Therefore, he either does not realize or is not concerned about the fact that he has not obtained the

[33] In verse (120c) Alcibiades declares: "Why, Socrates, I believe you are right; though I think neither the Spartan generals nor the Persian king are at all different from other people" [Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς μέν μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν, οἶμαι μέντοι τούς τε Λακεδαιμονίων στρατηγοὺς καὶ τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων.].

required training to be able to detect the differences. It is therefore obvious that he is not concerned about his status, even though he had previously evaluated it as unsatisfactory with respect to his education and training. This means that he does not truly grasp (the significance of) the difference between his education and training and that of his potential opponents. Thus, he believes that he is ready to deal with political and military matters, despite his failings and superficial knowledge. Equating the capabilities of the persons he mentioned above, it seems that he is not aware of the inevitable differences between them. With the education of his fellow-citizens and that of the city in general as his criterion for action, Alcibiades appears to judge himself only through comparison and not through absolute criteria[34]. Thus, his failings are not at this moment a motivation for improvement. On the contrary, these will only become of considerable significance to him should his fellow-citizens themselves – including his potential opponents – have or not have dealt with the matter of their individuality. Therefore, Alcibiades carries out his quest for self-awareness and self-improvement not through using absolute criteria but through the method of comparison, as can be seen from the answers he gives during the dialogue process. He obviously disagrees with his tutor. This disagreement is also observable in a long speech of Socrates, in which he presents information and data that escaped the notice of the young man and which led him to form false impressions and errors.

Thus Socrates, in his effort to draw his student's attention once again to his self and the question of self-improvement, asks him whether he has anything to lose by such self-analysis and looking out for himself or indeed by desiring to live a dignified life. Alcibiades replies: "By no means; rather that I shall get much benefit" [Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ὀνήσεσθαι.] (120d). The student knows – or at least says that he knows – what is beneficial for an individual, as a result of taking care of ourselves. However, he chose to compare his progress with the personal progress of others. This is an error that anyone can unwittingly make, when the standard for comparison is the failings of others and not the ontological wholeness of the "idea", that is to say, absolute Good.

By refering once more to the reasoning of his student, who wishes to see himself in terms of comparison with others, Socrates suggests ideal education standards for comparison, such as the education of the Persian kings, using it as an example and not merely as a model of education. With this particular example, through a lengthy monologue, Socrates does not limit himself to comparative evaluations of exemplary education, but rather expands on the significance and strengths of intellectual and mental skills and compares them with military force[35].

This is actually a reference to something other than that which was initially pursued: that is to say, a confrontation that is not limited to the force of weapons and the power resulting from a knowledge of military cases, methods and techniques. It is about knowledge of our personal nature, which motivates us to pursue and discover a worthy personal course of life and a prudent way to solve our problems through reasoning and

[34] See therefore *Alcibiades I*, 119b 8-10: "but now, seeing that these men have gone in for politics as amateurs, what need is there for me to practise and have the trouble of learning?"

[35] The verses *Alcibiades I*, 123d 7 – e 3 obviously refers to the ability and capability of Alcibiades to confront those who are in power: "and further, that when his lover tells him that he must first learn, and take pains over himself, and practise, before he enters on an a contest with the king, he refuses, and says he will do very well as he is; I expect she would ask in surprise, "On what, then, can the youngster rely?" [πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, τοῦ ἐραστοῦ αὐτῷ λέγοντος ὅτι χρὴ πρῶτον μαθόντα καὶ ἐπιμεληθέντα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀσκήσαντα οὕτως ἰέναι διαγωνιούμενον βασιλεῖ, οὐκ ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ φησίν ἐξαρκεῖν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, οἶμαι ἄν αὐτὴν θαυμάσαι τε καὶ ἐρέσθαι· τί οὖν ποτ' ἔστι ὅτῳ πιστεύει τὸ μειράκιον;].

rational evaluation of right without straying from this course. Therefore, by having a more substantial knowledge of ourselves, we can assert that we are right without degrading our nature. Consequently, through the more systematic examination of these new elements, we can ascertain that our course towards self-knowledge has three simultaneous aims:

– the detection and realization of our limits and capabilities;

– realistic comprehension of the situations, occasions and circumstances of an outwardly changing social environment;

– the scientific knowledge of moral principles and values upon which our actions our based.

Therefore, the factors that determine the quality of the subject's actions – and sometimes their consequences – also reveal the greatness of the man, while their rejection reveals the degradation of human nature. In observing them, one shows respect for the world of 'ideals'; should he scorn them, he would reveal a lack of human dignity and cultured human nature.

Self-analysis, attention to and cultivation of our nature, as previously discussed, does not leave young Alcibiades apathetic. Thus, again after a long monologue from his tutor, we see him meditate on – and become concerned about – caring for his self. The fact that he is not indifferent to the above issue is clearly indicated in the following phrase: "Then what can we do?" [Τί οὖν ἂν ποιοῖμεν;] (124d 7). This means that he is particularly interested in finding out how he will be better able to take care of himself. To this question, Socrates replies as follows: "There must be no crying off or skulking, my good friend" [Οὐκ ἀπορρητέον οὐδὲ μαλθακιστέον, ὦ ἑταῖρε.] (124d 8), fully expressing the ancient Greek ideal, which morally condemns inertia through the well-known saying: "Idleness is the source of all evil" (Ἀργία μήτηρ πάσης κακίας).

Once again, Socrates reiterates his previous declaration regarding the need for intellectual support in the pursuit of personal identity and sets a target which simultaneously brings the course to an end: this is nothing less than to attempt to develop human nature in the best possible way, and for the result to be acknowledged. However, Alcibiades appears to think hastily and give sweeping answers. It seems that he believes he has precisely defined the sense of 'the good man' and his blunt way of speaking as well as his attitude prove that, as far as he is concerned, no further explanation is required. He thinks that he has been fully enlightened, if we take into consideration his choice of word δῆλον. The fact that he can neither widely nor profoundly examine a concept to the extent required for precise clarification is evidence of his not yet having acquired adequate a cognitive and interpretative level of knowledge.

The probing questions posed by Socrates focus on his student's previous reply and are intended to help him clearly express himself – while also being aware where he stands – and at the same time to ensure that he can at all times confirm the clarity and accuracy of his words to his interlocutors or a wider audience. Moreover, it is obvious that he sets this as a required criterion, for this confirmation will result in an adequate degree of objectivity. If, therefore, the reasoning for self-knowledge up to verse 124e 1[36] was substantially for this, it is now undoubtedly directed to the means for its development and application, which can be implemented through the dialectic process. A theoretical view seeks such techniques that will prove its objectivity and reliability.

Within this dialectic process (127b–127c), Alcibiades is once again revealed by his

[36] See *Alcibiades I*, 124e 1: "Now tell me: we say, do we not, that we wish to be good as possible?"

tutor to be contradicting himself; on the one hand, he claims that friendship presupposes harmony yet on the other hand he states the opposite. Therefore, Socrates founds knowledge and self-knowledge on a communicative basis. Consequently, a segmental knowledge and comprehension of the environment and ourselves is harmful from both a personal and social point of view. In this latest upgrading of reasoning, the issue is modeled on a collective basis or that of an entire city. Alcibiades has been asked to consider the positive results that this virtue will have for a city but also the difficulties that a responsible politician has to face when up against the deficient education and ignorance of his opponents. He already demonstrates basic difficulties in his reasoning, making one error after another and so he cries out, exclaiming the following: "Well, by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I mean myself, and I fear that for some time past I have lived unarwares in a very disgraceful condition" – Ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' αὐτὸς οἶδ' ὅ τι λέγω, κινδυνεύω δὲ καὶ πάλαι λεληθέναι ἐμαυτὸν αἴσχιστα ἔχων (127d 6-8). This reflects the superficiality of his words, as he acknowledges that he is not truly aware of what he says through rescinding whatever he had previously claimed. Therefore, the fact that Alcibiades does not speak cohesively proves that he possesses neither the required dynamic intellectual skills nor the mental skills to obtain self-knowledge. These intellectual and mental failings can result in a feeling of shame which, when viewed in the wider context of self-control, fails to raise his self-esteem, although it is the beginning of his transformation.

On the occasion of his student's last acknowledgement, Socrates introduces a new perspective regarding the issue of self-knowledge, which summarised in the phrase "what should be done" [δέον γενέσθαι] (128b). This is followed by the following supposition: "that inner change and progress can be implemented by thorough and systematic training"[37]. In this way, the issue of whether systematic training affects how one searches for his inner 'being' and develops a real self in genuine existential conditions is significantly raised[38]. The student is induced and exhorted to examine the issue of training, self-control and looking out for himself, leading to the assiduity of human nature. Such assiduity signifies *a priori* the necessity for complete and integrated development and progress of mankind, in general, but also for each individual, resulting in the successful development and application of the inner capabilities of a human being, including the cultivation, development and broadening of human nature through systematic education and training[39].

The crucial point of change is determined to be when we become aware of our real state, that is to say, we have a clear view of ourselves and are in the mood for potential

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[37] See *Alcibiades I,* 128e 1-3: "Well, so much at least has been admitted, that it is not one which would help us to make a single one of our possesions better, but one which would help to make ourselves so?" [Ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε γε ὡμολόγηται, ὅτι οὐχ ᾗ ἄν τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ ὁτιοῦν βέλτιον ποιοῖμεν, ἀλλ' ᾗ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;].

[38] About the definition of the self see A. N. Zakopoulos, *Plato on man a summary and critique of his psychology and humanistic psychology*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1975, p. 44: "With respect to the declaration in *Laws,* that man's true self is his soul, it must be noted that Plato here and in other dialogues identifies soul or mind with what contemporary philosophers and psychologist call self, ego, I, but not with what has come to be termed personality."

[39] About the evaluation of the platonic *Alcibiades I* see M. Blitz, *Interpretation*, v. 22, No. 3, 1995, pp. 343: "If the *Alcibiades I* trully is about its traditional subtile-human nature, it is because Socrates explores and shows the limits of human activities insofar as they claim, or imagine that they could claim, to be fully comprehensive and self-sufficient, i. e. to be that nature."

change and evolution. The means for supplementing intellectual and mental failings is to constantly point out and analyse self-interest and self-attention, elements that are strictly related to the necessity for serious and systematic education and training (128d). Therefore, the theme of the discussion shifts towards the search for the kind of interest and attention to be chosen for our self-improvement. We search for that element to develop those parts of ourselves that will result in our becoming integrated. Consequently, the issue is to detect such an element that will best reflect genuine human nature by giving shape to an incomplete existent entity. Thus, our main aim is the productive pairing of a fully-formed entity with an incomplete one, resulting in objective comparison (129a).

Consequently, the matter under discussion is whether it is easy to achieve such a pairing and actually become aware of ourselves. Alcibiades, though often appearing to be audacious and prepared to take risks, does not now dare – and this is perhaps one of the few times this is apparent in the text – to admit that such an approach can be easily achieved. He acknowledges that has often found himself in extreme and contradictory situations, believing that his self-searching was sometimes easy and sometimes difficult. It seems, therefore, that Alcibiades has some difficulty with respect to the treatment of the above issue. Thus, it is obvious that he needs a real, experienced partner to encourage him and intellectually and mentally guide him on the path to discovering his being and the purpose of our existence, commonly known as αὐτοῦ ταὐτοῦ[40].

And as the dialogue comes to its end, self-knowledge and knowledge of human nature continue to be the subject-matter for discussion, study and investigation. The new issue arising from analysis through the dialogue process is to investigate the relationship between the body, material needs and the real and genuine self[41]. The examination of this relationship is based upon the analysis of what is more powerful: the body or the soul[42]. The student totally rejects the possibility that the body dominates and controls the soul and its activities, a fact that is not questioned by his interlocutor and tutor Socrates, this being deemed inevitable according to his general principles. Therefore, the powers of the body do not dominate the self, according to both interlocutors, who share the same

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[40] About the meaning of αὐτὸ ταυτό see Paul Friedländer, *Der grosse Alcibiades*, Teil II, Verlag von Friedrich Cohen in Bonn, 1923, pp. 18: „Auf der anderen Seite aber scheint es doch, als sei das ein bewußt ganz ins Allgemeine gewandter Ausdruck für die Sphäre des An sich, für das was in der Vereinzelung oder heißen müßte.“ See also the article of R. E. Allen, *Note on Alcibiades I*, 129b 1, in: *American Journal of Philology*, v. 82, 1962, p. 189: “αὐτὸ ταὐτό is neuter because ταὐτό is an abstract noun, characteristically formed by the neuter singular adjective and its article. The author of the *First Alcibiades* uses this familiar idiom to express a new conception, that of universal of the self.” About the relationship and the theory of the Forms see C. A. Bos, *Interpretatie vaderschap en datering van De Alcibiades Major*, Tjeenk Willink-Norduijn N. V., Culemborg, 1970, pp. 55-63.

[41] About the real self see A. N. Zakopoulos, *Plato on man a summary and critique of his psychology and humanistic psychology*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1975, p. 43: In addition we find in the *Alcibiades I*, of disputed authorship, the view that man is neither the body alone, nor the body and soul together, but the immortal soul itself. Plato quite clearly declares in the *Laws* that man’s true self resides in the devine and immortal part, that the real self of each of us is the immortal soul. We can assume that Socrates conception of education is being identified with the platonic syllogism above. Zakopoulos mentions at this point and the *Olympiodorus Commentary on the first Alcibiades* of Plato (ed. By L. G. Westerink), Amsterdam, 1956, pp. 1-15, 127-133, 202.

[42] About the relationship: soul and body see A. N. Zakopoulos, *Plato on man a summary and critique of his psychology and humanistic psychology*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1975, p. 73: “The psychology dualism of Plato corresponds to his metaphysical dualism. In the *Phaedo* he maintains that the soul in every way resembles the invisible, the immaterial and everylasting world, while the body has much more affinity with the visible and belongs to the material world.”

conclusions and opinions that the real nature of the self is psychointellectual and therefore its development indicates its transformation into a higher intellect (131a). This necessity can be detected in verse 131a 2-4: "And anyone who gets to know something belonging to the body knows the things that are his, but not himself. – That is so." [Ὅστις ἄρα τῶν τοῦ σώματός τι γιγνώσκει, τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀλλ' οὐχ αὑτὸν ἔγνωκεν.], where the relation between body and soul once more comes to the fore. Here the matter is of secondary importance when compared with the intellect of the genuine and real self[43]. 'The real being' is a Platonic means of expression which cannot be found in any other text. Again in accordance with Friedländer, the issue that is raised here is the definition, the content and the meaning of the phrase 'looking out for oneself'[44]. Looking out for oneself presupposes that he must first know himself[45]. When he acquires the necessary knowledge of "his real self", he is then aware of the meaning of "looking out for oneself". One's "real self" seems to acquire meaning and content through the concept of "what we really are".

The process used by Socrates to tutor Alcibiades and analyze his student's self comes to an end. All that the tutor and the student have to do now is to specify the appropriate intellectual and mental means to be used as guidelines to avoid any deviation whatsoever that might prevent one from acquiring self-knowledge. Thus, moderation and self-restraint are ensured through a sense of justice and prudence[46]. Being prudent is proved to be the appropriate way to lead one's life; therefore, prudence is the ruling virtue of the self. When justice and prudence are combined, they become the pillars, so to speak, of the path of development of an individual.

According to Socrates, these two virtues ensure the beneficient governing of a city. Therefore, they are the terms and conditions that lead to right and fair self-management within a strict framework in both our personal and public life[47]. Alcibiades speaks in praise of his tutor, characterising him as a spiritual leader who is competent to guide us along the difficult path to self-knowledge: "Well, that is the position, and I shall begin here and now to take pains over justice" [Ἀλλὰ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄρξομαί γε

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[43] *See Alcibiades, I* 132 c 1-2 And the next step, we see, is to take care of the soul, and look to that. [Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο δὴ ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμελητέον καὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλεπτέον.]

[44] See Paul Friedländer, *Der grosse Alcibiades,* Teil I, Verlag von Friedrich Cohen in Bonn, 1923, pp. 17: „Wie das Auge sich in Auge schaut und am deutlichsten im Stern des Auges, so erkennt Seele sich in Seele und am deutlichsten in dem Teil dem die edle Kraft der Seele, ihr Göttliches innewohnt." And also É. De Stryker, *L'authenticité du Premier Alcibiade*, in: *Les études classiques*, v. 11, p. 149: "Socrate recherche de quelle manière l'homme pourra le miex se connaître soi-même. Ce sera dans un miroir. Or l'oeil même conitent un miroir, la pupille; et c'est en elle que réside la puissance de vision. Semblament, l'âme devra considérer en elle-même ce qui fait sa puissance de connaître, l'elément divin, et c'est ainsi qu'elle arrivera à la vèritable connaisance de soi. Cette idée de la pupille-miroir est originale et gracieuse, et l'auteur l'améne et la développe habilement. Je dois dire pourtant que cette combinaison d'éléments métaphysiques et psychophysiologiques me paraît plutôt dans l'espirit du *Timée* que dans celui des premiers dialogues."

[45] See *Alcibiades I*, 132c 7-9: "Then how shall we obtain the most certain knowledge of it? For if we know that, it seems we shall know ourselve also" [Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο δὴ ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμελητέον καὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλεπτέον.].

[46] See *Alcibiades I,* 133c 5-7: "Then this part of her resembles God, and whoever looks at this, and comes to know all that is divine, will gain thereby the best knowledge of himself."[Τῷ θεῷ ἄρα τοῦτ' ἔοικεν αὐτῆς, καί τις εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων καὶ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον γνούς, [θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν], οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν γνοίη μάλιστα.].

[47] See *Alcibiades I,* 135b 7-9: "And before getting virtue, to be governed by a superior is better than to govern, for a man as well as a child" [Πρὶν δέ γε ἀρετὴν ἔχειν, τὸ ἄρχεσθαι ἄμεινον ὑπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος ἢ τὸ ἄρχειν ἀνδρί, οὐ μόνον παιδί.].

ἐντεῦθεν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἐπιμελέσθαι.] (135c 3-4)[48]. Therefore, the tutor receives positive evaluation and the student undertakes the responsibility of mapping out a new course of action for the acquisition of whatever is still unknown to him.

Conclusions

In accordance with our above-mentioned study, we arrive at the following general conclusions:

A) Plato presents self-knowledge as the essential element in characterizing a person as a moral personality. By relating the issue of moral life to that of education, he requests the discovery and implementation of an appropriate pedagogical method that leads to self-knowledge. This means that, in order for an individual to become moral, a systematic course of action must be undertaken by those who are deeply aware of one's inner space, especially if one is a young man. It is therefore essential that tutors choose a teaching method based upon a thorough analysis of the student's spiritual nature in order to develop his morals and therefore his personality. Thus, education, although it is also based upon general principles, has its own specific character, and aims at the realization of the special and the innovative while rejecting the standard and the inflexible. Moreover, it is alien to any random and automatic approach of the student.

B) If we accept that the term "individual" indicates a relationship and reference, then we can easily claim that Plato is a philosopher who systematically approaches this term. The communication between Socrates and Alcibiades is implemented through a dialogue and reveals the intent to transform a situation. Here the intention is of great significance and determines the depth and quality of communication and reciprocity. The tutor is therefore motivated to provide his student with his inner wisdom. However, this motivation has been excited by the student himself, an entity that requires improvement and integration.

C) Plato introduces a tutorial proposal that will help the young man to be able to use rational and cohesive arguments. He believes that insistence on scientific analysis and ordering of concepts motivate the organisation of thoughts and the objective reasoning process. His main concern is that the young man should develop his awareness on the basis of the requirements of both inner cognitive criteria and a strict scientific approach to reality. Within such a framework, the satisfaction that results from knowing things on a factual basis is overtaken by disquiet and a persistent need to seek the truth.

Based on the above approach we are facing the following conclusions:

– Social and political education presupposes the ultimate degree of self-awareness, which is self-knowledge.

– The cognitive matter of justice and injustice is associated with the anthropological question of the appropriate ethical and spiritual equipment for a cognitive and ontological completeness of a human being.

– Ideal education is an education that turns and orientates one towards self-knowledge

– As self-knowledge is a method but also an ontological state, we might say that as a method it is based on continuous exercise, care, and diligence, while the permanent and

[48] The issue about the self – care is now important as well for the tutor as for his student. The student comprehends now the necessity of carrying. This change describes the transformation of the external circumstances to internal.

lasting properties that the human being acquires, move and elevate the being to a new state/degree of self-knowledge. The ascribed inner process is shown in a very activating way.

– Self-knowledge as a method is a "purifying" process since the individual becomes aware of the contents of its self irrespective of perishable values and ephemeral passions.

– Accordingly, self-knowledge is the sum of the intellectual attributes, which reveal the inner possibilities of the nature of each human being.

– The intellectual attributes are proportional to the rational nature of a being and to the particular knowledge that being acquires.

– The process of self-knowledge is a course comparable to that of an empirical process: it is a process of continuous growth of ontological reformation and upgrading of the intelligible beings.

– Self-knowledge is an aspect of the Platonic cosmology and metaphysics: it involves features of revelation and manifestation of *a priori* situations.

– The above conclusions reveal to a whole concept of the earlier–socratic dialogues of Plato: the relationship between Ethics and the the Gnoseology as a post stage to Politics.

– Its methodological tools is the progress "for the better", which refers to the philosophy of transubstantiation and transformation of the incomplete and ephemeral human nature into a spiritual, entelechy and eternal one.

– Through self-knowledge, the factual experience of the terrestrial world is converted into a phenomenological experience of philosophical realism; it can be cultivated through an objective realization of the empirical world of the senses, while the intelligible beings intents to be very communicative by using of the terms of the phaenomenology.

– The ultimate stage of self-knowledge, therefore, is also the ultimate point of the progress towards self-knowledge and represents the point of completion of human nature as personal way of being, as a specific human hypostasis.

– Coming to the end of our study we refer to the following commentary of Proclus[49]:

> "At the end of the previous discussion, the young man accepted the conclusion, and the ignorance of what is just and unjust which Socrates indicated, but he admitted it with an excuse and made Socrates, not himself and his own character responsible for the demonstrations. He said that he was ignorant of what is just and unjust according to the argument of Socrates, but not according to the truth (for this is what he hinted by adding the remark." From what you say it isn't likely. "However, through this passage Socrates shows that even according to the judgement of Alcibiades himself, through the very terms by which he assented, he stands revealed as ignorant of what is just; that it is no else who has applied this refutation but Alcibiades himself and that he must not transfer the responsibility for the proofs to Socrates, but consider his own answers the most valid bases for the conclusion. It is shown clearly that it is the responser who states all the premises and conclusions, not both stated the proofs and in person refuted himself and accused his own ignorance, but not Socrates." [277]

[49] Proclus, *Alcibiades I* (translation and commentary by W. O'Neill), Martinus Nijhof, Hague, 1965, p. 181.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 45-56

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A Profile of Justice in Plato and Rawls

One of the eternal and persistent topics and subjects in the field of every ethical and political philosophy can be justice. Accordingly it is usual that philosophers of different periods with diverse approaches pay attention to this concept and in this paper I want to examine in a specific and selective case study the ideas of these two philosophers Plato and Rawls that belong to different eras and speak about justice in a direct, effective and thick way. The criterion of selecting these two thinkers pertains to this fact that in regard to justice beyond their individuality both of them represents and speaks for two different and also antagonistic models. Accordingly, in this monograph we will focus on that part of Plato's "Politeia" and Rawls "A Theory of Justice" that are comparable and review a profile of their ideas about justice. After doing this task as a result we see that Plato begins his discussion on justice from the internal of human beings and Rawls from outside.

Introduction

In this paper I want to discuss about one of the old and polemical topics of the political philosophy that is justice. But I will do it with regard and limited to the Plato's thought in the first Book of the "Republic"[1] and the chapters one to three of the Rawls in "A Theory of Justice"[2]. According to this schema the common background and context of comparing both of these thinkers will be the concept and not merely the word of justice that acts as a joint and bridge between them. But the before mentioned commonality should not make us forget the textual issues; the style and kind of writing; and their political and social context that have deep and important consequences for our discussion.

At first for finding the architectonic and intellectual pivot I have read the special oral / written, classical, dramatic, dialogical, Greek text of Plato Book one and also the written modern simple prose English text of Rawls chapters one to three. At this stage I do not want to compare these two thinking cosmos but through studying their texts I want to discover the architectonic principles, and by applying it once again I will read these two separate texts and use the heuristic axiom for rereading the Plato and Rawls writings. Therefore I will do simultaneously two things: reading of the texts for discovering the architectonic principles and then rereading the writings according to these axiom for comparing them.

Plato and his Architectonic Principle of Justice

Plato's discussion in the First Book of the Republic is about Justice or dikaiosyne. Such a term for Plato and Aristotle means right and correct conduct and behavior with the other

[1] Plato, *The Republic*, Translated by Paul B. Shorey, London: William Heinemann LTD, 1969, Book One.
[2] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, Chapters One to Three.

people that originated from inside of the individuals and signifies the existence of an ethical excellence and must. Plato in his dramatic dialogue narrates the discussion about justice in the context of the Athenian community among diverse and different main personalities, logos and factions. In this rather broad spectrum of ideas beside Socrates we have three main persons or models with their specific kind of discourses. According to each architectonic principle it is possible to classify them schematically in this way:

– The first current or fraction is represented by Cephalous that with his aphoristic discourse says that the basis of justice is a kind of transaction that is between human beings and Gods. According to this representation his architectonic principle is the observation of specific rules and to comply with the practical and behavioral rules or principles of this kind.[3]

– The second personality or faction is Polemarchus that with the discursive way of speaking emphasizes on the social relations and proposes equity as the equivalent of justice. Accordingly, the architectonic principle of justice is giving every person his or her due and share in the broad field of the social interrelation.[4]

– The third current or representative is Thrasymachus who with his rhetorical speech that with mentioning to a particular realism or the keeping of status quo introduces the dominant ideology as the basis of justice. On the basis of his speech justice is doing right and good things for the other people and ignoring and forgetting ones own goodness and pay attention always to the other individuals.[5]

In the context of these interactions and transmissions of different speeches Plato introduces his own philosophical discourse and discusses collectively and individually with these three personalities and representatives about justice. Therefore first he introduces his philosophical discourse against each one of the three discourses individually and then considers them as a unit and on the basis of a common pivot and notion review them.[6] And it is on the basis of the last approach that gradually he paves the way for introducing his own version of justice through the special discourse of philosophy against the other versions and discourses. Moreover, it is by this initiative that we can find his overall architectonic principal and thereby compare his idea as a whole with Rawls about justice. But notwithstanding the differences between Plato and Rawls texts and contexts the mentioned comparison is possible. For the thoughts of these both thinkers is based and formed in interaction with the other ideas of their special contexts although the particularities of each context is different and special. For example, the universal architectonic principle of Plato is shaped by its responses and interactions with the special discourses of his context about justice – observation of special rules; social relations; and domination of the other. But at the same time we can not ignore the specifications of his text as a combination of dialogue, drama or performance and orality.

At the beginning we can say that Plato in the Book One of the "Politeia" wants to give his conception about the framework of politics and for this aim wants to discuss about the subject matter of politics. More specifically, Plato wants to introduce his conception or the architectonic principle of politics through philosophical discourse in a comparison, agony and dialogue with the other main ideas and currents or their representatives. And in this context the title of this dialogue that is Politeia is very proper and

[3] Plato, op. cit., Book One, Vol. 1, 331 C.
[4] Ibid., 332 D-E, 333 B, 334 B.
[5] Ibid., 338 C, 339 A.
[6] We can see the symbol and representation of this fact essentially in the first Book of the Politeia 351A-354B although the focus is on Thrasymachus.

appropriate for it mentions to the structure and organization of politics. From the perspective of the text and its writing qualities it can be said that Plato as a philosopher makes a differentiation and dividing line between Phenomenon and Noumen[7] at the background of his discussion and then considers justice as a must or ethical internal excellence in this context. According to Plato phenomenal perspective toward justice is the common and habitual conception of the time that sees justice in the background of the social actions, conducts, responses, norms and expectations. In this state there is an external entrance into justice and want to understand it. As a result of this perspective, justice is more or less a phenomenon and not necessarily an internal and natural demonstration and representation of truth and reality, and lastly it is a result and accident and not model or idea. According to this philosophical perception the common sense and habitual conception will be challenged. Thereby the architectonic principle of these three arguments that are aphorism, discourse and rhetoric is based on phenomenon that according to the external determinations and appearances analyses and explains justice – with caution it can be said that according to the modern philosophical language justice is an objective entity and has external determinations.

But in the philosophical division between phenomenon and Noumen Plato chooses the second category and by a new and polemical perspective joins justice with a rational situation and state of the soul[8] – with caution it can be said that according to the modern philosophical language justice is a subjective entity and has internal determinations. According to this perspective justice is a quality that we have to acquire and make it internal and domesticated. Therefore it is not merely an artificial, unreal, external entity and the result of a series of actions and functions. But it is an excellence and virtue inside of the persons that has internalized it and has intrinsic values and also useful and fruitful results.

Up to now we have outlined the text of Plato basically and philosophically through the category of differentiation between phenomenon and Noumen. Now we want to review the intellectual context and background in order to make the above picture complete and somehow to avoid from one dimensionality and mere focus on text.

According to the Aristotle's account that is both ideational and historical[9] the people of Greece experience the transition from family and country with its more or less objective, and also mythical, theological and epical atmosphere to the totality of polis with its three moments that is city, state and citizenship with more or less ideational atmosphere. (This is a transition that has began before Aristotle and is not particular to his time and this physical and non-physical transition is effected by the other events and also itself is a kind if cause for the other effects and happenings.) With the construction of polis the main issue will be the perseverance of the physical and non-physical identity of this new entity. With regard to this new phenomenon that has a kind of parallel with the emergence of human and civic philosophy we have to understand thinking in its context and not out of it the perseverance of this phenomenon is the first task for identity and it becomes the primary and original duty of the people who have existence and live in the polis. In other words, now the people that have sympathy with it are called citizens and are not merely inhabitants of it. But it must be emphasized that polis at its inception is not merely a political, social or economical entity but first of all a normative and cultural, value-related, ethical and existential phenomenon.

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[7] Ibid., 340 A.
[8] Here is a differentiation between Psyche and Pneuma.
[9] Aristotle, *Politics*, translated by H. Hankmann, London: William Heinemann LTD, 1972, 1252a.

Of course the origin and formation of this existential, cultural and ethical phenomenon has occurred in the context of the both external and ideational developments and is not merely one of these. Importantly, this phenomenon also experienced external and ideational / notional developments and in these happenings we can see both positive and negative aspects or opportunities and challenges and it is not a one-dimensional event. In the other words, this phenomenon in the sphere of politics means that city is the only place that the citizens will realize political power and authority. Therefore the other places except city are not the place of politics proper, such as family or town and country and their subjects respectfully such as father, mother, husband, wife, … can not realize and actualize its aim and nature that is political power and authority. It is only city that is the site of politics and those who live in the city in a special meaning. City and citizens as the only proper site of and doers and practitioners of politics are forming and at the same time separating themselves from the other sites and doers. And as a special kind of both subjective and objective entity produce new changes and developments inside it and also in the other spheres. But the important point is the presence and influences of the architectonic principle or standard that in its explicit or implicit way is justice. There is diverse and different ideas about this principle and standard but this issue does not blind us about the presence and influence of this common and necessary principle – we can see this in the first Book of Politeia that its writer accounts different ideas about justice but at the same time after surveying and examining them gradually at the end of this Book on the basis of a common standard connects them with each other and presents his own idea about it. Therefore for the Greek peoples the identity and working of this new phenomenon needs a foundation that is justice.

It seems that there are different perspectives in regard to this new entity named polis and we can classify and simplify of them. On the one hand there are non-rational or semi rational (not anti-rational) views that refer to myth, poem and religion. These ideas accept polis on the mere existence of polis or with reference to the non-rational devices want to affirm the formation of this new phenomenon. Besides, most of the discussions are based on the agent and doer of the justice and do not refer to the process or way of its actualization or it has a second hand importance. Although the before mentioned points are necessary but are not enough, for they do not mention to the substructure of polis and its basic quality. It means that polis is a phenomenon that has developed and separated from family and town or in a word *aufheben* (in its both aspect and not merely one of its meaning) both of them is a new entity that both naturally and gradually develops from its past entities and at the same time wants to go beyond and be something else. Therefore for the different and divers idea about justice or the political justice this is the dominant or the only aspect. In other words, all of them consider justice as a must and excellence and consider and also explain its function in relation with this kind of aufheben: developing; negating and going beyond.

Accordingly, it can be said that justice is a kind of link and has connection with something that is outside of man that is polis as a material, objective and non-abstract phenomenon. In the first place, this conception denotes to a weak or non-existence conception about the relation of this category with the internal of the man or not considering it as an ideal or perfection for human beings – and this fact has many different results such as distance; disconnection; tension; non trust and such things.

Secondly, this notion that polis as a material, objective and non-abstract entity has its own justice or excellence (justice related specifically to the polis) reduces the importance

of themis and resolves it inside the dike. Before the formation of polis in the mytho-theological period dike is the result and offspring of themis that means basically good and correct counseling and advising and at the same time dike denotes to the judicial decision and judgment.[10] Now with the formation of polis dike transforms to a kind of must and correct way and direction that polis must obey as a norm and deviation of it is a kind of injustice and as a consequence has punishment. Thereby the past relation of dike with themis is disrupted and it is not subject to it but it is connected with the specific custom and norms of the polis. Thus the past reference and point of dike is destroyed and the justification of justice is not religion and myth but polis and its citizens *per se* – thereby the polis itself becomes and is understood as an ethical entity and order. Therefore the term justice of polis is very meaningful and complicate: the justice that belongs to the polis and at the same time the polis belongs to the justice and both of them is basis and reference for each other.

Now with this image about the evolution of the text and context and also about the knot of the issue we concentrate of the Plato's thinking about justice according to its guiding principle. It is possible to classify the proposed notions and currents about justice in the first Book of the Politeia into three main topics and at the same time as we said before with regard to a specific perspective we can put them under a common topic – the practice and method Plato himself does. The first personality or representative understands justice as a kind of doing and realization of undertakings that are universal and pertain both to the gods and human beings in all place and times indifferently. These undertakings are not merely derived and institutionalized from the process of the life with the other persons in the community or polis. According to the second personality and representative justice means doing what is proper and suitable in the communal interrelations and interactions of the people that merely can be classified under the friend and enemy titles. And lastly, according to the idea of the third personality and representative justice is a kind of undermining and destroying of ones own interests for the benefits and interests of the other people therefore mainly we realize the interests of the other.

But for Plato the important point is not the diversity and differences of these three notions but finding the common pivot that puts them in a unit and as a whole makes them critical. In this context it seems that for Plato the mentioned important common pivot of theses ideas is their externality – that is, justice in itself has no internal and innate goodness, excellence and virtue and is can not be transmitted to the individual and community that seeks justice. In this broad context the basic notion is not the internal nature of justice but the existence of external aspects and manifestations and the actions and behaviors and conducts that the existed people in the polis see and opines as just and if the individual and community behaves and acts according to it his or her actions and conducts are just and otherwise unjust. If this be the case, justice has no relation with the soul and internal of the people and community and their happiness and felicity but as a communal value is something external that individual or individuals without any ethical virtue and quality must adopt or comply themselves with this external excellence. Moreover, the mere realization of this conformity and harmony with something external even though hypocritical and fake is enough. For by this doing justice is realized and nothing more is expected from individual and the relations of the individual in the community. In other words, justice concerns with the organization of the relations, actions, conducts and behaviors of the individuals with the norms and values of the community and does

[10] G. Del Vecchio, *Justice. A Historical and Philosophical Essay*, Translated by A. H. Campbell, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1952, pp. 6, 7.

not concern itself with the ethical and cultural identity of the individuals. For in these kinds of relations individual is a kind of abstract entity without any relation identity and linkage. But for Plato individual apart from his or her relations has a kind of cultural and ethical identity and the human nature is not limited merely to the existence and realization of these kinds of somehow external relations. According to what has been said the linkage among the three different notions of justice in the first Book of the Republic is their external conception and perspective toward justice[11] that in its turn arises from a specific view and horizon that sees human beings and their relation to external environment.

In this regard it can be said that the external perspective on justice is based on the logic of situation and concerns itself with the position and state of the individuals, groups, communities … and accordingly judges and evaluates their actions, conducts, behaviors and speeches with attention to the quality and position of their situation. For example according to the Plato's text in the First Book the situational position and relation of the individual with gods, the other individuals as friend and enemy, and the established and sovereign power justice and injustice are defined and defended or attacked. Moreover it points to the other factors that are and exist in the situation for it is the situation *per se* that shapes the claims and speeches of this individual to this or that issue. But Socrates and Plato represent and defend of the internal notion about justice under the title of Soul/Psyche in its contradistinction with the external one. Accordingly, justice is the care and concern with the soul itself and with regard to the ethical quality and appropriate excellence of the soul that is being good, just and … It is possible to train and educate an individual to be a good and just person and as a result of this happening naturally justice arises from this kind of soul. For the soul of human beings is the place of different and diverse kinds of beliefs, declinations and sentiments that the presence or absence of them shapes the good or bad and just or unjust quality of the soul. Then these different soul qualities shape different individual with different ethical and cultural identities. Thus here the internal of the individual or the soul or more appropriately the quality and characteristics of it apart from the position and situation of the individual is important.[12]

The introduction of soul by Plato introduces a non-personal and individual aspect into justice and is not based on the personal or individual self as the main level of analysis, and this notion shapes the basic difference between Plato's perspective with the other three before-mentioned views. Thus Plato view is not individual-oriented but soul – oriented and for him soul is a universal, complete and superior whole and is not particular, incomplete and inferior and also contains different and hierarchical members, capacities and abilities that the quality of these relations and categories among these members, capacities and abilities constitutes the opposition, difference, identity, and … among human beings. Thus the soul is beyond the individual and we have to identify individual in relation with it and accordingly it is correct to classify Socrates' and Plato's perspective on Justice as a kind of un-individual and personal one, for it is larger than individual and person and contains it. Therefore the reference of their analysis and justification is not the individual and person and it is most probable that for this reason Plato uses the category of *techne* and not the technician in most of his criticism of the other three opposite perspectives.[13] Most probably Plato wants to emphasize upon and establish the non-personal and individual and also internal aspect of justice. Thus Plato uses the techne

[11] Plato, op. cit., 347 E.
[12] Ibid., 353 D.
[13] Ibid., 345 C.

category and concepts as a heuristic in order discover the internal and non-personal dimension of justice and now we have to discuss more about this category. For Plato the nature of *techne* as an important and serious matter is not the organized knowledge about the instruments for reaching to a specific and particular aim and goal, but *techne* is a kind of introduction and transmission of the appropriate virtue and goodness that pertains to the specific subject of the techne. In other words, techne is introduction and transmission of the special and related excellence of the subject that has no relation and connection with the idea and belief of this or that person, group… Therefore it takes shape in accordance with the subject of specific techne and is beyond any individual and person whim and aspiration like the techne of medicine. Furthermore, there is a linkage between the internal goodness of that techne with the internal goodness of subject of that techne and this produce a network of goodness. Thus the goodness of the subject of the techne and the techne itself in interaction with each other shape and enhance each other. Each one is a standard and goes forward to the other one and there is nothing outside this process and is not like the position of instrument for definition of techne – there is a kind of internal and innate relation inside this process.[14]

As a conclusion, for Socrates and Plato justice is the innate and internal excellence and goodness of the soul that should be realizes and accomplished and should not sacrificed for the individual and communal interests and interpretations. This kind of goodness is completely different from the goodness that results from doing a just action that comes back to its doer. Justice as an innate goodness in relation to human beings as its subject answers and realizes some thing that is inside humans and not something external and outside. Therefore we do not want to import and bring something from outside and then place it inside. If this is the case then soul is that internal and eternal entity that lives in the human beings and the discussion about justice should be focused upon it. In other words, human being should be defined with regard to the capacities and faculties of the soul and actualization of these is justice. Equipped with this architectonic principle against the other three introduced perspectives in the first Book of the Republic we can say that firstly, justice is the special and internal goodness of the soul that we have to arrange our actions, conducts and behaviors according to it. Secondly, human beings are not void and empty entities but having specific qualities and characteristics that makes them appropriate or inappropriate for receiving justice. According to modern jargon there is no separation and duality between subject and object of the justice, for the man who exercises justice at the same time receives it. Lastly, to have and exercise justice make the life supreme and sublime and conversely injustice makes the life inferior and bad. Therefore justice has relation with goodness and becoming good and injustice with badness and becoming bad.[15]

According to this schema Plato searches for the Noumen and not merely and only the phenomenon of justice although he mentions that phenomenon of it also exists. But the specific and one-dimensional concentration on phenomenon means forgetting the Noumen and the structure or the cause that is the prime cause of justice and injustice and this in turn produces many faults and false judgments about justice and injustice.

Rawls and His Architectonic Principle of Justice

As our discussion about Socrates and Plato, here we want to discover the architectonic principle in Rawls through consideration and examination of the first three chapters of

[14] Ibid., 345 E.
[15] Ibid., 352 E.

his book "A Theory of Justice" in the context of the intellectual environment (and not the social, political, economical one) that he has mainly introduced his theory in contradistinction of it. Thereby it is possible to compare a profile of his theory with the perspective of Socrates and Plato. According to the mentioned chapters that will be examined it is possible to introduce the related intellectual background and context that Rawls has confronted with it and in other words he has a critical dialogue with it under these three titles utilitarianism; perfectionism and intuitionism.[16] Like the three representatives and ideas that Plato considers in his dramatic dialogue, Rawls also pays attention to the distinctions and also the main common point of these three perspectives. In other words, Rawls pays attention to the guiding principle of the each one of the intellectual categories that on the whole shapes an intellectual related context. In utilitarianism according to Rawls account society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over individuals belonging to it.[17] According to this account the architectonic and guiding principle is "personal choice". It means that the societal or society's choice is merely the continuation of the individual choice and nothing more or conversely. This issue is realized for the society through the two impartial sympathetic spectator and sympathy ideas and thereby the thing that is good for the individual is also good for the society. Moreover, here utility is considered as a telos and it is nothing more than the maximizing of the net or mediate balance of the rational individual satisfaction and here individual is the pivot too. In this context the prefix of the societal that is added to different and diverse categories is nothing more than the specific collectivity that at the last analysis is composed of the individual gathering. Accordingly, society is a kind of impartial and sympathetic individual that represents the interests, tendencies, declinations … of the individual and the individuals are solved in it. According to these principles and Rawls critical view when utilitarianism confronts with category of justice it will not have internal affinity and sympathy with it and on an optimistic level takes it as a category that has a second social utility.[18]

Therefore society is composed of diverse and multiple individuals that belief in this notion guides us toward the issue about the quality and mode of relations among these multiplicity and plurality in all its aspects. Rawls answer to this issue is through intuitionism but in its general and not epistemological and traditional meaning. Accordingly, we face and confront a kind if multiplicity and plurality about basic principles that we should balance them by reference to our intuition that is not the result of ethical mediation. It means that we have to refer directly to our considered evaluations and judgments that is, attention to what seems to me correct and there is no interference of ethical standards. This kind of intuitionism is composed of two main elements firstly, existence of multiple and diverse basic principles that may have different kinds of relations with each other. And secondly, there is no universal or general rule or method for evaluation, classification, weighting and balancing these multiple and diverse principles except our own intuition.[19] For the complexity of moral realities nullifies our efforts for explaining the evaluations and instead propagates the multiplicity of the principles. But if we decide to go beyond these principles there will be two basic consequences such as reduc-

[16] John Rawls, op. cit., p. 22.

[17] This notion reefers to the two different kinds of Utilitarianism and the relation of their guiding principle with the absolute or mediate utility.

[18] Ibid., pp. 22, 25-27, 16.

[19] Ibid., p. 34.

tion of principles to vulgar and unscientific issues; or reaching to false categories and falling into extreme simplicity.

Now with regard to the above-mentioned points it can be asked about the function of our intuition and more exactly what its foundations are. It seems that it is by the way of perfectionism that Rawls answer to this matter. There is a thick and also thin meaning about perfection, in the thin or absolute meaning the related ideal or perfection is assumed as an absolute, clear, unit and accepted standard, principle, value and aim that all the individuals and institutions and also their tasks and engagements should be directed to it. In other words, individuals and institutions and also their related tasks and undertakings must be naturally directed towards the maximization and proliferation of the human good or excellence as an absolute and unitary category with innate value in the fields of art, science and culture.[20]

In contrast to this thin or absolute conception of perfection there is thick or unabsolute one. In this conception the considered ideal or perfection is an ideal and perfection among the other ones and should through the individual intuition be balanced as a kind if standard against the other ideal and perfection but not in a very precise and exact way. Of course with regard to the maximization and minimization of the values and the other standards such as wants and passions the principle of excellence or innate goodness and ideal will be a relative notion. With regard to this background and its intellectual or ideational context and also its connection with and disconnection from it Rawls paves the way for his theory of justice.

For him basically justice refers to a proper and contractual situation that rational, choicer and deliberative individuals exist in it and individuals with these qualities agree with each other about the primary principles and among it principles of justice. Accordingly, in its foundation justice refers to the factual or non-factual actualization of an external reality that operates as a background and model. Although it should be added that this external model is not a formless and without identity state but a proper and appropriate and in a word equitable situation. And at the same time it is a consensual event that is, many free and choicer individuals have role in its formation.[21] The existence of the primary situation with these characteristics guarantees that the individuals with these qualities that think and act in the related specific context are all on a just basis. Accordingly, the equity of the original position guarantees the actualization and realization of the justice and this means "justice as fairness". Although Rawls himself accepts that there is a gap between justice and equity[22], but at any way justice has to be understood and considered in the context of fairness. With regard to this point and the necessity of understanding Rawls according to his "A Theory of Justice", now we will examine in detail his notion as a symbol of an external perspective towards justice.

The primary and basic model and mould of justice is society and not community. According to the Rawls' definition society is a rather self-sufficient collectivity of persons that in their relations and interrelations reach to this understanding and awareness that some of the conduct rules are necessary and most of the time individuals in the course of their life act according to these rules. Moreover, these rules introduce a particular kind of help and cooperation system with the aim of advancing the goodness of those who are participants of it. According to this account society is a collectivity for

[20] Ibid., pp. 325, 327, 327.
[21] Ibid., pp. 16, 17.
[22] Ibid., pp. 12, 13.

cooperation and help for progress that normally conflict and also share of interests are present. In such an atmosphere we need principles that by them find social arraignments that make possible the distribution of interests and also to reach to consensus about the appropriate distribution of the individuals' share. Therefore these principles do two functions of division and distribution that are the principles of social justice simultaneously.[23] Therefore it is possible to suggest that our need to the fair principles as justice is due to the "context of the society" as an external category for individual and not as category that rises from within. Therefore we have to concentrate on society as an external format and mould and see what happens there that necessitates our need for the fairness principles. It possible to say that not only Rawls believes in the existence of differences, diversities and tensions among individuals for deciding about the rights of the main duties and also the appropriate distribution of the responsibilities and privileges for social cooperation but also he believes in the necessary existence of a series principles and recognize them. Accordingly, it is the role and function of the necessary principles that provide a mode and course for determination of the rights and duties of the basic and main social institutions and organizations, and at the same time define and specify the appropriate distribution of the responsibilities and privileges for the actualization of the social cooperation. Thereby the existent qualities and mechanisms of the society make the consensus about the principles in the two fields of the distribution and division a necessary and unavoidable fact – the principles that are nothing else except the principles of justice. Accordingly, the background is located outside of the individual and it is the effective and influential mechanisms and factors of the society and not from inside the individuals that introduce the necessity of the justice principles for all the individuals. Notwithstanding Rawls thinks that principles of justice have universality and this makes it necessary that they be limited and in a word have only "social" aspect – that is, the justice that has to be realized in the society be social justice and nothing more or beyond it.[24] (Historically we know that for the first time Aristotle introduces the particularity of justice and its existence in Plato's Dialogue is polemical.) For Rawls justice is particular and specifically refers to the social institutions and this directs us toward a more detailed and analytic consideration of this category.

It seems that Rawls understanding of "the societal" has two aspects, firstly, the basic and primary structure of society; and more specifically and precisely or secondly, those social main institutions that distribute fundamental rights and duties and divide the privileges that arise from social cooperation. And we can say that his meaning of the main institutions is political body and framework and also the main economical and social arrangements.[25] But among these his primary and initiative attention is toward the main structure that at first sight is somehow ambiguous. For the mentions that this structure has and contains different social positions that human beings with diverse expectations enter into these different before-shaped positions and the same expectations are shaped by the political system and the social and economic environment and context. But we must be aware that there are different kinds of inequality in this basic structure and this is an unavoidable happening. But it is the existence of this matter that makes the entrance of justice and its principles a necessity – thus justice is not an internal and innate and independent necessity. Thereby Rawls by introducing and proposing the basic and

[23] Ibid., pp. 4, 5.
[24] Ibid., pp. 7, 8, 9.
[25] Ibid., p. 7.

primary structure make the first step for limiting justice and it is in this course that on one hand, he does not examine the institutions and social actions and doings and on the other hand, the international and transnational aspect of justice.[26] Thereby we are confronted by justice as a special and particular and also abstract and isolated phenomenon in the form of the basic and essential structure of the society. This makes it possible that Rawls avoids from the generality and at the same time articulates openness of the justice.

But this is not the only limitation of justice, for apart from it Rawls introduces a kind of limitation with regard to the society. It means that notwithstanding of the other alternatives he limits his discussion to the ideal or completely just and ordered society, thus his discussion is not about the disordered, chaotic, and hybrid society that is an amalgam of justice and injustice.[27] For he thinks that is kind of society is the basis of the other societies and not converse. But it does not mean that the discussion is one-dimensional, for even though the concept and principles of justice should be considered in the broader and larger background called social ideal but the social ideal in turn has relation with the concept of society and it is against it that we have to understand the problems and issues.[28] Limitation of the justice to the basic and essential structure of the ideal society enters us into discussion about those principles that are appropriate and suitable for this kind of structure and the way of their formation that this in its own shapes the nature o justice and the theory of justice has to attend to it. Human beings as a collectivity and group have to define and determine what is justice and injustice. In other words, beforehand human beings have to define their mutual claims to each other and also the prism of the basis of the society. For realization of this the existence of a hypothetical situation with specific qualities is a necessity that in it the free, rational and choice-making individuals live together and reach to the primary agreements that are basis for the other agreements.[29] It must be mentioned that the hypothetical state is posited against the historical or primary or even natural state. The main characteristic of this completely suppositional state is existence of the "veil of ignorance" that has a wide range of extensions and is not limited, but these other ones remain in the parenthesis. The existence of this veil puts the participants of the primary state in a condition that makes them unconscious about their social status and personal interests and this produces a kind of state; agreements; general and widespread relationships among individuals; and gives to it a special flavor. The general and universal result of this special state is appearance of the fairness as a category and phenomenon and then it is from this that justice will come out and appear.[30] For it is in this special hypothetical primary condition and state that individuals in its special meaning for Rawls are situated, it seems necessary that we pay attention to the qualities of these individuals. The first quality of these individuals is their liberty but it is not absolute and unlimited, but as the society it is limited. In retelling Rawls idea about liberty we can say that for him liberty is a kind if independence and autonomy of the individuals that also undertake some obligations – the obligations that the members have imposed upon themselves and not converse. Therefore society is a kind of optional and volunteer formation and its constitutive members have limited and not absolute freedom and independence.[31] The second quality of these individuals is their rationality. The rationality of those individuals that are in the

[26] Ibid., p. pp. 7, 8. Although Rawls reduces this defect in this book: John Rawls, *The law of Peoples*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.

[27] Ibid., pp. 8, 9.

[28] Ibid., pp. 9, 10. [29] Ibid., pp. 11, 13. [30] Ibid., p. 12. [31] Ibid., p. 13.

primary state is a rationality that is void of the polemical ethical elements and Rawls sees it more proper to define it in its limited form as is the case in the common sense conception of economics, that is, provision and usage of the effective instruments for reaching to specific and definite aims and goals.[32] Lastly, the third quality of those individuals that are in the primary state is their choice making for Rawls individuals choose. But with regard to the concept of social cooperation and reciprocal relations and actions the principle of utility and interest can not be the basis of the individuals choice as equal, free and rational (in their special meanings) entities. Therefore we have to search for another basis for the choose and selection of the principles that in such situation social cooperation on the basis of this makes the choosing of principles possible. For Rawls this basis is the principles of equality and inequality in its sectional and conditional aspect, that is equality in rights and responsibilities and inequality in the social and economical issues and matters.[33] For the progress and flourishing of every person depends on the cooperation and participation of all the persons with each other on the rational conditions and the division of privileges and all these make participation and cooperation of all the parties who are strong and weak – this means growth, flourishing and welfare for all. Therefore all the individuals according to their proportions want to participate in this cooperation provided that the conditions are reasonable. For if it be so the existence of intermingling and cooperation makes it possible that the utility and advantage of some make the interest and advantage of the others or majority possible. But if the conditions were unreasonable this kind of cooperation will not be advantageous and attractive for the parties and they will not accept it. For on this case one party makes utility in the price of the other parties, and the other party makes no interest but will loss what has or there will be some shortage and damages in it and this party will endure difficulty and hardship.[34]

Thereby the guiding and architectonic principle of Rawls theory of justice that is the externality of justice becomes clear, precise and institutionalized at the outset and also through his presuppositions, here externality means both that justice is not inside of individual and also it is unfamiliar and alien category. The starting point is existence of a contractual (as he understand of contract) and fair primary condition, a contract that is itself external and based on the abstract level. Moreover, the existence and main role of rational, free, and choice-making individuals in the primary situation is based on a kind of personalism and individualism that the three mentioned characteristics belong to the individuals and have external aspect and are not inside or in the soul of human beings.

As a final conclusion, with regard to the introduced profile we can say that in the representative of the internal perspective that is Plato justice resides in a total named ethical/civic entity and this entity has soul with portions that has no connection with his being as a person. Therefore here it is necessary to have a primal, essential and internal outlook to justice. But in the representative of the other perspective that is Rawls justice is external and at the center of it is situated a specific individual that is rational, free, and choice-making and this individual as a subject is in the veil of ignorance in the primary state. Thus the mentioned qualities belong and are attributed to the individual as a person. Therefore here we can discern a kind of external (not internal); secondary (not primary); and procedural (not essential) outlook.[35]

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[32] Ibid., p. 143. [33] Ibid., p. 14. [34] Ibid., p. 15.

[35] I have used from this book for the conclusion: Kimon Lycos, *Plato on Justice and Power*, N.Y.: State University of N.Y. Press, 1987, p. 172-173.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 57-83

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Providence et liberté dans la pensée de Proclus

Introduction

L'étude fait partie de cette série apparue avec Providence et liberté dans la néoplatonisme. Apparemment rien n'est plus loin que la *Théologie platonicienne*, ouvrage final, et les *Trois Opuscules*, de datation plus incertaine. L'étude permettra peut-être de s'en faire une idée, avec certaines continuités tels les thèmes de la participation au divin, et quelques autres. Rien a priori, non plus, n'était plus différent que le théologien et le philosophe, le premier convaincu de ses certitudes, l'autre sur la voie du questionnement. Quelle est la nature de la Providence, peut-être est-ce le seul lien, mais le lien fort qui unit les deux. La théologie met l'accent sur la Providence, la philosophie se posera des questions sur elle, et essaiera de la réunir dans *Sur la Providence* et *De l'existence du mal*, avec la liberté.*

I

Nous partirons d'abord du *terminus ad quem* de l'œuvre de Proclus, la théologie platonicienne, si tant est qu'elle peut permettre, à partir de ce point d'achèvement de voir les problèmes posés à d'autres endroits, par la notion même de Providence. Là où l'interprétation du commentaire quitte le mot à mot, pour devenir ce tour de force, que l'on pourrait qualifier de tour de génie, si Proclus n'avait pas réservé le mot plutôt à Aristote. Il fallait, en effet, que le maître Syrianus ait indiqué la voie de l'exégèse théologique, qui est choisie, en opposition à la deuxième voie indiquée qui est l'interprétation logique du Parménide, qui, dans le détail des hénades divines, à côté de l'Un en soi, inconnaissable sont tirées de la deuxième hypothèse, contrairement à l'interprétation de Jamblique, pour que l'on ait quelque chose de nouveau, que l'on hésiterait, cette fois, à baptiser commentaire, tellement la force de l'interprète s'y fait jour. Mais la spéculation sur les vraies réalités[1], donnera cet aspect de vraisemblance à la lecture du texte platonicien, qui fera qu'en guise de théologie, c'est par le biais d'une ontologie que le texte est abordé, dans ses neuf hypothèses, dont les cinq premières peuvent faire exister les êtres supérieurs et les réalités intermédiaires[2], en sorte que s'élabore cette procession qui sera si essentielle pour comprendre la Providence, la nature de ces différentes choses, le mode d'apparition des classes secondes, à partir des classes premières[3] de « l'Un qui est qui procède, en effet, de l'hénade supérieure aux êtres, et engendre la classe dans son entier, l'intelligible, l'intellectif, le supra-céleste, et les dieux encosmiques »[4]. Il n'en fallait pas plus

* Les parties II, III et IV ont été présentées en abrégé au Congrès d'Helsinki (14-16 Juin 2007) de l'ISNS.
[1] Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne*, I, 10, 20, 22-23.
[2] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, 10, 21, 11.
[3] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, 10, 22, 11 et suivantes.
[4] Proclus, *Ibidem*.

pour que cette théologie prenne dans sa globalité, un tour scientifique: le *Parménide* lui offrait sa structure, qui n'était plus considéré comme logique, mais offrait son concours, malgré tout, par ses déductions, et ses démonstrations, à l'interprétation d'une théologie, devenue, pour ainsi dire, science.

La Providence n'était abordée qu'au c.15, avec les attributs divins, puisque «les dieux exercent leur Providence, aussi bien sur les êtres universels que sur les particuliers »[5], attributs divins que l'auteur tire des *Lois*, ce qui fait qu'ils sont *causes* de toutes les processions et de tous les mouvements de vie. Ainsi, est-ce cette idée de causalité divine qui est instauratrice de la Providence, ce qui n'est pas sans renforcer le caractère scientifique de cette théologie: « non seulement le mouvement local, mais tous les autres viennent de l'âme qui a rattaché à lui-même, la vie … qui préside à titre de cause, à toute action temporelle, et de plus haut encore, elle vient de l'existence de l'Un qui maintient, et l'intellect, et l'âme et les remplit de tous les biens… »[6].

Ainsi la Providence est-elle, comme chez Plotin[7], non seulement cause de l'être, mais cause de toute la bonté de l'être, et les dieux exercent-ils, puisqu'ils préexistent, en tant que classes divines à la multitude des êtres, cette Providence bienfaitrice[8], chose on ne saurait plus naturelle et conforme à leur devoir[9]. N'est-il pas normal d'exercer cette Providence sur ses propres productions, d'être comme le pilote du navire. « Mais l'exercent-il sur tous les êtres à la fois, ou laissent-ils chaque chose prise individuellement, sans une part de leur contrôle ? »[10]. Grande question de la Providence et le la liberté, dont on aura des échos dans les *Dix Problèmes*. Quoiqu'il en soit, cette Providence est là, qui posera le problème de savoir le mode selon lequel les dieux pénètrent partout[11], et aux chapitres suivants, cette autorité qui verra s'adjoindre, conformément à la *République*, les attributs de la Bonté et de la justice, ne saurait être, en tant que divine, que cette cause de tous les biens[12].

Le système théologique repose dans son entier, sur l'existence de l'Un transcendant le multiple, et cause avant tout de l'unité[13], transcendant ainsi les êtres, et cause finale de l'univers; cet Un premier est séparable, imparticipable, et cause de tout ce qui existe[14], malgré tout présent dans tout les êtres, puisque ce qui procède d'un principe, participe nécessairement au principe dont il a procédé, non pas directement, comme on le verra, mais à travers les hénades divines. Lui reste supérieur à tout: dieu ou Bien de la *République*[15], qui recevront l'intellect pur, des êtres intelligibles, une lumière intelligible, et de lui, Père de l'univers, leur caractère unitaire[16]. Mais l'Un, séparé qu'il est des hénades, causalité sans cause[17], reste ineffable, inconnaissable, infini, dans sa transcendance parfaite.

La triade limitant, illimité, et mixte révèle, dans sa composition antique, au livre III, la classe des dieux intelligibles. Ils sont comme la forme et la matière, dont la puis-

[5] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, 15, 38, 11-12.
[6] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, 15, 38, 9-15.
[7] Cf. notre exposé au Congrès de Québec, 26-29 Juin 2006, Providence et liberté dans le néoplatonisme, 3. Plotin
[8] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, 15, 39, 3-5.
[9] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, 15, 39, 3-5.
[10] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, 15, 40, 15-17.
[11] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, 15, 42, 18-20.
[12] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, 18, 45, 18-19.
[13] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, 1, 79, 2-5.
[14] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, 2, 83, 22-23; et 85, 9.
[15] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, 6.
[16] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, 7, 98, 5-8.
[17] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, 8, 105, 24.

sance mixte imite, par dissimilitude la puissance active[18] ; la forme serait le limitant, et le mixte formé des deux serait l'être, puisque les principes intelligibles engendrent tous les êtres. La classe des dieux intelligibles serait aussi en elle-même la beauté, la vérité, la proportion, définis dans le *Philèbe*[19], alors que le Vivant en soi du *Timée*, avec l'éternité, et l'Un vient encore préciser leur nature qui reste pour ces hénades parfaites que sont les dieux intelligibles de l'ordre de l'essence, participant à l'Un[20] révélant selon l'expression des *Oracles*, le monde caché[21], et restent, dans la dernière triade des totalités et des parties[22], que sont l'Un et l'être, monade, dyade, puis multiplicité intelligible dans le devenir, selon le *Parménide* qui a ainsi fixé la première classe, celle des dieux intelligibles.

Les dieux intelligibles intellectifs qui viennent ensuite « réunissent l'intellect imparticipable à la classe des dieux intelligibles qu'ils maintiennent ensemble les diverses processions des êtres inférieurs, révèlent et déploient les existences stables des causes qui leur sont supérieures »[23]. A ce titre c'est eux qui sont le plus essentiellement dieux, car ils sont la vie, « dieux du degré de la vie »[24], propageant celle-ci à travers la multiplicité des essences. Ils sont intermédiaires, en effet, dans le règne divin, là où les dieux prospèrent entre l'intelligible constitué, établi, et l'intellectif, en acte, unissant les extrêmes, manifestant les êtres supérieurs aux êtres inférieurs, ressemblant ainsi au Vivant complet du *Timée*[25]. Ils déclinent ainsi l'être, la vie, l'intellect[26], selon la célèbre triade. On peut les reconnaître d'après le *Phèdre* lorsque Zeus conduisait son char ailé vers les hauteurs, arrive à la voûte céleste et aux visions bienheureuses[27]: ainsi le lieu supra-céleste est-il leur première triade, puis on parlera la révolution céleste, de la prairie, ou encore de la voûte sub-céleste[28], limite inférieure des lieux célestes. Les dieux sources ressemblent aux dieux chefs des *Oracles*[29], et en tant que réceptacle, le lieu supra-céleste est féminin, recevant les causes paternelles, les attributs négatifs du « sans couleur » et «sans figure», ou encore le contact, et les attributs positifs de «science, sagesse et justice» demeurent. La plaine de vérité, la prairie, et la nourriture forment une autre triade où ce nectar indique la liberté de la providence nouvelle[30].

C'est au niveau des dieux intelligibles (νοεροι) seulement que se réalise la démiurgie et l'action providentielle. Leur classe est de structure hebdomadique, dans une exégèse compliquée où, à côté des trois pères intellectifs, on a trois dieux immaculés, rappelant les « dieux implacables » des *Oracles chaldaïques*, enfin une monade[31]. Leur procession aboutit à la création des mondes. Cronos, père de Zeus, puis Rhéa, mère de celui-ci en sont les premières figures, qui avec Zeus constituent la triade démiurgique première, avant qu'interviennent les hebdomades. L'intellect démiurgique de Zeus exerce alors sa providence sur les êtres inférieurs[32]. Cronos vit dans son royaume, engendre les âmes et a

[18] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, 9 et 10.
[19] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, 11.
[20] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, 24.
[21] Proclus, op. cit., III, 25.
[22] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, 26.
[23] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, 1, 179, 16-18.
[24] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, 1, 180, 27.
[25] Proclus, *op. cit.*., IV, 1, 181, 8-11.
[26] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, 3, 184, 9-10.
[27] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, 4, 186, 6-10, *Phèdre*, 248 b.
[28] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, 6 et 7, 189-190.
[29] Proclus, op. cit., IV, 9, 192-194.
[30] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, 15, 202 26-27, et 203, 15.
[31] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 2, 219, 19-22.
[32] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 6, 259, 7-9.

la même place qu'Adrastée chez les dieux précédents, et est décrit, comme chez Orphée, avec une barbe noire[33]. Cronos et Rhéa produisent Zeus qui produit le monde[34], jouant ainsi puisqu'il n'y a bien qu'un démiurge dans le *Timée*[35] le rôle de père et de créateur[36].

Les jeunes dieux vont être ceux qui n'ayant pas reçu la puissance d'engendrer des êtres égaux aux dieux, vont créer les mortels. La tâche de fabriquer l'ensemble du monde revient ainsi à Zeus « désirant mettre toutes les choses en ordre, capable d'exercer sa providence sur l'univers »[37]. L'action providentielle correspond ainsi à l'exercice de cette puissance, et à cette mise en ordre qui, dans cette démiurgie transcendante, passera pour les hommes par les jeunes dieux, imitateurs de leur père[38], remplis qu'ils sont de l'unité divine. A l'image du Vivant intelligible qui lui sert de modèle, il crée le monde. La Providence est ainsi du sommet intellectif, la véritable cause dans son unité du monde qui le maintient dans son unité ordonnée[39], s'étendant à l'univers et aux particuliers, par l'intermédiaire des âmes, mais reste invisible, alors que son doublet, la fatalité, elle, est visible aux humains[40]. Le monde est ainsi régi par l'intellect et la nécessité[41], à partir d'une démiurgie qui en est la source[42].

Aussi lorsqu'on arrive à la classe suivante des dieux chefs, a-t-on la réalisation de cette Providence. A ce stade, on a les dieux hypercosmiques, les dieux hypercosmiques-encosmiques, et les dieux encosmiques, qui sont l'image du démiurge qui les fait venir à l'existence. Ainsi vont-ils être les véritables intercesseurs de celui-ci pour réaliser cette Providence qui s'étend à tout, et le monde devenu une statue des êtres éternels, ils vont faire en sorte que l'ensemble participe de biens divins[43], trait essentiel d'une Providence qui dispense les puissances généreuses du démiurge et père[44]. Le pouvoir de la Providence est ainsi réparti entre les dieux, qui de leur père, Zeus, Poseidon, Pluton, comme dans la mystagogie orphique, elle est répartie entre les trois Cronides[45]. Les effets ne seront plus jamais séparés des causes, et les êtres qui en sont sujets vont y participer[46]. Les dieux commandent le monde et apparaissent sous ce double sens d'une providence coordonnée et d'une puissance transcendante[47]. Les dieux séparés du monde sont reliés aux « dieux célestes qui chevauchent les corps, tout de même qu'ils transcendent les dieux sublunaires qui ont reçu le gouvernement de la matière »[48]. Le démiurge possèdera des modèles de genres de vie[49], car, bien sûr, il n'est pas question, pour la providence de rendre tout uniforme. La réalité providentielle assure la mise en ordre la stabilité des sphères[50], car tout dans le fuseau obéit à des nécessités[51]. A l'instar du *Parménide*, le démiur-

[33] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 10, 263, 23..
[34] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 11.
[35] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 14.
[36] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 16.
[37] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 17, 280, 15.
[38] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 18, 284, 17.
[39] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 22 et 23.
[40] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 25.
[41] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 31, cf. *Timée* 35 a 1-4.
[42] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 32.
[43] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VI, 1, 351, 27-39.
[44] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VI, 6, 354, 10-11.
[45] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VI, 8, 364, 3-4..
[46] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VI, 11, 370, 24-25.
[47] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VI, 16, 389, 1-2.
[48] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VI, 16, 393, 1-4.
[49] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VI, 19, 397, 22-29.
[50] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VI, 21, 401, 22-23.
[51] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VI, 23, 406, 21.

ge était en-soi, et dans les autres, en contact avec lui-même et avec les autres[52], ce qui caractérise la manière d'être et l'intervention de cette Providence.

Voilà ce qu'on peut dire de l'intervention de la Providence dans cette théologie. Elle apparaît à l'intérieur d'un système de causes, à partir d'une causalité transcendante et imparticipable, celle de l'Un. Mais comme toutes procèdent les une des autres, elles se relient, et relient l'Un, cause suprême aux diverses classes de dieux, intelligibles, intelligibles intellectifs, intellectifs, puis aux dieux du monde[53]. Causalité qui est à peu près équivalente à la réalisation d'une puissance[54], à partir de la toute puissance de l'Un, puis des différentes puissances ou réalisations du réel qui se trouve à l'intérieur d'un cheminement qui est celui de la procession dans cette avancée continue qui devient celle de la προόνοια. Aussi lorsqu'on arrive à la causalité paternelle du démiurge est-il qualifié de meilleure des causes, à même de l'introduire, celle-là qui met en œuvre, par les dieux intellectifs cette réalité providentielle, avant que les jeunes dieux produisent les êtres mortels, en simples intercesseurs du démiurge[55]. Ainsi lorsque l'on arrive au monde, et à ces réalités encosmiques, trouve-telle dans cette longue chaîne et dans cette série, sa pleine expression dans les astres, à partir des modèles intelligibles qui font briller l'unité dans le monde de l'ici-bas[56], puisqu'ils sont l'image des réalités supérieures et transcendantes, ainsi diffusées sur la terre.

Cette théologie rationnelle sur ce plan trouve cependant des formes plus irrationnelles dans sa relation avec les autres, là où il s'agirait de « mettre toutes les théologies en accord »[57], et plus précisément celles d' « Orphée de Pythagore et des *Oracles Chaldaïques* »[58]. Proclus n'a jamais commenté lui-même Orphée, se contentant de reprendre le cours de son maître Syrianus[59]. L'expression du F 1 « la fleur de l'intellect » devient ainsi: « la fleur de cette triade » ou « la fleur de la garde inflexible de l'univers »[60]. Celle du F 4 « la Puissance est avec lui (le Père), et l'Intellect procède de lui », trait essentiel de la Providence, devient « puissance qui exerce sa providence à l'égard de tout ce qui est inférieur » où « le terme limitant est Père, le terme illimité, puissance, le mixte, l'intellect »[61]. Le F 5 note « le feu premier transcendantal, enclôt sa puissance dans la matière », ce qui devient « il ne fait pas descendre sa puissance dans la matière, mais produit toute la démiurgie de manière transcendante »[62].

« Le Père est toutes choses, mais intelligemment » devient en Proclus « la première triade est dans toute chose, mais sur le mode intelligible »[63]. « Ouvrière distributive de feu, porteur de vie » du F 32, devient ainsi « ouvrière de multiplicité »[64]. Au F 39 « l'intellect inséminé en toutes choses » devient « puissance indicible semée en chacun »[65] ;

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[52] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VI, 24, 412-413.

[53] L. M. de Rijk, Causality and participation in Proclus, dans *On Proclus and its influence in medieval philosophy,* ed. E. Bos & P.A. Meijer, Leiden, New York, 1992, p. 11 et suivantes.

[54] Cf. L. J. Rosan, *The philosophy of Proclus,* New York, 1949, 68 et suivantes.

[55] Proclus, *op. cit.,* V, 18, 286, 20-22.

[56] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 14, 272, 7-8.

[57] Marinus, *Proclus ou Sur le Bonheur*, Paris, Les Belles lettres, 2002, § 22, 20-21.

[58] La Souda, cité par H. D. Saffrey, accorder entre elles les traditions philosophiques: une caractéristique du néoplatonisme athénien, *Proclus and its influence in medieval philosophy,* Leiden, New-York, Köln, p. 37.

[59] H. D. Saffrey, *art. cit.*, p. 36.

[60] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, 36, 3, V, 3, 13.

[61] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, 13, 44; III, 21, 20-21.

[62] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 39, 11-12.

[63] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, 13, 4.

[64] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, 26, 3.

[65] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, 18, 13.

«Amour profond » dit le 43, « des profondeurs de son âme, comme le dit l'Oracle »[66]. La fameuse triade « foi, vérité, amour » du F 46, devient « à partir de cet amour procède l'amour intellectif, accompagné de la foi et de la vérité »[67]. S'agissant de la Providence, les dieux sources du F 49, deviennent: « les dieux sources sont rejetons du Père intelligible, remplis de l'unité intelligible, de même que tous les mondes des dieux principes »[68]. L'éternité du même fragment devient cette « éternité cause de vie inépuisable » ou « éternité incessante »[69]. Le F 57, où « le Père insuffle les sept firmaments » devient cette « mise en ordre des firmaments par Zeus »[70], ce qui, bien sûr est un des traits essentiels de la Providence. Le F 65 du « canal conducteur » fait l'objet de plusieurs reprises[71], puisque les canaux des *Oracles*, équivalent aux hénades. Enfin le F 102, si important: « ne regarde pas la nature, son nom est marqué par le destin » est repris sous la forme: « Car la source de la nature est appelée par les dieux, *la première fatalité: garde-toi* de jeter les yeux sur la nature, car son nom est la fatalité »[72]. Là où il s'agit de la liberté, et où l'on voit comment cette théologie qui empruntait à tout le panthéon hellénique, était si proche des *Oracles Chaldaïques*[73], sur la description de cette réalité providentielle.

D'un autre côté cette théologie, en plus d'être intégrale se devait d'être scientifique. Ce fut la tâche de l'exégèse du *Parménide*. Proclus, à la suite de son maître Syrianus, contre Jamblique qui partit de la première, voit l'origine des dieux, dans la deuxième. Pour les dieux intelligibles, les trois triades correspondant à l'Un-qui-est, sont en III, au §24-26, pour les dieux intelligibles–intellectifs, au § 28-34, correspondant au multiple, en IV, 35-36, pour le tout et les parties, 37, les trois triades des dieux intellectifs figurent en V, 37, 38, et 39[74].

L'interprétation que l'auteur veut théologique est, en fait, onto-théologique, puisque toutes les déductions partent de l'être, ajoutant seulement à la fin que cela correspond à telle ou telle classe divine. Il est vrai que l'on peut toujours remplacer le x ou l'Un qui figure dans l'interprétation logique, par une réalité: Proclus le fait, en s'appuyant, la plupart du temps sur d'autres dialogues, comme le *Phèdre* ou le *Timée.*

Ainsi, pour les dieux intelligibles, la première triade est-elle conforme, comme les autres, à « cette procession des dieux qui procède depuis la suprême unité des intelligibles jusqu'à l'Un-qui-est »[75], aussi est-elle cet Un-qui-est, l'Un s'étendant jusqu'à l'être et participant à celui-ci, le deuxième devient cette totalité: totalité antérieure aux parties par sa puissance, totalité des parties, par son être, totalité dans la partie[76]. Les dieux intelligibles intellectifs, correspondant dès lors à la multiplicité, dans lequel, l'auteur du § 28 à 34, raisonne sur les nombres divins, unité et dyade, multiplicité dans les intelligibles, nombre dans les intellectifs[77], puis de nouveau, tout et parties, en tant qu'un-multiple, tout-parties, limité-illimité, à l'instar du *Parménide* 144^{e} 8, puis figure. Les dieux intellectifs

[66] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, 2, 13-14
[67] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, 22, 15-17.
[68] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VI, 1, 1-3., cf. VI, 3, 5-6, I, 15, 20.
[69] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, 18, 21, cf. IV, 25, 19.
[70] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 24, 18
[71] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, 6, 28, p. 129, 27, 21; IV, 6, 11; VI, 2, 7, p. 344-345.
[72] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 32, 12, p. 317.
[73] Sur Proclus et les Oracles chaldaïques, cf. aussi L. Brisson, La place des Oracles Chaldaïques dans la théologie platonicienne, dans *Proclus et la théologie platonicienne*, Louvain, 2000, p. 109-162.
[74] Cf. pour une présentation d'ensemble, le tableau de la page LXIX du tome I, de l'édition H. Saffrey, L.G. Westerink de la *Théologie platonicienne*, Paris, les belles Lettres, 1968.
[75] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, 23, 82, 1-3.
[76] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, 25, 88, 10-12.
[77] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, 32, 97, 16-18.

correspondent, quant à eux, pour la première triade, à en lui-même, en un autre, où en effet, la création du monde par le démiurge sera cette sortie de soi vers l'autre, la deuxième triade, immobile en mouvement, avec cet épanchement d'un mouvement créateur de vie, et identique / différent, pour le troisième, où les dieux se distinguent des autres, dans cette hiérarchie descendante. Logique du divin, comme nous le disions ailleurs pour Plotin[78] puisqu'on ou classe des dieux, selon un ordre logique et ainsi scientifique.

Toujours est-il que la *Théologie platonicienne* présente les hénades comme intermédiaires entre l'Un imparticipable et les êtres: les hénades sont les dieux. Volonté de présenter une face rationnelle qui marquera l'entrée dans la métaphysique du divin ? Les hénades participent au multiple et constituent sur le plan du divin, ces réalités intermédiaires qui faisaient défaut chez Plotin, entre l'Un transcendant, et les autres réalités qui s'ensuivent, qui étaient trop disjointes[79]. Si c'est l'idée de participation qui justifie celle de leur être[80], celle-ci va, en même temps, introniser celle de Providence, puisqu'elle représente, en effet, l'incursion, des dieux dans les réalités, et dans le monde. Les hénades ou les dieux, note le traité III « ne laissent s'introduire aucun vide, ni dans les êtres incorporels, ni dans les êtres corporels », et il est nécessaire que ce qui procède dans chaque ordre naturel, procède par le moyen d'une similitude »[81]. Reliée à l'Un dont elles participent, elles sont universelles, réalisant partout sur la terre cet ordre universel[82], à mesure de la distribution de leur puissance, de la répartition de leurs effets, à partir de la cause. Distribuant cette parcelle d'universel dans le particulier, elles expliquent que les astres peuvent être des dieux, et soient en ce sens encore providentiels, parce que bonté, ainsi que le notaient les *Eléments de Théologie*[83], ce qui permet de réaliser cette bonté unique note la *Théologie platonicienne*, dans la multiplicité des êtres[84], réalisant ainsi la Providence, puisque chaque être particulier reçoit ainsi sa parcelle du divin.

II Les dix problèmes (questions 1 à 5)

On aurait bien voulu dire, à partir des *Lois*, que la Providence existe ou encore, comme il va en être question après, « que les dieux loin d'avoir moins soin des petites choses, alors en ont autant souci que des plus grandes »[85], ou encore, à partir du *Timée*, et des actions du démiurge, qu'elle est toujours présente, la conjuguer avec les *Oracles Chaldaïques*, ainsi que l'énonce l'auteur[86], mais les devanciers ainsi que l'«Hermès commun» se sont tellement accaparés de la notion qu'elle en devient presque suspecte. Si le dieu protégeait la vie philosophique et la dialectique, il n'en était pas moins devenu proverbial, et ainsi qu l'indique le *Commentaire sur l'Alcibiade*, mettait en pièces toute intelligence[87]: comme dira Salloustios, « ce sont les notions sur lesquels, les hommes, si on les interroge correctement, tombent d'accord »[88]. En sorte qu'il faudra, pour l'auteur replon-

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[78] Jean-Michel Charrue, *Plotin lecteur de Platon*, Paris, les Belles Lettres, 1978, p. 265.
[79] P.Bastid, *Proclus et le crépuscule de la pensée grecque*, Paris, 1969, p. 255.
[80] Cf. C. Guérard, La théorie des hénades et la mystique de Proclus, *Dionysius,* 6, 1982, p. 76-79.
[81] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, 2, p. 118, 21-24
[82] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, 2, p. 119, 18.
[83] Proclus, *Eléments de Théologie*, 132 et 133, cf. P. Bastid, *op. cit.*., p. 262.
[84] Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne*, I, 3, p. 5-6.
[85] Platon, *Lois* X, 900 cd.
[86] Proclus, *Dix Problème concernant la providences,* dans *Trois études sur la Providence*, t. I, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1977, §1, 8, introduction..
[87] Proclus, *Commentaire sur l'Alcibiade*, I, Paris, 1985, p. 86, cf. Jamblique, *Les mystères d'Egypte*, Paris, 1985, 1, 1, 4-5.
[88] Salloustios,, *Des dieux et du monde*, Paris, 1960, p. 4, I, 2.

ger dans les secrets de son âme, pour lequel, en effet, on peut espérer que celle-ci, avec la vie qui est la sienne, sa sensibilité, sa volonté qui a le pouvoir, αὐτεξούσιον[89], c'est-à-dire la liberté pourra ainsi, en elle-même, faire sa réflexion et résoudre les problèmes.

1. Dès le début de la première question (§ 1-4), qui doit déterminer s'il y a une connaissance de la Providence, Proclus se demande « s'il y a une connaissance qui s'étend à toutes choses, aux parties, jusqu'aux éléments les plus indivisibles des mondes célestes et sub-célestes »[90], traduisant ainsi le fait en langage conceptuel, pour avoir un aperçu général qui problématise les points de vue: le tout et les parties sont issus de ces concepts développés par le *Parménide* de Platon. Plus précisément, et l'idée des mondes célestes et sub-célestes va en ce sens, il semble que ce soit à la tradition aristotélicienne qu'il se soit adressé, puisque ceux ci avaient un peu un rôle à part dans l'hermès commun, en mettant en question certaines positions. Nous avons retrouvé, non pas dans le traité *du Destin*, d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise, mais dans celui beaucoup moins connu *de la Providence* retraduit récemment de l'arabe de Abu Ut man Bisn Matra, du manuscrit de l'Escurial, en français, par P. Thillet[91], deux allusions qui vont en ce sens: Au § 61, l'idée que la Providence, « là où s'exerce son action, c'est le corps divin tout entier qui constitue selon sa doctrine, la totalité des corps qui se termine à la sphère de la lune »[92], selon l'idée, dans la tradition péripatéticienne, que la Providence ne descend pas plus bas et s'arrête aux régions sublunaires. Le traité pseudo aristotélicien *De mundo*, de la même époque, en donnait les raisons: les choses qui sont sur la terre sont affaiblies, et en proie à la confusion[93]. Mais précise Alexandre « il y a une providence aussi dans les choses au-dessous de la sphère de la lune et dans le monde »[94]. Une autre image employée par le même texte, est celle qu'un homme noble impose à l'ensemble de ce qui se passe dans sa maison, où l'auteur se demande « si Dieu va étendre sa surveillance à toutes les autres choses qui sont ici-bas, à l'homme, mais en outre, à la souris, et à la fourmi »[95], c'est à dire aux choses moins importantes, même les plus insignifiantes. On trouvait dans le *Commentaire sur le Parménide*, s'agissant de la cause coordinatrice de tout, un passage où il essaie de solliciter Aristote, en *Métaphysique* Λ 1075a 10, pour montrer que l'intelligence divine pense à la manière de l'intellect humain, en saisissant tout, pour dire que « le Bien préside comme cause sur le tout »[96]. Ce qui montre que la question était pour lui reliée à l'aristotélisme et à Alexandre qui s'en détachait, dont on sait qu'il sera beaucoup lu par le néoplatonisme ultérieur.

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Seulement, il ne semble pas qu'il partage ici la même position que dans le *Commentaire sur l'Alcibiade*, selon lequel «le divin connaît tout, même les mouvements secrets de notre âme »[97]. Il faut conserver ses secrets intérieurs pour en faire le point de départ de sa réflexion, puisque la connaissance psychique est faite de ces deux parties, les dianoétiques

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[89] Proclus, *Commentaire sur le Timée*, 325b, cf. G. Martano, *Proclo d'Atene*, Naples, 1974, p. 78.
[90] Proclus, *Dix problèmes concernant la Providence*, I § 2, tr. D. Isaac, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1977, p. 55.
[91] Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *Traité de la Providence*, traduction française, par P. Thillet, Paris, Verdier, 2003.
[92] Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
[93] Pseudo Aristote, *De Mundo*, 397 b 30, cf. R.W. Sharrples, Threefold Providence, Ancient approaches to Plato's Timaeus, *Bulletin of the institute* of *Classical Studie*s, Londres, 1978, 2003, p. 121 et note 35.
[94] Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *op. cit.*, § 59, p. 114..
[95] Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *op. cit.*, § 25, p. 100.
[96] Proclus, *Commentaire sur le Parménide*, III, 788, et 790-791, traduction G. Morrow et Dillon.
[97] Proclus, *Commentaire sur l'Alcibiade*, Paris, 1985, t. 1, 142, p. 118.

et les doxiques[98], et qu'ainsi, à côté de la pensée intuitive, νόησις, on a, en descendant le logos, puis l'opinion qui va juger[99], avant la sensation au risque de l'erreur[100]. Force lui sera de reconnaître l'existence de cette connaissance chez les dieux, qui, pour lui, s'étend à l'universel, mais aussi aux particuliers, ainsi qu'on le trouve dans plusieurs passage de la *Théologie platonicienne*, car leur Providence s'étend sur tout ce qui règle le Bien des hommes[101], et que, pour ce faire, « ils connaissent toutes choses ensemble, l'universel, et le particulier »[102], que « c'est l'être particulier que la connaissance divine désire atteindre »[103], que le démiurge, après avoir reconnu ces deux types d'existence, se consacrera tout autant à la création particulière, malgré sa transcendance[104]. Ainsi, dans la première question, ici, des *Dix problèmes*, reconnaît-il cette connaissance de la pré-science divine, après avoir analysé les différentes facultés de connaissance en général, celle qui est générale, et celle qui est plus particulière, mais que toutes deux ont une compréhension universelle[105].

Ainsi cette réflexion libre conduit-elle, au § 4, à voir dans la Providence, ce souci de tous les êtres individuels, et non plus seulement, comme chez Alexandre, des espèces[106], afin de réaliser sa finalité, le Bien. Et celui-ci suppose la réalisation de connaissances qui garde une affinité avec chaque type d'existence: la sensibilité pour les êtres dénués de raison, en tant qu'irrationnels, la connaissance rationnelle, pour les êtres intelligents[107]. Mais, pour tous les êtres, l'Un existe, au-dessus, et en dehors de toute détermination[108]. Et tous existent, avec cette part d'Un, et celui qui n'en a pas part ne peut exister[109]. Aussi est-ce le mode d'être de la Providence: elle domine à la fois tous les êtres, puisque son unité est supérieure, et elle s'inscrit en eux, par cette part d'unité qui leur est consubstantielle. En sorte que pour assumer toutes les intelligences particulières, elle qui était, au départ, au-dessus de la connaissance, doit-elle posséder cette intelligence supérieure, qui fait que c'est par l'Un qu'il lui est permis de connaître toutes choses[110].

2. La deuxième question qui porte sur le fait de savoir si c'est la Providence qui connaît les contingents, se retire, en fait, des déductions de la première qui fait que la Providence s'attache aux individus, autant qu'à l'universel. Si, en effet, elle n'était qu'une providence universelle, elle serait reliée aux lois nécessaires de l'univers, se reliant aux individus, elle reçoit une part d'incertitude.

C'est d'ailleurs, à partir de cela qu'elle est définie *natura quaedam in entibus:* « la contingence est une certaine nature comptant parmi les êtres »[111]. Le *quaedam*, la « certaine » comportant cette part d'imprécision. Cette part d'indécision, en fait, se reliera à la temporalité des individus, à leur entrée dans le temps qui va définir « les êtres instables »[112], c'est-à-dire ceux dont l'existence est liée au changement, mais qui ne peuvent

[98] Proclus, *Commentaire sur le Timée*, II, 299, 6-8.
[99] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, 248, 29-249, 4.
[100] Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, *Les structures de l'imaginaire dans la philosophie de Proclus*, Paris, 1985, p. 131-151.
[101] Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne*, I, 78, 4-5.
[102] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, 98, 6-7.
[103] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, 8, 25-26.
[104] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, 30, 12-14.
[105] Proclus, *Dix problèmes concernant la Providence*, I, § 3, p. 56, 20-21.
[106] P. Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise, exégète de la noétique d'Aristote*, Paris-Liège, 1942, appendice II, p. 199.
[107] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, § 4, 7-12.
[108] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, § 4, 37-44, cf. L. Obertello, Proclus, Ammonius, and Boethius on divine knowledge, *Dionysius*, V, 1981 p. 129.
[109] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I § 4, 44-46.
[110] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I § 4, 21.
[111] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, 6, 16.
[112] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, 8, 7.

être connus que par le passé, « ante tempus »[113], avant toute la durée des temps, c'est-à-dire que l'incertitude, quant au connaître, s'adresse au futur. Même si la connaissance des individus par les dieux pose d'autres problèmes, ainsi que l'avait entrevu Alexandre, d'une dispersion à l'infini, ce qui est difficile à concevoir. En outre, selon la nature des dieux, puisque ceux-ci, comme hénades, vivent dans l'éternité, comment peuvent-ils dépasser celle-ci, pour arriver à une connaissance de nature différente des êtres.

On sait qu'un début de solution vient de sa saisie de la connaissance, séparée en un objet connu, le connaissable, et un sujet qui connaît, le connaissant: pour lui, celle-ci est, en fait, détachée et dépendante du connaissant. On sait d'où on était parti: cette sorte de conaturalité entre la connaissance des dieux et l'humain, pour, cette fois, arriver à une différence. L'auteur, de nouveau, pense le problème, à partir du déterminé et de l'indéterminé, sans que l'on puisse dire que celui-ci soit identique au contingent[114]: ce n'est que dans la voie de la résolution que l'indéterminé apparaît. L'Un des dieux, puis les hénades sont «immuables »[115], donc déterminés, par rapport à des êtres changeants, donc indéterminés par voie de conséquence en eux-mêmes, en sorte que leur mode de connaître habituel de la nécessité a, cette fois, affaire à l'indéterminé: ils connaîtront donc, sous ce mode de la nécessité, l'indéterminé, tout simplement, parce que leur connaissance est avant tout celle des causes, ce qui leur permet d'atteindre l'indéterminé par le déterminé[116]: comme le logos plotinien de la Providence, celle-ci porte en germe, en quelque sorte, le futur. Ainsi, les dieux, ont-ils la pré-science de tout ce qui adviendra et la connaissance du contingent.

F. P. Hager[117] pense – nous avons été, pour la première question le seul à le soutenir, quitte à le contredire – que pour cette deuxième question, que Proclus est tributaire de la réflexion d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise. Il cite le traité *Du Destin*, dans ses § 8-9, où il se livre à une opposition entre la nécessité et la contingence, et le § 30, où il réfute la pré-science sur le motif qu'elle suppose un monde où tout serait nécessaire, et non contingent[118]. Ainsi, a-t-on pu dire, sans doute, que Proclus a pu faire une lecture de ces textes, pour y puiser sa réflexion ; mais la consultation du traité *De la Providence* du même Alexandre en son § 14 montrera qu'il ne dit pas la même chose: « ceux qui soutiennent que Dieu attache son attention à tous les détails et aux individus, et que son soin et sa Providence à leur égard sont continus, entraînent l'absurdité… »[119]. Proclus nous l'avons vu, a une solution différente, en ce qui concerne, au moins l'intérêt pour les particuliers.

3. § 9-14: Là encore le problème vient de la question précédente: « puisque la Providence est la cause des déterminés et des indéterminés, l'est-elle selon l'identité de ces deux groupes, ou selon l'altérité ? »[120] La résolution commence au § 10, avec cette affirmation: « La Providence vient de l'Un »[121]. Le questionnement continue: celui-ci est identique au Bien, mais il y a différents types d'Un: le premier, puissant et fécond, tandis que si l'on suit la série des êtres, l'Un de la matière est faible et dégradé[122], mais s'il trans-

[113] Proclus, ibidem.
[114] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, 6, 6-8, Cf. Mignucci, Logic and omniscience, *Oxford studies in ancient philosophy*, 3, 1985, p. 242 la position de L. Obertello, *art. cit.*, qui identifie l'indéterminé et le contingent.
[115] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, 7, 24.
[116] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, 8, 9-20.
[117] F. P. Hager, Proklos und Alexander von Aphrodisias über ein Problem der Lehre von der Vorsehung, *Kephalaion C. J. de Vogel*, Assen, p. 175-178.
[118] Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *Traité Du Destin*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2002, § 9, p. 17-19, et § 30, p. 56-59.
[119] Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *Traité De la Providence*, Paris, 2003, p. 94.
[120] Proclus, *Dix problèmes concernant la Providence*, § 9, 2-5.
[121] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 10, 4.
[122] Proclus, op. cit., § 10, 16-17.

cende les êtres, est-il expliqué, son rôle est celui d'une cause[123], et il est la puissance de tous les êtres qu'il engendre[124].

C'est ce trait qui va décider de la suite, puisqu'en expliquant le comment de son action: l'Un, l'unité incorporelle, puis corporelle, sa puissance infinie, toute autre, et toute puissance finie. L'infini de la puissance qui est finie pour le supérieur et pour lui-même, n'est infini que pour les inférieurs et pour la série[125], en sorte que la Providence, puissance infinie agit par l'unité, et en un sens, par l'infini dans la série, et voit attribuer l'unité à chaque chose[126]. On a donc l'Un, dans cette dégradation processive, les incorporels dont on peut se demander comment ils agissent sur les corporels[127], puis les corporels éternels ou périssables[128].

La poursuite de l'explication rationnelle de cette action providentielle se fait sans concession, au § 12, avec la réintroduction du couple déterminé-indéterminé, où le premier, issu de l'Un domine dans le monde intelligible, l'indéterminé, dans le monde sensible[129]. Les deux sont régis par la Providence, le déterminé selon l'union, l'indéterminé selon l'infini providentiel, faisant en sorte que le premier principe d'ordre et de limitation domine les autres, ce qui satisfait à la loi essentielle de la causalité de la Providence[130].

On revient à la question posée: comment une seule réalité, l'Un, peut produire deux choses différentes, ou une même chose sous deux formes, l'incorporel et le corporel?[131] C'est comme l'âme, explique l'auteur, qui produit le vivant et le non vivant[132], et en généralisant, tout engendreur connaît les choses qu'il a engendrées, à partir de deux causes, par la cause supérieure[133]. Ainsi la Providence produit-elle deux types d'êtres, les uns déterminés par l'Un, les autres par l'infini, les premiers sont les êtres nécessaires, puisqu'ils sont produits par l'incorporel et les raisons, les seconds, les êtres contingents[134]. Mais les êtres premiers déterminés ne manquent pas d'infini, les êtres seconds de limite[135]: la raison en est que les contingents s'achèvent dans le nécessaire, et les êtres nécessaires participent à la puissance infinie, tantôt l'Un domine et fait régner le nécessaire en attachant l'infini au fini, tantôt c'est l'infini qui l'emporte et l'amoindrit[136]. La Providence connaît ainsi les deux: le faiseur de limite, le faiseur d'infini[137].

Ainsi l'exercice de la Providence se fait dans les incorporels et dans les corps; et il y a les composés, en sorte qu'elle a affaire à des natures simples et à des composés[138], à condition, bien sûr de connaître en même temps[139]. L'action de l'Un amène la production du nécessaire, celle de l'infini, le contingent ; mais l'Un prend toujours les devants: ainsi le nécessaire l'emporte, même si le contingent tarde à se déterminer[140], car il n'a ja-

[123] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 10, 22.
[124] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 10, § 28 et 32.
[125] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 11, 4 à 21.
[126] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 11, 21-27.
[127] Cf. J. Barnes, Immaterial Causes, *Oxford Studies in Ancient philosophy*, 1, 1983, p. 170-174.
[128] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 11, 27-fin.
[129] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 12, 7-11.
[130] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 12, 11-fin.
[131] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 13, 1-5
[132] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 13, 6-16.
[133] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 16-19.
[134] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 13, 22-28.
[135] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 13, 30-31.
[136] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 13, 32-40.
[137] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 13, 41-46.
[138] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 14, 1-5.
[139] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 14, 6-10.
[140] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 14, 11-20.

mais d'autre ressource que d'imiter la puissance infinie de l'Un[141]. Car il n'a d'autre alternative que de se soumettre à un moment ou à un autre, au nécessaire pour être, au lieu de ne pas être, en sorte que l'élément futur est déjà inscrit dans l'ordre du nécessaire[142].

Annihilation de la liberté, à ce stade ? En tout cas, on n'avait jamais, à ce point, expliqué, dans le détail, l'entrée en jeu de la Providence.

4. Le problème qui suit est celui du comment de la participation aux dieux[143]. Les deux univers peuvent paraître si disjoints, et si séparés, et la participation pouvant être intermittente[144]. Il faudra supposer l'existence d'un participant, considérer ce qui a déjà été dit, que les dieux sont des êtres éternels, et qu'ici-bas, c'est la durée et le temps[145], différent, même s'il peut y avoir une extension éternelle.

La participation, qui sera, nous l'avons vu, le problèmes des hénades, dans la *Théologie platonicienne*, est ici analysée en ses deux termes, les participants et les participés, que ce soit pour les êtres éternels ou pour les êtres corruptibles, partant de l'un pour aller vers l'autre[146]. Manière de ramener la Providence à la participation ? Non pas, mais seulement d'expliquer son mode d'action qui dépendra des être animés ou inanimés rationnels ou irrationnels, éternels ou corruptibles, puisqu'elle dépend de la connaissance que le sujet peut en avoir[147]. Le mode sera fonction: rationnel chez les êtres rationnels, irrationnel ou encore imaginatif chez les êtres tels, puisque la Providence est existentielle[148], puissance qui est cause, qui se définit comme la lumière du soleil[149].

La participation est disposition de nature, permanente ou intermittente, selon celle-ci, et la capacité de recevoir la Providence[150]. Aussi le soleil éclaire sans discontinuer, mais les êtres ne sont pas toujours capables de le recevoir[151]. L'activité de la divinité reste la même[152], mais comme un visage peut se tourner vers un miroir ou ne pas le faire, le participant peut ne pas recevoir le don céleste[153], ou encore les oracles remplis de prémonition qui répandent leur lumière: la défaillance de leur réception dépend des sujets récepteurs[154]. Comme l'éclipse dépend de la lune, la défaillance de leur proposition dépend des êtres[155].

Mais il y a aussi la proximité, celle des anges et des démons: la Providence agit plus sur les êtres supérieurs que chez ceux qui ont besoin d'intermédiaires[156]. Ainsi encore, celui qui ne sait utiliser la géométrie, à côté de celui qui l'utilise ; on mène une spéculation d'un niveau plus élevé: ce dernier prouve et franchit un stade de plus vers les réalités rupérieures[157]. L'action de la Providence dépend du rang, et de la capacité[158].

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[141] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 14, 23-30.
[142] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 14, 23-30. Pour ce passage nous nous sommes aidé des tableaux clairs présentés par F. Brunner, Proclus, De decem Dubitationibus ciraca providentiam, q. 3, 11-14, *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*, 24, p. 112-127.
[143] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 21, 1-3.
[144] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 21, 6.
[145] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 21, 13-14.
[146] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 22, 1-8.
[147] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 22, 9-20.
[148] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 22, 21-30.
[149] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 22, 31-40.
[150] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 23, 1-5.
[151] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 23, 16-17.
[152] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 24, 1-4.
[153] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 24, 5-12.
[154] Proclus, op. cit., § 24, 13-29.
[155] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 24, 29-35.
[156] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 25 1-20.
[157] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 25, 21-36.
[158] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 25, 36-51.

5. C'est alo2s l'existence du mal qui posd problè┤ me, semblant entraver l'action de la Provi-dence, et remonter à uje cause différente: mais elle est un fait[159]. Lequel est conforme à la nature, et fait en sorte que le corruptible existe en vue de la perfection de l'ensemble et favorise la génération[160]. Et dès lors, la Pro┤ vidence veille sur l'ensemble, puisqu'il y a, dans cette loa na-turelle, des contrai┤ res[161]. Le mal moral, contraire à la raison se trouve dans les passions, désirs et colère, hétérogènes au divin et à la raison, qui doit l'emporter, comme l'immor☼ tel sur le mortel[162]. Mais le désir de suivre sa nature, en ce qu'il a d'irrationnel(n'est-il pas déjà cette par-hyportase, dont parle le traité III ?[163] Chez les bêtes brupes, cette part de raison .'existe pas. Peut-on alors, parler de mal ? Alors que chez les êtres doués de raison, la domination de celle-ci est celle de la partie la meilleure de sa nature sur la plus mauvaise. La nature est dans les deux, mais il faire en sorte que le divin l'emporte, que « l'intelligence acquiert le don d'agir divinement, l'âme intellectivement, le corps spontanément »[164], car, par delà, il y a l'existence de cette liberté, qui est celle de participer à un bien pour l'âme, ou de ne vouloir être mû que par les mouvemants naturels du corps[165].

Encore faut-il reconnaître l'existence de la Providence qui implique, à la fois, une âme divine, et une âme mortelle soumise au corps. La Providence pénètre le monde, par la descente de l âme seconde, d'abord présente dajs le corps, avant l'âme divine, ce qui pebmet à cette d%rnièpe de ne pas se laisser troubler par les impressions dt corps, ses désirs, ses convoitises[166]. L'âme mortelle doit arriver à être agent plutôt que patient admettant continuellement ces servitudes[167]. Ainsi la dualité des rôles est conforme à la Providence: de même que dans le corps, le contraire à la nature n'existe qu'en vue de la nature, dans les âmes, l'irrationnel n'existe qu'en vue de la raison[168].

III Providence, fatalité, liberté

Sur la Providence est, en fait, une lettre de réponse de Proclus, à son ami l'ingénieur Théodore, sur la Providence, la fatalité, et ce qui est en notre pouvoir, qui va donner lieu, puisque les positions de Théodore ne sont connues qu'indirectement, à ce que Proclus expose ses propres positions, sur le déterminisme et sur la liberté.

On s'attend à ce que Proclus s'attaque au déterminisme, dans une sorte de voie négative, mais c'est en fait l'inverse qui se produit, une élaboration positive du τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, de ce qui dépend de nous. Cela tient à la personnalité de Théodore, expert en sciences mécaniques, μηχανικός qui est capable d'envisager les solutions et les expédients[169], ce qui correspondrait à peu près à notre terme d'ingénieur, quelqu'un imprégné de science, et amené à considérer que tous les phénomènes sont déterminés, ce que ne saurait accepter Proclus.

On aurait trop vite dit que sa position est celle du stoïcisme, dont le déterminisme proverbial avait fait l'objet de critiques dans le traité *Du Destin* de Cicéron, et surtout dans

[159] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 26 et 27.
[160] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 28.
[161] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 29.
[162] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 30, 1-20.
[163] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 30, 26.
[164] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 30, 46-48.
[165] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 30, 53-58.
[166] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 31, 10-26.
[167] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 31, 27-44.
[168] Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 31, 44-55.
[169] Sur ce point, cf. D. Paparella, *Tria Opuscul*a, *Providenza, liberta, male*, Bompani, Milano, p. 742.

celui d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise, qui avait contribué à dramatiser celui-ci. Or, si au début, Proclus amalgame sa position à celle-là[170], il fera allusion à Aristote, en parlant d'une «vie subordonnée par le premier mouvement »[171], puis à Epicure « identifiant le bien à l'agréable»[172]. Ce n'est donc pas seulement au déterminisme stoïcien qu 'il s'attaque, mais à un ensemble de positions qui faisait de celui-ci le partisan d'un déterminisme mécanique en général, lequel d'ailleurs, dépassant les positions de la *Stoa*, va être presque absolu.

Et Proclus, de son côté, s'il va rallier une position qui se rapproche de celle d'Alexandre, « qui disait que toutes choses sont liées les unes aux autres, affirmant qu'il n'y a aucun événement qui n'en résulte et ne s'y rattache comme à une cause »[173], ce qu'il envisage à un certain moment, ou en identifiant un système qui est essentiellement celui des causes à la nécessité[174], ce dont même Chrysippe s'était prémuni, qu'il va même quelque peu rejoindre avec son système de l'ἡγεμονικόν, par exemple, et envisager ainsi une solution de la liberté du τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, qui recoupait certaines positions stoïciennes. Avec sa propre justification, Proclus s'adressait à un déterminisme mécanique, imprégné de science qui empêche la liberté.

Ceci le conduit à exposer au préalable, sa propre philosophie, qui est celle du néoplatonisme (II à V). D'abord sur un plan ontologique (II–IV, § 3 à 26). Cela commence par la distinction de la Providence et de la fatalité, et à placer bien au-dessus la première, car « beaucoup de choses échappent à la fatalité, et rien n'échappe à la Providence »[175], alors que la vision matérialiste et mécaniste véhiculée par le stoïcisme, même s'il reconnaissait une providence qui gouverne tout[176], finissait par mettre en relief, en permanence le rôle de la fatalité. L'âme peut être, à la fois séparée du corps et être ainsi un principe de liberté, ou prise dans les liens du corporel[177]. Cette méthode divisive permet de séparer et de comprendre les choses[178]. Elle s'appliquerait d'abord aux causes que Proclus, en bon platonicien commence par hiérarchiser, alors que le stoïcisme, même s'il affirmait la liberté, faisait en sorte de l'enserrer dans une fatalité « qui elle aussi est cause d'une certaine connexion et d'une certaine succession pour les êtres soumis au devenir »[179]. La providence est intelligente et une cause supérieure.

Ainsi conçue est-elle la cause de tous les biens, et en même temps de tous les êtres[180], alors que la fatalité ne l'est que de la connexion. Se dégagent donc sur ce plan, trois sortes d'êtres, intellectifs, psychiques, corporels[181], et seuls les deux premiers permettent de se sortir de cette causalité hétéro-mobile[182]. Le monde est fait d'intelligence et de nécessité[183], et force est de constater qu'il n'y a pas pour les corps pouvoir de choix dans cette dualité de l'intelligible et du sensible.

S'efforçant de rallier à lui Aristote, en notant que « toute âme douée d'activité, se passant du corps, est dotée d'une substance pareille extérieure au corps et indépendante

[170] Proclus, *Providence, fatalité, liberté*, Paris, 1979, I, 2, 3-5.
[171] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VIII, 40, 3-4.
[172] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IX, 45, 3.
[173] Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *Traité du Destin*, Paris 1984, § 22, 15-17.
[174] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, 3, 6.
[175] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 4, 5-6.
[176] Cf. J. J. Duhot, *La conception stoïcienne de la causalité*, Paris, 1989, p. 78-86, 101-105.
[177] Proclus, ibidem.
[178] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 6, 2.
[179] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 7, 3-5.
[180] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 8, 18.
[181] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 9, 21.
[182] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 10, 23.
[183] Proclus, op. cit., III, § 13, 18, cf. *Timée*, 48 a 1-2.

de lui »[184], alors qu'on pouvait percevoir autre chose dans l'âme entéléchie, il en vient alors à séparer l'âme rationnelle de l'âme irrationnelle[185], considérant que seule la première peut gouverner, en se tournant vers l'intelligence. Chez Aristote, l'activité corporelle n'a qu'un effet limité, alors qu'en platonisme, l'âme commande au corps, puisqu'elle a cette causalité supérie← ure, même s'il faut lui laisser la sensation, et ci la deuxième âme s'arrête avac la mort, elle aussi est d'une autre nature, celle là même qui se trouvait chez Ammo┤ nius[186]. Et Proclus, néoplatonicien continue à voir en elle le principe d'une liberté qui n'est ni entravée par les choses corporelles, venant après, ni non plus celle du divin, affranchie, par la mort, mais celle d'une vie selmn la vertu[187]. A cela s'ajoute les différentes formes de bonnaissances (V, 27-32), qui vont faire $e l'âme l'image de l'in⚝ telli-gence, cette fleur dont parlent les *Oracles*.

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Lorsque commence la ré fttation de Théodore, en RI, 33, qui argte: « la liberté est bien peU de choses à l'égard des destinées célestes », et qu'au lieu du choix, il soutient « cette fameuse cause qu'est la fatalité »[188], tendant, en effet à prouver qu'il était contaminé par les doctrines stoïaiennes, et que son mécani-sme trouva`p son mode d'expression dans un tel fatalisme.

Les stoïciens trouvaient, pour décrire l` réalité physique, une multiplicité de causes, et ce, $ans les domaines de la réalité physique, à bommencer par la cosmologia, les phénoeènes de la vision et l'optique, la géographie, la mét©⚝ orologie, la dynamique, la médecine[189]. On peut dire que qu┤ and les phéno⚝ mènes intervenaient, celles-ci étai← ent com-e soudées, les ca← qses s'enchaînant les unes les autres, pour former une continuité, liant un événement antérieur à un autre, ainsi que nous l'avons vu dans la citation d'Alexandre[190]. Certes, comme cela est dit, il y avait une cause unique, principale et des causes secondaires, la première étant celle à même de déterminer l'événement, ainsi chez Chrysippe[191], mais on avait une véritable concaténation ou enchaînement des causes, qui s'entraînaient l'une l'autre pour former un continu, puisqu'il n'y avait pas de vide et la loi de la cause et de l'effet devenait, de la sorte, puisqu'elle se reliait à un principe premier, la divine ordonnance elle-même[192]. On peut insister sur le continu, mais la cause ne se faisait pas seulement par contact, mais par l'intermédiaire du *pneuma*[193], de l'âme qui reliait les événements du monde, et en raison de la sympathie faisait que tout élément était relié à un autre.

L'homme n'était pas vraiment libre, puisqu'il ne pouvait manifester son τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν que par l'assentiment et l'impulsion, qui se faisaient bien par lui. Mais son âme de nature physique seulement ne lui permettait que peu de résistance. Ainsi ne pouvait-il pas choisir dans le cas des contraires: les hommes mauvais ne pouvaient pas accomplir une action bonne, les hommes bons une action mauvaise[194], n'avaient donc pas un réel pouvoir de

[184] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 15, cf. *De Anima* Γ 430a 10-23 et *Métaphysique* Γ 3, 1070a 24-26.
[185] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, § 17-19
[186] Cf. notre article, Ammonius et Plotin, *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 102, 1, p. 81.
[187] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV § 23.
[188] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VI, § 33.
[189] Cf. J. J. Duhot, *op. cit.*, p. 44-69.
[190] Cf. ci-dessus, note 173.
[191] Cf. Cicéron, *Traité du Destin*, XVIII, Pléiade, *Les Stoïciens*, p. 489.
[192] A. A. Long, Freedom and determinism in the theory of human action, *Problems in stoïcism*, Londres 1971.
[193] J. J. Duhot, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
[194] A. A. Long, *art. cit.*, p. 184.

choix. Il s'agit bien du destin, même s'il y avait selon Alexandre un contre-destin[195]. La cause alors devenait cette nécessité qu'avait évité Chrysippe par l'argument du cône[196].

En présence d'une argumentation de Théodore, très proche, Proclus fait état de la responsabilité, estimant que c'est par elle seule que l'on peut parler du succès ou des échecs des hommes, et remaniant le système des causes principales et secondaires pour faire de Dieu la cause principale du Bien, après lequel on trouve, passant de l'éternité au temps, l'entrée dans l'harmonie cosmique, la coordination et le gouvernement des touts, puis, troisième cause, les hommes eux-mêmes avec leurs choix, seuls à même de leur attribuer la responsabilité, tripartition de Dieu, de la fortune et des hommes qui s'appuie sur les *Lois*[197], derrière laquelle on a reconnu la Providence, la fortune et la liberté. Ainsi l'action humaine prend elle un rôle à part: elle est certes partie du tout, mais la partie du tout n'est pas l'action humaine[198], autrement dit, ce n'est pas en partant du découpage des phénomènes, de la nature et de ceux-ci, que l'on peut parvenir à elle, la vie des âmes doit dépasser la fatalité.

C'est le prix de la liberté, qui est maigre concession au stoïcisme, dans les impulsions, mais en outre, dans les choix intérieurs, et c'est seulement cette association de choix et d'impulsion qui nous rendra maître, donnera à l'homme mérite et responsabilité, possibilité de louange et de blâme. Aussi, est-il dit, que « leur qualité ne vient pas du monde »[199], comme il avait été dit que l'homme n'est pas corps, mais âme. Si les faits viennent du tout, c'est la partie adverse qui agit, et qui donne la qualité de l'action. Même les *Oracles* le reconnaissent: « connais-toi toi-même », « pense que tu es hors du corps et tu l'es », reconnaissant ce rôle d'une personne maître de ses actes[200].

Aussi n'aura-t-il plus qu'à poursuivre, faisant état du vif intérêt de Théodore pour la divination, alléguée comme preuve que nous ne sommes pas maître de nous, et de nos choix. On ne saurait dire si Théodore, expert en mécanique, en est venu à penser ces choses que Proclus s'efforce de critiquer, ou s'il adhère aux doctrines stoïciennes. S. Bobzien analyse la critique impitoyable faite par Cicéron de la divination telle qu'elle est reçue par les stoïciens, et comment la croyance de Chrysippe était contradictoire avec sa logique modale[201]: « si un homme (ou Fabius) est né au lever de la canicule, il ne mourra pas en mer »[202], Alexandre avait montré la dénégation de ce qui dépend de nous que cela impliquait[203]. Le traité *De la divination* de Cicéron montrait comment les prédictions se faisaient à partir des signes, après une longue observation des phénomènes[204]. Peut-être n'est-ce que la manifestation d'une époque, et la pente de l'esprit.

C'est ainsi que Proclus comprend Théodore: l'art divinatoire s'exerce sur des événements qui sont sous la contraintes de forces qui rendent l'événement nécessaire[205]. Alors, à quoi bon chercher ce nécessaire ? Il renverse alors les positions ; au lieu que la divination retire « ce qui dépend de nous », elle le présuppose, recherchant ses possibili-

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[195] Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *Traité Du Destin*, § 6.
[196] Cicéron, *Du destin*, VIII, § 41, cf. S. Bobzien, *Deteminism end Freedom in Stoïc philosophy*, Oxford, 1998.
[197] Platon, *Lois*, IV, 727 bc.
[198] Proclus, *op. cit*., VI, § 34.
[199] Proclus, VI, § 35, 15-16.
[200] Proclus, *op. cit.,* VI, § 35, 22-24, et 36, 16.
[201] S. Bobzien, *op. cit.*, c. 4, divination, modality and universal regularity, p. 144-155.
[202] Cicéron, *Du destin,* § 12-14,,Pleiade, *Les stoïciens,* p. 483-485.
[203] Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *Traité du destin, op. cit.*, § 26, 35-37.
[204] Cf. S. Sambursky, *Stoïc Physics*, Princeton, 1959, p. 66
[205] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VII, § 37, 15-19.

tés d'agir, par ses prédictions: ce serait là l'objet de notre curiosité, et son utilité[206]. Ainsi, dans le cas des oracles ou dans les prières, celles-ci ne manifestent pas la recherche d'une intervention sur l'avenir, preuve s'il en est besoin, qu'il restait bien une liberté qui tend par là à se conforter[207], comme pouvoir de faire ou de ne pas faire, c'est dire de choix.

La divination témoigne de ce souffle divin qui se manifeste à propos de la survenance ou non d'une chose, qui parfois, lorsque les forces engendrées par le tout, se conjuguant, semblent vouées à un effet inexorable. Mais cela est très rare: la plupart du temps, les agents sont multiples et les puissances célestes peuvent être contrées par une liberté se servant des oracles, pour faire pencher la balance en sa faveur[208].

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Les paragraphes suivants ont ceci de commun qu'ils s'attaquent tous au sensualisme de Théodore. D'abord, réitérée l'affirmation que c'est non pas la providence, mais le tout, c'est-à-dire la totalité de l'univers et de la nature qui gouverne le monde, en ce que l'homme supposé troisième élément n'a plus alors qu'une existence consécutive à l'air et au mouvement[209]. On a reconnu là certaines des affirmations de la *Physique* d'Aristote, sur le mouvement transmis par le premier moteur au ciel des fixes, puis le premier qui va s'ensuivre qui est le mouvement circulaire de l'univers, alors que l'air, lui est l'objet d'un mouvemant rectiligne[210]. En sorte que l'existence humaine ne serait plus, en ce sens, que la conséquence de ces mouvements mécaniques, par rapport auxquels Proclus a beau jeu de prouver que s'il y a une âme irrationnelle, il y a aussi, en l'homme, une âme rationnelle dans le cerveau[211].

En rappelant à l'ordre ce sensualisme excessif, il en constate que Théodore est certes amateur de philosophies, mais que ce ne sont que des conséquences de son mécanisme. C'est alors, faisant état du savoir technique, qu'il associe à la géométrie et à l'arithmétique, pour faire en sorte que la sensation et ses images, au lieu de prendre une telle importance, ne devrait être considérée que comme cette part affaiblie des organes, et qu'en fait elle est incapable de réflexion, ce que peut seule la vie intellectuelle et affective[212].

Redoutant que ce matérialisme se réfugie derrière le rôle de l'éther dans la formation et dans le mouvement de l'intelligence et de l'âme, cet élément subtil, parfois associé au feu comme dans le traité *Du Ciel*, parfois repris par les stoïciens[213], ne voie en elle l'origine de l'âme éthérée et des éléments sublunaires de l'âme dynamique, il en revient à ce passage des *Lois*, pour dire que l'âme est plus ancienne que les corps[214], ne dépend pas d'eux, et à celui du *Timée*[215], où est analysée la composition de l'âme. Il n'en reste pas moins que l'âme dépend du divin, et qu'il y a bien deux âme, la psychique et la fatale, celle soumise au destin, que veut seule reconnaître Théodore, au profit de laquelle il a renversé l'ordre des causes.

Car c'est bien en partisan de l'ordre des causes qu'il fait intervenir la géométrie et l'arithmétique, que seule peut penser, en fait, l'âme rationnelle. On a reconnu l'auteur

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[206] Proclus, *op. cit.*,VII, § 37, 11, 19-27.
[207] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VII, § 38.
[208] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VII, § 39, 20-24.
[209] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VIII, §, 40, 4.
[210] Aristote, *Physique*, respectivement, VII, 6, 260; 8, 261 b; VIII, 10, 267 b.
[211] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VIII, § 40, 4.
[212] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VIII, § 41.
[213] Aristote, *Traité Du Ciel*, I, 2 et 3, 270b 20-24, cf. D. Isaac, note complémentaire à la p. 64, p. 95-6, note 2.
[214] Platon, *Lois*, X, 892 a-d.
[215] Platon, *Timée*, 41 d 4-5, cf. *Commentaire sur le Timée*, II, 58.

du *Commentaire sur Les Eléments d'Euclide*, pour lequel on ne peut faire de physique sans mathématiques, ce dont Théodore se montre incapable pourtant[216]. Certes, il y a bien une matière intelligible à côté d'une matière sensible, comme l'avait vu Aristote[217], mais celui-ci n'en avait pas tiré les conclusions qui s'imposent: donner le primat aux idéalités mathématiques pour faire de la physique, car « il y a la pureté de l'idée, et l'obscurité du sensible »[218], mais les deux sciences sont reliées: le point est une unité, plus une position, dira-t-il. Ainsi, la géométrie n'a jamais eu affaire à des tracés de lignes ou à des points ; le point mathématique est autre chose ; le cercle et le triangle ne sont pas sensibles[219]. Cependant on ne saurait faire, pour l'auteur de physique, sans mathématique, et en ce sens, une physique qualitative, au sens d'Aristote, est impossible. « La physique ne s'émancipe jamais de la mathesis, parce que le sensible ne peut jamais se soustraire à l'intelligible mathématique »[220]. Mêmes les éléments, note Proclus « sont soumis à la loi du nombre et de la figure »[221]. « C'est la mathématique qui a produit la mécanique, l'optique, et la catoptrique »[222]. Son domaine s'étend de l'arithmétique à l'astronomie, dont il note la proximité avec la physique[223].

A l'écouter, on eût évité la physique médiévale ! Les mathématiques sont une science dia-noétique, médiane, intermédiaire entre le sensible et l'intelligible pur[224]. C'est pourquoi, elles vont être le produit de l'âme, elle-même intermédiaire. l'axiomatique elle-même qu'il développe est porteuse de toute une réflexion ; les *Eléments de Théologie* l'avaient dit, déjà[225], il les retrouve. Son savoir ne se disjoint jamais d'un savoir sur les causes en géométrie[226], mais orienté, à l'inverse de Théodore, à bon escient ; la mécanique n'est pas première. Il y a l'Un, tête de série des nombres, et l'Un principe générateur[227]. Les *Eléments de théologie* avaient engagé la réflexion sur le tout et les parties, «les êtres considérés les uns par rapport aux choses, soit, ou bien des touts, ou bien des parties, qu'ils soient identiques ou différents »[228]. Le limité et l'illimité sont d'autres concepts qui les définissent[229]. Il pourra dire un peu plus loin à l'encontre de Théodore, que la vie incorporée est l'absence de choix[230]. Les mathématiques se dégageant des corps étaient, pour lui, ce principe de liberté.

Par la suite, c'est vers une autre sorte de sensualisme que dérive Théodore, auquel va s'en prendre Proclus, en disant que le Bien, c'est l'agréable, un sensualisme moral de type épicurien. Epicure, en effet, avait déclaré, dans *La lettre à Ménécée*, que « le plaisir est le principe de la vie heureuse »[231], propos qui avait choqué, repris par Cicéron: « il dit que le souverain bien, c'est le plaisir »[232]. Théodore ne le dit pas, mais proclame: le bien,

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[216] Proclus, *op. cit.*, VIII, § 43.
[217] Aristote, *Métaphysique*, Z, 10, 1036a.
[218] Proclus, *Commentaire sur les Eléments d'Euclide*, 77, 7-79,3, cité par S. Breton, *Philosophie et Mathématiques chez Proclus*, Paris, 1969, p. 59.
[219] N. Hartmann, Principes philosophiques des mathématiques, in S. Breton, *op. cit.*, p. 200.
[220] S. Breton, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
[221] Proclus, *Commentaire sur les Eléments d'Euclide*, 22,18, cité par N. Hartmann, *op. cit.,* p 228.
[222] Proclus, *op. cit.*, 10, 25, cf. N. Hartmann, *op. cit.*, p. 229
[223] Proclus, *op. cit.*, 41, 22-25, cf. S. Breton, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
[224] Proclus, *op. cit.*, 5, 13.
[225] Proclus, *Eléments de Théologie,* propositions 15 et 16.
[226] Proclus, *Commentaire sur les Eléments d'Euclide*, 9, 25, cité par S. Breton, *op. cit.,* p. 65.
[227] Cf. S. Breton, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
[228] Proclus, *Eléments de Théologie*, proposition 66.
[229] Proclus, *op. cit.*, proposition 89.
[230] Proclus, *Providence, fatalité, liberté*, VIII, 44.
[231] Epicure, *Lettre à Ménécée*, § 129.
[232] Cicéron, *De Finibus = Des termes extrêmes des biens et des maux*, I, 9.

c'est l'agréable, c'en est une variante, lorsqu'il note, à la fin du § 45, que l'homme même, pourra en trouver le fruit fort imparfait, après avoir montré les variations d'une telle approche, chez les Perses et les autres peuples, comme n'étant que le fruit de la jeunesse[233]. Il ajoutera au paragraphe suivant, qu'il faut retirer l'esclavage des sens et du plaisir[234], mais c'est peut-être par le traité *Du Bonheur* de Plotin qu'il était passé, lequel avait récusé la définition du bonheur par la fonction propre, parce que cela identifiait, l'homme à l'animal[235]: de même, c'est en comparant la vision précitée à celle des bœufs, que Proclus confiera l'appréciation du Bien à celle des vies raisonnables qui ne sont pas dominées par le désir[236].

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C'est alors, qu'au c. X, il est question de cette attitude de Théodore, de sa dénégation du vrai, lors même que celle-ci prétexte l'ignorance socratique[237]. Mais celle-ci ne saurait trancher en faveur de l'inexistence du libre arbitre. Socrate a montré, en effet, qu'il espérait connaître la vérité affranchie du corps, et la contemplation, aussi bien dans le *Théétète*, « celle des astres dans le haut du ciel »[238], que celle du Bien dans la *République*, qui, comme avec les mathématiques, permet d'être libre de toutes entraves[239]. Aussi les mathématiques occupent-elles cette deuxième section de la ligne, après celle consacrée aux choses immatérielles, lors même qu'elles dérivent d'hypothèses[240], alors que dans l'*Epinomis*, la dialectique en sera le lieu. Revenant sur Socrate, il montre que la conscience de son savoir se situait à un autre niveau, celle de soi-même, donnant ainsi au sujet, à la fois, l'expérience de ce qu'il sait et de ce qu'il ne sait pas, lui permettant de se situer dans un intermédiaire entre un savoir absolu par l'intelligence, et celui des imparfaits par la sensation, exprimant cette situation de l'âme. Car ainsi qu'il le note, on ne saurait tirer argument d'un savoir relatif pour abolir la science, puisqu'en abolissant celle-ci, on ne pourrait plus rien affirmer de rien, pas même du contingent[241], et qu'il faut donc considérer celle qui en mérite le nom, tout en sachant qu'il y a une vraie science, une intelligence supérieure à la science, et une pensée de nature divine[242].

Ainsi les données sont-elles posées, entre la liberté et la Providence, pour lequel Théodore voit encore dans l'insuccès des vertueux, et la réussite des méchants, une anomalie qui aboutit à la ruine du libre-arbitre[243], argumentation qu'avaient posée les stoïciens[244], ce en quoi, sans l'existence du libre-arbitre, répond Proclus, nous ne pouvons avoir ni mérite ni récompense[245], chose que Théodore mettait en doute, croyant à cet effet du tout, sans que l'homme y prenne part. Mais il y a, à la fois un libre-arbitre et une Providence[246], parce qu'il y a un choix. Mais au lieu d'y voir cette absolue possibilité d'atteindre ce que l'on veut, au nom d'une conception de la liberté absolue, comme son interlocute-

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[233] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IX, § 45.
[234] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IX, § 45, cf. Platon, *Gorgias*, 495 a, *Philèbe*, 11 b, *République*, VI, 505, b-d..
[235] Plotin, Du Bonheur, *Ennéades*, I, 4, 1 et suivantes.
[236] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IX, § 46 et 47.
[237] Proclus, *op. cit.*, X, § 48.
[238] Platon, *Théétète*, 173 e
[239] Proclus, *op. cit.*, X, § 49.
[240] Proclus, *op. cit.*, X § 50.
[241] Platon, *Sophiste*, 249 c 6-9-8.
[242] Proclus, *op. cit.*, XI, § 52.
[243] Proclus, *op. cit.*, XI, § 53..
[244] cf. supra, note 192, argument rapporté par A.A. Long.
[245] Proclus, *op. cit.*, XI, § 54.
[246] Proclus, *op. cit.*, XI, § 55.

ur le croit[247], Proclus revient à une conception plus saine de la liberté, où c'est, cette fois, lui qui rejoint Epictète[248], où la liberté est sous le contrôle, et à la mesure de l'homme. Une liberté absolue, pendant d'un déterminisme absolu, s'oppose cette saine conception d'un choix humain, qui rejoint aussi celui de Platon, dans la *République*, s'agissant des types de vie[249], véritable choix électif, dans lequel il faudra tenir compte des désirs et des appétits des hommes[250], contrebalancés par une âme rationnelle, dans cette double voie qui existe en nous[251], du bien et du mal, faisant de ce qui dépend de nous (τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν) le principe d'une liberté authentique, et de ce qui n'en dépend pas, celui de l'esclavage[252].

Ainsi, lorsqu'au chapitre 12, il est question de la dernière objection de Théodore, sur le déterminisme intégral, à propos de la pré-science des dieux, il est répondu que les dieux, connaissent, à la fois de manière déterminée et indéterminée, alors que les stoïciens, ont retenu la première, les aristotéliciens, la seconde,. mais si les dieux connaissent sous un mode déterminé, il faut envisager les dieux par rapport aux événements. Et le mode supérieur de leur connaissance, en bon platonisme, sépare les réalités incorporelles des réalités corporelles[253]. La connaissance ne s'adaptant pas à l'objet, mais au sujet qui connaît, ils préconcevaient ainsi incorporellement toutes choses[254], divinement et intemporellement les cylindres et les poulies de Théodore, et aussi ce qui dépend de nous, τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν[255], rendant possible, avec le libre arbitre, l'existence de la philosophie[256].

IV De l'existence du mal

Le traité se présente sous une forme différente des précédents, celle d'un parcours réflexif des régions de l'être, auquel nous a accoutumé le néoplatonisme, mais n'en présente pas moins, de la part de Proclus, une plus grande originalité des positions, où on le verra, s'opposer à Plotin, sur la question du mal, plus proche des solutions de la *Théologie platonicienne* que des *Eléments de Théologie*, penser à une datation plus tardive. Alors que les chemins du néoplatonisme s'étaient recoupés, faisant penser à une filiation du néoplatonisme depuis Ammonius, en passant Plutarque d'Athènes[257], ici il vont s'éloigner, dans cet autre néoplatonisme.

C'est que le problème du mal est tout autre. Il s'agit de trouver l'origine du mal moral, pour en retrouver la nature, qui est toute intérieure: la recherche nous mettrait, ainsi sur la route, en face d'une contre-épreuve qui pourrait faire douter de la beauté du monde et de sa Providence[258]. Reviendra souvent cette fameuse phrase du *Théétète:* « il est impossible que le mal disparaisse, Théodore ; car il y aura toujours, nécessairement, un contraire du Bien. Il est tout aussi impossible qu'il ait son siège parmi les dieux: c'est donc la nature mortelle et le lieu d'ici-bas, que parcourt fatalement sa ronde »[259].

Le début voit naître des questions qui sont récurrentes. La première étant de savoir,

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[247] Proclus, *op. cit.*, XI, § 56.
[248] Proclus, op. cit, XI, 57, cf. Epictète, *Diatribe*, I, 30, 8.
[249] Platon, *République*, X, 619 e-620d, tr. G. Leroux, GF, Paris, 2002.
[250] Proclus, *op. cit.*, XI, § 58.
[251] Proclus, *op. cit.*, XI,, § 59.
[252] Proclus, *op. cit.*, XI, § 61.
[253] Proclus, *op. cit.*, XII, § 63
[254] Proclus, *op.. cit.*, XII, § 64.
[255] Proclus, *op. cit.*, XII, § 65.
[256] Proclus, *op. cit.*, XII, § 66.
[257] Cf. notre article, Ammonius et Plotin, *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 102, 1, 2004, p. 89.
[258] L. Siassos, Le champ ontologique de l'apparition du mal, chez Proclus et Denys, *Diotima*, 23, 1995, p. 43.
[259] Platon, *Théétète*, 176 a 5-8.

au § 2, si le mal est un être: « « nullement étant », le mal est en effet, plus éloigné du bien que le non-étant »[260]. Faudra-t-il le placer encore, au-dessous du non-être ? Mais dès lors qu'il participe à une forme, n'appartient-il pas à l'être ? [261] La création du monde par un démiurge qui ne saurait vouloir le mal rend difficile cette hypothèse, qui reviendra au § 10[262]. Mais comme il faut, comme au tribunal, savoir le vrai, en éprouvant les deux thèses contraires[263], on envisagera au § 4 l'hypothèse contraire: il existe toujours des contraires, le vice par rapport à la vertu, la passion, par rapport à la raison, et que le meilleur l'emporte !

Mais comme l'homme recherche son salut, c'est-à-dire, son bien dans chaque être, comme le disait Socrate, on peut penser qu'il y a cette appétence du bien[264]. Le mal paraît exister par les faits, et ferait songer à une phénoménologie du mal, si l'idée de corruption qui vient n'avait pas quelque rapport avec la médecine hippocratique, qui était cette symptomatologie: Proclus, y-a-il songé, par une sorte de parallèle entre la mal physique et le mal moral, revenant à l'argument classique de la génération et de la corruption évoqué dans le *Phédon*[265] et chez Aristote ? Comme les arguments s'enchaînent, on reviendra plutôt à celui de l'éloignement d'une source, marquant une dégradation: le schéma vertical a succédé à l'horizontal. Par les contraires, le chaud, le froid, le juste, l'injuste, on arrive à l'existence du mal. Platon affirmait dans le *Théétète* que l'existence du mal est nécessaire[266]. Jusqu'où faudra-t-il le suivre ?

Cela se peut-il ? La question rebondit avec la forme. Il y a des êtres qui participent tantôt à des formes, tantôt non, ou de manière contingente[267]. Sera-ce le cas du mal ? Nouveau constat sur cette facticité du mal, car le bien n'existe pas toujours de la même façon et à l'identique: alors il ne serait que « la privation de la participation au bien »[268]. C'est alors que Proclus revient à la maladie absence d'ordre, non de tout ordre[269]. On considère alors qu'il y a deux maux: un pur, un autre mélangé[270]. Il ne serait pas complètement non-être ? hypothèse reprise au paragraphe suivant: mal intégral ou mal relatif[271]? Le retour à la volonté démiurgique du *Timée* fait revenir au Bien[272].

Le chapitre suivant présente ce parcours d'une recherche qui commence vers le haut. A commencer par les dieux: certes, certains d'entre eux s'en éloignent parfois, mais ils en perdent leur nature ; le fait est qu'ils sont dispensateurs du Bien, comme une lumière, qu'ils embellissent le monde, et qu'ils créent cet ordre fondé sur la justice[273]. En quoi seraient-ils créateurs du mal, puisqu'il est dans le temps, et qu'ils sont éternels ?[274] Les anges vont-ils voir apparaître le mal, qui par définition est éloigné des dieux Ils en sont les messagers: révélant le Bien,comment peuvent-ils être le mal ?[275] Là où le mal

[260] Proclus, *De l'existence du mal,* I, § 3, 7-9.
[261] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, § 2, 16-17.
[262] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, § 3, 18.
[263] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, § 8, 6-8.
[264] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, § 5, 3-4.
[265] Platon, *Phédon*, 71e-72d.
[266] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, § 6, 40.
[267] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, § 7, 5.
[268] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, § 7, 38.
[269] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, § 7, 65.
[270] Proclus, *op. cit.,* I, § 8, 10-11.
[271] Proclus, *op. cit.*, I, 9, 14.
[272] Proclus, op. cit., I, 10, 1-3.
[273] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 11, 37, 12, 1 et 14.
[274] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 13, 36-37.
[275] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 14, 14 et 25.

est présent, le Bien est absent, or ce n'est pas le cas ; en sorte qu'ils sont la bienfaisance même ; ils n'ont même pas à faire retour au Bien, par un mouvement de conversion, puisqu'ils ne l'ont jamais quitté[276]. Les démons ? Il y en a des pervers qui corrompent l'âme et le conduisent vers la matière[277]; mais on ne saurait négliger qu'il y en a de deux types: ceux qui entraînent l'âme vers le haut, tandis que d'autres la gardent dans sa condition[278]. Les héros ? Certains s'emportent – on songe à Achille- mais c'est leur nature, le type d'action qui est le leur et le mal, et le mal n'est pas en eux[279].

Le parcours, digne de l'auteur de la *Théologie platonicienne*, a épuisé toutes les catégories, révélant que le mal n'est nulle part dans le divin[280]. Le paragraphe suivant évoque cette mythologie de la *République*, où le devenir des âmes, après avoir bu la coupe de l'oubli, se déroule chez les vivants[281], troupe hétéroclite par la variété de ses choix[282], les uns accablés de fatigue, les autres, non. Selon cette approche, le mal, en fait ne serait que faiblesse renforcée par la cohabitation avec le mauvais, l'oubli, l'ignorance et la déraison[283]. L'infériorité serait le fait pour l'âme de se dissocier de la raison, dans cette image inférieure[284] d'une irrationalité qui ne reçoit plus la lumière d'en haut. Mais ces imperfections ne seraient elles par le fait d'une privation, comme la perfection, serait, retour à la nature[285]. On a l'idée de nature: le bien serait naturel, le mal cette contre nature variable[286]. La nature ne saurait être en cause, car chez les êtres conformes à la nature, le mal n'a pas place. Le contre-nature ne venant qu'avec les obstacles, la laideur, avec la matière, qui ne saurait atteindre les êtres immatériels, qu'avec les corps dans le désordre, privés de l'ordre premier[287].

C'est alors qu'il critique la position de Plotin, selon lequel la matière c'est le mal: « si elle est totalement un mal, comme certains le disent, c'est consubstantiellement qu'elle est le mal, d'où ils tirent qu'elle est le mal originaire »[288]. Même si l'essentiel de l'argumentation sera exégétique – pour mettre Plotin en contradiction avec Platon – le raisonnement est des plus serrés. Elle ne saurait être le principe du mal, puisque le mal est diffus dans le monde[289], en sorte que pour lui, on ne saurait aboutir à ce dualisme Bien / matière[290]; deuxième argument, celui de la cause, plus grande selon lui que son effet, en sorte que son principe serait un mal plus grand encore[291]; mais (le principe générateur de tout étant le Bien), on ferait du Bien la cause du mal[292]. Ainsi Plotin a-t-il méconnu les lois de la causalité métaphysique admises, et est-il en défaut. Aussi Proclus réfute-t-il que la matière puisse être principe du mal, puisqu'elle n'est pas le mal, à partir de l'idée de né-

[276] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 15, 26-35.
[277] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 16, 7-8.
[278] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 17, 28-29.
[279] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 19.
[280] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 20, 1-4.
[281] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 21-22.
[282] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 23, cf. *République*, X, 616a-618 b, le mythe d'Er.
[283] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 24, 1 et 45-48.
[284] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 25, 14-17.
[285] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, 26, 16-22.
[286] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 27, 19-20.
[287] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 28, 1-3, et 36.
[288] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 20, 8-11 et Plotin, I, 8 (51), 3.
[289] Cf. la traduction anglaise du traité par J. Opsomer, et C. Steel, *Proclus, On the Existence of Evils*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2003, Introduction, p. 16-19.
[290] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 31, 10-17.
[291] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 31, 20-21.
[292] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 31, 22-23.

cessité[293]. Entre temps, il aura été question de sa nature, de non mesure, d'illimité, qui deviennent besoin de mesure et de limite, détruisant par cela même l'idée d'opposition au Bien, mesure et limite[294]. Le mal, pour lui est d'abord faiblesse, c'est à dire le fait de l'âme, faisant que l'affaiblissement interviendrait avant que soit bue la coupe[295] – et on sait qu'elle dilemme cela posait pour Plotin[296]–descendant par elle-même, on ne saurait en rendre la matière responsable[297]. La platonisme conforte cette réfutation: la matière du *Timée* était mère ou « nourrice », « principe du monde » ou « partie élémentaire »[298], du *Politique*, le corporel est cause du désordre, alors que la matière est immobile[299]. « Le premier composé n'est pas un corps inqualifié, puisqu'il est visible, comme le dit Timée, puisque celui-ci n'est pas visible, alors que l'inqualifié ne l'est pas »[300]. Le magistral commentateur apparaît là.

Le mal ne vient pas de la matière, puisque celle-ci et le mouvement désordonné ne sont pas une seule et même chose [301], en sorte qu'en elle, il y a déjà un certain ordre. Dieu est générateur de l'infini, disait le *Philèbe*[302], fixant d'elle ainsi que des corps, et du mixte les trois genres et le produit de Dieu qui ne saurait faire le mal. N'étant ni Bien, ni mal, elle est le nécessaire, en effet, celui qu'a en vue le dieu, en relation avec lui et principe de la génération[303], d'où son désir du Bien. Il n'y a ni mal pur, ni mal originaire, puisque si elle était le contraire de cette forme originaire, elle serait le mal en soi, et en l'autre ; comme elle s'oppose surtout à ce dernier, elle ne saurait être le mal en soi[304].

Aussi n'est-elle que privation[305], et à ce titre Plotin a encore tort, car, en faisant de la matière un contraire, puisque les contraires sont des attributs, et que la substance chez Aristote n'a pas de contraire[306], ce qu'il méconnaît. La privation arrive, dans un ordre qui illumine l'être à partir du Bien n'étant pas encore le mal, comme avec le feu et les éléments, dont on ne saurait dire qu'ils le sont.[307] On distinguera l'absence d'ordre et de mesure, de l'ordre et de la mesure. Peut-on faire un pouvoir du mal, après lui avoir retiré son efficience?[308]

Mal physique des corps, ou mal psychique, lequel est le pire ? Le dernier sans doute, comme mal corrupteur de la substance, alors que l'autre ne corromprait que la puissance[309]. La corruption, comme mal de surface, apparaît comme ce symptôme que nous vu, évoquant la maladie, dont il faut tenir compte. C'est ainsi que Proclus le saisit, plutôt que comme un mal originaire qui serait principe. Ne faut-il pas préserver la Providence ?

S'agissant de la nature du mal, il rend compte des réponses multiples sur leurs causes: cause unique, pouvoir de malfaisance en l'âme, ou origine venue d'en haut[310]. Là encore, il faut se référer à Platon, qui, dans le *Théétète*, faisait état d'un modèle avec

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[293] Proclus, *op. cit.,* II § 32, 34, 36, et 37.
[294] Proclus, *op. cit.* II, § 32, 23-25.
[295] Proclus, *op. cit.*,II § 33, 17.
[296] Sur la descente volontaire ou non cf. D. O'Brien, *Théodicée plotinienne théodicée gnostique*, Leiden 1993.
[297] Proclus, op. cit., II, § 33, 18-19.
[298] Platon, *Timée*, 34b, 46c7, 51c4.
[299] Platon, *Politique*, 273b.
[300] Platon, *Timée*, 30 a et Proclus, *Commentaire sur le Timée*, I, 387.
[301] Proclus, *op. cit.,* II, § 35, 3-5.
[302] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 35, 7, et 22.*Philèbe*, 27a.
[303] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 36, 3-4, 22-26.
[304] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 37, 8-13.
[305] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 38, 1-7.
[306] Cf. D. Isaac, Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, 38, note, p. 78., Aristote, *Physique*, I, 5; *Catégories*, 5, 3b.
[307] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 38, 24-25.
[308] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, 38, 39-43.
[309] Proclus, *op. cit.*, II, § 39, 23-27.
[310] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 40, 6-13.

Dieu, l'autre sans, et dans les *Lois* de deux sortes d'âmes bienfaisantes ou non [311]. L'enquête ne peut révéler qu'une causalité divine, intelligible, ou psychique[312]. Mais les maux ont d'autres causes que Dieu, notait Socrate dans la *République*[313], car le divin ne saurait être que bon, et la lumière venue des dieux émane de leur cause[314], et « il y a cette loi sainte qui ne peut permettre que les principes des êtres deviennent les causes de leurs maux »[315] ; du reste le mal dépend du point de vue: ce qui est mal pour le particulier ne saurait l'être pour l'universel[316]. Ainsi la cause ne vient pas de dieu, car le mal n'est qu'impuissance et débilité[317], les dieux engendrent la bonté et la puissance. Le mal viendrait des formes ? Si le mal est éternel, peut-il venir des idées ou de l'intelligence qui est bonne ? Il n'y a rien de vil dans les idées[318] Les causes immuables des essences éternelles participent d'un ordre universel, à la progression des révolutions célestes, des inordonnés à l'ordre, et comme tout, ainsi à la nature[319], dont le mal vient déranger l'ordonnance, en sorte qu'il ne saurait avoir aucune cause immuable[320].

En l'âme? La poursuite de l'enquête conduit à se demander si elle a pour fonction le mal, ou même si elle est malfaisante. Certes il y en a une devenue telle à la suite de ses actes, mais l'âme véritable ne l'est pas, et l'autre peut redevenir boniforme[321]. Du reste, ce n'est que sa faiblesse qui l'a fait descendre, en sorte qu'on peut dire que ce n'est pas le devenir qui en est la cause, et qu'elle est absence de mesure et de détermination, tandis que la bonne est mesure et détermination de raison[322]. Les causes des maux sont diverses, et en tout cas ainsi que l'indique Socrate, jamais le divin qui n'est cause que du bien: « il faudra chercher aux maux d'autres causes »[323]. Dans cette multitude des causes surgit le contre-nature, et l'âme qui a opté pour le genre de vie des êtres dans lequel elle est[324]. Et même en poursuivant le bien, on peut connaître le mal; dira-t-on que le bien engendre le mal?[325] Car telle est la force d'attraction du mauvais, qu' « il pèse de tout son poids sur l'âme »[326].

Ainsi, au terme de l'enquête et de son parcours éblouissant, commence-t-on à saisir à partir de son origine et de ses causes, la nature du mal. Il est bien par-hypostase, ce qui avait été entrevu dès le début, sorte d'existence qui n'a pas d'existence ou d'être réel[327]. La deuxième déduction en est sa contingence, c'est-à-dire, « un de ces existants auxquels l'être est échu par accident »[328]. Aussi, paradoxalement, dans un contexte néoplatonicien, où toutes les existences dérivent les unes des autres par émanation ou par procession, rencontrons-nous cette idée d'accident et de contingence. On ne peut manquer de noter la proximité d'idée avec le traité *Du Destin*, d'Alexandre, ainsi que nous

[311] Platon, *Théétète*, 176 e, *Lois,* 896 a.
[312] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 40, 26.
[313] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 41, 14, Platon, *République,* 379 c.
[314] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 41, 18-19.
[315] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 41, 28-29.
[316] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III § 41, 32.
[317] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 42, 12.
[318] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 43, 8-9, et 32.
[319] Proclus, op. cit., III, § 44, 11-13.
[320] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 44, 25-33.
[321] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 45, 34-35.
[322] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 46, 22-23.
[323] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, 47, 12-28, cf. *République*, 378b et 379c.
[324] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 48, 6 et 10-12.
[325] Proclus, *op. cit.*, III, § 49, 3-6.
[326] Proclus, op. cit., III, § 49, 20-23, cf. *Phèdre*, 247b, et 248c.
[327] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, § 50, 3.
[328] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, 50,12-13.

l'avons fait à propos du deuxième opuscule ; mais alors que là il s'agissait tout autant de le contredire, cette fois-ci, il semble bien que Proclus, parce qu'il veut essentiellement dédouaner le Bien de tout créationnisme du mal, s'en soit rapproché, notamment lorsque celui-ci dit, au paragraphe 24, « certains des faits peuvent être tels qu'ils ont bien une cause, non certes principale, mais comme nous l'habitude de dire accidentelle »[329]. Un peu plus loin, il sera question des vices et des maux, avec la question de savoir s'ils sont en notre pouvoir ou pas[330], et il avait été question, entre temps d'une nature qui pourrait ou non être cause. On voit qu'il a pu trouver son inspiration dans ce traité, et davantage encore, lorsque après avoir spécifié, au début, qu'il ne pouvait y avoir d'existence sans cause qui ne soit conforme à la nature[331], il en vient, probablement par ce souci de la soustraire au Bien, et au divin, à dire que « par le mot par-hypostase, il désigne cette existence sans fin, sans but, en quelque sorte sans cause »[332]. R.W. Sharples, dans un article, et une traduction d'un passage du *De Anima libri Mantissa*, 169-172, qu'il attribue à un élève d'Alexandre, a montré que ce passage du *De Mantissa* est proche du traité *Du Destin* sur l'accident, la cause, puis le sans cause[333], puis, en note, la proximité du mal, comme non être avec plusieurs passages du texte de Proclus[334], évoquant la liaison avec la chute et l'affaiblissement de l'âme, dans le *De Mantissa*, thème qui ne figure pourtant pas dans le traité *Du Destin*. Opsomer et Steel, ont marqué, dans leur traduction du *De Malorum Subsistantia*, la liaison avec le *De Mantissa*, sur plusieurs points, notamment celui-là[335], ce qui ne peut que conforter notre argumentation, à propos des précédents traités, qu'Alexandre avait été, pour Les *Trois Opuscules*, le point de départ de toute une réflexion, mais cette fois, en lui empruntant une partie de ses solutions. Et ce, même si la notion d'existence sans cause du mal, soit comme non existence, soit comme existence crée par dieu avait fait l'objet d'âpres discussions dans le pré-néoplatonisme, notamment chez Plutarque de Chéronée[336]. On comprend pourquoi le mal devienne par-hypostase, parce que cette notion est reliée à celle d'existence sans cause, sorte d'existence sans substance, sans but, dépendante de son contraire le Bien, mais qui est une existence à part, ce qui l'interprétation donnée un peu plus loin au paragraphe 54, lorsqu'il la rapporte au passage du *Théétète*, où il s'agissait du sub-contraire[337]. L'existence sans cause entraînait une explication: pour ce faire, elle crée cette notion nouvelle de par-hypostase.

Ainsi la nature du mal – rien n'est plus difficile que celle-ci à expliquer[338] – commence, malgré tout à l'être. La nature du mal est une notion limite: défaut et privation du Bien, le mal en soi, totale privation. Son indétermination est dans son essence même[339], en sorte qu'il va être le principe de désordre[340], rompant l'exercice normal de la Providence.

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[329] Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *op. cit.*, *Du Destin*, tr. P. Thillet, § 24, p. 47.

[330] Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *op. cit.*, § 26, p. 50, 1-2.

[331] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, § 50, 10.

[332] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, § 50, 40-43.

[333] R. W. Sharples, Responsability, Chance, and not being, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mantissa, 169-172, *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, 22, 1975, p. 47.

[334] R. W. Sharples, *art. cit.*, note 175, p. 64, et Proclus, *op. cit.*, § 31.2, 42.10, 61.10.

[335] J. Opsomer et C. Steel, *op.. cit.*, introduction, p. 27, et notes 87 et 90, p. 52.

[336] Plutarque, *Des notions communes contre les stoïciens*, 1076 d, cf. J. Opsomer et C. Steel, Evil without a cause: Proclus' doctrine of the origin of evil, *Zum Rezeption der hellenistischen Philosophie, Akten der Tagend Congress in Trier*, 22-25 sept., 1997, p. 256.

[337] A.C. Lloyd, Parhypostasis. In Proclus, *Proclus and its influence*, Colloque de Neuchatel, Zurich, 1985, p. 154.

[338] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, § 51, 2-3.

[339] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, § 51, 13-15 et 31-32.

[340] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, § 51, 36-40.

Contraire, malgré tout, non pas contraire au sens absolu d'une totale privation, mais contraire qui lui-même est extrême faiblesse, mais qui dans les êtres où il se trouve leur emprunte puissance et force[341], menant cette sorte d'existence parasite qui fait naître le paradoxe, par exemple, que l'injustice comme mal est entretenue par la justice[342]. Le mal est le contre-nature même[343]. Son action s'analyse en termes de puissance: faible et impuissant, puisque toute puissance est Bien, il la trouve, ainsi dans le Bien[344].

En sorte qu'il est bien «cette privation de la première triade du Bien: volonté, puissance, activité », et qu'il a cette existence d'apparence[345]. Le mal existe, en fait, comme phénomène, résultat et concours de circonstances, lui-même conséquence de jeu de force, passion et raison qui s'affrontent. On peut donc parler à juste titre de sa facticité: c'est seulement comme fait réel perçu qu'on peut le concevoir. Et, son fait, c'est la corruption. Cette idée traverse tout le traité ; il en avait été question au paragraphe 5, puis 39, avec bien sûr, cette existence en surface, mais aussi comme symptôme, puisqu'à chaque fois, elle ramène à l'idée d'un mal physique et d'un mal moral: il y a un mal des âmes et un mal des corps, il ajoute, raffinant sur la division, mal des âmes pour la forme irrationnelle, et rationnelle, faisant en sorte qu'il y a trois maux: de l'âme, de l'image de l'âme, et du corps[346], et que dans ces trois natures, l'affaiblissement qu'est le mal concorde avec un abaissement de substance, vers le particulier[347].

En sorte que le mal est cet accident de parcours qui vient en plus de l'originaire toujours tendu vers le Bien, nature, âme ou intelligence[348], qu'il a dérangé l'ordre prévu, nature dans les corps, raison dans les formes irrationnelles de la vie, intelligence dans les formes rationnelles du Bien[349], perturbateur d'ordre comme la maladie, puisqu'il s'est insinué, en violant le développement normal des êtres.

La conclusion présente le dilemme suivant: les maux ou la providence, comment les deux peuvent-ils coexister ?[350]de cette Providence, qui comme disait *Timée*, « tout est bon rien n'est vil »[351], qui fait de dieu la cause, non pas la seule cause[352], on retire l'idée que le mal vient comme cela, aussi du Bien, de l'intelligence et de l'âme, puisqu'il s'est introduit subrepticement dans la procession des êtres et sa nécessité[353]. Alors il faut résoudre, car le discours philosophique a toujours le dernier mot, par sa dialectique: il y a l'universel et le singulier[354]: le Bien pour l'un devient le mal pour l'autre. Et en l'âme, elle divisera encore maux intérieurs conduisant à des actions malséantes, et maux extérieurs sous l'empire de la colère et du désir »[355]. Le mal peut même devenir à cet égard un Bien, dans le châtiment[356], ou être salutaire par une prise de conscience de sa nature, et

[341] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, § 52, 5-7.
[342] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, § 52, 16-20.
[343] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, § 52, 25.
[344] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, § 53 en entier.
[345] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, § 54, 4 et 14.
[346] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV § 55, 5 et 8.
[347] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, § 55, 20.
[348] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, § 57, 3.
[349] Proclus, *op. cit.*, IV, § 57, 8-10.
[350] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, § 58, 1-2, et 5-10.
[351] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, § 58, 14-15, cf. Platon, *Timée*, 30a.
[352] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, § 58, 22-23.
[353] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, § 58, 24-30
[354] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, § 58, 36-37.
[355] Proclus, *op. cit.*,V, § 58, 48-50.
[356] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, § 59, 2-5.

le repentir[357]. Il fait même mieux saisir l'action de la Providence, par exemple, dans l'art des médecins qui guérissent les plaies, la vie meilleure, une fois celle-ci guérie[358]. Comme si la Providence cherchait toujours à l'emporter, dans ce combat qui est le sien, contre le mal. Et ce qui est vrai physiquement l'est aussi pour l'âme, dans ses choix et ses actes, elle qui se porte toujours, par nature, vers le haut[359] et vers le salut.

La nature concourt aussi au Bien du tout pour les corps, ainsi, dans l'évocation de la maladie[360], comme si, en effet, elle était cette effervescence apparente du mal, dans la nature particulière, eu égard à la nature totale, expression même de cette nature enfin découverte du mal: la corruption, laquelle est malheureusement nécessaire dans le cycle des êtres[361] et de la vie.

Il en est ainsi pour l'âme venue du divin et du Bien, qui voit l'irruption du mal, comme venu d'ailleurs, d'autres causes, dans cette complexité du monde. Mais « tous les êtres sont groupés autour du roi de l'univers »[362], ainsi que le disait Platon, et dans cette belle image, le mal s'avance masqué, et il agit, et celle-ci (la Providence) ne peut être que cause de ce qui est bon, ne causant les maux qu comme des êtres, et les considérant comme des biens, puisqu'elle n'a qu'une connaissance unitaire, saisissant le mal comme bien[363].

Conclusion

Proclus a déroulé une *Théologie platonicienne*, qui présente les dieux en intelligibles, intelligibles/ intellectifs, et intellectifs, réalisant la Providence de l'Un transcendant par le biais des hénades, conjuguant les *Oracles Chaldaïques* et son interprétation du *Parménide*, par un système de causes et de participation. Il semble même que la Providence soit le seul fil qui relie les *Trois Opuscules*, à cette théologie. – *Les dix Problèmes* nous ont fait découvrir dans les cinq premiers, la finesse d'une réflexion sur une connaissance des particuliers et de l'universel, aux contingents, des déterminés et indéterminés, de la participation, du mal. Nous avons pu voir, grâce à une traduction française du manuscrit arabe de l'Escurial, à la fois la continuité et la séparation, avec le traité *de la Providence*, d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise ; d'autre part, avec le traité *Du Destin*. – *Providence, fatalité, liberté*, *Lettre à Théodore*, développe des prodiges d'argumentation, pour restaurer le τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, la liberté face au déterminisme d'une vision continuiste, à travers les deux âmes, immortelle ou non. L'auteur du *Commentaire sur les Eléments d'Euclide*, avait compris déjà, dans une remarquable intuition, qu'une physique ne pouvait exister sans les mathématiques, et que le mécanisme dépendait finalement des idéalités mathématiques, qui sont en l'âme, en même temps, un principe de liberté. – Le troisième est une énorme enquête sur L'*Existence du mal,* des dieux aux héros passant par les anges, sur le mal qui ne saurait être dans les réalités supérieures dispensatrices du Bien et de la Providence. Qu'est-ce que le mal, puisqu'il n'est pas, comme l'avait cru Plotin, dans la matière ? Une faiblesse, une privation de l'ordre providentiel. Il ne saurait être une forme, ni le fait de l'âme. Sa contingence, qui se rapproche, cette fois, d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise, en fait cette contre-nature, par-hypostase, existence qui n'en est pas une. Il n'était qu'un échec aléatoire d'une Providence venue des dieux, s'accordant avec la liberté des hommes.

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[357] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, § 59, 10-12.
[358] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, § 59, 15-22.
[359] Proclus, *op. cit.,* V, § 59, 44-45..
[360] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, § 60, 7-8, cf. Platon, *Sophiste*, 228a.
[361] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, § 60, 30, et 41-43.
[362] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, § 61, 14-15, cf. Platon, *Lettre* II,312a, 1-2.
[363] Proclus, *op. cit.*, V, § 61, 21-26.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 84-89

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Platonism and Christianity: Different Approaches

The relation between Greek philosophy and Christian theology has, so to say, from 1st till 21st century remained unclarified, producing thereby, all over again, very important and sometimes remarkably subtle controversies. Thinking about this forever challenging problem, those who have bravely endeavoured to solve it often confused (1) the relation theology during certain epochs or in the writings of a specific theologian *de facto* had towards the dominant or preferred philosophy with (2) the relation which, in their opinion, theology *should* have towards philosophy as such. The inability to distinguish between these two aspects of theoretical speculation blurred even further historically anyhow not always clear relation between these two spiritual disciplines. Whereas for the former, i.e. grasping some specific link between someone's theological thought and particular philosophy (e.g. Aristotelianism or stoicism), it is necessary to thoroughly know each, for the latter, i.e. abstract theorizing about the general relation between theology and philosophy, it is often thought that a thorough insight into someone's theological, and even less philosophical thought is not required.

Certainly, this approach could not be more wrong in itself, but, unfortunately, it is more widespread than one would expect. Exactly this, on the ignorance of particular theological or philosophical thought based prejudice considering the desirable or allowed relation between theology and philosophy, necessarily leads to the misunderstanding of the relation that these two disciplines *de facto* have in a particular historical situation. The power with which such prejudices affect the process of making judgements (even among very famous authors) is so great, that they fail to notice obvious influences in situations where, in their opinion, these influences must not exist. In cases like this, the logic of their argument is the following: Given that philosophy must not influence theology (an axiom based on prejudice), this influence (in some specific case) does not exist (an inferred judgment which is either (1) false – in case when certain philosophy indeed influenced certain theology, or (2) true – yet not because it was correctly inferred from a true axiom, but because of the real absence of such influence in that particular situation). Therefore, even when their conclusion is sometimes true, it is not so because it was inferred from the true assumption.

Although it would worth the effort to address this problem with respect to all the relevant philosophical orientations of the Antiquity (and then also of the later periods of the history of philosophy and theology, up to the present day), mostly Platonism will be considered here. This choice, however, is not accidental. Namely, it would be very hard to document any important influence that, for example, Scepticism or Epicureanism had on the theology of the early Church. This task would be much easier when it comes to Aristotelianism and Stoicism (but this will not be elaborated in this article).

However, when we speak of Platonism (whether we think of Plato himself and old Academy, or of Middle and Neo-Platonism), it seems that its influence is the easiest to notice (whether we view it with suspicion and distrust, or relatively favourably, or, though extremely rarely, with elation).

It is not impossible that the reason for modern suspecting the relationship between philosophy and Christianity lays in the early protestant refusal to recognize the justification of the close bond which existed between Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology in the Aquinas thought, which was conceived as the official teaching of the Church. According to Martin Luther Christ's teaching cannot go hand in hand with Aristotle's philosophy. It goes without saying that the same holds for Plato. It was Adolf von Harnack[1] who with great success and lasting influence on the following generations of theologians insisted that what happened with the early Church was so-called 'Hellenization' which consisted in the intrusion of Greek philosophy into early Christian theology as of an alien body in the Church organism. Needles to say, it was characterized as a negative phenomenon which should not have happened, because it complicated simple Christian message.

In his doctoral thesis[2] Niels Hyldahl attacked the generally accepted interpretation which affirms the continuity between the Platonism of St. Justin Martyr (and *ipso facto* Greek philosophy in general) and Christian Gospel. In the same spirit Heinrich Dörrie strongly supported the thesis about antagonism between Platonism and Christianity. For him, Christianity is one kind of approach to transcendence, and Platonism another. Therefore, Platonism is seen as an alternative to Christianity.[3] Just as we can view Christianity as a religion, so we can view Platonism not only as a philosophy, but as a religion as well (which specific feature is, like in Christianity, a doctrine of salvation). And that was the main reason for Christians to abandon Platonism, because it was another *religion* and another *theology* ('andere theologie'). So, for Dörrie, Platonism and Christianity were two religious confessions, and therefore mutually exclusive. As a consequence, it would be more accurate to speak about Christian anti-Platonism or counter-Platonism (comparable with counter-Reformation) than about accustomed Christian Platonism. Every similarity between the two is external or verbal. What has been taken over from Platonists are only things of language, the ways of expression, nothing essential. And even then these linguistic phrases and metaphors were transformed, losing in that way their original (non-Christian) meanings. A natural consequence was, Dörrie concluded, that Christians were always anti-Platonists and that 'Christian Platonism' never existed.[4]

His treatise "Die andere Theologie"[5] Dörrie concluded by affirming that "Christian doctrine developed according to its own intrinsic laws", so that "Never has Platonism touched the substance of Christian doctrine." For him this was natural because he con-

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[1] Harnack was an expert for Luther's thought and even wrote *Luthers Theologie* (2 vols., 1862-86). He was very proliferative writer, but for our purpose his most interesting work is *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* (3 vols., 1886-9; English translation as *History of Dogma* 7 vols., 1894-9) concerning the history of Christian doctrine until the age of Reformation, stressing especially the early Church.

[2] *Philosophie und Christentum. Eine Interpretation der Einleitung zum Dialog Justins*, a doctoral thesis in the Faculty of Divinity at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, 1966.

[3] "Die Andere Theologie," *Theologie und Philosophie* 56, 1981, pp. 1-46.

[4] Cf. his *Platonica minora*, München 1976, pp. 508-523.

[5] *Theologie und Philosophie* 56, 1981, pp. 1-46. See also the paper of Cornelia Johanna de Vogel, "Platonism and Christianity: A Mere Antagonism or a Profound Common Ground?", Vigiliae Christianae, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Mar., 1985), pp. 1-62 where she discusses the Dörrie's position.

sidered Platonism as another kind of *religious confession* irreconcilable with Christianity. As such, Platonism has not and actually could not have made any contribution to Christian teaching. Dörrie even based his theory on the argument from silence: Had Platonism really made any impact or change (which for him would necessarily imply deformation) to Christian theology, somebody would have written it somewhere in the official history of Church dogma. But this is not the case. Therefore the supposed influence has actually never happened.[6]

Dörrie also concluded, and de Vogel agreed,[7] that the theologians of the early Church had not searched for any help in Platonism, believing that they would find there solutions to their theological problems. Therefore, for Dörrie, the early Church used Platonism only as a strategy to reach the intellectual elite of Antiquity (and with this, as we shall see, de Vogel did not agree). Having a Lutherian or Barthian mentality, he firmly believed that 'philosophy' is one thing and 'faith' entirely other. So, for Christian faith, philosophy can only be something external: a tactical use of Platonic words and images with which the ancient people were more familiar, so that they could easier accept "something thoroughly unhellenical", i.e. Christian faith.

Eginhard P. Meyering was one of the many who reacted to such Dörrie's statements.[8] First of all, according to him a black-and-white approach like this is totally dependent on *a priori* (zunächst) presupposition of the existence of the typical platonic (typisch pltonisches) and the typical Christian (typisch christliches) ways of thought.[9] But, the problem is that this is only a presupposition that should be proved yet, and must not, prior to any investigation, be taken as the certain truth. Furthermore, one of Meyering's main objections was that what matters is not only the official Christian Creed, but, first of all, the way Church Fathers theologically (i.e. systematically and rationally) interpreted, founded and defended the basic truths of the Creed. And exactly there, in the theological interpretation of the truth of faith, lays the influence of Platonism (and all the later philosophies) on Christianity.[10]

Furthermore, the truths of faith were never directed against Platonism, but against Gnosticism (in the so-called Apostolic synod) and Aryanism (in the Nicene synod). So, it remains the fact, holds Meyering, that in their theological reflections Church Fathers really 'platonised'.[11] And they did it in two ways: (1) formally (i.e. in the neutral sense: they used platonic language, ideas and arguments) and (2) essentially. The first way is altogether out of doubt (even for Dörrie: "there is too much similarities and allusions"[12] between Platonism and Christianity). That is why Meyering con-

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[6] Interesting enough Dörrie admits the influence of Platonism (particularly Proclus via Dionysius) "nur im lateinischen Westen" (by the Latin West he understands 13th century scholastic theology), but not on the early Church. (Like many German scholars he made a sharp distinction between Patristics and Scholastics.)

[7] *Op. cit.* p. 34.

[8] He did it in his papers "Zehn Jahre Forschung zum Thema Platonismus und Kirchenväter," *Theologische Rundschau*, N.F. (36,4), (December 1971), pp. 303-320 and "Wie platonisierten Christen? Zur Grenzziehung zwischen Platonismus, kirchlichem Credo und patristicher Theologie," *Vigiliae Christianae*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Mar., 1974), pp. 15-28. Both papers reprinted in *God Being history: Studies in Patristic philosophy*, New York, 1975, pp. 133-146.

[9] "Zehn Jahre Forschung zum Thema Platonismus und Kirchenväter," *Theologische Rundschau*, N.F. (36,4), (December 1971), pp. 305.

[10] "Wie platonisierten Christen? Zur Grenzziehung zwischen Platonismus, kirchlichem Credo und patristischer Theologie," *Vigiliae Christianae*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Mar., 1974), p. 16.

[11] Op. cit. p. 17: "In ihrer Theologie 'platonisierten' die Kirchenväter."

[12] "Was ist spätantiker Platonismus?" - Überlegungen zur Grenzziehung zwischen Platonismus und Christentum, Theologische Rundschau (N.F.) 36, 1971, p. 294.

centrates himself on investigating the second way, i.e. the substantial influence of Platonism on patristic theology.

Distinguishing Creed from theology, Meyering held that Church Fathers had to deal not only with the question such as: is the world created or not (as they did in the Creed), but also with those of a different type: what does it mean, i.e. what are the consequences of answering yes and what of answering no, and how one can make a *coherent* theological picture from all accepted elements of this or that answer. The truths of faith (expressed in the Creed) are clearly confronted with the heresies (and with some vague Platonism in general in cases where Fathers thought Platonism inspired heresies). But, Meyering insists, Church Fathers were the children of their epoch, and the epoch was pervaded with the spirit of Platonism. For them Platonism was not one philosophical school confronted with the Church, but a mighty spiritual force in the hearts and minds of many Christian theologians. So, they 'platonised', so to say, 'naturally', without thinking about it. By interpreting the Creed, they tried not to oppose themselves to *their own Platonism* (they didn't tried not to oppose themselves to *Platonism as such*).[13] Therefore, Church Fathers interpreted the Creed not (1) *to* their epoch, but (2) *starting from* their epoch (which for Meyering implies that they interpreted the content of the Creed by using the Platonic forms of thinking).[14] Therefore, concludes he, the Christian Platonists do not exist; what exists are platonysing Christians.[15]

Another who reacted to Dörrie was his friend Cornelia Johanna de Vogel.[16] In her long paper she criticized Dörrie for his narrow concept of Platonism. For Dörrie, Platonism was a closed dogmatic system radically confronted with Christianity. But, as de Vogel rightly noticed, in the very core of Platonism always laid *rational argument* (so it could not been a religious dogmatic system). Moreover, Platonism (even if we take it as a system) was not closed (once and for all), but for many centuries open to different opinions and arguments, "which were accepted by some Platonists and rejected by others."[17]

Furthermore, de Vogel distinguished five main types of attitudes of ancient Christians towards Greek philosophy.[18] The first is the total rejection and hostility (the sole example of this type was Tatianus, the Syrian who "hated all that belonged to Greek civilization"). The second is the great open-mindedness and assimilation of philosophical thinking forms (the chief personality of this type was Clement of Alexandria: "philosophical thinking was part of his own mind, and he liked it, just as Philo did"[19]). The third is an extremely critical attitude with reception of certain elements (the examples of this type can be many illustrious men from the middle of the second century, like Justin Martyr and all second century Apologists, Origen in the third and Cappadocians in the fourth century up to the Augustine in the fifth). The fourth is the

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[13] "Wie platonisierten Christen? Zur Grenzziehung zwischen Platonismus, kirchlichem Credo und patristischer Theologie," *Vigiliae Christianae*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Mar., 1974), p. 27.

[14] *Ibidem*.

[15] "Zehn Jahre Forschung zum Thema Platonismus und Kirchenväter," *Theologische Rundschau*, N.F. (36,4), (December 1971), pp. 315: "Gibt es also keine christlichen Platoniker, so gibt es doch platonisierende Christen."

[16] She did it in "Platonism and Christianity: A Mere Antagonism or a Profound Common Ground?", *Vigiliae Christianae*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Mar., 1985), pp. 1-62.

[17] C. J. de Vogel, *Op. cit.* p. 28.

[18] C. J. de Vogel, *Op. cit.* pp. 18-27.

[19] C. J. de Vogel, *Op. cit.* p. 22.

far-going acceptance of philosophical thinking forms, sometimes in the spirit of syncretism (the examples of this type are Minucius Felix in the second and Severinus Boethius in the fifth century, and also Synesius, the bishop of Cyrene, who "became a Christian whilst still a Platonist, and remained a Platonist while being a Christian"[20]). The fifth is the far-going acceptance joined with transformation (chief example was Dionusius the Areopagite, who "was certainly a Christian Platonist"[21]). Finishing this survey, de Vogel concluded that "… on the whole, Christian intellectuals did not take an attitude of hostility towards Greek philosophy; mostly they were positively interested, though never without critical reserve."[22] Little can be added to this.

Of course, what was the most essential in Christianity, i.e. Jesus Christ as the God who became man, Christians have not, and could not have found in any form of Platonism. But it does not imply that because of this (Platonic) philosophy was for the early Christian theologians a mere outward form of thinking. On the contrary, maintained de Vogel,

> "… the Platonic ontology was at the bottom of their minds and was integrated in their own thinking about God and the divine world …"[23] Moreover, "… Plato's metaphysics of transcendent and perfect being on which all things visible depend has actually become an essential and even a fundamental part of Christian thinking from the second century onward."[24]

Answering to Dörrie's thesis that Platonism differed *in every respect* from Christianity, de Vogel maintained that Platonism in fact shared with Christianity a few basic views which she described as follows:

> "(a) that visible things are no primary reality, existing by and through themselves;
> (b) that by their imperfection visible things point to and require a perfect and absolute reality, primary being and founded in itself;
> (c) that this invisible reality is of an infinitely higher significance and value than that of visible things depending on it;
> (d) that this fundamental fact has to rule our life and conduct;
> (e) that it implies the infinite value of the human soul, and therefore, of the individual person."[25]

So, de Vogel showed that Platonism was *in many respects* similar with Christianity.

Now we shall try to come to the answer of the question wether Church Fathers were Platonists or opponents of Platonism. It seems to me that

(1) if to be a Platonist means to believe that Ideas (or Essences) eternally exist independently (of God and man), then they were not;
(2) if to be a Platonist means to believe in the transmigrations of souls, then they were not;
(3) if to be a Platonist means to believe in matter existing from eternity, then they were not;

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[20] C. J. de Vogel, *Op. cit.* p. 24: "… an impossible situation in Heinrich Dörrie's view."

[21] C. J. de Vogel, *Op. cit.* p. 41. She continues: "He corrects Neoplatonism by teaching that divine love is ἐκστατικός, that is, it "seeks the other", and that it does not spring at some lower ontological level but is the very Love of God as found in Scripture." See also her earlier paper "Greek cosmic love and the Christian Love of God", *Vigiliae Christianae*, Vol. 35 (1981), pp. 57-81.

[22] C. J. de Vogel, *Op. cit.* p. 27.

[23] C. J. de Vogel, *Op. cit.* pp. 34-35.

[24] C. J. de Vogel, *Op. cit.* p. 36.

[25] C. J. de Vogel, *Op. cit.* pp. 54-55.

(4) if to be a Platonist means to believe in the repeating return of the world after a long period of time, then they were not.

But

(1) if to be a Platonist means to believe that the world is not eternal, but created by a good Creator, then they were;
(2) if to be a Platonist means to believe that soul is 'better' than body, then they were;
(3) if to be a Platonist means to believe that it is much better to suffer the injustice than to do it, then they were;
(4) if to be a Platonist means to believe that ascetic life is an integral part of philosophy, then they were;
(5) if to be a Platonist means to believe that human being cannot attain everything, but that there is a region of transcendent Good from which depends everything both on earth and in heaven, then they were;
(6) if to be a Platonist means to believe that to know God is very hard, and to express him is even harder[26] (and not as some heretics claimed that they knew God even better than themselves), then they were;
(7) if to be a Platonist means to believe that real happiness is not to be found in the things of senses, then they were.

Of course, the list can be extended.

To my mind, Church Fathers were Platonists just because Plato was 'divine', i.e. divinely inspired. Namely, if the eternal Logos revealed to Plato as much as was necessary (and as much as he was able to receive) in order that (Old, Middle-, and Neo-) Platonism appear as the most powerful philosophical movement of Antiquity, which would (together with the Aristotelianism and Stoicism) prepare human mind for the theological formation of Christian truth, then the fact that Church Fathers platonised means only that they, by accepting the Platonic god-centered mind, recognized in it the work of God's Logos, since they were familiar with him in an incomparably more direct way, as with the Logos incarnated. To their mind Platonism was the natural milieu, an already established path through which they arrived (much) farther than those who traced it. As we already saw, Platonism was not for them a set of teachings (dogma) about some particular thing (the structure of the world, the nature of soul, the organization of human society and so on) in which case each one of them could be rejected as erroneous. On the contrary, Platonism was for them an intellectual atmosphere, the way of thinking and valuing, of giving priority to spirit above matter, to good above evil, to god-established order above human conventions.

To conclude: To those who claim (with Dörrie) that Platonism has nothing in common with Christianity, enough is said. To those who, on the contrary, claim that Christianity could not do without Platonism and philosophy as such, as a necessary source of rationality absent from the original Christianity, it should be underlined that "there is nothing particularly Hellenic, still less pagan, about the rational method, except that the Greeks had the *providential privilege* of its discovery and development. In itself, it is a part of the equipment with which human nature has been endowed by God who made mankind."[27]

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[26] It is not important for our point that St. Gregory Theologian turned this upside down.
[27] G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, London-Toronto, 1936, p. XIII, (emphasis mine).

Philotheos **9** (2009) 90-98

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Pagan and Christian Consolation

I

It is well known that the early Church Fathers usually received a thorough classical education based upon pagan writers before they turned to their own literary production. As a result of their belonging to either Greek or Roman educated elites, they self-consciously adopted various pagan literary models and inherited fully developed pagan genres. At the same time, however, they actively transformed what they inherited by adapting the existing genres to their own goals and using them as vehicles for conveying the Christian message. It gave rise to specific literary hybrids that, on the one hand, clearly showed formal (and not only formal) similarities with their role models, but, on the other, significantly differed from them in content as well as in context. Scrutinizing those intentional similarities and differences can be highly rewarding as it can give us a hint of the literary strategies applied by some of the early Church Fathers in their effort to emulate their models and distance from them at the same time.

The purpose of this text is to closely examine the above-delineated question within the genre of *consolatio* (λόγος παραμυθητικός) which under the influence of Greek and Roman rhetoric and philosophy gradually evolved from one single topos to a genre of its own.[1] Although it could be delivered as a funeral speech, the usual form of consolation was the epistolary. Consoling the bereaved is a natural urge that received its literary formation as early as in the Iliad, in a scene of Achilles solacing Priamus.[2] But more than being merely a sign of compassion, literary consolation provided the author with an opportunity to express and expound his own philosophical attitudes and convictions, and to convey them to the addressee (and thus to the readers). In this way, epistolary consolation often approached the form of philosophical treatise dealing with topics such as death, afterlife, fate, grief, etc.

It was a Platonist Crantor from Soli (IV-III cent. BC) who with his praised treatise *On Grief* (Περὶ πένθους) established consolation as a literary genre. The genre was then transplanted to the Roman soil and further elaborated by Cicero in his equally famous *Consolatio*, written after his daughter's death and dedicated to himself, and in certain passages of his *Tusculanae disputationes*. However, it was fully developed only in Seneca and Plutarch, whose works form the pagan corpus for our examination and will be discussed below. Among the early Christian writers, it was Ambrose, Jerome, and the Cappadocian Fathers who particularly excelled in the genre of consolation taken over

[1] This article is to some extent based on and marks a further development of our work "Plutarh i Seneka: dva pristupa tešenju ožalošćenih" (Plutarch and Seneca: two approaches to consoling the bereaved), *Lucida intervalla, Prilozi Odeljenja za klasične nauke, Filozofski fakultet u Beogradu*, 30 (2/2004), 5-68.

[2] *Il*. 24. 507-551. Priamus has come to Achilles' tent to request the body of his son Hector; Achilles, moved by the old man's grief, tries to calm him and thus sets a model for all future literary consolations.

from their pagan predecessors. The present examination will address only the writings of Ambrose and Jerome, and compare them with those of Seneca and Plutarch in search of literary and philosophical continuities and discontinuities.

II

The commonest but not necessarily the only reason for writing an epistolary consolation was death, more precisely that kind of death which was perceived as untimely (*mors immatura*, ὁ ἄωρος θάνατος). In Seneca's opus we find two such extant works: *Consolatio ad Polybium*, addressed to the Emperor Claudius' secretary mourning his brother's death, and *Ad Marciam de consolatione*, addressed to the writer's acquaintance mourning her young son's death. In Plutarch, two consolations of the kind have survived: *Consolatio ad uxorem*, dedicated to the author's wife on the occasion of their own son's decease, and *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, in which the addressee was a friend of Plutarch who also lost his son.[3]

Among the early Latin Christian authors, the genre of epistolary consolation was taken over vigorously by St. Jerome, in whose correspondence we find several consolations, the most important for our analysis being the one addressed to Jerome's disciple Paula, who lost her daughter Blaesilla (Letter 39). Also considered is his consolation to a certain Theodora, who mourned the death of her husband Lucinius (Letter 75).[4] On the other hand, none of the consolatory works of St. Ambrose was in epistolary form; they were all funerary speeches, subsequently revised by the author. Ambrose delivered two orations dedicated to the deceased Roman emperors: the *De obitu Valentiniani consolatio* for the Emperor Valentinian, and the *De obitu Theodosii oratio* for Theodosius the Great. However, a degree to which he praised the characters of the two rulers makes these works more panegyrics than consolations. It is not the case with another funerary speech of Ambrose, given on the occasion of the untimely death of his brother Satyrus, bearing the title *De excessu fratris Satyri*. As one of the most elaborate examples of Latin Christian consolation, it fully exhibits the main elements of the genre, the more so as it was intended to relieve the author's own grief.[5] This work, Jerome's letter *Ad Paulam*, Seneca's *Ad Marciam de consolatione*, and Plutarch's *Consolatio ad Apollonium* form the core of our comparative analysis.

III

It would certainly be an oversimplification to presume any kind of clear-cut and straightforward pagan–Christian opposition in this case study. There are at least as many differences between Plutarch and Seneca as there are between Ambrose and Jerome, both in terms of their literary style and intellectual approach. Seneca's rigid stoicism differs considerably from the mild philanthropy of the Platonist Plutarch. However, they both shared

[3] When referring to these works, we stick to the following editions: Seneca, *Moral Essays* II, tr. John W. Basore (Loeb Classical Library: London, 1970; Plutarch, *Moralia* II, tr. Frank Cole Babbitt (Loeb Classical Library: London, 1971).

[4] Other such instances are Letters 77 (a consolation to Jerome's friend Oceanus over the death of his wife) and 79 (to Salvina, a lady of the imperial court, considering the decease of her husband). The references from Jerome's works are given here according to *Patrologiae latinae tomus XXII, Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi opera omnia, tomus primus,* ed. J. P. Migne et successores (apud Garnier fratres: Parisiis, 1877).

[5] There were actually two separate speeches, delivered seven days one after the other and later joined together by the author. Thus, in some manuscripts the second book is titled *De Resurrectione.* We refer to these works of St. Ambrose according to *Patrologiae latinae tomus XVI, Sancti Ambrosii opera omnia, tomi secundi pars prior*, ed. J. P. Migne et successores (apud Garnier fratres: Parisiis, 1880).

and built upon the same literary-intellectual heritage – the one that started with Homer and received its generic form with Crantor. What they operated with was a standard set of commonplaces and stereotyped arguments within which it is not always easy to discern one philosophical tradition from another. An eclectic mixture of Platonism, stoicism, Epicureanism etc., mostly appealing to the reader's common sense and illustrated with appropriate quotes from poetry and prose, had become a universal basis for composing a consolation. The same goes for St. Ambrose and St. Jerome, who both excelled in their classical education and did not hesitate to engage it in their own writing. All this said, however, it should be noted that, when juxtaposed with their pagan counterparts, the consolatory works of the Christian authors exhibit a radically new and different element of argumentation, as our analysis demonstrates. This one new element – the eschatological perspective of Christianity – drastically changes the context of the consolations and their psychological range.

Every consolation contains a *laudatio* as one of its main elements. The person of the deceased is always praised for his/her virtues and portrayed as exemplary. Hence the advice is given that we should keep our memory of the deceased alive and fresh. Plutarch and Seneca follow this pattern diligently.[6] What comes subsequently is a remark that to mourn after our beloved ones is natural and justified, but only if it is limited to a "reasonable" extent. Once it exceeds this extent, it becomes "the worst of all passions" (*τὸ χαλεπώτατον πάντων παθῶν*), a vice (*vitium*) and evil (*malum*).[7]

One of the focal points around which both Seneca and Plutarch build their argumentation is the concept of self-deceit or forgetfulness (*opinio*, δόξα). Why are we so distressed when someone dear to us dies? It is due to a false but deeply embedded conviction that our mortal bodies will last perpetually. *Quae deinde ista suae publicaeque condicionis oblivio est?*, Seneca asks Marcia concerning her son. *Mortalis nata es et mortales peperisti. (...) Et quae diligis, veneraris, et quae despicis unus exaequabit cinis.*[8] Plutarch, too, points to this kind of self-awareness in his address to Apollonius: *Χρὴ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν εἰδέναι θνητὸν ὄντα τὴν φύσιν (...) Ἀνθρώπων γὰρ ὄντως θνητὰ μὲν* [*εἰσιν*] *καὶ ἐφήμερα τὰ σώματα*.[9] This leads to a further development of "consolation" based upon anthropological pessimism peculiar to the ancient Greeks: there is nothing we can do about our mortality. *In regnum fortunae et quidem durum atque invictum pervenimus, illius arbitrio digna atque indigna passuri*, concludes Seneca.[10] To confirm this viewpoint, Plutach invoces Homer and his well-known lines: *Οὐδὲν ἀκιδνότερον γαῖα τρέφει ἀνθρώποιο / (...) τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστιν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, / οἷον ἐπ' ἦμαρ ἄγησι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε*.[11] Man's mortality is something imposed upon him from above for reasons that remain unexplained and unexplainable, something Crantor terms "the *obscure fate*, which follows us from the very beginning and brings no good" (*ἥ τ' ἄδηλος αὖτη τύχη πόρρωθεν ἡμῖν καὶ ἔτ' ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἠκολούθηκεν οὐδ' ἐφ' ἑνὶ ὑγιεῖ*).[12]

The only remedy, as emphasised by both writers, is to *tolerate* one's conditioned

[6] Plut. *Ad Apoll*. 34-35 et passim; Sen. *Ad Marc*. 12. 3 et passim.
[7] Plut. *Ad Apoll*. 2; Sen. *Ad Marc*. 1.8.
[8] Sen. *Ad Marc*. 11.3. Cf. also 9.5: *Error decipit hic, effeminat, dum patimur quae numquam pati nos posse providimus*. Note that, according to Seneca, the error, or self-deceit, *effeminates* one's spirit. This sex-based attitude towards grief will later appear in Plutarch (*Ad Apoll*. 22) and in St. Ambrose (*De excessu fratris*, I, 7).
[9] Plut. *Ad Apoll*. 6. Cf. also 21.
[10] Sen. *Ad Marc*. 10, 6.
[11] Plut. *Ad Apoll*. 6. The quotation is from Hom. *Od*. 18. 130; 136-7.
[12] Quoted by Plut. *Ad Apoll*. 6.?

existence. This kind of quiet, introspected, and resigned self-awareness can only be based upon *reason*. Reason is man's last resort in coping with his mortality and the other calumnities of the earthly existence: *Κράτιστον δὴ πρὸς ἀλυπίαν φάραμκον* [*ἐστιν*] *ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ διὰ τούτου παρασκευὴ πρὸς πάσας τοῦ βίου μεταβολάς*.[13] Relying on reason leads to a state of *readiness*, which is perceived by both writers as a state of constant feeling of existential uncertainty and almost hopeless awarness of one's mortality.[14] In this regard the motif of borrowing occurs: life is only borrowed to us and we should be prepared to return it to the borrower whenever he requests it. *Nos oportet in promptu habere quae in incertum diem data sunt et appellatos sine quaerella reddere*, says Seneca.[15] As a stoic, he goes one step further than Plutarch and advocates man's right to suicide as a decent way out of this world.[16]

There are two crucially important implications of the above-delineated arguments. First, that the world is a place full of evils, making man's earthly existence a kind of unbearable burden, and subsequently, that death is good since it releases one from this burden. The flesh with its passions, fears, and illusions enslaves the soul and drags it down; therefore, death must be something joyful and blissful (*εὔδαιμόν τι καὶ μακάριον*).[17] In this regard, both authors arrive at a pessimistic but significant conclusion, that it would be better if we were never born at all.[18]

Finally, no consolation can awoid the question of the *post mortem* destiny of the soul, which implies a shift from the ethical and psychological to the ontological and metaphysical plane of argumentation. While Seneca does not go into detail on this matter, sticking to the vague stoic understanding of the soul as a divine, fiery substance that somehow continues its existence after death, Plutarch elaborates on it basing his approach on Plato's *Apologia Socratis* (40C). There, for the sake of "objectivity", Socrates analyses three possibilities: that the soul ceases to exist together with the body; that it remains existent but in a deeply dormant state; and that it moves to a new abode. Whatever the case, argues Plato's Socrates (and Plutarch after him), death is not an evil as it liberates one from this wicked world. Needless to say, both Plato and Plutarch (and to some extent Seneca, in his stoic manner) strongly believed in the eternal existence of the soul as an entity different from the body. They considered that the soul could obtain the level of pure contemplation of the Truth only after separating from the body and its "insanity" (*τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφρωσύνης*).[19] Thus both in Plutarch and in Seneca we find a strongly negative attitude towards the body, an attitude upon which they ultimately base their attempts to console the bereaved. However, they seem to be unable to specify what it is that one should expect in the afterlife, once the material body is left behind.

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[13] Plut. *Ad Apoll*. 6. In our opinion, the term *λόγος* here should be understood as *reason.*

[14] Sen. *Ad Marc*. 9. 5. *Aufert vim praesentibus malis qui futura prospexit*, concludes the author. Cf. also Plut. *Ad Apoll*. 21.

[15] Sen. *Ad Marc*. 10. 2. Cf. also Plut. *Ad Apoll*. 28. Plutarch compares humans with bankers (*οἱ τραπεζῖται*) who should always be ready to return their loan to the creditors.

[16] Sen. *Ad Marc*. 15-16.

[17] Plut. *Ad Apoll*. 13. Cf. Sen. *Ad Marc*. 11. 2

[18] Plut. *Ad Apoll*. 27. Plutarch illustrates this point with the story of the Phrygian king Midas and Silenus. We find the same story in Cicero, *Tusc. Disp*. I, 114. Seneca does not mention it but comes to the same conclusion, cf. *Ad Marc*. 22.3: *felicissimum est non nasci*.

[19] Plut. *Cons ad Apoll*. 13. Since pure knowledge cannot be acquired within the body, Plutarch advocates its mortification during one's lifetime (*ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι*) and purification from it (*ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ*). However, Ambrose expresses a similar thought: *Scimus tamen quod* [anima] *corpori supervivat, et ea, jam depositis proprii sensus repagulis expedita, libero cernat obtutu, quae ante sita in corpore non videbat* (*De excessu fratris* II 21).

IV

In the consolatory works of St. Ambrose and St. Jerome all the main elements of the genre are evident, revealing their thorough classical education and intentionally emulative approach. Large parts of Jerome's letter to Paula and of Ambrose's funeral speech are standard rhetorical *laudationes*, praises of Paula's daughter Blaesilla and Ambrose's brother Satyrus.[20] Both authors admit that sorrow is natural, as long as it does not exceed certain limits. Thus, to illustrate this "natural" range of mourning, Ambrose says: *Bos bovem requirit*, *seque non totum putat, et frequenti mugitu pium testatur amorem*. The comparison with animals and their grief is clearly reminiscent of Seneca's words about the cows that mourn the lost member of their herd (*vaccarum uno die alterove mugitus auditur*), even though the sense is slightly altered.[21] Jerome is also considerate to Paula concerning her daughter's death: *Si parentem cogito,* says he*, non reprehendo quod plangis*,[22] and elsewhere he admits: *Confiteor affectus meos, totus hic liber fletibus scribitur. Flevit et Jesus Lazarum, quia amabat illum*.[23]

It is imporant to note that in the analysed works, for the reasons discussed below, Ambrose uses classical topoi much more frequently than Jerome. Thus he conforms to Plutarch and Seneca in stating that, in the ultimate perspective, death should not be a reason for grief since it is inevitable and common to all living beings: *mortem non esse lugendam: primum, quia communis est, et cunctis debita*.[24] Furthermore, it liberates us from all carnal and wordly calamities and therefore cannot be an evil: *Ergo si mors carnis et saeculi nos absolvit aerumnis, utique malum non est, quae libertatem restituit, excludit dolorem*.[25] Subsequently, coming one step closer to his pagan predecessors, Ambrose denotes the body as a "prison-house" (*corporeum ergastulum*) from which the soul is eager to escape: *quanto magis anima nostra corporeum istud evadere gestit ergastulum, quae motu aereo libera, nescimus quo vadat, aut unde veniat*.[26] We find a similar expression in Jerome, who speaks of "the burden of the flesh" (*sarcina carnis*) from which Blaesilla's spirit was delivered: *Postquam autem sarcina carnis abjecta, ad suum anima revolavit auctorem*.[27]

This world is a place of misery, concludes Ambrose, and when death comes, there is no question of loss: *Non enim nobis ereptus es, sed periculis*, he says to his deceased brother. *Non vitam amisisti, sed ingruentium acerbitatum formidine caruisti*.[28] For Jerome, too, the world is "darkness" (*tenebrae*): *Faveamus Blaesillae nostrae, quae de tenebris migravit ad lucem*.[29] This leads Ambrose to a sombre thought previously

[20] Given his lifelong preoccupation – but quite atypically for other consolations – it comes as no surprise that Jerome first praises Blaesilla's knowledge of languages: *Si Graece loquentem audiisses, Latine eam nescire putares: si in Romanum sonum lingua se verterat, nihil omnino peregrini sermo redolebat. Jam vero quod in Origine quoque illo Graecia tota miratur, in paucis non dicam mensibus, sed diebus, Hebraeae linguae vicerat difficultates* (Ep. 39.1).

[21] Amb. *De excessu fratris*, I 8; Sen. *Ad Marc*. 7. 2.

[22] Hier. Ep. 39. 5.

[23] Idem. Ep. 39. 2. The reference is to Jn. 11. 35.

[24] Amb. *De excessu fratris*, II 3. Cf. II 4: *Quid enim absurdius, quam ut id quod scias omnibus esse praescriptum, quasi speciale deplores*? Death is for Ambrosius *lex communis* and *naturae consortium*. Plutarch and Seneca abound in such periphrases. Cf. also I 4: [Satyrus] *quod naturae communis fuit reddidit.*

[25] Ibid. II 21. Cf. also chapters II 18-20.

[26] Ibid. II 20.

[27] Hier. Ep. 39. 1.

[28] Amb. *De excessu fratris*, I 31.

[29] Hier. Ep. 39. 3.

expressed by Seneca and Plutarch – that it would be better if we were not born at all. However, he is careful enough to confirm this topos with the authority of Scripture: *Non nasci igitur longe optimum, secundum sancti Salomonis sententiam. Ipsum enim etiam ii qui sibi visi sunt in philosophia ecxellere secuti sunt*.[30]

A number of other instances reveals Ambrose's debt to the pagan consolation writers and their line of thinking. Thus in several places he appeals to reason (*ratio*) and temperance (*modus*): *Cur enim moestitiam tuam non ratio potius quam dies leniat?* Or: *Sit tamen patiens dolor, sit in tristibus modus, qui exigitur in secundis*.[31] Jerome, too, emphasizes this to Paula: *Attamen quod tempore mitigandum est, cur ratione non vincitur?* And: *Detestandae sunt istae lacrymae, plenae sacrilegio, incredulitate plenissimae, quae non habent modum*.[32]

The set of traditional arguments can also be recognized in the well-known motif of loan (*faenus*) employed by Ambrose. Life is only borrowed to us by the Lender (*creditor*) and it is a fault if we refuse repayment: *An si pecuniam neges, culpa est: si hostiam neges, pietas est? (...) Naturae auctor, et necessitudinis creditor fraudari non queat. Itaque quanto uberior fenoris summa, tanto gratior sortis usura*.[33]

An obvious borrowing from Plutarch (or from another common source such as Crantor) is the idea of excessive mourning as something befitting women, something that softens and effeminates man's spirit: *Denique Lyciorum feruntur esse praecepta, quae viros jubeant mulierum vestem induere, si moerori indulgeant; eo quod mollem et effeminatum judicaverint in viro luctum*.[34] Finally, Ambrose approaches Plutarch's and even Seneca's views concerning the cathartic and relieving function of death, but, as we shall see, in a radically different perspective: one should even desire death, he says. Why mourn over other people's death when it is exactly what we should seek for ourselves? (*Deformis est enim ... moerere in alio gravius quod in se ... sit expetendum*).[35] However, what Ambrose has in mind is one's readiness to sacrifice oneself for the faith, for religion, for righteous judgement (*pro fide, pro religione, pro aequitate judicii*), not resignation or suicide. Thus, to draw a strong line of difference, he immediately condemns suicide as cowardice, madness (*amentia*), and the cause of permanent loss of one's ties with the beloved ones: *Mortem non ferentes, et mortem appetentes ... qui quoniam consentaneum naturae suae ferre ac perpeti nequiverunt, contrarium voto incidunt, ut ab his in perpetuum separentur quos sequi desideraverint*.[36]

V

So far our brief survey has suggested that St. Ambrose and St. Jerome formally and generically based their consolatory writings upon those of their pagan predecessors. We

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[30] Amb. *De excessu fratris*, II 30. Cf. also II 5*: Fuisse etiam quidam feruntur populi qui ortus hominum lugerent, obitusque celebrarent*.

[31] Ibid. II 8 and II 11. The term *ratio* here corresponds to Plutarch's *λόγος,* which should not be undestood as what Jerome rendered as *Verbum* in the Vulgate (see footnote 13).

[32] Hier. Ep. 39. 5 and 39. 6.

[33] Amb. *De excessu fratris* I 3. Cf. Sen. *Ad Marc.*: *Mutua accepimus. Usus fructusque noster est, cuius tempus ille arbiter muneris sui temperat*; (...) *Pessimi debitoris est creditori facere convicium*. Cf. also Plut. *Ad Apoll*. 28.? and see footnote 15.

[34] Amb. *De excessu fratris* II 7. Most likely he refers to Plut. *Ad Apoll*. 22: *Τὸν τῶν Λυκίων νομοθέτην φασὶ προστάξαι τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολίταις, ἐπὰν πενθῶσι, γυναικεῖαν ἀμφιεσαμένους ἐσθῆτα πενθεῖν, ἐμφαίνειν βουληθέντα ὅτι γυναικῶδες τὸ πάθος καὶ οὐχ ἁρμόττον ἀνδράσι*.

[35] Amb. *De excessu fratris* II 7.

[36] Ibid. II 11. It should be emphasized that Plutarch, unlike Seneca, does not approve of suicide as a solution to the problem of death.

should now pay attention to another aspect of their literary approach and answer our main research question: what is the crucial ingredient of their consolations that makes them wholly different in character from those of Plutarch and Seneca? In other words, what was the way a Christian author established a distance from the pagan role model he emulated, at least in the case of consolatory literature? At which point a discontinuity in the Crantorian tradition appeared?

The answer is evident: for a Christian writer, no proper consolation could even be conceived of without the notion of the Resurrection. It was the Resurrection of Jesus Christ that gave death a radically new meaning – or, from the Christian point of view, that gave it *any* meaning at all. Thus we find in Ambrose and Jerome an entirely new layer of argumentation and interpretation, one that is certainly expected to appear but at the same time enters a complex interaction with the traditional pagan arguments used by the Christians. This interaction sometimes approaches the point of contradiction, which can be resolved only if we presume that the authors intentionally employ two separate levels of argumentation: 1) the one inherited through the literary consolatory tradition and appealing to the reader's common sense, and 2) the one based on the authority of *fides Christiana* and appealing to the reader's religious convictions. An underlying tension between these two levels appears occasionally as the authors refute the arguments they themselves have posed at other places.

Ambrose epitomizes the attitude a Christian should have towards grief and consolation in the following way: *Quem dolorem non soletur resurrectionis gratia*?[37] What sorrow is not excluded by the belief that nothing perishes in death? *Fleant ergo qui spem resurrectionis habere non possunt*, he concludes.[38] No doubt, death is something we all "owe" (*debitum est mortis*), but not to some abstract philosophical principle; we owe it to Adam, in whom we fell, in whom we were cast out of Paradise, in whom we died (*Lapsus sum in Adam, de paradiso ejectus in Adam, mortuus in Adam*).[39] And Adam means sin, which passed from one man upon all. However, Ambrose discerns three types of death: 1) natural (*naturalis*), 2) penitentiary (*poenalis*), and 3) spiritual (*spiritualis*).[40] Natural death is that by which the spirit is liberated from the body (*cum anima nexu corporis liberatur*) and concerning which all the traditional arguments appealing to one's common sense are fully applicable. It has also a prophylactic function, i.e. it prevents one from more sinning: *nam mihi lucrum est mori, ne plura peccem*. Penitentiary death was given to us by the Lord not so much as punishment, but as a remedy (*non enim pro poena Dominus, sed pro remidio dedit mortem*); it implies dying for sin and becoming alive for God (*una est cum morimur pecatto, Deo vivimus*). Spiritual death means eternal condemnation due to one's sinful condition and implies not only the death of the flesh, but of the soul as well. It is this type of death that is truly regretable and beyond consolation. Obivously, only the second level of argumentation can address the problem of the later two types of death.

Jerome also differentiates between spiritual and natural death and argues that only the former is worth grieving: *Lugeatur mortuus; sed ille quem gehenna suscipit, quem tartarus devorat, in cuius poenam aeternus ignis aestuat*.[41] The cause of both natural

[37] Ibid.II 3.
[38] Ibid. I 70.
[39] Ibid. II 6.
[40] Ibid. II 36-37.
[41] Hier. Ep. 39. 3.

and spiritual death is sin, i.e. Adam's falldown: *Nempe illud quod in Moyse, id est, in Lege veteri sub peccati Adam omnes tenebantur elogio* [*damnatione*]; *et ad inferos descendentes consequenter lacrymae prosequuntur*.[42] For Jerome, too, death carries a prophylactic role: it is good for one to die sooner *ne longo vitae itinere* [al. *longa vita in itinere*] *deviis oberraret anfractibus*.[43]

The death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ have transformed *the very nature of death*. He could have avoided dying, but then death would remain the same as it had been before his coming. Thus his death means life for all those who follow him: *Unius morte mundus redemptus est. Potuit enim Christus non mori, si voluisset; sed neque refugiendam mortem quasi ignavam putavit, neque melius nos quam moriendo servasset. Itaque mors ejus vita est omnium*.[44] In Jerome's wording, *In Jesu vero, id est, in Evangelio, per quem Paradisus est apertus, mortem gaudia prosequuntur*.[45] As a consequence, to mourn over those who die is a mark of infidelity, it reveals one's disobedience and lack of faith: *Non vereris, ne tibi Salvator dicat: Irasceris, Paula, quia tua filia, mea facta est filia? Indignaris de judicio meo, et rebellibus lacrymis facis invidiam possidenti?*[46] Hence Jerome's somewhat harsh reprimand of Paula, which resembles Seneca's reproach of Marcia and her "maternal selfishness": *Si parentem cogito, non reprehendo quod plangis; et Christianam et Monacham, istis nominibus mater excluditur. (...) Detestandae sunt istae lacrymae, plenae sacrilegio, incredulitate plenissimae*.[47] What comes forth as opposed to the previously mentioned appeal to *ratio* is faith: *Sed ego rationem a Christo non exigo*, says Ambrose. *Si ratione convincor, fidem abnuo*.[48]

It is interesting to note that both writers allude to some kind of self-conscious *post mortem* existence. Thus, in Jerome's letter, the deceased Blaesilla addresses her mother in the following way: *Putas me solam? Habeo pro te Mariam Matrem Domini. Multas hic video quas ante nesciebam. O quanto melior est iste comitatus*.[49] However, having said a lot about the separation of the soul from the body (note, for example, Jerome's expression *aliquem exire de corpore*, 39. 3), they both feel the need to emphasize the corporal nature of the resurrection on the Day of Judgement. Ambrose clarifies it in the following way: *Necesse est corpus resurgere, cujus actus expenditur. Quomodo enim in judicium vocabitur anima sine corpore, cum de suo et corporis contubernio ratio praestanda est?*[50] Jerome does not mention it to Paula, but he does it in his letter to Theodora. In order to avoid any possibility of Origenian misinterpretation, he stresses the remaining ontological difference between the deceased and the angels: *Quando dicit, non nubent, neque nubentur, sed erunt sicut Angeli in coelis, non natura et substantia corporum tollitur, sed gloriae magnitudo monstratur. Neque enim scriptum est, erunt Angeli, sed sicut Angeli; ubi similitudo promittitur, veritas denegatur*.[51]

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[42] Ibid. 39. 4.
[43] Ibid. 39. 3.
[44] Amb. *De excessu fratris* II 46. Cf. also II 6: *et sic nobis sicut per unum mors, ita per unum etiam resurrectio.* The first is Adam, the second is Christ.
[45] Hier. Ep. 39. 3.
[46] Ibid. Cf. also Amb. *De excessu fratris* II 26: *Quis enim tu es, qui de tuo merito ante pronunties? Cur praevenire desideras cognitorem? Cur eripis sententiam judicaturo?*
[47] Hier. Ep. 39. 5-6. On the selfishness of the bereaved, but in a non-Christian context, cf. Sen. *Ad Marc.* 12.1 and Plut. *Ad Apoll.* 19.
[48] Amb. *De excessu fratris* II 89.
[49] Hier. Ep. 39. 7. Cf. Amb. *De excessu fratris* I 6. On the other side, in his letter to Theodora, Jerome compares death with falling asleep: *Neque enim mors, sed dormitio et somnus appellatur* (Hier. 75. 1).
[50] Amb. *De excessu fratris* II 65.
[51] Hier. Ep. 75.2. His words are in reference to Matt. 12. 30.

VI

Finally, a question remains why St. Ambrose relies upon the available pagan tradition much more explicitly than St. Jerome. One would expect that the great admirer of Cicero and Demosthenes and the earnest student of Greek and Roman literature would freely reach for that precious heritage.[52] However, Jerome's letter to Paula hardly contains any references to the pagan consolatory tradition. Its frame of reference is exclusively that of Scripture. There are only a few allusions to the concepts of the Crantorian lineage, most of them mentioned in this article. On the other side, as we have seen, Ambrose allows himself significant excursions into the pagan background, even though he ultimately reaches the point of refuting or minimizing most of the arguments of this origin.

The answer could be inferred from Jerome's position in Rome at the time after Blaesilla's death (385-389 A.D.). Jerome had already been the spiritual adviser of her mother Paula when the death of Blaesilla's husband led to her conversion as well. However, the intensity with which Blaesilla carried her austerities brought her a public accusation of fanaticism, particularly when she fell ill and died less than four month after the conversion. Jerome was blaimed for what was perceived as canvassing both the mother and the daughter.[53] Paula, a wealthy Roman aristocrat and Jerome's main supporter, came under attack immediately after the funeral as her sincere adherence to Christianity was brought into question. "When you were carried fainting out of the funeral procession", Jerome writes to Paula, "whispers such as these were audible in the croud: 'Is not this what we have often said? She weeps for her daughter, killed with fasting. How long must we refrain from driving those detestable monks out of Rome? Why do we not stone them or hurl them into the Tiber? They have misled this unhappy lady; that she is not a nun from choice is clear. No heathen mother ever wept for her children as she does for Blaesilla.'"[54]

In other words, Paula's mourning over Blaesilla was publicly perceived as a sign of weekness that could further weaken the position of the Christian community in Rome, most particularly that of Jerome. In this context, the scope of his consolation surpassed the level of personal grief. As they were under attack by the pagan community of Rome, the adviser took care that his disciple regain her spiritual strength. These reasons could have dictated the general tone of the consolation and the apparent absence of the pagan literary elements. If so, this case would illustrate the complexity of the problem concerning the ambiguous attitude of the early Christian writers towards the tradition they emulated. Furthermore, this would lead to the problems of generic analysis, as Frances Young puts it. "Little of the Christian literature of the fourth and fifth centuries escapes influence from the classical traditions of antiquity", says she, "yet little of it can be analysed neatly according to the classical genres. (...) What makes generic analysis difficult is the fact that many different forms are used as vehicles for a single given tradition of Christian argument."[55] The consolations analysed here fit this conclusion perfectly.

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[52] On Jerome's attitude towards the pagan literary heritage see Nenad Ristović, *Starohrišćanski klasicizam. Pozitivni stavovi starohrišćanskih pisaca prema antičkoj knjizi* (Early Christian classicism. The positive attitudes of the early Christian writers toward the antique literature) (Beograd: Čigoja štampa, 2005), 206-214.

[53] See Jerome, *Letters and Select Works. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. 6, ed. Philip Schaff, Henry Wace (Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004), 47-49.

[54] Ibid. 53. The English translation is by W. H. Fremantle.

[55] Frances Young, "Classical genres in Christian guise; Christian genres in classical guise" in: *The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature*, ed. Frances Young, Lewis Ayres, Andrew Louth (Cambridge: CUP, 2004).

Philotheos **9** (2009) 99-127

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Sant'Agostino: non posse peccare

L'intento di questo articolo è quello di mostrare lo sviluppo graduale del pensiero di Agostino nell'affronto costante col modello antropologico, al primo posto, dei neoplatonici. Sebbene la formula: *non posse peccare* sia stata pronunciata durante una polemica con i monaci cristiani ortodossi,[1] le sue radici si trovano nel confronto agostiniano con

[1] Intorno al 426 Agostino scrisse *De gratia et libero arbitrio* diretto ai monaci di Adrumento, tra i quali l'*Epistola* 194, da alcuni di essi letta a Roma, che aveva suscitato il difficile problema del come possano coesistere la grazia e il libero arbitrio. In questo libro Agostino dimostra le due verità: a) necessità della grazia e b) esistenza del libero arbitrio; difende la gratuità della grazia. In seguito, sempre per gli stessi monaci, compose *De correptione et gratia*. Ivi Agostino approfondisce i temi della predestinazione e dell'efficacia della grazia, diversa prima e dopo il peccato originale, distinguendo *adiutorium sine quo non* da *adiutorium quo*. La grazia non detrae il libero arbitrio che nella storia dell'uomo è triplice: la libertà di Adamo gli permetteva di non peccare se avesse voluto; la nostra è schiavizzata dal peccato e quella dei beati in cielo consiste nel non poter peccare (*correpт*. 11. 30- 12, 33). La controversia spinse Agostino a produrre altri due trattati: *De praedestinatione sanctorum* e *De dono perseverantiae*, indirizzati a Prospero ed Ilario, i quali dalla Gallia lo avevano informato delle perturbazioni generatesi nei monaci di Marsiglia (scorrettamente chiamati più tardi semipelagiani) dalle due opere precedenti, che hanno attuato una robusta opposizione ad Agostino. A chiare lettere lui dimostra che tanto l'inizio della fede quanto la perseveranza nel bene sono doni di Dio e non, come affermavano loro, opera solo del libero arbitrio. Per gli approfondimenti: J. AMENGUAL, *La exégesis de* Io. *6, 44-45 en el periodo del las controversias pelagiana y semipelagiana*, Bilbao 1973; M.-F. BERROUARD, *Le devoir de la correction*: BA 71 (1969) 912-914; Id., *Dieu couronne ses dons, non tes mértis*: BA 71 (1969) 860sq.; C. BOYER, *L'*adiutorium sine quo non, *Sa nature et son importance dans la doctrine de saint Augustin: Essais anciens et nouveaux sur la doctrine de saint Augustin*, Milano 1970, 229-244 (=*Doctor Communis* 3 (1960) 5-18); Id., *Le système de saint Augustin sur la grâce. Paraphrase du* De correptione et gratia: *Essais anciens et nouveaux sur la doctrine de saint Augustin*, Milano 1970, 269-293 (=*RechSR* 20 (1930) 481-505). M. CAPPUYNS, *L'origine des* Capitula *d'Orange 529*, in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 6 (1934), pp. 121-142; O. CHADWICK, *John Cassien*, Cambridge 1950; J. CHENE, *Les origines de la controverse semipélagienne*, in *L'année théologique augustinienne* 13 (1953), pp. 56-109; Id., *Que signifiaient* initium fidei *et* affectus credulitatis *pour les semipélagiens*, in *RechSR* 35 (1948), pp. 566-588; Id., *Le semipélagianisme du midi de la Gaule, d'après les lettres de Prosper d'Aquitaine et d'Hilaire à saint Augustin*, in *RechSR* 43 (1955), pp. 321-341; Id., Introduction au *De correptione et gratia*: BA 24 (1962) 211-260; Id., Introduction aux *De praedestinatione sanctorum* et *De dono perseuerantiae*: BA 24 (1962) 385-461; G. FOLLIET, Introduction zu *De correptione et gratia*: CSEL 92 (2000) 129-215; G. FRITZE, "Orange (Deuxième Concile d')", *DThC* XI, coll. 1087-1103; R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, *La grâce efficace et la grâce suffisante selon saint Augustin*: in *Angelicum* 31 (1954) 243-251; A. GOLDBACHER, *S. Aureli Augustini Hipponiensis episcopi epistulae 5* (CSEL 58), Vindobonae/Lipsiae 1923; É. GRIFFE, *La Gaule chrétienne à l'époque romaine* (Vol. II: *L'Église des Gaules au V siècle*, pp. 160-170, 196-201), Paris 1957; V. GROSSI, *L'antropologia cristiana negli scritti di Agostino* (De gratia et libero arbitrio, De correptione et gratia): 4 (1980) 89-113; Id., *Il termine* praedestinatio *tra il 420-435: Dalla linea agostiniana dei "salvati" a quella di "salvati e dannati"* in *Miscellanea di studi agostiniani in onore di P. Agostino Trapè*, *Aug* 25 (1985) 27-64; Id., *Le questioni collaterali del* De correptione et gratia, in *Augustiniana* 41 (1991) 561-565; M. JACQUIN, *À quelle date apparaît le terme 'Semipélagien'?*, in *RSPhTh* 1 (1907), pp. 506-508; Id., *La prédestination d'après saint Augustin*, in *Miscellanea agostiniana* II (Roma 1931), pp. 853-878; S. KOPP, *Entstehungsgeschichte der Schriften "Gnade und freier Wille" und "Zurechtweisung und Gnade"*, in *Aurelius Augustinus. Schriften gegen die Semipe-*

da una parte dei personaggi di spicco della filosofia neoplatonica, Plotino e il suo portavoce Porfirio, e la tradizione giudeo-cristiana che allora prendeva sempre più una propria forma grazie l'aiuto del braccio secolare e di individui talentosi, che riflettevano sulle *Weltanschauungen* pertinenti al mondo ellenistico e quello semitico, fra loro spesso contrastanti.

L'agire umano sul piano etico è strettamente connesso con i presupposti ontologici, almeno come ci suggeriscono i nostri autori. Soltanto rispondendo alla domanda quale è l'origine e lo scopo dell'essere umano, o intellettuale si riesce a valutare le possibilità del loro autodeterminazione. Scrutiamo, dunque, senza pretese di essere esaurienti, i modelli ontologici di filosofia neoplatonica sui quali Agostino si trattenne maggiormente.

1. L'inizio ideale ovvero l'inizio è uguale alla fine

Semplificando (e si sa che ogni semplificazione è mancante in sé), ma volendo allo stesso tempo illustrare in una frase l'idea essenziale dell'ontologia greca, cito un frammento di Eraclito di Efeso:

> Inizio e fine coincidono sulla circonferenza del cerchio (ξυνὸν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ πέρας ἐπὶ κύκλου περιφερείας).[2]

In altre parole, l'essere *è*, ed è racchiuso in sè. Il dinamismo o la problematizzazione della certezza dell'essere è qualcosa di fittizio: *La via in su e la via in giù sono una e la stessa*.[3] Parmenide, afferrando correttamente che l'essere è uno e tutto, dice che si rimane sempre in un ciclo.[4] Con gli eleati siamo giunti a un monismo assoluto, nel cui orizzonte l'Essere è senza principio né fine, e di conseguenza non ammette qualsiasii fenomeno di movimento o metamorfosi.[5] Passando ai sistemi non-monistici, i quali permettono il movimento e divenire, tuttavia si rimane sempre dentro la stessa logica: gli elementi, ossia le radici di tutte le cose (Empedoclo), gli atomi (Leucippo, Democrito, Epicuro) e le omeomerie (Anassagora) sono eterni. Sentenza del Simplicio recita:

> Del nascere e del perire i Greci non hanno una giusta concezione, perché nessuna cosa nasce né perisce, ma da cose esistenti [ogni cosa] si compone e si separa. E cosí dovrebbero propriamente chiamare il nascere comporsi, il perire separarsi...[6] Anassagora, figlio di Egesibulo, di Clazomene, ha detto che le omeomerie sono principi delle cose. Gli sembrava un problema del tutto irresolubile che qualcosa potesse prodursi dal non essere e distruggersi nel non essere.[7]

Melisso di Samo, filosofo del IV secolo a. C., formulò infatti per primo il principio che poi è stato retto in latino con: *ex nihilo nihil fit.* Il suo primo *fr*. dice: οὐδαμὰ ἂν γένοιτο οὐδὲν ἐκ μηδενός. Questo principio regnerà sovrano su tutta la filosofia greca. Solo con il cristianesimo, non prima con i greci, dopo che è subentrata l'ontologia della *voluntas Dei*, acquista senso la domanda: "Perché l'essere e non piuttosto il nulla?".

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lagianer, pp. 30-57, Würzburg 1954; E. LAMIRANDE, *Correptio*: BA 32 (1965), 722sq.; H. I. MARROU, *Jean Cassien à Marseille*, in *RMAL* 1 (1945), pp. 5-26; G. MORIN, *Lettres inédites de s. Augustin et du prêtre Januarien dans l'affaire des moines d'Adrumète*: in *RB* 18 (1901) 241-256; K. RAHNER, *Augustin und der Semipelagianismus*, in *ZKTh* 62 (1938), pp. 171-196; A. SAGE, *Les deux temps de grâce,* in *REAug* 7 (1961) 209-230; G. TIBILETTI, *Polemiche in Africa contro i teologi Provenzali*, in *Augustinianum* 26 (1986), pp. 499-517; Id., *Rassegna di studi e testi sui "semipelagiani"*, in *Augustinianum* 25 (1985), pp. 507-522; F. WÖRTER, *Beiträge zur Dogmengeschichte des Semipelagianismus*, Münster 1899.

[2] *fr*. 103.
[3] *fr*. 60.
[4] *fr*. 5.
[5] *fr*. 7/8. Cf. ARISTOTELE, *met*. 1, 3, 10-12, 984a 17-b1.
[6] *phys. fr*. 17 (SIMPL. *phys.* 163, 18).
[7] *testim. fr*. 46 (ARIST. *de gen. corr.* 314a, 18).

L'essere non conosce nascita; esso *è*, ed *è* in modo *necessario*: ὃ γὰρ παντί τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχει, τοῦτο ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν.[8] Come non può porre la domanda della sua esistenza, è incatenato da Ananke (Ἀνανγκαίη = Ἀνάνγκη, lat. *Necessitas*), dea che è rimasta sempre priva di un vero culto,[9] essendo un essere inflessibile e rigido, ma che allo stesso tempo dirige tutte le cose, come celesti così quelle che riguardano i fatti particolari dei singoli uomini. Anche gli dèi non lottano contro Ananke, si legge in Suida.[10] Tutti gli avvenimenti si giocano sullo sfondo del ciclo immutabile ed eternamente ritornante della natura. L'intero essere, le cose e gli enti in esso contenuti sono regolati da una legge immanente.[11] Tale legge, personificata da Ananke,[12] dirigeva lo susseguirsi dei mondi: dopo la disgregazione di un universo, nasceva un altro e così via in infinito. La fine ritorna all'inizio. Questa è, del resto, l'idea del tempo ciclico che così tanto disturbò l'anima di Nietzsche.

Che posto occupa l'uomo in un universo di codesta specie? Per non chiamare in causa sempre gli stessi personaggi, mi rifaccio alle parole di Pindaro, un quasi contemporaneo di Eraclito, per cui αἰών umano è limitato. L'uomo è mortale; dire l'uomo o dire mortale, per i greci antichi era una e stessa cosa: "Non desiderare, cara anima mia, la vita eterna, ma cerca quello che ti sta a portata di mano."[13] Da uomo si aspetta di essere ciò che *è*, e lui è mortale. Suo infatti αἰών è θανατὸς αἰών.[14] L'arcaico αἰών non significa l'eterno. Al contrario, esso, secondo Omero è limitato. Finché l'uomo vive, è presente anche il suo αἰών. La ψυχή e l'αἰών lo abbandonano nel momento della morte.[15] Achille non crede nell'immortalità personale, ma nell'immortalità del nome, della fama che resterà impressa nella memoria della sua gente: "Se qui resto a pugnar sotto Troia, al patrio lido m'è tolto il ritornar, ma d'immortale gloria l'acquisto mi farò."[16]

Gli eroi spartani superavano la morte individuale grazie ai racconti delle loro imprese: *I nostri discendenti narrano dei nostri gesti, quindi siamo vivi*.[17] Come l'anima

[8] Cf. SUIDA, *lex. alpha*, 1827.

[9] Nel mondo romano. In Corinto invece era eretto un tempio che essa condivideva con la Violenza, ma in cui nessuno entrava (PAUS. *Graec. descript*. 2, 4, 7).

[10] *lex. alpha*, 1828: ἀνάγκη οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

[11] Cf. *l'Inno a Zeus* dello stoico Cleante (III sec. a. C) che prega in questo modo: "O più glorioso degli immortali, sotto mille nomi sempre onnipotente, Zeus, signore della natura, che con la legge governi ogni cosa, salve". Non sostengo la tesi tradizionale, di E. ZELLER, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, VI Aufl., Leipzig 1919, Bd. I, 1, p. 53s., secondo la quale il pensiero presocratico resta avvolto in riflessioni immediate naturalistiche, ma prediligo il procedimento di K. JOËL, *Der Ursprung der Naturphilosophie aus dem Geiste der Mystik*, Diederichs, Jena 1906, spec. p. 117ss. che sostenne che il primo pensiero greco è tutto impregnato del problema teologico. "I primi teologi concepiscono chiaramente l'unità del tutto, vale a dire che la Natura non è senza e fuori di Dio e Dio non è fuori della Natura, ma il principio immanente della sua vita, del suo continuo e instancabile processo come un Tutto unitario (*als Ganze, als Einheit*). In questi tre elementi allora, il Mondo, l'Anima e Dio, è Dio il principale che sta al principio dell'Essere e della Vita e la realtà della Natura, come molteplicità di esseri raccolta in un tutto e molteplicità di fenomeni unificata nella Vita universale, è qualcosa di condizionato e di esplicato. La comprensione del Divino diventa così il presupposto della comprensione della Natura" (CORNELIO FABRO, *L'Anima. Introduzione al problema dell'uomo*, a cura di C. FERRARO, *EDIVI*, Roma [2]2005, p. 151).

[12] PLAT. *resp*. 10, 616c; *Tim*. 48a.

[13] *Pyth*. 3, 72.

[14] *Nem*. 3, 75.

[15] *Il*. 16, 453; Ib. 5, 685; *Od*. 7, 224. Su questo tema si veda: P. JEVREMOVIĆ, *Herakliov 52. fragment*, in *Luča*, Nikšić 2000, pp. 3-22.

[16] *Il*. 9, 415 f.

[17] Per le idee principali sull'immortalità nel pensiero greco: W. JAEGER, *The Greek Ideas of Immortality*. Ingersoll Lecture On the Immortality of Man, Harvard University, January 1959, in *HThR* 52 (1959), 135-147. Le opinioni dei presocratici sull'anima ci sono state conservate da Aristotele (*de an*. I), dai dossografi e dai frammenti delle loro opere perdute.

era uguagliata alla vita corporea – l'uomo era tutt'uno – il nome immortale rappresentava valore massimo. Soltanto con Platone, non con Socrate,[18] l'immortalità personale ottiene un sostrato ontologico. Gli antichi ponevano l'immortalità in qualcosa di duraturo, vale a dire in nome che rimaneva sulle labbra dei discendenti, Platone invece lo pose in un ente invisibile, non composto, in una sostanza.[19] Il corpo si può decomporre, ma l'anima che è semplice non può perire. Il nome, una volta spezzata la catena (di coloro che lo ripetono), svanisce. L'anima che è elemento, atomo, non si può dividere. Può soltanto migrare da un corpo ad un altro.[20] Essa è *hypokeimenon* della verità celeste, irremovibile. È della stessa natura come le cose celesti, cioè è affine all'Eterno. Da Platone incomincia la storia sulla odissea dell'anima. L'anima immortale, grazie la sua originalità – non avendo l'inizio – migrava da un corpo ad un altro per poter raggiungere suo stato primordiale.[21] Ivi Platone non si mostrerà tanto chiaro e sarà criticato da Agostino, come vedremo in seguito.

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[18] Seguo ormai la classica ricostruzione di E. ROHDE, *Psyche. Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen*, (1890–1894, zweite Auflage 1898). G. LA MAGNA, il curatore del *Gorgia* di Platone (Milano 1942, p. 21), scrive che "il mito finale [del *Gorgia*] rivela la profonda convinzione [di Platone] che l'anima è immortale, e questa convinzione non era certo di Socrate." Infatti, la dottrina esposta nel *Fedone*, e nel *Gorgia* è interamente platonica e che nulla ha a che fare col Socrate storico. Cosa abbia pensato Socrate su questo argomento si vede da un brano della sua Apologia (40cd): "La morte, infatti, è una di queste due cose: o è come non essere nulla e il morto non ha alcuna consapevolezza di nulla, oppure, secondo quel che si dice, la morte è un cambiamento e, per così dire, una migrazione dell'anima da questa sede, quaggiù, verso un altro luogo. Ora, se la morte è non avere alcuna coscienza, ma come un sonno, quando uno, dormendo, non vede più nemmeno un sogno, la morte può essere un meraviglioso guadagno".

[19] Nel *Fedone,* 77a-77b; 78c- 80c Platone insiste sulla semplicità dell'anima: ciò che ha una struttura composta è soggetto a decomposizione. Non composte siano soprattutto le cose che sono sempre identiche e che permangono sempre nella medesima condizione. Composte invece sono sempre soggette a variazione e non permangono mai nella medesima condizione. Mentre cose mutevoli si possono percepire con i sensi corporei, quelle, invece, che sono immutabili si possano cogliere solo con la mente, perché sono invisibili. L'anima è in sommo grado simile a ciò che è divino, immortale, intelligibile, uniforme, indissolubile, sempre identico a se medesimo, mentre il corpo è in sommo grado simile a ciò che è umano, mortale, multiforme, dissolubile e mai identico a se medesimo. Un altro argomento per provare l'immortalità dell'anima lo troviamo nel *Fedro* 245c-246d dove essa si fonda sul movimento eterno e autonomo. Soltanto ciò che muove se stesso non cessa mai di muoversi, in quanto non lascia mai se stesso, ed è fonte e principio di movimento anche per le altre cose che si muovono. Il Principio non è generato da nulla, perché se il principio si generasse da qualcosa, non sarebbe più un principio. E poiché non è generato, è necessario che sia anche incorruttibile. Secondo una nuova concezione aristotelica la nozione dell'incorporeo faceva un notevole passo in avanti, essendo l'anima definita non più una sostanza fisica sottile come nei presocratici, ma come atto e forma di un corpo che è suo strumento nell'operare. Inoltre, la parte superiore dell'anima che è il principio intellettivo, è "qualcosa di divino e viene dal di fuori" (*de gen. an*. 2, 3, 736b, 27 s.).

[20] *Menone* 81ac: Sacerdoti e sacerdotesse, esperti nelle cose divine, come anche Pindaro, e molti degli altri poeti che avevano divina ispirazione "affermano che l'anima dell'uomo è immortale, e che talora termina la vita terrena... e talora di nuovo rinasce, ma che non perisce mai: per queste ragioni bisogna vivere la vita nel modo più sano possibile... E poiché, dunque, l'anima è immortale ed è più volte rinata, e poiché ha veduto tutte le cose, e quelle di questo mondo e quelle dell'Ade, non vi è nulla che non abbia imparato; sicché non è cosa sorprendente che essa sia capace di ricordarsi e intorno alla virtù e intorno alle altre cose che anche in precedenza sapeva".

[21] Cf. *resp*. 10, 614d-620d. Da un lato Platone con la teoria della metempsicosi tenta di risolvere il problema epistemologico e dall'altro, stabilire i presupposi della vita morale, ove le sue gesta lo collegano al sommo bene e si armonizzano con la giustizia universale (cf. *resp*. 608c-609b ss). Queste riflessioni sono raccontate nel mito di Er, che chiude la *Repubblica*. Er era un guerriero morto in battaglia, ma clinicamente morto, avremmo detto oggi; poco prima del rogo funebre, il corpo esanime si risvegliò e prese a narrare cosa aveva visto. Dopo eser uscita dal corpo, l'anima arrivò nel mondo delle idee, dove vi erano quattro voragini, due in cielo e due in terra; in mezzo sedevano dei giudici che, giudicata ogni anima, indirizzavano i giusti per la voragine destra del cielo e gli ingiusti per quella sinistra della terra; le anime sono destinate ad un viaggio di mille anni in cielo o sottoterra. Il viaggio sotterraneo era un viaggio di espiazione, nel quale ogni ingiustizia com-

Come Platone prese le idee orfico-pitagoriche, e le sviluppò, così i suoi concetti saranno messi sotto la lente dei posteri, medioplatonici e neoplatonici. Accanto loro, le nozioni platoniche vengono riprese nell'ermetismo, la gnosi e il manicheismo. Proprio queste teorie del platonismo ermetico e gnostico hanno incitato la polemica dei primi scrittori cristiani contro la concezione della filosofia pagana sull'anima, e non la corrente del platonismo "ufficiale".[22] In tutta questa elaborazione, piuttosto confusa, si possono evidenziare alcuni punti di questa concezione dell'anima:

a) l'anima è una scintilla divina, parte della sua stessa sostanza e quindi consustanziale con dio;
b) inizialmente beata nelle sfere celesti, precipitò nella materia;
c) legata al corpo per punizione, dovrebbe purificarsi dal male grazie al suo scomodo e penoso compagno;
d) dopo la purificazione ripetuta, ritorna alla sua patria primordiale.[23]

Nel platonismo filosofico il nucleo della riflessione pone il problema del rapporto tra Uno e pluralità. Per Plotino e Proclo, questa relazione si armonizza nel cielo. Si parla dei puri rapporti concettuali all'interno del mondo intelligibile. Così il molteplice viene superato nell'Uno e nell'unità in cui si raduna l'insieme dell'essere. Infatti, l'esistenza dell'Uno è *condicio sine qua non* della molteplicità. I punti cruciali di simile elaborazione sarebbero:

1) Nell'essere globale esiste una dipendenza causale e gerarchia degli esseri,[24] che nella logica medioevale verrà astrattizzata e denominata l'*Albero di Porfirio* (*scala praedicamentalis*).
2) L'anima si trova tra l'eternità ed il tempo, e tra unità e molteplicità. Collega il mondo intelligibile con il mondo materiale.[25]
3) L'anima, una volta rivolta verso il basso,[26] è colei che è presente in tutto il mondo e tutti

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messa in vita veniva pagata con dolori dieci volte tanti quanti quelli provocati. Con una misura analoga le azioni giuste venivano compensate. "Non sarà – dice Platone – il demone a scegliere voi, ma sceglierete voi il demone. E il primo tratto a sorte scelga primo la vita nella quale poi dovrà di necessità essere legato. La virtù non ha padrone: secondo che ciascuno la onora o la dispregia, avrà più o meno di lei. La colpa è di chi sceglie: Dio non ne ha colpa." Le anime erano poi condotte sulle rive di un fiume. Chi beveva dimenticava completamente la vita precedente, mentre i filosofi, guidati dalla ragione, non bevevano: in tal modo, mantenevano il ricordo, solo un po' attenuato, del mondo delle idee, da rievocare poi durante la nuova vita grazie agli studi. Con questo mito Platone riassume in breve il suo pensiero: il mondo sensibile è solo un riflesso del mondo delle idee che solo il filosofo con lo studio e la cogitazione può arrivare a contemplare; l'idea massima è l'idea del bene in sé che illumina tutte le altre cose; l'uomo è formato da due entità distinte: il corpo mortale, e l'anima immortale. La conoscenza è, quindi, reminiscenza del tempo passato durante il quale sono state contemplate le idee.

[22] Cf. A. J. FESTUGIERE, *La révélation d'Hermès Trimégiste*, III: *Les doctrines de l'âme*, coll. Études bibliques, Gabalda, Paris 1953.

[23] A. J. FESTUGIERE, *La révélation*. p. 41.

[24] Uno schema grafico della gerarchia degli esseri in E. R. DODDS, *Proclus. The Elements of Theology*, Oxford 1932, p. 282.

[25] PROCLO, *elem. teol*. prop. 190; cf. anche il *Tim*. 35a di Platone.

[26] Plotino raccoglie diverse spiegazioni sulla caduta dell'anima, che non si contraddicono fra loro: "la semina delle anime nel divenire; la loro discesa destinata al perfezionamento dell'universo; la punizione; la caverna; la necessità e la libertà... la dimora nel corpo come in una cosa cattiva; e poi, l'esilio dal dio, di cui parla Empedocle; il vagabondaggio; la colpa cui segue il castigo... il riposo nella fuga, di cui parla Eraclito... la discesa volontaria e la discesa involontaria. Tutto ciò che va verso il peggio è involontario, ma poiché ci si muove con azione propria, si può dire che il male è il castigo per le azioni compiute. Ma poiché questo patire e questo agire sono inellutabili per l'anima secondo una legge eterna della natura, poiché ogni evento che le accada in questa sua discesa finisce per essere utile a qualche altro essere in quanto discese da una regione superiore, chi dicesse che è Dio che l'ha inviata giù non sarebbe in contrasto... Anche le ultime conseguenze devono risalire tutte a un primo Principio, anche se gli esseri intermedi sono molti" (*enn*. 4, 8, 5).

gli esseri corporei, e li muove ordinatamente. Di conseguenza, essa è non solo indipendente dal corpo e immortale, ma preesistente ad esso di cui è principio motore,[27] e le perfezioni dell'anima sono esistite prima di quelle dei corpi.

4) Liberandosi da tutto ciò che è corporeo, si unisce con il cielo da cui è calata. In poche parole, l'Essere è uno e circondato. Sembra che esso con questo processo ciclico diventi autocosciente, l'idea che sarà estremizzata nell'idealismo classico tedesco.

I portavoci di Platone furono anche i pensatori cristiani. Tra loro si disgiunge in primo luogo il discepolo di Ammonio Sacca,[28] Origene. Nel primo libro di *De principiis* lui scrive:

> E come una sola cosa è la fine di tutto, così dobbiamo intendere uno solo l'inizio di tutto; e come una sola cosa è la fine di molteplici cose, così da un solo inizio sono derivate cose varie e differenti, che di nuovo per la bontà di Dio, la soggezione a Cristo e l'unità dello Spirito santo sono riportate ad una sola fine, che è simile all'inizio.[29]

Commentando questo brano Simonetti[30] conferma che la nozione: inizio = fine è un luogo appartenente a tutta la filosofia greca e che l'applicazione del motto aristotelico-stoico in Origene dipende in certa forma dal diverso modo in cui si intende la caduta degli esseri razionali. Origene la colloca nella visione dell'adempimento del disegno divino (cf. *princ*. 3,5,7). Questa dottrina altresì è fondata sulla base dei testi cristiani, per es. Ep. di Barnaba, 6, 13: *Ecco, io faccio le cose ultime come le cose prime*; dell'Apoc. 22, 13: *Io sono l'Alfa e l'Omega*; e della 1 Cor. 15, 28: *Dio sarà tutto in tutti*. Secondo la Prinzivalli, ivi si tratta di una polemica antignostica, che aspira di negare la infinità del male, che sarà sconfitto dalla onnipotenza divina. La fine corrisponde all'inizio, nel senso di una totale guarigione dagli effetti del peccato.[31] Tra l'altro, Origene spiega in chiave platonica il destino diverso degli uomini con la diversa gravità del peccato che hanno commesso quando ancora erano puri intelletti ed avevano la stessa identica potenzialità. Infatti il corpo è assunto in base ai meriti e demeriti antecedenti la nascita.[32] La sua intenzione è limpidamente apologetica: nessuno si può lamentare per il proprio destino perché si è distaccato liberamente da Dio, che come un buon padre vuole educarlo e riportarlo a sé.[33] Anche questa esposizione è antignostica: infatti, gli gnostici obiettavano che non esiste nessuna regola secondo la quale uno nasce ricco o povero, sano o malato ecc., e per questo concludevano che in realtà non esiste il libero arbitrio, ma tutto è condizionato dalla rottura nella sfera pleromatica. Secondo i sistemi binari gnostici, *psichici* e *ilici* sono destinati alla perdizione, *pneumatici* alla riconciliazione finale, mentre nei sistemi trinari, solamente *psichici* hanno la possibilità di decidere liberamente a proposito della loro sorte. I primi "che hanno introdotto le nature" (τὰς φύσεις εἰσαγόντων) nell'ambito cristiano erano proprio gnostici.[34] Loro difatti distinguevano gli uomini spirituali, dotati di seme

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[27] PLATONE, *leg*. 896c ss.

[28] Amonio fu anche il maestro di Plotino. Hegel, nella sua *Storia della filosofia*, si è meravigliato come uno che faceva mestiere di portatore di sacchi (molti dubitano sulla veridicità di questa notizia giuntaci dal vescovo Teodoreto), poteva occuparsi di filosofia.

[29] *princ*. 1, 6, 2.

[30] In Origene, *I Principi*, M. SIMONETTI ed., UTET, Torino 1968, pp. 201-202.

[31] E. PRINZIVALLI, voce *Apocatastasi*, in *Origene. Dizionario*, a cura di A. MONACI-CASTAGNO, Roma 2000, pp. 26-28. Su questo argomento si veda un breve riassunto di ROSARIO SCOGNAMIGLIO, *Il* De opifico hominis: *eredità filoniana e origeniana nell'antropologia del Nisseno,* in *Origene e l'alessandrinismo cappadoce (III-IV secolo)*: atti del 5. Convegno di Gruppo italiano di ricerca su Origene e la tradizione alessandrina: Bari, 20-22 settembre 2000, pp.115-138, ivi 124-125.

[32] *princ*. 2, 8, 4; 3, 3, 5-6.

[33] *princ*. 1, 7, 4.

[34] *com. Io.* 20, 8.

divino, e psichici, privi di questa scintilla divina. Disgraziatamente, la sorte di questa riflessione origeniana, bene intenzionata, è stata infelice.[35] Come è noto, la forma dell'origenismo disturbante fu condannata in 15 capitoli al Quinto concilio ecumenico del 553.

2. La controversia sulla prima antropologia agostiniana

La protologia del primo Agostino fu l'argomento poco evidenziato da parte degli studiosi della prima metà del vigesimo secolo. Si discuteva innanzitutto sulle probabili fonti dalle quali Agostino aveva attinto le sue idee cardinali. Gli scienziati ponevano l'accento su diversi autori sia latini come Cicerone, Varrone, Mario Vittorino, Ambrogio sia orientali: Porfirio, Plotino, Origene. La controversia invece sull'origine dell'uomo e della sua anima ebbe inizio con la ricerca condotta dal gesuita Robert J. O'Connell, della Fordham University, iniziata nel 1968 con la pubblicazione del libro: *St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A. D. 386-391*,[36] che ha indicato Plotino come principale fonte del giovane Agostino. Una revisione assai riuscita del suo studio è quella di Richard Penaskovic,[37] che nella prima parte riporta le idee basilari di O'Connell e nella seconda espone le critiche altrui. Alla fine dà il suo parere positivo sull'opera di O'Connell, senza tuttavia nominare gli studiosi schierati dalla sua parte.[38]

O'Connell dunque afferma che l'influsso decisivo sul giovane Agostino ebbe in primo luogo Plotino.[39] Secondo lui, per comprendere la vera natura di questa influenza non

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[35] Cf. H. CROUZEL, *Origenismo*, in *Dizionario patristico e di antichità cristiane*, ANGELO DI BERARDINO ed., vol. II, Marietti, Casale Monferrato 1984, col. 2533-2538; Id., *Origene e l'origenismo: le condanne di Origene*, XIV Incontro di studiosi dell'antichità cristiana sul tema: *L'origenismo: apologie e polemiche intorno ad Origene*, in *Augustinianum*, vol. 26 (1986), pp. 295-303; Id., *Origene*, Borla, Roma 1986.

[36] R. J. O'CONNELL, *St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A. D. 386-391*, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1968. Su questa stessa problematica sono poi usciti, del medesimo autore: *St. Augustine's Confessions: The Odyssey of Soul,* Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1969; *Augustine's Rejection of the Fall of the Soul*, *AugStud,* 4 (1973) 1-32; *Art and the Christian Intelligence in St. Augustine,* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1978; *The Enneads and St. Augustine's Image Of Happiness*, in *Vig. Chr.* 17 (1963) 129-164; *The Human Being as 'Fallen Soul' in St. Augustine's* De Trinitate, in *Mediaevalia*, 4 (1978) 33-58. Anche nel *The Origin of the Soul in St. Augustine's Later Works*, New York, Fordham University Press, 1987, fa i forti riferimenti al primo Agostino e tra l'altro afferma: "My interpretation of Augustine's theory of the human condition compelled me to conclude that his early works enshrined a view of man as 'fallen soul' that this view of our journey through 'this' life persisted in his *Confessions*" (p. 2).

[37] R. PENASKOVIC, *The Fall of the Soul in Saint Augustine: A Quaestio Disputata*, in *AugStud* 17 (1986) 135-146.

[38] La nuova prospettiva fu accolta non solo da Penaskovic, ma da numerosi altri studiosi. Tra coloro che sostenevano l'influsso di Plotino è da ricordare J. PATOUT BURNS, *St. Augustine: The Original Condition of Humanity*, *Studia Patristica*, 22, (1989) 219-222; Tra questi autori spicca R. J. TESKE, *St. Augustine's View of the Original Human Condition*., e *Spirituals and Spiritual Interpretation*. Contemporaneamente ma indipendentemente, quando O'Connell polemizzava con Gilson (nel suo contributo *The Fall of the Soul in the Confessions*, in *Congresso internazionale su s. Agostino nel XVI centenario della conversione*, Roma, 15-20 settembre 1986, Atti II Sezioni di studio II-IV, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Roma 1987, pp. 45-58), VITTORINO GROSSI, nel suo saggio intitolato *A proposito dei testi agostiniani sulla libertà*, stampato nello stesso volume, pp. 279-294, condivise la sua opinione: "La libertà sarebbe da comprendere all'interno dello schema platonico, in particolare plotiniano, della caduta dell'anima dalle realtà eterne nel temporale. Essa pertanto sarebbe in concreto quel 'defluxit angelus, defluxit anima hominis' delle *Confessioni* (XIII, 3) dall 'aeternitas tua' o 'coelum coeli' (libri IV; XII e XIII), dissoltasi nel tempo (il 'dissilui in tempora' del libro XI). Il temporale s'identifica col *saeculum* in cui l'anima, appesantita dalla ignoranza, dalla concupiscenza, dal corpo mortale brama onori e voluttà. Essa, per essere liberata da tali diuturne *affectiones,* abbisogna di un aiuto che la riporti all'unità perduta, alla *domus aetema,* cioè alla capacità di muoversi nel mondo delle realtà durature. Agostino indica tale aiuto nel Cristo o nella sua grazia che dice la medesima cosa, per consentire all'anima quelle *exercitationes* che la riportino alla perduta unità originaria" pp. 283-284.

[39] Tra coloro che accentuavano l'influsso di Plotino si distinse particolarmente P. ALFARIC, *L'évolution intellectuelle de Saint Augustin: Du manichéisme au néoplatonisme,* Nancy-Paris 1918.

basta verificare solo i paralleli testuali, ma si deve usare il metodo basato sulla ricerca e il confronto delle strutture concettuali e lessicali, considerando "the entire pattern of thought-drive, image, language-pattern and emotional tone having both shape and movement".[40]

I testi plotiniani che O'Connell esamina, e per i quali egli è convinto che Agostino li abbia letti e utilizzati sono *Enneadi*: 3, 7 *L'eternità e il tempo* (περὶ αἰῶνος καὶ χρόνου); 4, 3-5 *Problemi sull'anima* (περὶ ψυχῆς ἀποριῶν δεύτερον); 4, 8 *La discesa dell'anima nei corpi* (περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ σώματα καθόδου τῆς ψυχῆς); 5, 8 *Il Bello intelligibile* (περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ κάλλους). Per spiegare la relazione tra Creatore e creatura, Agostino usa l'idea plotiniana di partecipazione, realizzata attraverso l'onnipresenza.[41] L'anima individuale, secondo Plotino e discutibilmente secondo Agostino, è una parte dell'anima universale,[42] che è caduta nel mondo sensibile e non si ricorda del suo vero stato e della sua provenienza. Solo ricordandosi della sua origine può rivolgersi alle prime ipostasi. La posizione dell'anima è intermedia, essa si trova tra intelligibile e sensibile. Le sue opzioni sono due: o sceglie di aderire al sensibile, e allora si appesantisce, vi rimane impastoiata; oppure sceglie la via dell'unificazione e del ritorno verso l'intelligibile. Per entrambi i pensatori la funzione della memoria è cruciale. Poiché l'anima si accorge dell'Uno, non è quindi caduta in senso assoluto e definitivo, vale a dire che non si può più elevare. Ciò significa che c'è una differenza tra le anime secondo la gravità della loro caducità. Per il mondo corporeo, come da un punto di vista negativo, Agostino adopera il termine *nihil*, Plotino invece μὴ ὄν. Secondo Plotino, tendendo verso se stessa, l'anima cade nel non-essere, cioè nella materia, che è ultimo confine dell'essere, perché non può mai arrivare al non-essere assoluto.[43] Secondo Agostino, la causa della caduta si trova nella superbia, cioè nel movimento dell'anima verso se stessa.[44]

La maggioranza degli studiosi moderni segue la linea di O'Connell, secondo la quale il primo Agostino fu fortemente influenzato da Plotino. Ci sono tanti paralleli che sono effetivamente innegabili. R. J. Teske ha avuto il merito di averne segnalato che die-

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[40] R. PENASKOVIC, *The Fall of the Soul*, p. 137. Lo stesso nell'O'CONNELL, *Early Theory*, pp. 7-13.

[41] Il parallelo è tra *conf.* 7, 21, 27 e *enn*. 6, 4 -5. Cf. O'CONNELL, *Early Theory*, p. 48.

[42] R. J. TESKE, *St. Augustine's View*, p. 143 ci offre una brillante spiegazione dal secolo IX di Rotramno di Corbie dove egli cita Macario Scoto: "He [Augustine] did not hold one soul; he did not hold many souls. He held what he stated in the second place, that is, that the soul is one and many. Macarius was referring to *De quantitate animae* XXXII, 69, a text virtually contemporary with *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*. There Augustine indicates that he cannot say that the sous is simply one or that it is simply many; rather he implies that it is one and many at the same time". Riguardo al testo di Ratramno: Ratramne de Corbie, *Liber de anima ad Odonem Bellovacensem*, texte inédit publié par D. C. LAMBOT, O. S. B. *Analecta Mediaevalia Namurcensia* 2 (Namur: Godenne; Lille: Giard, 1951), p. 17.

[43] Cf. *enn.* 6, 9, 11; 6, 7, 23. Ivi Plotino segue Platone che distingueva i tre principi eterni, ovvero metafisici, rappresentati da Dio, dalle idee e dalla materia.

[44] R. PENASKOVIC, *The Fall of the Soul*, p. 139. Da parte sua O'Connell si esprime in questo modo: "One factor in the breakdown alluded to may well be this: Augustine's earlier evaluation of the contemplative life seems strongly indebted to the Plotinian view of man as soul, 'fallen' into the world of body, sense, and time. The decade from A.D. 391 onward may well have brought him to face more squarely some of the difficulties in this view. The Cassiciacum dialogues regularly stress the side of this doctrine that incriminates body and sense. But as Augustine's early thought develops, bringing him closer lo the synthesis enclosed in the *De Vera Religione* (A.D. 390), he focuses more and more firmly on that facet of the fall-teaching which attributes the fall to the soul's having turned away from 'eternity' and into 'time': the soul, cleaving to God in contemplative beatitude, enjoyed a participation of God's own eternity; but then, yielding to a "restlessness" within itself, it became "curious" to experience the power of its own activity upon the temporal world of sense realities. Its plunge into the temporal is at the same time a plunge into action; the entire restless sphere of action, then, as contrasted with the 'rest' of contemplation, is logically speaking the sphere of the 'fallen'" (R. J. O'CONNELL, *Action and Contemplation* in *Augustine. A Collection of critical Essays*, a cura di R. A. MARKUS, New York 1972, pp. 38-58, qui pp. 42-43).

tro alla dottrina agostiniana del peccato originale, ovverosia che per colpa della prima anima sono ree tutte le altre, si trova l'identificazione plotiniana delle molte anime con l'una. Altri paralleli osservati da Teske sarebbero: la felicità originaria, come libertà dalle preoccupazioni e dalle fatiche; la trasparenza assoluta degli esseri spirituali: non c'è nulla di nascosto fra loro.[45] Quest'ultima osservazione sembra tuttavia derivare da O'Connell, anche se Teske non lo indica come sua fonte.[46]

I principali paralleli esposti da O'Connell sarebbero i seguenti: 1) L'anima occupa il posto medio: *enn.* 4, 8 (μέση τάξις) *medietas animi* corisponderebbe a *Gn. c. man*. 2, 12; l'anima è ordinata in *meditullio quodam rerum*; essa poi deve governare le parti più basse. 2) Plotino dice che i corpi non erano del tutto (πάμπαν) corpi; Agostino usa i termini *coeleste*, *perspicuum*, *simplex*; 3) la descrizione della *vita mortalis* è comune; causa della caduta è τόλμα, termine che per i latini equivale a *superbia*. Questo termine acquista poi le varie sfumature, avvicinandosi a *cupiditas*. Secondo O'Connell la triade *pride*, *concupiscence* e *curiositas* è comune ai nostri autori.[47]

La reazione sulla caduta dell'anima era molto sentita da una recente corrente storiografica. Ernest Fortin tirò in ballo il fatto che Agostino continuava ad attingere da autori classici latini, in particolare da Cicerone. Robert P. Russel rifiutò la tesi della caduta dell'anima, perché lo stesso Agostino non fa nessun riferimento ad essa nelle *Retractationes*.[48] Un più debole attacco venne da Mary T. Clark che accusò O'Connell di leggere il primo Agostino attraverso le *Enneadi* 6, 4-5.[49] Gerald J. P. O'Daly affermò che Agostino non parla mai esplicitamente della caduta dell'anima e che deve più a Platone che a Plotino, ma egli non esamina accuratamente i testi riportati da O'Connell.[50] Frederick

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[45] R. J. TESKE, *St. Augustine's View*, pp. 148-149. I testi di Agostino, quando si paragonano con quelli di Plotino mostrano una somiglianza innegabile. Si consideri per es. il seguente passo tratto dalle *Enneadi* 5, 8, 4: "poiché lassù la vita scorre serena, e la verità è loro madre e nutrice, loro sostanza ed alimento; essi contemplano tutte le cose, non quelle cui appartiene il divenire ma quelle che posseggono l'essere e, fra le altre, se stessi; lassù tutto è trasparente, nulla è tenebroso e impenetrabile, ognuno è manifesto ad ogni altro nel suo intimo e in ogni dove, poiché la luce è manifesta alla luce. Lassù è puro anche il movimento, poiché ciò che muove, non essendo distinto dal movimento, non lo turba nel suo procedere, e nemmeno la quiete è turbata, poiché non è mescolata a ciò che non è stabile... Il suo fondamento è Intelligenza e il suo essere è Intelligenza... Lassù la vita è sapienza, non una sapienza che è acquisita per mezzo di ragionamenti, poiché è perfetta in eterno e non viene mai meno così che si debba farne ricerca, ed è la sapienza prima e non derivata: il suo stesso essere è sapienza, non un essere che diventi sapiente in un secondo tempo".

[46] R. J. O'CONNELL, *St. Augustine's Early Theory,* pp. 162-163.

[47] Per ulteriori dettagli si veda O'CONNELL, *St. Augustine's Early Theory,* pp. 146-183.

[48] Cf. R. P. RUSSELL, *Review of Robert J. O'Connell, S. J.,* St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A. D. 386-391, *Thought* 44 (1969), p. 304. A questa più seria obbiezione O'Connell rispose in due occasioni: 1) *The Origin of the Soul,* pp. 328-331 e 2) *Augustine's Rejection of the Fall*.

[49] R. PENASKOVIC, *The Fall of the Soul*, p. 143: "Mary T. Clark also says that it seems that O'Connell sometimes allows himself to think spatially of the expression 'fallen soul'. One wonders how Prof. Clark has arrived at such a conclusion. One may conceivably take the matter one step backward and make the same accusation of Plotinus himself. The very language of 'fall,' 'return,' is, it itself, spatial. It seems inappropriate to fault O'Connell on this particular point". La risposta di O'CONNELL: *Augustine and Plotinus: A Reply to Sr. Mary Clark*, in *International Philosophical Quarterly* 12 (1972) 604-608. Mary Clark accusa O'Connell di identificare la posizione porfiriana con quella plotiniana. Ella aderisce agli studiosi che mettono in evidenza l'influsso di Porfirio, come per esempio W. THEILER, *Porphyrios und Augustin*, Halle, 10/1, 1933, o J.O'MEARA, *Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Augustine*, Paris 1959; id., *Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Eusebius'* Praeparatio Evangelica *and Augustine's Dialogues of Cassiciacum*, in *RecAug*, 68 (1969) 103-139; id., *The young Augustin: an Introduction to the Confessions of St. Augustine,* London (1954), e OLIVIER DU ROY, *L'Intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin,* in *ÉtudAug*, 1966.

[50] PENASKOVIC, *The Fall of the Soul*: "One may also ask why O'Daly limits himself to the few texts that he does instead of taking a hard look at the texts in St. Augustine that O'Connell examines so carefully" (p. 142). G. O'DALY, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California

Van Fleteren ha cercato di convincerci che O'Connell, con il tema della caduta ha fatto entrare gli studiosi i un *cul de sac*.[51] Tra gli studiosi italiani si distinse particolarmente Nello Cipriani, autore di un *essay* col titolo: *Il tema agostiniano dell*'actio-contemplatio *nel suo quadro antropologico*.[52] Lui si rifà ai testi di Agostino che ponderano un altro modello antropologico che risale ad Antioco di Ascalona per mezzo delle opere di Cicerone e Varrone. Secondo Cipriani, ci sono i tre punti principali[53] che contestano la lettura di O'Connell: 1) l'uomo è composto di anima e corpo, non solo dell'anima razionale; 2) l'anima ha un *appetitus* naturale verso il corpo; 3) questi *appetitus* vengono soddisfatti in ogni età della vita umana in maniera tale che si raggiunge un'armonia tra gli *appetitus* e l'anima e tra la conoscenza e l'azione.

3. Il rapporto tra Increato e creato

Tutto l'essere agostiniano è diviso in due: da una parte c'è il vero Essere, dall'altra l'essere che ha il suo essere nel vero Essere.[54] La realtà è quindi divisa tra il Creatore e la creatura che partecipa in Lui. Questo rapporto tra essere e non-essere, o meglio, essere imperfetto, con i problemi inerenti disegna, posso dire, quasi tutta la speculazione di Agostino. Invocando Dio nell'esordio dei *Soliloquia* egli dice:

> O Dio verità, in cui, da cui e per mezzo di cui sono veri tutti gli esseri che sono veri (*Deus veritas, in quo et a quo et per quem vera sunt, quae vera sunt omnia*); o Dio sapienza, in cui, da cui e per mezzo di cui sono sapienti tutti gli esseri che posseggono sapienza; o Dio, vera e somma vita (*Deus vera et summa vita*)... o Dio beatitudine (*Deus beatitudo*)... o Dio bene e bellezza (*bonum et pulchrum*)... o Dio luce intelligibile (*Deus intellegibilis lux*)... o Dio, il cui regno è tutto il mondo che è nascosto al senso (*Deus cuius regnum est totus mundus, quem sensus ignorat*)... o Dio, dal quale allontanarsi è cadere, verso cui voltarsi è risorgere, nel quale rimanere è aver sicurezza; o Dio, dal quale uscire è morire (*Deus a quo exire, emori*)... o Dio, che ci spogli di ciò che non è e ci rivesti di ciò che è (*Deus qui nos eo quod non est exuis, et eo quod est induis*).[55]

Si nota che la riflessione di Agostino è fortemente sapienziale. In primo luogo menziona la verità,[56] poi la sapienza e alla fine la vita. L'ordine è casuale? No affatto. Non vorrei per il momento evidenziare lo schema trinitario ivi presente. Mi interessa notare che la verità è forma della vita, dell'essere. Uno può vivere è non essere conscio di ciò. Al contrario, se uno pensa sa anche che è vivo. Anche se erra, pensa, e se pensa vive.[57] Questo diventerà il punto di partenza per le successive riflessioni di Agostino e molto più tardi per Cartesio. Dall'autocoscienza si arriva all'esistenza. Mero vegetare, essere presente non significa nulla per Agostino. La cosa, l'oggetto che è presente davanti ai nostri oc-

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Press, 1987. Dallo stesso autore: *Did St. Augustine Ever Believe In The Soul's Pre-Existence?* in *AugStud* 5 (1974) 227-235 e *Augustine on the Origin of Souls*, in *Platonismus und Christentum*, Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum. Supplement 10, pp. 184-191.

[51] F. VAN FLETEREN, *A Reply to O'Connell*, in *AugStud* 21 (1990) 127-137.

[52] N. CIPRIANI, *Il tema agostiniano dell*'actio-contemplatio *nel suo quadro antropologico,* in *Augustinianum* 47 (2007), pp. 145-169.

[53] Ibid. p. 147.

[54] Cf. *beata v.* 4, 31.

[55] *sol*. 1, 1, 3.

[56] Dio e verità sono sinonimi (*mag.* 8, 21; *quant. an.* 14, 24; 33, 74. 76; 36, 81: *Deus ipse, id est veritas ipsa*; *div. qu*. 1: *Est autem veritas Deus*).

[57] Questi sono gli argomenti sviluppati nel *trin*. 15, 12, 21: *certum est etiam eum qui fallitur vivere;* e *civ.* 11, 26: *Si enim fallor, sum.* Simile pensiero abbiamo già in *lib. arb*. 2, 3, 7. La coscienza di vivere è qualcosa di più elevato della vita stessa (*lib. arb*. 1, 7, 17; 2, 3, 7; cf. et *mag*. 9, 25-28). Il sistema assiologico di Agostino è crescente: l'essere che è soltanto reale, ossia presente (corpo sensibile), l'essere anche vivente e in fine l'essere che è presente, vivente e anche pensante (*lib. arb*. 2, 5, 11).

chi, non ha l'essere in sé. Nel processo della riflessione risplende l'essere. La verità viene seguita dalla sapienza, vuol dire dalla consapevolezza. Una volta conscio, si ottiene l'esistenza. Dunque il punto di partenza non è dal basso ma dall'alto. Nel basso c'è quello che non è (*non est*), nell'alto ciò che è.

Non-essere attraverso l'Essere si impadronisce del suo essere; perde quel *non*. Il retore ripete senza stancarsi: *in quo et a quo et per quem.*[58] *In quo*, suggerisce l'idea dello stato in luogo: qualcosa si trova all'interno di Dio. Grazie a ciò ha il suo fondamento. Dio riconosce quello che ha in sé. *A quo*, qualcosa non è solamente *in* Dio, ma anche *da* Dio. Tuttavia, anche se qualcosa è in Dio e da Dio, non è una parte di Dio. Agostino usa la preposizione *a*, che a differenza di *e/ex* indica provenienza dall'esterno. *Per quem*, indica il mezzo attraverso il quale qualcosa si compie o la causa per la quale si compie. Quello che non è per se stesso vero, sapiente etc. è tale per causa di Verità, Sapienza. In una parola: *Deus per quem omnia, quae per se non essent, tendunt esse*.[59]

Ci troviamo davanti alla teoria platonica della partecipazione che è inserita in un altra sua teoria, quella delle Idee, nell'ambito della quale Platone esprime il rapporto che la realtà sensibile dei singoli ha con quella intelligibile e universale. Platone diede vita a questo dualismo per cercare di soddisfare l'esigenza di una conoscenza sicura. Oggetto di un tale tipo di conoscenza, non possa essere, secondo lui, la realtà sensibile, soggetta alla corruzione e al mutamento, ma la realtà incorruttibile e immutabile. Alla luce di questa suddivisione vanno considerati i rapporti che hanno i sensibili, sempre mutevoli, con le idee immutabili, e questa relazione è espressa con il termine di partecipazione.[60]

Tuttavia, le idee concepite come immutabili ed eterne, non sono i pensieri di Dio. Il Demiurgo platonico è un Dio-artigiano, e si trova addirittura ad un gradino sotto le medesime Idee: esse non hanno bisogno di lui per esistere, mentre lui ha bisogno di esse per creare il mondo materiale. Le Idee diventano il pensiero di Dio soltanto con l'Accademia antica, Filone Alessandrino, Antioco di Ascalona ed il quasi intero Medio platonismo.[61] La piena conferma di tale processo la troviamo nel neoplatonismo ed il suo rappresentante di spicco, Plotino, che ubica le Idee nella seconda ipostasi divina. Da loro Agostino riprende questa impostazione e non da Platone. Il pensiero originale dei grandi lumi classici, Platone e Aristotele, ormai fu offuscato dai loro commentatori sia pagani sia cristiani.[62] Quello, in conclusione, che è del mio particolare interesse e riguarda la teologia del giovane Agostino è il fatto che un Dio *pensante* è la causa di tutti gli altri enti. Può sembrare improbabile, ma solamente negli ultimi tempi gli studiosi si sono impegnati a far luce sulla "teoria della partecipazione" in Agostino.[63]

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[58] Agostino manterrà questo assioma: Non ergo essem, Deus meus, non omnino essem, nisi esses in me. An potius non essem, nisi essem in te, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia? (*conf.* 1, 2, 2). Lo stesso lo troviamo nel *quant. an.* 34, 77.

[59] *sol*. 1, 1, 2.

[60] Una ricostruzione del pensiero platonico da parte di Agostino: *c. acad*. 3, 17, 37; cf. *ep*. 3, 3; *vera rel*. 3, 3.

[61] Cf. S. LILLA, *Introduzione al Medio platonismo,* in *Sussidi Patristici*, Roma 1992, pp. 6-7; Id., *Die Lehre von den Ideen als Gedanken Gottes im byzantinischen Denken*, in *Hermeneumata,* Heilderberg 1990, p. 28; D. T. RUNIA, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato*, in *Philosophia Antiqua* 44, Leiden 1986, p. 53.

[62] W. JAEGER, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia*, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1965, pp. 41-43.

[63] D. V. MECONI, *St. Augustine's Early Theory of Participation*, *AugStud* 27:2 (1996) 81-98. Nella prima parte del suo saggio, Meconi riporta gli studi altrui: I. DI SOMMA, *De naturali participatione divini luminis in mente humana secundum S. Augustinum et S. Thomam*, *Gregorianum*, 7 (1926) 321-338; M. ANNICE, *Historical Sketch of the Theory of Participation*, in *The new Scholasticism*, 26 (1952) 49-79; P. WILSON-KASTNER, *Grace as Participation in the Divine Life in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo*, in *AugStud* 7 (1976), 135-

Il Creatore e la Creatura sono divisi nettamente, e così se il creato non riconosce il suo posto nell'ordine, cade nel peccato capitale che è la superbia. Da una parte, esiste l'unione tra creato e increato; dall'altra si precisa la distinzione tra loro. Secondo un assioma fondamentale della filosofia greca, soltanto le entità omogenee possono entrare in contatto fra loro; al contrario, due entità eterogenee non si possono unire e costituire in una sola natura. Per i greci, il mondo era un secondo dio, l'unigenito figlio di dio, l'immagine del suo costruttore;[64] tra esso e dio esiste un legame naturale. Dovrebbe essere più che chiaro che una idea del genere è del tutto inaccettabile per i cristiani che negvano l'uguaglianza ontologica tra le due realtà.

Questo divario ontologico tra Creatore e la creatura inevitabilmente comporta l'applicazione degli attributi negativi a Dio.[65] Egli è il sommo bene,[66] immateriale, cioè spirituale, immortale, incorruttibile, immutabile essendo fuori del tempo. L'immutabilità è per Agostino il carattere più significativo che lui adopera nel suo discorso su Dio. È utile dunque sottolineare che "essere", nel pensiero di sant'Agostino significa essere libero dal tempo.[67]

Agostino sviluppa questi temi soprattutto nelle *Confessiones* e nel *Tractatus in Evangelium Iohannis* dove dice che "essere significa esistere sempre nel medesimo modo (*mens capiat vere esse: est enim semper eodem modo esse*)".[68] Dio, dunque "è sempre stato e per sempre sarà, è stato sempre il medesimo e per sempre sarà il medesimo" (*qui nunquam non fuerit, nunquam non erit, nunquam aliter fuerit, nunquam aliter erit*).[69] Il suo essere non è diviso nelle sequenze ma è sempre uno e stesso, pieno, immutabile.

In conseguenza, Dio è *péras* del continuum spazio-temporale. Egli creò dal nulla come lo spazio con tutta la materia visibile e invisibile così anche il tempo.[70] Esistere nel tempo è la principale designazione dello stato creaturale e di una esistenza caduca. In questo punto differiscono gli enti somiglianti come sono l'anima e Dio:[71]

152; J. PEGUEROLES, *Participación y conocimiento de Dios en la predicación de San Agustin*, in *Espíritu*, 27 (1979) 5-26; G. BONNER, *Augustine's Conception of Deification*, in *JThS*, 37 (1986), 369-386; R. TESKE, *The Image and Likeness of God in St. Augustine's* De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus, in *Augustinianum*, 30 (1990), 441-151; C. MORESCHINI, *Neoplatonismo e cristianesimo: 'Partecipare a Dio' secondo Boezio e Agostino*, in *Sicilia e Italia suburbicaria tra IV e VIII secolo*, ed., S. PRICOCO et al. (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino Editore, 1991), 283-295. Meconi spiega la sua opinione sul *mor*. 4, ed esamina l'indicazione di Teske che trova l'ispirazione agostiniana in *Phaed.* 100d-102a di Platone. Altro testo di Platone potrebbe essere *Parm*. 130b.

[64] Cf. PLATONE, *Tim.* 29b; 31b; 92c.

[65] Agostino nel VII libro delle *conf*. descrive il suo abbandono della idea materialistica di Dio e anima aiutato dal pensiero neoplatonico. Nella *beata v.* 1, 4 riconosce il contributo di Ambrogio e Manlio Teodoro.

[66] Essendo il sommo bene (termine di origine platonica), Dio è immutabile, impenetrabile, incorruttibile, inviolabile; rispetto a lui nulla è più eccellente. È il bene in massimo grado e per sé, non per partecipazione di qualche altro bene, ma grazie la sua natura (cf. *mor*. 2, 3, 5-4, 6). Anche sul piano epistemologico Agostino si esprime nei concetti negativi: "Di Dio nell'anima non v'è altra scienza che avere scienza dell'impossibilità di averne scienza (*scire quomodo eum nesciat*)" (*ord*. 2, 18, 47). Questo tipo di cautela la manterrà anche nelle successive riflessioni triadologiche: quando si tratta di Dio è già una grande scienza sapere ciò che non è (*trin*. 5, 1, 2; *ep*. 130, 15, 28).

[67] É. GILSON, *Philosophie et incarnation selon saint Augustin*, Montréal, 1947, p. 13.

[68] Cf. et *Io. ev. tr*. 38, 10; 23, 9; *div. qu.* 17.

[69] *quant. an*. 34, 77. Cf. anche *mor.* 2, 1, 1.

[70] Per questa ragione non ha alcun senso domandare che cosa facesse Dio *prima* di creare l'universo, poiché il tempo cominciò con la creazione. In riferimento a ciò Agostino riporta un famoso aneddoto: "Ecco come rispondo a chi chiede: *Che cosa faceva Dio prima di fare il cielo e la terra* (Gn 1, 1). Non rispondo come quel tale, che, dicono, rispose in modo scherzoso, per eludere una domanda difficile ma inutile: *Preparava la geenna per chi scruta i misteri profondi*. Altro è capire, altro è schernire" (*conf.* 11, 12, 14).

[71] *quant. an*. 2, 3.

> Et est natura per locos nullo modo, sed tantum per tempora etiam ipsa mutabilis, ut anima. Et est natura quae nec per locos, nec per tempora mutari potest; hoc Deus est.[72]

Per illustrare questa angolazione, riporto un brano del *Gn. c. man*. Si vede senza ostacolo quale sia la differenza tra il Creatore e la creatura attraverso il più sublime punto di quella, vale a dire l'anima, in cui risiede l'immagine divina. La domanda proposta da Agostino era un'ambigua descrizione scritturistica a proposito della creazione dell'anima (*Gn*. 2, 7):

> Non dobbiamo credere che quella... parte della natura di Dio si fosse cambiata nell'anima umana e... che la natura di Dio è mutevole, come affermano codesti manichei... Costoro infatti hanno osato affermare che l'anima è la natura di Dio. Costoro però vengono messi da noi alle strette col seguente argomento, quando diciamo: 'La natura di Dio allora sbaglia, è infelice...[73]

Dunque, la principale differenza tra questi esseri somiglianti, Dio ed anima, non si trova nella loro sostanza ma nel loro diverso modo di esistere. Per non essere frainteso Agostino usa sempre questo binomio, mutabile ed immutabile. Attraverso questo è possibile notare facilmente la differenza tra i due esseri.[74] Agostino quindi nel *Gn. c. man.* sottolinea che ogni natura si distingue ontologicamente rispetto a Dio:

> non solo la creatura visibile, ma anche quella invisibile (*invisibilem creaturam*), ha rapporto col tempo a causa della mutabilità, poiché immutabile è solo Dio che esiste prima del tempo (*qui est ante tempora*).[75]

L'unica ragione dell'esistenza dello spazio-tempo è situata nella volontà di Dio.[76] La buona volontà di Dio rende buone tutte le cose create. Queste sono bene ordinate e disposte in misura, numero e peso (*mensura, numerus et pondus vel ordo*).[77] Malgrado l'indiscutibile bontà e bellezza d'ogni cosa,[78] esse sono buone relativamente perché

> Dio non le ha generate dal proprio essere affinché fossero ciò che è lui, ma le ha create dal nulla affinché non fossero uguali né a Lui, dal quale sono state create, né al proprio Figlio per mezzo del quale sono state create, poiché ciò è giusto (*iustum est enim*).[79]

Che cosa significa *iustum est enim*? È giusto fare la differenza tra l'uno e l'altro, cioè tra il Creatore e la Creatura. Il creato non può pretendere di uguagliarsi con il suo artefice, la natura creata ha il dovere di riconoscere il suo posto nell'ordine dell'essere. Essa dovrebbe essere grata al dono dell'esistenza, che è radicato nella volontà – quindi è deliberato – e non in una qualsiasi sostanza. L'immortalità del creato è nella volontà dell'increato. Alla creatura tuttavia non passa nulla del sostanziale, nulla del divino diventa transitorio.

4. Il metodo esegetico del primo Agostino

Non ci sono dubbi che Agostino abbia letto Platone (*Timeo*, *Reppublica*, *Fedone*), Aristotele (*Categorie*), Plotino[80] (*Enneadi*), Porfirio, Origene,[81] ma quanto lui ha seguito in

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[72] *ep*. 18, 2. Sui concetti mutabile-immutabile, creatio, creator, creatura cf. A. TRAPE, *La nozione del mutabile e dell'immutabile secondo Sant'Agostino*, in *Quardeni della Cattedra Agostiniana*, n. 1, Tolentino 1959.

[73] *Gn. c. man.* 2, 8, 10-11.

[74] Agostino dice che soltanto con la mente riesce a percepire in che cosa consista l'eternità e distinguere l'eterno da tutto ciò che è mutevole (*vera rel*. 49, 97).

[75] *Gn. c. man.* 2, 6, 7.

[76] *Gn. c. man.* 1, 2, 4; *conf.* 11, 10, 12.

[77] *Gn. c. man.* 1, 16, 26. 21, 32. La misura è il limite delle possibilità di una creatura; il numero è proporzione; l'ordine è il posto che occupa una creatura nell'universo.

[78] *Gn. c. man.* 1, 16, 26.

[79] *Gn. c. man.* 1, 2, 4.

[80] *c. acad*. 3, 18, 41: "Plotino, filosofo davvero platonico, fu giudicato tanto simile al maestro da sembrare che fossero contemporanei, ma è tanto l'intervallo di tempo da far ritenere che il primo si sia reincarnato nel secondo". Questa ammirazione per Plotino lo accompagnerà fino alla fine della vita. Aviccinandosene verso la morte, ripeterà le parole di Plotino (*enn*. 1, 4, 7): "Non sarà grande colui che ritiene gran cosa il fatto che cadono alberi e pietre e muoiono i mortali", che ci riporta il suo biografo Possidio (*vita Ag*. 28, 11).

fondo questi pensatori? Vediamo perciò alcuni suoi testi giovanili, innanzitutto *De Genesi contra manichaeos,* dove adoperò l'allegoria come metodo esegetico. Da una parte non riesce a spiegare tutto in senso storico, d'altro lato, senso traslato spiega quel rapporto perfetto che intercorreva tra Dio e la sua creatura intellettuale. Il suo metodo manifesta proprio le sue idee basilari sulla primitiva condizione umana: un essere spirituale che si relaziona con la Somma sapienza. Lui disprezza il senso infimo: *carnaliter*, *materialis*, *litteralis*, *historicus*.[82] Le potenze spirituali sono contemplate attraverso il senso spirituale.[83] Il filo conduttore di Agostino è ontologico: le categorie della mente non sono appartenenti puramente alla struttura linguistico-grammaticale. Esso è strettamente collegato a quello ontologico. Da un livello più basso si giunge anagogicamente a uno più alto.[84] In effetti, entrambe le cose dovrebbero essere tutt'uno. L'attività spirituale in realtà forma lo spirito e viceversa lo spirito elevato si esprime attraverso quest'attività.[85] Essa è il suo prodotto naturale:

> tutto questo racconto [della *Genesi* relativo alla creazione dell'uomo] però non viene esposto apertamente ma in senso figurato al fine di esercitare coloro che ricercano la verità e distoglierli dalle realtà carnali, per rivolgerli a quelle spirituali.[86]

5. La materia

L'idea della *creatio ex nihilo* faceva sin dall'inizio la parte indissolubile del credo agostiniano. Per la prima volta questo concetto lo troviamo nei *Soliloquia* (386-387): *Deus qui de nihilo mundum istum creasti*.[87] Il presupposto della creazione dal nulla è la onnipotenza di Dio, l'idea che non era divisa comunemente.[88]

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[81] Cf. *ep*. 28, 2, 2. Ci sono alcuni testi di Origene che il primo Agostino sicuramente li abbia letto: *prima omelia sulla Genesi, l'omelia sul Levitico* e *select. in Gn.* (Cf. L. CARROZZI, *Introduzione*, in NBA IX/1, p. 30).

[82] Mayer elencha i termini che denotano il senso simbolico nel *Gn. c. man.* e la loro frequenza: *aenigma* (2, 2, 3; 2, 5, 6), *allegoria* (1, 22, 39; 2, 4, 5. 10, 13); *figura* (1, 13, 19. 17, 27. 22, 34; 2, 2, 3. 22, 33); *imago* (1, 17, 28. 19, 29; 2, 1, 1. 18, 28. 26, 40. 27, 41); *imago et similitudo* (1, 17, 27. 17, 28. 23, 40. 25, 43; 2, 2, 3. 22, 33); *mysterium* (1, 3, 5. 13, 19; 2, 12, 17); *sacramentum* (1, 22, 23; 2, 12, 17. 13, 19. 19, 29. 24, 37); *signum* (1, 8, 14. 14, 20-21); *similitudo* (1, 13, 19; 14, 20. 22, 23. 23, 35; 2, 13, 18); *velum* (1, 22, 33; 2, 26, 40). Cf. C. P. MAYER, *Die Antimanichäischen Schriften Augustins*, in *Aug*. 14 (1974), p. 287.

[83] Cf. *Gn. c. man.* 1, 17, 27. In proposito si veda: R. J. TESKE, *Spiritualis and Spiritual Interpretation in Saint Augustine*, in *AugStud* 15 (1984) 65-81. Il medesimo autore così esprime l'idea principale del suo saggio: "I claimed that a spiritual man, as opposed to a carnal or animal man, was one who was able to come to an intellectual grasp of incorporeal realites and that to interpret a passage of Scripture spiritually meant to understand terms signifying corporeal realities with reference to incorporeal or spiritual realities" (Homo spiritualis *in St. Augustine's* De Genesi contra manichaeos, in *Studia Patristica* 22, (1989) 351-355, qui p. 351).

[84] *quant. an.* 35. 79: "Nell'ascesa dal basso verso l'alto, il primo atto, a scopo d'intelligenza, sia chiamato animazione; il secondo, sensazione; il terzo, arte; il quarto, virtù; il quinto, serenità; il sesto, entrata; il settimo, contemplazione. È possibile denominarli anche così: dal corpo, mediante il corpo, attorno al corpo, verso se stessa, in se stessa, verso Dio, presso Dio. Anche così: con bellezza dall'altro, con bellezza mediante l'altro, con bellezza attorno all'altro, con bellezza al bello, con bellezza nel bello, con bellezza verso la bellezza, con bellezza presso la bellezza".

[85] *imm. an*. 6, 11: "Ma se il potere della ragione attua lo spirito in virtù del congiungimento, e necessariamente lo attua, lo attua certamente nel produrvi l'essere. L'essere appartiene in grado sommo al pensiero che si concepisce come la forma più pura d'esenzione dal divenire".

[86] *Gn. c. man*. 2, 1, 1: Quae omnis narratio non aperte, sed figurate explicatur, ut exerceat mentes quaerentium veritatem, et spiritali negotio a negotiis carnalibus avocet.

[87] *sol*. 1, 1, 2.

[88] Cf. *Gn. c. man.* 1, 6, 10. Non c'è ombra di dubbio che tutto questo ragionamento è tradizionale: Dio non ha bisogno di alcun materiale per creare perché è onnipotente. Agostino in questa sede critica i manichei che non credono che Dio possa creare qualcosa dal nulla. Gli altri che non credevano in *creatio ex nihilo* erano gli Epicurei la cui posizione esprime Lucrezio nel *rer. nat*. 1, 150ss. Questo motivo ritorna periodicamente nei testi di Agostino (cf. *Gn. c. man.* 1, 7, 8; *mus*. 6, 17, 57; *lib. arb*. 1, 2, 5; *div. qu*. 78; *f. et symb*. 2, 2; *Gn. litt. imp*. 15, 51).

È facile dimostrare che Dio può creare dal nulla quando viene dapprima definito onnipotente. Quello che invece non è facile è riflettere sulle conseguenze che comporta *creatio ex nihilo* per la stessa materia. La sua doppia origine: dal nulla e da Dio produrrà diversi appellativi, positivi e negativi, nel linguaggio di Agostino.

La materia è stata creata dal nulla assoluto (*de omnino nihilo*).[89] Agostino usa pleonasticamente l'avverbio *omnino* per non essere frainteso. I platonici adoperavano sostantivo *nihil* per indicare la materia informe che è ricettacolo (ὑποδοχή) destinata a ricevere ogni tipo di forma conosciuta. Questa materia è la prima cosa creata da Dio che ha trattò dal nulla assoluto. Ha lo stesso ruolo della materia platonica. Essa è diversa da tutti gli elementi successivamente creati, perché è l'origine comune di essi. Non ha la forma ma è capace di ricevere le forme.[90] La Scrittura la definisce in vari modi, dice il giovane interprete: *cielo e terra*,[91] *terra invisibile e caotica*, *abisso con le tenebre*, ed *acqua al di sopra della quale si portava lo Spirito di Dio*.[92] La materia informe pertanto fu chiamata dapprima *cielo e terra*, perché come un seme racchiude in sé le radici, il tronco, i rami, ecc. che nasceranno da esso, Dio creò una specie di seme dei cielo e della terra, che aveva in sé la materia del cielo e della terra ancora confusi.[93] Agostino credeva che i greci chiamassero questa materia confusa e disordinata χάος.[94] Un altro appoggio scritturistico trovò nel *Sap*. 11, 18: "Tu hai creato il mondo *de materia informi* o, come dicono altri manoscritti: *de materia invisa*".[95] La materia primordiale dunque si potrebbe definire come pura potenzialità, ed è possibile considerarla identica alla materia prima di Aristotele (anche se Agostino non usa questo termine),[96] che è una materia che non ha alcuna forma, priva di ogni determinazione – altrimenti sarebbe una sostanza; la materia prima è quindi una materia pura, primordiale e plasmabile. Qui appare la difficoltà di Agostino nel definire la materia primordiale che dovrebbe essere qualcosa che non ha nessuna forma. Ecco allora che lui ricorre a un definizione negativa: non ci dice che cosa essa è ma cosa non è: è un sostrato ultimo assolutamente privo di forma. In fine, non si deve intendere uguale a *nil*, perché è qualcosa anche se senza forma. Agostino tuttavia non spiega il rapporto che esiste tra la materia informe e gli elementi. Nel *De vera religione* tutta la realtà e strutturata piramidalmente. L'essere purchessia è bene, dato che proviene dal sommo essere=bene. Ogni cosa deve avere un suo fondamento, per quanto piccolo; perciò, anche se è un bene minimo, sarà pur sempre un bene. La materia informe non è ancora il nulla avendo una qualche forma, sebbene piccola ed embrionale, ma viene nominata informe rispetto alle realtà perfette.[97]

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[89] *Gn. c. man.* 1, 6, 10.
[90] Cf. *f. et symb*. 2, 2.
[91] *Gn. c. man.* 1, 3, 5; 1, 7, 11.
[92] *Gn. c. man.* 1, 7, 12; *Gn. litt. impf.* 4, 13-15.
[93] *Gn. c. man.* 1, 7, 11-12; 1, 5, 9; *Gn. litt. impf.* 3, 10. Riporto in questa sede un frammento di Basilide perché lo trovo interessante e ideologicamente vicino alle speculazioni di Agostino: "Dio inesistente (οὐκ ὢν θεός)... volle creare il mondo... e il mondo... era il seme del mondo (σπέρμα τοῦ κόσμου). Il seme del mondo aveva tutto in sé, come il grano di senape tutto racchiude nella sua piccolezza: radici, tronco, rami... che nascono dalla pianta... Così il Dio non esistente creò dal nulla (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων) il mondo che non esisteva, gettando in basso e collocando di sotto il seme che aveva in sé tutta la semenza del mondo... Erano racchiuse nel seme tutte le cose... che si sarebbero adattate necessariamente, ognuna a suo tempo, al mondo che sarebbe nato dal seme e che per le aggiunte sarebbe cresciuto per volere di tale Dio quale la creazione non può né pronunciare né comprendere col pensiero" (Ippolito, *Philos*. 7, 21-22).
[94] *Gn. c. man.* 1, 5, 9; *Gn. litt. impf.* 4, 12.
[95] *Gn. c. man.* 1, 5, 9. Le stese parole ripeterà nel *f. et symb*. 2, 2.
[96] Г. Г. Майоров, *Формирование средневековой философии*, Москва 1979, p. 291.
[97] *vera rel*. 18, 35; 41, 78: "Ogni natura, per quanto ultima o ignobile, è a buon diritto degna di lode in confronto al nulla".

Dunque, anche la natura nuda (*informis*) è un bene perché proviene dal Primo Bene. Con questa affermazione si chiude la polemica manichea. Nonostante ciò Agostino va avanti e in diverse occasioni nominerà la stessa materia o corpo *nulla*.[98] Lo steso vale per il corpo umano: il nulla è, in certo qual modo, la sua materia.[99] L'elemento materiale possiede in potenza la possibilità di annihilarsi. Da solo, avendo origine dal nulla, avvierebbe al nulla: *Deus qui ne id quidem quod se invicem perimit, perire permittis*.[100] Dunque, per quanto dipende dalle creature medesime, esse possono annullarsi perché sono state create dal nulla; non spariscono grazie all'azione di Dio e non grazie alla struttura della materia.[101] La materia, secondo il primo Agostino, è, per così dire, vacua.[102] Questo succede perché "l'essenza del corpo non è nella massa (*non... est in mole corporis*), ma nella forma (*specie*)".[103] Agostino inoltre era molto turbato dall'idea che i corpi fossero divisibili all'infinito.[104] Non è da sorprendersi di questa inquietudine degli antichi perché essa ha anticipato un'altra grande scoperta nel campo della fisica quantistica: esistenza delle particelle senza massa.

Per quanto riguarda gli elementi che costituiscono la realtà sensibile, Agostino non era originale. Sosteneva a tutti la ben nota teoria dei quattro elementi,[105] perfezionata da Empedocle. Lui rimane fedele a Empedocle su un rilevante punto di vista: non accetta, infatti, l'idea che la materia sia dotata di una forza propria, con la quale è in grado di compiere fusioni e scissioni. I movimenti degli elementi vengono spiegati meccanicamente: ogni elemento ha un suo peso grazie al quale occupa il proprio posto nell'ordine dell'essere.[106] I contrari come caldo-freddo, umido-secco ecc. descrivono la natura corporea.[107]

Come la base dell'Universo c'è Dio. Intermediario tra Dio trascendente e il mondo visibile è l'anima,[108] almeno come ci testimonia la maggior parte dei testi agostiniani

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[98] *div. qu*. 54: Deterius enim omni corpore nihil est, quia, et si materiam quis dixerit unde ipsum corpus fit, recte, quoniam caret omni specie, nihil dicitur.

[99] *div. qu*. 4: Ut sit homo deterior aut in ipso causa est, aut in alio aliquo, aut in nihilo. Si in nihilo, nulla causa est. Aut si ita accipitur in nihilo, quod homo ex nihilo factus est vel ex his quae ex nihilo facta sunt, rursum in ipso erit causa, *quod eius quasi materies est nihilum*.

[100] *sol*. 1, 1, 2: "O Dio, che non permetti di perire neanche ciò che da sé può distruggersi".

[101] *Gn. litt. imp*. 12, 36: quantum autem in ipsis est, possunt deficere, quia de nihilo facta sunt; et in quantum non deficiunt, non est eorum materiae, quae ex nihilo est, sed eius qui summe est, et illa facit esse in genere atque ordine suo.

[102] *imm. an*. 7, 12.

[103] *imm. an*. 8, 13. Nello stesso anno (387) Agostino scrive a Nebridio (*ep*. 3, 2): "Soltanto questo mi turbava molto, cioè che i corpi fossero divisibili all'infinito. Al che si è forse dato una risposta con la teoria della proprietà contraria del numero intelligibile".

[104] I padri della teoria della divisione all'infinito dei corpi erano stoici: "Crisippo sostenne che si dividono all'infinito (σώματα εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεσθαι) i corpi e quanto è simile ai corpi, come la superficie, la linea, la distanza, lo spazio e il tempo. Ma pur divisi all'infinito, né il corpo è composto d'infiniti corpi, né la superficie, né la linea, né la distanza, né lo spazio, né il tempo" (STOBEO, *anth*. 1, 14, SVF II, 402). È da segnare la difficoltà interpretativa; Diogene dice che: "infatti non è qualcosa di infinito ciò verso cui procede la divisione (*vit*. 7, 150). Gli stoici affermano che non c'è corpo-limite (PLUTARCO, *commun. notitiis adv. Stoic.* 1079b SVF II, 487). Agostino poteva attingere a Plotino che esplicitamente affermava che i corpi possono essere tagliati all'infinito: εἰς ἄπειρα... χωρίζεται (*enn*. 6, 2, 4), oppure a Porfirio come sostiene W. THEILER, *Porphyrios und Augustin: Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus*, Berlin 1966, 160-251, qui p. 192 (=SKGG 10), Königsberg 1933, pp. 26-27.

[105] *imm. an*. 10, 17; *quant. an*. 1, 2; 13, 22; 31, 62; *mor.* 2, 8, 13.

[106] *quant. an*. 31, 62: "E non possiamo affermare che il corpo, quando è stato prodotto, ha ricevuto il potere di essere autosufficiente qualora fosse abbandonato dalla causa produttrice" (*imm. an*. 8, 14.).

[107] *quant. an*. 22, 38; *div. qu*. 81, 1.

[108] *imm. an*. 15, 24: Soltanto l'anima, la quale comunica la vita, si frappone fra la somma vita, che è anche mente e verità sovrasensibile, e l'essere infimo che è vivificato, il corpo. *Gn. c. man.* 2, 9, 12: "L'albero della

di questa epoca. Ogni corpo infatti riceve la forma soltanto mediante l'anima.[109] Essa, animando la materia del corpo, gli dà forma in un'unità armoniosa e non permette che le parti del corpo si disgreghino.[110]

Dunque, tutto ciò che esiste, esiste legato al soggetto conoscente. L'esistenza della coscienza del soggetto pensante, a cui appare la realtà dell'essere, sarebbe la condizione del vero. Se non c'è un soggetto pensante, un corpo non può esistere oggettivamente. Un corpo esiste solo nell'anima che lo pensa: *Nihil sit per se*.[111] Agostino anticipa in un certo senso la formulazione di George Berkeley *esse est percipi*. Il filosofo irlandese riprende e rielabora nei *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* (1713) il sensualismo del giovane Agostino: *un oggetto esiste soltanto per i sensi*.[112]

L'ente che è mosso da un altro e non muove se stesso è mortale, dichiara seccamente Agostino.[113] Essere corporeo, che corrisponde all'esistenza nello spazio,[114] significa essere soggetto al divenire. La morte non raggiunge gli esseri non soggetti al divenire.[115] Nel divenire la serie dei momenti non può essere simultaneamente, e tutte le cose, che non possono essere simultaneamente in un attimo di tempo, sono inevitabilmente nel divenire.[116] Vorrei insistere su questo punto – palese e indiscutibile – per rendere sani gli altri passi della chiarificazione del pensiero agostiniano:

> La soggezione del corpo al divenire è d'immediata evidenza. Lo dimostra l'universale movimento dell'universo sensibile.[117]

Il mondo sensibile o materiale che Dio creò è mortale per natura, perché è soggetto al divenire, ossia alle condizioni spazio-temporali. Questa convinzione è il risultato di un attento studio della natura di cui Agostino si è vantato.[118]

6. Quando Dio creò la flora e fauna?

Fin ora esposto ci conduce a chiedere perché Dio creò il mondo materiale. Meglio, il mondo è stato creato in vista di qualcos'altro, e se è così, quando è stato creato? Ci troviamo, come mi pare, davanti le incongruenze basilari nel pensiero del primo Agostino: la valutazione positiva della materia dal lato cristiano, e quella negativa dal lato platonico

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conoscenza del bene e del male è invece simbolo della natura intermedia e dell'ordinata integrità dell'anima. In realtà anche quell'albero era piantato in mezzo al paradiso e perciò è chiamato albero della conoscenza del bene e del male. Mi spiego: l'anima deve protendersi verso le realtà che stanno davanti a lei, cioè verso Dio, e dimenticare quelle che stanno dietro di lei, cioè verso i piaceri corporali". Cf. anche *Gn. c. man.* 1, 25, 43.

[109] *imm. an*. 16, 25; *quant. an*. 33, 70.

[110] *Gn. c. man*. 2, 7, 9; *quant. an*. 33, 70.

[111] *sol*. 2, 2, 5.

[112] Agostino parte dalla premessa che il corpo non può esistere se non esiste l'anima (*sol*. 2, 4, 6) e che gli oggetti sensibili possono apparire soltanto ai sensi. Ma, segue che dentro la terra non vi sono pietre perché non vi siano presenti soggetti senzienti. La pietra non vi sarebbe se non c'è l'osservatore, o sparirebbe quando si allontanerebbe. Tutto ciò che è nascosto nell'interno di un corpo per conseguenza non esiste. Anche se questa conclusione pare talmente assurda ad Agostino (*sol*. 2, 5, 7), rimarrà inrisolta. Cf. anche *ep*. 13, 3: "Il corpo è una cosa sensibile, ma l'esistenza del corpo è intelligibile".

[113] *imm. an*. 3, 3.

[114] *imm. an*. 15, 24.

[115] *imm. an*. 2, 2.

[116] *imm. an*. 3, 3; *lib. arb*. 2, 6, 14: *corpora mutabilia esse.*

[117] *imm. an*. 8, 15; *sol*. 2, 18, 32: "È siccuro che il corpo si dissolve (*interitum*)". La legge che regna sul mondo sensibile è la perpetua mutabilità, in altre parole, la morte. Il mondo sensibile non è sottoposto a dissoluzione a causa di un peccato ma è tale per sua natura. Tutto ciò che è composto è destinato a decomposizione.

[118] *quant. an*. 31, 63. Si veda la condotta di Agostino e i suoi giovani compagni durrante l'esperimento di una vivisezione sul vermiciattolo (*quant. an*. 31, 62-32, 68). Il vantarsi di queste cose non era estraneo ad Agostino (cf. *lib. arb*. 2, 7, 17).

che esistono simultaneamente nel suo ragionamento. Sembra che il mondo corporeo non esistesse prima del peccato. Se piante pericolose sono state create per esercitare i mortali,[119] quando, chiedo di nuovo, sono stati creati i vegetali utili (*viride agri*)? Agostino risponde così circa la *Gn*. 2, 5:

> l'espressione della Scrittura: *Nel principio Dio fece il cielo e la terra...* denotava... la materia stessa (*materiam ipsam*), a partire dalla quale furono fatte tutte le cose... Mediante i cespugli dei campi vuol farci intendere la creatura invisibile, com'è l'anima (*invisibilem creaturam vult intellegi, sicut est anima*)... Chiama dunque cespugli dei campi la creatura spirituale e invisibile per esprimere il vigore della vita (*vigorem vitae*) e col termine *pabulum* ("nutrimento") intendiamo giustamente la stessa cosa certamente a causa della vita. Quanto poi alla frase che la Scrittura aggiunge: *prima che fossero sulla terra,* viene intesa nel senso di "prima che l'anima peccasse", poiché, essendo stata insozzata dalle passioni terrene.[120]

Quindi, la verzura è una denominazione simbolica. Il cielo e la terra sono la materia, i cespugli sono l'anima. Osservando questo brano isolato dagli altri, si conclude che le erbe non esistevano prima del peccato.[121] Agostino non afferma che la verzura è figura dell'anima, in pratica essa è semplicemente nome per l'anima. Che qui non si tratta della creazione della vegetazione Agostino porta un altro argomento che riduce all'assurdo l'interpretazione testuale: per l'agricoltura è necessaria la pioggia, ma la *Gn*. 2, 5 afferma che *Dio non aveva ancora fatto piovere sulla terra né c'era uomo che la lavorasse*.[122] La verzura è nutrimento dell'anima, cioè la vitalità e il movimento ordinato della medesima.[123]

Agostino è costretto a ricorrere all'allegoria perché la Scrittura dice chiaramente che le piante sono state create al terzo giorno (*Gn*. 1, 11). La fonte *jahvista* (J), come la chiamiamo oggi, dovrebbe spiegare più dettagliatamente la precedente narrazione *sacerdotale* (P) della creazione, sosteneva il primo Agostino. Dunque, la *Gn*. 2, 5 non è una *continuatio* ma una *interpretatio* della *Gn*. 1, 11. Basterebbe, secondo Agostino, un solo fatto per convincere gli scettici che la flora e fauna non si devono intendere in senso materiale, perché nel libro della *Gn.* 1, 29-30 le verzure dei campi e gli alberi fruttiferi sono dati per nutrimento a ogni specie di bestie, a tutti gli uccelli e i rettili, mentre vediamo che i carnivori si nutrono esclusivamente di carni degli altri animali, e i rettili che vivono in luoghi deserti, dove non ci sono le piante, per conseguenza non si nutrono di esse.[124] La conclusione importante sull'interpretazione agostiniana della redazione P, è che essa, secondo lui, esprime una originaria dinamica spirituale. È da intendere che nondimeno si trovavano gli animali, perché la condizione della loro esistenza sono proprio le erbe.

Come i vegetali dannosi, così anche gli animali pericolosi servono ad esercitarci o a punirci (*vel punimur, vel exercemur, vel terremur*) ed ebbero il loro luogo dopo la caduta.[125] Però neppure gli animali utili furono stati creati prima del peccato. Per bestie vanno intese le passioni dell'anima. Il dominio dell'uomo sulle bestie è un'allegoria che riflette il rapporto tra l'anima e i suoi moti.[126] L'inutilità della presenza degli animali si

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[119] *Gn. c. man.* 1, 13, 19: "*per peccatum hominis terra maledicta sit*... Le piante erbacee velenose invece sono state create per castigare o mettere alla prova i mortali (*ad poenam, vel ad exercitationem mortalium creatae sunt*)... dopo il peccato invece noi vediamo nascere dalla terra molti vegetali irti di spine e infruttuosi".

[120] *Gn. c. man.* 2, 3, 4-5.

[121] *Gn. c. man.* 1, 20, 31.

[122] *Gn. c. man.* 2, 4.

[123] *Gn. c. man.* 1, 20, 31.

[124] Ib.

[125] *Gn. c. man.* 1, 16, 26.

[126] *Gn. c. man.* 1, 20, 31; cf. et *Gn. c. man.* 2, 11, 16.

vede limpidamente dall'affermazione agostiniana secondo la quale essi non hanno nessun rapporto con il Cielo.[127]

7. L'uomo primordiale

Secondo Agostino, Paradiso e vita lassù si debbano intendere in senso figurato perché esso non è un posto ma uno stato;[128] la differenza tra maschio e femmina non è corporale poiché simboleggia il rapporto tra l'intelletto e l'azione (*masculus et femina, id est intellectus et actio, quorum copulatione spiritalis fetus terram impleat*).[129] Per tutto questo non sorprende che Agostino afferma: *l'anima pecco*.[130] Il corpo, quale noi intendiamo, non aveva nessun ruolo nel corso di tentazione.[131] Prima della caduta Dio *irrigabat eam fonte interiore, loquens in intellectum eius*.[132] L'anima decadendo dal rapporto con Dio si è rovesciata come fosse un guanto. Uscendo fuori da se stessa trova un nuovo mezzo per svolgere la sua attività, il corpo.[133] Peccando, l'anima perde la sua primitiva semplicità e allora incomincia a sentire confusione e passioni.[134] Il discorso sul vero corpo si introduce solo con le tuniche di pelle:

> Tutti noi che siamo nati da Adamo siamo stati destinati dalla natura (*coepimus debere naturae*) a pagarle il debito di subire la morte minacciata da Dio quando diede il precetto di non mangiare il frutto dell'albero. La morte era dunque simboleggiata nelle tuniche di pelle (*illa ergo mors in tunicis pelliceis figurata est*)... Dio cambiò i loro corpi nell'attuale natura mortale della carne ove si nascondono cuori menzogneri... I progenitori poi restarono nel paradiso... finché non si giunse alle tuniche di pelle, cioè alla condizione mortale di questa vita (*Tamdiu autem in paradiso fuerunt isti, quamvis iam sub sententia damnantis Dei, donec ventum esset ad pelliceas tunicas, id est ad huius vitae mortalitatem*)... l'uomo viene abbassato fino alla condizione mortale delle bestie.[135]

C'è però qualcosa che non quadra bene con questa ricostruzione del pensiero agostiniano. Lui infatti afferma che il corpo di Adamo è *de limo*[136] e quindi di aspettarsi che

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[127] *Gn. c. man.* 2, 17, 26: quia pecora non amiserunt beatitudinem aliquam coelestem, quam nunquam habuerunt, sed in sua natura quam acceperunt peragunt vitam. *Gn. litt.* 5, 14, 32: nam et pecora dicuntur vivere, quae frui non possunt participatione sapientiae.

[128] *Gn. c. man.* 2, 9, 12. Il fiume della *voluptas* che si divide in quattro bracci, simboleggia le quattro virtù cardinali, cioè *prudentiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam et iustitiam* (ib. 2, 10, 13-14). Così anche le piante paradisiache simboleggiano le virtù dello spirito, non sono le realtà fisiche. Il diavolo tentò Eva attraverso l'immaginazione (*spiritaliter*) e non spaciale (ib. 2, 14, 20). Lui non poteva essere nel Paradiso ma ivi non era neanche il serpente.

[129] *Gn. c. man.* 1, 25, 43. L'idea simile si trova in Filone (*opif.* 59, 165): "Per noi, infatti, la mente vale uomo, la percezione [sensibile] vale donna" (ἐν ἡμῖν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς μὲν ἔχει λόγον ὁ νοῦς, γυναικὸς δ' αἴσθησις). Tuttavia, il primo uomo, quello celeste allora non era differenziato ai sessi (οὔτ' ἄρρεν οὔτε θῆλυ), Ibid. 46, 134.

[130] *Gn. c. man.* 2, 3, 5: *antequam anima peccaret*; 2, 4, 5: *sed hoc nondum erat antequam anima peccaret* 2, 6, 7: *ante peccatum animae.*

[131] J. P. BURNS, *St. Augustine*, p. 221.

[132] *Gn. c. man.* 2, 4, 5.

[133] Ibid: "E poiché, gonfiandosi per superbia verso l'esterno, non fu più irrigato dalla sorgente intima (*non irrigari fonte intimo*)... Orbene, che cos'altro è la superbia se non abbandonare l'intimo segreto della coscienza e desiderare d'apparire ciò che non si è (*quod non est*)"?

[134] *Gn. c. man.* 2, 13, 19: "Quanto al fatto che Adamo e sua moglie erano nudi e non ne provavano vergogna, è simbolo della semplicità (*simplicitatem animae*) e purezza dell'anima".

[135] *Gn. c. man.* 2, 21, 32.

[136] *Gn. c. man.* 2, 7, 8. "Orbene, noi diciamo che il corpo umano divenne fiacco, fragile e destinato alla morte solo dopo il peccato. Costoro infatti, riguardo al nostro corpo, hanno in orrore soltanto la condizione per cui esso è soggetto alla morte, da noi meritata per castigo". L'apologia agostiniana a questo punto è costretta a richiamarsi alla onnipotenza divina, ma aggiungerei, ricorrere a tale argomento è sempre segno di debolezza. È interessante notare che l'idea secondo la quale le cose di per sé soggette alla corruzione sono indistruggibili per voler del Padre, come affermano i medioplatonici: Severo, Attico e Plutarco, interpretando il

è come il corpo attuale, cioè animale.[137] D'altra parte è descritto come corpo spirituale, leggero, semplice, trasparente (perché illuminato) non differenziato sessualmente, quindi immortale. Agostino, in fine, dice palesemente che l'uomo primordiale fu immortale.[138] Se proviamo di concordare queste idee, dovremmo immaginare un corpo altamente spirituale, qualcosa di etereo, che per causa del peccato si trasforma in corpo attuale. L'interpretazione del genere andrebbe bene con la spiegazione del maturo Agostino secondo il quale il corpo celeste dei demoni poté essere mutato in corpo aereo (invisibile ma passibile) a causa del loro peccato.[139] Ma, parlando chiaro, non possiamo dire che vi è una trasformazione, cioè una semplice modificazione, ma l'assunzione di una nuova realtà. Al posto dell'etere si colloca l'aria. Gli elementi fondamentali non si mutano. Dunque, il peccato corrisponde ad una certa insomatizzazione, che è la soluzione vicina a quella origeniana.

8. Riasunto della primitiva concezione agostiniana

Ci sono diversi punti con cui abbiamo l'obbligo di confrontare il "sistema" di Agostino nel contesto delle idee appena abbozzate:

1) Lui davvero sosteneva la tesi di caduta dell'anima nel corpo? Più o meno già ho riportato gli argomenti dei due schieramenti. Il punto più debole di coloro che negano la teoria della caduta dell'anima si trova nel loro congetturato che Agostino per forza doveva valutare positivamente la materia,[140] e che non prendevano in considerazione che lui, quando in seguito parlava del rapporto tra anima e corpo, pensava sempre a *questo* corpo. Inoltre, se uno vuole intendere le affermazioni esplicite di Agostino sulla caduta dell'anima, e spiegarle come riferenti al vero Io, ma che è sempre situato in un corpo umano, come fece per es. Ambrogio[141] (l'interpretazione plausibile), si troverà alle strette davanti ad un altra frase:

> Dunque una simile anima (peccatrice) a causa del peccato non è idonea all'abitazione nel cielo, ma è idonea mediante la pena a quella sulla terra (*Habitationi ergo coelesti talis anima non congruit per peccatum, terrestri autem congruit per supplicium*).[142] Oppure: *In corporibus autem inferioribus atque mortalibus post peccatum ordinata*.[143]

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passo di Timeo 32c3-4, 41b3-6 (*fr*. 32, in E. DES PLACES, *Atticus. Fragments*, Paris 1977; S. LILLA, *Introduzione al Medio platonismo,* pp. 64-69). Tale procedimento non è affatto accettabile per Origene (*sel. in Gen.* PG 12, 101) che dice che alcuni interpreti, cercando di evitare certe difficoltà, hanno sostenuto che le tuniche di pelle sono la condizione mortale, di cui Adamo ed Eva sono stati rivestiti. "Ma costoro non possono agevolmente dimostrare come mai Dio e non il peccato abbia provocato la mortalità a colui che aveva peccato. Inoltre essi debbono sostenere che la carne e le ossa per propria natura non sono corruttibili". Certi autori ortodossi moderni (per es. J. РОМАНИДИС, *Прародитељски грех*, Беседа, Нови Сад 2001; (id.) J. S. ROMANIDES *Original Sin according to St. Paul*, in *St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly*, IV, 1-2, 1955-1956) insistono che Adamo è stato creato come un qualcosa di intermedio: né mortale né immortale (cf. per es. TEOFILO DI ANTIOCHIA, *ad Autol*. 2, 33; 2, 36). Questi, criticando Agostino, dicono che lui, sostenendo la primitiva immortalità dell'uomo, ha fatto Dio responsabile della morte, e che quindi, i cristiani occidentali nutrono un odio e ribbelione contro tale Dio. Agostino, che in seguito ha cambiato la sua posizione, dirà che Adamo fu immortale e che Dio, come inevitabilmente segue, *cambiò i loro corpi nell'attuale natura mortale*. Tuttavia, loro dimenticano che proprio il Crisostomo sosteneva fino alla fine la tesi dell'iniziale immortalità dell'uomo (*hom. in Gen*. 15, 4; PG 53, 123).

[137] *Gn. c. man*. 2, 8, 10.

[138] *Gn. c. man*. 2, 21, 32.

[139] *Gn. litt.* 3, 10, 15.

[140] Così per es. É. Gilson in O'CONNELL, *The Fall of the Soul in the Confessions,* pp. 45-47.

[141] *hexaem*. 6, 43: Anima nostra ad imaginem Dei est. In hac totus es, homo; quia sine hac nihil es; sed es terra et in terram resolveris.

[142] *lib. arb*. 3, 9, 27.

[143] *lib. arb*. 3, 11, 34.

In altre parole, l'anima, dopo il peccato discende nel mondo materiale. Nessun'altra interpretazione mi sembra ammissibile. Inoltre se uno pensa che Agostino riteneva che l'anima era in un corpo etereo, ciò non ha nessuna importanza, perché il suo presunto corpo primitivo non funzionava come corpo attuale, e non era certo di limo. In questo senso coincidono la caduta dell'anima e l'assunzione di un corpo materiale.

2) Trovo invece più importanti gli altri elementi che legano Agostino all'idea greca ad un inizio perfetto. Anche se Agostino rifiuta l'eternità dell'anima e la sua connaturalità con Dio, vede nella sua incorporalità e capacità di pensare sede dell'immagine divina. Al primo posto Dio ha collocato la creatura intellettuale che è partecipe dell'eterna e immutabile Sapienza di Dio, dalla quale ha il suo *habitus*. Contemplando le idee e esercitandosi con le quattro virtù cardinali, essa rimane nell'unione con Dio, come ho già chiamato, Pensante. Se essendo tentata, non materialmente o spazialmente,[144] cede alla superbia e inverte l'ordine ontologico, deve purificarsi via *duplex ordo*: un *ordo vitae* e un *ordo studiorum*.[145] Liberandosi dagli ostacoli materiali e dalla concupiscenza, l'anima si unisce di nuovo con Dio, perché Egli sta "sopra", e non che si debba aspettare il suo arrivo. Per Porfirio, Dio sta molto al di sopra e perciò durante la vita terrena nessun uomo potrà raggiungere la perfetta conoscenza del suo intelletto; dopo questa vita, invece, una volta che l'anima si sarà spogliata del corpo, la potranno conseguire solo pochi, quelli che vissero *secundum intellectum*.[146] Più precisamente dicendo, soltanto pochi e in rare occasioni possono vedere Dio.[147] Platone e Plotino sono più ottimisti su questo punto che Porfirio. Platone nel settimo libro della Repubblica, sostiene che il saggio può raggiungere una visione del Bene in questa vita. Secondo Agostino invece perlomeno alcuni potranno pervenire alla perfetta sapienza già durante questa vita. Nella vita dopo la morte, poi, anche quelli che sono disadatti di apprendere le discipline liberali, purché credano nell'*auctoritas*, vivano bene e preghino, potranno essere liberati più o meno facilmente a seconda delle loro vita più o meno buona. L'ottimismo agostiniano indica la più positiva apprezzatura del corpo rispetto a Porfirio, e la sfiducia nel scetticismo incondizionato.[148] Tuttavia, ciò che accomuna Agostino e i platonici è l'idea base: l'uomo per mezzo di contemplazione filosofica coglie il pensiero divino.

In ultima analisi l'uomo dovrebbe recuperare la sua primitiva capacità di contemplare la mente divina e di rimanere in tale stato grazie alle virtù cardinali che rimarrano in eterno.[149] Il primo Agostino non parla mai dell'eschaton come di una specie di nuova creazione – al contrario – l'uomo torna alla sua posizione originaria.

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[144] *Gn. c. man*. 2, 14, 20.

[145] *ord*. 2, 8, 25.

[146] *civ*. 10, 29, 1. PORF. *de regr. an*. fr. 10 infatti sviluppa il tema platonico di *Tim.* 30cd.

[147] Porfirio descrive l'esperienza mistica di Plotino: "Egli era sempre vigilante e la sua anima era pura e sempre anelante al divino, che amava con tutto il suo cuore. Egli fece di tutto per liberarsi e per fuggire *ai flutti amari di questa vita avida di sangue*. E così specialmente per mezzo di questa luce demoniaca che sale col pensiero sino al primo Dio che è al di là, seguendo la via additata da Platone nel *Simposio*, egli contemplò quel Dio che non ha né forma né essenza, poiché si trova sopra l'Intelligenza e l'intelligibile. A questo Dio, lo confesso, io Porfirio, mi sono accostato e con esso mi sono unito una sola volta: ed ora io ho sessantotto anno. A Plotino apparve la visione del fine vicino. Questo fine e questo scopo era per lui l'unione intima con Dio che è sopra tutte le cose. Finché io fui con lui, egli raggiunse questo fine quattro volte con un atto ineffabile e non potenzialmente" (*vita plot*. 23). Cf. *enn*. 1, 6, 8.

[148] Su questo si veda N. CIPRIANI, *Il rifiuto del pessimismo porfiriano nei primi scritti di S. Agostino*, in *Augustinianum* 37 (1997), 113-146.

[149] Cf. *mus*. 6, 16, 51-55.

9. Il "secondo" Agostino

Con i dodici libri del *De Genesi ad litteram*, Agostino, allontanandosi dalla sua visione giovanile, tenta un'interpretazione non allegorica, ma fondata sui fatti visti nella loro realtà storica.[150] La regola principale che Agostino segue è che tutti i fatti narrati siano storicamente esistiti: questi sono in primo luogo le realtà e poi i simboli.[151] Scrivendo sulle tre opinioni a proposito del paradiso, egli afferma che una certa corrente intende il paradiso unicamente in senso letterale; l'altra solo in senso allegorico; terzi invece prendono il paradiso in entrambi i sensi: cioè ora in senso letterale, ora in senso allegorico, un approccio che lui predilige.[152] Si deve tener conto che in questa opera ci siano più domande che soluzioni e perciò necessitano di ulteriori approfondimenti,[153] ma sono più che preziose perché mostrano lo sviluppo del pensiero agostiniano.

Oramai si notano certi cambiamenti. La terra con i suoi abitanti, nel *Gn. litt.* diventa un posto meno paradisiaco che nel *Gn. c. man.* I vegetali e gli animali dannosi erano presenti nel Paradiso dall'inizio.[154] Esisteva addirittura la catena nel cibarsi tra gli esseri viventi. Dunque l'Eden era in relazione con la nostra terra,[155] anche se protetto. La natura degli esseri corporei comunque è mortale in sé.[156]

Adamo fu l'uomo storico, costituito di carne e ossa. Il corpo dei capostipiti era come quello dei *bruta animalia*. La natura del suo corpo era mortale in sé sin dall'inizio. Ciò provano i seguenti dati: a) fu costituito di terra e acqua, gli elementi passibili; b) si nutriva dall'albero della vita per rimanere in esistenza;[157] c) doveva propagarsi via sesso. Questo problema Agostino tenta di superarlo dicendo che i genitori, senza morire, avrebbero avuto come successori i figli immortali, coloro che sono predestinati di formare un popolo santo, come quello che sarà dopo la risurrezione.[158] Se Agostino prima era tormentato dalla procreazione per mezzo degli organi sessuali, ora la benedizione di Dio si riferisce nientemeno che al desiderio di procreare. Sebbene i vegetali avessero la capacità di riprodursi, non ottennero la benedizione, perché questa è riservata per gli esseri che hanno desiderio di propagare la prole e generano con la coscienza (*sensus*). Allora l'*affectio* e il *sensus* sono intimamente connessi e vengono positivamente valutati. I nostri progenitori avrebbero generato figli con il loro seme ma *sine ullo inquieto ardore libidinis*, senza la fatica e il dolore del parto.[159]

In questo punto Agostino non riccore più nel pericolo platonico di disprezzare la corporeità: *Occorre rifuggire da ogni sorta di corpo* (*omne corpus esse fugiendum*) recita una sentenza di Porfirio.[160] Porfirio avrebbe detto bene se non avesse scritto *ogni cor-*

[150] *retr.* 2, 24, 1.
[151] *Gn. litt.* 8, 4, 8.
[152] *Gn. litt.* 8, 1, 1.
[153] *retr.* 2, 24, 1.
[154] *Gn. litt.* 3, 15, 24.
[155] *Gn. litt.* 3, 18, 28; 3, 16, 25.
[156] *Gn. litt. impf.* 11, 35; 15, 50.
[157] Il frutto di questo albero fu materiale e spirituale (*Gn. litt.* 6, 26, 37).
[158] *Gn. litt.* 3, 21, 33.
[159] *Gn. litt.* 9, 3, 6; 9, 9, 14.
[160] Motivo ricorrente in Porfirio: cf. *sent*. 7-9; fr. ex *de regr. an*.; *ad Marc.* 8, 32, 34 citati dallo stesso Agostino in c*iv.* 10, 29, 2; 22, 26; *serm*. 241, 7. Agostino in questo modo ritratta le sue frasi giovanili: "Anche nell'affermazione che *bisogna del tutto fuggire da codeste realtà sensibili* (*sol*. 1, 14, 24), si sarebbe dovuto evitare il sospetto che facessimo nostra la posizione dello pseudofilosofo Porfirio, secondo il quale si deve fuggire da ogni realtà corporea. Non ho detto *da tutte le realtà sensibili*, ma solo da quelle di questo mondo soggette a corruzione. Avrei dovuto piuttosto dire: non ci saranno più realtà sensibili come queste nel cielo nuovo e nella terra nuova del mondo che verrà" (*retr*. 1, 4, 3).

po: si deve stare, ci suggerisce Agostino, lontano dal corpo corruttibile che appesantisce l'anima, ma non anche dal corpo che non la soffoca, cioè dal corpo incorruttibile. Ci dispiace la corruttibilità, la mortalità, ma non il corpo in quanto corpo.[161]

È da notare che il corpo di Adamo, benché mortale e animale non sarebbe morto senza la trasgressione successiva, perché la componente spirituale dell'albero della vita, che è la sapienza o figura del Cristo, lo manteneva in vita.[162] Dunque, Adamo non ebbe la *plenam immortalitatem*. Fu condizionatamente immortale. Per questa ragione il suo corpo era destinato a trasformarsi, di diventare spirituale, di entrare nella condizione del corpo risorto.[163] Più radicale allontanamento dalla sua giovanile concezione difficilmente si può immaginare. Secondo il primo Agostino, come abbiamo visto, l'uomo fu spirituale, ossia immortale.[164]

Ora si deve risolvere la seguente ambiguità: se il corpo originale fu creato come un corpo naturale, in tal caso noi avremmo ricevuto non solo quanto avevamo perduto in Adamo, ma una qualità superiore perché il corpo spirituale è migliore da quello naturale. Il problema è creato dalla terminologia della Scrittura che afferma che l'uomo sarà *rinnovato*. Agostino dice che noi non accogliamo l'immortalità di un corpo spirituale che l'uomo non aveva ancora, ma riceviamo la giustizia originaria. Il nostro corpo non sarà trasformato nel corpo primitivo, ma in uno migliore, ossia in un corpo spirituale. Solo nella risurrezione i corpi umani non saranno in grado di morire.[165] Dunque, l'uomo non torna ad un suo inizio mitico, ma è indirizzato verso futuro.[166] I corpi dei risorti sono chiamati corpi spirituali, ma non nel senso che saranno spiriti e non più corpi, perché come i corpi attuali sono chiamati corpi animati ma non sono anime, così anche i corpi spirituali non sono spiriti, ma corpi. Si chiamano spirituali perché saranno a disposizione dello spirito. In essi non ci sarà nulla che si ribelli.[167] Il maturo Agostino ammonisce in che modo vada intesa la sua opinione giovanile, espressa per es. nel *De agone christiano* (396) dove aveva affermato che il corpo risorto non sarebbe stato più carne e sangue, ma corpo celeste. In tal modo egli aveva commentato i versetti di Paolo: *La carne e il sangue non possederanno il regno di Dio* (*1 Cor*. 15, 50)... *È necessario che questo corpo corruttibile si rivesta di incorruttibilità e questo corpo mortale si rivesta di immortalità* (*1 Cor*. 15, 53):

> La carne e il sangue saranno cambiati e diventeranno corpo celeste e angelico (*corpus coeleste et angelicum*). *E i morti risusciteranno incorruttibili e anche noi saremo cambiati* (*1 Cor*. 15, 52), in modo che è vero il fatto che la carne risorgerà, ed è anche vero il fatto che la carne e il sangue non possederanno il regno di Dio.[168]

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[161] *serm*. 242A, 3.

[162] *Gn. litt.* 6, 25, 36; 8, 5, 9.

[163] *Gn. litt.* 6, 26, 37. Anche questo punto viene revocato: "*Questo stato di salute raggiungerà il massimo di consistenza e di certezza quando, in un tempo e secondo un ordine stabilito, questo corpo sarà restituito alla sua originaria stabilità* (*mus*. 6, 14, 44). Non si deve intendere però con questo che dopo la risurrezione i nostri corpi non sopravanzeranno quelli dei primi uomini collocati nel paradiso. Basti pensare che, a differenza di questi ultimi, i corpi risuscitati non avranno più bisogno di alimenti di cui nutrirsi" (*retr*. 1, 11, 3).

[164] *Gn. c. man*. 2, 8, 10.

[165] *Gn. litt.* 6, 25, 36.

[166] *retr*. 1, 1, 3: "In un altro passo, trattando dell'anima, ho detto: *Per tornare, resa più sicura, in cielo* (*c. acad.* 2, 9, 22). Per maggior sicurezza avrei dovuto dire *per andare* piuttosto che *per tornare*, e ciò per evitare l'errore di coloro secondo i quali le anime umane, cadute o cacciate dal cielo in conseguenza dei loro peccati, verrebbero costrette a entrare in questi nostri corpi."

[167] *serm*. 242, 8, 11. Lo stesso in *Gn. litt.* 12, 7, 18: "[il corpo spirituale] per la sua completa prontezza e incorruttibilità, sarà sottomesso allo spirito e senza alcun bisogno d'alimenti corporali sarà vIvificato solo dallo spirito, ma non perché avrà una sostanza incorporea".

[168] *agon*. 32, 34.

Tutto ciò quindi non va inteso nel senso che non vi sarà più la sostanza della carne, perché l'Apostolo con i termini *carne* e *sangue* ha designato la corruzione della carne e del sangue, che non vi sarà più in quel regno nel quale la carne sarà incorruttibile. Forse l'Apostolo può aver chiamato *carne* e *sangue* anche le loro opere.[169]

10. La caduta degli esseri razionali in secondo Agostino

Agostino in primo luogo indagava, essendo sempre tormentato dall'idea dell'inizio perfetto, *quando* avvenne la caduta degli angeli: se all'origine stesso del mondo, ossia all'inizio del tempo, o dopo qualche tempo, mentre gli angeli ribelli erano ancora nella comunità degli angeli beati. Al *perché* si risponde abbastanza facilmente, e su questo punto Agostino corregge la tesi che il diavolo precipitò dal cielo perché aveva avuto invidia dell'uomo.[170] L'invidia è conseguenza della superbia, non la precede.[171] *Quando*, dunque, avvenne esattamente la caduta del demonio? Agostino ritiene probabile che questa caduta sia avvennuta all'inizio della creazione:

> Si può anche supporre non senza fondamento che il diavolo cadde a causa della superbia all'origine del tempo e che prima non ci fu alcun tempo in cui visse tranquillo e felice con gli angeli santi ma che si allontanò dal suo Creatore fin dall'inizio della sua creazione.[172]

Il problema è il seguente: l'angelo godeva più o meno dell'unione con Dio? Se ne godeva, per conseguenza avrebbe dovuto esser felice. Ma come potrebbe esser felice un'essere che non ha la sicurezza della sua stessa felicità? La sicurezza proviene dalla conoscenza del proprio destino, e questo risulta dalla partecipazione alla Sapienza divina. In questa comunione spariscono le frontiere temporali. Lo spirito unito con Dio non ha dubbi o incertezze.[173] Per questo, come dice Agostino, alcuni hanno pensato che il diavolo non appartenesse agli angeli sublimi che sono al di sopra dei cieli, ma a quelli che furono creati un po' inferiori ai primi e destinati a funzioni particolari legati al nostro mondo. Gli angeli di questa specie avrebbero forse potuto provare attrazione per qualcosa che non è indirizzato verso Dio, come nel caso del primo uomo.[174] Quindi, Agostino propone che Lucifero cadde immediatamente dopo essere stato creato,[175] perché non vuol classificare gli angeli in gerarchie alte e basse. Questa ipotesi sulla immediata ca-

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[169] *retr*. 2, 3. A proposito la stessa opinione espressa nel *f. et symb*. 10, 24 e *c. Adim*. 26, 1 avverte in *retr*. 1, 17 e 1, 22, 23.

[170] Ireneo racconta dell'angelo che, provando invidia perché l'uomo era oggetto di gratificazioni straordinarie, decise di sedurlo (*demonstr*. 16). In tal modo coincidono la caduta dell'angelo e dell'uomo.

[171] *Gn. litt.* 11, 14, 18; 15, 19.

[172] *Gn. litt.* 11, 16, 21.

[173] Discutendo quattro ipotesi sulla caduta degli angeli, Agostino afferma che "nella beatitudine celeste degli angeli santi non è incerta la loro vita eterna, e questa non sarà incerta neppure per noi, conforme alla... grazia e alla promessa assolutamente fedele di Dio, quando saremo uniti a loro dopo la risurrezione e la trasformazione del nostro corpo terreno" (*Gn. litt.* 11, 26, 33).

[174] *Gn. litt.* 11, 17, 22.

[175] *Gn. litt.* 11, 23, 30: "Non si potrebbe dire che il diavolo cadde fin dalla sua origine; egli infatti non poteva 'cadere' se fosse stato creato cattivo; egli invece si allontanò dalla luce della verità subito dopo essere stato creato, poiché era gonfio di superbia e corrotto, avendo provato compiacimento del proprio potere. Ecco perché non poté godere la dolcezza della vita beata e angelica, non perché non l'avesse ricevuta e poi l'avesse disdegnata, ma perché se ne allontanò e la perse rifiutando di riceverla. Per questo motivo non poté avere nemmeno la previsione della propria caduta, poiché la sapienza è frutto del timore di Dio". Ancora in *civ*. 11, 13 Agostino mantiene questa tesi, trovando appoggio nel NT, dove si afferma che *dall'inizio il diavolo pecca* (*1 Gv*. 3, 8). Questo non va però interpretato in chiave manichea, come egli ammonisce, cioè che dall'inizio ci sono due principi distinti per natura.

duta dell'angelo, anche se la più coerente tra quelle ipotizzabili, viene in seguito rifiutata dallo stesso Agostino, sempre meno convinto del presupposto platonico che l'inizio sia uguale alla fine. Quindi, fin dall'inizio esiste una distanza incolmabile tra Dio e le sue creature. Ciò vale tanto per gli angeli quanto per gli uomini.

Di nuovo, Agostino si chiede qual era la felicità dell'uomo nel paradiso. Due sono le possibilità: o l'uomo era incerto della sua felicità – e allora come poteva essere veramente felice? – o la sua certezza si fondava su di una falsa speranza, ed allora sarebbe stato stolto, il che è un chiaro segno della condizione postlapsaria.[176] Come soluzione viene proposta la gradazione degli stati di beatitudine, i quali, nel caso degli angeli, non sono tuttavia accettati come modello esplicabile. In tal modo Adamo aveva una vita felice in una certa misura, anche se non prevedeva la sua caduta:

> Sebbene egli non fosse sicuro, in base a una vana presunzione, d'una realtà incerta come uno stolto, ma restando fedele in virtù della speranza, prima di ottenere la vita in cui sarebbe stato del tutto sicuro della sua stessa vita eterna, avrebbe potuto *rallegrarsi*, come dice la Scrittura, *con tremore* (*Sal*. 2, 11), e con questa gioia godere nel paradiso di una felicità molto maggiore di quella che hanno i fedeli servi di Dio quaggiù sulla terra, anche se, in qualche misura, minore di quella degli angeli santi che vivono al di sopra dei cieli nella vita eterna, ma nondimeno reale.[177]

Il nostro autore dunque introduce l'ignoranza non più come conseguenza del peccato, ma come indicazione dell'imperfezione, che non ha un valore etico.[178] Questa soluzione viene alla fine, nel *De correptione et gratia* (426/7), applicata alla caduta del diavolo. Così la discrepanza fra le due diverse soluzioni, proposte nel *De Genesi ad litteram*, viene così superata:

> Ma anche il diavolo e i suoi angeli erano beati prima che cadessero, e non sapevano che sarebbero piombati nella miseria; c'era tuttavia ancora qualcosa che poteva essere aggiunta alla loro beatitudine, se per mezzo del libero arbitrio fossero restati saldi nella verità fino a ricevere quella pienezza della più alta beatitudine come premio della loro perseveranza. Cioè, dopo aver avuto dallo Spirito santo grande abbondanza dell'amore di Dio, essi non avrebbero più potuto assolutamente cadere e lo avrebbero saputo con assoluta certezza. Non avevano questa pienezza della beatitudine, ma poiché ignoravano la loro futura miseria, godevano di una beatitudine minore, ma tuttavia senza difetto. Infatti se avessero conosciuto la loro futura caduta e la condanna eterna, certo non avrebbero potuto essere beati perché il timore di un male tanto grande li avrebbe ridotti ad essere infelici fin da allora.[179]

Tutto questo ci fa intendere che Agostino introdusse, per così dire, dalla porta di servizio l'idea di evoluzione in luogo della statica visione platonica. Lo schema origeniano-evagriano: στάσις–κίνησις–γένεσις è lasciato da parte. Da adesso in poi il primo posto è occupato dalla creazione, seguita dal movimento, che a sua volta finisce nell'immutabilità.

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[176] *Gn. litt.* 11, 18, 23.

[177] *Gn. litt.* 11, 18, 24.

[178] Nel *lib. arb.* 3, 71-74, l'ignoranza, ossia *stultitia* è *vitium*, non fa parte dell'originaria natura umana. Cf. O'CONNELL, *The Origin of the Soul*, pp. 50-52.

[179] *correpт*. 10, 27. Lo stesso si riferisce ad Adamo: "Infatti egli non sarebbe potuto essere beato neppure nel paradiso terrestre, anzi non avrebbe potuto nemmeno starci, lì dove non si conviene essere infelici, se la prescienza della sua caduta con il timore di un male tanto grande lo avesse afflitto" (*correpт*. 10, 28). Un'altra testimonianza di questo cambiamento del pensiero di Agostino lo troviamo in un'opera che scrisse prima di *correpт*. Si tratta dell'*Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide et spe et caritate* (422) 9, 28: "Ma dopo l'atto di superbia di colui che fu trasformato in diavolo, commesso con complici di empietà, tutti gli altri con pia obbedienza si unirono al Signore, ricevendo anche una scienza certa, che non ebbero i primi, grazie alla quale poter essere sicuri di una saldezza eterna e assolutamente incrollabile".

11. Le considerazioni conclusive

La concezione ciclica, ovvero quella che ritiene che l'universo sia stazionario – espresso in linguaggio moderno – che inizio corrisponde a fine è una impostazione statica dell'essere. Lo stesso essere rimane prigioniero di se stesso, perché il suo fondamento è qualcosa di certo e di anticipato. Gli individui si rapportano con il generale grazie una sola natura che condividono. Il giovane Agostino fu ferito di tale ideazione. Raffigurava nella mente un inizio ideale. Acquistando sempre di più le impostazione giudeo-cristiane, cambia bruscamente l'ontologia "indubbia". Nulla è dato come sicuro in precedenza. La certezza non è più nell'essere come tale, ma nella volontà di Dio.

Il punto debole della concezione stabile è di spiegare la prima rottura nella sfera celeste: come mai qualcosa che è perfetto si distacca dalla sua perfezione? e come mai, dopo il recupero, non ci si presenteranno le successive fratture?[180] Questa domanda non ha nessun senso dentro un sistema ciclico. Soltanto da una prospettiva lineare del tempo si può obbiettare al concetto concorrente. La chiesa, infatti, si è rifiutata di approvare l'idee origeniane ritenendole incompatibili con la sua dottrina.

Abbiamo visto che secondo il giovane neoconvertito praticare le virtù e la contemplazione era qualcosa essenziale per la creatura dotata dalla ragione. Grazie alle virtù e l'amore essa rimaneva unita a Dio. Lo stesso meccanismo doveva valere anche per la condizione eschatologica. Il maturo Agostino invece nega che le virtù saranno necessarie in cielo.[181] Se queste mantenevano il primo uomo nella comunione con Dio, la successiva caduta, se la stessa regola rimane per il secondo uomo, è inevitabile. La futura caduta non sarà possibile non soltanto perché Dio è riuscito di ammaestrare il suo fanciullo disobbediente, e perché l'amore dell'altro è accresciuto, ma perché il secondo uomo sarà interamente incorporato in Dio. Parliamo di ben nota visione di *totus Christus*. Il Cristo escatologico è il capo del suo corpo che contiene tutti gli angeli e gli uomini santi, che devono rimpiazzare il numero degli angeli ribelli e in questo modo ricostruire il primitivo disegno divino. Tutto ciò che accederà all'immutabile eternità, non potrà decadere perché entra nella dimensione della divina esistenza, che è disegnata proprio dalla prerogativa *immodificabile*.

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[180] Agostino non va d'accordo con le affermazioni filosofiche (Pitagora, Platone, Porfirio etc.), che le anime dimenticano completamente le miserie della vita precedente e cominciano a desiderare il ritorno nel corpo. Il nostro retore enfaticamente dice: "Tornano a dimenticarsi di Dio o, magari, a bestemmiarlo; tornano a provare il richiamo dei piaceri del corpo e a lottare contro le passioni disordinate. Ma da dove tornano a sobbarcarsi a queste miserie e con che scopo? Dimmelo! Perché fanno così? Perché hanno dimenticato. Se hanno dimenticato tutti i mali dimentichino anche i piaceri carnali! Questo solo, per loro disavventura, ricordano, cioè quello che le ha rovinate... E tornano: ma perché? Perché trovano piacevole abitare in un corpo come prima. Come provano un tal piacere se non perché ricordano che un tempo hanno abitato nel corpo? Togli via ogni ricordo, e forse otterrai che rimane la sapienza. Non rimanga null'altro che possa richiamare indietro" (*serm*. 241, 4). Continuando la polemica sullo stesso tema Agostino riporta un brano di Virgilio, dove Enea agli inferi chiede a suo padre, che gli ha presentato le anime di romani famosi che da lì salgono al cielo, come mai esse volevano tornare ad abitare in un corpo. Enea chiama folle quel desiderio e sventurate quelle anime (VIRG. *Aen.* 6, 719-721). Infatti esse non possono essere beate se sanno che dovranno sperimentare di nuovo lunghe miserie nella vita successiva. Non possono essere beate se ad esse manca la sicurezza, ma se non sanno il futuro, sono beate perché preda dell'errore; saranno beate non per l'eternità ma per la falsità (*serm*. 241, 5). I filosofi poi intendono raggiungere la vita beata quaggiù, ma essa si avrà dopo la morte. Lassù uno avrà la speranza di tornare alla vita misera? Quindi la speranza d'essere infelici ci dona la felicità, mentre la speranza della felicità ci rende infelici. È illogico che le anime esenti da colpa, divenute sapienti e pure, possano desiderare di ritornare nel corpo per amore di esso (*serm*. 241, 6).

[181] *Gn. litt.* 12, 26, 54.

Un altro elemento del primo Agostino verrà ritrattato: infatti, l'uomo non si collega a Dio grazie alla sua forza contemplativa (questo non significa che lui si augura con i posteri di godere la beata ignoranza). È amareggiato di "aver dato troppo peso alle discipline liberali sulle quali grande è l'ignoranza di molti santi, mentre alcuni, pur conoscendole, non sono dei santi".[182]

Se il giovane Agostino riteneva che l'uomo può giungere alla visione di Dio in questa vita, più maturo contesterà tale convinzione.[183] Dio infatti non sta più "al di sopra", come in platonismo, e basta quindi soltanto innalzarsi per raggiungerlo, ma sta "in futuro". A uomo rimane attenderlo con fiducia. È illuminante questa ritrattazione di Agostino:

> Mi rammarico anche di aver sostenuto, non a nome di Platone o dei platonici, ma come si trattasse di una posizione mia, che esistono due mondi, l'uno sensibile, l'altro intelligibile, e di aver insinuato che questo avrebbe voluto intendere il Signore (*ord.* 1, 11, 32) in quanto anziché dire: *Il mio regno non è del mondo*, dice invece: *Il mio regno non è di questo mondo* (*Gv*. 18, 36). Si potrebbe scoprire che alla base di quelle parole v'è una qualche locuzione consacrata dall'uso. In ogni caso, se Cristo Signore fa riferimento ad un altro mondo, lo si potrebbe più convenientemente identificare con quel mondo in cui ci saranno *un cielo nuovo ed una terra nuova* (*Is*. 65, 17; 66, 22; *2 Pt*. 3, 13; *Ap*. 21, 1), quando avrà compimento quella realtà che invochiamo con le parole: *Venga il tuo regno* (*Mt*. 6, 10).[184]

La dottrina platonica sul mondo intelligibile, invece si debba identificare con la stessa immutabile ragione con la quale Dio ha creato il mondo.[185] Grazie al questo modello Agostino vuole spiegarsi meglio e scappare il pericolo origeniano. Nella creazione primordiale l'uomo fu fatto maschio e femmina, *invisibiliter, potentialiter, causaliter, quomodo fiunt futura non facta*; e in un altro modo dopo, cioè: "visibilmente, nella forma della struttura umana che noi conosciamo".[186] O'Connell[187] ha ragione quando ritiene che Agostino ha dissociato la creazione primordiale da quella posteriore, ma erra affermando che il corpo "vero" appare nel sesto giorno. Considero che O'Connell volle insistere sulla continuità del pensiero agostiniano, e in un certo senso attribuire al secondo Agostino di affermare che l'anima aveva una vita consapevole e precedente. Il sesto giorno appartiene ai "giorni" invisibili in cui Dio creò tutte le cose contemporaneamente, e agli altri giorni cosiddetti "normali" fa parte la creazione del corpo. Esso si sviluppa nel tempo dall'involucro primordiale. Agostino infatti era preoccupato che qualcuno pensasse qualcosa che lui non sosteneva. Era convinto tuttavia che parecchi pensavano che egli considerasse che l'uomo,

> esistesse già dotato d'una certa forma di vita con cui potesse capire, credere e comprendere... Chi dunque immagina ciò, sappia che io non ho né pensato né affermato una simile cosa (*noverit ergo qui hoc putat, non hoc me sensisse, neque dixisse*).[188]

D'altronde se nella creazione primordiale l'uomo non era tale qual è attualmente, non si deve credere che l'uomo non esisteva affatto.[189] Esisteva solamente nelle "ragioni causali" (*rationes causales*). Per questo Agostino non accetta come possibile la soluzione di coloro che sulla scia origenista sostenevano che nel sesto giorno erano state create

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[182] *retr*. 1, 3, 2.
[183] Il primo distacco si nota nel 395 (cf. *c. Adim. man*. 9, 1).
[184] *retr*. 1, 3, 2.
[185] *retr*. 1, 3, 2.
[186] *Gn. litt.* 6, 6, 10. Cf. *Gn. litt.* 6, 5, 8.
[187] R. J. O'CONNELL, *The Origin of the Soul,* p. 211.
[188] *Gn. litt.* 6, 6, 9.
[189] *Gn. litt.* 6, 6, 10.

le anime secondo l'immagine di Dio, mentre il corpo sarebbe stato formato in seguito. Una tale interpretazione non è plausibile perché la creazione era stata completata e perché il sesso maschile e femminile può esistere solo in rapporto ai corpi.[190] Però questi corpi non esistevano in modo che potessero percepire o funzionare come i corpi attuali.[191] In un certo senso le cose sensibili sono state portate a perfezione e in altro senso sono abbozzate le medesime cose che Dio creò tutte nello stesso tempo.[192] Ivi Agostino decisamente respinge la posizione che aveva assunto nel *Gn. c. man.* (1, 25, 43), non però menzionandola come propria:

> Se invece uno penserà che i due sessi sono in certo qual modo l'intelletto e l'azione in un'unica anima (*intellectum et actionem... in una anima*), che cosa farà dei frutti degli alberi dati da Dio come alimento nello stesso giorno, dal momento che l'alimento è certamente necessario solo a un uomo dotato di corpo? Poiché, se uno vorrà prendere anche questo alimento in senso figurato, si allontanerà dal senso vero e proprio dei fatti, che innanzitutto e con ogni scrupolo dev'essere messo alla base per quanto riguarda narrazioni di tal genere.[193]

„Uno che pensa" è il primo Agostino. Questa è la prova decisiva, secondo me, che il primo Agostino, in ultima analisi, sosteneva che Dio all'origine ha creato l'anima che in seguito è caduta nel mondo materiale. Il maturo Agostino invece ha rielaborato questa visione giovanile dandole un altro senso grazie alla riflessione più profonda sui concetti basilari del platonismo.

L'ultimo argomento da menzionare è il rapporto di Agostino con i due altri pensatori cristiani, Giuliano di Eclano e Teodoro di Mopsuestia, che sostenevano una specie di "evoluzione", ossia l'idea di un inizio incompleto. Gli studiosi moderni hanno un compito arduo di mettere insieme le affermazioni contrastanti che si leggono nell'opera di Teodoro,[194] pervenuteci purtroppo in precarie condizioni a causa della condanna che lo colpì dopo la morte. Da una parte sono attestate le dichiarazioni che Adamo si è reso responsabile per l'entrata della morte, d'altra parte si afferma che l'uomo sin dall'origine era mortale.[195] Secondo Devreesse vi è una "seule explication possible: l'interpolation".[196] Io, pur ammettendo l'ipotesi della falsificazione in altri casi, in questo non sono così sicuro. Teodoro sosteneva la teoria delle due κατάστασις, cioè dei due periodi o delle due condizioni dell'uomo: la prima sarebbe una condizione di mortalità originale,

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[190] *Gn. litt.* 6, 7, 12.
[191] *Gn. litt.* 6, 8, 13.
[192] *Gn. litt.* 6, 11, 18.
[193] Ibid.
[194] Tale è il procedimento di S. ZINCONE, *Studi sulla visione dell'uomo in ambito antiocheno: Diodoro, Crisostomo, Teodoro, Teodoreto*, Roma: Japadre editore, 1988, pp. 39-46.
[195] Alcune delle affermazioni, secondo le quali Adamo provocò la morte del genere umano, cioè che Adamo divenne mortale in seguito alla prevaricazione: *comm. in Rom*. 5, 12, 14; 7, 4; 8, 19; *comm. in Gal*. 1, 3-5; 2, 15-16; *in Io*. 12, 31; 17, 11. Le affermazioni contrastanti si trovano in Θεοδώρου Ἀντιοχέως πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας φύσει καὶ οὐ γνώμῃ πταίειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (*Contra dicentes: peccatum naturae inesse*). Cf. *bibl*. 177. Secondo Fozio, non è sufficiente, contestare un'opinione errata, ma se ne devono trovare le vere ragioni. Tra gli argomenti inaccettabili di Teodoro vi è quello della mortalità naturale di Adamo: ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μὲν θνητὸν πεπλάσθαι τὸν Ἀδάμ. Questa affermazione, sostiene Fozio, non conduce ai retti giudizi: οὐ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ τοῦτό μοι δοκοῦν εἰς ὀρθοὺς ἀναφέρειν λογισμούς. Eppure, l'idea della *naturalis mortalitas* è attestata anche nei commenti alla *Lettera ai Romani* di Teodoro. La mortalità naturale ha una funzione pedagogica perché l'uomo possa esercitare le virtù e comprendere i fini utili per la sua salvezza (*comm. in Rom*. 11, 15; *comm. in Gal*. II) Dio tra l'altro creò Adamo mortale perché il suo peccato non diventasse immortale (*In Gen*. PG 66, 640C-D). S. ZINCONE, *Studi...* p. 46 conclude che "Nella visione di Teodoro la mortalità, insita nella natura dell'uomo per provvidenziale decisione divina, è senza dubbio un limite di cui si sperimenta quotidianamente la drammatica realtà, ma è anche principio di salvezza e palestra di libertà."
[196] R. DEVREESSE, *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste*, Città del Vaticano 1948, p. 103.

vale a dire, di mortalità non condizionata dalla trasgressione; la seconda una condizione di incorruttibilità, immortalità e impeccabilità instaurata da Cristo con la sua resurrezione.[197] La teoria delle due κατάστασις vuole suggerire che è l'uomo colui che arriva, dopo l'esercizio e le proprie imprese eroiche, a Dio. Durante il primo periodo l'uomo si prepara per entrare in comunità con Dio. In questa impostazione la salvezza parte da giù, e nella agostiniana da su. Agostino non crede che chiunque sia esercizio potrebbe rendere l'uomo talmente forte a diventare irremovibile.

La morte, secondo Agostino che segue Paolo, è nemica dell'uomo e quando essa sarà sconfitta sarà distrutto anche il suo frutto, il peccato. Giuliano di Eclano ha una simile visione, ma a differenza di Agostino egli dice che scompariranno tutte le forze della potestà avversaria "quando la morte *eterna* vedrà se stessa distrutta e vinta da tutti i santi".[198] Non dice semplicemente la morte ma la morte *eterna*, cioè la morte spirituale. Per Giuliano nemica è la morte eterna, per Agostino quella del corpo e poi la "morte seconda". Agostino è più vicino di Guliano alla moderna psicologia[199] quando afferma che la paura della morte è innata e che nessuno la sente come una benedizione, che sarebbe senz'altro nel caso se fosse naturale.[200] L'uomo naturale non si può liberare né dalla morte né dal peccato.[201] Per questo Agostino non può accettare la tesi di Celestio: *Adam mortalem factum, qui sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, fuisset moriturus*.[202] L'uomo mortale è un essere frustato e spinto a peccare. Solamente nella resurrezione futura, attraverso l'annientamento della morte, scomparirà anche il peccato e la possibilità di peccare.

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[197] *In Gen*. PG 66, 633: "A Dio piacque dividere la creazione in due catastasi (*in duos status divisit Deus creaturam*): una che è quella presente, in cui ha fatto tutte le cose mutevoli; la seconda, che sarà quella futura, quando rinnovando tutte le cose, le renderà immutabili."

[198] *opus imp*. 6, 37.

[199] Secondo lo studio, ormai celebre, di ERNEST BECKER, *The Denial of Death* (New York: The Free Press, 1973) che ha vinto il premio Pulitzer nel 1974, la paura della morte è il mecanismo basilare che oprime lo *self* umano e lo trascina nelle neurosi e psicosi.

[200] Cf. *opus imp*. 2, 186: "Insomma, se è ingiustificato il timore della morte, è una pena lo stesso suo timore; se invece è per legge di natura che l'anima non vuole essere separata dal corpo, la morte stessa è una pena, sebbene la grazia divina la converta in un buon uso".

[201] Essere morituri ha invece per conseguenza un disordinato modo di agire. Per questo Agostino non accettava l'idea che Adamo o gli angeli abbiano avuto paura della morte (cf. *opus imp*. 6, 14).

[202] *gest. Pel.* 11, 23; *gr. et pecc. or.* 2, 11, 12.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 128-151

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Baptême chez saint Grégoire Palamas

L'Introduction

Quel pourrait être l'intérêt de parler une fois de plus de la théologie de saint Grégoire Palamas étant donné que tant de livres ont été écrit et tant d'élaborations faites? Apparemment que sa pensée reste toujours peu connue pour certains scolaires et pour beaucoup de chrétiens. La raison pour cela est facile à expliquer. Un nom de plus ou de moins, une conception théologique de plus ou de moins, dans le monde d'aujourd'hui ne changera pas beaucoup de choses. Nous pensons le contraire. Notre temps est un temps de la recherche des idées et des personnes qui peuvent rassembler. Dans la théologie et dans la pensée orthodoxe ce sont les pères qui d'une certaine manière sont les unificateurs et témoins d'unité. Notre travail consiste de démontrer que Palamas, bien que déjà accepté comme père et témoin par les orthodoxes, peut aussi l'être pour la chrétienté d'aujourd'hui.

Grégoire Palamas (1291-1358) fut l'archevêque de Thessalonique, grande figure de la théologie orthodoxe. Il est connu par sa théologie sur les énergies participables qui révèlent Dieu telle qu'il se veut aux hommes.[1]

A vrai dire, beaucoup d'études ont été écrites au sujet du baptême. Notre travail prend en considération cela et essaye de faire un exposé de la conception de baptême chez Palamas d'un point de vue qui se veut être un peu différent. Quand on parle du baptême chez tel ou tel père nous prenons tout d'abord : le contexte historique – nous mettons la pensée de ce père dans son contexte et son milieu et nous établissons les liens entre ce contexte et la raison de parler du baptême dont il le fait. Ensuite nous prenons le côté liturgique qui est un des moments important pour comprendre du quel rite baptismal il s'agit.

Autre raison pour laquelle nous avons choisis notre sujet est de montrer comment le baptême raisonne dans l'ensemble de la pensée de Palamas. Nous pensons, et en cela nous sommes d'accord avec père Meyendorff[2], que le baptême chez Palamas est en effet le sacrement-mystère[3] qui explique le mieux les deux côtés de sa pensée : a) côté théologique – qui touche à des questions sur les énergies et la grâce et, b) côté liturgique – qui

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[1] Sur Palamas voir : J. Meyendorff, « Palamas (Grégoire)», dans *Dictionnaire de la spiritualité*, Tome n° 12, 1984, col. 81-107

[2] J. Meyendorff, *Introduction à l'étude de Grégoire Palamas*, coll. Patristica Sorbonensia 3, Seuil, Paris, 1959, pp. 217-218

[3] Nous allons utiliser toutes les deux expressions car, d'un côté le mot mystère désigne une réalité concrète chez Palamas, et d'autre le mot sacrement est conventionné dans le langage théologique français pour désigner ce que Palamas appel mystère.

touche à la question d'importance de la vie dans l'Eglise pour participer à la divinisation par les énergies. Nous allons donc proposer une lecture qui essaye de donner la réponse aux deux aspects.

En effet, depuis que la controverse sur la participation aux énergies divines avait commencé elle a prit, à notre avis, un chemin erroné surtout en Occident. Palamas dans ses premiers écrits,[4] donne une réponse concrète à la question : est-ce que le Dieu est connaissable et comment. L'unique approche, que ses adversaires faisaient, était de l'ordre gnoséologique. Une autre dimension, qui fut mise en exergue est la dimension théologique au sens premier du mot. Quand on dit théologique on pense à la question : qu'est-ce que Dieu si Il est participable. S'Il se fait participant aux hommes est-ce que cela veux dire que Dieu change ? C'est la vieille question qui touche au cœur même de la querelle « palamite » qui de son côté avait produit beaucoup de désaccords, surtout en Orient.[5] Puisque les adversaires de Palamas avaient déjà accepté la théologie scholastique[6] étant réfugiés en Occident, cela appliquait en soi que la « théologie palamite » serait condamnée en Occident. Avec une renaissance d'intérêt premier pour la théologie patristique dans l'Eglise orthodoxe du début du XX siècle, Palamas étant présent dans la Liturgie de l'Eglise comme un père et auteur incontestable trouve forcément sa propre place dans ce renouveau.[7] Un tel renouveau apporte une suspicion par rapport à la « théologie palamite » en Occident. Puisque Palamas fut condamné en Occident sans être entendu, les théologiens occidentaux vont faire des recherches pour voir en effet quelle sorte de la théologie est celle de Palamas. L'un des premiers ouvrages sur Palamas fut la thèse de S. Guichardan qui donne un point de vue théologique et philosophique et qui fait lectures des œuvres de Palamas à travers les concepts scholastiques.[8] En outre, la réponse arrive du côté orthodoxe qui veut démontrer que Palamas doit être lu différemment de ce qu'on a prit l'habitude de le faire. Le père Kern donnera la première explication de la théologie de Palamas.[9] Ces premières tentatives ont été suivies d'un dialogue fructueux, et ont aboutit à une compréhension que la théologie sur les énergies en Dieu relève d'une Triadologie qui est propre à l'Orient.[10] La théologie des énergies divines de Palamas donc est propre à la tradition orthodoxe.

Une autre question qui se pose au sujet de la théologie de Palamas est : peut-on dire que la théologie de Palamas introduit une nouveauté par rapport à l'importance de l'Incarnation. Cette question se pose comme légitime parce que si on accepte l'existence des énergies en Dieu comme une manière de participer à Dieu, nous n'avons plus besoin de l'Eglise, ni même d'un Dieu incarné. En effet, participer aux énergies nie l'importance de l'Eglise. Cette question fut résolue par les études qui ont invoquées la théologie de l'Esprit et son importance dans la théologie de Palamas. Ainsi il est établit d'après les

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[4] Par exemple : *Traités apodictiques*, 6-8, pp. 163-166

[5] Voir pour l'histoire de la querelle : Meyendorff, *Introduction*, 65-129

[6] Sur cette question voir : J. S. Romanides, « Notes sur la controverse palamite et les thèmes liées » [en anglais], *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review* IX, winter, 1963-1964, pp. 236-249

[7] B. Krivosheine, « L'enseignement ascétique et théologique de Grégoire Palamas » [en anglais], *The Eastern Churches Quarterly* 4, 1938, pp. 1-67

[8] S. Guichardan, *Le problème de la simplicité divine en Orient et en Occident aux XIV et XV siècles : Grégoire Palamas, Duns Scot, Georges Scholarios*, thèse de doctorat, Lyon, 1933

[9] C. Kern, « Les éléments de la théologie de Grégoire Palamas », *Irénikon* 20, 1947, pp. 6-33, 164-193

[10] D, Stiernon, « Bulletin sur le palamisme », *Revue des études byzantines* 30, 1972, pp. 231-337, et : A. de Halleux, « Palamisme » in *Patrologie et œcuménisme – recueil d'études*, Leuven University Press, 1990, pp. 769-831

œuvres de Palamas, que l'Esprit joue le rôle le plus important dans sa théologie. L'équilibre est gardé entre le personnalisme trinitaire oriental et l'ecclésiologie. La théologie de l'Esprit qui possède la place centrale dans la théologie orthodoxe est ainsi confirmée par l'œuvre théologique de Palamas.[11] L'équilibre entre la christologie et la pneumatologie chez Palamas fut démontré par la thèse de S. Yangagzoglou qui constate que la pneumatologie n'est en aucun cas privilégiée dans la pensée de Palamas.[12]

Ce qui suscite une recherche profonde est de voir dans quel mesure la théologie de Palamas trouve son appuie dans la vie sacramentaire de l'Eglise. Avec un renouveau liturgique et un renouveau de la théologie liturgique proposée par père Schmemann, la théologie orthodoxe redécouvre le fondement même de ce qu'elle voit comme axe d'auto-compréhension – l'Eucharistie. Ainsi la théologie de Palamas placée dans ce contexte se veut exagérée car elle insiste sur la participation aux énergies peut importe si cette participation se fait dans ou en-dehors de l'Eglise.

Comment Palamas conçoit-il l'Eglise et la vie ecclésiale ? La participation aux énergies est-elle une participation aux énergies dans l'Eglise ou une autre sorte de participation ? Voici les questions qui sont encore à étudier dans la pensée de Palamas.

Notre travail essaye donc d'aborder une de ces questions à partir du sacrement-mystère du baptême du côté rituel et théologique à la fois. Il ne se fonde pas sur une recherche des textes liturgiques et de la liturgie, bien que cet aspect soit présent dans notre recherche et lecture. Nous nous contentons de voir que les textes patristiques sont liés théologiquement à l'action baptismale et par elle à la vie ecclésiale. De cette manière nous allons aussi traiter le sujet indiqué chez Palamas. La liturgie et son rôle dans la théologie de Palamas n'est donc, pas le but principal de notre étude.

Nous faisons recours à l'herméneutique de Palamas pour voir : a) comment comprend-t-il les Ecritures tout d'abord dans les homélies que nous utilisons, et b) quelle est la manière dont il explique les Ecritures.

La recherche que nous faisons essaye de démontrer comment Palamas voit le sacrement-mystère du baptême. Nous espérons qu'une telle approche ouvre les portes de la compréhension de l'Eglise et de l'Eucharistie dans la pensée théologique de Palamas. Elle sera, semble-t-il, un éclaircissement pour tous – aussi bien pour les Orientaux que pour les Occidentaux. Dans l'Eglise catholique romaine c'est avec le concile Vatican II, que l'ouverture est faite surtout dans le domaine de la liturgie et de l'ecclésiologie. Pour cette raison notre sujet se veut comme une ouverture de la théologie orthodoxe à l'Eglise catholique romaine en vue de donner de nouvelles pistes au dialogue et faire comprendre de quelle manière les orthodoxes voient-ils la théologie sacramentaire et l'ecclésiologie de Palamas.

1. La contextualisation des homélies de Palamas

1.1. Une interprétation dans l'histoire

Parler des mystères–sacrements avait été toujours un défit, car dans la conception orientale montrer ce qui est le mystère–sacrement représente en effet montrer comment le théologien qui en parle comprend ce qu'est l'Eglise et ce qu'est la vie en Christ. Cela fut aussi un défit pour Grégoire Palamas, bien que par sa plume il n'a pas écrit beaucoup sur

[11] Pour illustration voir : V. Lossky, *Théologie mystique de l'Eglise d'Orient*, Paris, 1944. A savoir que le pneumatologie de Lossky n'est pas exagéré. Elle le devient par les interprétations postérieures.

[12] S. Yangazoglou, *La communion de la déification – synthèse de christologie et pneumatologie dans l'œuvre de saint Grégoire Palamas* [en grec], éd. Domos, Athènes, 2001

les mystères–sacrements. Néanmoins, Palamas avait mentionné assez souvent le baptême.[13] A notre avis, le baptême est d'une grande importance dans la conception théologique de Palamas.[14] Notre travail sera abordé à partir des deux homélies[15] que Palamas avait prononcées comme archevêque de Thessalonique des années 1340-1347. Il explique l'Evangile et cet Evangile lui donne une opportunité de parler à propos du baptême.

L'évidence d'une interprétation des Ecritures dans les deux homélies est plus que claire. D'après les textes auxquels Palamas fait recours et d'après le lectionnaire byzantin nous voyons qu'il s'agit des trois textes qu'il interprète. Ces trois textes ne sont pas lus en même temps, mais dans ces deux jours de fête. Pour le jour d'avant-fête il s'agit d'Evangile selon Luc 3, 1-18 (péricope 9),[16] pour le jour d'Epiphanie il s'agit d'Evangile selon Mathieu 3, 13-17 (péricope 6), et en même temps il fait recours à l'Evangile selon Marc 1, 9-15[17] (péricope 2). Les textes nous expliquent le message que porte ces jours de fête. Ainsi, la veille de la fête est célébrée comme le jour du baptême du Christ. Pour cette raison là, la lecture s'arrête avant la partie où on a décrit l'événement scripturaire du témoignage du Père et de l'Esprit lors du baptême du Christ par Jean le Baptiste. Les deux parties de l'Evangiles néanmoins, sont liés par le message interne qu'ils veulent transmettre et par ce message on comprend la personne même du Christ et Son baptême.

L'Evangile qui décrit le témoignage du Père et de l'Esprit à propos du Fils, selon la tradition byzantine, est gardé pour être lu pour le jour de la fête de l'Epiphanie (Mt. 3, 13-17), et cela explique l'importance de cet événement dans la compréhension de la liturgie byzantine et dans la théologie de celle-ci. La compréhension de l'économie divine chez les pères et théologiens byzantins donnaient une place très importante à cet événement décrit dans les Ecritures. L'importance et l'évidence de la révélation de la Trinité toute entière – de la théophanie, sera donc traité par Palamas aussi dans la deuxième homélie du jour de l'Epiphanie qui est appelée et Théophanie (*theos* – Dieu ; et *phaneo* – explication, révélation). Ce nom signifie, selon la tradition byzantine, que dans cet événement toute l'économie divine fut révélée aux hommes à travers le Dieu Trine.

On peut voir que Palamas reste fidèle aux textes des évangiles du jour, et qu'en expliquant l'évangile de la veille il ne mentionne pas celui qui est à lire pour l'Epiphanie. Ainsi on peut établir quels évangiles ont été lus. Il s'évertue à bien étayer son explication de l'Evangile du jour. Cela, semble-t-il, est nécessaire tout d'abord pour des raisons pastorales.

1.2. La problématique des homélies de Palamas

Pour bien comprendre les homélies que allons traiter il est utile de rappeler le contexte historique dans lequel Palamas les a prononcées. Elles l'ont été lors de son épiscopat.

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[13] Voir dans les œuvres de Palamas: *Traités apodictiques*, p. 232; *De la divine et déifiante participation*, p. 20

[14] Voir : J. Meyendorff, *Introduction*, p. 227

[15] Nous allons consulter pour notre travail homélies en grec avec la traduction en grec moderne édite par P. Christu : ΕΠΕ, Γρηγοριου του Παλαμα, ΕΡΓΑ 11, Ὁμιλίες (ΜΓ΄-ΞΓ΄), Θεσσαλονικη, 1996 ; et la traduction existante en français : Grégoire Palamas, Homélies, éd. L'échelle de Jacob, YMCA-PRESS/O.E.I.L. 1987. Dans l'édition de Christou, les homélies portent des chiffres 59 et 60. Dans l'édition française des chiffres III et IV.

[16] Le lectionnaire byzantine de l'époque et de nos jours ne connait pas les divisions en chapitres et verset. La manière de lire les Ecritures était selon les péricopes. Pour cette raison-ci nous avons aussi donné et les renseignements à partir de péricopes. Voir : A. Kniazeff, « La lecture de l'Ancien et du Nouveau Testament dans le rite byzantin », in *La prière des Heures*, éd. Lex Orandi 35, Paris, 1963, pp. 208-222

[17] Dans la tradition byzantine contemporaine on lit la péricope de Marc pour la consécration des eaux du jour d'avant fête de Epiphanie : *Grand Euchologe et Arkhiératikon,* éd. Diaconie Apostolique, Parma, 1992, p. 390

L'époque de l'épiscopat[18] de Palamas à Thessalonique fut très difficile. Il a dut se battre contre les divisions qui existaient encore à Thessalonique.[19] L'écho des zélotes était encore présent. Selon eux, Palamas pensait comme un de leur adversaire politique, Jean Cantacuzène.[20] Ainsi Palamas, tel un pasteur de l'Eglise a d'abord, du affronter les problèmes de scissions dans la ville de Thessalonique.[21] Il faut dire que les zélotes, gouverneurs de la ville, ont précipités la vie ecclésiale de Thessalonique dans l'isolement. Devant lui Palamas eut divers problèmes auxquels il devait faire face et en parler dans son homélie. Il fallait aborder ces questions en qualité de pasteur qui veut que son Eglise soit toujours sur le chemin vers Dieu. Des calomnies furent prononcées contre Palamas qui ne lui permirent pas d'entrer à Thessalonique en 1347. Il y entra en 1350 et fut accepté par le peuple. Palamas fut avant tout celui qui essaye réunir les fidèles autour de lui i.e. dans l'Eglise.[22] Ceux qui sont prêts à entendre la voix du salut, la voix qui change de l'intérieure vers l'extérieur, seront autour du pasteur. Un changement dans la vie, d'ailleurs, fut toujours la préoccupation de Palamas dans ces homélies et dans ses paroles. Les paroles qu'il utilise dans les sermons sont toujours dans cette intention ; faire des fidèles de meilleurs hommes, des meilleurs chrétiens, de hommes sauvés déjà en ce monde.[23]

De la même manière Palamas explique pourquoi il parle du baptême :

> « Puisque la plupart des personnes qui obtiennent ce divin bain, sont encore dans leur plus jeune âge et ne connaissent la puissance de ce mystère, eh bien, dévoilons-la maintenant aux oreilles de tous, en peu de mots, car la fête qui s'approche l'exige. »[24]

La manière dont il traite les questions pourrait être appelée ecclésiale. Cette manière consiste tout d'abord de voir l'histoire du salut décrite dans les Ecritures comme une histoire confier à l'Eglise et pour l'Eglise. L'Eglise étant en chemin constant vers Dieu sauve les hommes. Nous pouvons dire que Palamas engage toute sa pensée pour apprendre aux fidèles ce qu'est l'Eglise. L'explication et la liaison qu'il expose entre le baptême du Christ et celui d'un chrétien sont présentées par Palamas comme une seule réalité qui explique le pourquoi de l'Eglise. Or, cette explication veut souligner que le baptême du Christ a eu lieu, et est un événement disons – cosmique. Cet événement est directement lié à chaque personne baptisée. L'événement du baptême du Christ et de la descente de l'Esprit est présent aussi pour les hommes dans l'Eglise :

> « … *J'ai contemplé l'Esprit descendant des cieux comme une colombe, et il demeura sur Lui* (ἐπ' αὐτόν), non seulement sur Lui, mais aussi en Lui (καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ), (Jean en est le témoin, quand il dit : « de sa plénitude nous avons tous reçu ».[25]

Cette idée que le salut est un fait de l'économie divine pour les hommes sera constante dans toute l'intention pastorale de Palamas. Pour ainsi dire son point de départ théologique et pastoral est sotériologie. A partir de cela nous voyons que la conception de Palamas vient d'abord de ce contexte ecclésial car le salut est dans l'Eglise :

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[18] George T. Dennis, « Les Métropolites de Thessalonique en Byzance Tardive » [en anglais], Dumbarton Oaks Paper 57, (2003), pp. 255-264

[19] Tafrali, O. *Thessalonique au XIV siècle*, Paris, 1936, p. 124

[20] J. Meyendorff, *Introduction,* pp. 134-136

[21] Déjà dans sa prière qu'il avait prononcée avant d'entrer à Thessalonique, Palamas souligne que la guerre entre les frères fut un péché et qu'il faut chercher pardon et l'union, dans le sang du Christ – dans la communion. Voir : Grégoire Palamas, ΕΠΕ, τ. 8, p. 524

[22] *Homélies 24*, 11

[23] V. Miltiadis, *Les points sociaux de saint Grégoire Palamas* [en grec], thèse de master, Thessalonique 1997, non publié

[24] *Homélie III*, 1

[25] *Homélie IV*, 10

> « En fin, nous sommes les frères et par la richesse d'avoir une mère commune –Sainte Eglise et la piété (εὐσεβία), des quelles le Chef et metteur en fin de tout, est le véritable Fils de Dieu, Qui n'est pas uniquement notre Dieu, mais il a voulu être et notre frère et notre père, et plus que cela, être la Tête qui nous réunisse dans un seul Corps et fait de sorte que nous soyons les membres les uns aux autres et à Lui-même. »[26]

La conception théologique de Palamas est basée sur la sotériologie.[27] Puisque l'Eglise est conçue dans le Christ[28] qui se donne par l'Esprit Saint c'est Lui qui procure l'unité et qui est le fondement de l'Eglise. Le fait qui en témoigne est la grâce qui est donné dans le Christ par l'Esprit Saint pour l'union de tous :

> « Pour quelle raison encore les langues parurent-elles se partager sur eux ? Parce qu'au Christ venu d'en haut, et à Lui seul, l'Esprit a été donné sans mesure par le Père ; oui, en plénitude Il possédait même dans sa chair, la puissance et l'énergie divines, et nul autre n'a contenu tout entière la grâce de l'Esprit ; ce n'est qu'en partie que chacun obtient le charisme qui lui revient : afin que nul n'aille penser que la grâce données aux saints par l'Esprit est une nature. »[29]

Nous pouvons constatés que Palamas cherche toujours à présenter les textes dans toute leur richesse. Richesse qu'il présentait d'abord pour que la communauté entre dans le mystère qui est décrit dans les Ecritures aussi. Ce mystère des textes scripturaires, selon Palamas, nourrit les membres de l'Eglise. Quand il parle des mystères, cet auteur les rend compréhensibles en les liants à la lettre des Ecritures. De plus, elles doivent pousser celui qui écoute à aller scruter et chercher toujours toutes les richesses que les Ecritures donnent. Ainsi il va dire :

> « Etant donné que l'Eglise du Christ n'accueil pas aux sons seins uniquement des hommes simples, et encore plus dans cette grande ville, mais aussi des sages, qui le sont soit de par leur nature, soit de par leur formation aux sciences profanes ou à mes enseignements, le sermon que je vous transmets n'est ni trop élevé, ni trop simple, même si j'ai l'intention de lever ceux qui sont plus bas, que de faire descendre à cause d'eux, ceux qui sont plus haut. Celui qui est attentif et qui écoute le message, même s'il est simple, il ne sera pas dépouillé de la compréhension de ce qui est dit. »[30]

Nous voyons donc, que Palamas a toujours l'intention de prendre en compte tous les faits. Il souligne que l'avancement dans la vie ecclésiale est proposé à tous d'une manière approprié à chacun. L'intention indiquée ci-dessus, présente dans les homélies de Palamas va se traduire dans une interprétation à la fois contextuelle et actualisante. Il va toujours souligner la nécessité des liaisons entre les événements de l'économie divino-humaine et la vie quotidienne.[31]

1.2.1. La première homélie (59)

La première homélie[32] essaye donc, de donner une réponse à des questions concernant le baptême. Le baptême est une entrée dans la vie qui désigne les chrétiens comme les fils de Dieu. Il mentionne que le baptême gracie le baptisé et explique pourquoi le baptême est nécessaire. La manière dont Palamas aborde la question du baptême est surtout à tra-

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[26] *Homélies 1*, 1
[27] J. Meyendorff, *Introduction*, p 249
[28] *Homélies 1*, 1
[29] *XII homélies*, X, 3, pp. 176-177
[30] *Homélie* 33, 3
[31] *Homélie* 26, 1-14
[32] Une brève explication de l'homélie est donnée par P. Christou dans l'introduction sur des Homélies de Palamas. Voir : ΕΠΕ, 11, p. 17

vers le rite qui s'accomplit sur celui qui veut être baptisé. Palamas explique qu'il va parler du baptême à travers le rite tout d'abord parce que :

> « La plupart des personnes qui obtiennent ce divin bain, sont encore dans leur plus jeune âge et ne connaissent pas la puissance du mystère. »[33]

On pense que Palamas essaye de réintroduire les fidèles dans le mystère du baptême et en même temps, il fait un « rappel au souvenir et de l'examen attentif des cérémonies saintes du baptême »[34]. Les autres propos qu'il va en évoquer seront la nécessité du repentir au cas où on s'éloigne des promesses faites pendant le baptême et la nécessité des actes pour commencer et vivre dans la foi. En même temps, il introduit ceux qui l'écoutent dans la totalité du mystère du jour, i.e. dans la fête du baptême du Christ en leur parlant de la fête d'après les textes lus dans l'Evangile du jour. Il fait cela en établissant la liaison qui existe entre le baptême du Christ et le baptême des fidèles. La première homélie est caractéristique par un langage simple et cohérent. L'homélie essaye d'introduire les auditeurs dans la compréhension de la vie sacramentelle à travers le sacrement qui sera pour Palamas le sacrement non pas uniquement de l'initiation mais aussi d'une vie nouvelle. Pour cette raison nous pouvons dire que Palamas utilise un langage qui est celui du rite, un langage sacramentel. Palamas insiste aux liens réels entre le rite et ce qui est donné par ce rite – la grâce de Dieu, la grâce de l'Esprit Saint. Il ne parle pas d'aucun dualisme. Il confirme la réalité sacramentelle dans son contexte liturgique et ecclésiale. Cette réalité constitue d'une part la vie, car elle ouvre la porte de la filiation[35] et d'autre part la participation à la vie divine. Il finit l'homélie en soulignant qu'il continuera le jour d'après, et dit que : l'Esprit ne quitte jamais les baptisés s'ils vivent dans le repentir.

1.2.2. La deuxième homélie (60)

La deuxième homélie s'attache à l'explication de l'évangile du jour.[36] Néanmoins puisque cet Evangile traite de la révélation des deux autres Hypostases divines au moment du baptême du Christ, Palamas va continuer l'explication de la signification du baptême du Christ pour les chrétiens et de la signification de cet événement qui est fêtés. Il en parle à partir de la conception de l'économie divino-humaine. Dans cette homélie il va surtout souligner la relation entre baptême du Christ et celui du fidèle. Il met en exergue le rôle de Jean Baptiste dans l'évènement et parle de la différence qui existe entre le baptême fait par le Baptiste et celui qui est fait par le Christ et après le Christ. Il souligne que le baptême des fidèles est identique à celui du Christ car les fidèles sont baptisés en Lui, par l'Esprit qui est descendu sur le Christ et qui descend sur les fidèles aussi. Tout cela est fait pour montrer qu'il faut aller vers le Père. L'homélie reste comme celle du jour d'avant, très claire et précise. Elle devienne une sorte d'explication profondément théologique du baptême du Christ et de l'économie divino-humaine qui se fait pour les hommes. La théologie qu'il expose est profondément liée à la pensée patristique. Tout au long de son homélie, l'aspect de la théologie trinitaire domine. Pour dire quels sont les faits de la vie nouvelle, Palamas insiste sur la description de ce qu'est la vie nouvelle. Selon lui la vie nouvelle est la vie trinitaire qui est donnée aux fidèles.

Ces deux homélies sont tellement liées qu'elles ne peuvent être abordées séparément. Cela est bien compréhensible car la conjonction des deux jours festivals le mette

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[33] *Homélie III*, 1
[34] Ibidem
[35] *Homélie III*, 4
[36] *Homélie IV*, 1

en exergue. Le but des homélies fut d'expliquer de la manière compréhensible le rôle du baptême du Christ et de faire à partir de celui-ci l'explication du baptême des fidèles. Pour preuve que les homélies sont liées nous pouvons citer les paroles de Palamas qui à la fin de la première homélie dit :

> « Quant à nous, nous poursuivrons plus tard le reste de ce sujet comme appartenant au jour principal de la fête ».[37]

Par cela nous voyons, quant au contenu des homélies, qu'elles traitent le même sujet. Cela est aussi témoigné par le fait que même les questions secondaires se répètent, par exemple l'explication et la signification de la courroie des sandales.[38]

1.3. Interprétation des Ecritures

Nous allons aborder la manière dans laquelle Palamas interprète les Ecritures car cela va nous permettre au moment donné de bien discerner les questions de la relation entre symbole et réalité chez Palamas qui seront posées dans le texte qui suit.

Il faut établir que Palamas prend en conscience le temps et le lieu de l'explication. Palamas était très attentif à des questions de la vie quotidienne. Il essaye toujours d'interpréter les Ecritures afin de souligner la vraie signification de ce que les Ecritures présente. Néanmoins il ne s'agit pas d'une interprétation pour on-ne-sait-pas-qui. Il prend en compte la communauté qui est devant lui. Dans une de ces homélies il va dire :

> « Selon nous et ce petit goût est aussi la profondeur inépuisable. Même si nous avons déjà interprété le miracle du paralytique à votre charité au moment où Marc l'annonce cet événement en bonne parole à l'Eglise, même si nous avons par la grâce qui en découle nourrit vos âmes, nous allons aujourd'hui, en scrutant ce miracle que nous raconte l'évangéliste Mathieu, de nouveau trouver la magnificence de la richesse de la nourriture spirituelle, ou autrement dit, nous allons découvrir aujourd'hui un peu de cette richesse qui est caché. Et cette part sera non seulement suffisante pour tous, mais elle va surabonder. De cette manière comme au jour où le Seigneur a nourri mille hommes avec les pains, en les multipliant pendant qu'Il les partageait. Or, en ce temps là je vous ai d'abord proposé comme nourriture les rayons de miel, exposant, par une interprétation d'un sens plus sensible et éthique, et l'histoire même de ce miracle. Mais, étant donné que j'avais déjà séparé le miel des rayons, je vais régaler avec joie, dans la mesure où le temps me le permettra, ceux qui se sont réunit pour cette fête spirituelle. »[39]

Une interprétation actualisante chez Palamas n'est pas uniquement comprise dans le sens de la contextualité scripturaire. Il s'agit néanmoins d'une contextualité, comme nous avons déjà dit et de ce qui est vu de communautaire dans la citation indiquée.

Ainsi, l'Evangile du jour en liaison avec les événements de la vie quotidienne fait une contextualité plus vaste, mais en même temps cette liaison se montre très nécessaire pour la compréhension de la pensée et de l'interprétation que Palamas fait quant aux Ecritures. Pour illustrer cela nous pouvons indiquer l'homélie prononcée pendant le temps de la moisson.[40] Palamas va dire :

> « C'est maintenant le temps de la moisson dans cette période d'année chez nous, mais la moisson dans nous même n'existe pas ! Pour nous, en fait, il n'existe pas uniquement moisson de ce monde, mais aussi une moisson noétique et spirituelle. . . Etant aujourd'hui entre les murs du temple, élevons nous en esprit au dessus de cette place, mettons notre espoir auprès du Seigneur et plaçons notre esprit au ciel, en pensant sur la moisson noétique et spirituelle.

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[37] *Homélie III*, 10
[38] *Homélie III*, 8 ; *IV*, 7
[39] *Homélies 29*, 2
[40] *Homélies 27*

Nous allons dire à votre charité à propos de cela quelques mots, en vous donnant ainsi quelques repères pour le salut. »[41]

Les homélies que nous traitons sont conçues de la même manière. Il prend le texte évangélique, il le regarde d'abord dans son contexte historique et après il essaye de trouver un sens plus profond qui conviendra pour son temps. Cette manière de scruter les Ecritures est déjà présente chez saint Grégoire de Nysse[42] et saint Maxime le Confesseur.[43] Dans une autre citation il dit:

« *Les cieux s'ouvrirent sur lui* ; ou comme Marc le dit (Mc. I, 10), *Ils se fendirent* : *en remontant de l'eau, Il vit les cieux se fendre* ; pourquoi donc l'un a-t-il écrit *s'ouvrirent*, et l'autre *se fendirent* ? Pour qu'il n'échappe pas, à quiconque écoute intelligemment, que le mode de ce mystère est double (διπλοῦς ὢν ὁ τοῦ μυστιρίου τρόπος). Oui, par l'expression *s'ouvrirent*, Matthieu a montré que les cieux nous étaient auparavant fermés, à cause de notre péché et de notre désobéissance envers Dieu».[44]

Il est évident que Palamas essaye de démontrer qu'il y a deux réalités, deux manières (τρόπος) pour comprendre. Pour lui, il est important de prendre conscience des deux. Il s'agit d'abord d'une compréhension de ce qui est dit par le texte scripturaire avec son contexte (le temps, le lieu, les coutumes etc.) Nous voyons que Palamas commence par le fait historique qu'il lit non plus comme un fait mystique et non-existant, mais comme un fait d'histoire du salut. Ainsi remarque-t-il :

« Discernons d'abord ce que dit l'histoire évangélique à propos de lui (Zachée). *Dans ce temps-là Jésus entra à Jéricho*. Quel est ce *temps-là* ? C'est le temps quand il a purifié les lépreux, donné la faculté de voir aux aveugles, quand à cause de leur histoires, avec les autres, et chez Zachée eu nait l'envie de le voir ».[45]

Après avoir donné une longue explication du texte tel qu'il est lu dans le récit évangélique, Palamas invite :

« En élevant vos pensées envers un sens plus haut, soyez attentifs à ce qui suit. Etant donné que le nom de Zachée veut dire *justifié*, il me semble en partant de ce qui est dit que les pharisiens, qui se disaient les justes, en effet ils étaient les publicains. »[46]

Pour finir avec l'explication sur ce qu'est Zachée pour les chrétiens, il va dire :

« De cette manière nous avions exposé en bref et le sens allégorique de cette histoire. »[47]

La manière dans laquelle Palamas donne l'explication des Ecritures nous montre qu'il réunit deux manières de comprendre les Ecritures : la manière historique et la manière actualisante. Cette actualisation, néanmoins n'est jamais artificielle. Elle reste dans le domaine du compréhensible et accessible. « L'allégorie », comme nous pouvons le voir, pour Palamas n'as pas le sens de scission, elle est plutôt ἀναγωγή vers les mystères de la vie divine. C'est dans ce contexte qu'il va parler du baptême. Pour Palamas le baptême est vu tout d'abord dans le contexte de l'histoire scripturaire. Ainsi, l'explication du baptême sera dans toutes les deux homélies liée au texte scripturaire. Cela donne à Palamas à la fois une simplicité et une ampleur. Dans l'homélie sur Zachée Palamas va précisément souligner ce que nous venons de dire :

« Quand à son temps l'évangéliste Luc avait prêché à propos de la guérison des lépreux, et en suite concernant les aveugles de corps, cela donc, avait été notre point de départ pour le ser-

[41] *Homélie 26*, 4
[42] Voir : Grégoire de Nysse, *La vie de Moïse*, SC 1ter, Cerf, Paris, 1968, p 107
[43] Voir : Maxime le Confesseur, *Ambigua* , Les Editions de l'Ancre, 1994, p 168
[44] *Homélie IV*, 5
[45] *Homélies 62*, 2
[46] *Homélies 62*, 8
[47] *Homélies 62*, 9

mon spirituel que nous avons dit à votre charité. »[48]

« Le sermon spirituel » est donc, une sorte de mystagogie par laquelle Palamas veut amener ses fidèles à la vie divine.[49] Voyons en effet que Palamas prend des faites connues pour aller dans le sens de un approfondissement de l'histoire du salut. « L'allégorie » est utilisée par lui, pour que les fidèles entrent dans la richesse de la vie de l'Eglise. Il veut dire en effet, que la vie des fidèles doit se changer constamment, car cela est une nouvelle manière de vivre, une nouvelle manière de comprendre le monde autour de soi.

Un autre fait à rappeler nécessaire pour conclure est que Palamas interprète les Ecritures tout d'abord, comme un livre liturgique. Il y trouve des moments et des parties qui sont écrits comme les signes aux fidèles qui les conduisent vers la vie dans le mystère de la foi et de l'Eglise. Les explications qu'il donne sont, de manière très soucieuse, fondées sur les Ecritures qui, à son avis, sont les paroles de la vie qui conduisent les fidèles dans leur chemin vers Dieu.

1.4. Le baptême est un mystère–sacrement

Il faut tout d'abord constater que dans le langage de Palamas il n'y a pas de mention de sacrement. Palamas avait gardé la conception qui est différente de celle de la scholastique, selon laquelle le sacrement fait liaison entre le vrai corps du Christ qui est *res significata et sigificans* et le corps mystique qui est l'Eglise – *res significata et non sigificans*.[50] Pour Palamas la base à partir de laquelle est comprise la réalité appelée en latin *sacramentum* et en français *sacrement* est l'économie divino-humaine. La totalité du mystère pour Palamas est la vie divine. Disons qu'il donne une approche à partir de la fin, à partir du salut déjà fait en Christ. Ainsi les termes le sacrement et le mystère sont dans la conception de Palamas une et même chose aussi bien linguistiquement que théologiquement. Cela fait que dans notre étude nous retiendrons l'une expression toujours à côté de l'autre. Cela est confirmé du côté linguistiques, car Palamas utilise qu'un seul mot – τὸ μυστήριον pour désigner la réalité du mystère–sacrement. Théologiquement la raison pour cela est tout d'abord parce que pour lui, tout ressort d'une et même θεανδρικὴ οἰκονομία – l'économie divino-humaine.[51]

Palamas avec une intention particulière essaye de rappeler ce qu'est un baptême à fin d'expliquer son importance et de démontrer quelle est la liaison entre le baptême des fidèles et le baptême du Christ. En même temps Palamas introduit les fidèles dans le rite lui-même, il donne des explications et montre aux fidèles en quoi consiste le rite du baptême à son époque. Notre recherche pose la question légitime du comment Palamas avait-il compris le baptême dans l'ensemble des mystères–sacrements. D'ailleurs, combien de mystères–sacrements Palamas mention-t-il ? Toutes ces questions sont très intéressantes car, à notre avis, les réponses à ces questions vont une fois de plus nous aider d'établir comment comprend-t-il les mystères–sacrements aussi que leur rôle.

Dans les homélies de Palamas nous trouvons que les trois mystères–sacrements d'initiation chrétienne sont la base et le nœud de la compréhension des mystères–sacrements chez lui. Il dit dans les homélies que nous traitons :

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[48] *Homélies 62*, 1

[49] Une manière très similaire à celle exposée dans le livre de P.-C. Bori, *L'interprétation infinie,* Cerf, Paris, 1991

[50] D'après L.-M. Chauvet, *Symbole et sacrement*, p. 475.

[51] En cela Palamas est d'accord avec Jean Chrysostome qui parle d'une seule réalité une seule « économie divino-humaine » dans laquelle tous les hommes trouvent la salut. A propos ce sujet voir : A. Jevtic, *L'ecclésiologie du saint apôtre Paul selon saint Chrysostome* [en serbe], p. 210

> « … Il nous a confié la tâche d'accomplir le sacrifice non sanglant en mémoire de ceci (l'économie du salut par mort et résurrection), et de recueillir ainsi les fruits du salut ; par l'âme, il est descendu en enfer et en est revenu, communiquant à tous lumière et la vie éternelle, et Il nous à confié, en signe de cela, la tâche d'accomplir le divin baptême et de recueillir grâce à celui-ci les fruits du salut. Par chacun de ces mystères et l'action conjointe des deux, l'âme et le corps sont déifiés et reçoivent les semences de la vie sans mélange. Car de ces deux mystères dépend tout notre salut, l'économie divino-humaine tout entière étant récapitulée en eux. »[52]

Nous pouvons constater que pour Palamas ces deux mystères sont au cœur même de la vie ecclésiale.[53] Pour Palamas comme d'ailleurs pour son contemporain Nicolas Cabasilas,[54] il y a trois mystères qu'on voit comme tels : le baptême, la chrismation qui fait partie du baptême, et l'Eucharistie. A notre avis ces trois mystères pour Palamas sont les centres de l'ecclésialité. L'un est le début – le baptême, l'autre est confirmation et le troisième est la somme et le but de la vie en Eglise- l'Eucharistie.[55] Palamas va dire :

> « Tout cela sont des archétypes des mystères qui se font chez nous : la mer est l'archétype de l'eau baptismale ; le nuage – celui de l'Esprit divin qui mystiquement, des hauteurs des cieux, illumine les baptisés, aliment et breuvage – celui du Corps et Sang du Christ auxquels nous communions, pour ainsi dire, quotidiennement. »[56]

D'abord on voit que Palamas établit les trois mystères et en parle. Ces trois mystères sont le fondement même de la vie ecclésiale. C'est sur eux que se fonde la vie ecclésiale, car ils sont le commencement et la vie chrétienne. Nous n'avons pas d'autres citations qui pourraient confirmer l'idée que Palamas appelle les autres actions de l'Eglise « mystères ». Pour Palamas le mystère achève à la déification qui est la vie en Dieu.[57] Avec une déification qui est la vie dans la montée vers Dieu, tous les mystères sont des mystères qui font des fidèles des participants à la vie divine.[58] Cette vie est donc, un chemin sans arrêt.[59]Dans une telle compréhension le plus important est le début de ce chemin – le baptême, aussi que les mystères qui suivent, qui font de la vie chrétienne un chemin sans fin pour Palamas.

Palamas établit que les coutumes des gens de l'Eglise de son époque ne sont pas de l'ordre acceptable pour la vie ecclésiale et il essaye de dire et d'expliquer pourquoi cela doit changer. Il parle souvent de la nécessité de vivre une vie agréable à Dieu, une vie qui est une vie de la foi.[60]Pour ainsi dire, une compréhension des mystères que donne Palamas, est aussi la mise en pratique complète de sa théologie.

1.5. Le baptême expliqué par Palamas

Bien que notre étude n'ait pas la prétention de parler de l'aspect liturgique, ce sont les homélies que nous utilisons qui nous y obligent d'une certaine manière à le faire.[61]

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[52] *Homélie IV*, 3

[53] Cela fut constaté et par M.-H. Congourdeau dans : *Histoire du christianisme* 6, éd. Desclée/Fayard, p. 453 ; voir également : *Homélies* 8, 8 éd. serbe, p 64

[54] Nicolas Cabasilas, *La vie en Christ*, SC 355, Cerf, Paris, 1985

[55] Sur l'Eucharistie de Palamas voir : J. Van Rossum, « L'Eucharistie chez saint Grégoire Palamas », *Contact* 202 (2003), pp. 180-192

[56] *Homélies 38*, 10

[57] *De la divine et déifiante participation*, pp 22-23

[58] *Homélie III*, 4

[59] *Défense*, II, 3, 41

[60] *Homélie III*, 1

[61] Contextualiser un ouvrage se fait tout d'abord par établir les points centraux de ce ouvrage et d'en parler. Comme le rite – l'action rituelle est un des points centraux dans les homélies nous en parlerons au fur à la mesure avec l'attention de ne pas prétendre faire une recherche propre à un liturgiste. Néanmoins si

Palamas commence l'exposé de l'action baptismale et dit que quand l'évêque[62] voit que vers lui s'approche celui qui veut être baptisé il « rend mentalement grâce » à Dieu qui est la cause de toute chose. La convocation de l'Eglise, pour Palamas, semble être un geste nécessaire avant le baptême et il est fait par l'évêque. La raison de la convocation est tout d'abord l'envie de « célébrer en commun le salut de cet homme qui s'est approché, et d'y coopérer (συμπράξοντας). »[63] La logique qui nous procure le texte originel, nous amène à conclure que le baptême faisait partie de l'Eucharistie, car Palamas en quelque sorte souligne la présence de la plénitude de l'Eglise. Il dit, que l'évêque convoque l'Eglise qu'il préside, cela veut dire l'assemblée en entier. Après cette confirmation il dit que l'évêque est entouré par les prêtres devant la sainte table et qu'il prononce avec eux et « devant tous » l'action de grâce (τὴν εὐχαριστίαν), après quoi il (l'évêque) sort pour demander au futur baptisé « dans quelle intention il s'est approché de l'Eglise ». Nous voyons, que Palamas, souligne que l'assemblée fait l'Eglise, et que d'une manière le baptême est fait pour que le futur baptisé devienne un membre de l'Eglise. Cela montre que Palamas propose un cadre à travers lequel on doit regarder le baptême et il souligne l'importance de « ce cadre » pour le futur baptisé. Donc si on peut dire, la première étape est la convocation des fidèles de l'Eglise coopérant au salut.

Après s'être réunit et avoir commencé à rendre grâce à Dieu « qui fait tout », c'est l'évêque qui sort et demande au futur baptisé pourquoi est-il venu. Ce dernier répond seul ou par l'intermédiaire, qu'il veut « avec l'intercession et la coopération de l'évêque, appartenir à Dieu et participer aux réalités divines (διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεσιτείας καὶ συεργίας τοῦ Θεοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ τῶν θεῖων ἐπιτυχεῖν)[64]. Le futur baptisé ainsi confirme qu'il veut être nommé pour l'un des membres de l'Eglise. Nous pouvons supposés que le mot « τῶν θεῖων » au génitif pluriel, signifie le plus vraisemblablement le sacrement de l'Eucharistie.

Dans le discours que l'évêque fait après la réponse du futur baptisé, on voit que Palamas souligne, qu'il faut que chez le futur baptisé la profession et la vie s'unissent, car la promesse est faite à Dieu seul. Palamas mentionne aussi que l'évêque fait un discours « de la conduite conforme à l'Evangile »[65] et il demande la confirmation de celui qui veut être baptisé que c'est là la vie que ce dernier avait choisit. Après la réponse positive l'évêque lui applique le sceau et le place ainsi parmi les sauvés en l'inscrivant dans des livres.[66] L'évêque prie Dieu.

Ayant dépouillé ses vêtements, le futur baptisé se tourne vers l'occident pour repousser Satan et le renoncer. Ce renoncement est fait trois fois. Nous voyons que Palamas cherche dans les gestes une signification qui amènera à une meilleure compréhension de ce que le baptême est dans son ensemble. Ainsi il va continuer :

> « …l'action de regarder vers l'occident et de repousser des mains indique celle de se détourner des ténèbres du péché ; par l'insufflation, il (le futur baptisé) montre qu'il expire, écarte, et en quelque sorte rejette comme étant le propre de diable, la disposition intérieure établit en lui par le péché, et la triple confession du renoncement signifie qu'il échappe, avec certitude

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notre recherche donne des pistes d'ouverture à ce sujet, nous trouverons que le chapitre sur le rite de Palamas avait obtenue une raison être.

[62] Palamas utilise l'expression « ὁ ἱεράρχης » qui indique qu'il s'agit tout d'abord d'évêque comme présidant de l'Eglise.

[63] *Homélie III*, 2

[64] *Homélie III*, 2

[65] Ibidem

[66] On peut comprendre qu'il s'agit d'un catalogue des baptisés qui existait dans l'Eglise ancienne aussi.

et définitivement, à l'ennemi de Dieu »[67]

L'insufflation qui est aussi faite par le futur baptisé, signifie que la disposition intérieure est aussi changée vers la vie pure. Le pourquoi du triple renoncement Palamas le voit dans le souhait de montrer toute la certitude que le baptisé à échapper à l'ennemi.

L'évêque ordonne que le futur baptisé se tourne vers l'orient pour se joindre au Christ. Il faut remarquer que Palamas n'indique pas précisément, est-ce qu'il y avait une confession de foi ou pas. Il dit au début de l'homélie que la confession au cours du rite est « proférée par notre bouche »[68] ce qui peut nous amener à penser que la confession faisait partie du rite. Palamas souligne que le futur baptisé se tourne vers l'orient et tend les mains pour confesser et confirmer qu'il se joint au Christ.

L'évêque scelle de l'huile sainte de l'onction le futur baptisé. Ce sont les prêtres qui oignent le reste du corps du futur baptisé. Après l'onction le futur baptisé, il est amené vers « les saints fonds, qui déjà ont été sanctifié par des actions et des épiclèses nombreuses et très-saintes».[69] Le baptême est fait par une triple immersion «invoquant à les trois hypostases à chaque immersion ».[70] Palamas va développer toute une théologie du baptême. Le baptême se termine par l'habillement du baptisé d'un habit lumineux, par l'onction de myrrhe divine et par la communion aux saints dons – le corps et sang du Christ.

Or, nous voyons maintenant que l'action de grâce (τὴν εὐχαριστίαν) mentionnée au début du texte peut être comprise comme l'Eucharistie, car pour communier et célèbrer l'Eucharistie une assemblée est nécessaire. Aussi, il est intéressant de voir que pour Palamas le baptême se termine par l'Eucharistie. Il considère que les trois mystères–sacrements (le baptême, la chrismation et l'Eucharistie) font partie d'un et même mystère d'initiation du chrétien dans l'Eglise – qui le mène vers la déification. Tout cela fait que le baptisé :

> « Est devenu un enfant de lumière, concorporel au Christ (Eph. 3,6) et participant de l'Esprit (ἀπολύει φωτὸς τέκνον αὐτὸν δείξας ἐντεῦθεν γεγενημένον καὶ Χριστῷ σύσσωμον καὶ τοῦ θείου Πνεύματος μέτοχον) ».[71]

2. La réalité du mystère – l'économie divino-humaine

Dans son discours homilétique expliquant le baptême, à travers l'interprétation scripturaire, s'appuyant sur la pensée patristique et l'explication de l'action baptismal, Palamas souligne l'importance du baptême. L'auteur scrute la profondeur de ce baptême et montre qu'il est partie intégrante de l'économie divino-humaine pour l'Eglise. Notre troisième partie consiste donc s'interroger sur la pensée théologique de Palamas par rapport aux trois axes suivants : a)l'axe christologique, b) l'axe pneumatologique et c) l'axe ecclésiologique. La vraie théologie est cachée dans le rite comme nous venons de l'indiquer dans le sous-chapitre précédent. Il faut établir d'abord ce qu'est pour Palamas raison d'être du baptême.

2.1. L'homme dans le chemin vers Dieu

Palamas n'est pas le premier à dire que le baptême s'inscrit dans un retour avant la chute du premier homme. Il est intéressant de constater que Palamas nous procure les idées de ce qu'est la chute et le péché originel, déjà dans les homélies que nous traitons. Néanmo-

[67] *Homélie III*, 2
[68] *Homélie III*, 1
[69] *Homélie III*, 2
[70] Ibidem
[71] *Homélie III*, 4

ins l'idée de la chute que Palamas se fait n'est pas en décontextualisée du salut donné au genre humain par le Christ. Il commence par la conception qui suit :

> « Au commencement, après que eut été dit : *créons l'homme à notre image et à notre ressemblance* (Gen. I, 26) et que notre nature fut modelée en Adam, l'Esprit vivifiant, manifesté, et donné par l'insufflation sur Adam, manifesta aussi le caractère trinitaire, selon les hypostases, de la divinité créatrice, alors que pour les autres créatures, – puisqu'elles ont été suscitées par un seul mot, – seuls le Verbe et le Père proférant le Verbe S'étaient manifestés… Non seulement parce qu'il est son seul initié, son seul adorateur terrestre, mais encore parce que seul il existe à son image. »[72]

Nous voyons que pour Palamas l'homme est crée à l'image et à la ressemblance de Dieu. Cette image est donc inscrite dans la nature même de l'homme. Dans la conception de l'auteur la nature d'homme est composée de plusieurs parties.[73] Ainsi l'homme est seul à être pleinement à l'image de Dieu.[74] Palamas va souligner qu'aucune créature n'est semblable à l'homme. L'homme en tant que sommet de la création et en tant que le « plus semblable » à Dieu possède des dons qu'il est le seul à posséder par rapport aux autres créatures. Même les anges sont en dessous de l'homme.[75] Voici ce que dit Palamas :

> « Oui, les animaux doués de sensation mais privés de raison (ἄλογα) n'ont qu'un esprit vital, mais qui ne peut subsister par lui-même, et ils n'ont aucune part à l'intelligence (νοῦ) et à la raison (λόγου). Quant aux êtres qui dépassent totalement la sensation – les anges et les archanges, comme ils sont intelligibles et raisonnables, ils possèdent l'intelligence et la raison, mais non l'esprit vivifiant, puisqu'ils n'ont pas un corps qui puisse être vivifié par lui ; seul l'homme est à l'image de la nature trihypostatique, et possède l'intelligence, la raison, l'esprit qui vivifie le corps, et le corps qui est vivifié. »[76]

Dans un autre texte il dit :

> « Autrement dit, l'homme spirituel est composé de trois parties : la grâce de l'Esprit Saint, l'âme raisonnable et le corps terrestre. »[77]

La nature humaine est donc vu par Palamas comme tripartite : le corps – l'âme – l'esprit. Nous pouvons dire que pour lui cette nature tripartite est la nature qui précède la chute. La conception que Palamas donne sur l'homme nous montre que quelque chose est arrivée à l'homme. Il a perdu l'esprit.[78]La chute est une fois de plus la mort pour l'homme. L'homme est mort à cause de la séparation de la relation avec Dieu. Palamas va dire que c'est la mort de l'immortelle âme :

> « …mais [tien plutôt compte] de celle (puissance) qui a d'abord invisiblement délié les liens des péchés et donné sa place à l'Esprit de sainteté, de celle qui redresse et éclaire l'homme intérieur, et qui grâce à l'union avec Dieu ressuscite l'âme d'entre les morts et la fait vivre de façon divine, lui faisant don de la vie de Dieu, vie divine et véritablement éternelle. En effet la résurrection du corps lui fait réellement suite, de même que la mort du corps a d'abord eu pour origine celle de l'âme, car la mort de l'âme est la séparation d'avec sa vie en Dieu… c'est donc qu'il existe aussi une mort de l'âme, bien que celle-ci demeure par nature immortelle.»[79]

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[72] *Homélie IV*, 2

[73] Voir : Kern, Cyprien, *L'Anthropologie de Saint Grégoire Palamas* |en russe], Paris, 1950

[74] Voir : *Cent cinquante chapitres*, chapitres 37-42

[75] Voir : *Défense* II, 3, 28-29

[76] *Homélie IV*, 2

[77] *Défense*, I 3, 43 N.B. j'étais obligé de changer la traduction que J. Meyendorff avait donnée. C'était traduit : « Autrement dit, l'hypostase de l'homme spirituel. . . » Apparemment que dans le texte original il n'y avait pas de mot *hypostase* :Ἄλλως τε καὶ ὁ πνευματικὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τριῶν ὑφέστηκε . . . Nous l'avions omit.

[78] Voir : G. J. Mantzaridis, « La doctrine de saint Grégoire Palamas sur la déification de l'être humain », dans *De la déification de l'être humain*, l'Age d'homme, 1990, pp. 57-64

[79] *De la divine et déifiante participation*, pp. 20-21

Comme cela ce voit, cette mort devrait être changée en vie :

> « Elles (les immersions) indiquent pareillement la résurrection de l'âme en dehors du péché après trois jours, et le retour des trois – l'intellect, l'âme et le corps, – à l'incorruptibilité. De sorte que dans le saint baptême sont montrés la mort et la vie, le tombeau et la résurrection, comme pour le Seigneur. »[80]

Nous pouvons constater que pour Palamas le péché originel est donc la mort, et le problème qui devrait être « réglé » est tout d'abord la mort. Cette mort conduit à une décomposition de l'homme et a pour effet de ne plus s'orienter vers Dieu. Cette orientation est une séparation de Dieu et elle représente la mort de l'homme.[81] La mort est donc liée à la chute ainsi qu'à la vie contre les vertus. Les vertus sont, disons-le, la manière de vivre de l'homme. La manière d'exister de la nature est corrompue, mais elle est changée par le Christ. Elle est tellement honorée par le Christ que, comme dit précédemment, elle est devenue plus grande que les anges. Elle a obtenu tout à cause du Christ vrai homme et vrai Dieu.

2.2. Le repentir dans la vie sacramentelle

Palamas dans les homélies que nous traitons mentionne aussi le repentir :

> « Le repentir est le principe, le moyen-terme et l'achèvement de l'art de vivre des chrétiens : c'est le pourquoi, l'avant, le pendant et l'après du saint baptême, que l'on recherche et dont on est redevable de se repentir. »[82]

Certains chercheurs[83] constatent que souvent « la triade » des sacrements de l'initiation est remplacée chez Palamas par une autre « triade » : le baptême, le repentir et l'Eucharistie.[84] Le repentir chez Palamas possède une place qui lui est propre parmi d'autres mystères. A notre avis il ne s'agit en aucun cas d'un remplacement. Palamas constate que pour un chrétien il est indispensable de vivre une vie de conscience de Dieu et de son prochain.[85] Pour cela le repentir est « un principe, un moyen-terme et l'achèvement » de la vie d'un chrétien. En plus avec la constatation que nous venons de dire, tout l'œuvre de salut fait partie de l'économie divino-humaine. Le repentir est la loi de la grâce dira Palamas[86]. Il dit aussi :

> « De celui-ci est claire que nous ne devons pas désespérer au sujet de notre salut, et que nous n'avons aucune raison d'être désespérés, car toute notre vie est le temps de repentir, étant donné que Dieu ne veut pas la mort des pécheurs… »[87]

Palamas explique qu'avant le baptême, le repentir est nécessaire étant une sorte de témoignage que celui qui veut être baptisé est prêt à changer sa vie. Ce changement bien sur est un témoignage que le futur baptisé a envie d'être adhérents à la vie en Esprit, car l'Esprit demeure dans ceux qui vivent dans le repentir.[88] D'ailleurs le Christ est celui qui a montré comment on doit vivre. Lui qui n'a pas eu de péché est descendu dans l'eau pour le baptême du repentir qui fut donné par Jean le Baptiste.[89]

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[80] *Homélie III*, 3
[81] G. J. Mantzaridis, « La doctrine de saint Grégoire Palamas sur la déification de l'être humain », p. 63
[82] *Homélie III*, 1
[83] Cela fut constaté et par M.-H. Congourdeau dans : *Histoire du christianisme* 6, éd. Desclée/Fayard, Paris, 1990, p. 453
[84] Ibidem
[85] *Homélies 24*, 15-16
[86] *Homélies 31*, 6
[87] *Homélies 22*, 6
[88] *Homélie III*, 10
[89] *Homélie III*, 5

Les nouveaux baptisés comme les fidèles voient dans la personne du Christ la manière de vivre. Cette manière consiste à vivre dans la repentance pendant toute sa vie. Ainsi, même après le baptême les fidèles sont invités au repentir et à vivre une vie agréable à Dieu. Pour ainsi dire, la vie dans l'Eglise est le repentir constant, bien qu'il y ait un repentir concret après des œuvres qui nous séparent de la vie en Dieu. D'un côté le repentir est « principe, moyen-terme et achèvement », mais d'un autre côté il est demandé de nouveau pour des raisons de « négligences » de la vie et des promesses fait à Dieu.[90] Ainsi Palamas précise qu'après le baptême des œuvres de repentir son nécessaires.[91] C'est en effet, ce que nous avons appelés le repentir constant. Même ce repentir constant est un don de l'Esprit.

Ce repentir présente en effet l'action de chaque personne sur le chemin vers Dieu. Après cela, le repentir devient en même temps don de Dieu et acte de l'homme :

> « Le frère du Seigneur Jacques, avait bien écrit en disant : *Car quiconque observe toute la loi, mais pèche contre un seul commandement, devient coupable de tous*, car celui qui tombe dans la péché et ne trouve pas le désir en soi, et par le repentir, sort du roché, il devient le transgresseur de la loi de la grâce. *Parlez et agissez comme devant être jugés par une loi de liberté*, car la loi du Christ est la loi de la liberté, avec laquelle Il nous a libéré par le intermédiaire du divin baptême de la loi du péché et de la mort. »[92]

Nous voyons que pour Palamas il y a une conception de *la loi de grâce* qui se répand – devient présent dans la vie de chaque fidèle bien avant, au moment, et après le baptême. Les œuvres ne sont rien d'autre que l'intention de l'homme de vivre selon les promesses faites à Dieu au cours de son baptême. Ainsi le repentir est une sorte du renouvellement du don du baptême – du don de l'Esprit qu'on dit avoir reçu. Il dit dans un autre passage :

> « Fuyons, donc, cette colère ; faisons le mieux de nous pour que par la voie du repentir nous puissions obtenir la grâce et la compassion du Tout-Saint Esprit. »[93]

Le repentir n'est pas fait uniquement un événement en soi, mais il est représente l'acte de l'affiliation à Dieu ou plutôt retour à la conscience que les fidèles sont les fils de Dieu. Cette affiliation est faite par le Saint-Esprit. C'est pour cela que Palamas dit :

> « Et puisque cet Esprit se pose et s'éloigne de Sa propre volonté, ayant le même pouvoir que le Père et le Fils, qu'Il demeure sur ceux qui vivent dans le repentir, même s'ils pèchent, sans s'éloigner d'eux, comme nous l'avons appris de David (Ps. 50, 11) ; mais qu'Il s'éloigne de ceux qui pèchent sans se repentir, comme il l'a fait avec Saul, puissions-nous tous, en œuvres, en paroles et en pensées, en persistant dans une vie de repentir, Le grader en nous à jamais… »[94]

C'est pourquoi il y a chez Palamas cette idée que le repentir est aussi bien un des mystères–sacrements de la foi et de l'Eglise.[95] A savoir que Palamas met en exergue le fait que le repentir est le début du changement, du remodelage et chaque fois quand on est dans le repentir on arrive au remodelage qui est fait premièrement avec le Christ qui avait reconstruit – remodelé la nature humaine en soi. Commençant par le repentir avant le baptême, en l'acceptant au baptême, en le vivant après le baptême et en se souvenant de celui-ci par le repentir constant chaque homme accepte d'être remodelé dans le Christ

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[90] *Homélie III*, 4
[91] Ibidem
[92] *Homélies 38*, 7
[93] *Homélies 24*, 17. Il est indicatif de constater que Palamas mentionne le repentir en parlant du Saint-Esprit et de son rôle pour la fête de Pentecôte.
[94] *Homélie III*, 10
[95] Voir la constatation sur ce sujet là : *Histoire du Christianisme* 6, p. 453

par l'Esprit. Pour ainsi dire la vie des baptisés après le baptême est constituée de la vie en Christ par l'Esprit. Comme celui qui veut vivre avec le Christ ne peut pas être autrement inclus dans cette vie que par l'Esprit, il est dans l'insufflation permanente du Saint-Esprit. Pour Palamas la réalité de la vie en Christ, qui commence par le baptême, est faite par l'Esprit et elle reste dans l'Esprit si on accepte de vivre avec l'Esprit dans le repentir. Le repentir n'est rien d'autre que d'accepter d'être remodelé à la manière du Christ et de vivre avec l'Esprit d'une manière semblable à celui du Christ.[96] Grâce à une telle conception il est intéressant de voir que la théologie de Palamas possède une cohérence intérieure. Cette cohérence est très importante pour comprendre le rapport entre « la question » de la théologie de Palamas – la question des énergies ainsi que la question des mystères – sacrements.

2.3. Le Christ comme premier baptisé

Pour Palamas l'événement du baptême du Christ est dans sa totalité lié au baptême de chaque homme qui sera baptisé en son Nom. Nous pouvons dire que Palamas donne par son approche christocentrique du baptême, une explication de ce qu'est le baptême du Christ.[97] La fête du baptême du Christ fut pour lui l'occasion de parler de ce que le Christ par ses œuvres avait fait pour le genre humain. Ce qu'Il avait fait était en aucun cas une action isolé. Elle est bien inscrite dans chaque membre du corps du Christ. Le Christ avait remodelé notre nature et c'est pourquoi notre salut se passe par et en Lui. C'est grâce au Christ que le baptême effectué par Jean le Baptiste devient une autre réalité :

> « La différence est aussi grande entre le baptême donné alors par Jean et celui du Seigneur, – dont nous avons été jugés dignes, – qu'entre l'eau et la grâce de l'Esprit : le Seigneur le révéla en disant à Ses disciples : « Jean a baptisé dans l'eau, et vous, vous serez baptisés dans l'Esprit Saint » (Act. I, 5). Jean baptisait pour que l'on croie en Celui qui venait. Mais le Seigneur transforma par Lui-même le baptême de Jean, en y implantant mystérieusement, par Lui-même, la source éternelle de la grâce. »[98]

Le baptême du Jean fut celui du repentir et vise à préparer le peuple pour la venue du Christ. La repentance sans le Christ, est quasi inutile. Elle est uniquement une des préparations pour mieux accepter celui qui vient changer la manière de vivre. Le Christ vient et à chaque moment de sa vie sur terre, Il« accomplit pour nous l'économie divino-humaine ».[99] Ainsi le Christ change d'abord, dit Palamas, le baptême de Jean :

> « Il ajouta *pour l'instant*, parce que après le baptême du Seigneur ce lieu tout entier (ἅπας ὁ χῶρος ἐκεῖνος) devint également une piscine spirituelle, et contint Jean et tous les autres, car la grâce divine du Corps vénérable s'en déverse sur tous comme d'une source, et coule sur tous ceux qui en sont dignes, les illuminant divinement et les libérant de la malédiction ancestrale. »[100]

Pour Palamas en Christ est établie une ancienne manière de vivre. Cette manière est celle de vivre avec Dieu. Mais, vivre avec Dieu ne peut pas se faire qu'à la manière du Christ. Le Christ est la personne centrale de chaque événement et de la vie chrétienne. Le Christ est la réalité qui change la manière de vivre de l'homme. Il est vrai le Dieu qui s'est fait homme à cause de l'homme. Chacun de Ses gestes a sauvé l'homme. Le plus grand parmi tous ces gestes fut celui de revêtement de la nature humaine :

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[96] *XII Homélies*, VII, 1-3, pp. 115-119
[97] Voir notre chapitre sur la première période.
[98] *Homélie III*, 7
[99] *Homélie III*, 7
[100] Ibidem

> « Le vêtement que le Christ a reçu de nous est élevé jusqu'à une dignité telle, qu'on le contemple comme inséparable du Fils de Dieu, car même après l'incarnation, les hypostases adorées et illuminatrices sont trois, en lesquelles nous croyons et sommes baptisés, nous étant dévêtus du vieil homme et ayant revêtu le Christ, nouvel Adam hypostasié dans notre nature qui est débitrice, et qui fut renouvelée en Lui… »[101]

Nous pouvons constater que pour Palamas, la nature est sauvée en Christ par le fait qu'Il l'a assumé et vécut avec les hommes et dans cette nature en la faisant sienne. Il a assumée la nature de l'homme et pas une autre hypostase. Ce fait est important car la manière de s'unir avec Dieu ne se fait pas par le biais d'une nature quelconque, mais par la nature humaine qui est en Christ. La manière de cette union, la communion se fait donc par le Christ qui est « le nouvel Adam ». Pour cela le Christ est le premier baptisé et dans Son baptême est baptisé chaque chrétien. Pour cette raison Palamas va insister sur l'idée de l'anticipation de la descente en enfer et de la résurrection, déjà dans le baptême du Christ :

> « Tendez votre pensée, frères, je vous en prie, et appliquez votre intelligence au détail de ces paroles, pour comprendre la puissance du mystère qui réside dans le baptême du Christ. Car l'immersion du Christ et le fait que durant Son baptême il était sous l'eau, suggéraient par avance Sa descente en enfer : par conséquent, en remontant de l'eau, il suggérait par avance Sa résurrection d'entre les morts… de même montra-t-il à l'avance, mystiquement, Sa descente en enfer et Sa remonte, pat Son baptême, puis confia aux fidèles la tâche de l'accomplir, Se réservant la douleur et la peine, mais nous donnant la grâce de communier à Ses souffrances dès le commencement au moyen de cette cérémonie dépourvue de douleur, et nous unissant à Lui par la ressemblance avec sa mort afin de rendre dignes de la résurrection promise, au temps fixé. »[102]

Nous voyons que cette idée de l'anticipation propre à Palamas, souligne le fait que dans chaque moment de la vie du Christ nous avons une totalité de l'économie divino-humaine qui s'accomplit. Ainsi la descente et la résurrection sont des faits de la vie du Christ déjà dans cet événement du baptême, car le baptême n'est pas fait en vue de purifier la nature, mais en vue de la rendre immortelle et ressuscitée. Ainsi pour Palamas le seul ennemi de l'homme fut la mort comme le plus grand et l'ultime ennemi. Cet ennemi fut battu par le Christ dans sa mort et sa résurrection. Cette mort fut la vie pour nous. Elle est encore la vie pour nous car :

> « Dans le saint baptême sont montrés la mort et la vie, le tombeau et résurrection, comme pour le Seigneur. »[103]

Dans le Christ les hommes ont vu le changement. Ce changement n'est pas d'ordre morale où éthique bien que le changement aura impacte sur l'homme tout entier. Ce changement est d'ordre plus concret :

> « Et seule notre nature en Christ est hypostasiée en Dieu et absolument semblable à Dieu, acquiert la richesse de la pureté, et se trouve capable de contenir, pour ainsi dire, toute la splendeur, l'éclat, la puissance et l'énergie de l'Esprit divin. »[104]

En Christ la nature humaine est donc de nouveau devenue ce qu'elle fut avant. Elle est « semblable à Dieu » (ὁμόθεος) en tout. Cette ressemblance est non pas d'ordre naturel mais de la manière d'exister du Christ. Dieu veut que tout homme soit sauvé. Ce salut est en Christ qui fait que l'homme devient l'homme divin :

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[101] *Homélie IV*, 11
[102] *Homélie IV*, 3
[103] *Homélie III*, 3
[104] *Homélie IV*, 5

> « Puisque ce n'est pas une hypostase, mais notre nature, que le Fils unique de Dieu a assumée de nous et renouvelée, en S'unissant à elle dans Sa propre hypostase, ne communique-t-Il pas Sa grâce à chacune de nos hypostases, et chacun d'entre nous ne reçoit-il pas de Lui la rémission de ses propres péchés… »[105]

Ainsi le salut est en Christ :

> « Ensuite Jésus va au baptême, d'une part par obéissance envers Celui qui envoya Jean, car il dit : *ainsi nous convient-il d'accomplir toute justice*, d'autre part pour Sa propre manifestation. De sorte qu'Il a ouvert le chemin du salut, et S'est porté garant du don du Saint-Esprit à ceux qui le suivent et sont baptisés comme Il a suggéré et prescrit de faire ; enfin le baptême, grâce à Lui, à été transformé en un remède purificateur contre les souillures qui sont profondément entrées en nous du fait de notre naissance et de notre vie passionnelles. »[106]

Le Christ sauve l'homme en le faisant vivre par Lui dans le Saint-Esprit. Le Saint-Esprit est donné aux baptisés par la chrismation. Le baptême comme lieu de changement et le début de la vie en Christ est marqué par l'infusion du Saint-Esprit. C'est le Christ qui fait résider dans nous l'Esprit Saint et c'est l'Esprit Saint qui nous constitue en tant que corps du Christ et *des christs* selon la grâce.

2.4. Le baptême fait par l'Esprit Saint

Le don du Saint-Esprit[107] est la vie en Christ dira Palamas. La chrismation est donc le premier pas vers ce don. La chrismation est la réalité qui explique que les hommes sont oints par le même Esprit du Christ. C'est pour cette raison que Palamas insistera sur la liaison entre la descente du Saint Esprit sur le Christ qui est célébrée pour la fête d'Epiphanie. Cette apparussions de la Trinité est le témoignage de la foi et de la vie dans l'Eglise qui se manifeste au début de la vie ecclésiale – par la chrismation. Premier pas fut mourir dans les eaux comme le Christ l'avait fait. Il suit maintenant deuxième pas. C'est l'onction de la myrrhe et la réception du Saint-Esprit. C'est par le fait que le Christ a notre nature que l'Esprit devient notre « vêtement ». Le Christ avait reçu l'Esprit :

> « Il est montré que le Christ a reçu dans la chair la puissance et l'énergie entière, sans mesure, et infinie, de l'Esprit. »[108]

Ce que l'Esprit fait c'est qu'il est témoin du Christ, non pas un ajout mais comme Celui qui rend témoignage et qui révèle. Ainsi l'Esprit est l'Esprit du Christ. Il est dans sa propre action Celui qui témoigne du Christ. Le Christ n'est pas uniquement témoigné par l'Esprit mais c'est en recevant l'Esprit qu'Il témoigne et qu'Il montre de quelle manière les hommes seront sauvés. Pour les hommes le témoignage est fait. Palamas dit :

> « C'est pourquoi avant nous le médecin des âmes est baptisé et pénètre dans l'eau Lui le Père des esprits, le Christ qui porte le péché du monde événement dont aujourd'hui nous anticipons la fête. Car Il fait demeurer dans l'eau avec Lui, en l'attirant d'en-haut, la grâce de l'Esprit très-saint, de sorte que pour ceux qui par la suite sont baptisés en Lui et pénètrent dans l'eau, Il se trouve Lui-même en elle, et Il les revêt de Son Esprit ineffablement, les régénérant et les emplissant de la grâce qui purifie et illumine les esprits raisonnables ; c'est là ce que dit le divin Paul : *vous tous qui avez été baptisé en Christ, vous avez revêtu le Christ*. »[109]

Dans la conception de Palamas le Christ en tant que vrai homme et vrai Dieu avait attiré sur notre nature l'Esprit divin. Cet Esprit est la troisième hypostase divine. Pala-

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[105] *Homélie IV*, 11

[106] *XII Homélies*, VII, 11-13, pp. 125-127

[107] Sur la pneumatologie de Palamas voir : J. Lison, *L'Esprit répandu : la pneumatologie de saint Grégoire Palamas*, éd. du Cerf, Paris, 2004

[108] *Homélie III*, 5

[109] *Homélie III*, 3

mas en effet constate que le Christ n'est pas uniquement une sorte de la cause première de la venue du Saint-Esprit et qu'après cet événement l'Esprit vient sur chaque baptisé comme Il veut. C'est dans le Christ que cette descente se fait. Elle n'est pas d'un ordre charismatique indéfini. Cette descente, ce charisme est d'ordre christologique. L'Esprit est descendu sur la nature humaine du Christ, et en descendant sur la nature humaine du Christ. Il réside sur ceux qui sont à Lui et qui Lui sont concorporels.[110] C'est pour cette raison précis qu'il cite saint Paul (Rom. VI, 3) pour souligner que se vêtir du Christ s'opère par le Saint-Esprit. De même il dit :

> « *Laisse faire pour l'instant*, dit donc Jésus ; *ainsi nous convient-il* (c'est-à-dire *me convient-il*, et cette parole adressée à Jean est celle d'un maître), *d'accomplir toute justice*, ce qui signifie : il me convient de ne laisser inaccompli aucun commandement divin, de justifier ainsi parfaitement la nature humaine et de l'emplir plus manifestement encore de la grâce divine et éternelle : car en recevant de toi le baptême, j'attirerai visiblement d'en haut, sur la nature humaine , l'Esprit d'adoption. »[111]

Cet esprit d'adoption est en effet l'Esprit Saint, troisième hypostase Divine. Ainsi, pour Palamas, c'est en Christ que notre nature est sauvée en étant remodelée par l'Esprit saint dans le baptême. Le changement de la manière de vivre de la nature humaine est donc, œuvre de la Trinité toute entière. Pour ainsi dire, cela est la raison pour laquelle nous sommes baptisés au nom de la Trinité, dira Palamas.[112]

La conception du baptême pour Palamas est strictement liée au fait que le Christ devient notre Sauveur par l'action du Saint-Esprit. Ainsi, le baptême est la reconstitution d'une vie en Christ. Il n'y a pas de vie en Christ si ce n'est dans Saint-Esprit. Palamas met dans la bouche de Jean Baptiste ce qu'il pense être le fait le plus important :

> « Or l'Esprit ne Se manifesta pas seulement comme le doigt du Père qui désignait, mais descendit jusqu'à celui qui était désigné par le doigt paternel comme pour le toucher ; bien plus encore, il demeura sur Lui. Car *Jean porta témoignage, est-il écrit, j'ai contemplé l'Esprit descendant des cieux comme une colombe, et Il demeura sur Lui* (Jn. I, 32) ; non seulement sur Lui mais aussi en Lui (καὶ οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτὸν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ) (Jean en est encore le témoin, quand il dit : *de sa plénitude nous avons tous reçu* (Jn. I, 16))… »[113]

Nous voyons donc, que la réalité que l'Esprit révèle pour le Christ, est révélée pour les fidèles. Cette réalité est que Dieu dans son amour sauve l'homme à travers une action commune avec l'homme. Cette action est complètement faite en Christ qui étant premier d'une nouvelle vie représente ce que les fidèles vont vivre après leur baptême. Il y a une conception chez Palmas que la vie humaine devienne la vie du Christ, non pas uniquement par une ressemblance, mais par le fait d'une participation à la vie du Christ. Comme Christ avait participé et participe dans la nature humaine, de même les hommes participent dans la vie qu'Il leur donne.[114] La vie humaine est sauvée dans son œuvre salvatrice. C'est pour cette raison que Palamas insiste sur le point que les fidèles reçoivent l'Esprit car le Christ L'avait reçu. L'Esprit demeure sur le Christ dans l'histoire, non pas parce qu'il faut bien qu'il y ait une relation entre les Personnes divines, mais parce que c'est l'Esprit qui fait le Christ est et vit dans les hommes.[115] Les fidèles sont baptisés en Christ et ils vivent en Lui dans l'Esprit Saint.

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[110] *Homélie III*, 4
[111] *Homélie III*, 8
[112] *Homélie III*, 3
[113] *Homélie IV*, 10
[114] Ibidem
[115] Pour cette raison là, la conception théologique du Filioque sera une fois de plus étrange à Palamas. Voir : B.D. Marshall, « Action et Personne : Sont Palamas and Aquin d'accord autour de la procession de l'Esprit? » [en anglais], *Saint Vladimirs Theological Quarterly* 39 (1995), pp. 379-408

2.5. La vie en Christ par l'Esprit Saint

La pensée de Palamas, ainsi que le texte nous demande d'achever notre travail par une recherche plus approfondie des questions sur ce qui est présent après et avant le baptême.[116] La question qui se pose d'ailleurs est si tout est œuvre de Dieu, l'homme œuvre-t-il dans cette démarche vers Dieu ?

2.5.1. La vie après le baptême

Comme nous avons vu dans le chapitre qui explique le baptême comme mystère–sacrement chez Palamas, il devient évident que le baptême est le début du changement de la manière de vivre. Ce changement néanmoins n'est pas le but en soi. Il représente dans son ensemble le mystère de l'Eglise et la plénitude en soi – il est la plénitude car il porte en soi la vie et le commencement d'un long chemin vers Dieu qui n'aura pas de fin.[117] Le baptême est, donc :

> « Le serment à Dieu d'une bonne conscience, l'engagement et la promesse d'une vie agréable à Dieu et d'une existence amie à Dieu… il est (le baptême) connaissance de Dieu, promesse donnée à Dieu, foi, et connaissance de la vérité en Dieu, engagement et promesse pour des œuvres, des paroles, et une manière de vivre agréable à Dieu, par l'intermédiaire des rites sacrés qu'on y accomplit. »[118]

Le baptême suscite et une autre action qui est le but et la raison d'être du baptême – l'Eucharistie, qui est présentée par Palamas sous le nom « les mystères du Sang et du Corps ».[119] Avec le baptême qui est le commencement, l'Eucharistie devient le mystère des mystères. La raison pour cela est le fait que le Christ a établi ces deux mystères pendant son séjour sur la terre, et ils font déjà notre salut ici et maintenant :

> « Oui, de même qu'Il a montré à l'avance Sa passion salutaire par le pain et le vin mystiques,[120] et a confié ensuite aux fidèles la tâche d'accomplir ce mystère pour leur salut, de même montra-t-il à l'avance mystiquement, Sa descente en enfer et Sa remontée, par Son baptême, puis confia aux fidèles la tâche de l'accomplir… Par chacun de ces deux mystères et l'action conjointe des deux, l'âme et le corps sont déifiés et reçoivent les semences de la vie sans mélange (καὶ σπέρματα ζωῆς ἀκηράτου δεχομένων). Car de ces deux mystères dépend tout notre salut, l'économie divino-humaine tout entière étant récapitulée en eux. »[121]

Pour Palamas le baptême suscite l'Eucharistie car l'Eucharistie est le but du baptême. Ainsi, ce que l'on peut constater est que les mystères et les sacrements ne sont pas les moyens du salut, mais qu'ils sont et contiennent le salut. Le mystère–sacrement porte le salut et ce dernier n'est pas une réalité qui en résultera après. Le mystère–sacrement pour Palamas est la réalité du salut. L'Eucharistie est donc, le but du baptême et avant et après celui-ci. Les baptisés par les mystères reçoivent « les semences de la vie sans mélange ». Voici quels sont les effets du baptême et de la vie en Christ selon Palamas :

> « Aussi l'évêque, après avoir revêtu le baptisé d'un habit lumineux, l'avoir oint de myrrhe divine, et fait participer au corps et au sang du Christ, le laisse aller, ayant montré ainsi qu'il

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[116] Voir étude qui touche du côté théologique à l'œuvre du Christ et de l'Esprit dans le salut : S. Yangazoglou, *La communion de la déification – synthèse de christologie et pneumatologie dans l'œuvre de saint Grégoire Palamas* [en grec], éd. Domos, Athènes, 2001

[117] *Défense*, I, 3, 37

[118] *Homélie III*, 1 ; *IV*, 1

[119] *XII Homélies*, I, pp. 25-38

[120] Intéressant à constater que pour Palamas, l'anticipation des événements postérieurs dans ceux qui sont intérieurs est bien possible et présente une sorte d'idée propre de Palamas. En tout cas, cette idée de Palamas qui fut établit à la fois et pour sacrement du baptême et pour le sacrement d'Eucharistie est assez rare chez les autres auteurs.

[121] *Homélie IV*, 3

> est devenu un enfant de lumière, concorporel au Christ et participant de l'Esprit divin. Et de fait, nous sommes régénérés, devenus fils célestes de Dieu, de terrestres que nous étions, et éternels, au lieu de temporels, Dieu ayant fait naître mystiquement la grâce céleste dans nos cœurs, et nous ayant appliqué le sceau de la filiation par l'onction de cette myrrhe divine, sceau de l'Esprit très-saint pour le jour de la Rédemption, pour autant que nous ayons gardés cette confession fermement jusqu'à la fin, et accompli notre promesse par les œuvres… »[122]

L'idée que l'homme baptisé devient fils céleste et éternel du Père est l'axe central de la conception théologique du Palamas.[123] La réalité du fils est liée au fait qu'une fois baptisé en Christ, nous devenons des christs car nous recevons le même Esprit que Christ Lui-même avait reçu. Il l'a reçu pour montrer que la manière de vivre ne peut pas être autre que celle du Fils du Père. Pour cette même raison Palamas insiste sur l'idée que la venue du Christ est le moment centrale de l'histoire et de la vie divine (en commun).[124] La filiation n'est une chose faite, elle est la constante de la vie en Christ, car un chrétien pour vivre doit avoir l'Esprit qui vivifie. Si cela n'est pas le cas le chrétien est mort, bien que vivant. La séparation de Dieu est une mort aussi bien pour l'âme immortelle, comme le dit d'ailleurs Palamas.[125] Celui qui n'est pas en relation avec Père qui est par le Fils dans l'Esprit n'est pas affilié.

2.5.2. Le baptême et la grâce

Avec ce sous-chapitre nous allons traités la question la plus intéressante de la théologie qu'on appelle « palamite ». Cette question se pose comme nous le voyons déjà dès le début de notre travail. Quelle est la relation entre la vie sacramentelle – mystique du baptême et la théologie des énergies (relevé par certains auteurs comme l'idée centrale de Palamas) ? Bien que la tâche soit très difficile, nous allons essayer d'établir lien qui peut exister.

Le baptême est le début de la vie en Christ dans la tradition ecclésiale. Elle l'est aussi pour Palamas. Cette vie, comme nous l'avons vu, est la vie dans (ἐν) le Christ par (διά) l'Esprit-Saint. Ce ἐν et διά renvoient à des réalités divines qui sont exprimées d'une manière pas toujours très claire dans la théologie patristique. Pour ainsi dire les prépositions nous montrent la réalité théologique (ad intra) de la Trinité. Mais quand on parle de la relation avec l'homme et quand on dit ἐν et διά, on pense donc à une réalité qui est d'ordre ecclésiologique, car l'autre manière de comprendre renvoie soit à une compréhension messalienne[126] (le salut est une relation individuelle avec Dieu), soit dans une compréhension donatiste[127] (une communauté est privilégiée des dons divins car elle est juste). Ces deux approches ont été réfutées par l'Eglise. En tout cas, la manière la plus répandue pour comprendre ces prépositions, et la réalité qu'ils apportent et expliquent fut ecclésiale. Or, les hommes sont baptisés dans le Christ, i.e. Son Corps – qui est l'Eglise, par l'Esprit-Saint qui constitue l'Eglise comme ce corps. Palamas s'inscrit dans cette logique aussi ; bien qu'il donne une explication plus approfondie. Voici ce qu'il dit :

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[122] *Homélie III*, 4

[123] Voir à propos de la triadologie de Palamas : A. Radovic, *Le mystère de Sainte Trinité selon saint Grégoire Palamas*, thèse de doctorat, éd. Monastère Ostrog, 2006 et ; Meyendorff, J, « The Holy Trinity in Palamite Theology » dans : M.A. Fahey et J. Meyendorff, *Théologie Trinitaire Est et Ouest: St. Thomas d'Aquin – St. Grégoire Palamas* [en anglais], coll. « Patriarch Athenagoras Memorial Lectures », éd. du Holy Cross Orthodox Press, Brookline, 1979, pp 25-43

[124] *Homélie IV*, 11

[125] *XII Homélies*, VI, 1-3, pp. 93-96

[126] Voir : *Histoire du christianisme* 2, pp. 738-740

[127] Voir : *Histoire du christianisme* 2, pp. 229-233

> « Il (le Père) est montré que le Christ a reçu dans sa chair la puissance et l'énergie entière, sans mesure, et infinie de l'Esprit. Et les cieux ont montré en œuvres que cette puissance et cette énergie tout entière de l'Esprit divin ne pouvaient être contenues par aucune des créatures… Et seul notre nature en Christ est hypostasiée en Dieu et absolument semblable à Dieu, acquiert la richesse de la pureté, et se trouve capable de contenir, pour ainsi dire, toute la splendeur, l'éclat, la puissance et l'énergie de l'Esprit divin. »[128]

Nous répétons une fois de plus ce passage car il nous apporte les explications plus approfondies sur lesquels nous pensons nous appuyer pour conclure notre étude. Ainsi, pour Palamas, notre nature reçoit-elle en Christ les énergies qui sont les énergies de l'Esprit ? Cela veut dire que le Christ est le donneur et porteur de la grâce et de l'énergie pour les baptisés. La nature de chaque homme par le baptême, en devenant semblable au Christ dans leur manière d'exister, ce dernier étant fait par l'Esprit, reçoit-elle aussi cet Esprit. Mais ce que la nature humaine reçoit, n'est pas une hypostase de l'Esprit. D'ailleurs sinon, l'explication de ἐν et διά, nous amènera à une compréhension que la nature de l'homme, après le baptême, disparaîtrait parce qu'elle aurait reçu la divinité. Donc, ce n'est pas l'hypostase divine que les baptisés reçoivent, mais les énergies hypostatiques comme le dit Palamas. Dans les énergies il y a l'hypostase, totale même, mais sous le mot totalité il ne faut pas comprendre substance mais relation. Pour ainsi dire, Dieu est complètement présent dans les énergies et dans l'œuvre qui est fait – dans le baptême.

Cette énergie, cette action, est la grâce divine qui est née dans le baptisé, et par laquelle le Christ agit :

> « Car il fait demeurer dans l'eau avec Lui, en l'attirant d'en-haut, la grâce de l'Esprit très-saint, de sorte que pour ceux qui par la suite sont baptisés en Lui et pénètrent dans l'eau, Il se trouve Lui-même en elle, et Il les revêt de Son Esprit ineffablement, les régénérant et les emplissant de la grâce qui purifie et illumine les esprit raisonnables… » [129]

Toute la vie ainsi est comprise comme la vie dans la grâce, cette grâce qui fait vivre d'une manière tout autre qu'avant le baptême. Le repentir même est donc, une action de la grâce et fait que l'Esprit vit dans les baptisés et les fidèles d'une manière inexprimable et même quand ils pèchent :

> « La grâce du Christ, de Son Père, et de l'Esprit, fait se demeure dans l'eau du baptême. De sorte que tous ceux qui après Lui, sont baptisés en Lui, cette grâce les régénère divinement, les renouvelle et les modèle à nouveau, mystérieusement ; aussi ne proviennent-ils plus du vieil Adam et n'attirent-ils plus sur eux la malédiction, mais tenant leur naissance du nouvel Adam, ils reçoivent par la bénédiction, n'étant pas des enfants de la chair, mais enfants de Dieu, car ils nés du sang, ni de la volonté de la chair, ni de la volonté d'un homme, mais de Dieu par Jésus-Christ. »[130]

C'est la grâce qui fait que tout œuvre en l'Eglise est faite d'une manière trinitaire, à la fois dans le Fils et par l'Esprit pour le Père. Cela est la conception de la théologie du baptême de Palamas. Nous pouvons dire que sa théologie reste dans la ligné des Pères, avec des idées qui lui sont propres. Pour ainsi dire la vision hésychaste de Dieu est défendue donc par la conception que Palamas donne du baptême. Celui qui participe à la vie divine dès le début de son entrée dans l'Eglise le fera et dans la vie toute entière par des manières différentes et inexprimables que Dieu seul connaît.

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[128] *Homélie IV*, 5
[129] *Homélie III*, 3
[130] *XII Homélies*, VII, 11, p. 126

Conclusion

La tradition de l'Eglise qui a écrit les Ecritures donne une approche commune au sujet du baptême. Le baptême, telle une vie nouvelle, qui se fait dans la mort et la résurrection du Christ, est le moment central par lequel l'Eglise reçoit les nouveaux fidèles. La tradition voit le baptême comme une action commune qui se veut : a) mystique – car en elle on reçoit le baptisé dans le corps mystique du Christ qui est l'Eglise, et b) théologique – car par la participation à une telle action on reçoit la première révélation de ce qu'est le Dieu, ce qu'est la vie en Dieu.

Le Dieu qui est révélé dans le baptême est le Trine Dieu Père, Fils et Saint-Esprit. Chaque Hypostase divine agit selon sa propriété hypostatique dans le salut qui se met en évidence par une seule action trinitaire : la filiation du genre humain par l'Esprit Saint dans le Fils pour le Père. Cette idée et cette filiation est liée concrètement par participation aux actions faites par l'Eglise qui se manifestent dans toute l'œuvre ecclésiale et plus particulièrement par les mystères. Le baptême étant un de ces mystères ne peut pas être regardé isolement des autres mystères et surtout pas du mystère de l'Eucharistie.

Ces deux premiers paragraphes font d'une certaines manière un aspect commun.

Voici maintenant les conclusions qui relèvent de la pensée de Palamas : dans chaque mystère les hypostases divines agissent par une et même action – l'énergie. Le baptême est donc une action divine par laquelle les hommes deviennent les participants de la vie nouvelle et de la vie en Christ. Cette vie est faite par le Saint-Esprit. L'action baptismale est une action hypostatique divine pour que les hommes puissent devenir des hypostases. La vie qui suit le baptême est la vie divine qui mène à la participation au siècle à venir. Ainsi le baptême est lié à la théologie des énergies de Palamas pas uniquement nominalement mais réellement. Dans l'action qui est faite se sont les Hypostases – Personnes divines qui agissent et participent. Bien que Palamas parle d'une participation et une vision de Dieu dans l'hésychia, le début d'une telle vie est le baptême tout d'abord parce que sans baptême il n'y aurait pas la participation dans l'hésychia. Pour cela le baptême est la première participation à la vie divine et la première participation à la vision de Dieu. En outre la vision de Dieu est possible pour tous.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 152-172

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Hypostatic Union and Pictorial Representation of Christ in Iconophile Apologia

Abstract: This article explores the fundamental Christological principles discussed by Byzantine iconophile writers of the eight and ninth centuries, John of Damascus (675-749), Theodore the Studite (759-826) and Patriarch Nikephoros I of Constantinople (758-828). Within the larger context of theological concerns, the iconophile focus their attention on two key points: (a) the notion of the hypostatic union of human and divine natures in Christ; and (b) the properties of circumscription and uncircumscribability. These Christological aspects play critical part in supporting the main objective of iconophiles, the defense of Chalcedonian formulation, of which the theoretical justification of Christ's pictorial representation is simply one part, albeit a central one. In support to their theological cause, the iconophiles also make recourse to the distinction between nature and hypostasis and devote an important part of their exposition for the holy images on the dogmatic significance of the Incarnation.

The extent and magnitude of the iconoclastic controversy[1] shows that this crisis is not simply an acrimonious dispute over the use of images in worship, for it had far-reaching implications for Christological, and hence Soteriological, doctrine.[2] In fact, when the great iconophiles of the eighth and ninth centuries—like John of Damascus, Theodore Studite, and Nikephoros of Constantinople—vigorously defend the possibility of representing Christ iconographically, they are well aware that their words protect more than paintings. It is the real and complete human nature of Christ, united in one person with his real and complete divine nature that the iconoclasts call into question. If, as Chalcedon[3] has declared, Christ's human nature was not confused or changed with his divine nature, then he must be portrayable like any human being; if his two natures are not divided or separated, then the one portrayed must be the incarnate God, even if the divine

[1] Charles Murray, "Art and the Early Church," *The Journal of Theological Studies* n.s. no. 28 part 2 (1977) 303–345; Hans von Campenhausen, *Tradition and life in the church*, trans. A.V. Littledale (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968); Irven. M. Resnik, "Idols and Images: Early Definitions and Controversies," *Sobornost* 7 no. 2 (1985) 35–52; Andre Grabar, *Christian Iconography: A Study of its Origin* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1968) 85–86; Gertrud Schiler, *Iconography of the Christian Art*, vol. I (New York: Graphic Society, 1972) 3–7; Cyril Mango, *The Art of the Byzantine Empire 312–1453* (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972) 16–43.

[2] Nick Trakakis, "What Was the Iconoclast Controversy About", *Theandros: An Online Journal of Christian Theology and Philosophy* 2 no.2 (Winter 2004/2005), http://www.theandros.com/iconoclast.html.

[3] The Council of Chalcedon, then, taught the true Godhead, the true Manhood, and the unity of the Person of Christ. It also affirmed the union of God and humanity in the one person of Christ 'without division', 'without separation', 'without confusion' and 'without change'. 'The Documents of Chalcedon: Definitio fidei Concilii Chalcedonensis', in *The Council of Chalcedon: A Historical and Doctrinal Survey*, ed. R.V. Sellers, S.P.C.K. (London 1961) p. 209-211; also J. Pelikan, *Spirit of Eastern Christendom 600-1700* (Chicago 11974) p. 82-84

nature in itself is beyond circumscription. Further, it is the deification of human flesh that suffers if Chalcedon's fully integrated view of the one *hypostasis* is lost, making the question of icons a question of human salvation.

The present study seeks to get beneath the surface of the iconoclast controversy and discover the Chalcedonian themes that were really at stake in its debates. However, even to outline this course of conflict in Byzantine society is a daunting task, refusing to submit to monocausal explanation. Turning to the sources, we discover that almost nothing is written about the theory of images prior to the outbreak of the iconoclastic controversy;[4] and when writings on the topic finally do emerge, few of those on the iconoclast side of the debate will remain for our eyes—most having been destroyed by the victorious image-defenders during an event commemorated as the *Triumph of Orthodoxy*.[5] Nevertheless, some fragments of the icon-opposers' treatises are embedded in iconophile documents, thus becoming available to us in the *Acts* of the Second Council of Nicaea, the *Antirrhetici Tres Adversus Constantinum,* and the *Refutatio et Eversio* of Patriarch Nikephoros I of Constantinople,[6] to name a few. Numerous selective quotations of iconoclastic works are found also in the iconophile *Antirrhetici Tres Adversus Iconomachos* of Theodore the Studite and the *Contra Imaginum Calumniatores Orationes Tres* of John of Damascus.[7] Among the iconoclast documents thus partially preserved are imperial decrees, the definition of the iconoclastic *Council of Hiereia* (754), and excerpts from the *Horos* of the *Council of Saint Sophia* (815).

Exploring the basic reminiscent view of Christian doctrine held by Byzantine iconoclasts, it becomes clear that their arguments are very subtle, theoretically well-formulated and resourceful. However, in some ways iconoclast theology is less attentive and more conventional than that of the iconophile thinkers.[8] On the iconoclasts' side, the strongest charges against the veneration of images come from the Old Testament prohibition of image worship (Ex. 20:4; Dt. 5:8-9) and the appeal to Tradition (especially the scriptures, the written word, and the ethical argument for holiness). Additionally, the relationship between image and prototype is raised. The iconoclasts assert that a true image must have the same essence as its prototype. Hence, the eucharist, the cross, the scriptures, and the virtuous soul of the saint, are—for them—the only permissible images, and therefore the sole recipients of religious cult on the basis of both scripture and

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[4] But see Charles Murray, "Art and the Early Church," *The Journal of Theological Studies* n.s. no. 28 part 2 (1977) 303–345; Hans von Campenhausen, *Tradition and life in the church*, trans. A.V. Littledale (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,1968); Irven. M. Resnik, "Idols and Images: Early Definitions and Controversies," *Sobornost* 7 no. 2 (1985) 35–52; Andre Grabar, *Christian Iconography: A Study of its Origin* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1968) 85–86; Gertrud Schiler, *Iconography of the Christian Art*, vol. I (New York: Graphic Society, 1972) 3–7; Cyril Mango, *The Art of the Byzantine Empire 312–1453* (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972) 16–43.

[5] Bishop Auxentius, "The Iconic and Symbolic in Orthodox Iconography," *Orthodox Tradition* 4 no. 3 (1987) 49–64.

[6] See Leslie Brubaker, "Byzantine Art in the Ninth Century: Theory, Practice, and Culture," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* no. 13 (1989) 23–93; Nikephoros I of Constantinople, "*Antirrhetici Tres Adversus Constantinum,"* in Jacques-Paul Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca*, vol. 100, 205–534, (Paris: Garnier, 1857–1866).

[7] Theodore the Studite, *"Antirrhetici Tres Adversus Iconomachos,"* in Jacques-Paul Migne, *Patrologia Graeca* vol. 99, 327–436, trans. Catharine P. Roth, *St. Theodore the Studite: On the Holy Icons* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1981); John of Damascus, *"Contra Imaginum Calumniatores Orationes Tres*," in Bonifatius Kotter (ed.), *Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos*, vol. 3 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1975).

[8] John Travis, *In Defence of the Faith: The Theology of Patriarch Nikephoros of Constantinople* (Brookline, Mass: Hellenic College Press, 1984).

Tradition.[9] Finally, with the advent of Constantine's *Peuses* (or *Inquiries*), iconoclasm affirms for the first time a specifically Christological apologetic—one resting on the impossibility of circumscribing divinity.

The iconoclasts' Christology is grounded in Chalcedonian *apophasis,*[10] but fundamental to their contention is a "real distinction between two natures in Christ—the human and the divine—in comparison with the merely conceptual distinction made by their adversaries."[11] The crucial contrast between iconophiles and iconoclasts is found in their understanding and interpretation of the "undivided-unconfused" formula of Chalcedon as it pertains to iconology.

First, the iconoclasts reject the possibility of producing a painted icon of Christ, since he participates in two different natures: the divine and the human. The divine nature could not be represented because it is known only to the Father; meanwhile, the human nature—the flesh—has been mingled with the glory of his divinity[12], and thus cannot be depicted either.[13] As a result, the iconic representation of Christ implies (for the iconoclasts) either a division between the two natures, such as one finds in Monophysitism[14], or a confusion of the natures, as in Nestorianism.[15] Moreover, the iconoclasts have a very particular understanding of the hypostatic union. If Christ's human nature (united, without confusion, with his divine nature) is given shape by circumscription,[16] then a separate human *hypostasis* of the Word seems to be introduced.[17] The immediate result is an apparent duality of persons in Christ.[18] Carrying the argument further, the *Logos* (acknowledged in two natures without separation) cannot be depicted in an icon, since any such portrait would be a depiction of him simultaneously in both natures,

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[9] See Milton Anastos, "The Ethical Theory of Images Formulated by the Iconoclasts in 754 and 815," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* no.8 (1954) 154–160, at 157.

[10] On iconoclastic Christology see Robert V. Sellers, *The Council of Chalcedon: A Historical and Doctrinal Survey* (London: SPCK, 1961) 209–211; see also Jaroslav Pelikan, *Spirit of Eastern Christendom 600–1700*, (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press 1974) 82–84.

[11] Ambrosios Giakalis, *Images of the Divine: The Theology of Icons at the Seventh Ecumenical Council* (Brill: Leiden, Netherlands, 2005) 125-133.

[12] This iconoclastic statement sounds strikingly Apollinarian. The followers of the Apollinarian sect claimed that Christ did not have a real human soul, because its place was taken by the Word of God.

[13] See Nikephoros I (Patriarch of Constantinople), "Antirrhetici Tres Adversus Constantinum," in Migne, Patrologia Graeca, vol. 100, 534; idem, "Antirrheticus" II, 1, in PG 100, 329.

[14] These arguments are raised in opposition to iconophile position and not independently of the representation of Christ.

[15] The main Christological argument of the iconoclasts resembled the polemic about "pictures of Christ" found in the letter from Eusebius of Caesarea to Constantia, sister of the Emperor Constantine the Great. In this letter, Eusebius rejected the legitimacy of making representations of Christ, on the grounds that Christ could not be depicted because he has two figures: the divine and human. See Stephen Gero, "The True Image of Christ: Eusebius' Letter to Constantia Reconsidered," *The Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s., vol. 32 (1981) 461–70; Eusebius of Caesarea, "Letter to Constantia," in *PG* 20, 1545-50.

[16] See Keneth Parry, *Depicting the Word: Byzantine Iconophile Thought of the Eighth and Ninth Centuries* (Laiden: E. J. Brill, 1996) 108.

[17] The name "Christ" for the iconoclasts signifies God and man. As such, He is an image of God and man; and neither one nor the other can be separated and represented. The divine nature could not be represented because it is invisible, the human nature could not be depicted because Christ's flesh was made divine. Thus, according to the iconoclasts, artists who make an effort to depict the "human nature" of Christ represent a mere man, and in doing so they "add a fourth person to the Trinity." See Theodore Studite, *"Antirrhetici Tres Adversus Iconomachos,"* in Jacques-Paul Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca*, vol. 99, 327–436, (Paris: Garnier 1857–1866), trans. C. P. Roth, *St. Theodore the Studite: On the Holy Icons,* vol. 99 327–436 (New York: 1981); *idem*, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* III, A16, in *PG* 99 397A.

[18] Constantine V. Copronimus, as quoted by Nikephoros of Constantinople, *"Antirrheticus"* I, 9, in *PG* 100, 216.

distinct and yet together.[19]

The iconoclasts argue that Christ's human nature is unique and, as such, exclusive of circumscription.[20] Such "circumscription" is a characteristic of mere men; but as Christ is not a mere man (*philos anthrōpos*) and has no separate human *hypostasis*, he is not circumscribed.[21] Correspondingly, images of the person of Jesus Christ would seem to be both superfluous and blasphemous.[22] Some iconoclasts admit that it might be possible to represent the Word up to his passion,[23] but certainly not after the Resurrection and Ascension.[24] The iconoclasts bear an abhorrence of all anthropomorphism of the Divine, beyond verbal depiction of the incarnate Word.[25]

Against this arsenal, the Byzantine iconophile theologians develop an elaborate theory of holy images and a defense of their place in worship. The main *apologia* made for sacred images by John, Theodore, Nikephoros, and the others, lies in a few crucial points. Their views involve an interpretation of the scriptures according to the spirit rather than the letter (with respect to Tradition), such as might be said to involve belief in a progressive revelation. Secondly, compared to their opponents, the iconophiles give a rather new approach to the redemption of humanity, insisting on the sanctity of human nature and the glorification of material creation.[26] For the iconophiles, rejection of matter and icons, which they see as historical and material witnesses of the incarnation, constitutes a rejection of the Word who became flesh and, concomitantly, a negation of the very existence of matter's Creator and Redeemer. Thirdly, there seems to be present an irrefutable logical and theological imperative for making icons and for affirming the value of the material creation. It is the mystical or sacramental view of the universe—the conception borrowed by the Greek fathers from the Neoplatonic philosophers, who considered the entire sensible world to be a reflection, or image, of the supersensual celestial world.[27] Finally, and most importantly, iconophiles defend and clarify matters of Christology, focusing on the significance of the incarnation and real humanity of Christ, which is denied by the iconoclasts.

In order to provide an accurate theoretical interpretation of iconophile Christology as it pertains to iconology, this work concentrates on two aspects of iconophile thought: (a) the notion of the hypostatic union of two natures (*physeis*) in the one person (*hypostasis*) of Christ, and the topic of circumscription (*perigraptōs*)and uncircumscribability (*aperigraphia*). These two aspects of the discussion play critical roles in supporting the main objective of iconophiles—the preservation of the Chalcedonian understanding of the incarnate Word through the justification of his pictorial representation.

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[19] On the Second Council of Nicaea (787) see Giovanni Domenico Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio*, vol. 12–13 (Florence: 1767; repr. Graz: 1960), at vol. 13, 257; English trans. of sixth session, Daniel Sahas, *Icon and Logos: Sources in the Eighth Century Iconoclasm*, University of Toronto Press (Toronto: 1986) 40-41.

[20] See Theodore*, "Adversus Iconomachos"* I, 4, in *PG* 99, 332D.

[21] See Norman Hepburn Baynes, "Idolatry and the Early Church," in *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays* (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press 1955) 116–143.

[22] Constantine V. Copronimus, as quoted by Nikephoros, *"Antirrheticus"* II, 1, in *PG* 100, 329.

[23] Milton V. Anastos, "The Ethical Theory of Images Formulated by the Iconoclasts in 754 and 815," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 8 (1954) 155.

[24] Nikephoros, *"Antirrheticus"* III, 38, in *PG* 100, 437.

[25] Stephen Gero, *Byzantine Iconoclasm During the Reign of Constantine V with Particular Attention to Oriental Sources*, in *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium* 384 (Leuven: Peeters Press, 1977) 95.

[26] Panayiotis Nellas, "Redemption and Deification? Nicholas Kavasilas and Anselm's Question: Why Did God Become Man?" *Souroz* 66 (December 1996) 10–30.

[27] Alice Gardner, "Some Theological Aspects of the Iconoclastic Controversy," *Hibbert Journal* 2 (1904) 360–374 at 366.

The Hypostatic Union of Christ according to Iconophiles

The iconoclastic doctrine against images can be traced back to Monophysitism with its Origenistic accent on Neoplatonic spiritualism. As we have already noted, those who reject the sacred images are counterparts of the earlier Christian heretics who distort the vision Christ's complete reality, and specifically of his salvific assumption of our humanity. The three major iconophile writers of the eighth and ninth centuries—John of Damascus, Theodore the Studite, and Patriarch Nikephoros I of Constantinople—reject the iconoclasts distortion and, instead, propose a new sophisticated theory of images which embodies their acceptance of Chalcedonian Christology. The vindication of Christian images rests primarily upon the doctrine of the incarnation, which stands at the very centre of the Byzantine mystical experience: the transcendent God becomes immanent in the world, but in the very immanence of His *oikonomia* that leads to the incarnation and to the salvation of the creation, He reveals Himself as transcendent, as ontologically independent of created beings.[28] This doctrine forms the conceptual basis of the hypostatic union which, in turn, substantiates the claim that Christ is circumscribable and can be iconographically represented. The iconophiles demonstrate the 'complete' reality of each nature (defined only within the unity of one hypostasis) and at the same time they consider the two natures separately only for the methodological purpose of establishing their place in the theology of icons.

Distinction between *Ousia* or *Physis* and *Hypostasis*

Drawing on theology of the earlier synodical and patristic sources as well as of ancient philosophical categories, the iconophiles form the necessary theological background against which iconology finds its place**.** However, the most important contribution to the iconophile armoury is the use of the distinction between the notions of essence (*ousia*) or nature (*physis*), and person (*hypostasis*).[29] *Hypostasis*, a much more appropriate expression for the concept of "person" than the sometimes-used *prosōpon*,[30] the former designating concrete existence, which is noted in divine and human beings by their proper names.[31] The term o*usia* or *physis* designates the general, or what is shared in common—such as is indicated by the Chalcedonian formulation that Christ is *homoousios* (i.e. shares the same essence) with the Father as regards his divinity, but *homoousios* with us as regards his humanity; it has categories of relation and action (*pros ti te kai to poiēn*).[32]

John of Damascus is among the first to incorporate the distinction between *ousia* and *hypostasis* into his defense of holy images.[33] He applies this division to the theo-

[28] S.A. Mousalimas, 'Immanence and Transcendence through the Seven Councils', *GOTR* (1977) p. 375-380.

[29] Vladimir Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church* (Cambridge: James Clarke, 1973) 53.

[30] Some writers such as Cyril of Alexandria used the word *prosōpon* to refer to a genuine personal subject, not a grammatical or additive one. Others such as Theodoret of Cyrus used the word *prosōpon* to indicate a corporate entity composed of both the Logos and the assumed man. See Donald Fairbairn, The Puzzle of Theodoret's Christology: A Modest Suggestion, *The Journal of Theological Studies*, Volume 58, Number 1 (April 2007)100-133.

[31] Gregory the Theologian, "*Oratio* 39 (*In Sancta Lumina*)," 11, in *PG* 36, 334–359.

[32] Gregory Palamas, "*Capita Physica"* 134, in *PG* 150, 1213D–1216A; John Meyendorff, *A Study of Gregory Palamas*, trans. George Lawrence (London: The Faith Press, 1964) 210.

[33] In his treatment of hypostatical union John of Damascus used the term 'nature' (physis) in the meaning of substance (ousia) qualified by essential differences. Essential difference, according to Damascene, assures the existence of species and is a constituent of substance. Hence, for essential difference and its opposite it is impossible to be in the same species. However nature does not subsist in itself but has its subsitance in the hypostasis. See Anna Zhyrkova, "A Philosophical Explanation of Hypostatical Union in John Damascene's Fount of Knowledge," *Theandros: An Online Journal of Christian Theology and Philosophy* 2 no.1 (Fall 2004), http://www.theandros.com/jdamasc.html.

logical problem of unification of the divine and human natures in the one *hypostasis* of Christ.[34] In his *Dialectic*, which is a type of philosophical prelude, *hypostasis* has different meanings. Sometimes the term simply means existence (*hyparaxis*); at other times, the term designates what exists by itself and according to subsistence, i.e., what is constituted by itself. To clarify the meaning of the term *hypostasis*, John of Damascus asks his readers to imagine three men: Peter, James, and John. As human beings, the three people are identical (i.e., they share a *physis*), but as individuals concretely existing, they are numerically different from one another.[35] They are also distinguished as *hypostases*, each with a personal name and characteristics (*idiomata*).[36] Thus, the meaning of word "person" (*hypostasis*) in relation to an individual human connotes a superior reality; it is a principle of his individuality and his perfection, inasmuch as he is a being created in the image and likeness of God.[37] John of Damascus concludes that the notion of *physis* as a certain kind of substance, and of *hypostasis* as peculiar substance,[38] allows theological-philosophical vindication of the union of the two natures (i.e., sharing the *physis* of God and the *physis* of man) in the one *hypostasis* of Christ [39] Since no nature exists alone, but appears in *hypostases*, and each *hypostasis* fully possesses its own nature,[40] the divine nature and the human nature do not subsist in independent existences, but rather as complementary components of the one *hypostasis* of the Son of God (Exp. 53, 7-17)—defined by John as *enhypostatōn*.[41] This *hypostasis* assures unity as well as distinction of the two natures.[42] The icon of Christ, likewise, testifies about this unity of natures and the division between created and uncreated reality.[43]

According to Theodore, when someone is portrayed, it is not the *ousia* or *physis* but the *hypostasis* that is portrayed. It therefore follows, Peter is not portrayed because he is defined as animate, rational, or mortal, but for the reason that he is distinguished from other individuals by particular characteristics, such as long or short nose, curly hair etc.[44] Furthermore, he is called not only by a common name "man," but also by a proper name "Peter," which separates him from all other men.[45] Therefore, the prototype is in the image by similarity of *hypostasis* and name, and not according to the *physis* or *ousia*.[46]

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[34] Vladimir Lossky, *In the Image and Likeness of God* (Oxford: A. R. Mowbray/The Alden Press, 1975) 149.

[35] Joseph T. Lienhard, "Ousia and Hypostasis: The Cappadocian Settlement and Theology of One Hypostasis," in *The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium*, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, & Gerard O'Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 99–144. Compare with Leontius of Jerusalem's concepts of hypostasis and nature. Dirk Krausmüller, Divine Self-Invention: Leontius of Jerusalem'S Reinterpretation of the Patristic Model of the Christian God, *The Journal of Theological Studies*, Volume57, number 2 (October 2006) 526-545.

[36] On the various meanings *of ousia* and *hypostasis,* see Basil the Great, *"Epistulae"* 38, in *PG* 32, 320–340; see also Gregory of Nyssa to Ablabius, "On Not Three Gods," in *PG* 45, 116–136; see also Gregory the Theologian, *"Oratio* 31 (On the Holy Spirit)," 19, in *PG* 36, 153.

[37] Lienhard, "Ousia and Hypostasis," 144.

[38] Anna Zhyrkova, "A Philosophical Explanation of Hypostatical Union in John Damascene's Fount of Knowledge," *Theandros: An Online Journal of Christian Theology and Philosophy* 2 no.1 (Fall 2004), http://www.theandros.com/jdamasc.html.

[39] Lienhard, "Ousia and Hypostasis," 119.

[40] See John of Damascus, "DFO" IV; *idem*, II, 6, in *PG* 94, 1004A.

[41] For an excellent analysis of John of Damascus's Christology; See Andrew Louth, St. John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theolog, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002) 158-162.

[42] On this issue, see *Council of Nicaea II*, in Mansi XIII, 248D.

[43] Germanos of Constantinople, "Letter to John of Synada," in *PG* 98, 158CD.

[44] See Theodore, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* III, 34B, in *PG* 99, 405B.

[45] Ibid., III, 18A, in *PG* 99, 397CD.

[46] Ibid., I, 8, in *PG* 99, 337C; *idem,* I, 11, in *PG* 99, 341B; compare with Theodore, *"Epistulae"* 2, 65, in *PG* 99, 1288B; *idem*, 2, 85, in *PG* 99, 1329; *idem*, 2, 194, in *PG* 99, 1588D.

The same applies in the case of Christ. Although his human nature has no separate existence apart from the *hypostasis* of the Word, Christ can be portrayed not because he is simply a man (along with being God), but because he is differentiated from the rest of humanity by his hypostatic properties. He is, in every sense, a human individual: he is crucified, has a certain appearance, and is called by a proper name—Jesus of Nazareth.[47] It follows that, what can be seen in the icon of Christ is his circumscribable person or *hypostasis,* and never his divine nature (*physis*) or essence (*ousia*)—*perigraptōs ara Christos kath' hypostasis kan te Theōtēti aperigraptōs*.[48] This frequently-cited dogmatic statement seems to be the key to the iconic problem.[49] In the iconophile context, the icon differs from its prototype by essence (*ousia*) or nature (*physis*), but at the same time participates in the *hypostasis* of its prototype.[50]

Furthermore, following the principles of John of Damascus' Christological formulations, Theodore characterises the hypostatic union of two natures in Christ as *enhypostatōn*. This post-Chalcedonian notion of *enhypostatōn* provides the strongest support for Theodore's claim that Christ is circumscribable and can be iconographically represented. Since the *hypostasis* of the Word became a common *hypostasis* of two natures—*enhypostasing*[51] the human nature in itself—it is said that the Word is representable according to his essence that is like unto ours, and unrepresentable according to the nature of his divinity.[52] The Byzantine tradition, representing Christ with the letters *ho ōn* ("he who is"—the translation of the Tetragrammaton "YHWH" which is usually inscribed on the nimbus)—indicates the intention to represent in image the very *hypostasis* of the Son of God, invisible in his divinity, but visible in the human nature he assumed.[53] It appears that Theodore is mainly concerned with the iconological dimension of the body of Christ, taking the idea of concorporeality as justification for the depiction of Christ.

Hence, when the artists represent Christ, they do not represent his *ousiai* or *physeis*, but his *hypostasis*, which inconceivably unites in itself the two natures, "without confusion or division," according to the words of the Chalcedonian dogma.[54] Consequently the icon is not an image of his divinity or his humanity, but an image of a divine *hypostasis* incarnate; it conveys the features of Christ, who became visible and could, therefore, be represented.[55] The identity of the icon resembles the identity of the likeness of the divine person, through which the grace of God is communicated. Accordingly, the icon is linked with its prototype and receives divine grace because it portrays the person of Christ and bears his name.

Nikephoros considers Constantine's misjudgement an opportunity to clarify the notion of an iconographic representation of Christ as it applies to the *hypostasis*. According to him, Christ's icon is a work of art identical with its archetype as to his divine-human *hypostasis*, but not identical as to his divine, uncircumscribable nature.[56] Ni-

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[47] See *idem, "Adversus Iconomachos"* III, 20A, in *PG* 99, 400.
[48] See ibid., III, 34B, in *PG* 99, 405C.
[49] See ibid., I, 5, in *PG* 99, 333A.
[50] See ibid., I, 5, in *PG* 99, 333AB.
[51] This term was frequently used by Leontius of Byzantium. See his *"Lib. Tres."* I, in *PG* 86, 1277B–1280B.
[52] See Theodore, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* III, 22A, in *PG* 99, 400.
[53] Gabriel Barrow, The Iconoclastic Crisis, *Orthodox Research Institute* [Electronic version], http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/church_history/barrow_ iconoclastic_crisis.htm.
[54] Leonid Ouspensky, *Theology of the Icon* 101–103.
[55] See Theodore, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* III, 23A, in *PG* 99, 401A.
[56] John Travis, *In Defence of the Faith* 71.

kephoros maintains that Christ and his divine nature can be characterised, since the Son of God became visible in the flesh: "Christ whom we have seen with our eyes through faith, and whom our hands have touched, is the one we depict and represent, without dividing and separating . . . the flesh which has been once united with the divine nature."[57] Not only is Christ's visible human form introduced by means of the memory of and the likeness to the archetype, but also the *Logos.* Even if he is not circumscribed together or pictorially represented—since, according to his own nature, he is an invisible being and completely intangible—he is, nevertheless, one and undivided from the *hypostasis*.[58] The patriarch bases his reasoning on two premises: (a) since Christ received flesh, it follows that he is circumscribed; and (b) none of the attributes making up Christ's human nature can be taken away, including circumscription.[59]

Patriarch Nikephoros' contention, which is based on the unity of the *hypostasis*, offers a more sophisticated solution to the problem of the pictorial representation of Christ. According to Nikephoros, the Christological justification for iconographic representation of Christ is based on the recognition that the hypostatic union of the two natures is defined only within the unity of a single *hypostasis*. There is "one *hypostasis*" as the subject of all attribution, although the distinction of the divine and the human natures is carefully safeguarded.[60] Nikephoros accuses iconoclasts—and in particular Emperor Constantine V—of a Christological misconception, which refuses to acknowledge the unity of the divine and human natures in one *hypostasis*, claiming that this is clearly seen in the emperor's declaration of the hypostatic union. Rather than using the common patristic formula that Christ is one person "in (*en*) two natures," immaterial and material, united without confusion, Constantine employs the term "from (*ek*) two natures."[61] This vocabulary leads Patriarch Nikephoros to the conclusion that Constantine V conceives of the "one divine-human *hypostasis*" of the Word as being simple and non-composite, and therefore incapable of being depicted by material means.[62] Although declaring that Christ has one composite *hypostasis*, the emperor also denies the natural properties of each respective nature.[63] We have seen the relationship between the iconophiles' acceptance of the Chalcedonian understanding of the hypostatic union and their efforts to safeguard the veneration of images. Now let us consider their dispute with the iconoclasts concerning the possibility of the circumscription of Christ in the icon.

Communication of Properties in the Hypostatic Union

"The definition of Chalcedon becomes the yardstick by which iconophiles measure their orthodox credentials."[64] However, given the exigencies of countering the iconoclastic theology, Byzantine defenders of images are obliged to develop certain idiosyncratic formulations in relation to the precise effect of the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ.

John of Damascus deals with the question of the hypostatic union in his work, *De Fide Orthodoxa,* and in his *First Oration on the Divine Images*. He acknowledges that the union of the two natures in Christ is not with disorder or confusion or intermixture or

[57] Nikephoros, *"Antirrheticus"* I, 36, in *PG* 100, 292.
[58] Ibid., I, 23, in *PG* 100, 256.
[59] See ibid., I, 24-26, in *PG* 100, 260–273.
[60] Travis, *In Defence of the Faith* 69.
[61] See ibid., 69–70.
[62] Nikephoros, *"Antirrheticus"* I, 19BC, in *PG* 100, 232.
[63] Ibid., I, 20–21, in *PG* 100, 236–237.
[64] Parry, Depicting the Word 204.

commingling, in a personal or relative manner, or as a matter of dignity or agreement in will. The hypostatic union is unquestionably by synthesis, that is, in subsistence: without change, confusion, difference, alteration or separation.[65] It follows that the two natures in Christ are united "paradoxically" and "supernaturally" (*paradoxōs kai hyperphyōs*) without confusion, and are divided without separation according to the method and manner of difference.[66] Since Christ is of the same essence (*homoousios*) with God the Father, he wills and acts freely as God; and because Christ is *homoousios* with us, he likewise wills and acts freely as man.[67] As a consequence, in two perfect natures, the Son of God and the Incarnate God are one and the same God and man, uniting in himself substantially the attributes of both natures.[68] It may be implied that Christ is at once "uncreated and created, visible and invisible, in place and not in place."[69]

The union of the divine and human natures of Christ in one *hypostasis* "without confusion, change, division, or separation," means that all divine and human properties are attributed to him without any distinction. At the same time, the conjunction of the two natures points either to his difference from his Father and the Spirit, or to his difference from his mother and the rest of humanity.[70] Thus, in the doctrine of Christ, we may speak of his one composite *hypostasis* (*mia synthetōs hypostasis*), in which the divine and human natures are united.[71] It is on account of the *hypostasis* and the *circumincession* (*perichōrēsis*) of one nature into the other that the manner of exchange (*peri tu trop hytes antidōseōs*)[72] of properties occurs. Subsequently, one may say that "Christ is our God who appeared on earth and sojourned with human beings," and simultaneously that "he is the heavenly man who is uncreated and impassable and indescribable."[73] John clarifies, in the crucial text:

> That the Logos appropriates to himself the human [properties], because what belongs to his holy flesh is his; and he transmits to the flesh what are his own divine [properties] according to the manner of the exchange (*antidōsis*) on the account of the *circumincession* (*perichōrēsis*) of the parts towards each other and the hypostatic union, and because it was one and the same who wrought the divine and the human operations in each form along with the participation of the other.[74]

According to John, the *circumincession* takes place on account of the divine nature, not the other way round. The divine nature penetrates all things as it wills with *circumincession*, while nothing penetrates the essence. It is the nature that offers to flesh its glory, while remaining itself impassable, and without participating in the passions of the Lord.[75]

A notion that sums up this natural change of the human nature is that of deification (*theōsis*).[76] Deification of the flesh of the Lord does not occur in the sense of a change or

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[65] John of Damascus, "DFO" III, 3.

[66] Ibid., III, 7, in *PG* 94, 1008.

[67] See ibid., III, 13, in *PG* 94, 1034.

[68] See Mary H. Allies, *St. John Damascene*: *On Holy Images, Followed by Three Sermons on the Assumption* (London: Thomas Baker Publishing, 1898), "Sermon I (On the Assumption)," 151.

[69] *Idem,* "Oration I," 16, in *Kot*. 3, 90.

[70] George Dragas, "Exchange or Communication of Properties and Deification: Antitodis or Communication Idiomatum and Theosis," *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 43 nos. 1–4 (1998) 377–416 at 394.

[71] See John of Damascus, "DFO" III, 3, in *Kot*. 2, 115.

[72] See Ibid., III, 4 (48), in *Kot*. 2, 116–118.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid., III, 3 (47), in *Kot*. 2, 114.

[75] John of Damascus discusses the meaning of term *circumincession* in "DFO" III, 7 (51), in *Kot*. 2, 126, II, 57–63; ibid.,III, 8 (52), in *Kot*. 2, 127, II, 20–22.

[76] See ibid., III, 15 (59), in *Kot*. 2, 148.

mutation, alteration or confusion, but rather his flesh retains its integrity after the union. Christ did not depart from his divinity when he became man, nor was his human nature lost when it became part of the Godhead, but rather it became one with the Word through union (*kath' hypostasin*).[77] Hence, salvation comes through the participation of the humanity of Christ in the divine nature. The body taken by the Word was unchangeably God, not by virtue of grace from God (as is the case with the saints), but by the presence of the "Fountainhead Himself."[78]

Similarly, the three patriarchs of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch affirm the doctrine of the hypostatic union in a "Letter to Emperor Theophilos."[79] Their views are merely a repetition of what was formulated by their predecessors, almost verbatim. As theological polemicists with linguistic and thematic consistency, they use kataphatic and apophatic terminology together to describe the communication of properties (*antindōsis idionmatōn*) of the two natures in Christ. God Himself is also a man, and is called the Son of Man, known in an inextricable union of two natures, heterogeneous and not consubstantial, seen in the one composite *hypostasis* of the Word. As a consequence of the hypostatic union, Christ is at once: "immaterial and material, incorporeal yet within a body, uncircumscribed and circumscribed by place, without quantity yet limited to three cubits high, without quality and yet revealing the qualities of distinctive features, formless and yet displaying a human form, immeasurable but contained, uncreated and yet created,"[80] His figure □(*charaktēra*) is, nevertheless, represented in icons according to features □(*charaktēristika idiomata*) of his life in the flesh.[81]

With reference to the relation between the two natures of Christ in the hypostatic union, Theodore demonstrates a clear distinction between property (*idioma*, *isiomatikos*) and substance (o*usia*). "Christ is dual in nature," Theodore insists on the doctrine of Chalcedon (451) in order to avoid Monophysitism; but he is one and the same in his *hypostasis*, with two natures unconfused in their proper spheres.[82] Christ is also whole and complete in his divinity, one in person (*hypostasis*) as he has made himself manifest in two operations (*energeiai*).[83] So also he is manifest in two wills and two operations, through which he acts in accordance both with things divine and things human.[84] Thus, due to the conjunction of his natures, the Lord's divinity is conjointly venerated and glorified, although it is subject to circumscription of the flesh. Later, Theodore argues that divinity is in the icon, and is venerated there, not by a union of natures, but by relative participation—that is to say, because it shares the grace and honour of the depicted person.[85]

It is a logical step for Theodore to affirm that, if the properties of the divine and human natures in Christ are mixed, then obviously their natures are mixed as well. However, if this is heretical, then Christ is not a mere man—although he is circumscribed in the body.[86] Furthermore, if the two natures of Christ remain unconfused in

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[77] See *idem*, "Oration I," 4, in *Kot*. 3, 77–78.
[78] Ibid., I, 19, in *PG* 94, 1250.
[79] See Joseph A. Munitiz, *The Letter of the Three Patriarchs to Emperor Theophilos and Related Texts* (Camberley: Porphyrogenitus, 1997) 32 (7.d).
[80] Ibid., 32–33 (7.d).
[81] Ibid., 21–22 (5.e).
[82] Theodore, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* I, 3, in *PG* 99, 332C.
[83] See Parry, *Depicting the Word* 105.
[84] See Theodore, *"Testamentum*," in *PG* 99, 1813–24.
[85] See Theodore, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* I, 12, in *PG* 99, 344AB.
[86] See ibid., I, 4, in *PG* 99, 332D.

their respective domains after the union, as Theodore the Studite alleges, then the characteristics of their properties are not changed into one other.[87]

The iconophile saint Ioannikios, who is active during the second period of the Iconoclastic controversy (813–843), also talks about the hypostatic union of Christ. He states that, if we acknowledge two perfect natures in Christ, both in their existence and in the natural qualities relating to them, it will be indispensable also to acknowledge the natural wills and operations inherent in each nature. For it is necessary, if one believes in two *ousiai* or *physeis*, to proclaim that the aforementioned qualities of will (*thelēsis*) and activity (*energeia*) are also double. And since these two properties belong to natures, and since it is not possible to find a nature without them, the perfect purity in these natures will not be preserved.[88] But Christ did not possess these aspects in opposition to one another.

> For those characteristics that he assumed, yielded to and were subject to those of the One who assumed them. Just as nothing in him is considered as opposite and antithetical on account of the concurrent natures, even though the natures are opposite, so also the mode of the theandric energy in Christ, as he lived with us, will be clarified, understood indeed periphrastically, signifying the duality of the energy through the appropriate appellation of the two natures.[89]

Ioannikios concludes that the essential qualities of will and activity are different where the essences and bases of existence are different (which, indeed, is apparent in things of different natures).[90] Consequently, inasmuch as Christ willed and acted as God, so also he willed and acted as man, both in the miracles and also in the other human activities.

Concerning the communication between the two natures in Christ, Patriarch Nikephoros introduces three idioms, indicating three ways of understanding the relation between the natures presented in the scriptural and patristic traditions. The affinity of properties (*oikeiōsis idiomatōn*) means that each nature has its own properties, which do not pertain to any other than itself. The reciprocity of properties (*antidōsis idiomatōn*) is seen when the divine renders the human (and vice-versa) according to its natural properties, because both are united in one *hypostasis*.[91] Both affinity and reciprocity are accomplished through permeation (*perichōrēsis*), also understood as appropriation (*idiopoiēsis*) of the respective natural properties. Although each nature shares and receives properties, it does not mean that both natures of Christ are combined or conjoined, nor does it imply a loss or change in the character of his *hypostasis*.[92] The humanity of Christ is included in the divine *hypostasis* and exists, as it were, within this one *hypostasis*. Likewise, the human nature is sustained by the divine *hypostasis* (i.e., *enhypostasis*).[93] It follows that the human nature of Christ does not evade its natural attributes because of its union in the *hypostasis,* but instead the nature is transfigured (*metestoicheiōti*) toward the better through the power of the *Logos*, which enables us to see God.[94]

Patriarch Nikephoros acknowledges the natural properties common to each nature, but also their "unconfused unity" in the *hypostasis*. His formulation accommodates the principle of the sharing of natural properties (*antidōsis idiomatōn*) whereby a shar-

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[87] Ibid., I, 3, in *PG* 99, 332C.

[88] Vita Ioannikii, in Alice Mary Talbot, *Byzantine Defenders of Images: Eight Saints' Lives in English Translation* (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 1998) 243-353, at 315.

[89] Ibid., 317.

[90] Ibid., 320.

[91] See Nikephoros, *"Antirrheticus"* I, 47, in *PG* 100, 320.

[92] See Travis, *In the Defence of Faith* 81.

[93] See ibid., 69.

[94] See Nikephoros, *"Antirrheticus"* I, 26, in *PG* 100, 272.

ing of names is possible between both natures because of their unity in the *hypostasis.*[95] Hence, the Christological discussion of the sharing of natural properties and its consequence for the *hypostasis*, especially for the human nature receiving the grace of the divine operations, becomes justification for the pictorial representation of Christ.[96]

The focal point of the hypostatic union for Nikephoros is the mystery of the incarnation. Couched in terminology familiar to readers of Gregory the Theologian and John of Damascus, Nikephoros insists that at the incarnation,[97] the *Logos* "emptied himself out (*kenosis*) and took upon him the form of a servant."[98] He became like us not simply assuming flesh, but also a rational and intellectual soul.[99] Accordingly, after the *oikonomia*, the one Son was the same consubstantial (*homoousios*) with the Father in respect to the divine essence, yet consubstantial (*homoousios*) with us according to the human nature, keeping and preserving in the unity of the *hypostasis* the natural qualitative differences of those natures which are united without change and without confusion.[100]

We have seen, then, that the full acceptance of the implications of the incarnation leads the iconophiles to safeguard the veneration of images. By way of summary, we may say that the veneration of icons rests on the perfect unity of the two natures of Christ. If Christ had not really taken on the fullness of our nature, he could not be represented in the icon, for he would be immaterial and imperceptible; but because the Word has truly assumed the fullness of our materiality, he may be materially represented. If it were possible to separate the natures of Christ, then the icon would only represent the human, and its veneration would amount to idolatry; but because the *hypostasis* unites the two natures without division or separation, the icon represents not just the human nature but the whole person of Christ. In the veneration of the icon, then, the believer venerates Christ's *hypostasis*—human and divine. And because the will and operations of Christ in the flesh are hypostatically united to (though never confused with) the will and operations of the *Logos*, the actions of the humanity of Christ—depicted and reverenced in the icon—are simultaneously the salvific operations of the Second Person of the Trinity.

Circumscription and Uncircumscribability

The fundamental disagreement between iconophiles and iconoclasts is over the issue of circumscription vis-à-vis the hypostatic union in Christ, the possibility of such circumscription being essential to the iconophiles justification of the pictorial representation of the Word made flesh. The iconoclasts, led by Constantine V, accused the icon painter of theological ineptitude in this matter, either in promoting Monophysitism in relation to circumscription of the divine *ousia*,[101] or in fostering Nestorianism in relation to the separation and depiction of the human *physis*.[102] The iconophiles, for their part, accuse the iconoclasts of heresy, in denying that in the incarnation, the Word has really and truly become flesh—with all that that implies.

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[95] See ibid., I, 19, in *PG* 100, 236.
[96] See Ibid., I, 34CD, in *PG* 100, 288.
[97] Nikephoros, *"Logos"* 63, in *PG* 100, 754; compare with ibid., 37D, in *PG* 100, 641.
[98] Ibid., 20, in *PG* 100, 585–588.
[99] See Travis, *In Defence of the Faith* 67.
[100] See Nikephoros, *"Logos"* 19, in *PG 1*00, 585.
[101] See the fragments of Constantine's *Peuses*□□ (or *Inquiries*) that are preserved in Nikephoros' works. This particular issue is discussed in the *"Antirrheticus"* II, 1, in *PG* 100, 329.
[102] See Gero, *Byzantine Iconoclasm During the Reign of Constantine V* 74.

Circumscription and the Pictorial Representation of Christ

Although they become a more prominent theme in the second phase of Iconoclasm (when Theodore and Nikephoros give substantial consideration to this topic), it is actually John of Damascus who initially discusses the question of circumscription and uncircumscribability. In his *Third Oration,* and again in his *De Fide Orthodoxa,* John develops a definition of circumscription in relation to his doctrine of the angels.[103] Focusing on the objection of iconoclasts—who argue that angels cannot be depicted since they are bodiless—John repeatedly asserts that, to deny iconographic representations of angels is a blasphemous act. The divine nature alone is uncircumscribable, since it is incomprehensible, invisible, and bodiless.[104] Angels, on the other hand, can be represented, as they are circumscribable in time, in place, and by apprehension.[105]

In his *First Oration*, John applies the term "uncircumscribable" (*aperigraptōs*) when he examines fundamental questions of the knowledge of God's *ousia*. Asking which things are suitable for image-making, John suggests the divine nature alone can never be an object of vision or circumscription. Everything else that has shape and color, and is determined by place, time, and apprehension, is circumscribable.[106] The superessential nature of God is not a subject of speech or thought or even contemplation, for it is far removed from all that exists and more than unknowable, incomprehensible and ineffable to all.[107] "How depict the invisible? How picture the inconceivable? How give expression to the limitless, the immeasurable and the invisible? How give form to immensity, immortality or localise mystery?" asks John of Damascus.[108] If we make an image of the invisible God, he answers, we should in truth do wrong because the invisible, by the very fact of being beyond the reach of our vision, cannot be represented in a picture that appeals to the eyes. But if we make an image of God who took upon Him visible shape, form, and flesh, we are not misled.[109] It follows that it is permissible to draw an image of the invisible God, not as invisible, but as visible, partaking of flesh and blood.[110] Here, John of Damascus speaks of the circumscribability of the human nature of the Son, in contrast to the uncircumscribable nature of his divinity.[111]

Similarly, for iconophile fathers of the Seventh Ecumenical Council, it is essential that any theological discussion of icons understand that the divine *ousia* is far beyond any knowledge. Faithful to the doctrines of the Church, they claim to represent circumscribed truths, which possess dimensions and are immediately relevant to man's salvation and deification. Repeating the familiar statement of Pope Gregory II contained in his letter to Emperor Leo III the Isaurian, the iconophile fathers rhetorically ask: "Why do we not circumscribe, or represent the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ?[112] It is because they do not represent the simple, incomprehensible divine existence in certain forms and

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[103] See John of Damascus, "Oration" III, in 25, *Kot*. 3, 131–132; see also *idem*, "DFO," I, 13, and II, 3, in *PG* 94, 852C–853B and 869AC.

[104] See *idem*, "Oration III," 24, in *Kot*. 3, 131.

[105] See ibid., III, 25, in *Kot*. 3, 132.

[106] *Idem,* "DFO" I, 13, in *Kot*. 2, 39.

[107] Ibid., I, 4, in *PG* 94, 800B.

[108] *Idem*, "Oration I," 8, in *PG* 94, 1237C–1240B.

[109] He has put forward similar arguments in "Oration I," 5, in *PG* 94, 1226D–1237B; and "Oration I," 16, in *PG* 94, 1245A–1248C; "Oration II," 5, Kot. 3, 72

[110] Ibid., "Oration I," 4, in *PG* 94, 1235AD.

[111] Parry, *Depicting the Word* 91.

[112] See Ouspensky, *Theology of the Icon* 165.

shapes, nor have they determined to honour in wax and wood the divine essence."[113] A true picture of God is thus unattainable, as it is impossible to portray the One, who is without body (*asōmatōn*), invisible (*aoratōn*), uncircumscribable (*aperigraptōs*), and without form (*aschēmatistōs*) [114] The concepts ascribed to God affirmatively (*kataphasis*), such as "being," "substance," "life," and "power," are not indicative of what He is in essence (*ousia*); instead they correspond to His condescension. As a result, the circumscription of God—Who is, by nature, inaccessible—is validated, as expressed in the *Imperial Sacra* read at the first session of Nicaea II.

Using the vocabulary of the Cappadocians, the Nicene fathers make it clear that only the humanity of Christ is represented in the image; divinity itself cannot be circumscribed. They assert that, as far as Christ is God, he is invisible, uncircumscribable, incomprehensible, and present in every place of his sovereignty. However, as he assumed man's nature, he is visible and circumscribable.[115] If the divine nature is circumscribed together with the human nature, as iconoclasts assert, so is his uncircumscribable divinity in the depicted icon of the human nature. If the former does not occur, according to the Second Council of Nicaea, neither does the latter.[116] Thus, in the image, we have the Logos of God as perfect man because he became circumscribed in the flesh through the incarnation. The divine nature, however, is not depicted in the image because it is beyond description and circumscription.[117]

The two terms "circumscription" and "uncircumscribability" are discussed by Theodore the Studite and Nikephoros of Constantinople when confronting the Christological dilemma originally posed by Constantine V. At the beginning of his *Adversus Iconomacos*, Theodore immediately tackles the question of the uncircumscribability of the Godhead. He criticises the iconoclasts for confusing the veneration of pagan idols with the veneration of icons, claming that Christian images attempt to circumscribe the Godhead.[118] For Theodore, the term *aperigraptōs* is appropriate only when speaking of the Godhead, for the doctrine of *theologia* tells us that we do not know that the Godhead exists, "or what sort of thing he is."[119] The knowledge of God, according to Theodore, is of an altogether different order from our knowledge. He is simple and not composite, and therefore exempt from any kind of position or composition.[120] Because the true contemplation of God is unattainable, and He has no relationship at all to any likeness,[121] the only way we can describe Him is by using negations (*apophasis*). However, expressing above all the deficiency of language and failure of the mind before the mystery of God, Christian *apophasis* is applied to the paradox of Christian revelation. The transcendent God becomes immanent in the world; but in the very immanence of His *oikonomia* (leading to the incarnation and to the salvation of creation), He reveals Himself as transcendent, as ontologically independent of created beings.[122] The knowledge of God

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[113] Mansi XIII, 185C.
[114] See John of Damascus, "Oration I," 7, in *PG* 94, 1230CD.
[115] Council of Nicaea II, Session VI, in Mansi XIII, 340B.
[116] Ibid., in Mansi XIII, 253E.
[117] See ibid., in Mansi XIII, 244A.
[118] See Theodore, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* I, 2, in *PG* 99, 329C.
[119] See ibid.
[120] See ibid., III, 44, in *PG* 99, 409B.
[121] See ibid., III, 53, in *PG* 99, 413B.
[122] See Soterios A. Mousalimas, "Immanence and Transcendence through the Seven Councils," *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 42 (1977) 375–380, at 377

is, therefore, possible only inasmuch as God reveals Himself and manifests Himself in the economy of salvation. Once Christ becomes flesh and enters into circumscription, the Uncircumscribable One is seen, and the Intangible and Invisible One is subject to bodily sight and touch.[123]

Referring to the traditional concepts of *theologia* and *oikonomia* once again, Theodore tries to establish a connection between what is termed "circumscribed" and what is called "prototype." He states that Christ established a prototype of his image when he became man.[124] This notion defines the image as "likeness and figuration of all things being and existing." It is an important argument according to which Theodore and other iconophile fathers make the distinction between "icon" (*eikōn*) and "idol" (*eidōlon*). The religious image (*eikōn*) has a real honorable prototype, while the idol has no existing circumscribable prototype.[125] If Christ is circumscribable, then it follows that he is the prototype of his image, which has a different *ousia*.[126]

Furthermore, contrasting the uncircumscribaility of the Father with the circumscribability of the Son, Theodore states that Christ cannot have an image made by art, insofar as he proceeds from a Father Who cannot be represented. In fact, what kind of image could correspond to the Divinity, Whom "no thought can comprehend, no sound can designate for hearing, as it is by nature, whose representation is absolutely forbidden in scripture?"[127] It is only the incarnation of the indescribable Word of God that allows Him to become visible and describable, since God has manifested Himself in the flesh, receiving visible and describable human shape (*en antropine perigraphē heorato*) and becoming indispensable to every body of being contained in space.[128] Theodore accuses the iconoclasts for not acknowledging that Christ, who is visible according to his flesh, can be a subject available for representation. "Who does not bow down to his holy icon, does not bow to the Lord, as on the icon is the prototype that is perceivable to vision, and through it the reverence is given to the represented prototype."[129]

Once again Theodore asserts that denying the possibility of representing Christ in material images means annulment of his existence in human form.[130] He states that, when the *Logos* became flesh, remaining on the heights of his divinity, he was not changed to be susceptible to circumscription as far as he is God, but only as far as he appears like us.[131] Consequently, once the Son of God becomes man, it is necessary to represent him as man. "What do you say to that, enemy of Christ? If he has flesh and bones, does he not have the possibility of being portrayed in an image? So if the latter is impossible, so was the former. But he himself silently bears witness also to his being portrayed, for each of them confirms the other," argues the Studite monk.[132] If Christ is uncircumscribable not

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[123] See Theodore, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* II, 5, in *PG* 99, 356AB.
[124] Ibid., II, 6, in *PG* 99, 356B.
[125] See, in particular, ibid., II, 8, in *PG* 99, 357A.
[126] See ibid., II, 9, in *PG* 99, 357AB.
[127] Ibid., I, 10, in *PG* 99, 393A.
[128] On the relation between circumscription and the Incarnation see Gregory of Nyssa, *"Adversus Apollinarem*," in *PG* 45, 1160A; see also Gregory the Theologian, *"Poemata Theologica"* I, 62–64, in *PG* 37, 406; see further *idem, "Ad Cledonnum Presbyterum Contra Apollinarium*," *PG* 37, 177BC.
[129] Theodore the Studite, "Malo Oglasenie," in *Tvorenija Prepodobnago Teodora Studita*, vol I (St. Petersburg: 1907) 259 (XV) and 320 (LI).
[130] *Idem*, *"Adversus Iconomachos*," III, 10D, in *PG* 99, 433A.
[131] See ibid., III, 8A, in *PG* 99, 393A.
[132] *Idem*, *"Catechesis" 6*, in Bishop Metodij Zlatanov, "Little Catechesis of St. Theodore the Studite," *Pelagonitisa*, vol. 7–8 (Bitola: Misla, 1999) 5–16, at 8

only in respect to his divinity, but also in respect to his humanity, as iconoclasts claim, then his humanity will become his divinity.[133] At this point, Theodore makes reference to a Christological statement from Gregory the Theologian: "circumscribable in the body, uncircumscribable in the spirit (*perigraptōn sōmati, aperigraptōn pneumati*)."[134]

Theodore further attempts to settle the question of the circumscribability of Christ by comparing the human nature of the *Logos* with the humanity of the *Theotokos*.[135] As Christ is identical with his Father in respect to divinity and identical with his mother in respect to humanity,[136] he is both uncircumscribable (insofar as he comes from the uncircumscribable Father), and circumscribable (insofar as he is born of a circumscribable mother).[137] If we admit that he is not circumscribable, then we will have to admit that he does not have the same essence as his mother. It would follow that Christ's mother is not his mother, which is absurd.[138] And since the person of the Word becomes the common *hypostasis* of the two natures, it is reasoned that Christ is both God and man, but at the same time circumscribable and uncircumscribable,"*ēn kai estin aoristōs, kai aperigraptōs, panatachou ōn, kai dio pasēs tēs ktiseōs diēkōn. Kata de to phainōmenōn, en avtrōpien perigraphē heoratō.*"[139]

Properties and Natures in Christ

The iconoclasts, and particularly Emperor Constantine V, regard images as having one of two heretical aims: either they circumscribe only the divine nature (which is impossible) or they only depict the human nature (thereby denying Christ's divinity).[140] Theodore the Studite responds to this dilemma when discussing the logical relationship between properties and natures in Christ. *Proviso* entities do not have the same properties, he states; their essences (*ousiai*) are different.[141] Christ is of both essences and he is also of two properties.[142] It follows that Christ must be both uncircumscribable (as far as he is uncreated) and circumscribable (insofar as He is created.)[143] If uncircumscription is a characteristic of the substance of God, and circumscription is characteristic of the substance of man, then Christ is of two substances. Therefore Christ is known to have two characteristics as he is of two natures.[144] Neither of his natures makes the other into something new, nor departs from what it is itself, nor is one changed into the other. Hence, Christ can be depicted because he is double and composite in his natures, but one and the same in his *hypostasis*.[145]

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[133] See Theodore, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* III, 10A, in *PG* 99, 393CD.

[134] Theodore, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* II, 1, in *PG* 99, 353B; similar therminology is used by Gregory the Theologianin, in *"Epistulae"* 101, in *PG* 37, 177; see also Athanasius, *"Adversus Apollinarem,"* 2, 2, in *PG* 26,1133.

[135] See Theodore, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* III, 1B, in *PG* 99, 417A.

[136] See ibid., III, 2B, in *PG* 99, 417B.

[137] See ibid., III, 39A, in *PG* 99, 408.

[138] See ibid., III, 54A, in *PG* 99, 413CD.

[139] Gregory of Nyssa, *"Adversus Apollinarem,"* in *PG* 45, 1160A; see also Verna E. P. Harrison, "Receptacle Imagery in St. Gregory of Nyssa's Anthropology," *Studia Patristica*, 22 (1975) 23–27.

[140] See Nick Trakakis, "What Was the Iconoclast Controversy About?" *Theandros*:*Online Journal of Orthodox Theology* 2 no.2 (Winter 2004/2005), http://www.theandros.com/iconoclast.html.

[141] Theodore, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* III, 4A, in *PG* 99, 392D.

[142] See ibid., III, 3A, in *PG* 99, 392BC.

[143] See ibid., III, 7A, in *PG* 99, 393B.

[144] See Theodore Sideris, "The Theological Arguments of the Iconoclasts During the Iconoclastic Controversy," *St.Vladimir"s Theological Quaterly* 17 no. 3 (1973) 210–227, at 215.

[145] See Theodore, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* III, 22A, in *PG* 99, 400CD; similar vocabulary used by John of Damascus in his *"Dialectica*" 44, in *Kot*. 1, 109–110; see also *idem,* "DFO" 3, 9, in *Kot*. 2, 128.

What follows centers on how we are able to understand the relation of the terms *perigraptōs* and *aperigraptōs* in the hypostatic union. In response to the iconoclasts' charge that, when depicting Christ, the icon painter is responsible for the blasphemy of circumscribing the divine essence, Theodore maintains that, while the depicted shadow is only related to the flesh, the flesh of Christ is joined with the Godhead in the union of natures.[146]

The iconoclasts argue that circumscription is a characteristic of a mere man, but as Christ is not a mere man he cannot be circumscribed.[147] Theodore responds to this argument by once again maintaining that Christ assumes manhood in general, or the whole human nature as contemplated in an individual manner.[148] Generalities are comprehended with the mind and thought, according to Theodore, particular individuals are seen by sight, which looks at perceptible things.[149] If Christ assumed our nature in general, not contemplated in an individual manner (as the iconoclasts assert), he could be contemplated only by the mind and touched only by thought.[150] However, Christ is perceptible, tangible, and visible with bodily eyes, and differentiated from all other men by his hypostatic properties; thus he is circumscribed.[151] The human nature of Christ does not have its existence in a self-subsisting and self-circumscribed person, apart from having an existence in the *hypostasis* of the Word.[152]

Distinction Between Painting (*graphē*) and Circumscription (*perigraphē*)

The circumscription of Christ, who has divine and human figures (*morphai*), requires further nuance. Nikephoros devotes an important part of his exposition to an elaboration of the distinction between circumscription and inscription (or painting). In his *Antirrhetici Tres Adversus Constantinum*, he clarifies the important gap between circumscription and inscription. While Christ incarnate could encompass the divine and the human within time and place, an icon of him can never claim to do such a thing. Circumscription (*perigraphē*), according to Nikephoros, can occur in three different ways: in space, in time, and by apperception. However, one can speak about inscription (*graphē*) in two senses: (a) by means of letters, syllables, and words; and (b) by the art of painting and the help of colors. In fact, when the icon painter depicts human beings, he does not circumscribe his model in either of the above three ways, nor does he who circumscribes somebody in any of these three ways, paint him. As to Christ, he was circumscribed not by man, for that would be beyond human power, but by virtue of his dispensation (*oikonomia*). Nikephoros affirms that what is apprehended by thought and knowledge is circumscribed by apprehension. "Circumscription therefore is the comprehending and limiting of the thing comprehended and limited, or the termination of what is begun or moved, or the apprehension of what is thought and known." Christ, as far as his humanity is concerned, is circumscribable in all three ways.[153]

Moreover, Nikephoros claims that iconographers paint and do not circumscribe Christ.[154] Painting makes present the corporeal form of the one depicted, imprinting its

[146] See Theodore, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* III, 33, in *PG* 99, 404D–405A; ibid., I, 12, in *PG* 99, 341D–344B.
[147] See ibid., I, 4, in *PG* 99, 332D.
[148] See ibid.,I, 4, in *PG* 99, 333D.
[149] See ibid., III, 16A, in *PG* 99, 397BD.
[150] See ibid., III, 16A, in *PG* 99, 396D.
[151] See ibid., III, 19A, in *PG* 99, 400A.
[152] See ibid., III, 22A, in *PG* 99, 400CD.
[153] Nikephoros, *"Antirrheticus"* II, 12, in *PG* 100, 356B–357A.
[154] Ibid., II, 13, in *PG* 100, 360AB; this is further explored in ibid., II, 16, in *PG* 100, 365A.

contour and its sensible form and its likeness, whereas circumscription delimits boundaries and has nothing in common with the three modes mentioned above.[155] Christ, who is both God and man, is both incapable of being depicted and capable of being depicted.[156] The divine nature has apophatic attributes of *agraptōs* and *aperigraptōs*, whereas the human nature has the opposite qualities.[157]

Constantine V claims that not only the uncircumscribable divine nature of Christ ever remains uncircumscribable, but also his human nature becomes uncircumscribable and unportrayable through its union with the divine nature.[158] The Origenistic notion implying that the deification of humanity leads to dematerialisation and absorption into a purely intellectual mode of existence[159] is borrowed by the iconoclasts from Eusebius' letter to Constantia, the sister of Emperor Constantine the Great.[160] When Constantia requests an icon of Christ from Eusebius, he formulates a disjunctive syllogism in response: "Which icon of Christ do you mean," he asks: "That which is true and unchangeable and which bears the characteristics of his divine nature, or that which he assumed for us, the figure, that is, that he took in the form of a slave?"[161] Firstly, the icon of the divine nature of Christ is impossible by any definition, Eusebius states, for that nature is unknowable to the human mind (the Father is only known by the Son, and the Son by the Father), much less susceptible to portrayal in a picture made by human hands. Additionally, the human nature cannot be portrayed by means of dead and inanimate colors, because it is glorified by the divine nature and has passed from the mortal state of life.[162]

Nikephoros further responds to the forgoing arguments by highlighting the importance of the physical character of the incarnation of the *Logos*. If the iconoclasts, following Eusebius' line of thought, assert that the body of Christ is *aperigraptōs* due to its union with the Godhead, then the consequence is that all the sufferings of the body likewise affect the divine *ousia*. A further contradiction is that, while image-breakers proclaim that Christ is *aperigraptōs*, they state that simple-minded persons circumscribe him together with his image. The aim of the iconoclasts, it would seem, is to deny the incarnation with the word *aperigraptōs*.[163]

Patriarch Nikephoros declares that the *Logos* assumes not an abstract, ideal humanity, but the concrete humanity (which exists in history after the fall) in order to save it. Christ did not possess a flesh other than our own, that which fell as a consequence of sin. The fullness of humanity implies describability, for if Christ were indescribable, his mother—with whom he shares the same nature—would have to be considered as indescribable as well.[164] Thus, if we refuse to represent Christ as human, we reject his natural relationship to his circumscribable mother. The *Logos,* who unites himself with hu-

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[155] See ibid., II, 20, in *PG* 100, 357BCD.

[156] See ibid., I, 20, in *PG* 100, 236.

[157] Nikephoros defines *graptos* as applying both to writing and to painting, and *perigraptos*, he says, occurs in three ways: in time, in space, and by apprehension. See Nikephoros, *Antirrheticus* II, 13–16, in *PG* 100, 360AB–365A.

[158] Quoted by Nikephoros in his *Antirrheticus* I, 20, in *PG* 100; see also ibid., I, 20, in *PG* 100, 244CD.

[159] See Aleksei I. Sidorov, "Letter of Eusebius to Constantia," *Vizantiskii Vremenik* 51 (1989–91) 58–73.

[160] Eusebius, "Letter to Constantia," in *PG* 20, 1545–48.

[161] Ibid., in *PG* 20, 1546.

[162] See Sideris, "The Theological Arguments of the Iconoclasts" 179.

[163] See Paul Alexander, *The Patriarch Nikephoros of Constantinople: Ecclesiastical Policy and Image Worship in the Byzantine Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958) 252.

[164] John Meyendorff, *Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes*, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1983) 52.

manity, maintains both natures perfectly and without lacking anything, but also without losing their natural properties.[165] Accordingly, his Godhead is neither painted nor circumscribed in the body, nor is his divinity separated from his manhood. "When has anyone ever heard of a body which cannot be portrayed or circumscribed?" Nikephoros wonders. Circumscription is part of the definition of "body."[166]

Nikephoros pursues the distinction between circumscription and representation by saying that icons make Christ visible to everyone, not according to his circumscribability, but according to the ability of his bodily shape to be represented. Christ is invisible and intangible and apprehensible spiritually inasmuch as he is God, but perceivable to sight, to touch, and to the senses inasmuch as he is man.[167] We don't elevate what can be circumscribed by endowing it with the capacity of what cannot be circumscribed in Christ by demeaning it with terms particular to circumscribing.[168] But, if the Word is made flesh (John 1:14) and appeared on earth, and if God, who was before without body, was seen as a man by men, iconographers would not be doing wrong to reproduce pictorially what humanity has seen.[169]

Circumscription of Christ after the Resurrection

The question of the status of the human nature of Christ in his post-resurrection state had arisen during the iconoclastic period, when some of the iconoclasts claimed that Christ was circumscribable up to the passion but not after the resurrection.[170] According to the iconoclasts, since the body of Christ after the resurrection becomes incorruptible and immortal, it cannot be subject to representation—recally how he entered the room full of his disciples through closed doors (John 20:26).[171] Against this claim, John of Damascus insists that the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ is not destroyed by his death and resurrection, as Christ remains perfect man and perfect God in heaven as well as on earth. After Christ rose from the dead, he laid aside all his passions, corruption, hunger, thirst, sleep, weariness, and the the like.[172] But he laid aside none of the divisions of his nature, "neither body nor spirit, but possesses both the body and the soul intelligent and reasonable … and in this way he sits at the right hand of the Father, using his will as a man on behalf of our salvation …" So even after the resurrection, Christ retains his circumscribed body and sits in glory at the right hand of the Father, for he shall come again in like manner as the apostles have seen him go to heaven.[173]

Theodore the Studite investigates the question of circumscription in relation to the risen Christ in his *Second Antirrheticus*.[174] According to Theodore, Christ did not lose the properties of his human nature after the resurrection, as the scriptural text shows (Luke 24:39); the Apostles saw after the resurrection the same Christ they once knew, as Christ commanded the disciples to touch his flesh and bones.[175] According to Theodore,

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[165] See Nikephoros, *"Antirrheticus"* I, 25, in *PG* 100, 265A–272D.
[166] See ibid., I, 25, in *PG* 100, 266A–272D.
[167] See the *Vita Nikephori* in Talbot, *Byzantine Defenders of Images* 97.
[168] See ibid., 98.
[169] See ibid., 99.
[170] This issue is explored by Theodore, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* II, 40, in *PG* 99, 381C; and also by Nikephoros, *"Antirrheticus"* I, 25, in *PG* 100, 265; see also ibid., III, 38, in *PG* 100, 437B.
[171] Nikephoros, *Antirrheticus* III, 38; in *PG* 100, 437B.
[172] See John of Damascus, "DFO" IV, 1–2, in *Kot*. 2, 172–73.
[173] See ibid., IV, 1–2, in *Kot*. 2, 172.
[174] Theodore, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* II, 43, in *PG* 99, 384A.
[175] See ibid.,II, 43, in *PG* 99, 384B.

everything that is subject to vision is also subject to circumscription. Christ was without solidity; but when he wished, he showed properties as if he were solid (without losing the properties of his human nature). The *Logos* was seen and touched and shared food after the resurrection, which shows that he has properties of circumscription.[176] If Christ cannot be represented before and after the resurrection, then he is not truly man, humanity is not truly united with God, and no human beings could expect to become "partakers of the divine nature" (2 Peter 1:4). It seems that Theodore has a firm belief that Christians can achieve deification only through participation in the corporeality of Christ through the sacrament of the Eucharist, where the ordinary bread and wine are transformed into the circumscribed body and blood of Jesus Christ. Thus, the denial of the circumscription of the risen body of Christ leads to denial of Christ's Eucharistic presence.[177]

According to Patriarch Nikephoros, the human nature of Christ remains circumscribable not only after his resurrection but also after his ascension to heaven. The fact that Christ is no longer known according to the flesh, and now sits at the right hand of the Father, does not mean that Christ has lost his human nature (which he received at the incarnation). On the contrary, he maintains his human nature undiminished and without losing any of its characteristics, and he has kept the body and the rational and spiritual soul through which he wills and acts as God and as man.[178] The only things that Christ lost after the resurrection, according to Nikephoros, were the bodily needs and passions, such as fatigue, thirst, hunger, etc. Therefore, his human body can be circumscribed after the resurrection and the ascension into heaven, where he sits at the right hand of the Father.[179]

Conclusion

If acrimony has characterised the iconoclast controversy, it is because much more was at stake than a question about paintings. Underlying the acceptance or rejection of the veneration of images is an acceptance or rejection of the Chalcedonian dogma concerning person of Christ. And implied in the acceptance or rejection of this dogma is the possibility or impossibility of the redemption and deification of the whole human race.

The iconophiles' justification of the pictorial representation of Christ shows the implementation of ancient Christological principles to a relatively new area of theological concerns. The Chalcedonian distinction and relation between nature (*physis*) and essence (*ousia*), on the one hand, and person (*hypostasis*), on the other, sits at the very center of the question of the veneration of icons. In this context, the post-Chalcedonian notion of *enhypostatōn* provides the strongest argument for the iconophiles' claim that Christ is circumscribable and can, therefore, be iconographically represented. With this faith, John of Damascus, Theodore the Studite, and Nikephoros of Constantinople provide a systematic presentation of the Christological doctrine of hypostatic union against the iconoclasts, who claim that image-making contradicts the undivided and unconfused hypostatic union in Christ, introducing confusion between the two natures.

The basic Christological problem for iconophiles is the hypostatic union of the two *physeis* in the one *hypostasis* of Christ. In order to describe the nature of Christ, the iconophiles' *apologia* reflects apophatic thought in language. The nature of the hypo-

[176] See ibid., II, 44, 46, in *PG* 99, 384C.
[177] See ibid., II, 47, in *PG* 99, 385CD.
[178] See Nikephoros, *"Antirrheticus"* III, 38, in *PG* 100, 437BC.
[179] See ibid., III, 39, in *PG* 100, 444C–445AB.

static union is couched in the negative terms used in the traditional position of Christology, formulated at the ecumenical synods of the Byzantine Church. Without the traditional formulation of the synods, and especially the Chalcedonian definition of the hypostatic union, the iconophiles could not justify the veneration of Christ's image.[180]

The focal point of this union is the mystery of the incarnation. It is by means of this divine act of God that Christ has deified our flesh and sanctified us by assuming our humanity without losing his divinity. The hypostatic union of Christ unites the human and divine wills, freeing man from the bondage of his own will and releasing him towards deification. If Christ's human nature was not changed or confused with his divine nature, then he must be portrayable like any human being. If his two natures are not separated, then even though the divine nature cannot be portrayed, the one portrayed must be the incarnate God.

Byzantine polemics against iconoclasm insist on the fullness of the human nature in Christ, thus largely recovering the Christological tradition of Antioch. The iconoclasts emphasise the *ousia*, while the supporters of icons emphasise the *hypostasis*. The person of the incarnate Word serves as a foundation for differentiating between prototype and image and for safeguarding the possibility and legitimacy of the imitative representation of the reality. As the *hypostasis* assures the unity of (as well as the distinction between) the two *physeis*, the icon testifies to this unity of natures and to the distinction between the created and the uncreated. Christ was certainly not a mere man, nor did he assume an individual among men, but rather he took on the whole, the totality of human nature. It must be said, however, that this total nature was contemplated in an individual manner.[181]

As the Son of God assumed human nature in general (i.e., not a separate human *hypostasis*), therefore, Christ's human nature cannot be portrayed as nature by itself, but only as it occurs in the one composite *hypostasis*. Therefore, the divine *Logos* is present in the icon, not merely in his humanity, but in his divine and human power (provided by *enhypostasis* and the *communicatio idiomatum*). Yet, given the difference of the terms of their essence—that is, the difference between the uncreated infinite nature of God and the created finite nature of man—the iconophiles affirm that the Lord's flesh was deified, with the presence of divine actions on account of its full and hypostatic union with the *Logos*.

For the iconophiles, the Son (as natural image of the Father) remains, on the Trinitarian level, strictly invisible and thus indescribable or uncircumscribable (*aperigraptōn*), because indescribability is the attribute of the Father's divine essence that he has in common with the Son. In the economy of salvation, nevertheless, the Son (as the consubstantial image of the Father) reveals to the world this common divinity in his person. Thus, the very existence of the icon is a statement of the fundamental faith of the Church, that God truly became man and that—in turn—human nature can become deified. The icon of Christ affirms the deification of humanity because it is a picture of the visible, material, human body which is, nonetheless, God. And it is that divine-human person who is, in the icon, revered.

[180] See Travis, *In the Defence of the Faith* 69.
[181] See Theodore, *"Adversus Iconomachos"* III, 17A, 23A, in *PG* 99, 398BC.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 173-182

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Erfurt

Eine übersehene Anwendung eines logischen Folgerungsschemas in den Unionsgesprächen auf dem Konzil von Ferrara-Florenz

Bekanntlich wurde das Konzil von Ferrara-Florenz (ab jetzt: *Florentinum*) 1438 mit dem Ziel einberufen, das Schisma zwischen West- und Ostkirche zu überwinden. Rein formell wurde das Ziel erreicht, d.h. die Union wurde im nächsten Jahr in Florenz unterzeichnet und zelebriert.[1] In Wirklichkeit waren die orthodoxen Bischöfe über den Verlauf der Konsultationen enttäuscht – was später zur unilateralen Annullierung der Union seitens der Ostkirche führen sollte. Die meisten Quellen griechischer Sprache stimmen darin überein, dass die byzantinischen Delegierten von ihrer politischen Führung gezwungen wurden, sich dogmatischen Formeln zu fügen, die sich aus ihrer Sicht nicht als Dogma qualifizieren ließen.

In heutigen Darstellungen des *Florentinums* wird oft behauptet, dass der Hauptgrund für den dogmatischen Dissens zwischen West- und Ostkirche in der Methode läge. Die rationalistischen Scholastiker auf lateinischer Seite und die byzantinischen Mystiker, die im Osten darüber bestimmten, was als orthodox zu gelten hatte, hätten keinen echten Dialog geführt. Ich führe nur einige dieser nicht grundlosen Behauptungen an:

> [I]n der theologischen Methodik wurden [im *Florentinum*] die unterschwelligen Divergenzen nicht im Bewusstsein gehoben [...] Der „Vorkämpfer" der orthodoxen Partei, Markos Eugenikos, will in der Diskussion um das Fegfeuer die Autorität des Ambrosius und Augustinus solange nicht anerkennen, als ihm kein griechischer Kodex mit deren Schriften vorgelegt wird.[2]

> When a Latin speaker appealed to Aristotle as an authority, one of the Georgian envoys exclaimed. "What about Aristotle? Aristotle? A fig for your fine Aristotle". What could be

[1] Da das Augenmerk des vorliegenden Beitrags in der Argumentationsanalyse liegt, kann auf die historischen Hauptquellen und Sekundärliteratur nicht vereinzelt eingegangen werden. Insgesamt wurden gebraucht: Sylvester Sguropulus [=Syropoulos], *Vera historia unionis non verae inter Graecos et Latinos*, griechisch und latein, hg. v. Creyghton, R., Den Haag 1660; *Sancta generalis Florentina synodus*, in: Labbe, Ph., Cossart, G., Coleti, N. (Hg.), *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, tomus 31, Venedig, 1798 (= reprogr. Nachdruck Paris, 1904) [sogenannte Konzilsakten]; Michael Ducas, *Historia Turcobyzantina*, hg. v. Grecu V., (Scriptores Byzantini 1), Bukarest, 1958. Außerdem: [Ostroumov, I.N.], *The History of the Council of Florence*, London, 1861; Frommann, Th., *Kritische Beiträge zur Geschichte der Florentiner Kircheneinigung*, Halle, 1872; Kalligas, P., *Peri tēs en Flōrentiāi synodou*, in: Ders., *Meletai kai logoi*, Athen, 1882, 3-180 (reprographischer Nachdruck des ersten Teils dieser Sammlung einschließlich der uns betreffenden Studie: *Meletai byzantinēs historias*, Athen, Dēmiourgia, 1997); Gill, J., *The Council of Florence*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1959. Für den Ablauf der Konsultationen vgl. Hofmann, G., "Die Konzilsarbeit in Ferrara", *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 3 (1937), 110-40 und 403-55. Charakteristische Tendenzen der westlichen und östlichen Theologie anhand der Konsultationen sieht Ombres, R., "Latins and Greeks in Debate over Purgatory, 1230-1439", *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 35 (1984), 1-14.

[2] Podskalsky, G., *Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz*, München, Beck, 1977, S. 219.

> acceptable are "St. Peter, St. Paul, St. Basil, Gregory the Theologian".[3]
>
> East and West were going different ways in terms of method as well as in doctrine. At the Council of Ferrara-Florence those differences kept surfacing. Isidore of Kiev adverted to the frequent use of syllogisms by the Latins and thought that it had deepened the schism; Scholarius addressed the oriental synod in Florence aware that the Greeks in matters of the sort before them had no confidence in proofs from reason.[4]
>
> Archbishop Isidore of Kiev and all Russia, noting the frequent Latin use of syllogisms, went on to say, regretfully, that such reasoning 'deepened the schism and has made the disagreement greater and stronger'.[5]

Ohne Zweifel brachten ein paar Ostkirchen-Delegierten im *Florentinum* antiintellektuelle Tendenzen zum Ausdruck. Dies möchte und kann ich nicht bestreiten. Was ich in diesem Aufsatz widerlegen möchte, ist das sich aus vorgenannten Primär- und Sekundärquellen ergebende, meiner Meinung nach aber verzerrte und gleichzeitig weit verbreitete Bild über die Theologie der Ostkirche im *Florentinum*, ja über die orthodoxe Theologie ohne Zeitbeschränkung. Dieses Bild fasst Lawrence Cross, wenngleich gut gemeint, folgendermaßen zusammen:

> The voice of that unnamed Georgian [gemeint ist die o.g., von Gill angeführte Stelle aus Syropoulos, Historia vera, x, 12, S. 270] is still echoing loudly in the halls of contemporary Orthodox theology. As the remarks at Florence illustrate, Latins and Greeks do not undertake the theological task in the same way.[6]

Ich möchte dafür argumentieren, dass geradezu der Vorsprecher der „antilateinischen" Gruppe im *Florentinum*, Markus von Ephesus, nicht als sturköpfiger Traditionalist, sondern als ein in der Dialektik bewanderter Disputant und (fürwahr) als Scholastiker hervortrat! Markus hat in seiner Argumentation, wie weiter unten gezeigt wird, nicht ausschließlich patristische Stellen angehäuft, sondern ein Argument aus Plausibilitätsprämissen nach einem bekannten Folgerungssschema benutzt. Interessanterweise stammt es aus der stoischen Logik, ist aber auch aus der aristotelischen Logik ableitbar. Jedenfalls ist es ein Beleg gegen das verbreitete, antiintellektualistische Bild der spätbyzantinischen Theologie.

Die Anwendung des Folgerungsschemas, die ich hier vorstellen möchte, kam in einer Disputation zwischen den lateinischen und den griechischen Delegierten des Florentinums zum Fegefeuer vor.

Erster Punkt der Konsultationen in Ferrara, wo das Konzil im Jahr 1438 tagte, bevor es nach Florenz umzog, war die Fegefeuer-Frage (*ignis purgatorius*). In der ersten Disputation zu diesem Thema gaben die orthodoxen Delegierten totale Unkenntnis dieser Doktrin vor. Daraufhin erklärten sich die Kardinäle bereit, eine kurze, autorisierte Schrift über die Fegefeuer-Doktrin und ihre Berechtigung in der christlichen Tradition zusammenzufassen.

In dieser Schrift (ab sofort: *Cedula*),[7] die Kardinal Julian Cesarini am 5. Juni 1438 dem Konzil unterbreitete, wurde eine buchstäbliche Lesart einer Stelle im ersten Ko-

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[3] Gill, *The Council of Florence*, S. 227. Gill bezieht sich hier auf eine von Syropoulos, *Vera historia* (vgl. Fußn. 1), x, 12, S. 270 geschilderte Szene.

[4] Ombres, "Latins and Greeks in Debate over Purgatory, 1230-1439", S. 3.

[5] Cross, L., "Theology East and West: Difference and Harmony", *Irish Theological Quarterly* 71 (2006), S. 67-76; hier: S. 69. Cross nimmt auf eine Passage aus dem Codex Vaticanus Graecus 706, 12r-22r bezug, vergisst aber, die Stelle genauer zu lokalisieren.

[6] Cross, "Theology East and West: Difference and Harmony", S. 70.

[7] *Deputatorum Latinorum cedula de purgatorio*, in: *Documents relatifs au concile de Florence. I: La question du purgatoire a Ferrare*, hg. v. Petit, L., Patrologia Orientalis 15, Turhout, 1990, S. 25-38.

rintherbrief (III, 13-5) vertreten, an der über ein die menschlichen Werke prüfendes Feuer gesprochen wird. Gemäß *Cedula* solle ein körperlich verstandenes Feuer die Gerechten reinigen, die ohne einige kleinere Sünden eingesehen und verbüßt zu haben starben, je nachdem was die Gebete der Hinterbliebenen besagen. Außerdem wurde in der *Cedula* die Fegefeuer-Doktrin mit Indizien aus dem zweiten Makkabäer-Buch (XII, 46) sowie aus dem Matthäus-Evangelium (XII, 32) belegt, die das Fegefeuer nicht namentlich erwähnen. Darüber hinaus wird in der *Cedula* die dort vorgenommene Interpretation der Bibelstellen mit Passagen griechischer und westlicher Kirchenväter, allen voran Augustinus und Papst Gregor, untermauert. Wie erwartet in einem scholastischen Traktat beschränkt sich die *Cedula* nicht auf die *confirmatio ad auctoritates*, sondern sie enthält dialektische Argumente, die aus plausiblen Prämissen beweisen sollen, dass es eine intermediäre Instanz der Sühne nach dem Tode gebe. Die Prämissen besagen, dass keine Sünden vernachlässigbar sind, egal wie klein. Ferner, dass es nur gerecht ist, wenn einige Sünder, denen es nicht gelang, einige *lässliche* Sünden zu ihren Lebzeiten einzusehen, doch noch ins Paradies einziehen können. Da nun kein Bewohner des Paradieses mit irgendeinem Sündenfleck belastet sein darf (so eine weitere Prämisse) müssen lässliche, von ihrem verstorbenen Urheber nicht eingesehene, geschweige denn gesühnte Sünden, im Jenseits und zwar *vor* dem Einzug ins Paradies gereinigt werden. Daher erkläre sich laut *Cedula* die Notwendigkeit, eine Sündenvergebung zwischen Tod und jüngstem Gericht anzunehmen.

Markus von Ephesus übernahm die Aufgabe, von byzantinischer Seite Stellung zur *Cedula* zu beziehen. In seiner Antwort (ab jetzt: *Oratio prima*)[8] vertrat Markus eine agnostische These bezüglich der letzten Dinge: Man wisse nicht, was genau mit den Verstorbenen passiere. Mit den Thesen der *Cedula* übereinstimmend erklärte Markus, dass Gebete den Verstorbenen helfen würden. Markus widersprach aber der *Cedula*, indem er es für unklar hielt, auf welchem Wege dies geschehe – ob mit einem Feuer oder vielleicht doch anders. Bei den in der *Cedula* angeführten Autoritätsstellen wies Markus von Ephesus auf alternative Interpretationen hin. Im wesentlichen wies er auf den Umstand hin, dass an den Stellen aus dem Makkabäer-Buch, dem Matthäus-Evangelium und Augustinus nicht wörtlich von Feuer die Rede ist. Ein Feuer wird einzig bei Paulus erwähnt, aber hier deutete Markus auf einen allegorischen Sinn des Wortes „Feuer" hin.[9] Somit belegten aus byzantinischer Sicht die einschlägigen Autoritätsstellen, und zwar zum Teil dieselben, die in der *Cedula* genannt sind, nicht die dogmatische Richtigkeit der Fegefeuer-These. Mit seiner Vorliebe für eine allegorische Lesart der fraglichen Passagen bestritt Markus den in der *Cedula* enthaltenen Interpretationsansatz und machte somit die weitere Diskussion auf der Basis der Interpretation von Bibel- und patristischen Stellen unmöglich. Folglich konnte eine Beweisführung über das Fegefeuer nur noch aufgrund einer sachlichen Diskussion ohne Hinsicht auf die Textinterpretation von Autoritätsstellen erfolgen.

Um dem uferlosen Streit um die richtige Interpretation der Texttradition zu entgehen, versuchte Markus von Ephesus tatsächlich mit zehn Syllogismen, die Diskussion auf sachliche Argumente zu verlagern. Die Argumente II und III sind in ihrer Ge-

[8] Markus' Stellungnahme ist zu lesen in: Marci Ephesii, *Oratio prima de igne purgatorio*, 14, II-III, in: Petit, L. (Hg.), *Documents relatifs au concile de Florence. I: La question du purgatoire a Ferrare*, Patrologia Orientalis 15, S. 57. Zu den Sitzungen nach dem 4. Juni 1438 vgl. Hofmann, „Die Konzilsarbeit in Ferrara" (vgl. Fußnote 1), S. 419.

[9] Marci Ephesii, *Oratio prima*, 6, S. 47.

genüberstellung sehr interessant. Hiermit folgen eine Übersetzung und eine tabellarische Wiedergabe derselben:

> [Argument II] Es ist der Güte Gottes angemessener, eine kleine Wohltat als eine kleine Sünde zu berücksichtigen. Aber die kleinen Wohltaten der Urheber großer Sünden ergeben keine Belohnung, da die Boshaftigkeit überragt. Folglich sind die kleinen Sünden derjenigen, die Großes errungen haben, nicht zu bestrafen, da die besseren Taten obsiegen. Denn, wenn das für größer Gehaltene [d.h. die kleinen Wohltaten der Sittenlosen] nicht zählt, so zählt um so weniger das, was für kleiner gehalten wird [d.h. die kleine Sünde der Tugendhaften]. Also ist es nicht erforderlich, ein Fegefeuer anzunehmen.
>
> [Argument III] Wie sich die kleine Missetat den sonst Sittenlosen berechnet, so berechnet sich die kleine Missetat den sonst Tugendhaften. Aber die kleine Wohltat solcher [sittenlosen] Menschen kann keine Gegenleistung im Sinne von Wohltaten nach sich ziehen, sondern nur eine Verminderung der Qual. Die kleine Missetat ergibt also keine Qual, sondern eine Verminderung im Genuss. Also ist kein Fegefeuer anzunehmen.

	Argument II	*Argument III*
Anfangshypothesen	Kleine Wohltaten von Verbrechern wiegen schwerer als kleine Missetaten von Tugendhaften	Kleine Wohltaten von Verbrechern und kleine Missetaten von Tugendhaften wiegen gleich schwer
Hilfshypothesen	Kleine Wohltaten von Verbrechern ergeben keine Belohnung	Kleine Wohltaten von Verbrechern ergeben keine Belohnung, sondern verrechnen sich mit der Schwere von Missetaten erst in der Hölle
Stillschweigende Annahme	Wohltaten und Missetaten werden auf analoge Weise bewertet	
Zwischenergebnisse	Kleine Missetaten von Tugendhaften ergeben keine direkte Bestrafung	Kleine Missetaten von Tugendhaften ergeben keine direkte Bestrafung, sondern lassen sich erst im Paradies mit dem Lohn aus Verdiensten verrechnen
Definition Fegefeuer	Das Fegefeuer dient der direkten Reinigung kleiner Missetaten von Tugendhaften vor dem Einzug ins Paradies	
Konklusion (aus Zwischenergebnissen und Definition Fegefeuer)	Es ist nicht nötig, ein Fegefeuer anzunehmen	

Zum Argument II kann Folgendes angemerkt werden: Dieses Argument besagt, dass die Gerechtigkeit Gottes diktiere, kleine Wohltaten seien mehr zu berücksichtigen als kleine Missetaten.[10] Gott gehe sparsam mit Strafe und großzügig mit Lob um. Also müsse er Verbrechern ihre etwaigen kleinen Wohltaten höher anrechnen als Tugendhaften ihre kleinen Missetaten. Dabei sei es aber unplausibel, fährt Markus fort, dass Gott Verbrecher wegen einiger kleiner Wohltaten honoriere. Wenn die berücksichtigungswürdigeren Kleinwohltaten der Verbrecher keinen Unterschied machen würden,

[10] Marci Ephesii, *Oratio prima*, 13, II, S. 57.

dann sei dies erst recht bei den lässlichen Missetaten tugendhafter Menschen der Fall. D.h. diese Missetaten würden nicht geahndet (Zwischenergebnis Argument II). Da nun das Fegefeuer nach westlicher Vorstellung genau die Funktion haben sollte, die kleinen, zu Lebzeiten nicht gesühnten Missetaten der Tugendhaften zu reinigen, gebe es daher keine Not, die Existenz des Fegefeuers anzunehmen (Konklusion).

Zum Argument III nun: Die Anfangshypothese von Argument III[11] besagt, dass lässliche Missetaten tugendhafter Menschen in genau demselben Maße Pein verursachen, wie die kleinen Wohltaten von Lasterhaften Lohn verursachen. Damit widerspricht sie der Anfangshypothese des Arguments II. Die übrig gebliebene Alternative, dass Gott kleinen Missetaten von guten Menschen gegenüber in höherem Maße Strenge zeigt, als er wohlgesonnen ist gegenüber kleinen Wohltaten von bösen Menschen musste wohl diskussionslos ausscheiden, da sie einer Grundintuition über die Milde Gottes widerspricht. Sie stellt ja Gott als einen altmodischen Schulmeister dar, der mit Lob geizt – und zwar bei denen, die ihn am meisten nötig haben! – und im Bestrafen übertreibt – und zwar bei denen, mit denen er Grund hätte, zufrieden zu sein! Das Zwischenergebnis von Argument III besagt, dass den Lasterhaften nach Kleinwohltaten Strafe abgezogen, den Tugendhaften aber (ein einziger Maßstab!) werde nach etwaigen kleinen, jedenfalls lässlichen Missetaten Genuss abgezogen. Letzteres macht die Annahme des Fegefeuers wieder überflüssig (Konklusion) – wie im Argument II also. Die Gründe, aus denen die Konklusion des Arguments III gleich lautet wie die des Arguments II sind aber andere. Hier macht es der Umstand, dass im Paradies Genuss abgezogen wird, höchst unwahrscheinlich, dass man vor dem Paradies mittels Fegefeuers gereinigt wird. Es wäre ungerecht, durch das Fegefeuer zu gehen und trotzdem im Paradies weniger zu genießen, genauso wie es ungerecht ist, einen Schuldner zur Begleichung seiner Schulden aufzufordern, nachdem jemand anders diese beglichen hat.

Im Sinne eines Vergleichs zwischen beiden Argumenten liegen folgende Betrachtungen nahe: In beiden Syllogismen schließt Markus auf das gleiche Resultat: Die Annahme des Fegefeuers sei nicht erforderlich. Und zwar sind es nicht irgendwelche Prämissen, aus denen Markus von Ephesus dieses Ergebnis gewann. Die Anfangshypothesen der Argumente II und III widersprechen sich. Laut Anfangshypothese von Argument II ist Gott jemand, der Kavaliersdelikte vergisst und Verbesserungsansätze, egal wie klein, großzügig honoriert. Laut Anfangshypothese von Argument III ist er aber ein sehr genauer Buchhalter, der weder Strafe zu verhängen vergisst noch über die Leistung honoriert. Beide Hilfshypothesen lauten ähnlich. Hinter dieser Argumentationstaktik steckt eine besondere Absicht. Man ist versucht zu sagen: eine listige. Diese Absicht werde ich gleich untersuchen.

Mit seinen Argumenten II und III versuchte Markus offenbar, seine Antwort auf die *Cedula* auf eine möglichst nah an das *logische Dilemma* herankommende Formulierung zu bringen. Obwohl ihm dies nicht ganz gelang (die Argumente II und III sind keine Einsetzungsinstanz des Dilemmas), ist es für das Verständnis von Markus' Absicht lohnend, dieses Folgerungsschema mit seiner Argumentation zu vergleichen.

Nach dem „Dilemma" genannten Folgerungsschema gilt: Implizieren zwei einander widersprechende, jedenfalls ausschließende Sätze (hier wären das die Anfangshypothesen) jeweils ein und dasselbe Konsequens (hier wäre das die Konklusion), dann ist dieses Konsequens unabhängig von diesen Sätzen wahr. Das *klassische* Dilemma,

[11] Marci Ephesii, *Oratio prima*, 13, III, S. 57.

d.h. die Form des Dilemmas mit kontradiktorischen Anfangshypothesen, ist offensichtlich nach aristotelischen Prinzipien als gültiger hypothetischer Syllogismus abzuleiten. Dies kann unschwer unter Anwendung des Prinzips des ausgeschlossenen Dritten und des *Modus Ponens* gezeigt werden. Traditionell wird aber das Dilemma meist mit den Stoikern und der Rhetorik in Verbindung gebracht.[12]

Nun implizieren die Anfangshypothesen der Argumente II und III zwar nicht direkt ein und denselben Satz, sondern indirekt über die Hilfshypothesen zwei unterschiedliche Zwischenergebnisse. Aber die Hilfshypothesen der Argumente II und III können so interpretiert werden, dass sie dasselbe besagen. Dann haben die Anfangs- und Hilfshypothese des Arguments II die Form (p & q) bzw. die Anfangs- und Hilfshypothese des Arguments III die Form (¬p & q). D.h., die Konjunktion von Anfangs- und Hilfshypothese des Arguments II und die Konjunktion von Anfangs- und Hilfshypothese des Arguments III widersprechen sich. Zum Widerspruch zwischen der Gesamtheit der Prämissen von Argument II und der Gesamtheit der Prämissen von Argument III genügt zu zeigen, dass sich die Anfangs- und Hilfshypothese des Arguments II und die Anfangs- und Hilfshypothese des Arguments III widersprechen. Das ist aber wie gesagt der Fall. Es widersprechen sich also die Konjunktion der Prämissen von Argument II und die Konjunktion der Prämissen von Argument III. Die stillschweigende Annahme muss als neutral betrachtet werden. Da sie in beiden Argumenten vorausgesetzt wird, hat sie keinen Einfluss darauf, ob die Konjunktion *aller* Prämissen des Arguments II und die Konjunktion *aller* Prämissen des Arguments III einander widersprechen und sie kann infolge dessen außer Betracht gelassen werden. Auf diese Art folgen beide Zwischenergebnisse. Diese sind zwar nicht die ein und einzige Folgerung aus widersprüchlichen Prämissen, die das klassische Dilemma erfordern würde, aber aus den Zwischenergebnissen folgt tatsächlich (mit Hilfe einer wiederum neutralen weil gleichlautenden Definition des Fegefeuers) *eine einzige* Konklusion. Dass die Konklusion („Es ist nicht erforderlich, ein Fegefeuer anzunehmen“) aus sich widersprechenden Prämissen folgt, macht die Argumente II und III zu einer Einsetzungsinstanz des klassischen Dilemmas. So sieht es jedenfalls auf den ersten Blick aus. Die Konklusion müsste daher allein genommen wahr sein.

Dies hatte für die Kardinäle folgende Auswirkungen: Hätten diese die Hilfshypothesen tatsächlich als gleichlautend angesehen, dann müssten sie sich geschlagen geben, denn dann wäre die Argumentation des Markus von Ephesus eine Einsetzungsinstanz eines gültigen Theoremschemas (Sie hätten sich nicht so ausgedrückt. Sie hätten etwa gesagt: „Die Argumentation des Markus von Ephesus ist ein Dilemma“. Aber der Sache nach ist es dasselbe).

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[12] Für die Vorgeschichte des Dilemmas vgl. Kneale, W., und Kneale, M., *The Development of Logic*, Oxford, 1984, S. 178-9. Einige wichtige frühe Quellen für das Dilemma sind: Galenus, *Institutio logica*, cap. 6, 5, hg. v. Kalbfleisch, K., Leipzig, 1896; Cicero, *De inventione*, lib. 1, cap. 45, hg. v. Stroebel, E., Leipzig, 1915; Pseudo-Hermogenes, *De inventione*, cap. 4, 6, hg. v. Rabe, H., Leipzig, 1913; Anonymus, *Epitome artis rhetoricae*, in: *Rhetores Graeci*, 3. Bd., hg. v. Walz, Chr., Stuttgart, 1834, 641; Photios, *Bibliotheca*, 412a, hg. v. Bekker, I., 2 Bde, Berlin, 1824-25, erläutert das Dilemma in seiner Besprechung der Rhetorik von Aristides Aelius anhand folgenden Beispiels: Sokrates behauptete, er habe nichts gewusst. Wenn dies wahr war, dann war Sokrates nicht weise, denn er wusste nichts. War aber Sokrates' Behauptung nicht wahr, dann war dieser ebenfalls nicht weise, denn er habe etwas Falsches behauptet, das er introspektiv hätte feststellen können. Photios schlussfolgert daraus, dass Sokrates mit der Äußerung „Ich weiß nichts“ sich als nicht weise erwies, und zwar unabhängig davon, ob seine Behauptung zutraf oder nicht.

Aber auch wenn die Kardinäle so etwas nicht zugaben, d.h. auch wenn sie die Hilfshypothesen nicht als gleichbedeutend betrachteten (die Anfangshypothesen sind unumstritten widersprüchlich, so dass sie gegen diesen Punkt der Argumentation sowieso nichts vorbringen konnten), in die Enge getrieben wurden sie doch noch. Es blieben ihnen nämlich nur wenige Spielzüge offen. Ihre Arbeit wäre nicht getan, wenn sie z.B: nur eine Anfangshypothese angefochten hätten. Denn die andere Anfangshypothese wäre damit automatisch bestätigt (die Anfangshypothese widersprechen sich ja) und mit der dazugehörigen Hilfshypothese würde die Konklusion doch noch folgen. Sie mussten also bestreiten:

I. dass die Hilfshypothesen Gleiches besagen;
II. dass die zur wahren Anfangshypothese dazugehörige Hilfshypothese wahr ist.

Wenn sie sogar zu allen Hypothesen des Markus Stellung nehmen wollten (was ja laut Regeln einer scholastischen Disputation notwendig war), dann konnten die Kardinäle höchstens eine Hypothese von Argument II und eine von Argument III X-weise akzeptieren. Aber sie mussten auch mindestens zwei akzeptieren. Denn:

III. eine der Anfangshypothesen mussten sie akzeptieren, wenn sie eine ablehnten;
IV. eine der Hilfshypothesen, wenn nicht beide, mussten sie aus Intuitionsgründen akzeptieren.

D.h. sie konnten entweder sagen:

i. „Kleine Wohltaten sind mehr zu berücksichtigen als kleine Missetaten und alles wird vergolten nach seinem Maß an Güte oder Schlechtigkeit“;
oder aber:
ii. „Die kleinen Missetaten tugendhafter Menschen wiegen genauso viel wie kleine Wohltaten von Verbrechern und Gott honoriere keine Verbrecher wegen einiger kleiner Wohltaten“.

Es eröffneten sich also den Kardinälen nicht gerade viele Möglichkeiten. Außerdem musste es theologisch naheliegend sein, was sie hier zu akzeptieren hatten. Markus war ein argumentativer Spielzug gelungen, aus dem sich seine Gesprächspartner hatten zwar befreien können, allerdings mit noch nicht auszumachenden Schäden für ihre Fegefeuerlehre. Mit der Alternative (ii) wäre z.B. Gott jemand, der kleine Missetaten Tugendhafter und kleine Wohltaten von Verbrechern zwar mit gleichen Maßstäben misst, der sich aber weigert, letzteren den Preis für solche Wohltaten anzurechnen, und sich stattdessen darauf beschränkt, Tugendhafte für Missetaten, wohlgemerkt für gleich wiegende wie der nicht entrichtete Lohn der Verbrecher, im Fegefeuer zu reinigen, damit sie auf keinen Teil der vollen Prämie im Paradies verzichten müssen. Entspräche das irgend einem Gerechtigkeitssinn? Wohl kaum. Deshalb hatten die Kardinäle im Endeffekt nur einen wirklich vertretbaren Ausweg – die Alternative (i). Ob diese auch im Sinne der katholischen Kirche war, blieb noch festzustellen.

In der Konzilssitzung des 14. Juni 1438 las Bessarion von Nizäa[13] eine überarbeitete Form der *Oratio prima* vor.[14] Das (ab jetzt: *Responsio Graecorum*) war die offizi-

[13] Bessarion sollte später Kardinal werden, aber in jenem Moment war er noch ein Mitglied der Ostkirche und deren Delegation auf dem Konzil.

[14] [Markus von Ephesus/Bessarion von Nizäa], *Responsio Graecorum*, 19, I-II, in: Petit (Hg.), *Documents relatifs au concile de Florence* (vgl. Fußnote 8), S. 76. Zur Sitzung vgl. Hofmann, „Die Konzilsarbeit in Ferrara“ (vgl. Fußnote 1), S. 420-1.

elle Antwort der griechischen Delegation. Der Wortlaut der Argumentation von Markus war in der *Responsio Graecorum* beibehalten. Bessarion, ein früher Humanist, hatte an anderen Stellen Markus' strengen Ton in der *Oratio prima* abgemildert.

Nach Erhalt der *Responsio Graecorum* und nach einer Bedenkzeit, gab der Dominikaner Juan de Torquemada am 27. Juni 1438 die lateinischen Antworten auf die Argumente des Bischofs von Ephesus bekannt.[15] Er nannte sie bezeichnenderweise „*solutiones*", wie die Auflösung strittiger Punkte in einer Disputation. Dort (ab jetzt: *Latinorum responsio*) wird die Anfangshypothese von Argument II akzeptiert und *eo ipso* die Anfangshypothese von Argument III abgelehnt. Abgelehnt wird nebenbei bemerkt auch die aus Intuitionsgründen bereits ausgeschlossene Alternative, dass Gott kleine Wohltaten von Verbrechern ignoriert, gleichzeitig kleine Missetaten von Tugendhaften ohne Nachsicht bestrafen würde – vgl. oben.

Des weiteren lehnt die *Latinorum responsio* die Hilfshypothese von Argument II ab (sonst müsste ja die Schlussfolgerung akzeptiert werden, dass es keinen Zwang zur Annahme des Fegefeuers gebe). D.h. es wird in der *Latinorum responsio* abgelehnt, dass die kleinen Wohltaten von Verbrechern nicht belohnt würden. Dabei wird (wohl aus Intuitionsgründen) die Hilfshypothese von Argument III akzeptiert. Das wäre nicht nötig. Die Ablehnung beider Hilfsphypothesen würde nicht mehr nach sich ziehen, als dass Wohltaten von Verbrechern weder direkt belohnt werden noch gegen ihre Verbrechen verrechnet in der Hölle strafmildernd wirken. Aber dass eine kleine Wohltat für einen Verbrecher irrelevant wäre, wäre natürlich aus lateinischer Sicht nicht hinnehmbar. Deshalb lässt die *Latinorum responsio* gegen die Hilfshypothese von Markus' Argument II eine gewisse Belohnung der Verbrecher wegen ihrer kleinen Wohltaten zu. Die Hilfshypothese II zu akzeptieren, war auch aus dem Grund nicht gewollt, dass die dazugehörige Anfangshypothese laut *Latinorum responsio* wahr sei. Gleichzeitig heißt die *Latinorum responsio* mit der Hilfshypothese von Argument III gut, dass die kleinen Wohltaten der Verbrecher nicht direkt belohnt, sondern verrechnet werden. Macht das irgendeinen Sinn? Ja, wenn man die Belohnung, von der in der Hilfshypothese von Argument II die Rede ist, als jegliche Art von Belohnung versteht, ob sie Genuss verursacht oder auf Strafmilderung ausgeht, die Belohnung dagegen, von der in der Hilfshypothese von Argument III die Rede ist, ausschließlich als direkte Belohnung. So verstanden besagen beide Hilfshypothesen nicht dasselbe. In diesem Sinne lässt sich einerseits leugnen, dass Verbrecher wegen etwaiger kleiner Wohltaten belohnt würden, andererseits bejahen, dass diese kleinen Wohltaten der Verbrecher gegen ihre Verbrechen in der Hölle verrechnet werden. Da die *Latinorum responsio* sowieso Markus' stillschweigende Annahme über die analoge Art der Bewertung kleiner Wohltaten von Verbrechern und kleiner Missetaten Tugendhafter fallen lässt, würde letztere Annahme nicht implizieren, dass die kleinen Missetaten der Tugendhaften sich ebenfalls gegen deren Verdienste verrechnen lassen.

Man sollte sich überlegen, was laut *Latinorum responsio* zu akzeptieren ist. Abgestritten wird dort, dass Gott kleine Missetaten und kleine Wohltaten genau vergilt. Angenommen wird, dass Gott kleine Wohltaten von Verbrechern sehr genau zur Entlastung des Sünders gut schreibt und diese gegen die Verbrechen verrechnet, kleine Missetaten von tugendhaften Menschen dagegen etwas ermäßigt soll schreibt und diese

[15] [Juan de Torquemada O.P. (?)], *Latinorum responsio*, 17, I-II, in : Petit (Hg.), *Documents relatifs au concile de Florence* (vgl. Fußnote 8), S. 99-100.

(Vorsicht!) nicht verrechnet, sondern direkt im Fegefeuer reinigt und zwar zu einem Preis, der etwas gemindert ist verglichen mit dem tatsächlichen Wert der kleinen Missetat. Hätten sich aber die kleinen Missetaten von Tugendhaften stattdessen erst im Paradies verrechnen müssen, dann hätten sie sich mindernd auf das Maß des Genusses im Paradies ausgewirkt. Die einen hätten dann mehr, die anderen weniger Genuss im Paradies, was nicht sein könne, weil verschiedene Klassen von Genuss dem paradiesischen Zustand nicht gerecht wären. Die *solutiones* lauten wie folgt:[16]

> *Solutio* [*ad argumentum II*]: Hierauf antworten wir, dass der Obersatz [gemeint ist die Anfangshypothese], den ihr [im Argument II] annehmet, wahr ist, wenn die kleine Wohltat unberührt bleibt. Dies ist nämlich nicht der Fall, wenn sie aus irgendeinem Grund storniert wird, was bei all denjenigen der Fall ist, die eine Todsünde begangen haben. Denn die Todsünde storniert alle Wohltaten, die vorher begangen wurden. Der Sünder also, der wegen seiner Sünde Gott lästert, muss alle ihm geleisteten Güter ablegen. Daher verbleibt denjenigen, die unter der Last einer Todsünde gestorben sind, nichts in der Hand, welche Wohltaten sie auch immer geleistet haben mögen. [...] Anders verhält es sich aber bei kleinen Sünden, d.h. verzeihbaren Schuldlasten bzw. bei einer durch die Strafe bezeugten Einsicht derjenigen, die in Liebe ablebten, denn die Liebe ist in ihnen noch tätig. Die Liebe ist also nicht derart, dass kleine Sünden sie tilgen, sondern nur die ihr entgegenstrebende Todsünde [kann das], die das Leben aufhebt, welches ein Geschenk der Liebe ist. Aus dieser Ungleichartigkeit hat das Prinzip, das ihr an der genannten Stelle einführt, keine Geltung. Es gibt folglich Gegenbeispiele zum Untersatz [=Hilfshypothese] eures Syllogismus, so dass wir ihn verneinen können. D.h. es gibt keine Belohnung – keine Linderung der Strafe eher – für kleine Wohltaten, die von Untugendhaften geleistet werden. D.h. derjenige, der mit einigen frommen Taten in die Hölle geht, erleidet eine leichtere Strafe als derjenige, der ohne diese den ewigen Qualen geliefert wurde. Daher scheint die göttliche Wohltätigkeit keiner Sache mehr zugeteilt zu werden als diesen kleinen Errungenschaften.[...]
>
> *Solutio* [*ad argumentum III*]: Obwohl wir aus dem obigen geantwortet zu haben meinen, müssen wir [zum Argument III] sagen, dass es nicht allgemein gilt, was ihr in eurem Obersatz [=Anfangshypothese] annehmet. Es dürfen nicht mit gleichem Maßstab die kleinen Wohltaten derjenigen Toten beurteilt werden, die eine Todsünde begingen, sowie die kleinen Missetaten derjenigen, die in Liebe von diesem Leben verschieden. [Die kleinen Wohltaten der Schwerstverbrecher] sind wegen des Todes in der Todsünde keiner Gewährung ewigen Lebens bzw. keines Ablasses der ewigen Qualen würdig. Im zweiten Fall aber [d.h. einer kleinen Missetat durch einen Tugendhaften] muss allen voran die Reinigung vorgenommen werden aufgrund des gerechten Urteils Gottes und wegen der höchsten Perfektion der himmlischen Seligkeit sowie wegen der Reinheit und der Überlegenheit des gewährten Guts. Denn sonst würde kein Mensch in gar keiner Visionsart jenes ewige Gut betrachten, es sei denn er kann ein reines und tiefst unbeflecktes Gemüt vorweisen, in dem sich nichts Böses innezuwohnen ziemt. Auch wenn kleine Wohltaten derer also, die ansonsten liederlich sind, einen Unterschied in der Bestrafung resultieren, so ziehen kleine Missetaten derer, die ein tugendhaftes Leben führten, keine regelmäßige Verminderung im Genuss.

In der *Latinorum responsio* wird also für die einzig vertretbare Möglichkeit optiert. Diese steht im Gegensatz zur stillschweigenden Annahme des Markus. Markus hätte die *Latinorum responsio* in diesem Punkt widerlegen können, wenn er diese stillschweigende Annahme hätte begründen können, d.h. wenn er geltend gemacht hätte, dass Gut- und Sollschreiben auf gleiche Weise zugeordnet werde; dass allen, sowohl Verbrechern mit kleinen Wohltaten als auch Tugendhaften mit kleinen Missetaten der

[16] Vgl. Fußnote 15.

Lohn oder die Strafe dafür gegen ihr sonstiges Verschulden bzw. Verdienst indirekt verrechnet würde; dass es also nicht der Fall ist, dass ersteren die kleinen Wohltaten indirekt verrechnet werden, letztere aber wegen ihrer kleinen Missetaten direkt bestraft werden. Das ist nicht selbstverständlich und ohne eine Begründung dafür ist Markus' Behauptung, Gott vergelte die kleinen Sünden der Tugendhaften „nicht mit Höllenqualen, sondern mit Verminderung des Genusses im Paradies" nicht zu rechtfertigen. Höchstens konnte Markus von Ephesus entgegnen, dass es *möglich* ist, dass Wohltaten und Missetaten auf analoge Weise, indirekt vergolten werden, und zwar mittels „Genussminderung".

Das hat für die Zwecke des Markus von Ephesus sogar genügt! Markus benötigte ja keine so starke Schlussfolgerung zu dem Effekt, dass die Sünden-Verrechnung tatsächlich im Paradies vonstatten gehen müsste. Für seine Argumentationszwecke war es hinreichend zu beweisen, dass eine Verrechnung aller Kleinsünden im Paradies *möglich ist*. Dies bedeutet selbstverständlich, dass das Fegefeuer *nicht notwendig* ist. Da die Westkirche auf die *Notwendigkeit* des Fegefeuers setzte, brauchte der Bischof von Ephesus nicht mehr zu beweisen, um die Ansicht des Gegners zu widerlegen. Es galt ja zu zeigen, dass man unabhängig von Prämissen immer zu dem Schluss kommt, dass das Fegefeuer nicht notwendig ist. Die Byzantiner bestritten ja nicht die *Möglichkeit* einer Sünden-Reinigung zwischen Ableben und Jüngstem Gericht, sondern ihre *Notwendigkeit*. Sie zogen es vor, sich auf agnostische Weise eines endgültigen Urteils darüber zu enthalten. Markus machte diese agnostische Argumentationslinie nicht sehr deutlich. Hätte er das getan, dann hätte die Gegenseite viel weniger erwidern können.

Abgesehen von der Argumentationsstrategie des Markus bezüglich theologischer Fragen dieser Art ergibt sich aus den hier ausgewählten Texten, dass die byzantinische Philosophie, ja der antiwestliche, palamitische Zweig derselben, sich durchaus logischer Instrumente beim Argumentieren bediente.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 183-190

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Principles and Characteristics of George Gemistos Plethon's Philosophy

George Gemistos Plethon was a Byzantine Philosopher, who lived during the 14th and 15th centuries before the fall of the Byzantine Empire. In his writings we can find the feeling of an intense Greek identity. Also, he can be considered as a genuine neoplatonist, who played a decisive role in the controversy between Platonists and Aristotelians in his era. He took part in the Council of Florence and the Council of Ferrara (1438-1439), where he gave a course of lectures on Platonic Philosophy, which was the cause for the founding of Academia Platonica by Cozimo de Medici (1459). His social and political ideas were very important and derived from an ideal for reforming the social reality of his country. But they weren't appreciated, as he wished, in Peloponnesus, and especially in Mistra, where he lived for the most part of his life. Although his theology and ontology are based on a metaphysical determinism, the human being maintains his freedom because of the rational part of soul. Man and his soul are in a middle position between the intelligible and the sensible world. His ethics was developed on a wide theory of virtues, including the four main platonic virtues, from which derive twelve subdivisions. His anthropological, social and ethical theories are based on the neoplatonic line of thought and had a very large influence not only on Byzantium but on the whole European culture of Renaissance.

1. Biography

George Gemistos Plethon (Constantinople, 1360? - Mistras, 1452) was a Byzantine Philosopher, the last great spirit of Byzantine Hellenism before its fall. His birth place was Constantinople and, although he found a great respect among his fellow citizens, he settled very soon in the capital of free Byzantine Peloponnesus, Mistra. Plethon as a young man went on a journey to the court of sultan Mourat I, where he got acquaint with the country and the people of the most dangerous enemy of his country. He was taught, especially by a Jew called Elissaios, the ancient dogmas of Zoroaster and polytheism. Plethon became a neo-platonist studying Plato (he took the name Plethon ("the full") because it is similar to the sound of the name of the great ancient philosopher; the word Plethon is an archaic translation of the Modern Greek gemistos ("full, stuffed")). Another reason for Plethon's Platonism was his thought that the only way to stop the decline of the Empire was the rebirth of the Greek Byzantium, through the return to ancient "nationalistic" beliefs.

Between 1414 and 1423 he wrote two commentaries to the emperor of Mistra Manouel II Palaeologus and to the lord of Mistra Theodorus II Palaeologus, which contained perspicacious proposals for the defense of Peloponnesus. In these commentaries

one can also find a great number of plans for reforming the society with ahead the time for that era ideas.

In 1438 Plethon was invited to participate in the mission with the emperor John VIII Palaeologus to the Council of Ferrara and the Council of Florence. The discussions in these Councils were about the possibility of a union between the Greek and the Roman Churches. Accompanying John VIII were Plethon and his students, Johannes Bessarion and George Scholarios. In Florence, Plethon, as a secular scholar, didn't play an important role in the Council; but he set up a temporary school to teach the doctrines of Plato. He was the one who essentially made Plato known in the Western world, where mainly Aristotle's authority dominated for centuries. One of the Maecenas in Florence, Cozimo de Medici, attended these lectures and later founded the Academia Platonica (1459), in which scholars like Marsilio Ficino and Pico de la Mirandola participated and worked. The students of Plethon, especially cardinal Bessarion, reinforced decisively this movement.

The works of Plethon extend to a great number of small treatises dealing with different matters. He also compiled and commented on many texts of ancient Greek authors. In Florence he wrote the famous book *De Differentiis*, a description of the differences between Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of God. Already before his journey in Florence, he had prepared a great work under the title *Treatises of Laws*. It is this book which George Scholarios (who became Gennadius II, Patriarch of Constantinople) threw to fire and convinced the Byzantine emperor Manouell II Palaeologus to confine Plethon in Mistra; however, Plethon remained famous among his contemporaries even after the condemnation by Scholarios. Other well known book of Plethon is the *Magic Words of the Magicians who were Disciples of Zoroaster*, in which he presented a polytheistic view. His treatise *On Virtues*, the *Response to Scholarios*, and the *Response to Various Questions*, are considered today important works. He also wrote about the political condition of Peloponnesus, and a number of works on geography, music and different other subjects.

Plethon died in 1452 just before the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans. All his friends and students (Bessarion, Manuel Chrysoloras, Laonikos Chalcocondyles, Michael Apostolis etc.) felt grieve for his death as we can see in the texts they dedicated to him. These texts also contain marks of admiration for the wisdom and virtue of their celebrate teacher. In Italy, his memory remained alive. When in 1465 the ruler of Rimini, Sigismundo Malatesta, occupied temporarily the Mistra, he took the relics of Plethon and set them to the Cathedral of Saint Francisco, where they still remain.

2. Greek Indentity

One of the most important characteristics in the writings of Plethon is his intense Greek identity, which is manifested by his often statements to the ancient tradition and his efforts to put aside the Roman element in the life of Byzantium. In his address to the emperor Manouel he summed up the leading statement of his ideal by the following words: "We are Greeks in the origin; the language and the education of our nation are the testimonies for this". This conscience of the "Greek nation" and "Greek origin" leaded him to an intense critic of Empire's traditional idea. He found out that the ancient Greek values were the spiritual base of the new political reform that the Byzantines should apply to their country. For this reason, Plethon took a decisive position as a defender of Plato in the controversy of Platonists and Aristotelians in the 15th century.

Plato was for him the most important educator for the total reformation of the political life of Byzantium. In the end, he became an opponent of Aristotle due to the "Christianization" of Aristotle's dogmas during the Middle Ages.

With the commentaries to the rulers of Byzantium, Plethon following the *Republic* of Plato tried to find a new model for political life. Moreover, he made special practical observations on the economical and social situation of Peloponnesus. But precisely because of his Platonism, he maintained an aristocratic point of view; while, at the same time, he proposed a new legislation based on the factor of ordinary man. Although he was a Christian before his journal to Florence, he came back having pagan beliefs, as we can see from his later works, i.e. *Treatises of Laws*. In the paganism and the values of the ancient Greek tradition he believed that he could find a renovating way-out for his country. For this reason, he can be called the first philosopher of the Neo-Hellenic period.

3. The Controversy between Platonism and Aristotelism

Plethon believed that he found the key for the renaissance of his country in a universal religion based on the platonic dogmas. In the 15th century he had the dream of a syncretistic mysticism, which is derived not only from the works of Plato, but also from the philosophies of Iamblichus and Proclus; in this sense he can also be characterized as a neoplatonist.

When Plethon went in Florence for the Council, which had as aim the union of the Churches (1438-1439), he taught the Florentines the superiority of Plato to Aristotle. It is in this place where he wrote a book under the title *On the Differences between Aristotle and Plato* (*De Differentiis*), which was a summary of his lessons. That work of Plethon was the cause for the division of the scholars between Platonists and Aristotelians, not only in Byzantium, but also in Italy; the controversy caused a break in the continuation of the Western scholasticism. George Scholarios was the first to defend Aristotle. Plethon wrote an anti-aristotelic treatise with two letters to Bessarion as a response to several difficulties. After that, the controversy was generalized: Theodoros Gaza and Andronikos Kallistos, two of the most well known Aristotelians in that era, George Trebizond and his brother Andreas, Theophanis of Medeia (who died in 1480) and Michael Sophianos (who died later in 1570) defended Aristotle. Michael Apostolis, Ganandria, Nikolas Perottus and John Apostolis supported Plethon. Bessarion, who in the beginning intended to have the attitude of an arbitrator in the discussions, became Platonist and expressed his sympathy to Plato, when he wrote the book *Adversus Calumniatorem Platonis*; thus, in the end one could probably see a justification of Plato. The Italian admirers of Plethon asked from the pope to include Plato among the saints of the Christian Church.

Plethon, due to his anti-aristotelism, turned against the Christian aspect of Aristotle. Especially, he disapproves the Aristotelian averroisme and the scholastic interpretation of it, as was that of Thomas Aquinas (whose works were translated in Greek by Demetrius Kydonis and George Scholarios). If we see this controversy historically, Neoplatonism already existed at Proclus's time (5th century) against the Church, which had incorporated the Aristotelic dogmas. Michael Psellos (1018-1096) and his student John Italos were condemned for "Greek atheism". So, the Greek spirit was identified with neoplatonism already before the time of Plethon and Scholarios. As regards the matter of aristotelism, the rules of Stagirites in the *Organon* were considered harmless

for the Dogma of the Church, since at least superficially the rational analysis didn't seem to prevent it. John Philoponus in the 6th century accepted the aristotelism, while M. Psellos in the 11th century was partly against it. John Italos and the Byzantine philosopher Theodorus Metochites (1260-1332) were admirers of Plato as was Nicephorus Gregoras (1295-1359/60).

The effort of Plethon to place Plato in a level higher than Aristotle met the opposition of the aristotelic philosophy in the West. Also, although Plethon claimed that he used the real works and the historical positions of Aristotle, found against him the critic of Scolarios, who claimed that Plethon had made many errors in the comprehension of the original text of the peripatetic philosopher. According to the argumentation of Plethon this happened with Scholarios as well. Because of their opposition, they both reversed the accusations which they had already accepted. That kind of criticism regarding the closeness to the original ancient Greek texts was to be expanded at some point after the late Middle Ages.

4. The Plethonian Political Ideal of Society

For Plethon an ideal society is ruled by virtue. He remembers the ancient Greek values and he believes that the reform of the society in his time and place has to be supported by ethics. It is this ethics that he presents in his work *On Virtue*. But his moral request is also a social request.

Plethon is a monarchist, but he is not a blind monarchist. The monarch must have many counselors by him and he must act according to the just laws. Moreover, the division of the society should be according to him in three classes: a) the farmers (autourgikon) b) the tradesmen, who serve all the society by doing the trade and other business (diakonikon) and c) the primal race (archikon) of the public positions. He proposes that army should be organized from the state, but he considers of less importance the clergy and the philosophers. He also proposes a new way of taxation based on human dignity; taxes should be imposed proportionally to the productivity of each individual. Among other proposals he rejects the coercive work or other ways of slavery.

His program for the property of land is connected with an economic reform. Everybody could have property of land only on condition that they continue cultivating it. We should add here some other proposals, too, like the establishment of national monetary system, the prohibition of import of luxurious goods and the exploitation of criminals for work beneficial to the public. All these proposals regarding the social conditions of his contemporaries have been interpreted as having different meanings. Other interpreters put emphasis on the ideal of justice that these proposals contain and others have found in them a totalitarianism, which has its origin in the social conditions of Ancient Sparta in Peloponnesus.

It is true that Plethon had in mind a model of a society out of temporal and spatial restrictions (as Plato and Aristotle had already thought and written about it); especially in his book *Treatises of Laws*. In such a society, the government should be constituted by wise men like the ones in Ancient Greece (Lycourgos, Plato, and Socrates). The aim of such a society is to bring happiness to its members. The person, according to Plethon, cannot live outside the society. The sociability is a special characteristic of human beings and its motive is the rational function (logos). We are God's works and properties and we all participate in the common human nature. In his work *On Virtue* he insists on justice as a psychological attitude and as a social action as well. The ulti-

mate goal of his ideal is man's perfection. Justice in his philosophy is a soteriological means that leads us to God.

A lot of comparisons of social ideas of Plethon with those of Ch. –H. de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) about property often have been pointed out. But Plethon is mainly interested in farmer's property and not in all kinds of property. It is also interesting that Thomas Morus (1478-1534) was a friend of Erasmus (1466-1536), who had in his library the manuscripts of Plethon's two commentaries, which included many of his proposals for social reformations. Morus knows the problem of England during the 15th and 16th centuries and he condemns the predatory spirit of the noble men of his time.

5. Theology and Ontology

Today, behind Plethon's polytheism we can see a universal ontological solution based on metaphysical principles and related with the cosmological problem. His ontological system, being neoplatonic in its structure, functions through emanation and hierarchy. Plethon's metaphysical determinism is based on two maxims: a) everything generated has a cause, and b) every action takes place because of a definite necessity. The hierarchical system of beings corresponds to a theological scale of Gods and principles. On top of the scale is Zeus, the first cause, Plato's "Good" and Plotinus' "One". Supreme God is beyond being and generates the entire Universe with its laws. Plethon's "One" is the primal principle and the cause of all beings; it is transcendental and self-definite. Under Zeus we have the intelligible world, where the archetypes of all created beings are found. But Plethon, under the influence of Proclus, divides the intelligible world into other Gods who constitute a second category.

Inside this hierarchical system man takes a place between Intellect and sensible world, being the bond between them. If we want to understand the position of man, we should consider him inside the scale of beings. Man as a unifying factor of two worlds, the intelligible and the sensible, and particularly because of his soul that emanated from intellect, has a creative facility. Soul is power, activity and essence, playing the role of form that organizes matter. The union of immortals and mortals beings and elements produces and constitutes the harmony of all.

The sensible world is included in the chain of being according to the principle of determinism without gaps or divisions. The cause of the sensible world is found in the intelligible world. The sensible objects have as models the ideas and the archetypes of intelligible. But the infinite number of the sensible objects is incompatible with the intelligible ideas, qualitatively and quantitatively. In "intelligible" does not exist the "infinity". Matter is excluded from "intelligible" because of its infinity.

In Plethon's theology, we can find the theory of man's likeness to God and a practical and ethical system, as means for the achievement of this likeness. Pethon's ethical system has platonic, aristotelic and stoic elements.

Plethon's esthetic is connected with his theology. Contrary to Plotinus, he accepts the conceptions of classical Greek tradition as regard symmetry and harmony. The beautiful, in all its manifestations, has metaphysical origin. He supports a theory which unifies the natural beauty with the beauty of Art. The way the natural objects have been made by the creative power of God so have the artifacts by the genius of man.

6. Theory of Fate

The theory of Fate (Heimarmene) has a central place in Plethon's philosophy. His theory of Fate is different from the one in ancient Greek, and especially the Christian theo-

ry, which had the meaning of man's paternal guidance from God. For Plethon, human freedom is very limited. But because Fate is the necessity of Good, man is forced to act having the rational thought as his only aid. In the system of the philosopher of Mistra, these positions created an optimistic atmosphere contrary to the fatalism and the providence of God. Plethon intended to change the actual belief of Byzantines who thought that through the Ottoman danger God was testing them.

The presupposition for the irreversible Fate is a stable consideration of being in accordance with reality. These presuppositions are the "common notions" or the "common dogmas" and their verification can be achieved through human rational thought. The "common notions" came to us from the time of Zoroaster and their symbols are the names of the ancient Gods of Greece. All these notions have their origin in Good, the self-goodness, the self-truth and the real being.

The Plethonian theory of Fate is an absolute determinism, contrary to Aristotle's, who introduced the chance, which is a very inconceivable notion for Plethon. According to Plethon's neoplatonism, God moves the superior part of our soul, and this superior part of soul moves the more inferior part and so on. In this way we have a narrow and necessary connection of the sensible world with theology. "God according to Aristotle", says Plethon, "is not the first principle of world; Stagiretes declares that the universe is eternal, denying the creative act of God". Yet Aristotle doesn't mention the immortality of soul, and according to Plethon's opinion, he comes to a materialistic view of the whole. Plethon believed that Plato found the right philosophical path in the history of ideas, following the teachings of Zoroaster and Pythagoras. He prefers Plato's philosophy because he never deals with physics without theology, contrary to Aristotle. Plethon supports a pure theism with an idealistic elevation and by his theory of Fate tries to proceed in a reduction of everything in metaphysical and rationalistic causes.

a. Philosophical Anthropology

As we saw, man for Plethon is between the sensible and intelligible world, like an immortal animal that participates by nature in a mortal nature. Man's nature is composite from the divine and the animal element, but his genuine essence lies in the divine and immortal element. This position has, for its foundation, the reduction in the universal harmony; the mixture of the immortal and mortal element inside man derived from God, the creator of human beings.

In the practical field, these principles of Plethon have the meaning that the human being participates in wisdom and hence in freedom. Freedom is based on the equitable practice that is to say on the practical moral behavior, which is the same for those who rules and the ones who are ruled. But Plethon's "religion of ratio" and "common notions" lead us to a science through philosophy, without overlooking the importance of theology. The aim of man is to comprehend the real being. Thus the pedestal of science is not only philosophy but also theology. His conviction that philosophy can create religious faith is included in the neoplatonic movement and made him apostatize from the Christian Byzantine tradition to which, with regard to all other subjects, he belongs.

Plethon's philosophical anthropology tries to balance between the intelligible and the sensible, having as means and as ontological bond the soul. He follows the neoplatonism of Plotinus, with regard to the theory that the soul should return to the source of all created beings. This is the main point of view of all the neoplatonic authors from Plotinus and afterwards. Finally, soul is self-moving and no immovable, surviving after death.

b. Ethics

According to Aristotle, virtue constitutes the human aim, which is the reality of Good. Plato considered virtue as a higher good that has a metaphysical meaning. Plethon believed that there are four main virtues: temperance, courage, justice, and prudence. Also, for him virtue is an attitude that has, as aim, the likeness with God as far as possible. He criticized the Aristotelian Golden Means on ethics, which cannot lead us to choose between good and evil. Moreover, the four virtues are based on metaphysical principles. Besides all these, each virtue is divided into three more partial virtues: decency, liberality, moderation/nobility, force of soul, meekness/sanctity, civism, honesty/good counsel, comprehension of nature, religiosity.

The rational soul constitutes the real man, who is considered to be a complete person only through his participation in his rational part and in social relations. Still, the wild natural phenomena shouldn't frighten us because they are out of our power, and they don't depend from our will (ouk eph' emin); so they don't come under our ethical criterion. The natural evil can't destroy the immortal element in man, which is virtue. Plethon didn't believe that the Aristotelian ethics has a metaphysical foundation, and even if it has, it is more inferior to Plato's ethics, which has placed the virtue of temperance above all the other virtues. At the end of his book *On Virtues* Plethon proposes an educational program with the special division of each main virtue. His purpose is that our superior principles must rule the soul. The method that he proposes, takes into consideration the generation of individual. If we see his ethical program concerning the 15th century, we can easily include it in the methods of the cultivation of the self, which emerged precisely in the era of Renaissance. As Jakob Burckhardt at the 19th century has shown, and Michael Foucault at the 20th century as well, the art of living was introduced in each educational attempt that became from a point after the Renaissanse in European tradition. So, we can see the work of Plethon on virtues as the foundation of such a project. In this way, his ethical work can stand besides his work *De Differentiis*, which brought Plato's philosophy in the West.

7. Plethon's Contribution to the Renaissance

Plethon's plans for the reformation of society were presented in his work *Treatises of Laws*, though the Byzantines didn't appreciate this effort. But broadly speaking, his ideas had an influence on many European spirits. We saw in his biography the journey to Italy and the foundation of the Academia Platonica by Cozimo de Medici (1459). This movement by Plethon was reinforced by a lot of his students.

From the works of Plethon there are many which have comments on texts of ancient authors like Xenophon, Theophrastus, Aristoxenus, Polybius, Diodorus, Plutarch, Ptolemy etc. Still, he dealt with the *Isagoge* of Porhyry which is an introduction to the logical works of Aristotle. In general, all his works constitute a testimony of his wide Greek paideia. He wrote a *Book in favor of Latins*, a book with *Response to Various Questions* (a response to the doubts of the Emperor John Palaeologus for the Aristotelian maxim of contradiction and for the composite nature of man), a book on geography (it was said that Christopher Columbus red it and used it before the discovery of America), on music, on rhetoric, on history and on calendar. A very important book was also the *Responces to Scolarios*, written in 1448.

At the Council of Florence and Ferrara (1438) Plethon met George Trebizond, who said that Plethon had already decided what would be the future religion of man-

kind. This would be for him paganism. But Plethon, although in this point he was an opponent to Christianism, he maintained an ideal of the free action of man inside his rational and divine destiny. As regards the social, ethical and anthropological philosophy he remains a former of Renaissance's ideal of man. *Homo universalis* emerged from this neoplatonic revival in which Plethon contributed as much as he could. Humanism made its appearance in history and the Byzantines scholars comprehended it and shaped its outlines. The influences of Plethon's ideas were exerted on different other issues, like the conception of Art, on the teaching on the eternal return of everything and, in general, on ideas regarding Antiquity, which Plethon set forth in that stage of History.

His students (Bessarion, Manuell Chrysoloras, Gregory the monk, Hieronymos Charitonymos, Laonikos Chalcocondylis, and Michael Apostolis etc.) also contributed the best they could to the transmission of Greek knowledge from Byzantium in to the West. But Plethon's social and anthropological writings and teachings were very important, although they weren't appreciated by his contemporaries as much as other aspects of his work; a work which found, however, a wide acceptance with a simultaneous controversial effect.

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Philotheos **9** (2009) 191-200

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Metanoia (Fundamental Change of Mind) and Theosis (Deification) in Upbringing and Education

Desire directed to God is the only power capable of raising the soul.
Simone Weil[1]

Assumption of the Moving Spirit

The path of the grand and true spirit is always ascending, expanding, overcoming, heading vertically upward, which is how we recognize it. The path of a mediocre spirit is heading nowhere, constricting, subconsciously pandering, moving horizontally, which is how we recognize it. The path of the low spirit is always heading down, matchlessly constricting, consciously pandering without any honor, moving vertically downward, which is how we recognize it. Which of these paths a person or a community will take depends solely on how much the paths themselves have been recognized. The level of recognition, however, depends on the level of elementary literacy, or education of the human spirit. Unsatisfactory spiritual literacy, insufficient education of the spirit – of man, people, the world, shall lead – this man, people, world – toward lower levels of recognizing elementary values. With the spirit excluded, this then turns into a dragging movement, into horizontal mediocrity, and, finally into the collapse of subhorizontal quasi-values.

Diagnosis of the Relationship between Modern and Classical Education

Modern education is today less and less combined with classical education. The tendency of contemporary education is that classical education and upbringing are first to be reduced to education only, then this education is to be reduced to knowledge, this knowledge to practical knowledge, this practical knowledge to barebone practical information, and, finally, all of this information is to be included in exchange whose only criterion of truthfulness would be the market, rather than Truth itself, for today there seems to be no elementary interest in, let alone acceptance and valuation of a spiritual Truth. Hence the only unequivocal path of contemporary education – an unparalleled restriction and reduction. This is the path of horizontal mediocrity, and thus, the road to nowhere.

The path of classical education and upbringing has quite a different perspective. It starts from the fundamental hypothesis that there are spiritual truths, spiritual criteria and intransient values, but it starts from that barebone practical information which it

[1] Simone Weil, Waiting for God, Harper Perennial Classics, 2000, p. 61.

then translates and extends into spiritual knowledge, and this spiritual knowledge is turned into education and upbringing. This is the path of ascension and expansion, always vertical, the road to wisdom and life.

Historical Assumptions behind Paideia (Education) in the West

Yet, what is classical education (*paideia*)? It is well known that the terms *paideia*, *education, pedagogy* and *pedagogue* [2] appeared first in classical Greece, over two and a half millennia ago, after which they spread throughout the West, remaining with us today, too. As claimed by W. Jaeger, if the Greeks are important for any reason, this is the concept of paideia, since other nations had upbringing, while the Greeks were the only ones to have paideia, education, i.e., *morphosis* , shaping or formation, development of a personality according to a predefined model and idea of humanity.[3] Hence the Romans were right to translate this term as *humanitas*, i.e. a *man becoming a man*. More precisely, only through conscious and well-thought out effort, paideia, does man become or fulfill that which he potentially carries within – his humanity.[4] It is exactly this original Greek idea – that with the help of some guided means man can shape his unbridled elements and thus become a man – that lies at the basis of classical education.

Therefore, the first assumption and the ultimate goal of such education has always been – man – a personal, individualized being and a being in the community. Its first assumption was the biological and socially conditioned man, and its ultimate goal was the higher, spiritually developed man, able to grow out of the conditions imposed by the body and the community by *freely approaching them*. And even though the substance of paideia has changed, its principal aim and meaning, given at the very beginning, seem to have remained the same. In the time of Isocrates and before, paideia represented a broad, versatile education based primarily on poetry (first by Homer, then Hesiod, and ultimately all other poets), but read, in the words of V. Perisic "not as *belles lettres*, but as something providing norms and patterns for human life."[5] Hence, in Isocrates' words, one is Greek only if one has received Greek paideia, education, that is, spirit or culture, and one is not only Greek by ethnicity.[6] Contrary to Isocrates, Plato provided a narrower, more specific, yet a higher meaning to paideia, defining it as philosophy[7] and also broadening it to encompass the mathematical sciences (later: artes liberales), now taken as a necessary condition, or a pro-paideia, for a true paideia, or philosophy[8]. And, even though in terms of the substance of the true paideia, and its ultimate goal, Isocrates' and Plato's conceptions differ quite a bit – in Isocrates the rhetor inclining toward practical and socially useful aspects of rhetorical study, in Plato the philosopher more toward the theoretical and seemingly disinterested view of the being and world of ideas – in both one still notices the leading thread according to which the very being of a man, in a *sequential rhythm of potentiality and actuality* of a consciously governed paideia, has the possibility to grow and mature as a being, i.e. to educate and form a personality. It is precisely this principal thread of the classical paideia that, with the advent of Christiani-

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[2] Originally, a slave taking a child to school.

[3] Werner Jaeger, *Humanism and Theology*, Plato, Belgrade, 2002, p. 11-12.

[4] Ibid, p. 15.

[5] Vladan Perisic, *Filozofske studije [Philosophical Studies]*, XVI, Belgrade, 1984, p. 147.

[6] W. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[7] Which provides true norms or patterns for human living. As opposed to poetry which Plato rejects, or set aside, not as art, but as a lower paradigm as compared with true paideia.

[8] V. Perisic, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

ty, did not only remain intact, but, we dare say, was developed, in a much more profound and sublime form.

Indeed, the fundamental assumption of Christianity, according to which man is made "in the image of God" [9], resulting in our task to embody this image in our lives, the ultimate goal of human life, for some Christians meant not a discontinuation of the Greek paideia, but rather its more profound and sublime expression.[10] Even more, Christians considered their paideia by far more perfect than its classical counterpart, because for them the perfect paradigm of the perfect man was not an indefinite, abstract or humanly envisaged personality, but a living, embodied personality of the God-man Christ and Logos, from whom came the most concrete possibility to learn knowledge of the logos (literacy), as Justin the Philosopher says "*from Logos itself*" (αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος)[11]. Thus, after the original misunderstanding and hostility between Christianity and the Greek classical paideia and culture[12], starting from the 2nd and 3rd centuries and the learned Christians, Origen, Climent of Alexandria, Justin the Philosopher, and the great Cappadocian Fathers, St. Basil the Great, St. Gregory the Theologian, St. Gregory of Nyssa, and so on – persons who accepted the Greek paideia – a process started in which there was room for a better understanding, even partial blending, and a more thorough revaluation of the Greek educational system.

As it may be, starting from the assumption that only after Christianity was announced to humanity a *true paideia* was revealed, positions emerged that the classical Greek paideia, taken not only in Isocrates' sense of education based on poetry, but also on Plato's understanding of education based on mathematical sciences (his pro-paideia), and even his supreme paideia, philosophy, in a word, that *the entire Greek culture was in itself a pro-paideia for the Christian paideia*. The latter was, therefore, the former's natural but, let us not forget, also its supernatural continuation, since it arrived through a divine intervention, that is, through revelation. Hence one can clearly recognize the threads of identical cultural heritage on all levels – that of terminology, ideas, and substance.

From Plato and his clearly formulated idea that "*God is the* pedagogue *of all the world"*[13], to Climent of Alexandria and St. Gregory of Nyssa, calling Christ the *"pedagogue of humanity"* and Christianity *"the one true paideia"* or God's paideia (paideia tou kirioy)[14]. From stoics and their teaching on pronoia, i.e. divine care for the entire world and cosmos, to Origen and his concretization of the term "pronoia" as divine *providence*. The providence, pertaining to and influencing entire human history, and in this sense the view that Christ was this concrete "pedagogue" who, even before his incarnation, had always guided and taught all humanity, as he does today. From Pythagoras' philosophical and religious fraternity and leading of the so-called philosophical way of life (βίος φιλόσοφος) to Christian ascetic and monastic way of life, which, at the time of Origen, was also called "philosophical life", and monks were, accordingly, called "philosophers". From Socrates' *phrontisterion*, mentioned in Aristophanes' *Peoples*, to

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[9] An idea found in the Old Testament in the sentence: "*God created man in his own image*" (Genesis, 1:27).

[10] This was most strongly advanced by the so-called Alexandrian School, Climent, Origen, etc.

[11] Justin 1: 1. 5

[12] Which has, actually, never stopped!

[13] Plato, Nomoi 879b

[14] V. Perisic, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

the Christian monastery which became a *phrontisteria*, i.e. the city of thought.[15] Finally, from Heraclitus' anticipated divine logos, to Christian declared Logos, the Son of God.

Therefore, there is no single crucial theme, problem or relevant term, even though we mentioned but a few, which was not transposed from the classical Greek framework into the life, i.e. theory and practice, of Christianity. It remains certain, however, that among all ideas and problems, the leading role in the transfer was given to the concept of paideia. As claimed by W. Jaeger, "*The idea that the* maturation of a being *is the crucial essence of the highest human activity permeated the entire history of the Greek spirit. It was a constant constructing my own spirit and also the metaphysical apriori for the Greeks, which we encounter whenever we ask ourselves of the source of their art, philosophy, or life organization.*"[16]

The spirit of paideia is transferred based on this idea precisely, which, as we have pointed out, reached its full maturity in Christianity in the relations broader (*propaideia* = *paideia*) and narrower: *the classical principle – morphosis* (*formatio* or formation) = *the Christian principle – metamorphosis* (*transformatio* or transformation of the human being).[17] It transfers both geographically (to the West) and historically (to our modern age). Naturally, there are some differences between the classical and Christian paideia, and they are not only terminological, but also, apart from the principal idea, may be essential.

Thus, while the classical paideia is based on human thinking and effort, the Christian paideia is grounded primarily in divine revelation. Hence the understanding of Christian paideia as a result of joint, synergetic effort of God and man. The consequences of educational conceptions so defined are far-reaching. The goal of the classical paideia is the *actualized (realized) man*, who, for Plato, strives for "*similarity with God"* (*homoia*), while the goal of Christian paideia is even more ambitious – *a deified man*.[18] The former position, i.e. the goal (*skopos*) of classical paideia reflects Socrates' imperative "know thyself", in terms of self-knowledge (the later sense) and also in terms of understanding of the actual human position against a higher divine entity (the pre-Socratic sense).[19] On the other hand, the starting point of Christian paideia (in the sense of *skopos*) is found in the cry of St. John the Baptist "*Repent (change your mind fundamentally* – metanoite*) for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand!"*, where the stress is not only on self-knowledge, but also on radical spiritual change (*metanoia* = repentance, change of mind), i.e. *spiritual decisiveness to receive true education*[20]. On the other hand, the higher and more remote *goal* of classical paideia (in the sense of *telos*) is that the fully actualized man, like Socrates, should come to the profound understanding that "he knows that he knows nothing" , while the "telos" of Christian paideia is man's deification (*theosis*), or *becoming a God through blessing*, where such a man also knows (learns) that "he knows nothing", but, simultaneously, by *becoming one with God*, he

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[15] W. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

[16] W. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[17] St. Gregory of Nyssa talks of this, see W. Jaeger, *op. cit*, p. 83.

[18] Hence the need for additional divine energy also known as *haris* = blessing.

[19] See Branko Gorgiev, *Vladeta Jerotic i njegovo delo u svetlu termina "metanoia" [Vladeta Jerotic and His Work in the Sense of the Term* Metanoia*]*, Proceedings "Vladeta Jerotic – Acts in the Time", Municipal Library, Gadzin Han; Ars Libri – Belgrade; Centre for Church Studies, Nis, 2005, p. 113-131.

[20] Which also emerges in consequence of "self-knowledge" but, we notice, more in a pre-Socratic sense.

"knows (learns) that he loves God and his neighbor". In classical[21] paideia, the path of reaching this goal (*telos*) is called "philosophical life", the road for advancing toward virtue (*arete*), i.e. a *vita activa* which reaches its peak in what is called *vita contemplativa*.[22] In Christian paideia, the road to deification (*theosis*), also based on approaching virtue (*vita activa*), reaching its peak in contemplation which looks forward to God (*theoria, contemplatio*), *vita contemplativa*, is called life of ascetic achievement.

The common goal of both types of paideia is quite certainly a higher, fuller, more noble-minded life. In *classical* paideia, this is *a life for the eternity*, in *Christian paideia* – an *eternal life*.

Very high ideals are undoubtedly incorporated in both types of paideia. In the latter, Christian one, they are obviously higher and more difficult. Viewed from today's perspective, but also from the perspective of Stoic *pronoia* (divine providence, concern for the entire cosmos) , it seems that with the advent of Christianity mankind was given a deeper, more perfect, and more demanding paideia. As we have stated already, its pattern is: 1) *metanoia* (repentance, fundamental change of mind); 2) ascetic path (*vita activa*), which, through deep contemplation looking forward to God turns into its more sublime form – *vita contemplativa*; 3) *theosis* (deification). The paradigm for this life is the living and embodied God and accomplished man, Christ, Logos itself, while the result and *telos* of this perfect paideia should be deification (*theosis*) and eternal life. In this process, not only is classical paideia not rejected, but it is fully contained in this new Christian paideia, and it has survived to our day, most likely thanks to it. It is contained within not in an artificial or forceful way. Rather, it remains part of the new paideia in a natural and spiritual manner – according to the *subordination principle*.

More precisely, just as Plato incorporates all sciences and arts in his perfect paideia, philosophy, where sciences and arts become its propaideia, Christian paideia incorporates both the previous propaideia and Plato's perfect paideia – philosophy, into a truly perfect paideia – Christian theology. Hence the thought of Climent of Alexandria, who says: "*Sciences should not only strive for the same goal; they should also take the same path, with the exception that the lower sciences may reach just the first part of the road, heading for philosophy, while philosophy should lead further toward theology, which will finally provide the prize for all the efforts.*"[23] Or, the thought of St. Basil the Great according to which Christians should pay attention to numerous beautiful excerpts by well-known Hellenic "*poets, historians, and especially philosophers, in which virtue is praised,*"[24] because philosophy, along with the remaining Greek paideia as propaideia, represents an imperial road to Christian theology.[25] Or, the thought of St. Gregory the Theologian, who claims that "*general education (*panoia paideia*) in which classical and Christian literature are bound together is a highly-valued jewel.*"[26]

Yet this "binding together" according to the subordination principle is not a totally Christian novelty but, it seems, a natural continuation of a process which started already with Aristotle, who, looking up to his teacher Plato and his term "theology"[27], called his

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[21] Taken not in Isocrates', but in the more exalted Plato's (or Aristotle's) sense!
[22] Seneca's translation and expression for what the Greeks called *bios theoretikos.*
[23] Climent 4: VI, 11
[24] Basil 2, quoted after V. Perisic, *op. cit.*, p. 52
[25] Ibid
[26] Beseda [Sermon] 11, 1. PG 35, 832 B
[27] In Plato's *Republic*, II, 379a

"primary philosophy" "theological science".[28] Later on, in the time of Plotinus, all philosophy, more precisely, almost all philosophical texts (with the exception of skepticism) would become strongly theologized, in terms of themes and problems, but also in their essence, and philosophy would be almost equalized with theology. As Trypho the Jew says to the Greek philosopher in Justin's dialogue: "*If you are a philosopher, this means you deal with god and theological issues*."[29]

Therefore, "binding together" is not the only novelty. Rather, what is new here is a qualitatively "new integration" of the classical and Christian paideia, in which the *peak of values, aspirations and ideals, ordered as in a pyramid, is moved one step higher*, to the very edge of human natural powers and capacities. This is where man naturally requires divine assistance, i.e. God's blessing in this perfect education process, while man himself is offering ascetic effort and feat through which he will purge his soul, body, and mind, the so-called *apatheia*, followed by the indispensable means to achieve this – prayer. This is why in the 4th century Evagrius of Pontus would say: "*if you are a theologian, you will pray genuinely, and if you genuinely pray, you are a theologian*."[30] In the spirit of such time, the noun "theologian" was replaced by "philosopher", while a "truly educated man" was "the one who prays."

However, looking at things in their entirety and from a historical standpoint, both paideias, united over the idea of maturation and formation (*morphosis*) of the human being would live together, in unity, throughout the Middle Ages, for over a thousand years, with slight formal changes found in the programmatic framework of the so-called Trivium and Quadrivium, and with almost no changes in the spiritual domain – in terms of the complementarity of the two paideias.

The entire medieval history of philosophy and education, in both the West and the East, but also that of the modern age, such as the *classical* German philosophy of Kant, Hegel, Fichte, and also the existentialism of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Jaspers, etc, have been marked exactly by this classical and Christian idea of paideia.

The same line of thought can be tracked outside of the narrow philosophical domain, for instance, in the work of the distinguished Swiss psychiatrist, physician and thinker K. G. Jung. More precisely, his pivotal *idea of the individuation process*, around which an entire system of structural concepts was built, such as: anima, animus, the shadow, the self, etc. As we can see, it is fully grounded on the fundamentals of the classical and Christian idea of human maturation, or, as we have already said – man's becoming a man. To set the record straight, his anthropological assumption seems to be based more on classical than on Christian paideia, or is located at the very borderline between the two.

As for the attempt to move this borderline further, let us mention an interesting and fruitful attempt of the Serbian psychiatrist, physician and thinker of Orthodox orientation, academician Vladeta Jerotic, to read this Jungian fundamental philosophical and anthropological conception in not so much a new as much in an original way, and deepen it in accordance with centuries old Orthodox Christian views. Indeed, in V. Jerotic's texts, Jungian "self-actualization" (*individuatio*) is once again elevated to the old-new Christian ideal labeled "deification" (*theosis*), or "self-actualization as a God-man". In

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[28] What his copyists would much later label *metaphysics*, i.e. that which comes after the texts on physics.
[29] After W. Jaeger, *op. cit*, p. 52
[30] After V. Jaeger, *op. cit*, p. 51

this respect, one may claim that the entire work of V. Jerotic has emerged in the spirit of the classical and Christian paideia! More precisely, along the mentioned paradigm: on the one hand, self-knowledge (the *skopos* of the classical principle) moves along toward the change of mind (repentance, the *metanoia* of the Christian principle), while, on the other, individuation (the *telos* of the classical principle) becomes elevated to reach deification (*theosis*, the *telos* of the Christian principle).[31] Indeed, this may be seen on all planes, from syntactic and stylistic, to the characteristic classical Christian approach to themes and problems, and also from the diachronic and synchronic analysis of V. Jerotic's work as a whole.[32] This way, through the work of V. Jerotic, Jung's pieces gain a new life, through a creative synthesis of the classical and Christian paideia, after a model seen in the first centuries of Christianity.

In this respect, not only Jerotic's, but also this old[33] internal relationship between the classical and the Christian paideia could be best described by the relationship between spouses as given by the apostle Paul: that the wife should *respect* her husband, because he is the head of the family, and that the husband should *love* his wife, because she is the body, or the pillar of the family. Furthermore, the paradigmatic axis is the same in the view of the church as "Christ's body", where Christ is "the head of the Church". For this reason, the Christian family has always been viewed as a "small church" . However, just like in this "small church" the husband's leadership is relative and relational, and not absolute or self-explanatory, since the leadership itself is conditioned by the husband's relationship with God (an entity above him), thus Christian paideia, too, taken as a higher form of paideia, has never been allowed to forget that which should be both before and above it – *the living God Logos, the meaning behind all the meanings of paideia*.

In this sense, we may notice that at the moment in the history of mankind when the process of removing God from the focus, *contemplatio* or *theoria*, started, and this began to happen in the West towards the end of the Middle Ages, only to become more intensive in the Modern Age, the process of decapitation of the very idea of paideia commenced, too – not only Christian, but also classical. As a result, we notice that both its ideal life expressions have become degraded, too: *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa*.

The first expression, *vita activa*, gradually descended from the heights of ascetic-Christian and ascetic-philosophical practical achievement of virtue (*arete*), understood in both Christian and classical (Platonic) senses as man's similarity (*omoios*) with God, to be further degraded to a lower ideal of socially useful skills by a line of Aristotle's successors, the so-called modernists who favored the practical mind[34] and by Isocrates' educational ideal, primarily based on practical aspects of the study of poetry (art in general). This eventually resulted in our modern-day substantial inversion of the *vita active* ideal and its conversion into a *vita productiva*, where schools (and the educational system) are slowly becoming small "workshops" instructing future craftsmen, whose ultimate goal (*telos*) is the all-out production of (more or less necessary) things, and not persons.

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[31] See B. Gorgiev, *Vladeta Jerotic i njegovo delo u svetlu termina "metanoia" [Vladeta Jerotic and His Work in the Sense of the Term* Metanoia*]*, Proceedings "Vladeta Jerotic – Acts in the Time", Municipal Library, Gadzin Han; Ars Libri – Belgrade; Centre for Church Studies, Nis, 2005, p. 113-131

[32] Ibid

[33] Old in the sense of the Middle Ages.

[34] As opposed to the second line of Aristotle's successors, the so-called "classicists", who, just like their teacher, favored the "theoretical mind".

What can one say? The understanding of being (τὸ ὄν – that which is), the world and the essence (οὐσία) of existence causes the paideia that we have. An unclear and confusing attitude to the being (τὸ ὄν) of the world, to the essence (οὐσία) of existence, to God (ὁ ὤν – he who is), all provide an unclear and confusing concept of paideia. In this interstate of deliberation and failure to choose the priorities of paideia today, man slowly becomes not the goal, but the means of paideia (often not knowing and not realizing why).

The Question

Should education (paideia) be reduced to the useful craft for survival, ultimately to a *"survival tool"*, and should the "value" of education then be assessed from such a perspective? Or could it be that the value of education should be assessed from the perspective of one's prospect to "out-live" the eternity, to get closer to God, where a *man should become a man*? It is clear that the need to survive is innate and results from man's instincts, so that man instinctively in-clines to reduce paideia (education) to a "survival tool". This reduction and de-cline of classical paideia was noticed in the classical age already, with the appearance of the Sophists,[35] and also in Callicles and Isocrates (the major opponent of Plato's paideia concept). It continued in one line of Aristotle's successors, the so-called modernists who preferred the practical mind and the paideia which would primarily develop practical skills and professions useful for the society. Here, *vita activa* was, at best, an active involvement in the political, scientific, and social life of one's area. It is clear, however, that man also has deeper spiritual instincts urging him to elevate the education concept toward higher, more spiritual domains, taken as the "art of living" (*ars vitae*). Another ideal of the classical and Christian paideia! An ideal traceable back to the first Ionian philosophers, over Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, all the way to Plotinus and his successors, when, with the advent of Christianity and those Christians who accepted the classical paideia, this term slowly transformed, becoming a deeper, more demanding ideal of living, we would say resembling the lives of the holy fathers. This road is also known as the ascetic way and *vita activa*, but, contrary to the former path, the emphasis here is on the practical achievement of virtue (ἀρετή), where it leads to the most sublime form of life, *vita contemplativa*. This is, from a worldly aspect, a useless, disinterested, theoretical (contemplative) life whose final goal (*telos*) is to become similar to God (*omoios*, the classical principle – Plato) and to become deified (*theosis*, becoming a God through blessing – the Christian principle). Ultimately, man is always an end, not a means. It is also true that this most sublime way of life provided by the classical and Christian paideia has never, in any period, been whole-heartedly accepted by the majority. Open-minded and witty Ionians might have had more understanding for the philosophical way of life of their fellow citizens, Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Pythagoras, and others. However, in their colonies in Sicily, the serious Dorians physically attacked Pythagoras' philosophical and religious brotherhood in Crotone. Socrates and his disinterested pursuit of individual and social theoretical problems was protected by powerful Athenians, but even they lacked the power to fully protect him – in the end, he was executed. Aristotle was forced to leave Athens on a number of occasions, saying that he would not give Athenians the opportunity to sin against a

[35] Though one must stress their positive role in the sense that they directed the theoretical mind away from cosmological and physical problems (discussed by Ionian philosophers) and toward anthropological issues.

philosopher again (alluding to Socrates and himself). In Greek comedies we find quite a few derisive comments and scornful images of philosophers who pursued a theoretical, i.e. philosophical, way of life and renounced the material life and values cherished by their neighbors. This is why in *The Republic* Plato would utter a prophetic statement (from the point of view of Christ and Christianity): that, if he was born, "*the just man will have to endure the lash, the rack, chains, the branding-iron in his eyes, and finally, after every extremity of suffering, he will be crucified*."[36] Did Plato really prophesize the coming of Christ, so that we could call his work an "ancient Greek testament", or perhaps a "philosophical and classical testament", where he himself would be a "philosophical prophet" of Christianity, or did he merely pronounce his position based on a reality that he was all too familiar with? We do not know this, nor will we ever learn. However, one thing is almost certain. The theoretical (contemplative) way of life, implying certain detachment from the ideals and values of the majority, has always caused distrust and apprehension in most people. As we know, this occurred later with Christians themselves. Let us remember the attitude of laymen, but also of the Church in general, to monasticism in the 3rd century – packed with distrust and fear, all the way to the moment in which monks proved that they were devoted to the Church, when they explained their mission and the need for a perfect paideia, and ultimately took over the leadership in the Church in the 4th and 5th centuries. Not all of them equally attained the classical and Christian life known as *vita activa*, nor did they all equally fervently advocate the highest, theoretical life, *vita contemplativa*. However, they were all equally potential, and sometimes true victims of the environment which did not understand them (even of the people closest to them). And this environment would always strive for the usual, lower life expressions.

As we can see, the struggle between survival in "the here and now", and living for "the there and tomorrow" is eternal. In this struggle, one should take the right side, or at least have the understanding for it. However, the first precondition for this is for one to understand one's own heritage – the legacy of the classical and Christian European paideia, which we today also inherit (although we are not always worthy of it).

Conclusion

The path of the grand and true spirit is always ascending, expanding, overcoming, heading vertically upward, which is how we recognize it! However, this is only possible if the spirit always has in mind (*theoria*) something and someone above it – the metaphysical principle (something) and God (someone)! And not only in the hierarchical sense (that of a higher, rationally fathomable *authority* set above oneself), but primarily in the sense of a primordial, supreme *value*, which is a value *authority in itself*. Which, therefore, includes not only *ratio*, but also love, emotions, the heart, and the mind. The path of a mediocre spirit is heading nowhere, constricting, subconsciously pandering, moving horizontally, which is how we recognize it! The path of the mediocre spirit is the path of the majority, usually ourselves, and this is why it is difficult to recognize. Because self-knowledge depends on self-learning. And self-knowledge and self-learning lead to the fundamental change of mind (*metanoia*), i.e. to the true desire to change for the better – toward individuation and deification. The path of the mediocre spirit is, thus, the horizontal path of mere survival, but also the path of choice and deci-

[36] Plato, *Republic*, 362E, BIGZ, Belgrade, 1976.

sion. It is on us to decide which road we will take to reach *vita activa* – the higher or the lower form. The first, higher one, whose goal (*telos*) is to attain virtue (*arete*), to become similar to God (*omoios* – Plato), and to become deified (*theosis* – Christianity). Whose goal is for a man to become a man (the classical and Christian paideia), where *vita activa* naturally and inexorably overcomes itself and becomes *vita contemplativa*, practical out-living and theoretical contemplation of the Meaning. Or the other, lower one, whose goal is to achieve skill (*techne*), and thus "become similar to a perfect machine" . Whose goal (*telos*) is to turn man into a means (an unconscious tendency of modern paideia), where *vita activa* naturally and inevitably turns into *vita productiva*, practical survival and theoretical "contemplation" of meaninglessness.

Naturally, skills, means of living, and some material objects helping us survive are equally important. This is the "care for the body", or the care for the physical survival of a man, community, the species. However, what is the purpose of survival, if not with the aim of out-living , a true, meaningful and authentic life – to include the classical and Christian so-called "care for the soul"? Modern education is indeed facing a turning point. Either it will retain the path of risky reduction of the broad and profound classical and Christian education (paideia) to narrow and shallow, almost atomic, information. Or there will be a "fortunate twist", where modern education will get the ultimate and true "information" which will inform it *anew* of the timeless values of classical and Christian paideia, the path of wisdom and life. In hope of the reemergence and renaissance of the classical and Christian paideia, one should recall the words of the French classicalist and writer Simone Weil, "*desire directed to God is the only power capable of raising the soul.*"[37]

[37] Simone Weil, Waiting for God, Harper Perennial Classics, 2000, p. 61.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 201-211

Monk Romilo of Hilandar
Mount Athos, Greece

Restoration –Transformation of the Body of Christ

In March 2004 two thirds of the Holy Monastery of Hilandar was destroyed by the fire.* The Monastery is now at a point of restoration. What is the goal of this restoration? We shall all agree, I believe, that the goal is restoration of Hilandar's primordial Beauty. The task of restoration would be the easy one was this Beauty nothing more then mere human product. This is why, when talking about restoration, we need to ask: What is Beauty?

We like flowers in Hilandar. But, we also like weeds. I believe that you are all familiar with the following verses:

"What would the world be, once bereft
Of wet and of wilderness? Let them be left,
O let them be left, wilderness and wet;
Long live the weeds and the wilderness yet."
Gerald Manley Hopkins

In Andrei Tarkovsky's film *The Sacrifice* the main character, Alexander, speaks of a visit to his mother's. His mother was very ill at the time. He wanted to help her in some way and to express his love. He noticed the garden overgrown with weeds. He thought that doing his mother's gardening would be the most useful thing that he could do for her. Alexander, who was also a professor of aesthetics, worked long and hard. When he finished the job he sat down to rest. He was probably convinced that his effort had paid off. He looked at the garden to confirm his thought. However, his first impression was one of disappointment. A double disappointment. He had not succeeded in creating the beauty he desired. He had destroyed the beauty that existed.

Even our most common actions, such as gardening, imply basic philosophical and theological views. What are the philosophical and theological views behind Alexander's deed? Alexander claims that the world and man are not created *ex nihilo*, that the world and man do not have an absolute beginning. If the world and man were understood as being created from non-being, then they would continuously have to seek all their characteristics, their life, their truth, and their beauty as a gift from their Creator. To exist is one thing, but to live is something entirely different. Man is created and he exists, but he *lives* only when he takes part in divine Life. Existence is passing, because every man dies. Life is eternal. Every man, even when he dies, can be alive in God and through God, if he so wishes. Beauty according to the measure of this world is fleeting. Even before death, with the passing of youth, man ceases to be beautiful by human measure. Divine Beauty is eternal. Man can radiate with this Beauty even when he is eighty years

* The lecture *Restoration as Transformation of the Body of Christ* was held in English, on June 11 2008, at St. Anne's College, Oxford, at the General Annual Meeting of Friends of Mount Athos, presided by His Grace Metropolitan Kallistos Ware.

old, even when he does not meet human standards of beauty, such as symmetry and harmony of body.

If Alexander believed that the world is created from non-being, he would know that the beauty of creation, as well as the life of creation, is something wavering, something that depends on God's love. If Alexander believed that the world is created from non-being, he would know that man is not the origin of life, that man is not the origin of beauty, that man must partake in God's Life in order to be alive and beautiful. Alexander would know that it is more important to pray for God's Uncreated presence, God's beauty, to emerge in the plants than to clear the weeds from the garden. Another thing is very important – Alexander would know that matter is not foreign to God, that it is not something that God was forced to use in order to create the world, since matter had allegedly always coexisted with him. In the case where matter does not have an absolute beginning, it cannot in itself be beautiful. Matter is then only the shadow of the beauty of the eternal world of ideas. Matter in itself does not have a purpose of existence. It serves only as a ladder leading to the understanding of the beauty of the eternal world of ideas.[1]

In the context of this worldview, I quote Philip Sherrard:

> "We can still say that signs and indications of God – vestiges or signatures of God – may be discerned in visible phenomena, or that the visible world is a kind of divine cryptogram that we have to decipher. But in this view of things it is difficult for us to go beyond that and to escape from what one might call a dualistic mentality, for which the otherness of God is projected in the otherness of the physical or material nature of the visible world, so that there is always a distance between them, a hiatus which culminates in an absence – in a *deus absconditus* – and makes it impossible to conceive of a nuptial union between them."[2]

However, if God created matter from non-being, it means that matter is entirely God's creation, that matter in its essence carries the signature of the God the Logos, the signature of Christ, that it is logosic and Christic.

This is exactly how G. M. Hopkins understands creation:

> "A corollary to this Hopkinsian stress upon the value of senses and of sensuous perception is the value of created reality itself. If creation, especially in its particularity, is Christic and thereby potentially revelatory, then the approach of humanity to nature must be affected. Hopkins has been called the 'environmental poet' for his insistence on a kind of 'devotional' respect for creation."[3]

Man who is aware of the logos of matter cannot commit arbitrary violence against it, in the aim to create his own beauty. In gardening he will monitor God's logos in every plant. He will hesitate to pluck even a single blade of grass. In cutting a single stone to make a house or church, he will be following God's logos in it. He will try to trace what Hopkins called *inscape*, what Joyce called *quidditas* or *whatness*,[4] what Proust named *the general essence of things*.[5] He will seek its structure, its make-up. He will seek the way that the stone allows itself to be cut. He will not impose his will on the stone.

If the world and man are created out of nothing, this means that at any moment of

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[1] Ιωάννου Δ. Ζηζιούλα, *Η κτίση ως ευηαριστία, Θεολογική προσέγγιση στό πρόβλημα τῆς Οἰκολογίας*, Εκδόσεις Ακριτας, σ. 71 (John D. Zizioulas, *Creation as Eucharist*).

[2] Philip Sherrard, *The Sacred in Life and Art*, Denise Harvey (Publisher), Evia, Greece, 2004, p. 6.

[3] Philip A. Ballinger, *The Poem as a Sacrament, The Theological Aesthetic of Gerard Manley Hopkins*, Peeters Press, Louvain, W. B. Eerdmans, 2000, p. 240.

[4] James Joyce, *Stephen Hero*, edited by Theodore Spencer, New York, New Directions Press, 1944, p. 211-213.

[5] Marcel Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu, A l'Ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs*, Gallimard, 1988, p. 24, 182.

their existence they are surrounded with the possibility of nonexistence, the possibility of non-being.[6] On the other hand, the view that man was not created from non-being inevitably leads at some point to the conclusion that man is self-sufficient. And in fact, Plato understands the human soul as eternal in itself. Origen believed that God could not be omnipotent unless He had at His side a world where He could demonstrate His power from eternity. And that logically leads to the conclusion that the soul is inherently eternal.

The view that man is not created from non-being and that he could return to non-being inevitably leads to Descartes' *Cogito*, Kant's Copernican revolution, and Nietzsche's Superman. The position that man was not created out of dust, that is from non-being, will at some point inevitably lead to the conclusion that man is a god. The view that man's existence is not constantly surrounded by non-being does not recognize the term *deification*, it recognizes only *self-deification*. It does not know that man can become a god, a god by grace; rather, it believes that he can become a god only through his own effort and firm determination. Regardless of how many times philosophy begins anew, if at its beginning it has a theory that matter and space have always existed parallel to God, it is a logical inevitability that Nietzsche's Superman and the desire for power will emerge as its conclusion, because a God with Whom something else has existed in parallel since eternity cannot be an omnipotent God. Such a God, Who is essential to the life of man, must ultimately be overthrown. He is overthrown by a man who does not have an absolute beginning.

God who is not omnipotent ultimately relinquishes all His characteristics to man. This God is no longer Life, no longer Truth, no longer Beauty. It is man that now becomes all this. Descartes' definition of existence, *Cogito ergo sum*, represents an entirely logical conclusion to the tragic error of the philosophical thesis that *something* cannot be created out of *nothing* – a thesis that has paid dearly for its fidelity to human reason. However, were these great people – Descartes, Kant, and Nietzsche – convinced beyond a doubt of the absolute truthfulness of this starting hypothesis? Descartes' *Cogito* claims that man is self-sufficient in order to live. However, Descartes wrote:

> "God has created three miracles: the creation out of nothing, free will and God human."[7]

Nietzsche differentiates between existence and life:

> "(…) I still perhaps have the right to say about myself *cogito, ergo sum*, but not *vivo, ergo cogito*. That empty 'Being', not full and green 'Living' is ensured for me. My original feeling only guarantees me that I am a thinking thing, not that I am a living essence, that I am not an animal, but at most a cogital.[8]"

Copernicus' astronomical revolution led to Kant's Copernican revolution, regardless of how naïve this deduction could appear. As Bertrand Russell wrote[9], if the Earth is not the center of the universe, then man, being an inhabitant of Earth, is not the purpose of God's creation of the world:

> "Another thing that resulted from science was a profound change in the conception of man's place in the universe. In the medieval world, the earth was the centre of the heavens, and everything had a purpose concerned with man. In the Newtonian world, the earth was a minor planet of a not specially distinguished star; astronomical distances were so vast that the

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[6] M. Athanasiou: Kata idolon, ERGA, T. 1. Thessaloniki, 1973, p. 204.

[7] *Œuvres*, éd. Adam-Tennery, Paris, Cerf 1898, 10, p. 255.

[8] Nietzsche, F., *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen*, Friedrich Nietzsche Werke in Drei Bänden, Bd. 1. Herausgegeben von Karl Schlechta, Carl Hanser Verlag, München 1966, p. 280-281.

[9] See: Bertrand Russell, *Copernican Revolution*, in: *Religion and Science*, Oxford University Press, 1961.

earth, in comparison, was a mere pin-point. It seemed unlikely that this immense apparatus was all designed for the good of certain small creatures on this pin-point."[10]

If man is not the purpose of the universe, then the universe, most probably, does not have a purpose at all. If man is not God's most important creation, then it is quite natural to assume that man's cognitive abilities were not created in such a way that they could grasp the truth of the world around him, to grasp a thing in itself. Man's existence is the consequence of chance. Man is a being without a purpose, cast by chance onto the margin of the endless universe. The foundations of the world's logocentricism have been undermined. Man's categories of thought, such as time and space, do not correspond to the reality of the world around him. However, as though doubting the validity of his own philosophy, Kant wrote *Critique of Judgment*, which perhaps represents the cornerstone of his system. In this work he attempts to establish a general measure for the judgment of beauty. If the world is the consequence of chance, if the reality around man is beyond his reach, since he is confined to his categories of thought, categories according to which the world was not created, then a general measure of truth must be found within man himself. I would like to emphasize: What is Kant actually attempting? He is attempting to find within man a cognitive power that would be in harmony with the structure of the world. He attempts to *reunite ontology and gnoseology*; to disprove his own Copernican revolution. Kant tries to force man to see reality free of everything selfishly human, of everything that would apply only to man, but not to reality. For this reason Kant introduces the term *disinterest*. However, Kant's disinterested is not uninterested. With the term *disinterest*, Kant actually strives to reject any possible bias: racial, ethnic, social, ideological, gender… as though he is trying to reach a point where man exceeds himself, *comes out of himself*, and perceives the world as someone that is no longer a man. But – as someone who is no longer – *what kind of man*? As someone who is no longer a man *who has become god thanks only to his autonomous struggle*. However, paradoxically, Kant wants man to leave himself and look at the world as God. And when God created the world, as we can read in *Genesis*, He said that it was "good".[11] Therefore – it was very beautiful, as we see that Septuagint translates the Hebrew *tov*, aiming by this at the Greek way of seeing the world as beauty.

All this of course we find in Kant only as an unconnected system. It lacks the basic cognitive tool with which man can perceive the world from the standpoint of its Creator, i.e. to see in the creation what God wanted to make of it, the sense that God installed in it. We know that the Greek word *logos* means inner *sense*, as we find in Lampe's *Patristic Greek Lexicon*.[12] Therefore, the creation's logos should be observed within it. However, God does not need the grass for the purpose of mowing it and making hay. He doesn't need snow-covered mountains to build hotels and make ski slopes. And does God have some need for mosquitoes, lice, or slugs? From the human standpoint, the world would certainly be more beautiful without mosquitoes; any one of us will admit that. But we do not know what mosquitoes were like before the fall of Adam. We know that Adam was not attacked by the animals, that even the serpent did not attack him. Before the Fall the serpent did not slither on the ground, but was similar to present-day birds. God was not forced to create the world – He created it of His own free will, out of joy, wanting to create *beauty*. He created it out of *love*.

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[10] Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, A Clarion Book, New York, 1945, p. 537-538.
[11] 1, 10.
[12] *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, edited by G. W. H. Lampe, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 1248.

As we have said, Kant, and with him all of Western epistemology, lacks the basic cognitive tool that would allow man to perceive the world from the standpoint of its Creator. God created the world as beauty, out of love. Kant, and each of us, lack the cognitive tool of love, which would allow us to see the world as beauty. In Orthodox gnoseology love is the most important cognitive organ.

Love is man's greatest way to get outside himself. It is only through love that man can remove himself from the center of the world. Only through love can man cease to be a pseudo-god. Only through love can man cease to be the fallen man, i.e. a pseudo-god. And he becomes a god by grace. By becoming a god by grace he gains the power to perceive the world from a divine standpoint. He becomes capable of understanding the purpose of the existence of the creation because he now sits on a throne, the only point from which this purpose can be perceived. He sits on the throne of love. From the throne of love the world is created as beauty; as lavishly lush beauty. God gave gowns more beautiful than Solomon's even to the flower whose beauty lives for a single day. Caught up in creative verve, God was a benevolent artist. We see that some Holy Fathers called God an Artist, an Artist par excellence.[13] God believes that unrestrained splendor of beauty has its meaning within itself.

Father Justin Popovich once wondered, "And without infinity can man exist at all?"

Abundance of infinite diversity is the definition of life. Man can find it only in God. Creating the world, God gave man an image of this infinite abundance. By pulling up the weeds from his mother's garden Alexander destroyed the blaze of unbridled lushness. He destroyed Life. He destroyed Beauty. This was the origin of his sorrow and disappointment. The beauty that he created did not lead him to the Truth. Beauty that does not lead to the Truth is an ominous beauty because it does not grant Life to a man. It is this beauty that Thomas Mann described in *Death in Venice* and *The Magic Mountain*, the beauty of Polish boy Tadio and Madam Shosha. We, however, search for life-giving Beauty. We search for Beauty that redeems.

We search for the definition of Beauty. Going back to Kant, I emphasize an unusually important fact: as Elizabeth Prettejohn notes[14], Kant's *disinterest* leads to the conclusion that *everything that exists has the same importance, can be beautiful*. Prettejohn goes on to say that a piece by Jacques-Louis David is no more beautiful than a still life by Chardin. From the aspect of beauty, the depiction of an important historical event is not necessarily more important than that of a common object. Furthermore, there are those that would resolutely point out that common objects are immensely more important than certain historic events. They are even prepared to claim that common objects are the bearers of salvational Beauty. James Joyce told his brother:

> "It is my idea of the significance of trivial things that I want to give the two or three unfortunate wretches who may eventually read me."[15]

One should point out that salvational Beauty is the one that leads to Truth, Goodness, and Life. It is the Beauty that leads us to Christ. Can the beauty of a worn-out pair

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[13] "ὄντως τεχνίτης, δημιουργός, ἀριστοτέχνης, καλλιτέχνης". About the Holy Fathers and their naming God an Artist, especially in St. Clement of Alexandria, St. Kyrill of Alexandria, St. Gregory Palama and St. Gregory the Great see more at: Χρυσόστομου Ἀ Σταμούλη, *Ἡ τέχνη τῆς θεολογίας καὶ ἡ θεολογία τῆς τέχνης. Φύση καὶ Ἀγάπη*, Ἐκδόσεις Τὸ Παλίμψιστον, Θεσσαλονίκη, 1999, σελ. 128-129.

[14] Elizabeth Prettejohn, *Beauty and Art; Eighteenth-century Germany: Winckelmann and Kant*, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 49.

[15] Richard Ellman, *James Joyce*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1959, p. 169.

of shoes lead to Christ? Can the beauty of an old chair lead to Christ? Can the beauty of a pebble, a flower, or a cloud? Even that of the sky, a very beautiful sky? For isn't ultimately the sky something quite common, something that we see every day, something we don't even notice any more? The beauty of weeds, wet or wilderness? Dostoevsky's hero Prince Myshkin states that "beauty will save the world". I am partial to believe Myshkin, to believe Dostoevsky. Hopkins and Eliot knew that Christ's Incarnation is the ontological basis for the beauty of creation:

> "'I think that trivialness of life is, and personally to each one, ought to be seen to be, done away with by … the incredible condescension of the Incarnation"', wrote Hopkins. Eliot's own 'moments of happiness … the sudden illumination' are again described, as they had been by Augustine, as 'the point of intersection of the timeless/With time, of which 'the hint half guessed, the gift half understood, is Incarnation'".[16]

Hopkins and Eliot knew that the Incarnation gave meaning to the human body in its entirety. That it gave meaning to the human senses.

> "For Hopkins, the Great Sacrifice, or *ensarkosis*, of the Word sealed his theory of inscape, spiritualized the aesthetic philosophy he inherited in part from John Ruskin, 'intellectually authorized the sanctification of sensory experience', and justified his sacramental vision of poetic language. In this vision of aeonian Incarnation, whereby the Word becomes 'eucharistically' present in the matter, Hopkins saw that God, humanity, nature, and language participate in one other and are bound together. In this sense … the Eucharist became a kind of archetype for Hopkins whereby created things participate in the divine reality they signify."[17]

Christ was incarnated and resurrected – all of creation became His Body. Man experiences Him also in taste, perhaps in the taste of a madeleine. And also in smell, perhaps even in the scent of mold, of which Proust wrote that in him "ecstasy was not created by some significant thought, but rather by the smell of mildew"[18] and that smells are "the great reservoir of poetry."[19]

As we have seen, Kant's *disinterest* does not mean *uninterest*. It is only one step away from love; one step away from man's greatest step beyond himself; one step that makes man god by grace and allows him to perceive the world from God's viewpoint. As St. Maximos the Confessor wrote, God incarnated Himself because of love. God "emptied Himself" (*kenosis*), or as Hopkins said, made this "Great sacrifice", because of love. It was because of love that God took upon Himself human flesh and suffered everything that man can experience, in every respect, with the exception of sin. Dostoevsky says that Satan was not incarnated because he has no love, because Satan is an absolute recluse. When we love we are incarnated in the loved one, we become him; we see the world through his eyes, his heart beats within us. There is no other way to know another.

Kant was only a step away from understanding Beauty as Truth, Beauty as Being. Orthodoxy understands Beauty as the manifestation of Truth in creation, as the manifestation of Being in creation, as the manifestation of Christ in creation.

We have searched for the definition of the Truth. Perhaps now is the moment to offer the Orthodox definition of Beauty. *Beauty is the apophatic manifestation of Truth*

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[16] See: M. H. Abrams, *Natural Supernaturalism*, W.W. Norton, London/New York, 1974, p. 420.

[17] Philip A. Ballinger, *The Poem as a Sacrament, The Theological Aesthetic of Gerard Manley Hopkins*, Peeters Press, Louvain, W. B. Eerdmans, 2000, p. 234.

[18] Marcel Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu, A l'Ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs*, Gallimard, 1988, p. 65.

[19] *Du côté de chez Swann*, Gallimard, 1988, p. 49.

in creation. This definition could also be expressed differently. If the Truth, Christ, is manifested in creation, this means that creation, everything in existence, participates in Christ's Life, in Christ's Beauty. Therefore, *Beauty is participation in Christ's Beauty*. Orthodox icons depict this by showing everything illuminated by the Uncreated Light; and this Uncreated Light is the love of God the Father for the Son and the creation that came to be through the Son.

Nonetheless, perhaps it could also be said that *Beauty is the apophatic* epiphany *of the Truth in the creation*. Epiphany implies that something wishes to be revealed to us of its own free will.[20] Free will is characteristic only of a person. Christianity understands God as a union of three Persons. We have said that abundance of infinite diversity is the definition of Life. Abundance of infinite diversity *does not exist outside of the Person*. The seemingly infinite universe would be an infinitely small dungeon for man if the presence of God the Person did not appear in creation. If prayer does not bring us such a feeling of life, this means that we are praying to the wrong god, a god that is not a person. Everything that God the Person creates, He creates in a personal way. God the Person does not know how to create otherwise but in the personal way. This means that God the Person creates everything to be unique and unrepeatable. No blade of grass is created identical from start to finish. No ant, no mosquito, no fly. Would it be right if among all creatures only man was created as an eternal being? Would it be just if a mouse existed in eternity only in the form of his nature, as a specie, and not as a particularity?

How does St. Maximus the Confessor understand this question, according to Metropolitan John Zizioulas?

> "Maximus' use of 'nature' in the above positive sense must always be taken together with his expression *λόγος φύσεως*. 'Logos of nature' is for Maximus an expression that points not to nature as it is but to nature according to its aim (σκοπός) or end (τέλος), that is, to nature as it exists in the *hypostasis* of the divine *Logos*. To exist 'according to nature' (κατὰ φύσιν), means to exist 'according to the *logos* of nature' (κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς φύσεως), and this in turn means to exist in the way that God *intended* nature to be incorporated in the *hypostasis* of the *Logos* … The 'logos of nature' for Maximus denotes not nature as such but nature *personalized* … In other words, to exist 'according to the logos of nature' means to hypostasize your nature in true and authentic personhood, to make the general (nature) exist in a state of otherness and particularity for ever. The 'logos of nature' is not to 'naturalize' the person but to 'personalize' nature by turning it from general to particular, by introducing otherness into its very 'being.'"[21]

According to the teachings of Holy Fathers, aeonian existence is possible only in a personal way. A being which in eternity does not preserve its otherness and hypostatic particularity does not exist in a true way:

> "How true is the being of a particular being if at some point it ceases to exist as a particular? How can a 'mouse' be truly a 'person' if personhood means particularity (*idion*) and if this animal's particularity is destined to disappear? Personhood or *hypostasis* aims at the survival, the ever-being of its particularity; only a particular being that is liberated from its death can be an ontologically true particularity, that is, a true person or hypostasis."[22]

I believe that many of you know the biography of St. Silouan the Athonite. It was written by Archimandrite Sophrony, whose holy relics lay not far from here, at the mon-

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[20] Morris Beja, *Epiphany in the Modern Novel*, p. 51.
[21] John D. Zizioulas, *Communion & Otherness*, T & T Clark, London, 2006, p. 64-5.
[22] John D. Zizioulas, *Communion & Otherness*, T & T Clark, London, 2006, p. 66.

astery of St. John the Forerunner. St. Silouan wrote that on one occasion he killed a fly without any great reason. "I cried for two days after that," St. Silouan wrote. He protested when his student, Father Sophrony, cut down weeds "without any great reason" in order to clear the path that they were walking along. Is it a pathological phenomenon to cry for two days over a squashed fly; to feel pain for the unnecessarily pulled weeds? Or is this about something else? That through love we perceive the world through God's eyes? God always watches the world from eternity and sees it as it will be in eternity. Each blade of grass feels that its end is meant to be in eternity and it moans to God asking for the coming of His sons who will help it to reach this state.[23]

One cannot describe the power of the love with which God created the world, the amount of love with which He created what is considered an insignificant detail, from man's point of view. He did not create flies in swarms, serially. He paid special attention, gave special love, to each one of them. God cannot create in any other way and still be God the Love. He cannot have a different view of creation. I dare say that He creates every detail, every fly, and every blade of grass – as a person. And the person is absolutely unrepeatable. That is why St. Silouan wept over a squashed fly.

Any other relationship towards creation leads to its transformation into a shapeless mass. "Matter has become mud," Adorno and Horkheimer wrote in *Dialectic of Enlightenment.* Matter has become mud because

> "the relationship between the Enlightenment and things is that of between the dictator and men. He knows them in so far as he can manipulate them… In this way their 'in itself' becomes a 'for him'. In this transformation the essence of things is revealed as always the same, a substratum of domination."[24]

"Existence has become enclosed in itself", Heidegger wrote. This is because creation longs for existence in a personal and therefore, eternal way. However, when man treats it like mud, it conceals its deepest secret from him. It hides the fact that it is personal, alive and infinite in every detail, that it is the portrait of its Creator. It opens its heart to man only when it feels love, just like man cannot know God if God has not known him first.[25]

If we look at the history of art, we will see that man is increasingly becoming enclosed within himself and lonely. Man flees from God. He no longer depicts events from the Old and New Testament. He starts to be involved only in nature. However, man then flees nature because he feels that it is God's work. Man wants to live surrounded only by the products of his own labor, surrounded by things that do not bear God's signature. Man depicts his life in modern cities. He depicts and describes objects that he has created. If he happens to miss some natural detail, some tree, it bears no trace of God; it has been completely humanized. And in that way man lives in false hope that there is a place in the world where he can hide from God's love. Of course, such a place does exist. When we tell Christ that we do not wish union with Him, we are in that place.

However, let us assume that in the infinite depths of his heart man did not in fact utter this "I do not want it". Even though his reason says this; and that he still left a very small gap in his solitary confinement, even though it might be in the form of hesitation to tell Christ, "I do not want it". God does not violate human freedom, but His overa-

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[23] Rom. 8: 19-23.

[24] Horkheimer - Adorno, *Dialectics of Enlightenment,* translated by John Cumming, New York, 1989, p. 23.

[25] Gal. 4:9. *But know, after that ye have known God, or rather are known of God…*

bundant love also uses our hesitant intention to tell him the ultimate "no" in order to save us from eternal doom. Man created such a solitary confinement. He created a world consisting exclusively of his own handiwork. Joyce's *Ulysses* represents a description of twenty-four hours in Dublin. And yet epiphany was and remains one of the key notions of Joyce's poetics. However, as it has already been written about, Joyce always related epiphany to common, insignificant things.[26]

Let us return to the question that has already been raised: can the beauty of a common object lead one to Christ? The beauty of a chair? Van Gogh was deeply moved when he saw the chair that used to belong to Dickens. Can the beauty of a worn-out pair of shoes lead one to Christ? Driven by a suicidal urge, man retreated into solitude. He shut the gates to all roads leading to salvation. Can the beauty of a worn-out pair of old shoes be the beauty that can save him? We said that all creation longs for the eternal form of existence, i.e. the personal form of existence. *Creation longs for a man who is a person.* God gave man a frightfully important role. Man is responsible for the salvation of creation.

> "If *hypostasis* means *idion*, that is, particularity – and this is what it means to the Greek Fathers – it follows that the only true particularity from the ontological point of view is to be found ultimately in divine personhood, and, as far as creation is concerned, in the *hypostasis* of the incarnate Son, in which it is called to be hypostasized in the end. It is such a particularity or *hypostasis* that the human being is called to be an image of God, that is, a particularity that would be ontologically true by overcoming mortality, and at the same time capable of hypostasizing the rest of creation so that creation, too, may be saved through incorporation in the human being."[27]

The entire universe is represented in miniature within man. The entire universe is anxiously listening to the human heartbeat. The entire universe is uneasily anticipating the direction of human thought. Father Justin Popovich wrote that "the creation records even the smallest movements of the human soul with photographic precision." Man's environment is his silent judge. Creation longs for a man who is a person. Of all creation, only man has the gift of freedom to establish and reject union with God. Man becomes a person when he is in union with God the Person. Man's relationship with God is not reflected primarily in his official piousness, official Orthodoxy or the rational statement that he is pious. Man can be pious even when he thinks and says that he is not pious. T. S. Eliot wrote that Joyce even in his later works unconsciously preserved his Catholic piety.[28] It takes much time for our rational infidel views to root out the resident experiences of the Living God deep in the heart. Man is not primarily what he *says* he is, or what he *thinks* he is. Most of all man is what he feels, what he feels for Christ. However, a tragic misunderstanding occurs when man exchanges Christ's living Person with preaching or Christ's preachers.

Father Justin Popovich wrote that it is Christ's Person that is the *measure of truth*, not Christ's preaching. However, not everyone has the privilege of encountering Christ. Where else can we encounter Christ's Person? We can encounter it in Christ's creation. Therefore man is what he feels for Christ, above all; and he encounters Christ in the creation, even when he is not aware of that. Christ's Person is therefore encountered in Beauty. We have said that Beauty is the apophatic manifestation of the Truth in creation.

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[26] Morris Beja, *Epiphany in the Modern Novel*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1971, p. 17, 73.
[27] John D. Zizioulas, *Communion & Otherness*, T & T Clark, London, 2006, p. 67.
[28] T. S. Eliot, *After Strange Gods*, Faber & Faber, London, 1934, p. 35-39.

Beauty is the incarnated Christ. In 1888 Nietzsche was in Naples. He had just finished writing *The Antichrist*. However, the beauty of the sky above the southern city inspired him to write in a letter to Meta von Salis "The Old God still lives."[29] Looking at the sky the philosopher who had written "God is dead" now writes that this God "still lives."

Nevertheless, we asked the question about the old pair of shoes. Can the beauty of a common object be the beauty that redeems? It is not only nature but also human handiwork that photographically records our life. If somewhere in the unknown depth of his heart man has preserved the experience of Christ like the one that Nietzsche speaks of, then such a man is a person. Then everything around him, even common objects, becomes, first of all, man's portrait. Trivial things gain freedom. Then as man becomes a person even by unconsciously living in union with Christ, they become a portrait of the person. They become Christ's portrait.

Heidegger wrote his work *The Origin of the Work of Art* based on one such portrait – Van Gogh's painting *A Pair of Shoes*. Heidegger believes that these are the shoes of an unknown peasant woman. Meyer Schapiro believes that these are Van Gogh's shoes. However, both Heidegger and Schapiro agree that the old shoes have become the portrait of whoever wore them.[30] Schapiro compares this painting with Hamsun's description of shoes from his novel *Hunger:*

> "We come closer, I think, to Van Gogh's feeling for these shoes in a paragraph written by Knut Hamsun in the 1880s in his novel *Hunger*, describing his own shoes: '… Something of my own nature had gone over into these shoes; they affected me, like a ghost of my other I – a breathing portion of my very self'".

Heidegger gives his experience of this portrait:

> "From Van Gogh's painting we cannot even tell where these shoes stand. There is nothing surrounding this pair of peasant shoes in or to which they might belong – only an undefined space. There are not even clods of soil from the field or the field-path sticking to them, which would at least hint at their use. A pair of peasant shoes and nothing more. And yet –
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> From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to the *earth*, and it is protected in the *world* of the peasant woman. From out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself.
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> But perhaps it is only in the picture that we notice all this about the shoes. The peasant woman, on the other hand, simply wears them. If only this simple wearing were so simple.[31] When she takes off her shoes late in the evening, in deep but healthy fatigue, and reaches out

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[29] Nietzsche an Meta von Salis, in: Friedrich Nietzsche, *Briefe. Januar 1887-1889*, hrsg. von G. Colli und M. Montinari, Walther der Gruyter, Berlin-New York 1984, S. 472. The full sentence we quote here goes: "Der Herbst war hier ein Claude Lorrain in Permanenz, – ich fragte mich oft, ob so Etwas auf Erden möglich sei. Seltsam! gegen die Sommer-Misère da o b e n gab es also wirklich eine A u s g l e i c h u n g . Da haben wir's: der alte Gott lebt noch..."

[30] Meyer Schapiro, *Theory and Philosophy of Art: Style, Artist, and Society*, George Braziller, New York, 1994, p. 140-141.

[31] Underlined by Monk Romilo of Hilandar.

for them again in the still dim dawn, or passes them by on the day of rest, she knows all this without noticing or reflecting."[32]

Rilke lamented over the disappearance of such objects. Over the disappearance of the beauty of common objects that redeem. How many such objects vanished in the fire that destroyed two thirds of Hilandar in 2004! Observing modern humanity Rilke realized that man is running from God, and then running from God's creation. He realized that this flight has made man an impersonal being. He also saw that an impersonal being creates impersonal handiwork; that it creates an excessively human beauty; a beauty that leaves an aftertaste of void, dissatisfaction, disappointment. Rilke is the only modern artist to develop an almost complete philosophical system on the meanings of common objects. In a letter to Witold Hulewicz, his translator into Polish, Rilke wrote:

"And this activity (of poetic transformation of tangible and visible things into invisible)[33], is sustained and accelerated by the increasingly rapid disappearance today of so much of the Visible which we cannot replace. Even for our grandfathers a house, a fountain, a familiar tower, their very clothes, their coat, was infinitely more, infinitely more intimate; almost every object a vessel in which they found something human or added their morsel of humanity. Now, from America, empty indifferent things crowd over to us, counterfeit things, the veriest dummies. A house, in the American sense, an American apple or one of the vines of that country has *nothing* in common with the house, the fruit, the grape into which have entered the hope and meditation of our forefathers. The lived and living things, the things that share our thoughts, these are on the decline and can no more be replaced. *We are perhaps the last to have known such things.* The responsibility rests with us … to keep remembrance of them…"[34]

The Hilandar Monastery is at a point of restoration. We want to restore its beauty, but a beauty that redeems. We will complete this task only if we are careful. If we respect the will of the wood and the stone that the Monastery was made of. By respecting the will of the wood and the stone, we will approach the secret of God's unutterable beauty. We will thus show our conviction that man and the world were created from non-being. This conviction represents the foundation of humbleness. Humbleness is the fundamental prerequisite for union with God. Man becomes a person only in this union. Through the continuous effort of each us; the endless effort of many generations of monks; at least as many generations as there have been since the creation of the Hilandar monastery; through the effort to preserve the union with Christ despite the temptations, weaknesses, and grave illnesses. Through this effort, the creation, which has become the Body of Christ through Incarnation and Resurrection, will finally start to be transformed. To take on the features of a person. The only infinite Person – Christ's Person.

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[32] Martin Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, The Continental Aesthetics Reader, Edited by Clive Cazeaux, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 86-7.

[33] Remark: M. R. H.

[34] Rainer Maria Rilke, *Selected Letters of Rainer Maria Rilke*, Translated by R. F. C. Hull, London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1946, p. 394-395.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 212-227

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Die mittelalterliche Konzeption von Seele

„Verwegner! Möchtest von Angesicht zu Angesicht
Die Seele sehn
Du gehest in Flammen unter."[1]

In Analogie zu einer ‚Wiederkehr der Religion(en)' spricht der emeritierte Zürcher Professor für Klinische Psychiatrie an der Psychiatrischen Universitätsklinik Zürich und jetzt Leiter des Kompetenzzentrums für Depressions- und Angstbehandlung an der Privatklinik Hohenegg/CH *Daniel Hell* ‚Die Wiederkehr der Seele' an, die, offenbar durch systemtheoretische und naturalisierende Konzepte nahezu zum Verschwinden gebracht, jetzt aber wieder als wesentliches Einheitsprinzip der nach wie vor vom Seinsgeheimnis umwitterten menschlichen Existenz eine Funktion hat. Hell sagt mit Recht:

> „Die Seele ist eher von dem her beschreibbar, was sie nicht ist, als von dem her, was sie ist. Sie ist weder ein objektivierbares Ding, noch hat sie einen lokalisierbaren Ort. Sie lässt sich weder in Definitionen einschliessen, noch ist sie auf irgendeine Weise von irgendjemandem in Besitz zu nehmen."
>
> „Ich verstehe die Seele als Grundwort, auf dem sich wie auf einer Projektionsfläche die menschheitsgeschichtlichen Sedimente der Beschäftigung mit dem Geheimnis des menschlichen Seins abgelagert haben. Dieses Grundwort wurde historisch in die verschiedensten mündlichen und schriftlichen Texte eingewoben und bekam deshalb je nach den Zusammenhängen, in die es gestellt wurde, auch unterschiedliche Bedeutung. Aber auch eine postmoderne Sichtweise kann den Reichtum der Empfindungen, Gefühle und Denkweisen, die mit diesem Wort verbunden sind, nur staunend zur Kenntnis nehmen. Es aufzugeben hiesse, sich von einem grossen Schatz zu trennen. Ich sehe es vielmehr als Aufgabe unserer Zeit an, auf den Schultern älterer Sucher und Denker eine aktuelle Annäherung an das zu finden, was uns seelisch ausmacht, was wir aber letztlich nicht ergreifen können."[2]

Der vorliegende Text stellt die Grundlage eines Vortrags dar, den ich vor einigen Jahren auf Daniel Hells Einladung hin im Burghölzli Zürich gehalten habe. Er gehört in den Rahmen der von ihm gewünschten und nachhaltig geförderten Erforschung der Seelenkonzepte der Menschheit – ein Thema, das sowohl für die physische wie geistige

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[1] Friedrich Hölderlin, Gestalt und Geist, in: Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, hg. von M. Knaupp, Darmstadt 1998, 235f.

[2] Daniel Hell, Die Wiederkehr der Seele. Wir sind mehr als Gehirn und Geist. Überarbeitete und erweiterte Neuausgabe, Freiburg i. Br. 2009, 13f. Zu einer auch inhaltlich begründeten Weiterführung des Begriffs ‚Seele' vonseiten der Theologie gegen eine naturalistische Ablehnung des Begriffs vgl. Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, Oxford 1987; und die von einem ‚Laien'-Standpunkt aus 'kritische' Position vonVito Mancuso, L'anima e il suo destino, Milano 2007. Für den literarischen Kontext von der Antike bis in die Moderne siehe Béatrice Jakobs und Volker Kapp (Hg.), Seelengespräche, Berlin 2008.

Formung der Menschen von entscheidender Wichtigkeit ist.[3]

Zwar gehört es zum kaum mehr diskutierbaren Selbstverständnis einer selber nur noch funktionalistisch am Narrenseil der Paradigmenwechsel und der sich spannungslos austauschenden ‚Turns' hängenden ‚Wissenschaftlichkeit' nicht nur der Geisteswissenschaften, dass „der Begriff ‚Seele' verschwunden ist".[4] Am Seelenbegriff hing und hängt auch heute noch wie an keinem andern psychologischen Begriff die ganze Chance des Menschen, sich selber zu werden, sich selber zu erkennen und so in die Welt- und Gotteserkenntnis ausgreifen zu können. Die Problematik, inwiefern die Seele sich selber erkennen kann oder inwiefern sie sich sogar erkennen muss, damit sie, ihre Herkunft und gleichzeitig ihre eigene Kausalität für anderes erkennend, sich selber und alles andere Intelligible überhaupt zu erkennen vermag, bewegt die Philosophie seit der Antike und Spätantike (insbesondere seit dem Neuplatonismus) immer wieder intensiv und stark. Selbst-, Welt- und Gotteserkenntnis sind drei Seiten ein und derselben Denkanstrengung.

Alle Seelenerkenntnis ist nur im Rahmen des Paradoxons zu haben, dass das erkennende Subjekt die Leistung, sich selber zum Objekt zu machen, auch tatsächlich zu erbringen vermag, obwohl dieser Vorgang eine nahezu autonom göttliche Leistung voraussetzt, wenn man einen aristotelischen Massstab ansetzt, wonach Gott das einzige Wesen ist, das nach Aristoteles (384-322) sich selber denken kann:

> „Sich selbst also erkennt die Vernunft, wenn anders sie das Beste ist, und die Vernunfterkenntnis (bzw. -tätigkeit) ist Erkenntnis ihrer Erkenntnis (-tätigkeit) (νόησις νοήσεως)."
>
> „Wie sich die menschliche Vernunft, d. h. die auf das Zusammengesetzte gerichtete, in einer gewissen Zeit verhält – denn sie hat nicht in diesem oder in jenem Teile das Gute, sondern im Ganzen das Beste, welches etwas anderes ist (als sie selbst) –: so verhält sich die Vernunfterkenntnis ihrer selbst (der göttlichen Vernunft) die ganze Ewigkeit hindurch."[5]

Mit andern Worten: Das menschliche Subjekt erkennt sich selbst in Analogie zur Selbsterkenntnis des göttlichen ‚unbewegten Bewegers',[6] der damit durch eine unüberwindliche Schranke vom Kosmos und dessen Seiendem (auch den Menschen) getrennt bleibt, die von ihm bloss in der Art einer Final- [und nicht einer] Kausalursache angezogen werden.[7] Dass dies also gar nicht so leicht zu erreichen ist, zeigt sich sehr bald im Mass, als das Ich, das sich um diese Selbsterkenntnis bemüht, nicht unbedingt mit dem Menschen in seiner leibseelischen Konstitution, sondern letztlich einzig mit der Seele zu identifizieren ist.

Dass eine solche Einschränkung möglich werden konnte, liegt zunächst an der extremen Stossrichtung der intellektuellen Selbsterkenntnis auf *Innerlichkeit*,[8] was

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[3] Edith Düsing, Einleitung: Problemskizze zu ‚Geist und Psyche' in Antike, Christentum und Neuzeit, in: Edith Düsing, Hans-Dieter Klein (Hg.), Geist und Psyche. Klassische Modelle von Platon bis Freud und Damasio, Würzburg 2008, 7-16.

[4] Christoph Wulf, Seele, in: ders. (Hg.), Vom Menschen. Handbuch Historische Anthropologie, Weinheim und Basel 1997, 967-974, hier 967 (7 von 1160 Seiten eines Entwurfs zu einer *Historischen Anthropologie*!). Dass sich ein Herausgeber eines solchen Werks heute nicht einmal ein Hundertstel des zur Verfügung stehenden Textumfangs für eine Darstellung des historischen Rangs des Seelenbegriffs im Rahmen eines Handbuchs zur Anthropologie gestattet, verweist auf die geistige Verarmung unserer Wissenschaftsszene!

[5] Aristoteles, Metaphysik XII, 9, 1074b, 33ff. und XII, 10, 1075a, 12ff.

[6] Klaus Oehler, Aristotle on Self-Knowledge, Proceedings of American Philosophical Society 118 (1974) 493-506; ders., Der unbewegte Beweger des Aristoteles, Frankfurt a. M. 1984, 99ff.

[7] J. Follon, Ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ θεῷ („Suivre la Divinité"): Introduction à l'esprit de la philosophie ancienne, Louvain-Paris 1997, 154f.

[8] Jean Pépin, Idées grecques sur l'homme et sur Dieu, Paris 1971, 55-203, hat in diesem wichtigen Buch in höchst eindrücklicher Weise gezeigt, wie die Verinnerlichung des Menschen im griechischen Den-

einerseits die Tendenz zu einer denkerischen Emanzipation der Seele als des Eigentlichen vom Uneigentlichen des (materiellen) Körpers förderte, andererseits aber schier notwendigerweise zu einer von den christlichen Vätern und mittelalterlichen Denkern privilegierten, gegen alle antiken kosmologisch begründeten Weltdeutungskonzepte sich wendende Sonderstellung des Menschen in seinem Bezug zum Göttlichen führte.

Das Christentum brachte eine heute kaum mehr nachvollziehbare Neuheit gegenüber den antiken Weltdeutungsvorstellungen. Sicherlich bestand das Grundprinzip des griechisch-hellenischen Philosophierens in der Formel, wie sie Plotin (um 205-270) als das Grundproblem der Philosophie darstellt:

> „Die auch von den alten Weisen oft erörterte, wie aus dem ‚Einen', wenn es so beschaffen ist, wie wir sagen, dass es ist, irgendeine Vielheit, eine Zweiheit oder eine andere Zahl, hervorgehen konnte und es nicht in sich ruhend blieb, sondern aus ihm die Vielheit der Dinge entsprang (Enn. V, 1, 6). Seit jeher, schon von den Zeiten der jonischen Naturphilosophen an, handelt es sich für das griechische Denken darum, ein einziges, einfaches Urprinzip zu finden, aus dem dann – in geistigem, verstehenden Nachvollzug des realen Entstehungsprozesses – die Vielheit der mannigfaltig differenzierten Erscheinungen abzuleiten ist."[9]

Mit andern Worten: Dem hellenischen Denken – wie es die Stoa mit ihrer Konzeption eines in der Menschenseele aufbewahrten ‚Seelenfunkens' (ψυχαῖος σπινθήρ)[10] oder der Neuplatonismus mit seiner in die Vernunft (νοῦς) oder letztlich in das ἕν sich auflösenden Seele (ψυχή) entwarfen – entspricht zunächst viel eher die Auffassung einer den *Kosmos* durchformenden, ihn ganz machenden *Einheit*, in der alles Viele eingeborgen wird. Eine dieses Ziel anvisierende Reihe seelischer Introversionsbewegungen entspricht solcher Absicht zunächst wenig. Da aber auch in der Seele die Sehnsucht nach

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kraum über die einseitige Verdeutlichung gelaufen ist, nach welcher der Mensch im eigentlichen Sinn *die Seele an sich* ist! Vgl. zu diesem für die Kultur- und Zivilisationsgeschichte kaum überschätzbaren Vorgang einer fundamentalen Entdeckung der Innerlichkeit: Endre Ivánka, Hellenisches und Christliches im frühbyzantinischen Geistesleben, Wien 1948; Pius Künzle, Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen. Problemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen von Augustin bis und mit Thomas von Aquin, Freiburg/Schweiz 1956; Michael Landmann u. a., De Homine. Der Mensch im Spiegel seines Gedankens, Freiburg/München 1962; Endre von Ivánka, Plato Christianus. Übernahme und Umgestaltung des Platonismus durch die Väter, Einsiedeln 1964; Marie-Madeleine Davy, L'homme intérieur et ses métamorphoses, Paris 1974; Reto Luzius Fetz, Ontologie der Innerlichkeit. Reditio Completa und Processio Interior bei Thomas von Aquin, Freiburg/Schweiz 1975; ders., Shri Ramana Maharshi: Vom Ich zum Selbst. Hinduistische Mystik im westlichen Vergleich, Münster 2006; Gerd Jüttemann / Michael Sonntag / Christoph Wulf (Hg.), Die Seele. Ihre Geschichte im Abendland, Weinheim 1991; Hennings Andersen, Odyssee des Gewissens. Die Entwicklung der freien Individualität von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, Stuttgart 1992; Theo K. Heckel, Der Innere Mensch. Die paulinische Verarbeitung eines platonischen Motivs, Tübingen 1993; Jan Assmann (Hg.), Die Erfindung des Inneren Menschen. Studien zur religiösen Anthropologie, Gütersloh 1993; Christoph Markschies, Die platonische Metapher vom ‚inneren Menschen': eine Brücke zwischen antiker Philosophie und altchristlicher Theologie, Zs. f. Kirchengeschichte 105 (1994) 1-17; Hanna-Barbara Gerl Falkovitz u. a. (Hg.), Rationalität und Innerlichkeit, Hildesheim 1997 (wertvoll); Jan Assmann & Guy G. Stroumsa (Hg.), Transformations of the Inner Self in Ancient Religions, Leiden 1999; Ernst-Michael Kranich, Der innere Mensch und sein Leib. Eine Anthropologie, Stuttgart 2003; Alois M. Haas, Self-Knowledge – Space of Inwardness, in: Sadananda Das/Ernst Fürlinger (Hg.), Sâmarasya. Studies in Indian Art, Philosophy, and Interreligious Dialogue – in Honour of Bettina Bäumer, New Delhi 2005, 479-520; Umberto Galimberti, Die Seele. Eine Kulturgeschichte der Innerlichkeit, Wien 2005. Jüngst hat Theo Kobusch, Christliche Philosophie. Die Entdeckung der Subjektivität (Darmstadt 2006) die historische Wirkmächtigkeit der Denkform vom ‚Inneren Menschen' magistral herausgearbeitet! Vgl. schliesslich Jean Lévêque / Maurice Nédoncelle, Intériorité, DSp. VII/2, 1877-1903; Michel Dupuy, Introversion, ebd., 1904-1918; Renate von Heydebrand, Innerlichkeit, HWPH IV, 386-388 (ungenügend); R. Piepmeyer, Innigkeit, ebd., 388-391.

[9] Ivánka, 1948, wie Anm. 8, 11.

[10] ΨΥΧΑΙΟΣ ΣΠΙΝΘΗΡ. Histoire d'une métaphore dans la tradition platonicienne jusqu'à Eckhart, Revue Augustinienne 21 (1975) 225-255.

einer Rückkehr in die Einheit als dauernd wirksam gedacht wird,[11] war dem Menschen der Antike Selbsterkenntnis nichts anderes als ein Gang ins eigene Innere (ob dieses nun als göttlich oder höchst sterblich konzipiert wurde).

Das innere Selbst wurde zusammen mit 'physischer Lebensträgerschaft' und 'Dämon' in der Antike mit wechselnden (monistischen oder dualistischen) Akzentuierungen als 'ψυχή' bezeichnet und meinte eigentlich zur Zeit der Lyriker und Philosophen ursprünglich Verschiedenes:

> „ψυχή ist... einmal der physische Lebensträger, dann jener fremde δαίμων, der eine Zeitlang zu Gast oder in Gefangenschaft in einem Körper ist, aber, solange er um sich weiss, stets nach seiner Rückkehr trachtet, und dann bei den Lyrikern das Innere Selbst, also das Denken, Fühlen und Wollen, all das, was abgesehen von meiner körperlichen Erscheinung 'ich' ist."[12]

Entscheidend geworden ist dann die spätere Entwicklung einer eher monistischen Identifizierung der drei ursprünglichen Seelenmomente im Sinne der Konzeption einer 'Unsterblichkeit der Seele'.[13] Man geht wohl nicht fehl in der Annahme, dass diese Vereinheitlichung des Seelenbegriffs in der mit dem Christentum einsetzenden Geschichte einer 'Metaphysik der Freiheit' eine wesentliche Rolle spielte, sofern eine solche Vereinheitlichung des Seelenbegriffs die sittliche und metaphysische Rolle eines in sich freien und zu sich offenen Ichs ganz wesentlich stärkte.[14]

Historisch dürfte jedenfalls zutreffen, dass im Wesentlichen das Christentum im Zeichen der *conversio* zu den Lehren des Evangeliums *nicht* gegen heidnische 'Religionen' antrat,[15] sondern in Wirklichkeit gegen die "totale Anerkennung" eines "totalitären Staates", der "gegen die freie menschliche – sittliche und religiöse – Persönlichkeit" ankämpft.[16]

Obwohl die Vereinheitlichung des Seelenbegriffs zu einer den ‚äusseren Menschen' leitenden Lebensform im Christentum dominierte, ist die Ansicht eines in der christlichen Eschatologie weiterwirkenden ‚Doppelpoligkeit' der Seelendefinitionen bis heute geläufig und begründbar.[17] Die beiden Modelle treten allerdings in der Geschichte des Christentums kaum je in völliger Getrenntheit hervor, sondern meist in

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[11] Vgl. Alois M. Haas, „... ausserhalb Gottes ist alles eng". Johannes' vom Kreuz , Appetit' nach Gott, Aufgang. Jahrbuch für Denken, Dichten, Musik. Band 2: Sehnsucht. Hg. Von José Sánchez de Murillo und Martin Thurner, Stuttgart 2005, 121-141, besonders 123ff.

[12] Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp, Inneres Selbst und Lebensträger. Zur Einheit des ψυχή-Begriffs, Rhein. Museum für Philologie 118 (1975) 48-61, hier 48f. Vgl. Dazu von dems., Introspektion in naturwissenschaftlicher Psychologie (Zu Aristoteles, de anima III 5 und Verwandtem), ebd., 120 (1977) 30-44.

[13] Dazu vgl. die befürwortende Stellungnahme von Joseph Ratzinger, Kleine Katholische Dogmatik. IX: Eschatologie – Tod und ewiges Leben, Regensburg 1990, und kritisch Gisbert Greshake / Jacob Kremer, Resurrectio Mortuorum. Zum theologischen Verständnis der leiblichen Auferstehung. Darmstadt 1986, 168–176 (Greshake); Heimo Sonnemans, SEELE. Unsterblichkeit – Auferstehung. Zur griechischen und christlichen Anthropologie und Eschatologie. Freiburg im Breisgau 1984 (Freiburger Theologische Studien 128); Fritz Heidler, Die biblische Lehre von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele. Sterben, Tod, ewiges Leben im Aspekt lutherischer Anthropologie, Göttingen 1983; Christian Herrmann, Unsterblichkeit der Seele durch Auferstehung. Studien zu den anthropologischen Implikationen der Eschatologie, Göttingen 1997, 105-188.

[14] Theo Kobusch, Die Entdeckung der Person. Metaphysik der Freiheit und modernes Menschenbild, Darmstadt 1997, 19ff.; ders., wie Anm. 8, 84-89.

[15] Endre von Ivánka, Spätantikes Heidentum, in: ders., Aufsätze zur byzantinischen Kultur, Amsterdam 1984, 121-128.

[16] Ivánka, Die antike Welt wird christlich, in: ebd., 129-133.

[17] Vgl. Gisbert Greshake, Die Leib-Seele-Problematik und die Vollendung der Welt, in: G. Greshake / G. Lohfink (Hg.), Naherwartung – Auferstehung – Unsterblichkeit, Freiburg 1986, 157ff.; Greshake, wie Anm. 13, 168ff.; Sonnemans, wie Anm. 13.

irgendeiner Form der Kombination. Das zeigt sich bei einem renommierten Denker wie Thomas von Aquin in klarer Deutlichkeit, wenn der den Satz des Aristoteles: „Der Tod ist das Allerschrecklichste“mit folgenden Worten kommentiert:

> „Der Grund dafür ist, dass der Tod das Ende dieses Lebens ist, und nichts von alledem, was uns aus dem jetzigen Leben vertraut ist, weder im Guten noch im Bösen, scheint nach dem Tod noch zu gelten. Und *der Zustand der Seelen nach dem Tod ist uns nicht einsichtig.* Dasjenige nun, wodurch der Mensch alles Gut, das ihm vertraut ist, verliert, ist wohl sehr schrecklich. [18]

Hier zeigt sich klar, dass Thomas dem Gedanken des sog. Zwischenzustands oder – positiv – der sog. „Mittelschau“[19] (zwischen Tod und Auferstehung) gegenüber eine eher apophatische Haltung eingenommen hat, also noch nicht gewillt war, sich auf eine Streitdiskussion einzulassen, wie sie sich im 14. Jahrhundert zwischen zwei Päpsten – Johannes XXII. (1245/49-1334)[20] und Benedikt XII. (um 1285-1342)[21] zusammen mit Robert von Anjou, dem König von Jerusalem und Sizilien (1278-1343)[22] – ergab.[23] Anlass zum Streit war Johannes des XXII. Ansicht, dass der Zwischenzustand zwischen Tod und Auferstehung ein schlafähnlicher Zustand sei, was von seinen Gegnern aufs leidenschaftlichste bestritten wurde. Der Papst musste mit dem Geständnis seines Irrtums in dieser Sache auf den Lippen sterben.

All dies hatte im Gefolge die christliche Übernahme zweier Seelenmodelle, des dualistisch-platonischen und des hebräisch-christlichen, was insgesamt die Seelenproblematik im Mittelalter äusserst kompliziert, aber auch lebendig gemacht hat.[24]

Ich möchte zuerst die Tendenzen zu einer im platonischen Sinn emanzipatorischen Betrachtung der Seele im Rahmen christlich-mystischer Bestrebungen aufweisen, um sodann ausführlicher auf die in der scholastischen Psychologie des 13. Jahrhunderts dominante Doppelung zweier unterschiedlicher Seelenmodelle einzugehen. Dass mit diesem Vorgehen eine gewisse Oberflächlichkeit in der historischen Beschreibung der Phänomene unumgänglich ist, die es nicht gestattet, der Komplexität der Probleme voll Genüge zu tun, ist dabei in Kauf zu nehmen. Wenigstens in Umrissen soll dabei der Reichtum des mittelalterlichen Seelenbegriffs ins Blickfeld geraten und dabei gezeigt werden, dass dieser Begriff zu keiner Zeit seiner Wirkung einseitig oder gar unilateral ausgelegt wurde. Die Seele ist immer ein Gradmesser der lebendigen begrifflichen Bemühung um sie gewesen und kaum je blosse Deutungsschablone. Für Einzelhinweise muss auf die reiche Sekundärliteratur verwiesen werden.

I.

Der Ernstfall der Beziehung von Körper und Seele ist sicherlich dann gegeben, wenn die beiden nahezu sichtbar auseinandertreten, also nach dem Tod, wenn die substantial gedachte Seele sich von ihrem Leib getrennt hat und nach allgemein verbreitetem Gla-

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[18] In Eth. Nic. III, lect. 14; zitiert bei A. Luyten, Der Tod als Problem der philosophischen Anthropologie, Universitas Friburgensis 37 (1979) 85; Emil Schnütgen, Die Visio Beatifica, ihr Wesen und ihre theologisch-philosophische Berechtigung, Würzburg 1867.

[19] Alfons Lellig, Die Visiolehre des Gerardus Odonis Generalministers der Minoriten (1329-1342), Roma (Gregoriana) 1951, 8-19. Den Streit referiere ich verkürzt in Alois M. Haas, Todesbilder im Mittelalter. Fakten und Hinweise in der deutschen Literatur, Darmstadt 1989, 93ff. (mit älterer Lit.).

[20] Marc Dykmans, Les Sermons de Jean XXII sur la vision béatifique, Roma 1973.

[21] Friedrich Wetter, Die Lehre Benedikts XII. vom intensiven Wachstum der Gottesschau, Roma 1958.

[22] Marc Dykmans: Robert d'Anjou, La vision bienheureuse. Traité envoyé au pape Jean XXII, Roma 1970.

[23] Vgl. jetzt die ausführliche Darstellung Christian Trottmann, La vision béatifique. Des disputes scolastiques à sa définition par Benoît XII, Rome 1995.

[24] Vgl. Greshake / Lohfink, wie Anm. 17, 82-120; Haas, wie Anm. 19, 22-25.

uben in ihren Ursprung zurückkehren soll.[25] Hier wird das Problemfeld Körper-Seele-Beziehung akut. Mit andern Worten: Hier ist auch der Ansatzpunkt für alle Formen für die Totenpflege, deren Seelen eine ungewisse Reise in ein ebenso ungewisses Jenseits unternehmen müssen, also nicht ausgelöscht sind. Dabei ist immer ein gewisser Konsens darüber vorausgesetzt, wie Körper und Seele während des Lebens zueinander in Beziehung oder im Verbund miteinander gestanden haben. Und damit ist unweigerlich schon der Seelenbegriff im Spiel.

Die abendländische Geschichte der semantischen Variationen des Seelenbegriffs[26] ist ohne Zweifel an die Namen von Platon[27] und Aristoteles[28] gebunden. In altgriechischer Auffassung steht der Seelenbegriff nicht allzuweit von alttestamentlichen Denkmöglichkeiten, wonach die Seele des Verstorbenen in der Unterwelt in einer irgendwie leibbezogenen Befindlichkeit mitsamt entsprechenden Möglichkeiten der Kommunikation, wenn auch sehr reduziert, weiterlebt. Eine Änderung bringen die griechischen Mysterienkulte und die daran anknüpfenden orphischen und pythagoreischen Weisheitslehren: Die Seele trennt sich danach im Tod vom Körper, um dorthin zurückzukehren, wo ihre wahre Heimat ist: zu den Göttern, in die göttliche Welt, der sie letztlich zugehört und die ihr *Unsterblichkeit* verbürgt.[29] Eine solche Unsterblichkeitsüberzeugung ist verständlich nur im Kontext eines pointierten anthropologischen Dualismus von Leib und Seele. Die Seele ist infolge eines selbstverschuldeten „Ur-falls" (oder aufgrund einer Entfremdung des Göttlichen zu sich selbst) in den sterblichen Leib

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[25] Die folgenden Überlegungen profitieren von Johannes Hirschberger, Seele und Leib in der Spätantike, Wiesbaden 1969; Hermann J. Weber, Die Lehre von der Auferstehung der Toten in den Haupttraktaten der scholastischen Theologie, Freiburg im Breisgau 1973 (Freiburger Theologische Studien 91); Sonnemans, wie Anm. 13; Klaus Kremer (Hg.), Seele. Ihre Wirklichkeit, ihr Verhältnis zum Leib und zur menschlichen Person, Leiden 1984; Greshake, wie Anm. 13. – Dass das Leib-Seele-Problem ein bis zum heutigen Tag problematisches ist, zeigen Aloys Wenzl, Das Leib-Seele-Problem, Leipzig 1933; Josef Seifert, Das Leib-Seele-Problem in der gegenwärtigen philosophischen Diskussion, Darmstadt 1979; Mario Bunge, Das Leib-Seele-Problem, Tübingen 1984, und viele andere einschlägige Werke vorbildlich. Diese kaum lösbare Problematik kann heute bis dahin führen, dass sich sensiblen bildenden Künstler(inne)n das Antlitz des Menschen in die Dunkelheit eines Existenzrätsels auflöst, das keinerlei menschliche Gesichtskonturen mehr prägnant sichtbar zu lassen vermag. Dominant ist also in der Frage sicherlich eine Art negativer Anthropologie. Vgl. dazu Christoph Wagner, Homo absconditus. Dunkelheit als Metapher im Porträt der frühen Neuzeit, Colloquia Academica G[eisteswissenschaften], Stuttgart 1996, 39-95.

[26] Einen Durchblick in Texten bietet Élie During, L'âme. Introduction, Choix de Textes, Commentaires, Vade-Mecum et Bibliographie, Paris 1997.

[27] Peter M. Steiner, Psyche bei Platon. Göttingen 1992; Heinrich Dörrie / Mathias Baltes, Die philosophische Lehre des Platonismus. Von der ‚Seele' als der Ursache aller sinnvollen Abläufe, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2002 (Der Platonismus in der Antike 6,1 und 2); Thomas Alexander Szlezák, „Seele" bei Platon, in: Hans-Dieter Klein (Hg.), Der Begriff der Seele in der Philosophiegeschichte, Würzburg 2005, 65-86; dazu Jens Halfwassen, Seele und Zeit im Neuplatonismus, ebd., 101-117. Für die hier besprochene Problematik vgl. Sonnemans, wie Anm. 13, 216–291.

[28] E. Rolfes, Die substantiale Form und der Begriff der Seele bei Aristoteles, Paderborn 1896; Heinrich Cassirer, Aristoteles' Schrift ‚Von der Seele' und ihre Stellung innerhalb der aristotelischen Philosophie, Darmstadt 1968; H. J. Blumenthal, Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity. Interpretations of ‚De anima', London 1996; Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Ed.), Essays on Aristotle's *De Anima*, Oxford 1997; Hubertus Busche, Die Seele als System. Aristoteles' Wissenschaft von der Psyche, Hamburg 2001 (Paradeigmata 25); Abraham P. Bos, Die Aristotelische Lehre der Seele – Widerrede gegen die moderne Entwicklungshypothese, in: Klein, wie Anm. 27, 87-99; Dominik Perler (Ed.), Tranformations of the Soul. Aristotelian Psychology 1250-1650, Leiden 2009.

[29] „Wer unter Griechen unsterblich sagt, sagt Gott" (Gustav Pfannmüller, Tod, Jenseits und Unsterblichkeit in der Religion. Literatur und Philosophie der Griechen und Römer, München 1953, 20-24, hier 21; zitiert bei Greshake, wie Anm. 13, 170; der Satz stammt ursprünglich von Erwin Rohde, PSYCHE. Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen. 2 Bände, Tübingen 1925, II, 2).

verbannt, den sie als Kerker, ja als Grab erfährt.[30] Also ist ihr ganzes Bestreben darin gelegen, sich von diesem einschränkenden Leib zu befreien; und je mehr ihr das gelingt, um so eher kann sie ihrer göttlichen Bestimmung zurückgegeben werden.

Diese etwas pauschale Beschreibung mag Platon nicht in allen Punkten gerecht werden; sein „Dualismus" ist letztlich kein anthropologisch-ontologischer, sondern ein bloss religiös-ethischer. Gleichwohl ist festzuhalten, dass die platonische Abwertung des Leibes zugunsten einer Erhebung der Seele zur Unsterblichkeit im Blick auf eine immer mögliche und drohende schuldhafte Hingabe der Seele an die Bedürfnisse des Leibes geschieht (etwa als Verzauberung durch Lüste und Begierden des Körpers). Mindestens ist daher immer eine ethische Reinigung gefordert, ein Auf- und Überstieg zu dem, „was mehr als schön ist": zum Urschönen.

Bei aller Anerkennung der ethischen Implikationen dieser Haltung Platons bleibt ein „ontologisch-theoretischer Dualismus" in seinem System bestehen. Leib und materielle Welt bleiben entfremdend, sie sind nur transitorische Momente des Lebens. Auch die Weiterführungen der platonischen Sicht im Neuplatonismus halten sich an diese dualistischen Implikationen im System, und sie gelten auch in der christlichen Antike und im Mittelalter als gut platonisch.

Das zeigt sich seit dem 2. Jahrhundert nach Christus in einer bedeutsamen Wendung des mentalen Interesses vom Äusseren ins Innere – auch im politisch-sozialen Raum sichtbar durch einen Rückzug vieler Staatsdiener ins Privatleben! –, d.h. in einer klar sich abzeichnenden Introversion und Neigung zur Theoria.[31] Auffällig ist das begleitende Entstehen vieler Traktate über die Seele, in denen der platonische Dualismus im Rückgriff auf den Dialog ‚Phaidon' neu orchestriert übernommen wird.

Man kann und muss sich fragen, ob solche platonischen Ansichten mit dem werdenden *Christentum* kompatibel waren, das im Zentrum seiner Lehre eine *inkarnatorische Heilsökonomie* vertrat, gegenüber der jeder platonische Aufstieg aus Welt und Leiblichkeit eigentlich ein böser Verstoss sein musste. Christlich ist der Logos Sarx geworden. Plotins metaphysischer Schlachtruf: ἀπὸ σῶματος οὐ μετὰ σῶματος ἀνάστασις – „Auferstehung weg vom Leib und nicht mit dem Leib" (Enn. III 6,6), konnte niemals vom Christentum eins zu eins übernommen werden, auch wenn seit den Kirchenvätern vielerlei ‚Platonismen', insbesondere auf der Denkspur des Origenes (um 185–253), bis heute zu irritieren vermochten.

In der *Gnosis* geschah eine beachtliche Zuspitzung der Problematik, indem die Dualismen radikalisiert und verabsolutiert wurden. Nun ist der ganze Kosmos – nicht nur das Kompositum ‚Mensch' – in eine göttliche und in eine widergöttliche Region, in κόσμος (lichthafte Ordnung) und σκότος (Finsternis), zerspalten. In seiner Leiblichkeit ist der Mensch dauernd mit der kosmisch vorgegebenen Urdissonanz zeit seines Lebens konfrontiert. Eine rettende Erlösung aus diesem Zwiespalt ist einzig in der radikalen Parteinahme fürs pneumatische Selbst denkbar und möglich. Das führt zur Konzeption einer ‚Himmelsreise der Seele', in der die Vollendung und Rettung der Pneuma-Seele aus Leib, Welt und Geschichte sich verwirklicht. Der Leib hat hier keine

[30] Die Formel: τὸ σῶμα σῆμα steht dafür: Platon, Gorg. 493a, Crat. 400c, Phaidon 82e. Zu dieser Formel vgl. Pierre Courcelle: L'Âme en cage, in: Kurt Flasch (Hg.): Parusia. Studien zur Philosophie Platons und zur Problemgeschichte des Platonismus. Festgabe für Johannes Hirschberger, Frankfurt a. M. 1965, 103-116; jetzt in: Pierre Courcelle, Connais-toi toi-même. De Socrate à Saint Bernard. 3 Bände. Paris 1974, II, 381-393.

[31] Hans-Georg Beck, Theoria. Ein byzantinischer Traum? München 1983 (Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Kl., 1983, H. 7).

Chance selber auferstehen zu können, wie es das Christentum annimmt. Es geht im Gegenteil um eine Befreiung vom Leib, denn die σάρξ – μὴ δεκτικὴ σωτηρίας (denn die Sarx [Fleisch] ist nicht erlösungsfähig).

Zwei Themen aber haben sich in diesen widersprüchlichen Entwicklungen durchgehalten, das der Selbsterkenntnis und das der damit verhängten Introversion des Ichs in die eigene Innerlichkeit. Diese Thematik verbindet den Neuplatonismus mit Augustinus. So beginnt der neuplatonische Denker Plotin (205–270) seine Enneade 27 (IV 3) ‚Über die Seele' mit folgender Argumentation zugunsten seines Vorhabens:

> „Von der Seele handeln, über all die Schwierigkeiten, die sich der Lösung zuführen lassen, oder auch bei den Schwierigkeiten selber stehen bleiben und dann wenigstens den Gewinn haben, das jeweils Unlösbare zu kennen: das ist gewiss ein berechtigter Gegenstand der Untersuchung. Denn da so viel verhandelt und untersucht wird, wobei könnte man mit besserem Grund verweilen als bei der Seele? Aus vielen anderen Gründen und vor allem deshalb, weil sie nach beiden Seilen Erkenntnis gewährt, sowohl über die Dinge, deren Urgrund sie ist, wie über diejenigen, von denen sie stammt. Auch folgen wir wohl, wenn wir darüber, was die Seele ist, unsere Prüfung anstellen, dem Gebot des Gottes, welcher gebietet, uns selber zu erkennen. Und wenn wir alles andere erforschen und ausfindig machen wollen, so ist es doch nur recht und billig, danach zu forschen, was denn dies Forschende ist, zumal wir das ‚anmutige Schaubild' zu ergreifen suchen."[32]

Es ist rasch erkennbar, dass Plotin in der vom Gott Apollo verordneten Pflicht zur Selbsterkenntnis der Seele – ‚Erkenne dich selbst (Γνῶθι σεαυτόν)[33] – eine Problematik sieht, die – das zeigt sich in anderen Stellen – von der Lektüre des platonischen ‚Charmides' herrührt, wo Sokrates anschaulich die Aporie eines sich auf den *circulus vitiosus* der Selbsterkenntnis gründenden Weisheitsbegriffs demonstriert, in dem Subjekt und Objekt des Erkenntnisvorgangs identisch sind.[34]

Auch *Augustinus* (354–430), der über den Neuplatonismus mit der platonischen Tradition in engstem Zusammenhang steht, hat nie einen Zweifel darüber gelassen, dass sein ganzes theologisch-philosophisches Denken im Ziel einer denkerischen Erschliessung von *Gott und der Seele des Menschen* beruht:

> „Die Philosophie hat eine doppelte Vorlage zum Gegenstand, die eine handelt über die Seele, die andere über Gott. Die erste bewirkt, dass wir uns selbst, die andere, dass wir unseren Ursprung kennen lernen."[35]

Dass die menschliche Seele nahezu gleichrangig neben Gott, der doch das alles überragende Ziel der Menschen ist, als Erkenntnisobjekt angeführt wird, hängt daran, dass sie in ihrem Grund der ‚Ort' des Zugangs zu Gott ist. An einer Stelle der ‚Enarrationes in Psalmos' zeigt Augustinus die die Seele transzendierende Immanenz Gottes im menschlichen Innern und die Bedingungen, die Seele wahrnehmen zu können, auf:

> *Nisi ipsa anima super se se effundat, non pervenit ad visionem Dei ei ad cognitionem substantiae illius incommutabilis. Nam modo, cum adhuc in carne est, dicitur ei: Ubi est Deus tuus? Sed intus est Deus ejus, et spiritualiter intus est, et spiritualiter excelsus est: nec pervenit anima ut contingat eum, nisi transierit se.*

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[32] Enn. IV 3 (27), 1, zitiert nach: Plotins Schriften. Übersetzt von Richard Harder, 6 in 11 Bänden. Hamburg 1962, Bd. IIa, 164f. Weitere Stellen und Erläuterungen siehe bei Courcelle: wie Anm. 30, I, 83–87, hier 86, Anm. 21. Vgl. Paul Otto Kristeller, Der Begriff der Seele in der Ethik des Plotin. Tübingen 1929.

[33] Vgl. Courcelle, wie Anm. 30, I, 11ff. und Eliza Gregory Wilkins, The Delphic Maxims in Literature, Chicago 1929; Jean Defradas, Les themes de la propagande delphique. Paris [2]1972, 268–283.

[34] Platon: Charm. 164d– 169c. Vgl. dazu Courcelle, wie Anm. 30, I, 16f.

[35] De ordine II 18,47: *Cuius (philosophiae) duplex quaestio est, una de anima, altera de deo. Prima efficit, ut nosmet ipsos noverimus, altera, ut originem nostram*. Vgl. auch Soliloq. I 2,7 (*A: Deum et animam scire cupio. R: Nihilne plus? A: Nihil omnino.); II 1,1* (*Deus semper idem, noverim me, noverim te. Oratum est.*)

> „Wenn nicht die Seele selber sich über sich ergiesst, gelangt sie nicht zur Schau Gottes und zur Erkenntnis von dessen unveränderlicher Substanz. Denn bald, solange er noch im Fleische ist, wird ihm gesagt: Wo ist dein Gott? Aber innen ist sein Gott, und er ist geistigerweise innen, und geistigerweise ist er auch oben. Und die Seele gelangt nicht dazu, ihn zu berühren, wenn sie sich selber nicht überschreitet."[36]

Es handelt sich hier offensichtlich um jenen ungreifbaren Ort in der Seele, den die Mystiker ‚Seelengrund' nennen[37] und auf den sich zurückzubeziehen Augustin die gläubigen Christen auffordert. Sowohl die ‚Confessiones'[38] wie sein Traktat ‚De Trinitate' verweisen abwechselnd auf die *abstrusior memoriae profunditas*, wenn die Abgründigkeit der Seele gemeint ist, während die Seelenhöhe mit der Umschreibung *principale mentis humanae quae novit Deum vel potest nosse*.[39] Damit schliesst er sich einer Denkform der stoischen Philosophie an, deren Seelenauffassung als „Grundprinzip" nachhaltig vertrat: „dass es nicht primär eine Vielheit von Seelenkräften und Seelenvermögen gibt, sondern zunächst, als ihre Wurzel, eine seelische Grundkraft, die sich dann erst in die Vielheit verschiedener Seelenkräfte differenziert".[40] Der Ruhm, als erster „das Vermögen des Göttlichen" im tiefsten Grunde der Seele im Blick auf „eine tiefste Schicht der persönlichen Entscheidung noch jenseits des Rationalen" mittels stoischer Begrifflichkeit zu erschliessen, gebührt Origenes (um 185–253).[41] Er hat damit der transrationalen (nicht: irrationalen oder arationalen!) Tendenz der christlichen Mystik aufs nachdrücklichste eine über den Platonismus hinausreichende Dynamik auf die Konzeption eines eigentlichen ‚mystischen Seelenvermögens' hin verliehen, wie sich dann beispielshalber sehr deutlich bei Gregor von Nyssa (335/40–vor 400) zeigen wird.[42]

Eine solche Zusammengehörigkeit von Selbst- und Gotteserkenntnis, wie sie für Augustinus ein Anliegen blieb, das sein ganzes Denken von Grund auf prägte, hatte natürlicherweise Folgen fürs Mittelalter,[43] da die mittelalterliche Spiritualität ganz unter dem Einfluss von Augustins Denken stand.[44] Das bezeugt sich insbesondere in der mittelalterlichen Zuschreibung ansonsten anonymer Traktate an Augustinus,[45] speziell im Traktat ‚De spiritu et anima' von Alcher von Clairvaux (12. Jh.),[46] der den Seelenbegriff mit der Selbsterkenntnis in engsten Zusammenhang rückt.[47] Dann aber auch in einem im 12. Jahrhundert weithin spürbaren völlig neuen Erschlossensein der Seelenproble-

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[36] In Psal. 130, n. 12. Das Folgende nach L. Reypens, Âme. DSp. 1, 433–469, hier 436–441.

[37] Vgl. P. Wyser, Der Seelengrund in Taulers Predigten, in: Lebendiges Mittelalter. Festgabe für Wolfgang Stammler. Freiburg/Schweiz 1958, 203–311; M. Tardieu, Histoire d'une métaphore dans la tradition platonicienne jusqu'à Maître Eckhart, Revue des Études Augustiniennes 21 (1975) 222–255.

[38] Conf., Buch 10, c. 7–27.

[39] De Trin. 14, c.7, n. 11).

[40] Endre von Ivánka , 1964, wie Anm. 8, 322.

[41] Vgl. ebd., 328–331.

[42] Jean Daniélou, Platonisme et theologie mystique. Doctrine spirituelle de Saint Grégoire de Nysse, Pans [2]1966, 254ff., 266.

[43] Vgl. Courcelle, wie Anm. 30, I, 113–163.

[44] Vgl. M.-D. Chenu, La theologie au douzième siècle, Paris 1976, 115–118 und Courcelle, wie Anm. 30, III 767; Gordon Leff, Augustinismus im Mittelalter, TRE 4, 699–717.

[45] A. Wilmart, Auteurs spirituels et textes dévots du moven âge latin, Paris 1932; Ferdinand Cavallera, Augustin (Apocryphes attribués à S. Augustin), DSp 1, 1130–1135.

[46] PL 40, 779–831. Zu Alcher von Clairvaux, Zist. Mönch, 12. Jh., vgl. Karl Werner, Die Entwicklung der mittelalterlichen Psychologie von Alcuin bis Albertus Magnus, Wien 1876, 41ff.; Bernhard Gever (Hg.), Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie, Berlin 1928 (Überwegs Grundriss II), 260, 708; Hannes Möhle, Alcher, LTK 1, 349.

[47] Ermenegildo Bertola, Il Socratismo Cristiano nel XII secolo, Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 51 (1959) 252–264, 259; Courcelle, wie Anm. 30, 220, 239, 280, 282, 381, 477.

matik in den Kontexten von Eros und Agape, deren anthropologische Dimensionen gleichzeitig von weltlichem (cf. ‚De amore' des Andreas Capellanus) und geistlichem Interesse (Bernhards von Clairvaux ‚De diligendo Deo')[48] aufmerksam und mit theoretischem Interesse verfolgt werden. Eine Fülle von ‚De anima'-Traktaten beherrscht zudem die Diskussion, in der die Innerlichkeit und Individualität des Menschen aufs entschiedenste – zum Teil in höchst extremen Engführungen – betont werden.[49]

II.

G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) hat in seiner ‚Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften' mit Nachdruck darauf hingewiesen, dass nach seiner Meinung Zielrichtung und Absicht des delphischen ‚Γνῶθι σεαυτόν' auf die Erfassung des ‚konkreten' Geistes gerichtet sind – was sicherlich eine Missdeutung des delphischen Satzes ist, der die Sterblichkeit und Hinfälligkeit der Menschen angesichts des Gottes (Apollo) ins Visier nimmt, – und dass – immer noch nach Hegel – die „Bücher des *Aristoteles* über die Seele mit seinen Abhandlungen über besondere Seiten und Zustände derselben ... noch immer das vorzüglichste oder einzige von spekulativem Interesse über diesen Gegenstand [sind]".[50] So ist Aristoteles (384–422 v. Chr.) für Hegel nicht nur der Begründer einer philosophischen Psychologie, sondern auch ein legitimer Anwalt der delphisch-sokratischen Selbsterkenntnis.[51]

Die Übernahme der aristotelischen Philosophie im Mittelalter[52] bedeutet einen gewaltigen kulturellen Umbruch, in dem das philosophische Denken eine völlig neue Signatur bekam. Von der Nachhaltigkeit dieses Übernahmeprozesses, in dem ein griechischer Denker über Griechen und Araber in die Latinität aufgenommen wurde, zeugt ein Corpus von ca. 2000 Handschriften vom neunten bis sechzehnten Jahrhundert, in denen sich in Corpus-Überlieferung erhaltene lateinische Übersetzungen seiner Werke finden.

Mit Beginn des 13. Jahrhunderts wurde Aristoteles Werk mit besonderer Intensität studiert, indem man den aristotelischen Text und die arabischen Kommentare dazu in lateinischer Übersetzung verbreitete und so breitestens zur Kenntnis nehmen konnte. Auch Aristoteles' Schrift ‚De anima' wurde so bekannt – zum Beispiel in Michael Scotus' Vermittlung von Averroes' Text und Kommentar[53] (aus den Jahren 1220/35). Später kamen andere Übersetzungen wie z.B. die von Johannes von Venedig (1125–50) oder Wilhelm von Moerbeke (vor 1268) hinzu, deren handschriftliche Überlieferung durchs Band reichlich ausfielen. Der aristotelische Text ‚De anima' geriet – das bezeugt diese starke Überlieferung! – voll ins Scheidewaser der zeitgenössischen Universitätsdiskussion zwischen den Vertretern der Philosophie (d.h. der *Artes*) und der Theologie. Insbesondere wurde die aristotelische Seelenlehre gegen die platonisierenden Konzepte eingesetzt.

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[48] Vgl. dazu Denis de Rougemont, Die Liebe und das Abendland, Gaggenau 2007; Jacques Le Brun, Le pur amour de Platon à Lacan, Paris 2002.

[49] Vgl. Chenu, wie Anm. 44.

[50] Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Band 10: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III, Frankfurt a.M. 1970, 11 (§ 378). Vgl. dazu Jean-Louis Chrétien, L'appel et la réponse. Paris 1992, 102f.; Thomas de Koninck, De la dignité humaine. Paris 1995, 90f. Vgl. auch Hegels Einschätzung des Aristoteles in seinen ‚Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie' (Band 19, 133ff.).

[51] Vgl. Charles Taylor, Hegel, Frankfurt a. M. 1983, 203-230; ders., Quellen des selbst. Die Entstehung der neuzeitlichen Identität, Frankfurt a. M. 1994.

[52] Vgl. Bernard G. Dod, Aristoteles Latinus. in: Norman Kretzmann / Anthony Kenny / Jan Pinborg (Hg.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy from the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100–1600. Cambridge 1984, 45–79, bes. 76; Perler, wie Anm. 28.

[53] Comm. Magnum in Arist. De An. Libr., hg. von F. S. Crawford, Cambridge 1953.

Thomas von Aquin (1224/25–1274) war nun sicherlich die Hauptgestalt der scholastischen Philosophie und Theologie, die es unternahm, sowohl die platonischen wie aristotelischen Bestrebungen seiner philosophisch-theologisch orientierten Psychologie ineinander synthetisch zu integrieren.[54] Für Aristoteles

> „ist die Seele der Akt oder die Form des organischen Leibes, der das Leben ‚in Potenz', d.h. der Möglichkeit nach hat. Das Verhältnis der Seele zum Leibe ist also ein Sonderfall des allgemeineren Verhältnisses von Form und Materie."[55]

Indem er das vor ihm Gedachte aufgriff und dieses zudem auf eine völlig neue Stufe stellte, gelang es ihm, weiterzukommen. Schon die Frühscholastiker waren auf ein Problem gestossen, das für sie letztlich eine unübersteigbare Aporie darstellte: Wie konnte es möglich sein, den Menschen ganz von der Seele her zu bestimmen und andererseits gleichzeitig an der unverbrüchlichen Einheit des Menschen aus Seele *und* Leib festzuhalten, ohne doch die wesenhafte Zugehörigkeit des Leibes zur Seele begrifflich eindeutig und schlüssig fassen zu können? Die beiden augustinisch verbürgten Erkenntnisse: Erstens ist der Mensch durch seine Seele bestimmt, denn er ist „eine Seele, die sich ihres Leibes bedient" – das ist (man denke an die Wagenlenker-Metapher) platonisches Denken! – und zweitens ist der Mensch gleichzeitig auch die Einheit aus Leib und Seele, was einen Rückhalt im aristotelischen Gedanken hat, wonach der Mensch „ein substantiales Kompositum"[56] sein muss, wenn er als ganzer – als Leib und Seele – gerettet werden soll. Denn „es gibt keine Seele losgelöst vom Körper" (οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος).[57] Der Leib kann dem Menschen in dieser eminent christlichen Sicht keinesfalls bloss ein Gefängniskerker oder ein Grab sein, sondern muss in sich ein Kompositum darstellen, das als Ziel der ganzen Heilsökonomie taugt. Denn der Mensch wird nach christlichem Glauben im Vollalter Christi auferstehen und als leib-seelische Einheit die Ewigkeit bestehen müssen; ihm ist seine ganze *persönliche* Unsterblichkeit versprochen „und nicht die Unsterblichkeit einer gesonderten Substanz".[58] Unsterblichkeit der Seele und Auferstehung des Fleisches scheinen sich grundsätzlich zu widersprechen und lassen sich christlich nicht ohne weiteres synthetisieren.[59] Christlich ist der Tod daher immer nur ein Phänomen auf Zeit, nie auf Ewigkeit (selbst die Hölle ist in ihren ernstesten Definitionen ein ewiges Nicht-Sterben-Können).[60]

Es ist ganz klar, dass in der aporetischen Engführung der augustinischen Anthropologie sich die aristotelische Seelendefinition gewissermassen als die christlich vorteilhaftere offerierte. Sie verbürgte die substantiale Einheit des Menschen: Denn nach Aristoteles ist die Seele der Akt oder die Form des organischen Leibes, der das Leben ‚in Potenz', d.h. der Möglichkeit nach, hat. Das Verhältnis der Seele zum Leibe ist also ein Sonderfall des allgemeineren Verhältnisses von Form und Materie. Form und Materie sind zwar insofern voneinander trennbar, als eine bestimmte Form nicht naturnotwen-

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[54] Fürs folgende halte ich mich eng an Greshake, wie Anm. 13, 223f.; vgl. auch Haas, wie Anm. 19, 22–25.

[55] Etienne Gilson, Der Geist der mittelalterlichen Philosophie. Deutsche Fassung von Rainulf Schmücker, Wien 1950, 200.

[56] Ebd., 199.

[57] De an. II, 1 (413a); zitiert nach Aristoteles, Über die Seele. Mit Einleitung, Übersetzung und Kommentar, hg. von Horst Seidel. Griechisch-Deutsch. Hamburg 1995, 64; siehe auch Thomas von Aquin, Die Seele. Erklärungen zu den drei Büchern des Aristoteles ‚Über die Seele'. Übertragen und eingeleitet von Alois Mager, Wien 1937, 31.

[58] Gilson, wie Anm. 55, 202.

[59] Vgl. Sonnemans, wie Anm. 13, 355–406.

[60] Vgl. Haas, wie Anm. 19, 149f.

dig darauf festgelegt ist, eine *bestimmte* Materie zu informieren; aber Materie und Form sind anderseits doch auch wieder voneinander untrennbar, wenigstens bei den konkreten Substanzen, insofern derartige Formen nicht ohne jede Materie schlechthin existieren können. Die menschliche Seele ist nun gerade eine derartige Form, und so ist sofort ersichtlich, welche Vorteile und welche Nachteile es hat, sie mit Aristoteles als Leibesform zu definieren. – Die Vorteile liegen auf der Hand. Dem Aristoteliker bereitet die substantiale Einheit des Menschen nicht die geringste Schwierigkeit, denn Leib und Seele sind nicht zwei Substanzen, sondern die beiden untrennbaren Bestandteile ein und derselben Substanz. Für die christlichen Philosophen, die sich so sehr bemühten, den Fortbestand und die Einheit des menschlichen Kompositums philosophisch tu sichern, war dies natürlich eine sehr befriedigende Lösung des Problems.[61]

Die Einführung des aristotelischen Hylemorphismus in die anthropologische Debatte brachte also einige Vorteile: Der Mensch in seiner heilsökonomischen Zielform konnte schon in seiner Existenzweise in *statu viae*, d.h. in seiner durch die Erbsünde beschädigten und kontingenten Inkonsistenz wahrgenommen werden. Die menschliche Identität in ihrer leib-seelischen Substanz blieb etwas am Menschen, das sich, trotz dem Unterbruch, den Tod und Zwischenzustand vom Todeszeitpunkt bis zum Jüngsten Tag markierten, identisch und individuell am einzelnen Menschen von der Zeit bis in die Ewigkeitsdimension hinein durchhielt. Aber die Kombination dieser aristotelischen Anschauung mit der nicht aufgebbaren platonischen, die im Postulat der Unsterblichkeit der Seele gipfelte,[62] brachte neue Schwierigkeiten. Denn diese Unsterblichkeit beruhte gerade auf dem Konzept einer Substantialität der Seele, die im aristotelischen Modell keine Gültigkeit haben konnte, denn da ist der Mensch in seiner leibseelischen Materie-Form-Bindung *die Substanz*; es hat hier keinen Platz für die Sonderexistenz einer *anima separata*. Folglich wird mit dem Menschen, der stirbt, auch Leib *und* Seele gleichzeitig sterben müssen.

Für Aristoteles kompliziert sich die Sache nochmals, wenn er die Rolle des Nus in Erwägung zieht, die eine Art vernünftiger Substanz jenseits und über der Seele darstellt,[63] ein Gedanke, den er erwähnt, aber leider nicht weiterverfolgt. Denn nochmals stringenter stellt sich die Frage nach einer möglichen substanzialen Einheit des Menschen, wenn der Nus auch in den Verband der menschlichen Individualität eingehen sollte. Aber offenbar ist für Aristoteles der Nus nur eine weiter nicht diskutierbare vernünftige Substanz, die auf nicht näher definierbare Weise mit der Seele in Beziehung steht.[64]

Es ist klar, dass die Theologen der beginnenden Frühscholastik versuchten, zwischen Platon und Aristoteles einen Kompromiss zu schliessen oder im Sinn einer Perspektivenwahrheit zu argumentieren, sehr häufig durch einen Rückgriff auf *Avicenna* (980–1037)[65] und die sog. ‚Theologie des Aristoteles', die man noch für ein genui-

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[61] Gilson, wie Anm. 55, 200f.

[62] Die Literatur zum Nachleben des platonischen Konzepts einer Unsterblichkeit der Seele ist immens. Nur ein paar ältere Hinweise (neben der schon genannten Literatur): Theophil Steinmann, Der religiöse Unsterblichkeitsglaube. Sein Wesen und seine Wahrheit, religionsvergleichend und kulturphilosophisch untersucht, Göttingen 1912; Wilhelm Götzmann, Die Unsterblichkeitsbeweise in der Väterzeit und Scholastik bis zum Ende des 13. Jahrhundert. Eine philosophie- und dogmengeschichtliche Studie, Karlsruhe 1927; Bernhard Bendfeld, Grundlegung und Beweisführung der Unsterblichkeitslehre in der beginnenden Hochscholastik, Emsdetten 1940.

[63] Ebd., 201f.

[64] Vgl. dazu Greshake, wie Anm. 13, 224.

[65] Vgl. dazu Gilson, vie Anm. 55, 204.

nes Werk des Meisters hielt und nicht für eine neuplatonische Kompilation, was sie in Wahrheit ist.[66] Albert der Grosse (um 1193–1280) plädiert für eine Perspektivenwahrheit:

> „Wenn man die Seele in sich betrachtet, werden wir Platon folgen; wenn man sie aber als die den Leib belebende Form betrachtet, werden wir Aristoteles zustimmen."[67]

Albert macht sich hier zum Reflex einer von Avicenna vermittelten Denkform über die Seele, in der diese unter zwei gleichberechtigen Gesichtspunkten angeschaut wird: In sich selbst – worin sie ganz platonisch „eine geistige, einfache, unteilbare und folglich unzerstörbareSubstanz"[68] ist – und in ihrer Beziehung zu dem von ihr beseelten Leib – für dessen materielle Potentialität sie die konkretisierend-aktualisiernde Form darstellt, was dann aristotelisch verstanden werden muss. Nach dieser Lehre gilt:

> „In sich selbst ist die Seele eine Substanz, die zugleich die Funktion der Form ausübt, und darum besteht auch gar keine Gefahr, dass sie von der Zerstörung des durch sie beseelten Leibes mitbetroffen würde; stirbt der Leib, so hört sie einfach auf, ihre Funktion in ihm auszuüben."[69]

Schlagartig wird das Dilemma solcher perspektivisch gerichteten Aussagen sichtbar, wenn wir Avicennas Folgerung, die der Feststellung Descartes' vorauseilt, zur Kenntnis nehmen: Der Mensch wird nicht als unteilbares Ganzes aus Leib und Seele ernst genommen, sondern bloss als Seele. Denn wenn die Seele eine Substanz ist, deren Wesen eine Trennung von ihrem Körper nicht zuwiderläuft, dann meint die Aussage: ‚Ich denke' immer nur meine Seele, und wenn ich aus meinem Denkvorgang folgere: ‚Ich bin', dann kann ich immer nur meine Seele meinen. In den genannten und ähnlichen Kompromissformeln blieb das Dilemma eines grundlegenden psychischen *Dualismus* bestehen, das Greshake folgendermassen glücklich definiert hat:

> „Die Seele ist Form des Leibes ihren Potenzen, nicht ihrem Wesen nach, ein Hiatus zwischen unsterblicher Geistseele, die sich als Form sozusagen nicht voll in die Materie begibt, *einerseits* und der Leiblichkeit, die von einer eigenen Form geprägt ist und damit der Seele auch ‚gegenübersteht', *andererseits*."[70]

Thomas von Aquin wird allgemein zugebilligt, dass er den

> „gordischen Knoten des ewigen ‚griechischen' Dilemmas" [gelöst habe], „indem er die Seele so konzipiert, dass sie beides zusammen in Identität ist: ihrem Wesen nach ganz Form des Leibes *und* ganz subsistenter unzerstörbarer Geist. Ihre Substantialität ist in ihrem Formsein begründet und umgekehrt. Oder anders: Die Seele ist ‚eine Form, die Substantialität *hat* und *verleiht*'."[71]

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[66] Den Text in englischer Übersetzung siehe in: Plotini Opera, II, Paris-Bruxelles 1959, 374–409.
[67] STh II, 1169, 2, 2; zitiert bei Greshake, wie Anm. 13. 224.
[68] Gilson, wie Anm. 55, 204.
[69] Gilson, wie Anm. 55, 204.
[70] Greshake, wie Anm. 13, 225.
[71] Greshake, wie Anm. 13, 225. Zu Thomas vgl. Edouard-Henri Weber, L'homme en discussion a l'université de Paris à 1270, Paris 1970; ders., Dialogue et dissensions entre Saint Bonaventure et Saint Thomas d'Aquin à Paris (1252–1273), Paris 1974; ders., La personne humaine au XIII^{e} siècle. L'avènement chez les Maîtres parisiens de l'acceptation moderne de l'homme, Paris 1991; Klaus Bernath, Anima Forma Corporis. Eine Untersuchung über die ontologischen Grundlagen der Anthropologie des Thomas von Aquin, Bonn 1969; Johannes Mundhenk, Die Seele im System des Thomas von Aquin. Ein Beitrag zur Klärung und Beurteilung der Grundbegrille der thomistischen Psychologie, Hamburg 1980; Wolfgang Kluxen, Seele und Unsterblichkeit bei Thomas von Aquin, in: Klaus Kremer (Hg.), Seele, wie Anm. Ihre Wirklichkeit, ihr Verhältnis zum Leib und zur menschlichen Person. Leiden 1984, 66–83; Sven K. Knebel: Scientia de anima. Die Seele in der Scholastik, in: Gerd Jüttemann/Michael Sonntag/Christoph Wulf (Hg.): Die Seele, wie Anm. 8, 123–141; Markus Schuhe, Leibhaft und unsterblich. Zur Schau der Seele in der Anthropologie und Theologie des HI. Thomas von Aquin, Freiburg/Schweiz 1992 (Studia Friburgensia, NF 76); Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of *Summa theologiae* Ia 75–89, Cambridge 2002, 25–99; Christoph Rapp, Thomas von Aquin zum Verhältnis von Leib, Seele und Intellekt, in: Uwe

Wie sieht das näherhin aus?[72] Thomas setzt auch hier bedachtsam auf Aristoteles: Auch für ihn ist die Seele die organische, d.h. Realität spendende Form des Leibes, dem als Hyle das Leben nur *in potentia* zukommt. Auf der andern Seite aber glaubt Thomas, obwohl er das platonische und augustinische Gedankengut verdrängen möchte, die individuelle Unsterblichkeit der Seele doch wahren zu können. Als Voraussetzung der thomasischen Überlegungen ist es, wie gesagt, wichtig, um die Identität der Seele als Form *und* Substanz zu wissen (auch wenn ansonsten die ‚Substanz' meistens erst in der Kombination von Materie [Hyle] und Form [Morphé] zustandekommt). Auch Aristoteles kennt schon Formen, die gleichzeitig Substanzen sind. Es handelt sich um Substanzen, die reine Formen sind. Z.B. ist Gott und sein göttliches Denken im höchsten Grad immateriell und gerade darum im höchsten Grad auch Form, weil es reiner Akt ist. Aber auch die auf niederer Stufe lebenden Geister (bei Thomas die Engel, die Individualitäten sind, die je eine eigene Art [*species*] darstellen), die von jeder Materie frei sind, sind subsistierende freie Formen, also Substanzen. Es gibt also nach Thomas ernsthafte Indizien, die es erlauben, die Seele als Substanz zu betrachten; dass sie zudem Form ist, beruht gerade darin, dass „ihre Substanzialität ... gerade in ihrem Formsein begründet (ist)[73]. Es muss also nur gefragt werden, weshalb die Seele gerade die Form eines Leibes ist, und nicht, ob sie überhaupt Form sei.

Wenn Thomas die *anima hominis* als *esse quoddam principium incorporeum et subsistens* belegen möchte (Sth 1,75, 2, Resp.), dann zitiert er nicht zufällig Augustinus (STh I, 75, 2, Sed contra), der auf Leute verweist, welche die Substanzialität der Seele nicht gelten lassen können, weil sie sich nichts Unkörperliches vorstellen können. Das interessierte den jungen Augustinus, aber Thomas interessierte die Frage nach der Substanzialität der Seele, die er beweisen will. Thomas geht davon aus, dass jede gesonderte Tätigkeit eine besondere Form von Substanz voraussetzt. Substanzen erkennt man nur an ihren Tätigkeiten (*agere sequitur esse*) und umgekehrt. Existieren heisst für ihn: in Akt sein; das Sein steht hinter allen Tätigkeiten im Masse seiner Aktualität. Seindes existiert nur, insofern es in Akt ist. Nun beruhen Akte der Vernunfterkenntnis in wie alle Tätigkeiten auf einem konkreten, realen und in einer individuellen Natur subsistierenden Prinzip. Wo es Denkakte gibt, gibt es denkende Substanzen (augustinisch *mens* [Geist], thomistisch *intellectus* ([Vernunft]).

Die Vernunft übt eine erkennende Tätigkeit aus; sie vermag das Wesen aller körperlichen Dinge zu erkennen. Voraussetzung ist allerdings, dass die Vernunft nicht selbst eines der zu erkennenden Dinge ist. Wäre die Vernunft selber von körperlich-individueller Natur, sie könnte nicht Naturen erkennen, die von ihr verschieden sind. Also: Die die Körperwelt erkennende denkende Substanz darf nicht selbst Körper sein. Die Würde der menschlichen Vernunft besteht genau darin, dass sie solches zu leisten fähig ist.

> „Darum muss die menschliche Vernunft, eben weil sie Vernunft ist, als unkörperliche Substanz verstanden werden, unkörperlich sowohl in ihrem Sein wie in ihrer Tätigkeit."[74]

Es läge nun nahe, den Menschen mit der Vernunft identifizieren. Es ist deshalb nicht gestattet, weil der Mensch nicht nur Vernunfttätigkeiten vollzieht. Es geht aber auch nicht an, den Menschen mit seiner Seele zu identifizieren, wie das sowohl nach Pla-

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Meixner/Albert Newen (Hg.), Seele, Denken, Bewusstsein. Zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Geistes, Berlin 2003, 124-152.

[72] Nach Gilson, wie Anm. 55, 206ff.

[73] Gilson, ebd., 208.

[74] Gilson, ebd., 209.

ton[75] wie Augustinus denkbar wäre,[76] weil für beide die Sinnestätigkeit des Menschen eine rein seelische Tätigkeit darstellt.[77] Deswegen definiert die platonische Tradition ja den Menschen als Seele, die sich des Leibes bedient. Aber die Einheit des Menschen darf nicht in zwei bloss akzidentell verbundene Teile auseinandergerissen werden – *anima intellectiva* und Leib –, sondern es muss zugegeben werden, dass die besagte substantiale Form der Seele nur ein Teil des Menschen ist. Allem Anschein nach ist also der Mensch ein Kompositum aus der *körperlichen*, durch eine Form organisierten *Materie* und einer *intellektuellen Substanz*, welche diese Materie informiert und organisiert. Die Vernunft selbst ist die *Form* des menschlichen Leibes; denn die Seele ist in ihrem Wesen als unkörperliche Substanz eine *anima intellectiva*. Diese Bezogenheit des Körpers auf die Seele bedeutet nicht, dass diese vom Körper völlig unabhängig sein könnte. Auch die Seele ist in ihrer Bezogenheit auf den Körper von diesem abhängig.[78] Zwar gilt für Thomas, dass das Höhere das Niedere gestaltet – so erhält die Seele ihre Vollkommenheit zwar *im* Körper, aber nicht *durch* den Körper! –, aber die „Wucht der Tatsachen drängte doch zu stärkerer Betonung des Körperlichen".[79]

Fassen wir zusammen: Thomas legt den entscheidenden Akzent letztlich auf den *Menschen* und nicht auf die Vernunft, die denkt. Dies ist aber keine Deduktion, sondern eine Feststellung. Man kann sich aber eine vom Körper getrennte Vernunft vorstellen und muss dann mit Thomas zugestehen, dass die Vernunft ohne Leib wie eine von ihrem Leib getrennte Hand ist (STh I, 75, 2, Resp.). Die Menschen sind also und bleiben in erster Linie substanziale *Körper*formen. Die besondere Art von Substanz, welche die Menschen nun einmal sind, ist auf den Abstieg in die Materie angewiesen, um Welt erfahren zu können. Menschlicher Geist ist für Thomas nur denkbar als 'Geist in Welt'.[80]

Eine systematische Überlegung kann uns helfen, das zu verstehen: Das Seiende ist der Akt des Existierens. In diesem Akt ist es es selbst und kein anderes: *indivisum in se et divisum*. Das Seiende unter seinem Einheitsaspekt nennen wir *Substanz*, und *Subsistenz* nennen wir seine Fähigkeit, für sich und ohne substanziale Abhängigkeit von einem andern zu existieren. Der Seinsakt verursacht also die Substanz und Subsistenz. Beachtet man, dass das Seiende dieses und nicht jenes ist, dann kann man den Seinsakt einen formalen Akt nennen oder den Akt selber *Form*. Damit wird die Eigentümlichkeit des Aktes, die Subsistenz zu verursachen, durch die andere ergänzt, dass als Form *die besondere Art der Substanz* festgelegt wird. Gewisse Formen können als abgesonderte allein existieren, weil ihre Aktualität so stark ist. Andere können nur in einer Materie existieren: die *substanzialen Formen*. Unter diesen substanzialen Formen sind subsistierende Prinzipien, von denen bestimmte Tätigkeiten (Denken und Wollen) ausgehen, die ihnen als Formen eignen: die *vernunftbegabten Seelen*. Andere sind sowohl

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[75] Schuhe, wie Anm. 71, 85; Franz von Kutschera, Platon. Der Vorrang des Geistigen, in: Meixner u.a., wie Anm. 71, 1–19: „Die Seele ist der Kern der Person, das, was wir meinen, wenn wir ‚ich' sagen. Eine explizite Formulierung dieser These von der Seele als Kern der Person findet sich zwar erst spät, in den *Gesetzen*, wo der Athener sagt: ‚Schon in diesem Leben ist das, was das Selbst eines jeden von uns ausmacht, nichts anderes als die Seele ... Der Leib aber begleitet jeden von uns lediglich als äussere Erscheinung, und man sagt Zurecht, dass die Leiber der Toten blosse Abbilder der Verstorbenen seien.' (959ab–b3)".

[76] Hans Mayer, Thomas von Aquin. Sein System und seine geistesgeschichtliche Stellung, Bonn 1938, 201. Hier wird auch noch Hugo von St. Viktor genannt.

[77] Vgl. Thomas, STh I, 75,4.

[78] Meyer, wie Anm. 75, 202f.

[79] Ebd.

[80] Karl Rahner, Geist in Welt, Freiburg im Breisgau 1996 (SW 2), 241ff.

in ihrem Sein und Tätigsein an die Materie gebunden: *die materialen Formen*.

Der Mensch ist also zwar eine konkrete Substanz, d.h. eine Substanz, in der sich Teile finden, die man für sich betrachten kann, aber der Akt der Existenz ist einer, erstens weil ihre substanzialen Teile, Seele und Leib, nicht für sich subsistieren können, und weil zweitens weil die Substanz Mensch durch die Subsistenz eines einzigen dieser Prinzipien, der Seele nämlich, subsistiert. Die beiden Teile spielen *eine verschiedene Rolle*. So kann *die Seele*, wenn sie vom Leibe einmal die erforderliche Hilfeleistung erfahren hat, zur Not ohne diesen existieren, wie es nach dem Tod des Menschen tatsächlich geschieht, während *der Leib* keinesfalls ohne die Seele, der er seine ganze Aktualität verdankt, subsistieren kann (siehe Leichnam).[81]

Nach Thomas also widerspricht die Tatsache, dass der Mensch eine konkrete und in sich vollständige Substanz sein soll, nicht der Behauptung von der Substanzialität der Seele. Es geht bei Leib und Seele ja nicht um zwei Substanzen, aus denen eine dritte, der Mensch, hergestellt werden soll. In Wirklichkeit verdankt der Mensch, obwohl er nur als Ganzes im Vollsinn des Wortes Substanz genannt werden darf, seine ganze Substanzialität der Substanzialität seiner Seele. Denn die menschliche Seele ist Akt, Ding für sich und Substanz, der Leib hat seine Aktualität und Subsistenz von Gnaden seiner Form, der Seele. Der Verfall des Leibes kann nicht den Verfall der Seele nach sich ziehen. Die Substanz Mensch ist also nicht eine Verbindung zweier Substanzen, sondern *eine komplexe Substanz*, die nur dem einen ihrer konstitutiven Prinzipien ihre Substanzialität verdankt. Der Mensch ist eine Einheit aus einer Seele, die ihren Leib substanzialisiert, und aus dem Leib, in dem die Seele subsistiert.

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Hier wäre die Frage nach der Personalität und Individualität des Menschen zu stellen. Scholastisch gesehen ist durchgehends die Materie das Individuationsprinzip: die Materie eines Seienden *bewirkt* seine Individualität. Aber diese erstreckt sich notwendigerweise auch auf die Form. Denn wenn die Individualität im Kompositum Mensch einmal initiiert ist, dann gehört sie der Form noch mehr an als der Materie, denn sie ist hier die Individualität der Substanz, und in dieser Substanz ist die Form und nicht die Materie die Quelle der Substanzialität. Also: Die Materie individualisiert die Form, obgleich sie nicht als Form individuell ist, aber einmal individualisiert, ist eben die Form individuell. Die Subsistenz dieser individuellen Form überträgt ihre eigene Existenz auf die Materie und ermöglicht die Subsistenz des Individuums. Die Individualität der Seele aber ist *Person*, die weit mehr ist als ein Individuum. Nach der berühmten boëthianischen Formel ist die menschliche Person als „die individuelle Substanz eines vernünftigen Wesens“ (*Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia*).[82]

Es wäre sicherlich auch die Frage zu stellen, wie das Filigrannetz mittelalterlicher Seelendiskussionen für eine postmodern abgeflachte Denkstruktur, die sich in naturalistischen Abwiegelungen der geistigen Dimension erschöpft, beitragen könnte. Sicher dieses: das Konzept einer Geistigkeit, aus und in der der Mensch – sowohl existentiell wie essentiell – immer noch ‚Ich’ sagen kann.

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[81] Boris Groys, Politik der Unsterblichkeit, in. Ders., Die Kunst des Denkens, Hamburg 2008, 35-48, kehrt die Verhältnisse um, indem er – anstatt mit Platon eine Unsterblichkeit der Seele zu fordern – eine Unsterblichkeit des Leichnams verkündet: „Wenn es kein Weiterleben der Seele nach dem Tod des Körpers geben soll, so gibt es auf jeden Fall ein Weiterleben des Körpers nach dem Tod der Seele“ (37).

[82] Boethius, De duabus naturis 3.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 228-252

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The Argument from Simplicity: A Study in the History of an Idea and Consciousness

The discipline of the History of Ideas, as defined by Arthur Oncken Lovejoy, in *The Great Chain of Being*, traces throughout the intellectual history of the West what the author describes as certain major "unit ideas" as they appear in the various disciplines of philosophy, history, biology, art, literature, and so on. In order to perform this task, however, as the author indicates, the Idea must remain the same conceptually; it has to maintain a certain unity and identity; it must display a recognizable integrity.[1] Accordingly, Lovejoy cautions us that the concept of God, for example, cannot be such a unit idea precisely because the gods of Aristotle, Augustine, and Spinoza are not the same God. A subsidiary point that Lovejoy makes is that the Idea exhibits a "life of its own," the emphasis thus falling primarily on the Idea rather than individual thinkers; and consequently we discover that both minor as well as major writers from various disciplines can be shown to partake equally of the Idea's nurturing springs. Having said this, I will nevertheless primarily restrict myself in what follows to the disciplines of philosophy and theology through the first seven parts of the study but in the last and eighth section I intend to draw upon the teeming streams of literature and psychology as well.

In what follows, I shall show that the various arguments, deriving from a single, unit idea that I am going to pursue historically, serves as a fundamental "first principle," an ultimate assumption, a basic premise grounding arguments for no less than eight different conclusions.[2] Additionally, it exhibits both a historically linear progression as well as a conceptually circular "turning back on itself" throughout the course of Western philosophy. Accordingly, in this context it offers various paradigms for certain assertions about the soul or mind in Western philosophy as it is employed in an octagonal array of distinct uses. Some readers may recognize it as related to Kant's four Paralogisms in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), and as famously related to the Second Paralogism where Kant eulogizes it as the Achilles, the most powerful of all arguments in the pure doctrine of rational psychology. It may be recalled that the four Paralogisms, each assuming as their major premise that the soul is immaterial, then seek to demonstrate, through *a priori* (universal and necessary) reasoning, four different metaphysical judgments, namely (1) that the soul is a substance; (2) that it is qualitatively

[1] Lovejoy, Arthur Oncken, *The Great Chain of Being* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), Introduction.

[2] Mijuskovic, Ben Lazare, *The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant: A Study in the History of an Argument* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974); hereafter abbreviated as *ARA*; and *Contingent Immaterialism* (Amsterdam: Gruner, 1979); hereafter abbreviated as *CI*.

simple and hence *both* a self-conscious unity *and* immortal; (3) that it constitutes a continuous temporal personal/moral identity; and (4) that it stands in an ideal metaphysical and epistemological—and therefore dualistic and problematic—relation to outer, external objects in space. Thus, it is my contention that the four Paralogisms, including the highly profiled Second Paralogism, are all grounded in the same ultimate "first principle," namely, that thoughts, consciousnesses, and/or minds are "simple," immaterial, unextended.

Recently, a concentrated study, consisting of fifteen articles dedicated only to a discussion of the Second Paralogism which, in the first edition *Crtique of Pure Reason*, deals with the unity of consciousness, has appeared in print.[3] The essays share in common the conviction that Kant, in the Second Paralogism, initiates his discussion of the rationalist argument with the (empirical) premise of a unity of consciousness. More specifically, that one may begin with the internal sense of *psychological* unity as the diverse elements (words) of a sentence or verse result in a unified thought perceived as belonging to a single consciousness. What is not so clear is whether Kant himself intends the ultimate premise to be that the soul is immaterial, and then the Paralogisms' quartet of assertions about its substantiality; unity and immortality; personal identity; and subjective ideality follow from its incorporeality; or whether, instead, he proposes to begin with the experienced unity of self-consciousness and then conclude that the soul is immaterial? In what follows, I shall argue in behalf of the first interpretation, namely, that Kant assumes a comprehensive underlying first principle, which holds that the soul is non-physical and consequently the four paralogistic conclusions follow directly from the simplicity premise. Thus, in his introductory remarks to the section, A 345=B 403, Kant presents the fourfold rationalist claim that the soul is a substance as deriving from its essential *immateriality;* both its *incorruptibility* (immortality) and its unity as grounded in its *simplicity* as an intensive quality; its continuous identity through time as establishing its *personality*; and its immaterial *spirituality* as confirming metaphysical dualism. Hence, the first edition *Critique of Pure Reason*, pages A 356-357 and following, clearly relate to the Second Paralogism and its usual traditional employment as an argument for immortality, as in Descartes and Leibniz, but also to the unity of consciousness claims, especially as in Leibniz. But surely philosophers in the past have not begun with the empirical premise that man is immortal and then concluded that therefore the soul must be simple. Similarly, I do not believe that Kant intended to start, in the first part of the Second Paralogism, with an empirical experiment, namely, that separate thoughts "belonging" to the same person proves that the soul is immaterial. Rather the undeclared immaterialist premise comes first and the conclusion asserting the empirical unity of consciousness follows. This is clearer still in the second edition Paralogisms (1787) where Kant discusses Moses Mendelssohn's proofs for immortality in the latter's *Phaedo* (B 414). As a consequence, I believe, that the authors of *The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology* have unduly restricted themselves to what they themselves term the "narrow" view of the Achilles argument and accordingly they have failed to extend it to its actual historical and "broader" exploitation as Kant does. Thus, in Kant's thinking,

[3] *The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology*, edited by Thomas Lennon and Edward Stainton (Springer, 2008). The editors graciously acknowledge my work on the Second Paralogism in the following terms: "What remains surprising, however, is that so little work has been done before on the Achilles argument. Ben Lazare Mijuskovic's pioneering work was the first in modern times to draw attention to the importance of the argument, but aside from the subsequent work he has done…there is little else in print" (p. 2).

the Second Paralogism, invoking the simplicity premise, deals with the category of pure quality, and it rationally demonstrates that the soul is *both* immortal *and* a unity. Another way to read Kant's position is by interpreting him as saying that the assertion that the soul is qualitatively simple—the category of quality being intensive rather then extensive—it is therefore the simplicity *premise* that is the Achilles, the strongest of all presupposed concepts in the pure doctrine of rational psychology. In any case, by contrast, I believe my study is in line with Kant's "wider" intellectual intuition as he unfolds the immateriality/simplicity premise in its four paralogistic conclusions. Kant, of course, regards all four Paralogisms to involve fallacious metaphysical assertions.

Nevertheless, it's clear that the Paralogism *Of Simplicity* holds a special place in Kant's thought and it is undoubtedly attached to his pre-critical stage, during which period both the Cartesian and Leibnizian assumption that the apperceptive, reflexive, *self*-conscious soul/monad is immaterial led to conclusions that it is therefore intrinsically immortal; a unity; and an identity. But Kant was also undoubtedly concerned to what extent his own criticisms in the first edition Paralogisms were just as applicable against him and compromised his own positive declarations concerning the unity of consciousness—the transcendental unity of apperception—in the second edition *Critique* (B 131 ff.). It is perhaps more than a curious fact that *both* the Transcendental Deduction in A *and* the Paralogisms in A were completely recast for the second edition. For myself, following Kemp Smith, I believe the premise of time-consciousness (A 99 ff.) in the first edition is stronger and more indubitable than the starting assumption of the unity of consciousness in the second edition (B 131) precisely because even Hume would have to admit the former, namely the temporal *succession* of impressions, although he would deny the latter (*Treatise of Human Nature*, section *Of personal identity*).

But is my interpretation persuasive? I would submit that it is and in this connection I wish to draw first on Jonathan Bennett's study of Kant's Dialectic.[4] Bennett in his commentary ushers in his discussion of the First Paralogism with an analysis of Descartes' reflexive "I think" and for "what it implies, with regard to Descartes' argument for the immateriality of the self" (p. 72). Accordingly, Bennett asserts that the conceptual connection between the Cartesian soul as a simple substance (denying that it is an aggregate of material parts), while asserting that it is both immortal and a unity are often fused together. As Bennett states, "It is not surprising, therefore, that Kant cannot keep the first and second paralogisms apart from each other" (p. 78). It may be remembered that Descartes' original title for his metaphysical treatise was *Meditations on First Philosophy in which the Existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul Is Demonstrated;* the title was later changed to the "distinction" between soul and body following the set of Six Objections to his system.[5] In Bennett's Chapter 5, which focuses on a discussion of "The Simplicity of the Soul," he once again connects it with the fundamental rationalist principle of both Descartes and Leibniz, namely, that souls "are simple, noncomposite, indivisible, without parts" (p. 82). Hence, in the section entitled "Simplicity and Immateriality," in his comments on Kant's Second Paralogism, Bennett declares:

> The soul's simplicity is supposed to imply its immateriality: 'The assertion of the simple nature of the soul is of value only in so far as I can thereby distinguish this subject from all mat-

[4] Bennett, Jonathan, *Kant's Dialectic* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

[5] Mijuskovic, Ben, "Descartes' Bridge to the External World," in *Studi Internazionali di Filosofia*, III:3 (1971), 65-81; reprinted in *Rene Descartes: Critical Assessments*, edited by Georges Moyal (Crom Helm Publishers, 1996), pp. 312-328.

> ter…This is…the only use for which the above proposition is intended' [A356]. Kant also suggests that immateriality would imply immortality…Kant shows a clearer perception of Descartes' work than Descartes himself had. Descartes places the argument rather inconspicuously in the *Sixth Meditation*, without sufficiently emphasizing its crucial role in support of substance dualism (p. 90).

Bennett thus concludes that "Kant's treatment from simplicity to immateriality is basically sound" (p. 90). And, again, it is my contention that all four Paralogisms are essentially grounded in the definitional principle that is prescriptive for all rationalist—and idealist—thinkers, namely, that the mind and its thoughts are simple, i.e., immaterial. Hence, although Kant initiates the Paralogism chapter with the category of *quantity* (extensity) as pertaining to substance, it is really the category of *quality* as an intensive magnitude, which grounds his "dogmatic," rationalist, and idealist arguments in behalf of the section's four inferences. (In the Table of Categories, in the Transcendental Analytic, Kant begins with the category of Quantity, and the first category is Unity; whereas in the Paralogisms, "unity" falls under the category of quality. (Interestingly enough, Hegel, by contrast, in the *Science of Logic*, starts with the categories of Quality.) In A 347=B 406, in referring to "the properties of the simple," Kant is clearly equating it with the immaterial as grounding his exposition of the four separate arguments he is preparing to criticize. To repeat, for Descartes, Leibniz, and the Kant of the precritical, Wolffian period, the immaterial *is* the simple, the indivisible, the active, the unified as contrasted with the material, the divisible, the passive, the disunified. Simply put, what I am contending is that the unity of thought derives immediately, directly from its immaterial essence, it is a consequence of the soul's simplicity, and not the other way around. Confirmation of this reading is also provided in Kant's discussion of the regulative functions of the faculty of reason, offered further on in the Dialectic, when Kant emphasizes that if reason takes the pure self, "the I itself, viewed simply as thinking nature or soul," in its role of an unconditioned first principle, it will form a concept "of a simple substance, which is unchangeable in itself (personally identical), stands in association with other real things outside it; in a word, the idea of a simple self-subsisting intelligence" (A 682=B 710). From the soul's immateriality, its unity follows and not the other way around. Just as Descartes maintains that although in the order of discovery and knowledge the cogito comes first, nevertheless in the order of Being, God is primary. Just so, although in the order of awareness the unity of consciousness comes first nevertheless in the order of reality, the soul's immaterial essence precedes the former. Unlike Descartes and Leibniz, however, Kant criticizes the Paralogisms as empty of sensory content but nevertheless as consisting of *meaningful* metaphysical assertions.

Further, as Karl Ameriks announces, in his study of the Paralogisms, we should begin with the complex question:

> 'Is the soul a simple immaterial substance?' and then to approach this question by focusing first on the issue of immateriality...The claim of the soul's immateriality is thus emphasized from the start, and the surprising fact…that it is associated with the first rather than the second of Kant's topics [1. The soul is *substance;* 2. As regards its quality is *simple*] signals the very close interrelation that exists between the first two Paralogisms…I will also show how Kant's attitude towards the immateriality issue is always closely linked to his views on the simplicity issue, and thus I will claim that a kind of rationalism remains even when this latter topic is taken up in the second Paralogism.[6]

[6] Ameriks, Karl, *Kant's Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 25-26.

One further point remains. It may be possible that Hume could maintain that consciousness is a unity even in the event that there is no multiplicity within it when he rejects, for instance, self-consciousness in favor of non-reflexive perception. Thus, Hume could hold that a consciousness could—conceivably—be aware of a single, simple qualitative shade of blue (*Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 6). Additionally, Hume's principle that what is distinct is separate and what is conceivable is possible, coupled with his commitment to an atomistic treatment of impressions, in his section *Of personal identity*, certainly leads him to assert the "disunity" of impressions, ideas, and perceptions, and therefore, of consciousness (although, to be sure, he takes much of this skepticism back in the *Appendix*). That is why the Third Paralogism is vitally suggestive because it argues in behalf of a continuous, temporal unity, which Hume, with his acknowledgment of a *succession* of impressions is forced to admit. Consequently, there is a *temporal* unity and continuity of (self-)awareness that even Hume cannot deny, for to be conscious of an immanent continuity of time presupposes a unity of consciousness embedded in the same person and held together through various moments and therefore as *belonging to one single consciousness.* In the Analytic in A, the Third Paralogism appears in the guise of the threefold transcendental syntheses of temporal consciousness.

Accordingly, in what follows, I propose to trace what I regard to be Kant's more comprehensively intuitive insight and explore the simplicity premise and its quartet of arguments in four distinct uses: the immortality of the soul as a permanent substance; the unity of self-consciousness; personal or moral identity; and as an ontological and epistemological argument for idealism. Beyond that, I will draw on a series of references from my later articles and a book, *Contingent Immaterialism*, to suggest four further applications as likewise grounded in the simplicity premise.

In previous publications, I have historically and conceptually traced the prevalence and the influence of this seductive argument as it repeatedly surfaces in the history of ideas and consciousness. This proof, which I claim ultimately derives from Plato (*Phaedo*, 78b) has been frequently invoked throughout the course of Western philosophy and it has had a major influence in shaping certain philosophical discussions since the Hellenic Age. The form of the argument is fairly straightforward: The essential nature of the soul consists in its ability to think; thought, being immaterial, is unextended, i.e. simple, without parts; and what is simple is (1) indestructible; (2) a unity; and (3) an identity. However, (4) if the mind is immaterial, then it also follows that whatever is given to consciousness must also be mental or ideal. To this point, the present study will merely vicariously flesh out the same four metaphysical speculations that had tantalized Kant in the first edition *Critique.*

Beyond these employments, culminating with Kant, however, the simplicity assumption can also be shown to take on four additional historical forms by contending that (5) since immanent time can- not be simply accounted for by the spatial measure of matter in motion (Aristotle), it follows that we require a different account for our experience of internal time-consciousness, as it occurs within subjective awareness, but one that is grounded in an immaterial paradigm of mental processes; (6) since the immaterial mind and its states of consciousness are perfectly self-contained and independent of any real connection to the material external world, it follows that the mind is therefore intrinsically free; (7) since meanings and relations are purely mental, it follows that they are not reducible to sensory configurations or associations; and, finally (8) since the soul

is absolutely self-contained, it follows that its existence is essentially monadic, solipsistic and therefore irredeemably alone and lonely.

It is worth noting, before we begin, that the simplicity premise, as outlined above, is enlisted as a major premise precisely because it represents a foundational definition, which analytically equates, identifies simplicity and immateriality. The opposite physicalist paradigm, by contrast, posits a passive, material aggregation of brain particles as a substitute for the active, indivisible mind. Historically this opposition trumpets the eternal battle between the Gods and the Giants anticipated in Plato's *Sophist* (245e-246e), between the idealists and the materialists, between Plato and Democritus; Plotinus and Epicurus; Descartes and Hobbes; Leibniz and Locke; Kant and Hume; Hegel and Marx; and H. D. Lewis and D. M. Armstrong. I would contend, therefore, that the rationalist and idealist commitment to a paradigm of the mind as a simple immaterial entity enables them to posit the mind as intrinsically *self*-conscious; whereas, in opposition, the empiricist and materialist model posits *perceptions* as passively programmed from without, as externally caused. But just as a watch is unaware of the time it indicates, a flashlight cannot shine its ray on itself, and a camera is unable to take a picture of itself, neither can the brain reflexively turn on itself; rather it can only passively react to external stimuli.

1. The Simplicity Argument and the Immortality of the Soul

Plato appears to have restricted the use of the argument to a proof establishing (1) the immortality of the soul, whereas Plotinus will clearly go on to invoke it in uses (1), (2), and (3) above. The principle, along with its accompanying argument, initially makes its initial appearance in one of Plato's middle dialogues, the *Phaedo*, a dialogue which first introduces the doctrine of the Forms. The metaphysical contention is that the soul, along with its pure, non-sensory activities, and its self-conscious thoughts are all non-physical, immaterial, incorporeal; and although they exist or occur in time, they have no spatial location. It follows that the soul as a substance (this is clearly presupposed) and its accompanying states of consciousness, are essentially unextended. We can then describe the soul as "simple," indivisible, invisible, unalloyed, incomposite, without parts, indissoluble, pure, non-sensuous and, unlike the body, it is intrinsically incorruptible. Hence, it can be rationally demonstrated, in a completely *a priori* fashion, that it is immortal. By contrast, the body, along with all the material elements constitutive of a human being, is a compound, a composite, a manifold of diverse parts and therefore its earthly tenure can be destroyed by the dissolution of its physical elements. When this occurs, as in the case of humans and other animate beings, we call the event death. But the rational "part" of the soul lives on forever as a result of its immaterial nature. Accordingly, Plato declares:

> Then consider, Cebes, 'he said,' whether this is our conclusion as a result of all that has been said, that soul is very like that which is divine and deathless and intelligible and uniform and indissoluble and always invariable and constant, while body is very like that which is human and mortal and manifold, incomprehensible to the intelligence, always liable to dissolution, never constant...Well, this being so, surely it belongs to body to be disrupted quickly, but to soul to be completely indissoluble, or nearly so?' (*Phaedo*, 80 AB).[7]

I have recruited a series of synonyms above because some commentators, like A. E. Taylor, have objected that Plato did not have the technical language to state that a substance is "simple" and consequently that it is anachronistic to impute such a term to him. According to Taylor,

[7] Plato, *Phaedo*, translated by R. S. Buck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), pp.77-78.

> Plato's reasoning adopted in the dialogue lies at the bottom of all the familiar arguments of later metaphysicians who deduce the immortality of the soul from its alleged character as a 'simple substance,' the [second] 'paralogism' attacked by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason….Socrates' point is not that the soul is a 'simple substance'—he had not so much the language to say such a thing—but that it is, as the Orphic religion had taught, something divine. Its 'deiformity,' not its indivisibility is what he is anxious to establish; the indivisibility is a mere consequence.[8]

By contrast, I am inclined to follow F. M. Cornford's interpretation and I believe Plato did intend the argument in the form that was frequently subsequently imputed to him. Thus, Cornford, for instance, contends that Plato proves the soul to be simple because

> As immortal and imperishable, the soul is 'most like' the divine, immortal, intelligible, simple, and indissoluble whereas the body is most like the mortal, multiform, unintelligible, dissoluble and perpetually changing.[9]

And, quite clearly, in the *Meno*, Plato holds that the slave boy's disembodied soul must have subsisted in a previous life or state, even "before he was a man," when he was an immaterial spirit (*Meno*, 86a); and it was during this prior existence, and only due to the immaterial essence of his soul, that he was able to partake or share (*metechein*) in the knowledge of the eternal mathematical Forms. Certainly Platonic doctrine dictates that at some time long past, the soul existed in a disembodied state; otherwise all our "pure" concepts would be endlessly tainted by sensations. It is only on this condition of immateriality that the slave boy is able to partake or share in the pure, non-sensory knowledge of the Forms.

In any case, this passage from the *Phaedo* is often related, as Taylor indicates, to the argument that Kant refers to in the Second Paralogism as the Achilles of all rationalist demonstrations in the history of "dogmatic" psychology and, coupled with the First Paralogism of Substantiality, it seeks to establish the active soul as an entity independent of matter and hence as an immortal substance. Its first employment, as we have just observed, is in connection with a Platonic proof for the immortality of the (individual) soul, the soul as a permanent substance.

Beyond this use, Plato clearly also wishes to contend, on epistemological grounds, that precisely because the soul is both immaterial and perpetually engaged in a "pure" mental activity of self-"motion," it is able to grasp the eternal, immutable Forms, since both share in the identical attribute of incorporeality. (Plato defines thought as the soul's internal dialogue with itself.) Thus it is that "like can know like" and the non-physical soul can directly apprehend the immaterial Forms.

In Plotinus, the simplicity or immateriality argument is similarly invoked. Thus, against the Epicurean thesis that the soul in man is just as mortal as in animals, Plotinus, after showing that the rational soul in man "is not material," then proceeds to demonstrate that it must be immortal because:

> Every dissoluble entity, that has come to be by way of groupement, must in the nature of things be broken apart by that very mode which brought it together; but the soul is one and simplex…; and this can be no cause of dissolution.

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[8] Taylor, Alfred Edward, *Plato: The Man and His Work* (New York: Meridian, 1960), p. 189. Ralph Cudworth, one of the leading figures of the Cambridge Platonists, maintains that it is Plotinus who is the first to invoke the simplicity argument in support of the soul's immortality; see *ARA*, p. 69, note 20.

[9] Cornford, Francis Macdonald, *Plato's Cosmology* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 63. Cornford's discussion of *Phaedo* 78B occurs as a parenthetical comment on *Timaeus*, 35A; the two Platonic passages have often been related by commentators.

> But, we will be told, it tends to destruction by having been divided (in the body) and so becoming fragmentary.
>
> No, the Soul, as we have shown, is not a mass, not a quantity.
>
> May it not change and so come to destruction?
>
> No: the change that destroys annuls the form but leaves the underlying substances: and that could not happen to anything except a compound.
>
> If it can be destroyed in no such ways then it is necessarily indestructible.[10]

After Plotinus, the argument is generally avoided by the early Medieval and later Scholastic philosophers primarily because of its implications to a Platonic theory of reincarnation, its implicit rejection by Aristotle, for whom body and soul, form and matter constitute a substantial unity, and the increasing preference by Catholic theologians to depend on faith rather than reason in assertions concerning immortality. Nevertheless it is itself resurrected during the Italian renaissance, most notably by Marsilio Ficino, in *Theologia Platonica*, and later by the Cambridge Platonists. It also makes a brief but important appearance in Descartes' Synopsis to the *Meditations*, following the set of six Objections, as an emendation to his failed proof that the distinction between mind and matter is sufficient to establish the immortality of the soul.[11]

Not unexpectedly, then, the Cambridge Platonists, Leibniz, Berkeley, and Moses Mendelssohn all appeal to the argument in their proofs for the soul's "natural," i.e., rational, immortality and Kant's criticism of it is directly aimed at the latter's version of it when he objects that an unextended point of consciousness nevertheless could be extinguished by diminution, "elanguescence" (B 414).

2. The Simplicity Argument and the Unity of Self-Consciousness

In this context, the contention is that the simplicity of the soul constitutes a positive and necessary condition in order for consciousness to be a unity, since whatever is unextended is intrinsically unified. Accordingly, it confirms the rationalist principle that thought must be immaterial in order for *self*-consciousness to occur.[12] This second use of the immateriality assumption, as an ultimate epistemological premise, takes place as early as Aristotle's treatise on metaphysics and it concerns the reflexive unity of self-consciousness attributed both to the Unmoved Mover as well as to man, the latter occurring during certain privileged moments of contemplative awareness. In turn, this reflexive paradigm of consciousness will subsequently continue to be invoked throughout the entire history of Western rationalism and idealism and it will also be found prominently in Augustine's version of the cogito, in Descartes Second Meditation, in Leibniz' opening sections of the *Monadology*, as well as in Kant's conception of the transcendental unity of apperception in both the first edition, (A), with its stress on internal time-consciousness, and the second edition, (B), with its emphasis on the unity of consciousness even though the two versions of the Transcendental Deduction are quite dissimilar. Thus in A, it serves in grounding the threefold temporal syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition; and in B, it functions as the "logical" condition for the unity of all thinking. In both of these uses, as we have seen, it is aimed against the material-

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[10] Plotinus, *Enneads*, translated by S. McKenna (London: Pantheon, 1969), IV, 7, 12; pp. 355-356. See Inge, Willam, *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), Vol. I, pp. 213-216. Concerning Plotinus' debt to Plato for the argument from the indivisibility of the soul, see B. Darrell Jackson, "Plotinus and the Parmenides, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 4:3 (1966), 325.

[11] See Mijuskovic, *ARA*, Chapter Two.

[12] See Mijuskovic, *ARA*, Chapter Three.

istic, Democritean, Epicurean, Hobbesian, Lockean, and Humean principle that consciousness is reducible to, explainable by, or identical with matter in motion; or that awareness is translatable into physically-caused perceptions, i.e., sensations. Hence the heraldic battlecry of the rationalists and metaphysical idealists against the materialists that "senseless matter cannot think."

Accordingly, Aristotle declares:

> And thought thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and the object of thought are the same (XII, 7, 1072b, 19-23)….It is clear then from what has been said that there is a substance eternal and immovable and separable from sensible things. It has been shown also that this substance cannot have any magnitude but is without parts and indivisible (1073b, 39-42).[13]

As The Philosopher proceeds, he goes on to describe this very special thought "as a thinking on thinking":

> Since, then, thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of things that have not matter, the divine thought and its object will be the same, i.e. the thinking will be one with the object of its thought. A further question is left—whether the object of the divine thought is composite; for if it were, thought would change in passing from part to part of the whole. We answer that everything which has not matter is indivisible—as human thought, or rather the thought of composite beings, is in a certain period of time…so throughout eternity is the thought which has itself for its object (1075a, 3-11).

In the same vein, Plotinus, who frequently combines Platonic and Aristotelian themes in his arguments, offers his assertion that the unity of self-consciousness is no exception as he contends against the Epicurean thesis of "thinking matter," this latter assertion being regarded by both the rationalist and idealist traditions as a palpable contradiction. We recall that the Epicureans claimed that thoughts, or more properly speaking, sensations, could be explained completely by simply postulating the physical and causal interaction of atoms within the void. Perception, then, was considered to be merely the result of the configuration, position, and motion of physical particles in empty space. Against this view, Plotinus maintains that only an incorporeal simple can constitute the requisite condition necessary for the unity of consciousness. For only if consciousness (or the soul) is an essential unity, by virtue of its simplicity, can our diverse concepts be grounded in a single integrated judgment "belonging" to an identical being. On this model, Plotinus compares the soul to the unextended point at the center of a circle, and as the various radii represent lines that converge at the center, so the separate and distinct thoughts or concepts meet in the immaterial unity of self-consciousness. Furthermore, Plotinus insists that if there were no center of cognitive activity, then all of our different sensations could no longer belong to one percipient, but rather the various sense impressions would instead belong to *separate* consciousnesses.

> It is easy to show that if the Soul were a corporeal entity there could be no sense-perception, no mental act, no knowledge…
>
> There can be no perception without a unitary percipient whose [continuous temporal] identity enables it to grasp an object as an entirety. ..a face is known not by a special sense for separate features, nose, eyes, etc., but by one sense observing all in one act [Aristotle's *sensus communis*].
>
> When sight and hearing gather their varying information, there must be some central [immaterial] unity to which both report. How could there be any statement of difference unless

[13] Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, edited by Richard Peter McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).

all sense-impressions appeared before a common identity able to take the sum of all? [A differentiating comparison can only occur if a unitary self is temporally extended and remains identical throughout the differentiating process.]

This there must be as there is a centre to a circle; the sense-impressions converging from every point of occurrence will be as lines striking from a circumference to what will be a true [immaterial, simple] centre of perception as being a veritable unity.

If this center were to break into separate points—so that the sense-impressions fell upon the two ends of a line—then, either it must reknit itself into unity and identity, perhaps at the mid-point of the line, or else all remains unrelated, every end receiving reports of its particular field exactly as you and I have our distinct sense-experiences.

Suppose the sense object be such a unity as a face; all the points of observation must be brought together in one visual total, as is obvious since there could be no panorama of great expanses unless the detail were compressed to the capacity of the pupils. Much more must this be true when the sense-objects impinge upon the centre of consciousness in the guise of indivisible [simple, unified] thoughts. Either the object is unified or—supposing it to have quantity and extension—the centre of consciousness must coincide with it point by point of their co-expansion so that any given point in the faculty will perceive solely what coincides with its object: and thus nothing in us could perceive anything as a whole.

This cannot be (*The Enneads*, IV, 7, 6: pp. 346-347).[14]

Consequently, against the Epicurean thesis regarding thinking matter, Plotinus holds that since the four elements of air, water, earth, and fire "are in themselves soulless," it is therefore "impossible, in fact, that the collocation of material elements should produce life, or mindless entities mind"; and he further declares, "No one, moreover, would pretend that a mere chance mixing [as the Epicurean school held] could give such results."

Anyone who rejects this view, and holds that either atoms or some entities void of part coming together produce soul, is refuted by the very unity of soul…Bodily materials, in nature repugnant to unification and to [self-conscious awareness of] sensation could never produce unity or self-sensitiveness, and soul is self-sensitive (*Ennead*, IV, 7, 3, pp. 346-347).

Probably the clearest expression of the simplicity principle and its related conclusions is to be discovered in Leibniz' *Monadology*, Sections 1-16. Hence, Leibniz writes:

1. The Monad [the Greek word for oneness or unity]…is nothing but a simple substance, which enters into compounds. By 'simple' is meant 'without parts.'

2. And there must be simple substances, since there are compounds; for a compound is nothing but a collection or aggregatum [disunity] of simple things.

3. Now where there are no parts, there can be neither extension [space] nor form [figure] nor divisibility. These Monads are the real [spiritual] atoms of nature [reality] and, in a word, the elements of things.

4. No dissolution of these elements need be feared, and there is no conceivable way in which a simple substance can be destroyed by natural means. [6. Only God can create or annihilate a simple substance.]

7. The Monads have no windows through which anything could come in or go out. [This directly implies both metaphysical and epistemological idealism.]

11. It follows…that the natural changes of the Monads come from an internal principle, since an external cause can have no influence on their inner being.

13. This particular series of [temporal] changes should involve a multiplicity in the unit [i.e., a unity of consciousness] or in that which is simple For, as every natural change takes place gradually, something changes and something remains unchanged; and consequently a simple substance must be affected and related in many ways, although it has no parts.

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[14] Plotinus, *The Enneads*, translated by Stephen McKenna (New York: Pantheon Books), 1969. Another manner of putting the issue is by asking, "How do I know that my thoughts and sensations are mine and not yours?"

> 14. The passing [passive] condition, which involves and represents a multiplicity in unity or in the simple substance, is nothing but what is called Perception, which is to be distinguished from [the activity of] Apperception or [Self-]Consciousness.
>
> 15. We have in ourselves experience of a multiplicity in simple substance, when we find that the least thought of which we are conscious involves variety in its object [conception]. Thus all those who admit that the soul is a simple substance should admit this multiplicity in the Monad. (Leibniz, *Monadology*)[15]

Clearly, in this passage the demonstrative conceptual elements for immortality, the unity of consciousness, personal identity, idealism, and the essential insularity of the human soul are eminently manifest.

Following Plotinus, Leibniz also analogically characterizes the monad as the center of a circle while the conceptual radii constitute the elements within or present to a single consciousness. And just as Kant later suggests, if one were to physically distribute the separate words of a verse among different individuals, nowhere could one discover a unity of the entire thought as a whole. And most importantly, as we shall see, these internal relations are dynamic, which is to say, not only active but temporal. Consequently, they will be seen later to translate into a doctrine of internal, immanent time-consciousness.

Further, in his *Lettre a Arnauld*, Leibniz speculates that

> In natural perception and in feeling, it is enough that what is divisible and material, and is actually divided among several beings, should be expressed or represented in one indivisible being [soul] or in a substance which possess genuine unity. We cannot doubt the possibility of such a representation of several things in one only, since our soul gives us an instance of it. But this representation is accompanied in the rational soul by [apperception, self-]consciousness, and then it is called thought.[16]

Quite possibly we can see here already an anticipation of Kant's Second Paralogism argument in the A edition of the first *Critique*, which Kant will later christen the "Achilles" of rationalist proofs.

Although Kant did not have access to the *Monadology*, he had some familiarity with Leibniz' *New Essays.* However, in any case, he certainly would have been familiar with these arguments from the philosophy of Christian Wolff. Metaphysically, transcendently speaking, Kant next reproduces the dogmatic contention that the soul is both immortal and a unity, before attacking it, in the following two passages:

> Everyone must admit that the assertion of the simple nature of the soul is of value only in so far as I can thereby distinguish this subject from all matter, and so can exempt it from the dissolution [or mortality] from which all matter is liable. This is indeed, strictly speaking, the only use for which the above proposition is intended, and is therefore generally expressed as 'The soul is not corporeal' (A 357).

Obviously, in this assertion and the following, Kant makes it manifestly clear that the simplicity argument is expected to perform a double duty—it will serve as the premise for *both* the immortality of the soul, as in the passage above, *and* for the unity of consciousness in the citation below. The Achilles syllogism follows:

> But with thoughts as internal accidents belonging to a thinking being, it is different. For suppose it be the composite that thinks: then every part of it would be a part of the thought, and only all of them taken together would contain the whole thought. But this cannot be maintained. For representations (for instance the single words of a verse), distributed among dif-

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[15] Leibniz, *The Monadology*, translated by Robert Latta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968).

[16] *Lettre a Arnauld*, in *Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, edited by C. J. Gerhardt (Berlin:1875-1890), ii, 112.

> ferent beings, never make up a whole thought (a verse), and it is therefore impossible that a thought should inhere in what is essentially composite (A 352).[17]

Presumably, this is a fallacy of rational psychology occurring when reason, unaided by any sensuous content, is allowed to fly toward a "transcendent" or metaphysical sphere. But compare this passage with Kant's positive "transcendent*al*" conviction half a dozen years later in the second edition *Critique:*

> It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my [single] representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me….I call it *pure apperception*, to distinguish it from empirical apperception, or, again, *original apperception*, because it is that self-consciousness which, while generating the representation *'I think*'…cannot be accompanied by any further representation. The unity of this apperception I likewise entitle the *transcendental* unity of self-consciousness….For the manifold [or the multiplicity of] representations, which are given in [a sensuous] intuition, would not be one and all my representations, if they did not all belong [as unified, synthesized] to one self-consciousness. As *my* representations…they must conform to the conditions under which alone they *can* stand together in one universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me…That relation [of unity] comes about, not simply through my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only in so far as I can *conjoin* one representation with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in *one consciousness*, is it possible for me to represent to myself the *identity of the consciousness* in these representations (B 131-132).

It is my contention, therefore, that Kant remains committed to an immaterialist paradigm of consciousness in both editions of the *Critique* and that ultimately he continues to be influenced by a paradigm of a monadic, noumenal reality.

3. The Simplicity Argument and Personal or Moral Identity

The third recruitment of the immateriality principle connects it with an argument in behalf of personal, i.e., moral identity. What is at stake in this use is not only its metaphys-

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[17] Kant, Imanuelle, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1958). On Kant's continued dependence on an ultimately Leibnizian paradigm of noumenal reality, even in the *Critique* itself, see Ben Mijuskovic, "Kant on Reality," *Cogito*, II:3 (1984), 61-67. Although commentators, like A. O. Lovejoy and H. J. Paton, contend that Kant nowhere proves the existence of a noumenal realm, I believe that it is demonstrated in the first two Antimonies, which show that if space and time are taken to be things in themselves, then reality itself is intrinsically self-contradictory. And this cannot be for then everything would dissolve into mere appearance and not only science but indeed consciousness itself would be impossible. See also my discussion of Arthur Collier's *Clavis Universalis*, cited above, for a possible connection with Kant.

On the "unity of self-consciousness" paradigm, see Ben Mijuskovic. "The Premise of the Transcendental Analytic," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 23:91 (1973), 156-161; interestingly enough, Robert Paul Wolf, in *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, actually invokes the seductive Second Paralogism fallacy as a positive interpretation for the ultimate premise of "*The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception*" in the second edition Transcendental Deduction in B. Cf. William James, *The Principles of Psychology*: "Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence" (Volume I, p.160); see also: Volume I, pp. 338-340, wherein James describes the unity as a *temporal* unity thus explicitly connecting it with Kant's Third Paralogism, *Of Personality.* Clearly, these are empirical appeals on the part of James. Cf., Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,'* (New York: Humanities Press,1962), p. 461. The interesting part of this passage is that it concludes with the same assertion as the presumably fallacious Paralogism of Simplicity; see also: Ben Mijuskovic, "The General Conclusion of the Transcendental Analytic," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, XII:3 (1974), 357-364; and "The Simplicity Argument *versus* a Materialist Theory of Consciousness," *Philosophy Today*, 20:4 (1976), 292-304.

ical (in regard to immortality) or epistemological (in regard to unity) conclusions but its ethical implications as well, for unless the soul continues as the same self through time, moral accountability cannot be imputed to it. The self must remain *identically* the same from the moment of the initial act until and through the period that praise or blame, reward or punishment are accorded, in both this life and presumably the next.

Now although Plotinus clearly anticipates the use of the immateriality premise in order to infer the soul's constant temporal journey through time (*Ennead*, IV, 6, 7), still it is to the seventeenth century and especially to the writings of the Cambridge Platonists that we must now turn in order to discover explicit expressions of this theme. Generally speaking, for the Christian Middle Ages, each soul's moral identity is guaranteed by God's unique and singular act in its *ex nihilo* creation, a creation which occurs in the context of an absolute framework of time, rather than as following from the intrinsic nature of self-consciousness itself, as the rationalist tradition had held. For example, Descartes, although he remains convinced, despite all objections to the contrary, that he has demonstrated the substantial existence of the soul and its immortality as well, nevertheless believes that the continuity and preservation of the soul depends on an external divine force. Thus he holds that God conserves, i.e. re-creates, not only the entire universe but indeed each individual soul at each moment in time, and so the *continuity* of the Cartesian self lies in the power of the Deity and not in is essential nature of immateriality. For Descartes, although space has objective and scientific significance, time, by contrast, is relatively unreal.

Locke is the first philosopher to focus on the need for explicit criteria for personal identity when he adds an additional chapter in the second edition of the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* at the request of his friend, Molyneux (*Essay*, II, xxvii). Hence, Locke distinguishes nominal identities, like a heap of sand; artificial identities, like a watch, in which the principle is external, in the mind of the maker; organic identities exhibiting an internal principle of organization, as in plants and animals; and moral or forensic identities grounded in "intuitive" ideas of reflection, Locke's "unobserved observer," and memory constituting his intuitive version of the *cogito.*

Later, during his controversy with Edward Stillingfleet, Locke launches a bombshell when he announces that it is conceivable that God could have created thinking matter. Immediately charges of atheism and Socianism are hurled against him. But for our purposes it is to Leibniz' criticism of Locke and his response to the latter that we must turn our attention. Locke, as we have seen, insists that personal, moral, and even "forensic" identity is guaranteed by the twin criteria expressed in his version of the *cogito* and in memory. Against this view, Leibniz counters that often we forget acts and yet nevertheless they are imputed to us. Thus, Leibniz invokes *petitio percipi* or unconscious thoughts as constituting integral parts of our respective monads or spiritual atoms. (In a similar fashion, Descartes posited continuous thinking, even in deep sleep, lest the soul should cease to exist.) Further, as soon as Locke's work appeared in print, it was recognized as a major philosophical achievement that had to be taken into account. In 1688, an abstract of the *Essay* had already been printed and it was immediately translated into French, appearing in Leclerc's "Bibliotheque Universelle" (VII, pp. 49-142), where Leibniz first gained knowledge of it. After 1690, a quick succession of editions became available and the second edition appeared in 1694, which first included the section on personal identity, further followed by printed issues in 1697, 1699, and 1705, all of

which testified to its welcome reception by cultivated circles. Leibniz himself undertook a careful study of it, point by point, and, as was his usual custom, he attempted to engage Locke in correspondence regarding their disagreements. When Locke failed to respond, Leibniz nevertheless continued to pursue his interest in Locke's work, which was enhanced by a French translation of the *Essay* in 1700 by Pierre Coste. Following that, Leibniz formulated a plan for a more thorough answer to the Englishman's challenge. Delays in connection with rumored changes that Locke had achieved and Locke's death in 1704 finally decided Leibniz to abandon his goal of publication. And in fact, his *New Essays* did not reach print until 1765, almost half a century after Leibniz' own death.

Leibniz' composition itself assumes the form of a dialogue between two friends, Philalethes (Love of Truth) and Theophilus (Love of God), the former representing Locke's views and the latter those of the author. Thus, in the section of the *New Essays* concerning personal identity, Theophilus declares that

> as regards substances which are in themselves a true and real substantial unity, to which may belong actions properly called vital, and as regards substantial beings…which a certain indivisible spirit animates, you are right in saying that they remain perfectly the same individual through this soul or this spirit which constitutes the ego in thinking beings.[18]

Similarly, the Cambridge Platonist camp, which includes John Smith, Henry More, and Ralph Cudworth, also advances the argument for the successive moral identity of the person. Thus, Cudworth insists that the soul continues a perfect identity and simplicity because it is an immaterial monad:

> A Thinker is a monade, or one single substance, and not a heap [or aggregate of separate] substances: whereas no body or extended thing is one, but many substances, every conceivable or smallest part thereof, being a real substance by itself.[19]

According to this line of reasoning, it follows that the identity of the soul, self, or person resides in an unchanging center that remains continuously present despite any and all apparent physical and mental changes in the overlaying conscious substance. Thus the indivisible and hence immutable monad constitutes a universal self or subject present during all cognitive or ethical acts. This same self not only functions as the ground or the sufficient condition for moral identity but, as we have already observed, it also serves as the essential condition for self-consciousness. Hence each monad is

> properly called I My Self, not the extended bulk of the body, which is not one but many substances, but an unextended and indivisible unity…one self-active…substantial, or inside being (ibid., p. 826).

Later, John Witty insists that thinking substances "are absolutely simple, and infinitely removed from divisibility by a strict necessity, each of them must forever continue the same simple individual thing."[20] And, Samuel Clarke, who defended Newton against Leibniz in the famous controversy over the metaphysical status of space and time, in directing his objections against the materialists, summarizes both sides of the controversy when he declares against the "Materialists and Mechanists," and specifically against Henry Dodwell's thesis that man is a completely material compound that

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[18] See Ben Mijuskovic, "Locke and Leibniz on Personal Identity," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, XIII:2 (1975), 205-214; and cf., Ben Mijuskovic, "Hume and Shaftesbury on the Self," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 21:85 (1971), 324-336.

[19] Cudworth, Ralph, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* (Stuttgart-Bad-Canstatt: Frommann, reprinted in1964; first published in 1678), p. 830; cf., p. 824. Further, on Locke's debt to the Cambridge Platonists for the context of this controversy, see *ARA*, Chapter Four.

[20] Witty, John, *The First Principles of Modern Deism Confuted in a Demonstration of the Immateriality, Natural Eternity and Immortality of Thinking Substances* (1707), p. 290.

> your [Dodwell's] doctrine perplexes the notion of Personal Identity, upon which identity the justice of all reward and punishment manifestly depends; makes the resurrection in your way of arguing, to be inconceivable and impossible: And consequently your doctrine, (which supposes the body to be the whole man,) is destructive of religion; leaving no room for reward or punishment, but in the present life only; and consequently giving men the liberty to do everything for their present pleasure or advantage….Which is the greatest mischief that can possibly befall mankind. But if the soul be, as we believe, a permanent indivisible immaterial substance, then all these difficulties vanish.[21]

Finally, Isaac Newton, whose great admirer is Clarke, in his *Principia* agrees that "Every soul that has perception is, though in different times and different organs of sense and motion, still the same indivisible person."[22]

Almost invariably the terms simplicity, unity and identity are used interchangeably. Creation and annihilation, by contrast, are opposed technical meanings—only God can create a simple substance out of nothing and only the deity can return to nothing a being once willed into existence by Him. Natural immortality refers to the consideration that the soul can be demonstrated from *a priori* premises and arguments to be immortal as opposed to maintaining that immortality is grounded in faith, as Locke believes.

4. The Simplicity Argument and Metaphysical and Epistemological Idealism and Phenomenalism

I define idealism as the thesis that all that exists is mental, mind-dependent, or spiritual whereas phenomenalism is the related principle that existence consists of a construction of mental sense data.

There are a number of arguments in behalf of idealism, including, for instance, the identification of being and consciousness, that "to be is to be perceived" (Berkeley); that in principle an idea can only be compared to another idea and not to an object since the two entities share no common attribute (Montaigne); that allegedly independent primary, objective qualities, e. g. extension, figure, motion, solidity, can be reduced to secondary, subjective mind-dependent ones, e. g., color, touch (Foucher, Berkeley, Hume); that the existence of a material world existing apart from mind is a contradiction in terms (Collier); and that the relative sensations of warmth and cold in separate hands immersed in tepid water at the same time in the same percipient demonstrates the subjective and mental nature of our sensations (Berkeley).

But the strongest argument in favor of idealism holds that since the soul or mind is simple, it follows that whatever the mind experiences must be simple as well despite its appearance of spatiality, extension, or "outwardness." But, of course, the problem with any idealist metaphysical and epistemological theory is that the world appears to be "spread out" in space. It is at this juncture that the simplicity argument comes to apply, since it translates all sensations into *minima tangibilia* and *visibilia*, into simple, unextended points of touch and sight, as consisting of purely *intensive* qualities completely devoid of extensive magnitude. Thus, according to both the idealist and phenomenalist traditions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the appearance of space (and time) are a direct result of a purely mental manner of ordering or organizing simple

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[21] Clarke, Samuel, "A Fourth Defense of an Argument made use of in a letter to Mr. Dowell to prove the immateriality and natural immortality of the soul."

[22] Newton, Isaac,*Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy by Sir Isaac Newton*, translated by A. Motte, (New York, 1846), Bk. III, General Scholium.

points within the mind.[23] In pursuing this connection, let us resume our intellectual Odyssey with the helpful companionship of Leibniz. As previously shown, Leibniz defines monads as spiritual metaphysical atoms, immaterial units without physical or extended parts (see quotation above). As such they are simple, indivisible. Perception, by contrast, always involves sensation while apperception implies the unification of a multiplicity of qualitative cognitions within the single consciousness of a monad, a center of cognition which may be unconscious, conscious (perceptive), or rational, i.e., self-conscious, reflexive, apperceptive. The monad, as a unified center of awareness or self-awareness, thus has true and real existence in terms of intensity but no actual extensive magnitude. The latter is only an appearane. In his controversy over the metaphysical—and thus "scientific"—status of space and time with Samuel Clarke, who defended Newton's conceptions of both as absolute containers, Leibniz argues that space, or the appearance of extension, is merely due to a relational construction performed by the mind consisting of phenomena *bene fundata*. Objects or images again only have an apparent dimensionality; in reality they are organized, structured, ordered indivisible, simple points of color and touch in themselves unextended; they are phenomena within correspondingly simple, partless mental or thinking substances. Space, then is ideal and reducible to nonspatial perceptions "within" monads. It consists in purely ideal relations, mental constructions, between appearances whose ultimate reality or essence is not quantitative, and consequently is not material, but mental or spiritual. Leibniz, therefore, can speak of space as an idea and sensations as confused conceptions and thus by reducing or translating all reality into the mental or spiritual, he is able to adopt a consistent idealist position in the strict and strong sense of the term. Since the monads are "windowless" and nothing can enter from without, it follows that we creatively, spontaneously generate everything from within our own states of consciousness. In brief, the spiritual monads are perfectly self-enclosed and solipsistically alone.

Now a facile method of "explaining away" the reality of space is by simply saying we can dream of space and colors when they are not present. But clearly such a contention would fail to avoid the objection that at one time in the past we experienced spatial exposure. But I think that what Leibniz is counting on—unlike the empiricists who later followed along similar lines in terms of the *minima sensibilia*—is that he is able to distinguish two sorts of propositions, analytic/identical/necessary and synthetic/relational/contingent; the latter ultimately resting on the principle of sufficient reason. Thus, for example, the connection between substance and accident or cause and effect—both conceptual relations—is a pure *a priori* relation. I believe Leibniz then proceeds to speculate that just as concepts can be related within the mind, so can immaterial points thus resulting in the phenomena of space.[24] In short, Leibniz thinks that the relational activities , spatial "categories" or constructs, are generated by the creative powers of the mind. To be sure, Hume distinguishes relations of ideas from matters of fact, but

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[23] See *ARA*, Chapter V; and Ben Mijuskovic for a discussion of *minima sensibilia* in "Hume on Space (and Time)," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, XV:4 (1977), 22-23, for a discussion of the *minima sensibilia* as they apply to Kant, see *ARA*, p.135, note 36. Cf. Norman Kemp Smith, *'A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,'"* pp. 51, 86-87, 101, 103, 105, 620.

[24] On the connection between the simplicity principle and argument in the philosophy of Leibniz, see *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, III, pp 330 ff. and especially pp. 334-335. In Hegel's *Science of Logic* (1812-1816), space is "created" by the movement of an indivisible point as it initially generates a line, then an enclosed triangular two-dimensional figure, and finally the simplest solid, a pyramid.

the former are mere tautologies, whereas Leibniz' relations are productive (not empirically re-productive) and hence constitutive and generative ingredients of a qualified "reality." While Kant later declared that intuitions are given (and blind) and concepts are thought, Leibniz posits spatial relations as the result of acts of thought and hence *conceptual* in nature.

In turn, Berkeley employs two important gambits in denying the substantial reality of an independent, material, external world. The first (a) is to deny the validity of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities by reducing them both to ideas in the mind; and the second is, like Leibniz, (b) to "explain away" the appearance of what we see as "outside" of us. To take (a) first. Just as pain and pleasure, ugliness and beauty (tertiary qualities) do not actually exist in things but rather reside in the subject that perceives them neither do colors, sounds, tastes, and smells exist independently of the perceiving mind. And since the alleged primary attributes of extension and solidity—as held by Descartes and Locke—depend for their being on color and touch, it follows that the primary, "objective" attributes are subjectively mental and mind-dependent as well. Thus both the primary qualities, conceived as residing in the external object itself, as well as the secondary, subjective qualities are no more independent of human consciousness than the emotions of joy and anger (*Principles*, Sections 9-15).

Next, Since Berkeley defines the mind, spirit, or soul as an unextended and immaterial simple, i.e. without parts (*Principles*, Section 27), it follows that the ideas of extension and materiality are actually simple and immaterial in themselves, although they convey both the semblance of spatiality and solidity. But if to be is to be perceived, it follows that the sensed itself must be simple regardless of its seeming. In his study of Berkeley, Professor Luce indicates that when Berkeley

> began to shape the argument for immaterialism he was met at the outset by an obstacle that seemed to bar further progress—we see the outside world; we see the world as if outside. Therefore, there is a world and it is outside.[25]

Berkeley offers two answers to this difficulty, the first rather unconvincing and the second more philosophically sound. I give the text of the criticism and his solutions in full:

> It will be objected that we see things actually without or at a distance from us, and which consequently do not exist in the mind, it being absurd that those things which are seen at a distance of several miles, should be as near to us as our own thoughts. In answer to this, I desire it may be considered that in a dream we oft do perceive things as existing at a great distance off, and yet for all that, those things are acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind.
>
> But for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worthwhile to consider, how it is that we perceive distance and things placed at a distance by sight. For that we should in truth see external space, and bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther off, seem to carry with it some opposition to what hath been said, of their existing no where without the mind.

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[25] Luce, A., *Berkeley's Immaterialism*, pp. 26-29. Berkeley's *Essay* adopted a position of semi-materialism wherein the objects of touch were presented as physical while the "sensa" of sight were characterized as mental. In the *Principles*, both descriptions were incorporated into a mentalist language and Principle 67 specifically concluded that "all place or extension exists only in the mind." See A. A. Luce, *Berkeley's Immaterialism*, pp.26-29. See also: *ARA*, Chapter IV. Hume's own efforts to provide a phenomenalist interpretation of space and time is offered in *A Treatise of Human Nature*; see Ben Mijuskovic, "Hume on Space (and Time)," *The Journal of the History of Philosophy*, XV:4, (1977), 387-394; reprinted in *David Hume: Critical Assessments*, edited by Stanley Tweyman (London: Routledge,1994), II, 61-70. Hume studied the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence and his reflections on the issues are essentially in line with Leibniz in the respect that his "relations" are expressed as the manner or order of distributed points.

> The consideration of this difficulty it was, that gave birth to my Essay towards a new Theory of Vision…wherein it is shown that distance or outness is neither immediately of it self perceived by sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that hath a necessary connexion with it: but it is only suggested to our thoughts, by certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which in their own nature have no manner of similitude or relation, either with distance, or things placed at a distance. But by a connexion taught us by experience, they come to signify and suggest them to us, after the same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for. Insomuch that a man born blind, and afterwards made to see, would not, at first sight, think the things he saw, to be without his mind, or at any distance from him (*Principles*, Sections 42-43).

A different approach to the ideality of space and the external world is taken by Kant, who studied the Clarke-Leibniz Correspondence, as he elected to translate space into a form of passive mental intuition, in itself unextended, in his effort to combine and mediate between the Leibnzian conception emphasizing the mind's subjective contribution and the Newtonian scientific paradigm of space as an absolute independently existing container, which literally regards space and time as God's infinite and eternal sense organs.

To this point, as a preliminary conclusion, I would hold that the simplicity argument continued to influence Kant's positive tendencies in the Analytic as well and that he never succeeded in emancipating himself from its influence.

5. The Simplicity Argument and Time-Consciousness

Generally speaking, there have been two dominant conceptions of time in Western thought—the absolute and the relative. The first view regards space and time as absolute substances that are not dependent on either the presence of objects or events. In other words, both space and time could be completely empty, devoid of any qualities and yet absolute spatial locations and temporal moments would still exist theoretically. The second view holds that both space and time depend on the relative arrangements of objects in space and the "measure of motion" through space. But, beginning with Leibniz, a novel claim is initiated, which links time-consciousness with a conception of dynamic mental activity. In Kant, this connection becomes explicit; it is expressed as an identification of inner sense with consciousness—an identification, however, that is separate and distinct from Kant's claims in the Aesthetic that time is merely a passive form of sensibility, an intuition, which offers an empty matrix of possibilities for ordering sensations, the latter serving as the mental contents of consciousness. Rather, time *is* consciousness (*Critique of Pure Reason*, A 99 ff.). Indeed, as Kemp Smith has persuasively argued, immanent awareness of time serves as the indubitable premise of the entire first edition *Critique* while the emphasis on the unity of consciousness dominates in the second edition (B 131 ff.).

As Kemp Smith points out, Kant has three options for an indubitable starting point, an undeniable premise: the existence of the world; the existence of the self; and consciousness of (internal, subjective) time. The first two are vulnerable to the challenges of Descartes and Hume, respectively. Thus, I would contend that the first edition is the stronger of the two Deductions. And, indeed, interestingly enough, when Kant rather elects in 1787 to emphasize the unity of consciousness, he decides to recast the Second Paralogism altogether and thereby judiciously deletes the compromising argument of the Second Paralogism concerning the distribution of single words among various consciousnesses. Instead, as we have already indicated in our previous discussion of the

unity of consciousness, in the Deduction in B, he emphasizes the foundational aspects of the unity of consciousness at the expense of its temporal structure. Accordingly, we find Kant affirming the critical role of an immanent time-awareness in the A Deduction:

> Whatever the origin of our representations, whether they are due to the influence of outer things, or are produced by inner causes, whether they arise *a priori* or being appearances have an empirical origin, they must all as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. All our knowledge is thus subject to time, the form of inner sense. In it they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relation. This is a general observation which, throughout what follows, must be borne in mind as quite fundamental (A 99).

If one entertains a mentalist paradigm of the mind—the mind as simple, unextended—then it is difficult, although not impossible, as we have seen, to make sense of the sensation or experience of spatiality. With time, however, it appears truer to bind, synthesize, meld, fuse the past, present, and future into a flowing awareness and temporal unity. In this regard, notice a suggestive passage by Peirce, who was strongly influenced by Kant, as he describes the experience of an "internal" consciousness of time.

> We observe two sorts of elements of consciousness, the distinction between which may best be made clear by means of an illustration. In a piece of music there are the separate notes, and there is the air. A single note may be prolonged for an hour or a day, and it exists as perfectly in each second of that time as in the whole taken together; so that, as long as it is sounding, it might be present to a sense from which everything in the past was as completely absent as the future itself. But it is different with the air, the performance of which occupies a certain time, during the portions of which only portions are played. It consists in an orderliness in the succession of sounds which strike the ear at different times; and to perceive it there must be some continuity of consciousness which makes the events of a lapse of time present to us. We certainly only perceive the air by hearing the separate notes; yet we cannot be said to directly hear it, for we only hear what is present at the instant, and an orderliness of succession cannot exist in an instant. These two sorts of objects, what we are immediately conscious of and what we are mediately conscious of, are found in all consciousness. Some elements (the sensations) are completely present at every instant so long as they last, while others (like thought=Kant's relational categories) are actions having beginning, middle, and end, and consist in a congruence in the succession of sensations which flow through the mind. They cannot be immediately present to us, but must cover some portion of the past or future. Thought is a [temporal] thread of melody running through the succession of our sensations.[26]

What is being rejected, of course, is the Aristotelian notion that time is the measure of motion through space, which would make time a derivative and secondary reality. As St. Augustine points out in the *Confessions*, with temporal awareness it can be shown (as the passage cited above intimates), that the past and the future both meld into a unified present whenever I prepare to recite a psalm (Book Eleven, xxviii). Again, this can only occur on the condition that consciousness is immaterial.

Similarly, in C. E. M. Joad's *How Our Minds Work*, the author offers the following example of what he describes as the "synthesizing power of the mind" in terms of temporal unification. Professor Joad further presupposes that this critical phenomenon can only occur if the mind is immaterial.

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[26] Peirce, Charles Sanders, *Essays in the Philosophy of Science*, edited by V. Tomas in "How To Make Our Ideas Clear" (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957), pp. 37-38. Cf., Edmund Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, translated by James Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), pp. 30-31. By bracketing the external world, and focusing on the phenomenological awareness of time as exhibited in an experience of music, Husserl is able to offer an eidetic description of immanent time. See also: Ben Mijuskovic, "The Simplicity Argument and Time in Schopenhauer and Bergson," *Schopenhauer Jahrbuch* (1977), pp. 43-58; and Ben Mijuskovic, *CI*, Chapter VI.

> The notes of a symphony considered separately consist merely of vibrations in the atmosphere. Each note may, when sounded in isolation produce a pleasant sensation, and as one note is struck after another we get a sequence of pleasant sensations. But although this is a sufficient description of the symphony considered as a collection of material events, and of our reaction to these events considered merely in terms of sensations, it is quite clear we normally think of a symphony as being something more than this. We think of it in fact as a [temporal, continuous] whole, and it is as a whole that it gives what is called aesthetic pleasure. Now in thinking of the symphony in this way our mind is going beyond the mere sequence of pleasant sensations which its individual notes produce, and putting them together in some sort of [temporal] pattern….It seems to follow that our pleasure in a symphony cannot be wholly accounted for, although it may depend upon our physical responses to the stimuli of the individual notes; in order to obtain aesthetic pleasure we must somehow be able to perceive it as more than the sum total of individual notes—that is, as a whole pattern or [temporal] arrangement….We must conclude, then, that we possess the power of realizing external objects not merely as collections of physical stimuli, which of course they are, but as wholes in which the actual sensory elements are combined to form a single [temporal and ideal] object of a higher order. This faculty of combining or putting [or synthesizing] together seems to involve the existence not only of a mind, but of a mind of an active, creative type which is able to go beyond the raw material afforded by our bodily sensations, and to apprehend ideal objects as wholes which are more than the collection of physical events which compose their constituent parts.[27]

In the rationalist and idealist traditions, the self-conscious mind is assumed to be active, dynamic, spontaneous; it produces and creates thoughts, meanings and relations which transcend the immediate and transient givenness of the sensory. It goes temporally *beyond* instantaneous sounds that remain insignificantly, meaninglessly.

6. The Simplicity Argument and the Freedom of Consciousness

Generally speaking, both the rationalist and idealist camps tend to move from the giveness of self-consciousness to reason and from reason to the freedom of consciousness on the grounds that what is immaterial and a unity is essentially independent of external factors or influences. To be independent in this sense is by definition to be self-sufficient and free. Both Leibniz and Kant maintain that non-empirical concepts and categories are independent of matter, physical causes and hence sensations. Kant's chosen manner of characterizing these pure concepts of the faculty of the understanding is by describing them as spontaneous, since he believes the mind can actively create, generate something from "within" by its own internal resources, it can fashion a product completely free of matter or any dependence on the external world. Further, man is free as both Rousseau and Kant claim, when man gives the law to himself and follows his own law. When self-conscious reason gives its own commandments and obeys its own laws, then the mind achieves true independence because it is not determined by anything external to itself.

But the most explicit and extended metaphysical argument in behalf of the freedom of self-consciousness derives from Hegel's work on the philosophy of history.

> The nature of Spirit may be understood by a glance at its direct opposite—Matter. As the essence of Matter is Gravity, on the other hand we may affirm that the substance, the essence of Spirit is Freedom…It is a result of Speculative Philosophy, that Freedom is the sole Truth of Spirit. Matter possesses gravity in virtue of its tendency toward a central point. It is essentially composite consisting of parts that exclude each other. It seeks its Unity; and therefore exhibits itself as self-destructive, as verging toward its opposite (an indivisible [simple, im-

[27] Joad, C. E. M., *How Our Minds Work* (London: Westhouse, 1946), pp. 65-66.

> material] point). If it could attain this it would be Matter no longer, it would have perished. It strives after the realization of its Idea; for in unity it exists ideally. Spirit, on the contrary, may be defined as that which has its center in itself. It has not a Unity outside itself, but has already found it; it exists in and within itself. Matter has its essence out of itself; Spirit is self-contained existence. Now this is Freedom, exactly. For if I am dependent, my being is referred to something else which I am not; I cannot exist independently of something external. I am free, on the contrary, when my existence depends on myself. This self-contained existence of Spirit is none other than self-consciousness—consciousness of one's own being. Two things must be distinguished in consciousness: first, the fact that I know; secondly, what I know. In self-consciousness these are merged in one; for Spirit knows itself.[28]

Ultimately, this aspect of the argument in Hegel, I believe, can be traced back to a conflation of Plato's concept of the Good, Aristotle's paradigm of the Prime Mover, and Plotinus' process of emanation as it "moves" from self-consciousness to reason and finally to freedom.

7. The Simplicity Argument, Meanings, and Relations

Classically, beginning with Plato's doctrine of the simple and immaterial essence of the Forms and Aristotle's emphases on the inferential nature of the causal principle and syllogistic reasoning, both rationalists and idealists have grounded their major arguments on the simplicity thesis. Thus, ever since Plato's *Sophist*, where Plato opposes the idealists, or the Gods, and the materialists, or the Giants, the battle over "whether senseless matter can think" has captivated philosophical discussions since the Hellenic Age. I don't think that this section needs much in terms of references or citations since they are familiar to all who have a passing acquaintance with the history of philosophy. It is well-known that Plato believed in the immateriality of an eternal realm of immutable Forms and that the soul, in virtue of its non-corporeal nature was able to participate (*metechein*) in their knowledge. Similarly, Descartes' *cogito* offers a prime example of a pure but active conception, simple, self-contained and intrinsically "existential." Likewise, Kant's twelve relational, mediate categories of the understanding, as well as the non-sensuous inferences involved in the Paralogisms, Antinomies, and Ideals of pure reason are all instances of ideal and purely conceptual and inferential activities of the mind. By the same token, all of Hegel's metaphysical and epistemological synthetic *a priori* categories of reality in the *Science of Logic* (1812-1816), the "Greater Logic," are also simple, immaterial, conceptual.

But the assumption that ideas are immaterial is not merely confined to rationalists, dualists, and idealists; it is also prevalent at times as well in phenomenology. What these mutually compatible views insist upon is that meaningless atomistic sensations cannot by a mere "construction" result in meanings and relations, that although an electroencephalograph may show *that* a person is thinking, it cannot indicate *what* a person is thinking.

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[28] G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, translated by J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), p. 17. See Ben Mijuskovic, "The Simplicity Argument and the Freedom of Consciousness," *Idealistic Studies*, VIII:1 (1978), 62-74, which discusses both Hegel's and Bergson's conceptions of freedom at greater length. See also: *CI*, Chapter III. Throughout the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel uses the term *simplicity* as synonymous with an abstract conceptual identity and unity, as in the following citations: "Self-identity is pure abstraction; but this is thinking. When I say 'quality,' I am saying simple [conceptual] determinateness; it is by quality that one existence is distinguished from another, or is an existence; it is for itself [self-consciously], or it subsists through this simple oneness with itself. But it is thereby essentially a *thought"* (Miller translation, p.33). Or, "Precisely because existence is defined as Species [a universal], it is a simple [immaterial] thought; *Nous*, simplicity, is substance" (p. 34). Again, in the *Science of Logic*, Hegel declares that "The simple idea [Notion] of pure Being was first enunciated by the Eleatics, as the Absolute and as the whole truth; especially by Parmenides," (Johnston and Struthers translation, p. 95).

Thus, Husserl declares that meanings or intentions are not in space; they are not extended or physical; and they are not reducible to the behaviorist and mechanistic model of the brain as a complex of electrochemical reactions occurring among cells.

Whether ideas are ultimately dependent on the brain is one question but that meanings are not reducible to nor identical with physiological processes is a totally different issue, one which Husserl consistently denies after 1900. Thus meanings, intentionalities, as well as consciousness itself, are incorporeal for the later Husserl. Husserl's view of consciousness and meaning is, if not derived from Kant, certainly very similar to it in most important respects. Thus, in the *Cartesian Meditations*, for instance, in his discussion of the unity and identity discovered in all noetic acts of intentionality, Husserl insists that it is constitutive, structural syntheses that make possible the unification of multiplicities into a single meaning. Perhaps Husserl's most explicit acknowledgment that meanings are essentially non-spatial occurs in a lecture given on May 7, 1935 at the University of Prague. In the presentation, Husserl announces the goal of European man to be is infinite striving for rationality and idealism. Thus, he declares:

> Ideas, within individual persons as sense-[meaning]structures that in a wonderfully new manner secrete within themselves intentional infinities, are not in space like real things, which latter, entering as they do into the field of human experience, do not by that very fact as yet signify anything for the human being as a person.[29]

Ultimately, this unity, as all unity, is grounded in the transcendental ego, the center or source of all intentional constitution. Hence, as Husserl himself admits, in *Cartesian Meditations*, his conception of the ego is modeled on Leibniz's theory of the monad and Kant's transcendental concept of the unity of apperception. The unity of thought now becomes a unity of intention, of meaning, for both unity and meaning are intentional. As for Kant, so for Husserl, the "constitutive" *a priori* syntheses are rule-directed activities —although immediately "seeable" for Husserl, who believes that color and extension; pitch and timbre; objects and aspects are all connected in an *a priori* synthetic fashion and generated through structures of consciousness, structures that emanate from the ego.

All this follows from Kant's position that the transcendental ego is not in space, space being merely the form of mental appearance. Similarly, neither is Husserl's since the independent existence of the "external" world is bracketed, suspended. What remains is the phenomenological field of consciousness; and the task for the phenomenologist is to describe the eternal and immutable meanings in this bracketed but infinitely rich field of beings.

A different approach, although culminating in an identical conclusion, is developed by Professor Joad. As he expresses it:

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[29] For support of my interpretation that meanings are unextended, see E. P Welch, *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl* (Octagon, 1965), pp. 164, 178, 188-189, 249, 252, 254, 283, 285; Joseph Kockelmanns, *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology* (Duquesne, 1967), pp. 175, 289; Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: *An Analysis of His Phenomenology* (Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 42, 54 and note 17. See also: Ben Mijuskovic, "The Simplicity Argument and Absolute Morality," *Journal of Thought*, 10:2 (1975), 123-134; Husserl, "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man," in *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy* (Harper Torchbook, 1965), p. 160; see Ben Mijuskovic, "Brentano's Theory of Consciousness, " *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XXXVIII:3 (1978), 315-324. See *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, Part 2: "The Fundamental Phenomenological Outlook"; *Cartesian Meditations*, Second Meditation, Section 22; *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Sections 94-95, 104; and Quentin Lauer, 138, 196. Lest someone think that the "analytic" tradition is alone immune to the temptations of the simplicity argument, I would refer them to my article, "The Simplicity Argument in Wittgenstein and Russell," *Critica*, VIII:22 (1976), 85-103.

> An important fact about our mental life is that we are capable of appreciating meaning. A statement of fact written on a piece of paper is, so far as its material content is concerned, merely a number of black marks inscribed on a white background. Considered, then, as a collection of visual, physical stimuli, it is comparatively unimportant; what is important is the meaning attached to these marks….Now the meaning of these marks is obviously not a physical stimulus; it is something immaterial.
>
> Let us suppose that I am a geometrician and am thinking about the properties of a triangle. As I do not wish at this point to enter into the vexed question of whether *some* physical stimulus is or is not necessary to initiate every chain of reasoning, we will assume that in this case there was a physical stimulus—it may have been a chance remark about Euclid, or the appearance of a red triangular road signpost while I am driving a car—a stimulus I will call X, which prompted me to embark upon the train of speculations about the triangle. My reasoning proceeds until I arrive at a conclusion which takes the form of a geometrical proposition expressed in a formula. I carry this formula in my head for a number of days and presently write it down. In due course, I write a book, setting forth my formula and giving an account of the reasoning which led me to it. The book is read and understood by A. Presently it is translated into French, and is read and understood by B. Later still I deliver a lecture on the subject which is heard and understood by C. As A, B, and C have understood my formula and the reasoning upon which it is based, we may say that the reasoning process has had the same meaning throughout. If it had not, they would not all have reached the same conclusion and understood the same thing by it. Yet in each of the four cases the sensory stimulus was different; for myself it was X; for A it was a number of black marks on a white background; for B a number of different black marks on a white background; and for C a number of vibrations in the atmosphere impinging upon his eardrums. It seems incredible that all of these different stimuli should have been able to produce a consciousness of the same meaning, if our respective reactions to them were confined to physical responses…which were subsequently reflected in our minds by a process of mental registration of the different responses. The stimuli being different, the intervention of something possessed of the capacity to grasp the *common* element among these physically different entities alone seems able to account for the facts, but the common element is the meaning, which is immaterial and can be grasped, therefore, only by a mind (pp. 62-63).

8. The Simplicity Argument and Loneliness

Does a study like this have any *practical* value? I think it does because it strongly points to a certain principle, indeed, a paradigm indicating the strengths of a subjectivist picture of human awareness and existence as it posits the utter insularity of the human mind. In this regard, I believe it is significant that the narrative form of the novel essentially only begins after Descartes' emphasis on self-conscious reflections. Not surprisingly, then, the earliest novel in English is Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*, consisting in the chronicling of the solitary thoughts of a man living alone for a quarter of a century on a deserted island. But in point of fact, even third person narratives are merely the personal reflections of an omniscient observer once removed.

In previous publications, I have claimed that after the biological drives for air, water, and food have been satisfied, the most insistent psychological drive is to escape from our enforced sense of loneliness and that it is the fear of loneliness which serves as the universal motivational principle animating all human thought, passion, and action.[30]

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[30] Mijuskovic, Ben "Loneliness: An Interdisciplinary Approach," *Psychiatry*, 40:2 (1977a), 113-132; reprinted in *The Anatomy of Loneliness*, edited by. J. Hartog, International Universities Press 1980, pp. 65-94; "Loneliness and a Theory of Consciousness," *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, XV:1

Consequently, I have argued at length that the Cartesian *cogito*, the Leibnizian monad, and the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception all point to a particular paradigm of self-awareness, with its problematic implications concerning the certainty of knowledge in regard to other minds, forcing each and every one of us to consider our respective senses of alienation and estrangement from our fellows. By the same token, the Leibnizian model of the enclosed ego or soul as hermitic, solipsistic, insular, windowless, inescapably alone and irredeemably lonely, similarly leads to an opaque view of other selves. Accordingly, I would submit that this is a plausible model of human existence and a persuasive paradigm of consciousness. In this context, I suppose that my intellectual interest in the simplicity argument derives in great part from my emotional commitment to an existential picture of man as religiously estranged (Kierkegaard) and socially alienated (Marx). As Joseph Conrad has expressed it, in *An Outcaste of the Islands*, "We are lonely from the cradle to the grave and perhaps beyond." And Brand Blanshard has echoed these same sentiments in the following passage:

> We shall never wholly understand each other, if only because we cannot exchange biographies; each man is like a nautilus who lives in a house of his own making, and carries it around on his back. We shall never know how our language sounds to a Frenchman, or precisely how a melody appeals to another person, or just how anything affects the opposite sex, or indeed exactly how anything strikes anybody but ourselves. We can guess and conjecture more or less successfully, but if we try to do more, we come to that 'salt estranging sea' which neither science nor romance has been able quite to bridge.[31]

How intensely terrifying the prospect of absolute loneliness may be imagined by metaphysically contemplating whether any human being would choose to be immortal if his eternal subsistence were purchased at the cost of existing as the sole self-conscious awareness in a universe totally bereft of any other conscious or animate beings.

The foregoing seven sections of the paper I feel have to a certain extent guided us toward this final conclusion, to a Sartrean image of man in despair because of the meaninglessness of human existence; in anguish because of each individual's condemnation

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(1977b), 19-31; "Loneliness and the Reflexivity of Consciousness," *Psychocultural Review*,1:2, (1977c), 202-213; "Types of Loneliness," *Psychology*, 14:3 (1977d), 24-29; "Loneliness and the Possibility of a 'Private Language," *Journal of Thought*, 13:1 (1978), 14-20; "Loneliness and Time-Consciousness," *Philosophy Today*, XXII:4 (1978), 276-286; "Loneliness and Personal Identity," *Psychology*, 16:3 (1979), 11-20; *Loneliness in Philosophy, Literature, and Psychology*, (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1979); "Loneliness and Narcissism," *Psychoanalytic Review*, 66:4 (1979-1980), 480-492; "Loneliness and Communication" in *Man and His Conduct*, edited by J. Gracia (University of Puerto Rico Press, 1980), pp. 261-269; "Loneliness and Suicide," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, XI:1 (1980), 11-17; reprinted in *Geriatrics and Thanatology*, edited by E. Prichard (Praeger Press, 1984), pp. 148-160; "Loneliness and Human Nature," *Psychological Perspectives*,12:1 (1981), 69-77; "The Sociology and Psychology of Loneliness," *International Review of Contemporary Sociology* (1984); "Loneliness, Anxiety, Hostility, and Communication," *Child Study Journal*, 16:3 (1986), 227-240; "Loneliness and Counseling Adolescence," *Adolescence*, XX:84 (1986), 941-950; "Loneliness and Sexual Dysfunctions," *Psychology*, 24:4 (1987), 15-21; "Reflexivity and Intentionality," *The Psychotherapy Patient*, 4:3/4 (1988a), 39-50; "Loneliness and Adolescent Alcoholism," *Adolescence*, XXIII:91 (1988b), 503-516; "Loneliness, Atomistic Societies, and Organic Communities," *Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare*, XIX:2 (1992),147-164; "Loneliness and Intimacy," *The Journal of Couples Therapy*, 1:3/4 (1990a), 39-48; reprinted in *Intimate Autonomy: Autonomous Intimacy*, edited by J. Brothers (Haworth Press, 1991), pp. 39-48; "Reflections on Philosophical Counseling", in *Philosophical Counseling*, edited by R. Lahav and M. Tillmanns (University Press of America, 1996), pp. 85-100; "The Phenomenology and Dynamics of Loneliness, *Psychology*, 33:2 (1996) 41-51; "Further Reflections on Philosophical Counseling," *Zeitschrift fuer Philosophische Praxis*, 1:1 (2/1996), 23-25; and "Theories of Consciousness, Therapy, and Loneliness," *International Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 13:1 (2007), 1-16.

[31] Blanshard, Brand, *The Nature of Thought* (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), I, 203.

to a radical freedom; and to forlornness as a result of the soul's absolute and irredeemable loneliness.

What is the philosophical basis for these sad declarations? I have contended that there are basically three dominant theories of consciousness—excluding for the purposes of our discussion the theory of "neutral monism" defended by William James and Bertrand Russell. The first is represented by the rationalist-idealist paradigm, which stresses (a) immateriality; (b) activity; (c) reflexivity; (d) internal unity; and (e) genuine personal identity. The second model emphasizes (materiality; (b) passivity; (c) sensory discreteness; (d) the empirical association of ideas; and (e) a fictional self. The third construct consists in the phenomenological-existential models of Franz Brentano, the early Husserl, and Sartre, which posits (a) immateriality; (b) activity; (c) intentionality; (d) transcendent unity; and (e) the disappearance of the self, at least in Sartre. I further submit that the first paradigm is the only one that does justice to the basic, universal sense of loneliness that characterizes human beings. In turn, this view describes consciousness as both unified and temporal and leads to what later, in the hands of novelists, like James Joyce, Thomas Wolfe, and William Faulkner, became known as the "stream of consciousness" style of expression. Thus, Joyce, for example, offers the longest unpunctuated sentence in the English language in Molly Bloom's nocturnal soliloquy in the last book of *Ulysses* as she self-consciously reflects in an exercise of self-revelation. And in the case of Wolfe, it is precisely due to his intense commitment to self-consciousness that he utters the universal cry of all mankind, from infancy onward:

> And left alone to sleep within a shuttered room, with the thick sunlight printed in bars upon the floor, unfathomable loneliness and sadness crept through him: he saw his life down the vista of a forest aisle, and he knew he would always be the sad one: caged in that little round of skull, imprisoned in that beating and most secret heart, his life must always walk down lonely passages. Lost. He understood that men were forever strangers to one another, that no one ever comes really to know anyone, that imprisoned in the dark womb of our mother, we come to life without ever seeing her face, that we are given to her arms a stranger, and that caught up in that insoluble prison of being, we escape it never, no matter what arms may clasp us, what mouth may kiss us, what heart may warm us. Never, never, never, never, never (*Look Homeward, Angel*, Ch. 4)

Similarly, in a passage reminiscent of Molly Bloom's reverie, Wolfe describes his sister Helen's thoughts of loneliness as night's blackness envelopes her:

> And filled with a numb, speechless feeing of despair and nameless terror, she heard somewhere across the night, the sound of a train again, and thought:
>
> "My God! My God! What is life about? We are all lying here in darkness in ten thousand little towns—waiting, listening, hoping—for what?
>
> And suddenly, with a feeling of sudden revelation, she saw the strangeness and mystery of man's life; she felt about her in the darkness the presence of ten thousand people, each lying in his bed naked and alone, united in the threat of night and darkness, and listening, as she, to the sounds of silence and of sleep. And suddenly it seemed to her that she knew all these lonely, strange watchers of the night, that she was speaking to them, and they to her, across the fields of sleep, as they had never spoken before, that she knew men now in all their dark and naked loneliness now without falseness and pretense as she had never known them. And it seemed to her that if men would only listen in the darkness, and send the language of their naked lonely spirits across the silence of the night, all of the error, falseness and confusion of their lives would vanish, they would no longer be strangers, and each would find the life he sought and never yet had found.
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> "If we only could!" she thought. "If only we could!" (Wolfe, Thomas, *Of Time and the River*, XXV).

Philotheos **9** (2009) 253-269

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Das Problem des Todes bei Rainer Maria Rilke und die philosophische Frage nach der Wahrheit der Dichtung

Auftakt und Perspektiven einer Vorlesung*

Rilkes Verhältnis zum Tod liegt in seinem Werk offen zu Tage und ist oft besprochen und dargestellt worden. Man kann in einem vielsagenden Sinn sagen: Rilke ringt zeitlebens mit dem Tod. Dabei kommt Schreckliches und Furchtbares zu Wort, aber auch in zunehmendem Maße solches, was den Tod verherrlicht. Rilke gewinnt dem Tod dann etwas Trautes, fast etwas Zärtliches ab. Er spricht den Tod als den Freund des Menschen an. Er feiert die Einzigartigkeit und die Unvertretbarkeit des Todes. Im „Stundenbuch" ruft er aus: „O Herr, gieb jedem seinen eignen Tod".[1] Und er hält es sogar für möglich, die Einheit von Tod und Leben im Zueinander liebender Menschen aufzuspüren: „Denn sie sind voller Tod, indem sie voller Leben sind." Und so wird Rilke, um es mit einer Formulierung Fritz-Joachim von Rintelens zu sagen, zum „Verherrlicher" des Todes.[2]

Auch wenn sich in jemandem, der durch Rilkes Werk hin dessen Ringen mit dem Tod in Prosa und Vers verfolgt, etwas sträuben mag gegen eine Wendung des Gedankens wie die, die nach dem „Problem" des Todes bei Rilke fragt, gerade in demjenigen, der, wie man sagt, von Rilkes Dichtung und Gedichten hin- und hergerissen ist, rührt sich Fragen: geht in derlei der Tod „in Wahrheit" auf, ist der Tod hier wie beispielsweise in Martin Heideggers Nachdenken über den Tod „verstanden"[3], kommt sein Sein zum Ausdruck oder nur solches, das Rilke von ihm hält und für was er ihn hält?

Nicht ganz dasselbe wie die Frage nach Rilkes Verhältnis zum Tod ist die Frage nach dem Verhältnis dessen, was Rilke über den Tod gesagt und gedichtet hat, zum Problem des Todes, zum problematisch Bleibenden des Todes. Das Wort Problem bringt hier zum Ausdruck, daß eine „Aufgabe" vorliegt, die es zu lösen gilt, daß es sich also um eine durch *Rilke* und auf *seine* Sageweise bisher nicht entschiedene Frage handelt, um eine offene Frage. In solchem Sinne kann dann auch Rilkes Verhältnis zum Tod zum Problem werden, insbesondere die eigenartig weihevolle, pathetisch anmutende Rühmung und Preisung des Todes, die Weise also, wie Rilke vom Tod *spricht* und ihn *an*spricht.

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* *Gehalten in Vertretung von Prof. Dr. Fritz-Joachim v. Rintelen 1959, aus gegebenem Anlaß 2005 meinem Mainzer Kollegen Prof. Dr. Hans-Martin Gerlach überarbeitet gewidmet.*

[1] Rilke, Das Stunden-Buch, 3. Buch: Das Buch von der Armut und vom Tode, in: Sämtliche Werke. Erster Band. Hrsg. vom Rilke-Archiv in Verbindung mit Ruth Sieber-Rilke. Besorgt durch Ernst Zinn, Insel-Verlag, Wiesbaden 1955, 347. = Werke

[2] Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, Rilke und die Todesverherrlichung, in: Philosophie der Endlichkeit im Spiegel der Gegenwart, Meisenheim/Glan 1951, 238ff., 255.

[3] Adolf Sternberger, Der verstandene Tod. Eine Untersuchung zu Martin Heideggers Existenzialontologie, Leipzig 1934.

Die Frage kann dann lauten: Hat Rilke mit dem, was er dichtend sagt, in der Tat dem *Wesen* des Todes, also einem Sein im Leben derer, die sind, und ihrem Nicht-mehr-Sein entsprochen? Hat er mit dem, was er dichterisch sagt, den *Sinn* des Todes ausgesprochen, nicht irgendeinen sondern den letzten? Hat er, der Dichter, die *Wahrheit* über den Tod gesagt, paradox ausgedrückt, sein „Sein", also *was* und *wie* er in Wahrheit *ist*, zum Ausdruck gebracht? Hat Rilke, dessen Dichtung nie des besonderen Tons ermangelt, der uns im Innersten zu rühren vermag, der anzurühren und zu berühren versteht, die Tiefe des Todes ausgelotet? Hat er überhaupt, so läßt sich in gewisser Weise unerbittlich angesichts seiner Dichtung fragen, vom Tod gesprochen und nicht vielleicht nur von sich selbst, von seinen eigenen Begegnungen und Erfahrungen mit den Vorboten des Todes, von seinen Stimmungen und Befindlichkeiten angesichts des Problems des Todes, vielleicht gar von seiner eigenen, ureigenen Sorge um seinen eigenen Tod?

Und was wir im Blick auf *Rilkes* Dichtung fraglich machen, ist prinzipiell etwas, das zum Anlaß wird, anhand dessen die Problemfrage nach der *Wahrheit der Dichtung* zu stellen, was uns also einem Problem konfrontiert, angesichts dessen es dienlich ist, in Rilke gewissermaßen das Exempel einer grundsätzlichen Frage zu statuieren.

Schauen wir uns zunächst nach *Reaktionen* auf Rilkes Artikulationen um. Der zumeist eher mild anmutende Religionsphilosoph und Theologe Romano Guardini hat gegenüber Rilke die Schärfe fast kühl wirkender Bestimmtheit für angebracht gehalten, wenn er sagt: „Er hat die gefährliche Gabe, Dinge, die nicht sind, so darzustellen, als wären sie es. Wer aber ein gutes Ohr hat, hört aus seinen Werken, wie wenig Rilke selbst seine Botschaft geglaubt und wie sehr er sich vor dem Tod geängstet hat."[4] Ist, so darf von solcher Charakteristik aus gefragt werden, Rilke in seiner Dichtung dem Sinn und Wesen des Todes auf die Spur gekommen und nicht nur seiner Erscheinung und seiner Wirkung und Auswirkung im Spiegel eines und nicht nur eines von ihm betroffenen und faszinierten Dichters?

Wir geraten in eine große Verlegenheit, wenn wir diese Frage ernst nehmen und sie nicht als rhetorische oder in pharisäischer Gesinnung stellen. Aber wir müssen sie stellen, nicht nur, wenn wir den Dichter *Rilke* ernst nehmen wollen, sondern *Dichter* und *Dichtung* überhaupt. Wir fragen also nicht – gewissermaßen philologisch und ohne uns dem *Problem* des Todes auszusetzen –: was sagt Rilke und was lehrt er uns über den Tod? Wir fragen statt dessen – problematisierend und gewissermaßen philosophisch-phänomenologisch -: gestaltet Rilke den Tod in solchem, was er von ihm in seinen hinreißenden, bezaubernden, einnehmenden Versen, in seinen elegischen und von entsprechender Stimmung getragenen Elegien und in seinen klangschönen Sonetten zur Anschauung und zum Klingen und Schwingen bringt, die wahre Wirklichkeit des *Todes* oder sein eigenes *Verhältnis* zum Problem des Todes, zu solchem also, was möglicherweise nicht durch Rilkes Sagen entschieden ist, sondern eine unentschiedene Frage an

[4] Romano Guardini, Die letzten Dinge. Die christliche Lehre vom Tode, der Läuterung nach dem Tode, Auferstehung, Gericht und Ewigkeit, Würzburg 1940; zitiert nach v. Rintelen, 240. Guardini hat in seiner Untersuchung „Zu Rainer Maria Rilkes Deutung des Daseins. Eine Interpretation der Duineser Elegien" (München 1953) ausdrücklich darauf hingewiesen, daß sie nicht danach fragt, „ob Rilkes Verheißungen persönlich glaubwürdig seien", sondern „ob das, was er so eindrucksvoll über Leben und Tod... sagt, auch wirklich zutreffe", und Guardini hat vermerkt, daß ihm Kritik eingetragen habe, daß „er aus der historisch verstehenden und ästhetisch würdigenden Behandlung dichterischer Texte zu ihrer philosophischen Beurteilung, das heißt, aber, zur Frage nach ihrer objektiven Wahrheit überging", 21. Und im „Nachwort" bekräftigt er sein Vorgehen mit der Feststellung: Es ergibt sich, „daß der Dichter nicht nur gefragt werden darf: was sagst Du über das Dasein aus? – sondern auch: ist das, was Du sagst, wahr", 421.

jeden von uns darstellt? Anders ausgedrückt: Kann Rilkes eigenstes Verhältnis zum Tod stellvertretend für die Entdeckung des „Wesens" des Todes genommen werden – wobei unter „Wesen" nicht irgendeine „Substanz" verstanden werden darf, sondern die Weise, wie er und als die er „west"? Wieder anders, nun aber punktgenau ausgedrückt: Sagt *Rilke* die „Wahrheit" über den Tod? Und es kann sich die Frage anschließen: Sagen die *Dichter* die „Wahrheit" über den Tod? Und für den, der so fragt, liegt die Frage nahe: *Wer* sagt die „Wahrheit"? Und auch diese Frage ist nicht ausschlaggebend, denn sie setzt voraus, daß die Frage: *Was ist Wahrheit?* nicht außer acht bleibt.

Wir geraten, wie gesagt, in eine große Verlegenheit, wenn wir diesen Fragekomplex ernst nehmen; denn, um hier ent-scheiden zu können, wäre es, methodisch gesehen, unumgänglich notwendig, daß wir ein „Kriterium", ein verläßliches Richtmaß hätten, das uns in die Lage versetzt, an dichterisch Gesagtem „Kritik" zu üben, also solches zu verwerfen, was uns zwar in „Stimmung" versetzen mag, aber nicht stimmt, und durch Unter-scheidung zu solchem, was zutrifft, über die Richtigkeit zu entscheiden, das uns also die Berechtigung zum Urteil an die Hand gibt bzw. gäbe. Ohne ein solches „Kriterium", das uns zur ent-scheidenden Beurteilung auf Grund genau umrissener Merkmale oder Sachverhalte befähigt, ist respektive scheint keine Kritik, also keine abhebende Scheidung und Unterscheidung, keine unterscheidende Scheidung und keine entscheidende Trennung, keine Urteilsfindung und kein Urteil möglich.

Gibt es ein solches Kriterium? Eine schwierige Frage! Tatsächlich gibt es, besser gesagt, trifft man, wenn auch nicht allerorten so doch vielerorts, auf eine ganze Reihe von „Kriterien", jedenfalls auf solches, was den gezielten und betonten Anspruch erhebt, *das* „Kriterium" und nicht nur *ein* Kriterium zu sein. Es seien im Folgenden wenigstens zwei in methodischer Absicht angeführt. Ich verschweige allerdings nicht, daß sie in meinen Augen zwar handlich sind, mich aber angesichts der Frage nach dem „Wesen" des Todes, also – wie gesagt paradox ausgedrückt – nach dem „Sein" des Todes zu der Frage drängen: Ist vielleicht der Tod, der nicht nur ein beliebiger Unterschied zu etwas anderem ist, zu etwas, das ein Etwas ist, das von anderem verschieden ist, sondern im strengen Sinne des Wortes der ab-solute Ab-schied von allem, das ein etwas ist, das also durch Unterschiedenheit von anderem gekennzeichnet und dem Sein nach bestimmt ist, selbst das radikalste Kriterium, der Unter-schied katexochen, das Ver-scheiden aller Unterschiede und alles ver-schiedenen Verschiedenen?

Romano Guardini deutet mit seinen „kritischen" Worten eine Richtung an, der wir zwar nicht folgen müssen, die wir aber doch verfolgen können. Rilkes „Todesverherrlichung", von der ja gerade auch v. Rintelen nachdrücklich gesprochen hat, sei, wir wollen es ganz schroff sagen, um unmißverständlich zu sein, ein Ausfluß der Angst vor dem eigenen Tod, also eine Art von Euphemismus, eine sprachliche Beschwörung einer „in Wahrheit" schrecklichen Wirklichkeit, der man sich hinter den Hüllen des schönen Wortes zu entziehen trachtet.

Die Psychoanalyse kennt viele solcher seelischen Vorgänge, bei denen ein Umschlag der Betroffenheit hin zur Beschönigung erfolgt, bei denen Sublimierungen vorgenommen werden, bei denen geheimste Nöte und Ängste in überschwenglich sich ergehender Umwertung „beschworen" werden. Ist Rilkes preisendes Rühmen des Todes ein solches Beschwören, ein händeringender, dichterisch in exaltierten Versen unternommener und vorgetragener Versuch, Wirklichkeit, die „in Wahrheit" anders ist, umzuwerten, Tatsächliches, Faktisches zu idealisieren, Objektives im subjektiven Gefühls-

überschwang, ja Stimmungsrausch seiner selbst zu entfremden und Fernstes, ängstlich Gemiedenes geschönt nahezubringen, jedenfalls in eine erträgliche, auszuhaltende Beziehung zu bringen, sich ihm und es uns zu nähern?

Es scheint zweifelhaft, daß diese psychologische Deutung ausreicht, die zugleich einen Hinweis darauf enthält, wie man sich mitunter die Entstehung von solchem vorstellt, was als „Dichtung" angesprochen wird und als solche gilt, eine Deutung, die leicht und immer bei der Hand ist; denn es könnte immerhin sein, daß gerade die Angst hellsichtig macht und Erkenntnis fördert oder aber, daß die Angst ein altes, uns überkommendes Gefühlsvorurteil ist, das vor den neuen Einsichten Rilkes, die sich gerade durch die ihm nachgesagte Angst nicht beirren lassen, zu schwinden beginnt und seine Wirksamkeit einbüßt. Um dies allerdings feststellen zu können, müßten wir nicht nur *um* den Tod im strengen Sinne des Wortes wissen, sondern wissen, *was* er ist, es sei, wir gäben Rilkes Einsichten ohne nähere Prüfung den Zuschlag.

Machen wir deshalb probeweise ein anderes, und zwar ein sich als zuständig anbietendes Kriterium ausfindig. Es bietet sich dasjenige an, das im Existentiellen des „Existentialismus" – dieser im weitesten Sinne einer Lebensgrundhaltung verstanden – tonangebend gewesen ist und Verwendung gefunden hat, um die Echtheit eines Gedankens oder einer Aussage, die nicht im Bereich des rechnenden und verrechnenden Denkens des Verstandes angesiedelt ist, zu erproben, das „Kriterium", das als die Frage auftritt: Inwieweit haben die Denkenden und die Dichtenden ihre Daseinsdeutung gelebt, ihr also in ihrem Leben und mit ihrem Leben Ausdruck gegeben, sie ver-wirklicht, sie lebendig verkörpert und konsequent das vollzogen, was sie auf diese Weise bezeugt und für wahr befunden und ausfindig gemacht haben? Inwieweit stehen sie ein, und zwar mit ihrem Leben und ihrem Handeln, für das, was sie rühmen und was sie sagen? Kurzum: Haben sie die Probe aufs Exempel durch ihr Exempel bestanden?

Doch vielleicht wird man einwenden, dieses „Kriterium", und zwar nach der Verwirklichung, nach dem „Vollzug" zu fragen, also danach zu fragen, ob jemand mit der ganzen Existenz für das von ihm für wahr Gehaltene einzustehen bereit ist, mag auf Märtyrer und sogar mitunter auf Philosophen zutreffen. Ein Sokrates, der, um dem Schirlingsbecher zu entgehen, sich, und das heißt seinem Denken untreu geworden wäre, hätte nicht die Erinnerung seit mehr als zweitausend Jahren für sich. Er wäre längst vergessen. Aber, so könnte der Einwand lauten, ganz abgesehen davon, daß Menschen mit ihrem Leben nachweislich für bloße Einbildungen und fixe Ideen eingetreten sind, ja es geradezu ein Grundzug des Fanatismus ist, selbst für Dubioses bis zum Letzten gerade zu stehen, es gibt dieses Kriterium nichts an die Hand, um *Wahrheit* von Unwahrheit zu unterscheiden, es beleuchtet nur, zu was Menschen fähig sind. Und hinzukommt, daß, selbst wenn besagtes Kriterium auf Philosophen zutreffen sollte und auch im Bereich der Religion auf die, die sie ernst nehmen und bereit sind, zu Märtyrern zu werden, manch einer meint, daß es gerade auf die Dichter nicht zutrifft, auf diese Lieblinge der Götter, denen nicht verwehrt ist, heute dies, morgen jenes, ja, das Gegenteil von dem zu sagen, was sie unlängst in Verse gefaßt haben und auf das sie sich und uns nicht nur einen *Reim* und nicht nur *einen* Reim sondern unzählige machen. Worin ist dann aber die *Wahrheitsverbindlichkeit* der Dichtung begründet?

Daß ihr gegenüber Zweifel am Platz sind, hat schon Platon mit Nachdruck betont, auf den die antithetische Fixierung der Begriffe „Dichtung und Wahrheit" zurückgeht, wenn er die „erdichtete Sage" von der „wahrhaften Erzählung", wie Friedrich Schleiermacher πλασθέντα μῦθον und ἀληθινὸν λόγον übersetzt oder, wie Franz Susemihl

diese Begriffe überträgt, ein „bloß erdichtetes Märchen" von der „wahren Geschichte" unterscheidet.[5] Platon, der Denker, nicht der Dichter, hat die Dichtung und die Dichter gerade wegen dieser Sprunghaftigkeit und Diskontinuität, wegen ihres halt- und haltungslosen Treibens und Getriebenseins, wegen ihrer Kehrtwendungen, wegen der, wie er es sieht, *Vor*führungen und die hierdurch bei anderen Menschen ausgelösten *Ver*führungen des Sinneswandels ohne konsequenten und logisch schlüssigen inneren Zusammenhang, aus dem von ihm entworfenen und propagierten „Staat", dessen Grundsätze und Verfahrensweisen er programmatisch festgeschrieben hat, hinaus gewiesen.

Er hat, wenn auch spürbar unter Schmerzen, die eine Haßliebe bereiten kann, ihre Inhalte für trügerisch und als gegen die wichtigsten Grundsätze der Wahrheit verstoßend geahndet. „Um es nur zu euch zu sagen – denn ihr werdet mich doch nicht angeben bei den Tragödiendichtern und den übrigen Darstellenden (μιμητικούς) insgesamt – mir scheint dergleichen alles ein Verderb zu sein für die Seele der Zuhörer, so viele ihrer nicht das Heilmittel besitzen, daß sie wissen, wie sich die Dinge in der Wirklichkeit verhalten". „Niemand", selbst Homer nicht, „soll uns über die Wahrheit gehen".[6] Angesichts des „alten Streits zwischen der Philosophie und der Dichtkunst (διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ)" gilt es zu tun, was „die Vernunft uns abnötigt (ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ᾕρει)."[7] Er hat der Form dichterischen Sprechens und Sagens eine unheilvolle Verführung zur Unstetigkeit des Geistes nachgesagt und ihrem Wesen Unwesen vorgeworfen, sogar Täuschungs-absichten über die wahre Wirklichkeit des Seienden, dessen also, was, wie es ist und was es ist, *ist* und das nicht in schönen Worten existiert und sich abspielt, sondern in der Gestalt von ewigen und unveränderlichen, keinem Wandel und keinem Verfall unterworfenen „Ideen" ist, die als Urbilder jedes Abbild und jedes Bild, das die Dichtung sich von etwas, aber auch von ihnen machen mag, an Realität und Klarheit, an Wahrheit und Vollkommenheit, an unvergleichlicher „Güte des Guten" übertrifft.

Dichtung bedeutet solcher verwerfenden Kritik, kraß gesagt, Selbstentfremdung des Menschen von seinem, der „Wahrheit" und dem Guten zugehörigen, angehörenden und gehörenden, auf sie „hörenden", also ihnen folgenden *eigentlichen* Wesen. Platon hätte gewiß nach diesem letztlich vernichtenden Urteil über die Dichtung, jedenfalls hinsichtlich ihres Verhältnisses zur Wahrheit und damit auch zum Guten, kein solches Kriterium, wie es „existentialistisch" betrieben und angewendet worden ist und wird, aufgestellt; denn da die Dichter von vornherein nicht die Wahrheit sagen, braucht ihr Dichten auch nicht auf „Wahrheit" hin überprüft zu werden. Es hat mit ihm eine andere Bewandtnis und es dient anderen Zwecken.

Aber ganz davon angesehen, ob Platons Ablehnung der Dichtung und ihre „Ausweisung" aus dem „Staat", denn sie „verdirbt das Vernünftige (logistikón)"[8] zu Recht besteht oder nicht, ob sie nur *bestimmte* „Dichter" zu treffen vermag, ob sie nur eine Konsequenz von Platons Hypothese von den „Ideen" als der eigentlichen und jedermann, weil in jedes Seele aufspürbaren und tätigen Wirk-lichkeit ist, die die Dichter überflüssig macht und jedermann in die Lage versetzt, deren „Bilder", Gebilde und Mißbildungen, mit dem Urbild vergleichend, zu messen, und deshalb nur diejenigen gelten läßt, die „idealistisch" sind, es dürfte gerechtfertigt sein, Dichtern wie Rilke ge-

[5] Platon, Timaios, 26e. Friedrich August Wolf, Zu Platos Phaedon (Berlin 1812, 27), übersetzt: „Dichtung und Wahrheit".
[6] Platon, Politeia X, 595bc.
[7] Platon, Politeia X, 607b.
[8] Platon, Politeia X, 607b, 605b.

genüber, deren Auftreten durch und durch von einem „aufs Empfindlichste gesteigerten Wahrheitsbedürfnis"[9] gesteuert und geformt scheint, aus diesem Grund das „Kriterium", das alles von der Verwirklichung und dem gelebten Ernst abhängig macht, gerade weil Rilke mit Nachdruck vom „Vollzug" spricht, heranzuziehen. Auf Rilke angewandt, müßten wir dann fragen: Wie ist Rilke gestorben? Hat sich in seinem Sterben sein Dichten, d.h. die dichterischen Weisungen und Preisungen des Todes, erfüllt? Hat er seinem dichterischen Sagen im eigenen Sterben die Voll-endung erwirkt oder aber ist er seinem eigenen Gedicht, dem Gedicht seiner Gedichte, seinem Leben, abtrünnig geworden? Hat er es verraten? Hat er uns gegenüber den Tod gepriesen und sich selbst gewissermaßen seinem eignen Tod, „seinem" Tod entzogen?

Eine ergreifende Schilderung vom Sterben Rilkes ist dem Buch von J. R. v. Salis „Rainer Maria Rilkes Schweizer Jahre" zu entnehmen, eine Schilderung, die seltsamer Weise nicht sehr bekannt geworden ist, weshalb sie hier angeführt sei: „In Valmont waren die Ärzte, die Pflegerin und Frau Wunderly die einzigen Zeugen des langen, schweren Sterbens. Besuche, von wem es auch sei, auch von den ihm im Leben ehemals Nächsten, verbot sich der Kranke wiederholt fast flehentlich. Der Gedanke, man könnte ihn in diesem Zustand besichtigen und bemitleiden kommen, war ihm ganz unerträglich. Auch den Wunsch, keinen Priester zu sehen, äußerte er von neuem.

Während sich bei seinen früheren Erkrankungen Symptome im Blut nicht feststellen ließen, konnte nach Rilkes Ankunft in Valmont eine akute Leukaemie diagnostiziert werden – eine selten auftretende, unheilbare Krankheit, die bei ihm eine besonders schwere, dem gewöhnlichen medizinischen Bild fremde Form angenommen hatte...

Noch während seiner schwersten Krankheit ließ er sich jeden Morgen von ihr (der Wartefrau) die Pariser ‚Chronique mondaine' aus dem ‚Figaro' vorlesen; offenbar wünschte er nur noch dieses fernste Geplätscher äußeren Lebens zu vernehmen, während er mit wichtigeren Nachrichten aus der Welt verschont sein wollte. Am Nachmittag las ihm Frau Wunderly, oft stundenlang, aus einem Band der ‚Cahiers verts' vor; wenn sie glaubte, der Kranke schlafe, und die Lektüre abbrach, rief er mit fast herrischer Stimme: ‚Continuez!'

Den heimkehrenden Arzt Dr. Haemmerli hatte er mit den Worten begrüßt: ‚Lieber Freund, wie gut, daß Sie da sind, daß Sie wissen, was es ist, und ich doch sicher bin, daß Sie es mir nicht sagen.' Und ein anderes Mal: ‚Es ist mir ein Trost, daß Sie wissen, was für unerhörte Qualen ich leide.' Worte des Trostes lehnte er unbedingt ab, er wollte, daß man dieses Leiden w i s s e. Rilke beurteilte seine Krankheit nicht nach medizinischen und anatomischen Maßstäben. Er glaubte, es hätten sich ungeheure Geschehnisse in ihm aufgestaut, die nun diesen körperlichen Ausbruch zum Vorwand für ihr Hervortreten nähmen: ‚Wir waren so wunderbar gute Freunde, mein Körper und ich; ich weiß gar nicht, wie es kam, daß wir uns getrennt haben und einander fremd wurden. Seit zwei Jahren habe ich das Gefühl und die absolute Gewißheit gehabt, daß etwas ins Unermeßliche aufsteigt, das nun ausbricht.' – Das Auftreten der Geschwüre hatte ihn erschreckt, aber auch in der Auffassung bestärkt, daß es für jeden Menschen seine besondere und eigentümliche Krankheit gebe. Auch wollte er durchaus nicht wissen, an welcher Krankheit er litt. An bakterielle Ursachen glaubte er nicht; auch dieses Furchtbarste noch sublimierte er, wie er alles sublimiert hatte im Leben, und verlegte es in den Ablauf eines metaphysischen Vorgangs. Er wünschte nicht, daß man ihm Verschlechterungen mitteile, noch

[9] Bernt von Heiseler, Über neue Lyrik, in: Hochland, 34. Jg., Kempten und München 1937, 487.

daß man ihm Medikamente oder Betäubungsmittel gebe. (Während der Behandlung wurde darauf geachtet, daß die notwendige Schmerzdämpfung durch narkotische Mittel die Grenzen der Bewußtseinstrübung nicht überschritt.) Nur mit Mühe konnte man ihn dazu bewegen, den Besuch eines Consiliarius zu empfangen; Dr. Haemmerli mußte ihm versprechen, daß es ein Arzt sei, der nicht den Dünkel habe, seine Krankheit wie ein Schulmeister einzuordnen. ‚Er soll nur', erwiderte Rilke, ‚wenn Sie es wünschen, das Blut für sich anschauen, aber um Gottes Willen keine professionelle Erklärung geben wollen. Denken Sie, wie schrecklich es wäre, wenn irgendein Pedant kommen und dies alles zerstören würde mit der banalen Tröstlichkeit einer Medizinervisite.'...

In Rilkes Gesprächen mit seinem Arzt kam immer wieder die Sorge zum Vorschein, daß dies niemandes Krankheit sei. Seine alten Vorstellungen von Krankheit und Tod als von geheimnisvollen, großen Ereignissen, die irgendwo ihren tiefen Grund und Sinn haben und sich deshalb an verschiedenen Menschen nicht einfach wiederholen können, scheinen seinen Geist bis zuletzt unablässig beschäftigt zu haben. Merkwürdig, erzählt Dr. Haemmerli, seien diese Gespräche gewesen, die immer bis an die Grenze gingen, wo der Kranke vom Tod das Wort hätte sprechen müssen und er plötzlich behutsam abbrach – aus Angst vielleicht, man könnte das Unfaßbare mit einem medizinischen Ausdruck präzisieren oder aber mit einem Trostwort unterbrechen. Es sei jedesmal schön und ergreifend gewesen, wenn beim Eintreten des Arztes in sein Zimmer Rilke zu ihm sagte: ‚Sie sind da, lieber Freund. Nicht wahr, Sie halten alles fern.'

Die Zeugen dieser Vorgänge sind überzeugt, Rilke habe lange ans Sterben nicht gedacht. Erst drei Tage vor seinem Tod habe er – meint sein Arzt – im tiefsten Grunde gewußt, daß er sterben müsse: ‚Nicht wahr, Sie sagen mir nicht, wie es mir geht', bat er. ‚Wenn Sie hereinkommen und ich schlafe, sprechen Sie mich nicht an. Aber drücken Sie mir die Hand, damit ich weiß, daß Sie da sind, und ich drücke Ihnen die Hand – so in dieser Form – dann wissen Sie, daß ich wach bin. Wenn ich Ihre Hand nicht drücke, versprechen Sie mir, mich aufzusetzen und etwas zu tun, daß ich wieder an meine Grenze komme.' – Einige Male, an den zwei letzten Tagen, sagte er: ‚Vielleicht wird die Lou Salomé doch begreifen, woran es gelegen hat...'

Von wahnsinnigen Fiebern ausgetrocknet, mit völlig abgemagertem Gesicht, lag der Sterbende in seinen Kissen. In der letzten Nacht war er längere Zeit ganz klar. Die Schwellungen im Mund und auf der Zunge wurden auf einmal so stark, daß ihn entsetzliche Schmerzen peinigten. Dann schlummerte er wieder stundenlang, nur ab und zu stöhnte er leise. Der Arzt stützte ihn mit Hilfe der Pflegerin mehrmals in aufrechter Stellung. Um seine Qual zu lindern, machte er ihm eine Einspritzung. – Noch eine Stunde vor dem Tod hat er auf das verabredete Zeichen Dr. Haemmerli die Hand gedrückt. – Plötzlich schaute er mit weit offenen, blauen Augen auf, wie ein Gesunder, blickte lange nach vorn, als sehe er jemanden, preßte krampfhaft die Hände, die ihn hielten. Es war in dieser visionären Stellung nicht möglich zu erkennen, daß er tot war. – Am 29. Dezember 1926, in der Frühe um 5 Uhr, war Rainer Maria Rilke gestorben. Als einer der Anwesenden das Fenster öffnete, wehte vom See ein kalter Morgenwind herüber."[10]

Rilke hat, das unterliegt nach dieser Schilderung wohl keinem Zweifel, paradox ausgedrückt, „seinen" Tod „gelebt", hat ihn er-lebt, getreu der Sicht, die er von ihm gegeben hatte. Somit dürfte er, schulmeisterlich gesagt, das Echtheits- und Wahrheits-Kri-

[10] Jean Rudolf v. Salis, Rainer Maria Rilkes Schweizer Jahre, Frauenfeld/Leipzig 1936; (3. Aufl. 1952), zitiert nach Hochland, 34. Jg., 1937, 81f.

terium einer Aussage, das im übrigen nicht erst der „Existentialismus" aufgestellt hat, erfüllt haben. Sein Dichten wäre, sofern es den Tod aussagt, überzeugend ausgewiesen. Gewiß, im Sinne der Bewahrheitung seines Sagens vom Tod durch seinen eigenen Vollzug, aber, und das ist ja die Frage, auch im Blick auf das Wesende des Todes, auf *dessen*, wenn man so sagen kann, Existenz?

Fragt man so, dann erfolgt eine Wendung gegen besagtes Kriterium, dann fragt man, ist durch Rilkes Tod, in welchem er sein Leben als Dichter vollendet, wirklich das „Problem", das der Tod aufwirft, *gelöst*? Müssen wir Rilkes Sterben und sein Verhältnis zum Tod in der Tat als vorbildlich im Sinne der „Wahrheit" erkennen und nicht nur als konsequentes Verhalten achten, jedenfalls respektieren? Müssen wir in ihm die *Wahrheit* über *Wesen* und *Sinn* des Todes formuliert und dargetan sehen?

Muß nicht – und diese Anmerkung ist methodisch und nicht apodiktisch zu verstehen – dieser Tod eines bedeutenden Dichters den *Christen* zutiefst in Schrecken setzen, weil dieses Sterben zwar manches demonstriert, aber kein Reflex erkennbar ist auf die Erwartung der letzten und einzigartigen Wirklichkeit, die ein Christ im Glauben anvisiert? Und wird nicht im Unterschied zum Christen – und auch diese Einlassung hat methodischen und keinen apodiktischen, unwiderleglichen Charakter – den *Materialisten* der Eindruck einer falschen, jedenfalls unangebrachten Feierlichkeit überkommen, einer Feierlichkeit dort, wo es doch nur „zu Ende" geht und dann „aus" ist? Was der eine zu wissen *glaubt*, verwirft der andere aus einem Glauben an, wie er meint, *Wissen*. Beide sind von dem, was sich da abspielt jeweils nur deshalb überzeugt, weil sie es an jeweils anderen Überzeugungen messen und sich dadurch berechtigt sehen, die jeweils andere Auffassung zu verwerfen.

Die frühen Christen feierten bekanntlich den Todestag ihrer Märtyrer als dies natalis, als den Geburtstag des wesentlichen Menschen, der in den „Himmel" kommt, d.h. seines Gottes ansichtig wird. Die Materialisten bereiten, so es sich um einen Sterbenden handelt, dem das Kollektiv viel verdankt und der gewissermaßen die Inkarnation des Kollektiv-bewußtseins darstellt, die Einbalsamierung und das Staatsbegräbnis im säkularisierten Pantheon vor, und das heißt jetzt und hier: am irdischen Ort des Gestorbenen und des nur in der Verehrung der schlangestehenden und patrouillierenden Wallfahrer unsterblichen „göttlichen" Gott-losen. Beide Gruppen erkennen kein anderes Kriterium an als das, das zu einer, wie sie beide voraussetzen, objektiven Wahrheit führt. Sie „wissen", und zwar jeder auf seine Weise, aus je anderen Quellen und Ursachen, was der *Tod* ist.

Auf Rilke bezogen, aber zugleich von ihm aus nach dem übergeordneten Problem, nicht nur nach *einer* sondern nach *der* Wahrheit der Dichter fragend, tut sich das keineswegs harmlose Problem der Frage nach so etwas wie der „Wahrheit" der *Dichtung* auf; denn die Frage nach der „Wahrheit" der *Dichter* ist, wie eine Untersuchung von Wolfgang Kayser andeutet, eine Frage der philologischen Forschung, durch die ein Spektrum buntester Antworten festgestellt wird. Er ist bemüht, sich im Sinne „literarischer Wertung und Interpretation" einzustellen „*auf das Dichterische*", und er wendet sich deshalb der Aufgabe zu, „Dichtung als Dichtung"[11] lesen und aufnehmen zu können. Bleibt nur noch die Frage, wer seine Aufgabe darin sieht, nach der *Wahrheit* des solcherart Gedichteten der Dichtung zu fragen. Bleibt solches Fragen etwa recht verstandener Philosophie vorbehalten und auferlegt? Aber, wie gesagt und gefragt, *was ist Wahrheit*, was ist die *Wahrheit*?

[11] Wolfgang Kayser, Die Vortragsreise. Studien zur Literatur, Bern 1958, 52.

Niemand wird vermutlich bezweifeln, daß Rilke in zwingender Weise Situationen angesichts des Problems, das der Tod aufwirft und das da „Tod" heißt, in seinem Werk beschrieben, gestaltet und dichterisch beschworen hat. Zurecht hat Erich Kahler „die spezifische Eigenart des Rilkeschen Dichtertums" als „geniale spirituelle Sensitivität" beschrieben und gekennzeichnet, als „Begabung des schöpferischen, forscherischen Erleidens, des aufspürenden Spürens, wo das Herz und der Geist an die Peripherie des Sensoriums, an die äußerste Front der Nerven vorgerückt, ja geradezu in die Sinne und Nerven übergegangen sind, und wo Eindruck und Ausdruck einander wechselseitig steigern."[12]. Wie echt klingen seine Worte, wenn er etwa von der von Orpheus unendlich geliebten Eurydice sagt:

„Sie war in sich. Und ihr Gestorbensein
erfüllte sie wie Fülle.
Wie eine Frucht von Süßigkeit und Dunkel,
so war sie voll von ihrem großen Tode,
der also neu war, daß sie nichts begriff."[13]

Wenn er in den „Sonetten an Orpheus" ausruft:

„Sei immer tot in Eurydike -, singender steige,
preisender steige zurück in den reinen Bezug.
Hier, unter Schwindenden, sei, im Reiche der Neige,
sei ein klingendes Glas, das sich im Klang schon zerschlug."[14]

Wie überzeugend kommt es uns an, wenn Rilke im „Stundenbuch" bittet:

„O Herr, gieb jedem seinen eignen Tod.
Das Sterben, das aus jenem Leben geht,
darin er Liebe hatte, Sinn und Not."[15]

Welch bittersüßes Echo mag der Schluß der „Duineser Elegien" mit dem Abgesang auf den Toten bewirken:

„Stehn am Fuß des Gebirgs.
Und da umarmt sie ihn, weinend.
Einsam steigt er dahin, in die Berge des Ur-Leids.
Und nicht einmal sein Schritt klingt aus dem tonlosen Los.

*

Aber erweckten sie uns, die unendlich Toten, ein Gleichnis,
siehe, sie zeigten vielleicht auf die Kätzchen der leeren
Hasel, die hängenden, oder
meinten den Regen, der fällt auf dunkles Erdreich im Frühjahr. -
Und wir, die an *steigendes* Glück
denken, empfänden die Rührung,
die uns beinah bestürzt,
wenn ein Glückliches *fällt*."[16]

Wir halten inne mit Zitieren, geht es uns doch nicht ums Ergriffensein sondern um das angezielte übergeordnete Problem von *Dichtung und Philosophie*. Wohl niemand, der Rilke liest, kann sich dem „Hinuntertrinken dieser sonderbaren Musiken"[17] entziehen,

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[12] Erich Kahler, Die Verantwortung des Geistes. Gesammelte Aufsätze, Frankfurt am Main 1952. Was ist ein Gedicht?, 189.

[13] Rilke, Neue Gedichte: Orpheus. Euridike. Hermes, in: Werke 1, 544.

[14] Rilke, Die Sonette an Orpheus. Geschrieben als ein Grab-Mal für Wera Ouckama Knoop, (Château de Muzot im Februar 1922), in: Werke 1, 759.

[15] Rilke, Das Stunden-Buch, 3. Buch. Das Buch von der Armut und vom Tode (1903), in: Werke I, 347.

[16] Rilke, Duineser Elegien. Aus dem Besitz der Fürstin Marie von Thurn und Taxis-Hohenlohe, in: Werke 1, 725f.

[17] Bernt von Heiseler, Über neue Lyrik, in: Hochland, 34. Jg., Kempten und München 1937, 487.

diesem Deuten und diesem Kosten der gedeuteten Dinge, sei es der „Panther" oder ein „Blinder", ein „Torso" oder „Orpheus", oder aber der Tod, angesichts dessen er die „einzigartige Grabschrift" für sich ersonnen hat, die dem Grabstein eingemeißelt ist: „Rose, o reiner Widerspruch. Lust/ Niemandes Schlaf zu sein unter soviel/ Lidern." Rose als „Gleichnis des ‚reinen', das heißt versöhnten und als Weltgesetz in den eigenen Willen aufgenommenen Widerspruchs", als „Chiffre für das Sein und Wesen des toten Dichters", der, denn „Lider" meint auch seine „Lieder", „hinter" der „Blüte seines Werkes" „als ein Nichts, ein Schlaf, den niemand schläft", „verschwindet".[18] Wohl niemand kann sich Rilkes dichterischem Wort entziehen, aber *öffnen* wir uns dadurch dem Sinn und Wesen des Todes oder *entziehen* wir uns ihm gerade auf diese Weise? *Was* ist der Tod? Was *ist* der Tod? Was ist das Ist seines nicht-seienden Seins?

Es dürfte inzwischen deutlicher geworden sein, was zu Anfang lediglich merkwürdig geklungen haben mag, daß es gilt, nach dem Tod als einem *Problem* zu fragen, das Rilke vielleicht nur „beschworen", nicht aber gelöst hat. Was aber berechtigt uns, Rilkes „Todesverherrlichung" (v. Rintelen) als eine unter anderen möglichen oder tatsächlich vorgenommenen, aber nicht verbindlichen Deutungen des Todes gewissermaßen nur einzureihen?

Vielleicht mißt ja Romano Guardinis psychologisches Kriterium, das die Verherrlichung des Todes auf Rilkes eigene Todesangst zurückführt, zu kurz. Und das „existentialistische" Kriterium, Wahrheit durch Bewährung im Leben und im Sterben zu begründen, ist nicht allgemeingültig und will es nicht sein. Sind nicht viele um sinnloser Dinge willen gestorben, willig und überzeugt gestorben, wenn sie es für etwas Besonderes erachtet und dementsprechend eingeschätzt haben? Es kommt nur zur Feststellung der subjektiven Unbedingtheit in der Übernahme und im Vollzug von existentiell durchaus tiefgreifenden und gewissermaßen den Personkern oder die innerste Existenz berührenden An-nahmen.

Wir haben, um das *methodologische* Bewußtsein zu entwickeln, Rilkes Trachten, dem Tod gewissermaßen seinen Stachel zu nehmen, vor den Hintergrund der christlichen Auffassung vom Tod als dem Geburtstag zum „ewigen Leben" gestellt und könnten uns auch auf die Auffassung vom Tod als „der Sünde Sold" beziehen.[19] Und wir stellten dem – ebenfalls in methodologischer Hinsicht – gegenüber die materialistische Einstellung der Selbstverständlichkeit angesichts des Todes, der die Bezeichnung dafür ist, daß es „aus" ist. Welche Auffassung sollen wir uns zu eigen machen, die des Dichters Rilke, die der christlichen Offenbarung oder diejenige dieser oder jener so oder so begründeten philosophischen Auffassung; denn statt des „Materialismus" hätte sich auch der „Idealismus" anführen lassen, und es hätten sich die argumentativen Gedanken eines Platon heranziehen lassen, und wir hätten zum Beispiel auf das nachdrückliche logische Bemühen des Sokrates in Platons Dialog „Phaidon" zurückgreifen können, woselbst eine Reihe von Beweisen, richtiger, jedenfalls unmißverständlicher gesagt, von Aufweisversuchen, die die Unsterblichkeit der Seele in heftigen Streitgesprächen kurz vor der Hinrichtung des unschuldig verurteilten Philosophen demonstrieren möchten, vorgebracht und erörtert werden.[20]

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[18] Rainer Maria Rilke in Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten. Dargestellt von Hans Egon Holthusen, Hamburg 1958, 163.

[19] Paulus, Röm. 5,12. Vgl. Romano Guardini, Die letzten Dinge. „Der Tod des Menschen ist kein Bestandteil seines Wesens, sondern die Folge einer Tat", 16.

[20] Platon, Phaidon, in: Sämtliche Werke, 3. In der Übersetzung von Friedrich Schleiermacher nach der Stephanus-Numerierung hrsg. von Walter F. Otto, Ernesto Grassi, Gert Plamböck, Hamburg 1958.

Es ist ratsam, bei der Frage: Was ist der Tod wirklich, das Wort „wirklich" wörtlich zu nehmen und zu fragen, was bewirkt das ihm wesentlich eigene Sein, und nicht in erster Linie darauf zu starren, in welcher Weltanschauung und von welchen „Wissenden" die einzig mögliche Antwort auf diese Frage zu erhalten ist – selbst wenn es sie vielleicht geben mag -, vielmehr darauf zu achten, daß die Frage auch eine methodische Frage ist, also eine, die auf dem *Weg* ist und die in ein übergreifendes Problem hineinweist, in das Problem von Philosophie und Dichtung, und damit in das Problem der Kriterien, durch die die Wahrheit *ge*funden und nicht *er*funden wird. Wenn, was ich bereits angedeutet habe, der Tod „wesentlich" selbst das entschiedenste Kriterium ist, das nicht nur erlaubt, den äußersten Unter-schied, den von Leben und Tod, zu bemerken, sondern durch den Ab-schied, den er bringt oder der er ist, das Schiedlichste ist, ist ihm mit „Kriterien", die abkünftige Modi sind oder sein mögen, nicht zu entsprechen und gewissermaßen „zu Leibe" zu rücken.

Philosophie hat, seit es sie gibt, auf die unterschiedlichsten Weisen nach der „Wahrheit" gefragt, wohlgemerkt gefragt, und wenn in ihr, wie es nur zu oft geschehen ist und geschieht, dies oder jenes als „die" Wahrheit behauptet wird, so fragt das *Philosophieren* als die der Philosophie eigene Lebendigkeit immer wieder über die gegebenen Antworten hinaus, hält die Frage offen, indem es sich nicht bei Antworten beruhigt und sein Treiben, besser gesagt, ihr Getriebensein durch das Fragen, einstellt oder aufgibt. Das *Fragen* ist das Wesensgesetz der Philosophie, ihr Leben und „Wesen", und in gewisser Weise ihr Untergang; denn gelänge ihr, was manche Philosophen meinten, erreicht zu haben, käme sie an ihr Ende. Aber, solange sie fragt, fragt sie die Frage nach der Wahrheit, fragt sie diese Frage im Hinblick auf alles, was ist, nicht nur hinsichtlich ihrer selbst sondern auch im Blick auf die Dichtung, und zwar, ob es den Dichtern gefällt oder nicht.

Doch ist, und dadurch wird das Problem gewissermaßen brennend, die Frage nach der Wahrheit nicht nur die Frage der Philosophie, sie ist die Frage der Menschlichkeit des Menschen, der das fragende Wesen katexochen ist[21]; denn trotz aller Versuche Friedrich Nietzsches, darzutun, daß zwar notwendig sei, daß Wahrheit ist, daß aber ihr „Wert für das Leben entscheidet", daß das Wahre der sogenannten Wahrheit nichts anderes ist als ihre Brauchbarkeit für das Leben, folglich das Wahre dieser Wahrheit nicht wahr zu sein braucht, ja es nicht ist, ja, daß dieses Wahre der Wahrheit gerade nicht die behauptete Wahrheit ist, daß vielmehr gilt: „Wahrheit ist die Art von Irrtum, ohne welche eine bestimmte Art von lebendigen Wesen nicht leben könnte"[22], bleibt den Menschen, die es noch nicht in Nietzsches Sinne zum „Übermenschen" gebracht haben, und das trifft auf uns alle zu, nichts anderes übrig, als nach der Wahrheit als dem zu fragen, das uns dem Wesen von etwas konfrontiert, durch das wir uns nicht nur nichts über etwas und über uns selbst *vormachen*, sondern dem nahezukommen trachten, was *ist* und *was* etwas ist, es sei Gott, Welt oder Mensch.

Nietzsche hat auf eine bemerkenswerte Weise aufgedeckt, daß es sich bei vielem, was gerade auch Philosophen unter dem Namen „Wahrheit" angezielt und zum Ausdruck gebracht haben, „gar nicht um ‚Wahrheit', sondern um etwas anderes handelte, sagen wir um Gesundheit, Zukunft, Wachstum, Macht, Leben...". Aber wie in anderen Fällen

[21] Richard Wisser, Die Fraglichkeit der Frage nach dem Menschen, in: Richard Wisser, Philosophische Wegweisung. Versionen und Perspektiven, 2. Aufl., Würzburg 1998, 415-439.

[22] Friedrich Nietzsche, Aus dem Nachlaß der Achtziger Jahre, in: Werke in drei Bänden. Hrsg. von Karl Schlechta, 2., durchgesehene Aufl. München 1960, 3. Band, 844.

auch übertreibt er, wenn er behauptet, daß es sich „bei allem Philosophieren" nur um derlei gehandelt habe.[23] Nietzsche kann durchaus auf Erfahrungen verweisen, wenn er den „Willen zur Wahrheit, zur ‚Wahrheit um jeden Preis'" als „Jünglings-Wahnsinn in der Liebe zur Wahrheit" charakterisiert und die Folgerung aus dieser Einschätzung zieht: „Wir glauben nicht mehr daran, daß Wahrheit noch Wahrheit bleibt, wenn man ihr die Schleier abzieht". Aber Nietzsche ist nicht der Gefahr entgangen, die Schleier, in die die Wahrheit gekleidet wird, mit der Wahrheit zu verwechseln.[24] Und er hat zwar mit großer Energie unternommen, sich Klarheit darüber zu verschaffen, was das ist, „was in uns eigentlich ‚zur Wahrheit' will", und er war sichtlich bemüht, darzutun, daß es Sache des Willens ist, nach dem „Werte der Wahrheit"[25] für *uns* zu fragen, z.B. nach ihrer Nützlichkeit für das *Leben*, für *unser* Leben. Aber er hat unterlassen, danach zu fragen, was *sie* von uns will. Deshalb können gerade die Erfahrungen, die Nietzsche gemacht hat und die schließlich in den Satz münden, „daß die Kunst mehr wert ist, als die Wahrheit"[26], dazu dienen, Abwege hinsichtlich der Wahrheit zu vermeiden, nicht aber *ihr* gerecht zu werden und den Umgang mit *ihr* einzuüben. Sie müssen gerade nicht von der Wahrheit ablenken, helfen vielmehr, Verwechslungen zu vermeiden, und sie verhelfen dazu, die Sensibilität für die Wahrheit zu steigern.

Ist es diese Sensibilität für die Wahrheit, die verhindert, daß wir, prosaisch gesagt, der Kunst „auf den Leim gehen"? Denn bleibt nicht gerade bei Versen Rilkes oft dieses seltsam schmeichelnde Werben einer Melancholie der Einsamkeit das bleibende Erlebnis, diese „letzte Verfeinerung der Sinne und Nerven, die an Hellsichtigkeit, an die überschärften Sinne des Hungernden grenzt", das Erlebnis des „Hinüberfließens in jene Geschöpfe"[27], in eine Gebärde, in eine Haltung, in eine Sonne, in einen Blinden, in einen Torso? Und, so wird philosophisch zu fragen sein, also im Sinne des auf Wahrheit angelegten Menschen: Erfahren wir auf diese Weise das „Wesen", das Walten, das Eigensein der Dinge?

Platon sagt nicht nur an einer Stelle im „Staat" den Dichtern auf den Kopf zu, daß sie „lügen".[28] Hölderlins Vers: „was bleibet aber, stiften die Dichter" (Andenken), hält dagegen. Heidegger hat sogar angedeutet, daß in gewisser Weise sein „Denken" als die Explikation, die begriffliche Entfaltung der dichterischen Existenz von Hölderlin und – bedingt – von Rilke erscheinen könne, was an gehöriger Stelle zu erörtern sein wird. Hier nur so viel: „Hölderlin sagt... vom dichterischen Wohnen nicht das gleiche wie unser Denken. Trotzdem denken wir das Selbe, was Hölderlin dichtet... Wenn wir dem nachdenken, was Hölderlin über das dichterische Wohnen des Menschen dichtet, vermuten wir einen Weg, auf dem wir durch das verschieden Gedachte hindurch uns dem Selben nähern, was der Dichter dichtet."[29]

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[23] Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Werke, 2. Band, 12 (2).
[24] Nietzsche, idem, 14 (4).
[25] Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Werke, 2. Band, 567f.
[26] Nietzsche, Aus dem Nachlaß der Achtziger Jahre, Werke, 3. Band, 693 (14).
[27] Robert Faesi, Rainer Maria Rilke, Zürich 1919. Vgl. auch seine Charakteristik Rilkes, in: Erlebnisse Ergebnisse. Erinnerungen von Robert Faesi, Zürich 1963: „Seiner Sensibilität, die ihn ununterbrochen durch Sinne und Nerven in anregende, aber zugleich verbrauchende Beziehung mit dem Aussen setzte, war die natürliche Regenerationskraft nicht gewachsen", 386.
[28] Platon, Politeia II, 377d-e; X, 607e: Die These lautet, daß „alle Dichter", von Homer angefangen, „an die Wahrheit nicht heranreichen", sie „nicht berühren" (τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας οὐχ ἅπτεσθαι). Aristoteles zitiert, allerdings kritisch, in der „Metaphysik" das „Sprichwort": „Viel lügen die Sänger zusammen", A2, 983a 3f. (Ins Deutsche übertragen von Adolf Lasson, Jena 1907, 11).
[29] Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, Pfullingen 1954: „...Dichterisch wohnet der Mensch...", 193.

Sören Kierkegaard dagegen kämpft mit einer ent-schiedenen Entschlossenheit und einer radikalen Verbissenheit gegen das Reich der Phantasie und gegen das „Ästhetische", das, wie er einmal sagt, sogar mit der ewigen Seligkeit nur „dichtend" umgehe, aber, können wir hinzufügen, auch mit dem „Tod". Dichtung ist ihm, mit einem Wort gesagt, die Flucht vor dem Letzten, vor dem, was das Existieren vor Gott erschließt. Und ein Diktum Hegels, ein Satz aus seiner „Einleitung in die Ästhetik" brennt im Herzen des Künstlers, der sich über das kritische Wesen des Menschen nicht mutwillig oder wirklichkeitsblind hinwegsetzt, und er verwirrt den Kopf des Kunstfreundes, weil das, was er sagt, noch immer unbewältigt ist: Es „ist und bleibt die Kunst nach der Seite ihrer höchsten Bestimmung für uns ein Vergangenes." Und Hegel fährt fort: „Damit hat sie für uns auch die ächte Wahrheit und Lebendigkeit verloren, und ist mehr in unsere V o r s t e l l u n g verlegt, als daß sie in der Wirklichkeit ihre frühere Nothwendigkeit behauptete, und ihren höheren Platz einnähme."[30] Selbst wenn es der Philosophie im Sinne der Aufgabe, die Wolfgang Kayser, der Philologe, ihr zumißt, gelänge, darzutun, daß „nicht in Worten, Begriffen, Gedanken der Wahrheitsgehalt der Dichtung liegt, sondern in der Gestaltung", die Frage bleibt: Was haben wir von der Dichtung zu halten? Sind wir doch in eine erhebliche Konfusion geraten, sehen uns doch hin- und hergezerrt, ermutigt, gewarnt, beschworen und verdächtigt.

Sind wir aber nicht vielleicht vom Weg abgekommen? Wir wollten doch über Rilkes Verhältnis zum Tod sprechen und stehen jetzt vor der Frage nach Philosophie und Dichtung hinsichtlich dessen, was man „Wahrheit" nennt. Immerhin, und es sei darauf verwiesen, haben wir gleich zu Anfang, als wir nach Rilkes Verhältnis, und nicht nur nach seinem, zum Problem des Todes fragten – vielleicht sollten wir unter Berücksichtigung dessen, was Gabriel Marcel, der im übrigen über sich bekundet, daß „das Werk Rilkes meine eigene Arbeit unendlich mehr gefördert hat als irgendein System, das ein Spezialist auf irgendeiner oft sehr deutlich mangelhaften persönlichen Basis errichtet hat"[31], nachdrücklich angemahnt, statt vom *Problem* des Todes vom „Mysterium" des Todes sprechen, eine Terminologie, von der Marcel sagt, daß er zu ihr „schon so oft" seine „Zuflucht genommen habe"[32] – , die Zielrichtung angesprochen. Damit war die Frage nach der Wahrheit und nach dem „Trefflichen" seiner Gestaltungen, seiner Aussagen und seines Sagens, seiner Dichtens und seiner Dichtungen, seines Gesanges gestellt. Fraglich wurde aber zugleich, ob es zulässig ist, den Dichter solcherart nach der „sachlichen", gewissermaßen objektiven Trefflichkeit zu befragen, den *Dichter*, der doch nach dem bekannten Wort Hölderlins es ist, der das Bleibende „stiftet".

Rilke ist, und dem ist nicht zu widersprechen, gerade der Dichter, der mit vollem „Einsatz" und im „Vollzug" die Sachen „eindichtet". Das ist ja der Grund dafür, weshalb er es ist, der uns zu dem Problem von Philosophie und Dichtung den Weg gewiesen hat. Edmund Husserls markanter Ruf des Philosophen: Zurück zu den Sachen! fin-

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[30] Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik, 1. Band, 32. Sämtliche Werke in zwanzig Bänden, 12. Band, Stuttgart 1937. Daß Hegel nicht das Ende der Kunst apostrophiert, sondern konstatiert, daß sie nicht mehr das „höchste Interesse des Geistes" (150) ist, drücken die erläuternden Sätze aus: „Man kann wohl hoffen, daß die Kunst immer mehr steigen und sich vollenden werde, aber ihre Form hat aufgehört, das höchste Bedürfnis des Geistes zu seyn. Mögen wir die griechischen Götterbilder noch so vortrefflich finden, und Gott Vater Christus, Maria noch so würdig und vollendet dargestellt sehen, es hilft nichts, unser Knie beugen wir doch nicht mehr", 151. Vgl. Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, Frankfurt am Main 1950, 66.

[31] Gabriel Marcel, Homo viator. Philosophie der Hoffnung, Düsseldorf 1949, 302.

[32] Gabriel Marcel, Homo viator, 37. Vgl. auch: Le mystère de l'être, Paris 1951. Dt. Geheimnis des Seins, Wien 1952.

det seine Entsprechung in Rilkes Ruf des Dichters: Zurück zu den Dingen. Er verbietet sich jedes vordergründige Wort und fordert niemals eine von Äußerlichem gedrungene, gedungene, lediglich füllende, nur ausfüllende Phrase, niemals das Approximative als Ausweg statt der Näherung.

Bernt von Heiseler hat sich, wie gesagt, über den „unmittelbaren Anschlag, der die Seele trifft", und doch „sehen kann, was da geschieht", Rechenschaft gegeben:

> „Was den Genuß, das einfache Hinuntertrinken dieser sonderbaren Musiken oft schwierig macht, ist eben das aufs empfindlichste gesteigerte Wahrheitsbedürfnis, das darin waltet. Nur nie das Annähernde, nie die Umschreibung setzen statt der Sache! so scheint sein unnachsichtiger Genius ihm zuzuflüstern. Das führt ihn dazu, daß er die Sprache, dies leidige, immer noch unentbehrliche Instrument des Ausdrucks, renkt und zwingt, um sie stets durchlässig zu halten, damit sie dem von innen hervordrängenden Licht nicht im Weg ist."[33]

Erschöpfen sich aber nicht vielleicht doch seine Möglichkeiten in der Verdichtung von Situationen, von jeweiligen Stimmungen, im Erklingenlassen des Unsagbaren? Wenn aber – und dies trifft nicht erst für das Denken Heideggers zu – „das Dichten wahrer als die Erkundung des Seienden" ist, und das sagt wohlgemerkt Aristoteles,[34] dann wird ein Wort Heideggers verständlicher, das besagt: „Jetzt müssen zuvor Denkende sein, damit das Wort des Dichtenden vernehmbar wird."[35]

Sollte dies zutreffen, dann befinden wir uns in einer für das Wesen der Philosophie und ihr Selbstverständnis ent-scheidenden Epoche. Alles scheint, wenigstens von Heideggers Denken her gesehen, darauf hinzudeuten, daß die Philosophie sich auf die Explikation der Dichtung einzulassen habe, ja, in einem eigens zu bedenkenden Sinn auf sie eingehend, in ihr aufzugehen hat, gesetzt, es handelt sich um solche Dichtung, die auf das Selbe aus ist wie die Philosophie, wobei das Selbe nicht ohne weiteres das Gleiche meint.

Verwiesen sei auf Heideggers Hölderlin-Auslegungen, auf seine George-Deutung, auf sein Eingehen auf Trakl, auf seine Erfahrungen mit Rilke und Nietzsche, um nur solche Dichter zu nennen, die auch von Heideggers „Schülern" „angedacht" worden sind.[36] Angesichts einer komplexen Diskussion sei wenigstens Walter Bröcker genannt, der bisweilen den Sinn von Heideggers Denken geradezu in der Selbstaufhebung der Philosophie zugunsten einer mythischen Weltreligiosität in der Weise des Dichters Hölderlin sieht, sehen zu dürfen meint.[37] Hingewiesen sei auch auf meine Besprechung einer Veröffentlichung von Volkmann-Schluck über Nietzsche, die zum Thema gehört, weil Volkmann-Schluck allen Ernstes die Frage aufwirft, ob sich nicht das Denken viel-

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[33] Bernt von Heiseler, 487.

[34] Wilhelm Nestle, Der Zweck seiner „Poetik" ist „die Rehabilitierung der von Platon in seinem Staat abgelehnten... Dichtung". Aristoteles, Hauptwerke. Ausgewählt, übersetzt und eingeleitet von Wilhelm Nestle, 3. Auflage, Stuttgart 1942, XLIV.

[35] Martin Heidegger, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung. Zweite, vermehrte Auflage, Frankfurt am Main 1952. „Heimkunft / An die Verwandten", 29.

[36] Hingewiesen sei schon hier auf: Martin Heidegger, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung. Zweite, vermehrte Auflage, Frankfurt am Main 1951; Holzwege. Wozu Dichter?, 248-295 (Vortrag zum Andenken an R. M. Rilkes zwanzigsten Todestag 1946), Frankfurt am Main 1950; „...Dichterisch wohnet der Mensch...", 187-204, in: Vorträge und Aufsätze, Pfullingen 1954; Zu Hölderlin. Griechenlandreisen. Gesamtausgabe Band 75, Frankfurt am Main 2000; Die Sprache im Gedicht. Eine Erörterung von Georg Trakls Gedicht, 35-82, in: Unterwegs zur Sprache, Pfullingen 1959. Dort auch: Das Wort. (Dichten und Denken. Zu Stefan Georges Gedicht *Das Wort*), 217-238.

[37] Richard Wisser, Grenze und Begrenzung der Philosophie. Walter Bröcker: „Dialektik – Positivismus – Mythologie" (Frankfurt am Main 1958), Rezension, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nr. 140, Literaturblatt, 21. Juni 1958.

leicht in Zukunft im alles ermöglichenden und im dichtenden Wechselspiel des „Gesanges" auflösen müsse.[38]

Aber, mag auch das „Denken" spezifisch für Heidegger sein, Heidegger ist gerade deshalb nicht mit der „Philosophie" identisch. Andererseits läßt schon Platon einen so unverdächtigen, allem Mystizismus abholden Philosophen und rechtverstandenen „Sophisten" wie Sokrates sagen – und dies in scheinbarem Widerspruch zu seiner eigenen Verurteilung und Aburteilung der Dichter und der von ihm geforderten Ausschließung aus dem „Staat" -, daß die Philosophie eigentlich die höchste, und das heißt, die eigentliche Dichtkunst ist. Und Platon hat, jedenfalls ist das eine Deutung, die Gerhard Krüger, der im übrigen für das übergeschichtlich „Erleuchtende" Platons gegen Nietzsches Geschichtsbe-tonung und für die Wesenserfahrung gegen die Geschichtlichkeit, also für „Wesen" statt „Weg" optiert, dem Dialog „Phaidon" zuteil hat werden lassen, hat als die wirkliche Tragik des Todes von Sokrates nicht das Sterben oder das Trinken des Schirlingsbechers als Folge eines Justizmords angesehen, sondern die Tatsache, daß die Philosophie mit ihren Mitteln das Letzte und Ent-scheidende, ja einzig Lebensnotwendige, nicht zu sagen vermag und deshalb dort, wo es für sie nicht mehr weitergeht, die Dichtung anruft zu helfen, sie zu Hilfe ruft, wenn und weil der Gedanke zu kurz greift.[39]

Überschlagen wir das bisher Gesagte und Erreichte: Im Ausgang von der Frage nach Rilkes Verhältnis zum *Problem* des Todes und nicht nur nach *seinem Verhältnis* zum Tod nahm der Weg eine merkwürdige Wendung hin zu einem Problem, das ansteht und kennzeichnend für mehr als nur eine wichtige Phase in der Entwicklung der Philosophie und des Denkens ist, die Frage nach dem *Verhältnis von Philosophie und Dichtung*. Schritte dieses Weges sind durch die Frage gekennzeichnet: Hat Rilke mit seinen Aussagen über den Tod respektive seinem „Sagen" von dem Tod überhaupt vom Tod gesprochen und nicht vielleicht nur von sich selbst und seinem Umgang mit etwas, dem auf die von ihm geleistete Weise und mit seinen Worten nicht entsprochen wird?

Kritisch macht Romano Guardini auf das Psychologicum aufmerksam, daß Rilkes Todesverherrlichung ein Ausfluß der Angst vor dem eigenen Tod, vor seinem, das heißt seinem eigenen Tod sein könne, ein Ausfluß der Angst letztlich vor der wirk-lichen Wirklichkeit des Todes und seines metaphysischen, religiösen „Wesens" und Waltens, eine Angst, die sich etwas vormacht. Guardinis „Kriterium" der Beurteilung schien uns zwar bedenkenswert, aber nicht ausreichend, eine begründete Ent-scheidung darüber zu fällen, ob Rilkes Dichtung über den Tod nur der Angst vor dem Tod entwachsen ist. Auf das Nur kommt es aber an, darauf, welcher *Wahrheitsgehalt* in dem von Rilke vielleicht doch geschauten und er-fahrenen *Wesen* des Todes zum Vorschein kommt.

Um den Wahrheitsgehalt thematisch zu machen, versuchten wir es mit dem existentiellen „Kriterium" und fragten folglich nach dem „Vollzug" des von Rilke dichterisch Gesagten in Leben und Tod, also angesichts des Lebens und angesichts des Todes. Fragten nach der Bewährung seines dichterischen Sagens: Hat Rilke, wenn uns im Blick

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[38] Richard Wisser, Gedanke und Gedicht bei Nietzsche – Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck: „Nietzsches Gedicht ‚Die Wüste wächst, weh dem, der Wüsten birgt'...", in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nr. 134, Literaturblatt, 13. Juli 1959.

[39] Vgl. Richard Wisser, Wesen und Weg der Philosophie. Gerhard Krüger: „Grundfragen der Philosophie. Geschichte – Wahrheit – Wissenschaft" (Frankfurt am Main 1958), Rezension, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nr. 223, Literaturblatt, 26. September 1958. Vgl. auch Richard Wisser, Wesen und Geschichte. Gerhard Krüger, Grundfragen der Philosophie, in: Zeitwende – die neue furche, XXX. Jahrgang, Heft 10, Hamburg 1959, 698-701.

auf sein erschütterndes Sterben, über das uns der zitierte Bericht Kunde gibt, solches zu sagen erlaubt ist, die Probe aufs Exempel bestanden? Aber auch dieses „Kriterium" reichte nicht zu, weil es uns nur die subjektive Unbedingtheit, die subjektive Bewährung – so wesentlich diese auch sein mag und ist – im Sterben des Dichters vor Augen führen konnte und kein Richtmaß an die Hand gegeben hat, um die – wie man das doch ein wenig vordergründig üblicherweise nennt – Objektivität, die allgemeine Gültigkeit seiner Aussagen über den Tod zu sichern.

Fast wurde uns auf solche Weise das Reden von „Kriterien" überhaupt suspekt, der Umgang mit Meßlatten, die Feststellung von zu Verrechnendem und Errechenbarem, das Ablesenkönnen an einem handlichen Richtmaß. Muß vielleicht, so fragten wir, das übliche Reden von den „Kriterien", durch das sich mancher, der sie anwendet, so aufdringlich in Szene setzt, im Blick auf das Phänomen des Todes zur Einsicht gebracht werden, daß es zu kurz greift, daß es nicht geeignet ist, über den Tod zu befinden, vielmehr umgekehrt der Tod als das ur-sprünglichste Kriterium, das heißt, als der radikale Unter-schied, als der Ab-schied im Ver-scheiden, ins Auge gefaßt werden muß, um die üblichen Kriterien als abkünftige Modi des tiefgreifendsten „Scheidens", als die abgründige „Kritik", als die Grund-Krise von allem zu erkennen?

Die Beschäftigung mit dem Tod, hellsichtig gemacht durch die Beschäftigung mit dem Problem (vielleicht, wie mit Gabriel Marcel gesagt, mit dem „Mysterium" des Todes), wäre dann von ent-scheidender Bedeutung. Würde sie doch einen Einblick in eine *Grundbefindlichkeit*, und zwar in die der „Endlichkeit" des menschlichen Seins, erlauben, die es einsichtig macht, nicht auf vordergründige „Kriterien" zu setzen und zu vermeinen, sie seien der Grund-Krise des radikal kritischen Unter-schieds enthoben, ließen also das traditionelle distinguere zu, das nur ein Unterscheiden im Rahmen des nicht ver-scheidenden Verschiedenen ist.

So ergab sich die Notwendigkeit, zu einer anderen Methode überzugehen und Rilkes Aussagen vor den Hintergrund der religiösen Offenbarung *christlicher* „Lehre" über den Tod und vor den Hintergrund philosophischer Systeme zu stellen, sei es das *materialistische*, sei es das *idealistische*. Vor diesen jeweils verschiedenen Hinter-Gründen – Nietzsche hat im Blick auf beide „Typen" von bloßen „Hinterwelten" gesprochen, und wir betonten, daß solches methodisch verstanden werden solle und daß uns nichts Abschätziges im Sinne steht -, und Rilkes Sagen hob sich vor dem, was solche Hinter-Gründe meinen, nämlich „Kriterien" der Be-urteilung, also Fähigkeiten zu unter-scheiden, „Scheinbares" von „Wahrem", die „Sache" von bloßer „Meinung", „Tatsächliches" von „Fiktivem" „scheiden" zu können, seltsam verzerrt ab, je nach dem Standpunkt und der zugrunde gelegten Sichtweise.

Damit waren wir bei dem *fundamentalen* Problem angelangt, bei der Frage nach der Basis, dem Grund, der Wahrheit der Dichtung und dem Ver-hältnis von Dichten und Denken, von Philosophie und Dichtung. Soviel ist dabei allerdings schon jetzt deutlich geworden: Bei dem „Und" handelt es sich nicht um eine beliebige Und-Verbindung, deren es ja unendlich viele gibt. In diesem „Und" steckt vielmehr das oft als höchst widersprüchlich erachtete Verhältnis zwischen so etwas wie Philosophie und Dichtung. Es scheint daher wichtig, sich den möglichen Sinn des Wörtchens „und" wenigstens einigermaßen verständlich zu machen.

Das „Und" zwischen Philosophie und Dichtung kann Verschiedenes bezüglich ihres Ver-hältnisses und dementsprechendem Ver-halten bedeuten. Es kann einmal Ge-

trenntes, ja Gegensätzliches zur harten Gegenüberstellung bringen, kann Aus-einandersetzung bedeuten: hie Philosophie, hie Dichtung. Es kann den Kampf beider Parteien um den Sieg bedeuten, beispielsweise Platons Kampf gegen die Dichtung, geführt unter dem Banner der „philosophischen" Wahrheit, oder aber Kierkegaards Kampf im Zeichen der christlichen Religion. Es kann zum Ausdruck bringen – und auch diese Beispiele spielen eine wichtige Rolle -, die Bestrebungen, die Philosophie in der Dichtung als der höchsten Stufe der Wahrheit aufgehen zu lassen, die Philosophie also zu überwinden im „Wesen" der zu sich selbst kommenden Dichtung. Es kann aber statt dessen auch darauf abzielen, umgekehrt die Dichtung und die Kunst als eine Phase der Entwicklung hin zur wie auch immer verstandenen und gearteten philosophischen Wahrheit als „vergangen" zu absentieren, zu separieren und auf sich beruhen zu lassen. Und es kann das „Und" schließlich zwischen Philosophie und Dichtung die verbindende Mitte einer Waage symbolisieren, die zusammenbringt und aufeinander bezieht, was auch immer und jeweils auf der einen oder aber auf der anderen Seite geschehen mag. Man meint dann, daß nur die richtigen Gewichte auf beiden Seiten den währenden Ausgleich verbürgen, die Inständigkeit der Beziehung statt des ständigen Auf und Ab, Ab und Auf.

Greift der Gedanke zu kurz, ruft das Denken das Dichten zu Hilfe. Welches Dichten? Gewiß nicht die Dichtung, von der Platon sagt, daß sie von den, krass gesagt, als „Lügner" dekouvrierten Dichtern stammt, wohl auch nicht diejenige Dichtung, deren „Wesen" das „Stiften" ist, sofern dieses als subjektive Hervorbringung verstanden wird. Doch wohl eher solche, die dem „Wesen" der „Dinge" entspricht, die offenlegt, was sie einräumen, und die ihrem Raum Raum gibt. Aber welches *Denken* entspricht solchem *Dichten*? Gewiß nicht das rechnend verrechnende eines Verstandes, der mit unzulänglichen „Kriterien" und Meßlatten hantiert und das eigentlich Maß-gebende am bloß Maß-nehmenden mißt, sich also ver-mißt und *sein* Messen als Bezugspunkt für das Angemessene ausgibt.

Wenn zutreffen sollte, was Heidegger einmal in den Satz gefaßt hat „Danken und Denken sind nicht nur dasselbe Wort, sondern die selbe Sache"[40], dann tritt preisendes Dichten und dankendes Denken in den inneren Verbund einer *Zwiesprache*.[41]

Dichten und Denken ist dann nicht eines unter vielen „Problemen" des Denkens, und die Zwiesprache ist dann mehr als ein „Problem" des Denkens, um das sich die Dichter nicht zu kümmern brauchen und das nur die Denker zu beschäftigen hat. Dichten und Denken ist dann die gemäße Weise, der Wahrheit und dem Wahr-sein zu entsprechen. Doch wer sagt, fragten wir alles andere als bloß rhetorisch, die Wahrheit? Der Dichter oder der Denker? Oder aber jeder von beiden auf seine Weise? Welche Weise aber *ent-spricht* der Wahrheit und was *ist* Wahrheit?

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[40] Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag von seiner Heimatstadt Messkirch, Frankfurt am Main 1969. Martin Heidegger, Ein Wort des Dankes, 32.

[41] Vgl. Joachim W. Storck, Rilke und Heidegger. Über eine „Zwiesprache" von Dichten und Denken, in: Blätter der Rilke-Gesellschaft. Herausgegeben von der Rilke-Gesellschaft, CH-Saas-Fee, 4/1976, 35-71.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 270-299

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Рождение русского философского гуманизма: спор славянофилов и западников

I. Введение. Структуры русского сознания и русской истории

Наша речь пойдет о философском процессе в России на стадиях его зарождения и формирования. На этих стадиях он еще не конституировался, не выделился отчетливо из общего процесса духовного и культурного развития страны, и потому мы должны начать с характеристики этого более широкого процесса. Как известно, здесь сразу встает вопрос об отношениях двух слагаемых, двух видов содержания данного процесса – аутентичных русско-византийских элементов и элементов, имеющих западноевропейское происхождение. Чаще всего этот вопрос обсуждался в жанрах эссеистики, публицистики, полемики, решался же с идеологических, политических, партийных позиций. Чтобы уйти с этого поверхностного уровня, мы будем использовать общие концепты структурного анализа русского самосознания, духовной и культурной традиций в России в рамках синергийной антропологии[1].

Основным рабочим понятием для нас будет служить *Восточнохристианский дискурс*. Это – специфический дискурс (в общем смысле семиотического процесса, способа означивания и языка освоения реальности), создаваемый Восточным христианством (православием) и содержащий духовный, концептуальный, эпистемологический фонд для формирования Восточнохристианского (византийского, а затем и русского) менталитета и культурно-цивилизационного организма. Он создается, начиная уже с 4 в., как реализация ведущей духовно-экзистенциальной установки Восточнохристианского сознания: установки примата аутентичного христианского опыта – опыта устремления ко Христу и соединения с Ним, опыта христоцентрического Богообщения. Именно достижение, хранение, трансляция этого опыта представлялись главной задачей (тогда как на латинском Западе главная задача скорее виделась в достижении завершенной полноты вероучения и церковной организации). Примат опыта Богообщения вел к появлению и развитию особой практики, посвященной культивации такого опыта. Мистико-аскетическая практика *исихазма* (от греч. *hesychia,* уединенный и безмолвный покой) зарождается уже в 4 в. и путем многовековых трудов складывается в классический образец *духовной практики* – ступенчатого, восходящего процесса холи-

[1] См.: *С.С.Хоружий*. Опыты из русской духовной традиции. М., 2005. *Id*. Духовная и культурная традиция в России в их конфликтном взаимодействии. Курс лекций в Гос. Университете «Высшая Школа Экономики», 2006 (неопубл.).

стической аутотрансформации человека, ориентированной к его актуальному онтологическому трансцендированию. Эта искомая цель, *телос* духовно-антропологического процесса, мыслится в православии как совершенное соединение всех энергий человека с Божественной энергией и называется *обожением.* Концепт или парадигма обожения – ключевое и конститутивное понятие исихастской практики. Последняя, подобно всякой духовной практике, выстраивается и хранится особым аскетическим сообществом, или *духовной традицией.* Духовная традиция – важный и парадоксальный социально-антропологический феномен: она – узкое сообщество, дистанцирующееся от социальной жизни, но только в ней продуцируется в полной и чистой форме особый опыт, который признается высшей духовно-жизненной ценностью, – и поэтому она оказывает на социум глубокое, стойкое и зачастую определяющее влияние.

Исихазм, связанная с ним духовная традиция и конституирующая его парадигма обожения составляют ядро Восточнохристианского дискурса, его главную часть. Весьма существенно, что это ядро определяет и задает определенную персонологию, способ конституции личности и идентичности человека. Греческая патристика 4 в. и первые Вселенские Соборы заложили основы *теоцентрической персонологической парадигмы* – концепции личности как Божественной Ипостаси, онтологического модуса совершенного Божественного бытия с конститутивными предикатами любви и общения. Логически завершая эту парадигму, православие принимает, что эмпирический человек в собственной (т.е. тварной падшей) природе не обладает ни личностью, ни (само)идентичностью, однако он обретает их «по причастию», т.е. в той мере, в какой приобщается Богу и Божественному бытию. Данное приобщение достигается в Богообщении, восхождении к обожению – так что исихастская практика представляет собой также и путь конституции человеческой личности. (В отличие от этого, западная мысль Нового Времени развила *антропоцентрическую персонологическую парадигму,* основанную не на концепции Ипостаси, а на римской концепции персоны, автономного индивида, дополненной картезианской концепцией субъекта.)

Но, начиная уже с первых этапов формирования, в состав Восточнохристианского дискурса входит также другая религиозная и мировоззренческая парадигма – *парадигма сакрализации,* имевшая не столько христианские, сколько языческие корни. Став государственной религией после Миланского эдикта, христианство начало впитывать в себя многие элементы Римской религии – в первую очередь, те, что требовались для официального имперского культа и обеспечивали сакрализацию императорской власти, то есть утверждение ее сакрального статуса и божественной природы. Из таких элементов и сложилась постепенно парадигма сакрализации как общая парадигма религиозного сознания: установка, приписывающая божественную природу определенному кругу феноменов здешнего бытия. Как и парадигма обожения, она утверждала определенный характер отношений горизонта здешнего бытия с Богом и божественным бытием; но, если в первом случае этот характер виделся энергийным и персонализованным, как возможность для человека свободной энергийной связи с личным Богом, то во втором случае он был эссенциальным и отнюдь не обязательно персонализованным: сакрализация могла охватывать и институты, обряды, материальные объекты… Будучи столь различны, две парадигмы имплицируют разный тип религиозности и

разную религиозную и культурную динамику[2]. Реальный же историко-культурный процесс складывается в итоге их наложения и взаимодействия – так что взаимное отношение двух парадигм в его эволюции выступает как фактор, определяющий развитие данного процесса. В ходе истории это отношение бывало самым различным, но, в целом, можно сказать, что для исторической реальности православия более типично преобладание парадигмы сакрализации. (Поэтому парадигме обожения в культурфилософии, в исторической науке отводят обычно маргинальную роль, а нередко, в особенности, на Западе, вообще игнорируют ее существование.) Отражением этого явился гипертрофированный символизм византийского сознания.

Предмет нашего внимания, однако, – не Византия, а Россия. Восточнохристианский дискурс формируется здесь в результате трансляции из Византии, которая интенсивно происходит после Крещения Руси (988) в Киевскую эпоху, но продолжается и в дальнейшем, в Московскую эпоху, вплоть до падения Византии (1453). Становящееся русское сознание восприняло обе конститутивные парадигмы. Аскетическая традиция, культивирующая парадигму обожения, удивительно быстро достигает здесь зрелого развития, и можно уверенно утверждать, что в эпоху Киевской Руси в русском христианстве данная парадигма преобладает над парадигмой сакрализации. Однако в Московскую эпоху это соотношение начинает меняться. Основные изменения были двояки. Во-первых, развитию централизованной русской государственности сопутствует неуклонное усиление тенденций сакрализации. Они проявляются и в прогрессирующей сакрализации верховной власти (особенно после крушения Византии, когда происходит *translatio imperii*), и в постепенной победе обрядоверия: в середине 16 в. Стоглавый Собор проводит догматизацию обряда, которая в дальнейшем существенно стимулировала Раскол, а знаменитый «Домострой» стремится внедрить сакрализацию тотально, вплоть до деталей быта. Во-вторых, проявляется одна особенность русской версии Восточнохристианского дискурса: при ее формировании возникает разрыв между *трансляцией* и *рецепцией*; важные содержания, связанные с парадигмой обожения, хотя и передаются на Русь, однако не усваиваются там, не входят в активный фонд русского сознания. Исихастское возрождение в Византии 14 в. кардинально расширяет сферу активности и влияния исихастской традиции: в полемике Исихастских Споров, в трудах св. Григория Паламы эта традиция интенсивно развивает богословско-философское творчество и выявляет в себе богатые культуростроительные возможности. Сведения об этом развитии, основные тексты нового паламитского богословия достигают Руси, но не находят там востребования и отклика. Русский исихазм не становится культуростроительным фактором, хотя изначально он имел такие потенции, как свидетельствует культура эпохи Сергия Радонежского и Андрея Рублева. В итоге, пути культурного творчества, развития оригинальной культуры на почве Восточнохристианского дискурса оказываются заблокированы, закрыты, и единственною возможностью культурного развития

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[2] Надо, однако, отметить, что при всех различиях, две парадигмы все же не составляют прямой противоположности друг другу, бинарной оппозиции. Парадигма обожения церковна, она включает в себя догматические и сакраментальные предпосылки, а с ними и установку *освящения* (sanctification), связанную с таинствами Церкви и составляющую необходимый элемент литургической сферы. Но сакрализация не тождественна освящению, она гипертрофирует его и выносит далеко за пределы литургической сферы.

остается обращение на Запад: *вестернизация*. В структуре же культурно-цивилизационного процесса в России образуется конфликт: разрыв между духовной традицией (остающейся вне культуры, в сфере низовой, народной религиозности) и культурной традицией. В дальнейшем этот разрыв становится ключевым фактором, определяющим паттерны культурного развития.

К концу Московской эпохи бинарная оппозиция *сакрализация – вестернизация* становится доминирующей структурой российского культурно-цивилизационного организма. Едва ли возможно отрицать, что это была нездоровая структура; ни один из ее полюсов не нес в себе начал культурного и исторического творчества. Одним из прямых плодов сакрализации явился Раскол, ставший длительным и болезненным катаклизмом национальной жизни; вестернизация же осуществлялась через посредство Малороссии, имела своей главной формой латинизированную «Киево-Могилянскую ученость», ориентированную на школьную систему иезуитов, и несла не столько европейскую культуру как таковую, сколько всего лишь культуру Восточноевропейского барокко. Преодолением оппозиции стала реформа Петра I, с ее радикальным выбором в пользу вестернизации и столь же радикальной сменой контента вестернизации.

Имперская Россия, созданная Петром, была неожиданным, странным сооружением. Ее замысел имел, в сущности, *технологическую* природу: в основе его лежала идея государства как эффективной структуры, всецело доступной единоличному управлению. Два элемента, в первую очередь, должны были обеспечить эту цель: абсолютная монархия и радикальное подчинение Церкви государству, огосударствление Церкви. Последнее требовало смены вектора вестернизации, с католической ориентации на протестантскую, что было проделано резко и решительно: Синодальный строй русской Церкви, уничтоживший патриаршество (1721), следовал протестантским принципам, а его руководящий документ, «Духовный регламент» Феофана Прокоповича, о. Г.Флоровский назвал «программой русской реформации». Но в то же время, для укрепления института монархии как нельзя лучше подходил византийский сакральный символизм, транслировавший из языческого Рима культ не только Империи, но и персоны Императора. Поэтому он сохраняется и поддерживается; в русском православии складывается абсурдная смесь византийской мистики Империи, цезарепапизма, и протестантского рационализма – одно из множества противоречивых, конфликтных сочетаний в структурах русского сознания и жизни Имперской эпохи. Духовная же традиция, «линия обожения», между тем – в тяжелом упадке, отчасти сохраняясь лишь глубоко в низовой религиозности.

Дело Петра удалось, царь сумел реализовать свой технологический проект: он добился эффективно управляемой машины абсолютизма и реально изменил историческую динамику и энергетику российского бытия, вернув России динамизм исторического процесса. Но внешнему успеху сопутствовали глубинные дефекты и риски, из коих важно отметить два: 1) вытеснение духовной традиции и ее крайний упадок, 2) неорганичный и эклектичный характер вестернизованной культуры, складывавшейся из пестрого набора заимствований и влияний, из лоскутов немецкой системы управления, французской галантной культуры, немецкой, голландской технической и бытовой культуры, пиетизма, мартинизма, масонства… Лоскутная культура не могла создать собственной традиции, не была

способна к трансляции. В свете этого, тот «вызов», что, по классической формуле Герцена, «Петр бросил России», был глубоко амбивалентным: наследием Петра был не только мощный порыв к историческому действию и творчеству, но и грозящие опасности, крупные ущербные факторы в жизни культурного организма. Ответ на вызов поэтому должен был быть двояким: необходимо было не только подхватить порыв, но и одновременно – преодолеть опасные явления.

Феномен классической русской культуры 19 в., вкупе с феноменом возрождения духовной традиции, – исполнение этого двоякого задания. Лоскутная культура 18 в. была внутренне осмыслена, пережита, переработана – и претворена в органичную, цельную культурную традицию. Одновременно, хотя и полностью независимо, в недрах общества происходит спонтанное возобновление русла исихастской духовности. Оно совершалось двумя путями, через связи с главным средоточием традиции, Афоном, но также и без подобных связей, в новых очагах аскетического делания, что начали зарождаться сразу в ряде ареалов Великороссии. Одним из таких очагов стала знаменитая впоследствии Оптина Пустынь. Оба исторических результата имеют кардинальное значение. Успех, победу усилия рождения целостной культуры символизирует, как верно заметил Герцен, фигура Пушкина. Но мы снова дополним Герцена: совершено было и усилие воссоздания духовной традиции. Успех, победу этого усилия символизирует фигура Серафима Саровского. Для дальнейшей истории России важны оба успеха, но важна и их полная разобщенность: как часто отмечают, Пушкин и преп. Серафим, будучи современниками, вероятней всего, не знали о существовании друг друга. В этой разобщенности духовной и культурной традиций крылись зерна новых оппозиций и противоречий российского развития.

Культура пушкинской эпохи, как и в целом русская классическая культура, носит явный характер синтеза. Какие же составляющие вобрал в себя этот «русский синтез»? Конечно, необходимо было свести воедино все компоненты «лоскутной культуры», взятые из множества культурных миров, умственных и духовных течений. Но более существенную задачу представлял Западно-Восточный синтез: успешное претворение «чужого» в «свое», заемного и лоскутного в органичное и творческое, означало, что ведущую роль в синтезе играли собственные, аутентичные начала – опыт русской истории, менталитета, православной религиозности (которая, при всей вытесненности исихастского ядра, все же не могла не нести его хотя бы отдаленных, опосредованных влияний и отражений). Можно считать, что в крупной своей структуре, русский синтез был синтезом: Восточно-христианского дискурса – опыта российского исторического бытия – секуляризованной культуры Запада. Столь разнообразная структура открывала широкие возможности самовыражения, артикуляции национального сознания и опыта – и эти возможности сразу же начали интенсивно эксплуатироваться.

В углублявшемся процессе развертывания национального самосознания была определенная последовательность. Впереди шла словесность. Прежде других сфер русской культуры она достигла творческой высоты у Державина, Карамзина, Жуковского; а кроме того, здесь рано сложились сообщество и среда, где живо дебатировались проблемы становления новой словесности. Многие из этих проблем выводили за пределы литературного жанра, расширяя горизонты рефлексии. Такова, в частности, была проблематика создания нового литературного языка, ставшая

самой насущной в свете поистине фантастических изменений, которые испытал русский язык в 17 и 18 столетиях. В дискуссиях этой проблематики сложились позиции и сформировались кружки, ставшие первыми воплощениями тех паттернов, что определяли русскую идейную и интеллектуальную жизнь на всем протяжении 19 в. Оппозиция «архаистов» и «новаторов», «Беседы» и «Арзамаса», во многом предвосхищала оппозицию славянофилов и западников; в спорах о «старом» и «новом» слоге уже проступали два полярных воззрения на общие процессы исторических перемен и контактов культур. От дискуссии судеб языка, русское сознание неизбежно переходило в более общий горизонт, к судьбам самой страны, к исторической рефлексии; а с нею естественно соединялся и философский план.

Здесь, однако, пора сделать пояснение. Речь идет о первых десятилетиях 19 в., почему же в этот период происходит еще только зарождение философии в России? – Как всегда замечают историки мысли, путь русской философии отличается «поздним пробуждением» (Флоровский), она чрезвычайно поздно занимает свое место в русской культуре. Причины этого «невегласия» (Шпет) много дебатировались, но в нашей концептуализации культурного процесса они прозрачны. Конститутивный принцип Восточнохристианского дискурса – примат духовного опыта, опыта весьма специфического: этот опыт личного Богообщения в корне отличен от любого эмпирического опыта и представляет собою «для эллинов безумие» (1 Кор 1,23). Воплощая его примат, восточнохристианское сознание строит богословский дискурс определенного рода, включающий в себя свидетельства живого опыта и ими руководящийся. Но в способе мышления, отвечающем этому дискурсу, философия не возникает столь прямо и естественно, как в античной мысли и западной, ей наследующей. Эта особая судьба философии в Восточнохристианском дискурсе, проблематичная и затрудненная, ясно проявилась уже в Византии (и заслужила ей стойкое пренебрежение западной мысли). В России же она привела к тому, что в русле Восточнохристианского дискурса философии вообще не возникало (задачу ее создания впервые поставит Иван Киреевский). Философия начиналась здесь лишь в русле вестернизации – и, соответственно, начиналась поздно.

Один из основных выходов к философии, как уже сказано, доставляла историческая рефлексия. В России она всегда тяготела к «историософии», вольному жанру, сливающему в себе элементы философии истории, культурфилософии, социальной философии. Далее, к развитию философии вела прямиком и другая нить, идущая от адептов масонства и прочих религиозно-мистических движений, что изобиловали в царствования Екатерины, Павла и Александра. Еще одну нить составило русское шеллингианство, представленное целым рядом профессоров университетов и духовных академий, влиятельное и в культуре светских салонов. Наконец, после Отечественной войны в декабристских и примыкающих к ним кругах активно развивается общественно-политическая мысль.

В итоге, многие нити, многие тенденции российского культурного процесса, соединяясь, к 30-м годам 19 в. приводят к активному пробуждению теоретического сознания, к растущей и ширящейся рефлексии, исторической, социальной, культурфилософской – и наконец собственно философской. Назревает и начинается, по крылатому выражению Михаила Гершензона, «великий ледоход русской мысли». Его нам и предстоит осветить.

II. Генезис философского процесса

Кружки, их почва и пища

В идейной истории России с «ледоходом» неотрывно соединено слово «кружок». Кружок – очаг и движитель, главный механизм идейного развития России в эпоху дворянской культуры (когда он часто, хотя и не всегда, бытовал в салонах), а затем и культуры разночинской (когда салоны отошли в прошлое). Известный, разумеется, во всех европейских обществах, он все же, пожалуй, нигде более не играл такой кардинальной роли: у нас же свыше столетия, от «арзамасцев» в Петербурге до евразийцев в Софии, культурные явления и движения почти неизменно зачинались в форме длительных, интенсивных дискуссий, «русских разговоров», в тесном кругу дружески связанных людей. Нередко они и не перерастали этой формы, оставаясь лишь камерными явлениями, несостоявшимися в большой культуре. Однако в кружках 20-х – 30-х годов 19 столетия зарождались явления отнюдь не камерные. На первом месте в ряду этих явлений – противостояние западников и славянофилов, определившее собой целую эпоху в истории русского сознания.

Далеко не сразу, однако, русские кружки стали кружками славянофилов и западников. В кружковых же формах протекал и эмбриональный период двух идеологий, когда они еще отнюдь не были взаимно разделены. На первых порах ледоход русской мысли совершался в «сплошной среде», которая еще не выработала никаких отчетливо различающихся позиций и только нащупывала те проблемные поля, где бы могли оформиться идейные размежевания. К этому эмбриональному периоду принадлежат, по меньшей мере, два значительных феномена кружковой культуры: кружок любомудров в 20-х годах и кружок Станкевича в 30-х. Они оба действовали в Москве, где большей частью и проходил ледоход: в Петербурге при Николае Первом льдам было трудней таять. В первый кружок, что возник еще в конце 1823 г. и, меняя форму, существовал до начала 30-х, входили В.Ф.Одоевский, Д.В.Веневитинов, И.В.Киреевский, А.И.Кошелев и др. По всему духу он очень близок был к культуре немецкого романтизма: молодых участников объединяли пылкая увлеченность философией, эстетикой, поэзией, преданность идеалам возвышенного и прекрасного, атмосфера известной восторженности и мечтательности. В философии в центре всех интересов был Шеллинг, в эстетике – идеи иенской школы; однако плоды собственной мысли любомудров были весьма незначительны. Тем не менее, в культурном процессе кружок оставил немалый след, благодаря своей новой для России направленности: к германской, но не французской мысли, к углубленной рефлексии, к философскому рассмотрению всех тем.

Поворот к философии был подхвачен «кружком Станкевича», который образовался среди студентов Московского университета зимой 1831-32 г. и существовал до отъезда в Германию в 1837 г. его лидера, Н.В.Станкевича (1813-1840). Этому кружку обычно отводят еще более крупную роль в идейном движении. Самая наглядная причина к тому – обилие в нем будущих крупных имен русской истории, причем представляющих радикально разные лагеря: членами его были М.А.Бакунин, В.Г.Белинский, Т.Н.Грановский, К.С.Аксаков, М.В.Катков. Причина же более глубокая в том, что по сравнению, с одной стороны, с отвлеченно-аморфным теоретизированием любомудров, с другой – с узко политическими группками постдекабристских лет (в том числе, с кружком Герцена,), беседы в

кружке Станкевича решительней и основательней продвигали идейный процесс, приближали формирование и размежевание идейных лагерей. Здесь, в частности, намечается активный поворот к изучению Гегеля и переход от Шеллинга к Гегелю доминирующего философского влияния в русской интеллектуальной среде. Следует подчеркнуть, что это влияние носило принципиально иной характер, чем влияние Шеллинга: мысль Гегеля мощно вовлекала в Систему, и эта система, вооружая адептов замечательными умственными орудиями, сразу давала им способ развития всевозможных теорий, толкала к собственным построениям. Поэтому увлечение Гегелем бывало затягивающим, всепоглощающим, захватывало умы не только западной ориентации. Среди первого поколения русских гегельянцев были не только Станкевич, Бакунин, Белинский, Герцен, но и ревностный славянофил Самарин, писавший так: «Участь православной церкви тесно, неразрывно связана с участью Гегеля»…

Однако не чистая философия становится главной почвой тех размышлений и дискуссий, в которых идейный процесс выходит вскоре на новые рубежи. В стране еще не было не только творческого философствования, но даже удовлетворительного философского образования. И при Александре I, и при Николае I, философия в университетах была всегда под идеологическим подозрением, нередко переходившим в гонение, и в историю вошла фраза одного из министров просвещения (кн. П.Ширинского-Шихматова): «Польза от философии не доказана, а вред от нее возможен». Поэтому кружковая молодежь не имела достаточной философской школы, и чистая философия могла быть для нее лишь областью ученичества, но не творчества, не создания оригинальных концепций. Не достигало творческого уровня и гегельянство. Была лишь единственная область, где насущные вопросы русского самосознания соединялись с достаточными уже возможностями их творческой постановки и разработки. Это была область русской истории, рефлексии движущих начал российского исторического бытия и развития. Одним из первых эту особую роль истории осознал Иван Киреевский, писавший еще в 1830 г.: «История в наше время есть центр всех познаний, наука наук, единственное условие всякого развития; направление историческое обнимает *всё*»[3]. К концу 30-х он же становится одним из главных участников усиленной работы мысли и острой борьбы идей, которые развернулись на указанном им поле.

К тому, что в центре усилий становящейся русской мысли оказывается рефлексия национальной истории, общественное сознание толкали и еще два фактора, два идейных влияния: официальной идеологии и мысли Петра Чаадаева (1794-1856). Полярно противоположные друг другу, они, при всем том, производили в идейном процессе сходную сократовскую работу майевтики, помогая родиться на свет русской философии. В отношении Чаадаева такая роль признавалась всегда. В русском обществе 1-ой пол. 19 в. он являл собой уникальную фигуру одинокого и влиятельного «частного мыслителя». Восприняв, главным образом, идеи французского католического традиционализма, он создал набросок христианской философии истории и культуры в форме цикла «Философических писем». Публикация Первого письма в 1836 г. – одно из самых ярких и громких событий умственной жизни Николаевской эпохи. Письмо поражало резким, нигилистическим

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[3] И.В.Киреевский. Обозрение русской словесности 1829 года // Он же. Избранные статьи. М., 1984. С.44.

отрицанием смысла и ценности русской истории[4], причем утверждало одновременно, что «на Западе все создано христианством» и «царство Божие до известной степени осуществлено в нем». Трудно вообразить более сильное средство возбуждения исторической рефлексии! Письмо действенно стимулировало становление и западничества и славянофильства: свидетельства о своем сильнейшем впечатлении от него оставили, в числе многих, Герцен и Петр Киреевский (у кого первого из всех сложились начатки славянофильских воззрений). – Однако официальная идеология Николаевской эпохи, выстроенная, прежде всего, С.С.Уваровым и отчасти Д.Н.Блудовым, А.Х.Бенкендорфом, М.П.Погодиным и другими, обладала тем же характером ясно артикулированной крайней позиции и своим существованием также содействовала самоопределению мысли. Притом, отнюдь не во всем сознание мыслящего общества самоопределялось, отвергая официоз; порой незаметно для себя, оно от него усваивало некоторые существенные элементы. Так, в 18 в. русскому сознанию не присуща была идея противостояния России и Европы: две культуры скорее сопоставлялись, нежели противопоставлялись, их исторические судьбы включались в широкую парадигму единой общей судьбы христианского мира. Идеологема противостояния, бинарная оппозиция Россия – Европа, была создана в русле николаевского официоза – но привилась практически во всем обществе, включая и западнические круги. Последние лишь дали свое толкование оппозиции, видя ее причину и содержание в коренной отсталости России от Запада. Позиция же «славянской партии», разумеется, утверждала превосходство России над Западом (как и позиция официальная, хотя та и усматривала это превосходство в иных вещах). В итоге, платформы западничества и славянофильства обе восприняли этот вклад официоза, формируясь на базе указанной оппозиции, как две ее противоположные трактовки: «То, в чем западники видели недостаток, славянофилы, напротив, находили достоинством»[5]. Помимо того, оформлению платформ способствовало и появление уваровской «официальной народности». Впервые знаменитая триада «православие, самодержавие, народность» возникает в Отчете Уварова о ревизии Московского университета в 1832 г., чтобы затем получить пространное выражение в его обзорном докладе царю за десятилетие его министерства (1833-1843). Здесь это «тройственное понятие» предлагается сделать «общим знаменателем всех элементов гражданского образования». Просвещенные круги в большинстве своем отвращались от казенного духа уваровских доктрин, от их «квасного патриотизма» (bon mot Вяземского), но volens nolens испытывали влияние предложенных концептуальных моделей, альтернатив которым покуда не было. «Очерк развития русской философии» Г.Шпета язвит даже, что славянофилы «с романтическою любовью приняли к сердцу преподанную Уваровым тему о народности»[6]. Западники могли принимать ее в штыки, но нужды нет! она делалась пищею ума, и они думали на темы России не

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[4] Ко времени публикации этот взгляд Чаадаева успел весьма измениться: считая по-прежнему, что прошлого у России нет, он начинал видеть в этом возможности великого будущего и заявлял даже так: «Мы призваны… обучить Европу бесконечному множеству вещей… Придет день, когда мы станем умственным средоточием Европы» (Письмо А.И.Тургеневу, окт.-ноябрь 1835 г. // П.Я.Чаадаев. Полн.собр.соч. и избранные письма. Т.2. М., 1991.С.99).

[5] К.Д.Кавелин. Московские славянофилы сороковых годов // Он же. Наш умственный строй. Статьи по философии русской истории и культуры. М., 1989.С.338.

[6] Г.Шпет. Очерк развития русской философии. Первая часть. Пг., 1922. С.277.

только по Гегелю, но и насколько-то по Уварову, в призме его «народности» тематизируя русскую «отсталость». И нельзя отрицать вклада официоза в тот кардинальный факт, что именно «вопрос о народности становится демаркационной линией, делящей передовую часть русского общества на два враждебных лагеря»[7].

Московские сражения

Итак, издавна существовавшие в русском обществе два воззрения, два рода мыслей, европоцентристское и руссоцентристское, долго вызревая в салонных и кружковых спорах, вбирая стимулирующие влияния побочных факторов, на грани 30-40-х годов наконец начинают превращаться в отчетливые идейные позиции. Вначале этот переход происходит в «славянском» лагере. Лидеры его А.С.Хомяков (1804-1860) и И.В.Киреевский (1806-1856) были несколько старше ведущих представителей западников – А.И.Герцена (1812-1870), В.Г.Белинского (1811-1848), Т.Н.Грановского (1813-1855) и, по свидетельству Герцена в «Былом и думах», в ту эпоху это имело немалое значение. Говоря о различии жизненного опыта двух групп, Герцен одновременно признает и приоритет «славян»: «Киреевские, Хомяков и Аксаков сделали свое дело… с них начинается перелом русской мысли»[8]. Однако перелом до последнего избегает печатного станка: программные тексты славянофильства появляются уже зимой 1838-39 гг., когда в другом лагере Герцен еще и не раскрывал Гегеля; но они писаны не для печати, а для чтенья в кружке. На одной из «сред» у Ивана Киреевского, А.С.Хомяков читает свою статью «О старом и новом», в одну из следующих «сред» хозяин зачитывает свой отклик, «В ответ А.С.Хомякову». Оба текста расходятся во многих списках, и с этого этапа вся дискуссия получает систематическую основу. Вкупе тексты дают связную модель историко-культурного процесса в России, стоящую на довольно ясно выраженных общих принципах. Они удачно дополняют друг друга: Хомяков, выдвигая оппозицию *Древность – Современность*, выстраивает историческую перспективу; Киреевский же, выдвигая оппозицию *Россия – Запад*, выстраивает культурфилософскую перспективу. В малой статье Хомякова четко уже заявлен и проведен главный принцип всей будущей славянофильской концепции России и ее истории: принцип ретроутопии, рисующий идеализированную древность (мирный зачин процесса и гармонический древнерусский социум) – представляющий современность как итог порчи, искажения этой древности (за счет привнесений с Запада, но также и внутренних факторов) – и утверждающий, что для достижения своих исторических задач России «довольно воскресить, уяснить старое… древние формы жизни русской». Киреевский добавляет к этому важный религиозный аспект: Россия сохранила во всей чистоте и полноте «правильную философию христианства», его сущностную основу, что хранится в патристике и аскетике. При этом, она, однако, нисколько не осмыслила и не развила их; Запад же, в противоположность России, активно развивал христианские начала, но при этом их искажал, сливая с языческими, а равно сливал начала духовные – со светскими. Отсюда намечался сценарий Западно-Восточной гармонии: стремясь к верному пониманию христианской истины, западная мысль может найти это понимание в православии, поскольку «в нашей Церкви… совсем неожиданно открывается именно то,

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[7] М.О.Гершензон. История Молодой России. М. – Пг., 1923. С.208-209.

[8] А.И.Герцен. Былое и думы // Он же. Соч. в 9 тт. Т.5. М., 1956.С.170-171.

чего теперь требует просвещение Европы»[9]. Россия же, в свою очередь, в осмыслении собственной духовной традиции сможет воспользоваться трудами западного разума. Из всех светлых славянофильских прогнозов этот оказался, быть может, единственным сбывшимся: в 20 в. западное христианство, действительно, интенсивно осваивало православную духовность, почерпая в ней многое ценное для себя[10], а православная мысль развивалась в плодотворном диалоге с западной духовностью и наукой. Правда, это происходило уже в «постхристианском» мире…

В октябре 1840 г. Чаадаев пишет в Париж Ивану Гагарину: «Наши доморощенные учения со дня на день все сгущаются и быстрыми шагами приближаются к конечным выводам»[11]. Эта оценка процесса справедлива, хотя до «конечных выводов» в виде полного оформления учений и полного же разрыва меж их сторонниками еще оставалось несколько лет. В отличие от славянофилов, всегда сконцентрированных в Москве[12], силы западников были разбросаны. Герцен с 1834 г., в основном, пребывает в ссылках; лишь с 1839-40 гг. он погружается в Гегеля, в дискуссиях с Бакуниным и Белинским формируя философские позиции левогегельянского толка. Грановский, вернувшись из-за границы, с 1839 г. начинает лекции по истории в Московском университете. Наконец в 1842 г. Герцен возвращается из новгородской ссылки в Москву; он пишет философский цикл «Дилетантизм в науке» и, по выражению Шпета, сразу «выходит на линию огня». Открывается последний этап споров, самый активный, оставшийся в истории как центральный эпизод в жизни русского общества 40-х годов. Споры захватывали всеобщее внимание; как некогда догматические споры в эпоху Вселенских Соборов, они делались главной темой даже и повседневной жизни горожан. Из всех их красочных описаний в мемуарной литературе, на первом месте стоят, бесспорно, классические страницы «Былого и дум». «Москва сороковых годов … принимала деятельное участие за мурмолки и против них; барыни и барышни читали статьи очень скучные, слушали прения очень длинные, спорили сами за К.Аксакова или за Грановского… На эти вечера приезжали … посмотреть, как встарь ездили на кулачные бои»[13].

К той поре две группы уже отчетливо разделились, получив окончательные имена. В отличие от западников, или «западной партии», славянофилы не сами дали себе это имя, но лишь согласились его принять; придумано же оно было еще в 1800-е годы, с оттенком насмешки применяясь к архаистам «Беседы», и позже перенесено на «славянскую партию» ее оппонентами. Основные темы дискуссий уже ясны: это русская история и «народность», значение петровских реформ, отсталость или превосходство России пред Западом, оценка западной истории и культуры; но отчасти и темы более общие, как философия всемирной истории, общество и личность, вера и атеизм… С углублением дискуссий, расхождения неу-

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[9] И.В.Киреевский. В ответ А.С.Хомякову // Полн. собр. соч. в 2-х тт. под ред. М.О.Гершензона. Т.1. М., 1911. С.120.

[10] Приведем для примера свидетельство католического богослова: в середине 20 в. происходит «своеобразная «ориентализация» католического богословия, которая достигла кульминации на II Ватиканском Соборе» (B.Petra. Catholic theology and the discovery of Orthodoxy in the 20th century. Talk presented at the Conference “The human subject and community in European philosophy and theology: Perspectives from East and West”. Florence, May 2006. (Unpublished).

[11] Письмо П.Я.Чаадаева И.С.Гагарину от 1 октября 1840 г. // П.Я.Чаадаев. Цит.изд. С.139.

[12] Ср. типичное суждение: «Славянофилы, продукт чисто московский…». Н.П.Колюпанов. Жизнь Александра Ивановича Кошелева. Т.1. Кн.1. М.,1889. С.580.

[13] А.И.Герцен. Цит.соч.С.156. Мурмолки – старорусский головной убор, который носили славянофилы, демонстративно возрождавшие ношение незападного, национального платья.

клонно обострялись. Долгое время навыки дворянской культуры, узы дружбы, сложившиеся до разделений, удерживали споры в границах любезного и доброжелательного общения; однако в 1844 г. запасы доброжелательности, а затем и простой учтивости начали истощаться. Последней победой добрых чувств над идейными разногласиями стал живописуемый Герценом знаменитый обед, устроенный 22 апреля 1844 г. С.Т.Аксаковым для обеих партий в честь завершения успешнейших публичных лекций Грановского по западной истории. Обед прошел в братаниях и лобзаниях, но к концу года все уже быстро двигалось к полному разрыву. В декабре появляются грубые памфлетные стихи Н.М.Языкова против западников. По их поводу возникает резкая ссора Грановского и Петра Киреевского, едва не приведшая к дуэли. В начале 1845 г. полный конец общих обсуждений и полный разрыв личных отношений стали фактом. С тех пор обе партии, по выражению Герцена, лишь «беспощадно терзали друг друга в журнальных статьях». Но для истории русского сознания, важней этого негативного исхода был позитивный плод. Появление двух интеллектуальных сообществ, которые полностью конституировались и взаимно дифференцировались в сфере идей, значило, несомненно, что «родилась новая интеллигенция, неофициальная, свободная»[14].

III. Мысли русского Януса

Крылатая фраза Герцена рисует два сообщества как нераздельно сросшиеся, как Януса. Описав рождение *русского Януса,* рассмотрим, что думали две его головы. Хотя противостояние двух партий охватывает, в конечном счете, все основные сферы мировоззрения, но главные споры их, главные творческие усилия всегда были сосредоточены на небольшом круге ключевых тем. Как нетрудно заметить, всё, что волновало оба сообщества, в своем существенном содержании сходится в два главных узла, два топоса всего предметного поля: *топос России* (в ее истории и ее «народности») и *топос личности* (или же личности и общества).

Топос России: славянофилы

В российской проблематике, позиции обоих лагерей базировались, как уже сказано, на общей установке коренной противоположности, противостояния России и Европы. По своей сути, данная установка представляла идеологический постулат, который заведомо не мог быть научно доказан и закрепление которого в сознании общества сороковых годов было, в значительной мере, совокупным плодом усилий Чаадаева и Уварова. Приняв этот постулат, два лагеря в своих спорах сообща создали два упрощенных идеологических конструкта, «образ России» и «образ Запада»: Россия – патриархальный традиционалистский мир, живой, но а-историчный, статичный, обращенный к ценностям прошлого и к коллективистскому сознанию; Запад – мир динамики, развития, совершенствования, устремленный к будущему и исповедующий индивидуализм. Далее, они развили концепцию о противоположности истоков славянорусской и европейской истории – в современных терминах, о двух противоположных типах этногенеза, характеризующих тот и другой мир. Такая концепция естественно имплицировала определенную картину и всего исторического процесса.

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[14] Г.Шпет. Цит. соч. С.281. Заметим, что термин «интеллигенция» Шпет употребляет в широком значении социальной группы носителей просвещенного разума, но не в привившемся узком значении, предполагающем, по Г.П.Федотову, предикаты оппозиционности и беспочвенности.

Концепция «славянская» явилась первой и, в отличие от концепции другого лагеря, покоилась на определенном философском основании, доставленном Хомяковым. Прежде всего, мы найдем у него общий тезис, утверждающий особую, конститутивную роль начала, истока в историческом процессе: «Закон развития общественного лежит в его первоначальном зародыше»[15]. Ясно, что этот тезис – прямое выражение определенного типа философской мысли, *археологического*, широко представленного в философской традиции, от греков до Хайдеггера. К этому типу принадлежит, в частности, «органическая философия», представляющая бытие в органической парадигме; а к органической философии, в свою очередь, принадлежит вся философия славянофилов. Итак, исток первичен, конститутивен. Если в истоке своей истории – рассуждает далее Хомяков – социум складывался мирным, гармоническим путем, то он образует органическое единство, «общину живую и органическую», движимую общим согласием, и таким пребудет во всем ходе своей истории. Если же, напротив, социум сложился в итоге насильственных конфликтов, завоеваний, он всегда будет лишь «случайным скоплением человеческих единиц», что может управляться лишь силою принуждения. Эти два типа этногенеза, из коих один есть мирное объединение племен, другой – их борьба и насильственное покорение, сопоставляются России и Западу (представление об исключительно мирной жизни древних славян бытовало тогда в науке). В силу конститутивности истока, они порождают два диаметрально противоположных типа социума и типа истории.

Российский социум, по славянофильской доктрине, воплощает в своем устройстве принципы гармонии и согласия, что делается возможным за счет созданной им особой социальной формы – «общины», или сельского «міра». Утверждалось, что эта форма крестьянского сообщества – уникальное достояние Руси, на Западе она отсутствует и неизвестна даже ученым. Она основана на «естественном и нравственном братстве и внутренней правде» и потому имеет такие «общежительные добродетели… которым, может быть, ничего равного не представляла еще история мира. Благородное смирение, кротость, соединенная с крепостью духа, неистощимое терпение, способность к самопожертвованию, правда на общем суде и глубокое почтение к нему, твердость семейных уз…»[16]. Культ общины – краеугольный камень славянофильской идеологии, и в нем выразились многие важнейшие черты последней. Прежде всего, славянофильство здесь выступает типичным образцом консервативной, традиционалистской мысли, которая всегда стремилась идеализировать крестьянский уклад и «неиспорченную городом» сельскую жизнь. Далее, тут видна и такая яркая черта славянофильского мышления как его гипертрофированный этицизм: нравственная идеальность общинного устройства не только обеспечивает общине все ее другие достоинства, но снимает необходимость в особом развитии правовой сферы и многих иных, ибо все они оказываются, по сути, внутри сферы нравственной; по одному тому, что члены общины *нравственны*, решение их общего схода и личное соглашение меж ними мыслятся как универсальные и достаточные формы регуляции всей правовой и хозяйственной жизни. Как многие другие славянофильские идеи, эта *оппозиция*

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[15] А.С.Хомяков. Мнение русских об иностранцах //Он же. Полн. собр. соч., изд. 3. Т.1. М., 1900. С.68.

[16] Он же. По поводу статьи И.В.Киреевского «О характере просвещения Европы и о его отношении к просвещению России». Цит. изд. С.242.

этики и права (бесспорно, близкая русскому сознанию) доводилась до максимума, граничащего с абсурдом, у К.Аксакова, прозванного «передовым бойцом славянофильства»: «Гарантия не нужна! — Гарантия есть зло. Где нужна она, там нет добра… Вся сила в нравственном убеждении… [Россия] *всегда в него верила и не прибегала к договорам*»[17]. Наконец, культ общины заключал в себе и некоторую форму коллективизма, примата общества над индивидом, к которой мы обратимся ниже, при обсуждении *топоса личности*.

На Западе, в противоположность России, социум развивается из ущербного истока, в котором вместо единства была раздвоенность, конфликт завоевателей и завоеванных. Отсюда, по Хомякову, следует, что в своем развитии он представляет собою не живой организм, а иной, альтернативный тип общества, принцип существования которого не жизнь, а механичность, «мертвенность». Оппозицию двух типов Хомяков с догматичной твердостью проводит во всех аспектах, рисуя законченно негативный образ Запада. Все характеризующие его нормы и принципы, отношения и связи сугубо неорганичны, формальны: тип связей – «условный договор» (вместо «истинного братства»), в сфере права – «мертвая справедливость», «законность внешняя, формальная» (вместо «внутренней, духовной») и «отрицательная свобода», что проявляется в розни и разномыслии (вместо «положительной», что тождественна единству и проявляется в единодушии[18]), в устройстве государства – централизация (вместо «процветания местной жизни и местных центров») и бюрократический аппарат (чиновник, по Хомякову, носитель принципа мертвенности).

Этот очередной идеологический конструкт нет смысла сопоставлять с реальностью. Бинарная логика мысли Хомякова требовала оппонента, «мальчика для битья», и образ Запада играет у него не самостоятельную, а методологическую, вспомогательную роль. (У Киреевского нет подмены Запада условным конструктом, но он рассматривает лишь философский, а не исторический процесс.) Истинный предмет его мысли – одна Россия, и оттого важен для этой мысли не Запад как таковой, а лишь его влияние на Россию, вестернизация. Вслед за темой общины, западное влияние – вторая из ключевых тем славянофильской концепции России. Хомяков и ее снабдил философским основанием. Оно строится легко в рамках его общей «органической философии». Жизнь социального организма зиждется на полнокровной связи с истоком; любые внешние привнесения, восходящие к другому истоку, замутняют, нарушают связь с собственным. Если же эти привнесения сильны, массивны, рискует измениться сам тип социума. Именно это и произошло в России в результате реформ Петра: утверждение коренной противоположности допетровской, «старой» и петровской, «новой» России – еще один краеугольный камень славянофильства. Изменение социума носило характер разделения, раскола: западный уклад приняли высшие сословия общества, подчинив этому укладу сферы образования и культуры, администрации, государственности и проч., низшие же сословия, «народ», остались носителями уклада исконного. Возник глубокий «разрыв в умственной и духовной сущности России… между ее самобытной жизнью и ее прививным просвещением»[19].

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[17] К.С.Аксаков. Об основных началах русской истории // Он же. Полн. собр. соч. Т.1., изд.2. М., 1889. С.18. (Курс. автора).

[18] Любопытно сопоставить эти понятия Хомякова с концептами отрицательной и положительной свободы в современной западной политической философии, от Берлина до Роулза.

[19] А.С.Хомяков. Мнение русских об иностранцах. С.33.

Органическая парадигма требует признать «новую» Россию неорганическим, ущербным обществом. Условие жизни – единство, разрыв – признак «мертвенности», но, очевидно, мертвенность здесь не такая же, какая характеризует Запад, а какая-то иная. Является необходимость определить род ущербности, поставить диагноз больной России. Именно так славянофилы понимали свой долг: восхваляя Древнюю Русь, они вели разговор о России современной в совершенно медицинских тонах, говоря о «нашей внутренней болезни», «глубокой ране нашего внутреннего раздвоения» и т.п. Диагноз, поставленный Хомяковым, был таков: главный недуг новой России – *подражательность*, следование чужим образцам. Это также вытекало из органической парадигмы: здоровый организм получает свое бытие исключительно из собственного истока, он *само-бытен*, и его самобытная жизнь есть развертывание того, что он получает из своего истока. Если же он питается некими инородными содержаниями, не из этого истока, он ослабляет и теряет свою с ним связь – разрушает свою жизнь, заболевает: «Введение начал неорганических в органическое тело сопровождается жизненным расстройством»[20]. Поэтому воздействие западной культуры, или «просвещения», в России может быть только отрицательным: «Влияние западного просвещения исказило самый строй русской жизни»[21]. Так диктует модель; и, повинуясь ей, славянофилы отрицают нагляднейшую реальность – блестящие успехи «русского синтеза», европеизированной культуры России; допустить синтетический характер культурного творчества, плодотворность кросскультурных контактов для них невозможно. Следуя своему диагнозу, они дают рецепт исцеления: возврат в изначальное состояние, что было до «введения начал неорганических» и потому было самобытным, здоровым. «Восстановление наших умственных сил зависит от живого соединения со стародавнею и все-таки нам современною русской жизнью»[22], ибо эта жизнь несла в себе связь с питающим истоком, несла «древние, живые и вечно-новые начала, к которым должно возвратиться». Надо лишь уточнить, что возврат славянофилы все же не мыслили эмпирически-буквально. Уже в статье «О старом и новом» Хомяков представляет «возврат к древним началам» скорее диалектически, говоря, что в его итоге «воскреснет Древняя Русь, но уже сознающая себя»; и по контексту ясно, что это достижение самосознания Руси для него значит «истинное познание веры», просвещение светом христианства всех областей жизни. При этом условии, Русь сможет «осуществить свое высокое призвание».

Несмотря на диалектическую поправку к образу чаемого финала, описанная схема вполне соответствует хорошо известному типу *ретроутопии* – социальной модели, помещающей общественный идеал в отдаленное прошлое – в исток истории, Золотой Век… Столь же типичным является соединение ретроутопии с мифологемой Падения: события исхода, извержения из идеального, райского состояния в «падший мир», эмпирию. Золотой Век славянофилов – домонгольская Русь, Падение (в решающем его элементе) – реформы Петра, вестернизация. Конституируя свою идентичность, в качестве первого этапа русское сознание осмыслило себя в универсальных структурах пробуждающегося мышления.

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[20] Там же. С.61.

[21] А.С.Хомяков. Послание к сербам. Цит. изд. С.381.

[22] Он же. О возможности русской художественной школы. Цит. изд. С.97.

Топос России: западники

Весьма поучительно сопоставить, как выстраивают топос России две партии. По той же канве вышивается совершенно иной узор, тот же материал и в рамках тех же общих воззрений тогдашней исторической науки, становится почвой для диаметрально противоположных оценок и толкований. Как принято считать, основной ответ западников на славянофильскую концепцию русской истории представлен в статье Кавелина «Взгляд на юридический быт древней России» (1847), базирующейся на его лекциях в Московском университете. Мы не найдем здесь попытки последовательно развить исторический дискурс, как мы это видели у славянофилов, на единой философской основе (хотя известное влияние Гегеля присутствует). Однако в остальном работа Кавелина, вкупе с примыкающими к ней, действительно, старается охватить тот же материал и дать ответ на те же коренные вопросы становления и развития нации. Совпадает, как выше сказано, и отправная позиция: Русь противопоставляется Западу, ее древний уклад – чисто родовой и патриархальный (впрочем, общинный уклад славянофилы отличали от родового, считая более высокой ступенью), тогда как на Западе – дружинный. Но далее уже всё наоборот: если у Хомякова воинская дружина – носитель «мертвенности», то у западников она же – колыбель личности, и оппозиция Россия – Запад теперь не оппозиция живой органики и мертвой формальности, а оппозиция отсутствия или подавления личности и ее свободного развития. Сменяется верховный принцип всего дискурса: вместо примата общины, у западников – примат личности.

Именно в ключе личности теперь рассматривается исторический процесс. «Древняя Русь представляется погруженной в родственный быт. Личность … еще не выступала; она была подавлена кровными отношениями»[23]. Это отсутствие личности в Древней Руси – центральный тезис западнической концепции, ее настойчивый лейтмотив. За счет него, и все свойства русской общины оказываются у западников отнюдь не достоинствами, а недостатками: «Общинный быт древней Руси… как мало было в нем зачатков гражданственности… Отсутствие твердой, юридической, на начале личности созданной общественности… характеризует нашу древнюю внутреннюю жизнь»[24], и т.д. В отличие от этого, в Европе, в особенности, у германских племен (отзвук «Философии истории» Гегеля), изначально развито «глубокое чувство личности», поскольку определяющие их уклад дружины суть «добровольные союзы… и начало личности положено в основание этих союзов»[25]. Поэтому здесь «с самого начала все отношения… запечатлены этим началом личности и выражаются в строгих юридических формах»[26]. При этом, центральная роль личности – не частная черта каких-то народов, а безусловная предпосылка причастности любого народа к мировой истории: «для народов, призванных ко всемирно-историческому действованию существование без начала личности невозможно… Личность, сознающая свое бесконечное, безусловное достоинство, – есть необходимое условие всякого духовного развития народа»[27]. Отсюда определяются внутренняя задача и смысл русской истории: в ней должно

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[23] К.Д.Кавелин. Взгляд на юридический быт древней России // Он же. Цит. изд. С.50-51.
[24] Там же. С.39, 37.
[25] Там же. С.21.
[26] Там же.
[27] Там же. С.22.

совершаться преодоление родового уклада и «постепенное образование, появление начала личности». Тут – снова противоположность Европе: «Задача истории русско-славянского племени и германских племен была различна. Последним предстояло развить историческую личность, которую они принесли с собою, нам предстояло создать личность»[28]. О трудности этой задачи сдержанный обычно Кавелин пишет экспрессивно в частном письме: «Русское государство раздавило личность на всех общественных ступенях… Если бы мы были азиатский народ, мы бы и сгнили в этом состоянии. Но в нас есть способность к развитию; и потому начало личности, индивидуальности должно было выразиться и понемногу вступить в свои права»[29]. Петр, согласно Кавелину, сумел успешно решить задачу: «У нас не было начала личности… с XVIII в. оно стало действовать и развиваться»[30]. Этот огромный успех дает основания для его превознесения: «Петр… великий человек, наш герой и полубог, наша надежда»[31]. Стоит сравнить это со славянофильскими оценками Петра как изменника неписаному договору русского государства с народом (К.Аксаков), «совратителя» Руси «на путь западный» и т.п. Само «совращение» тоже получает, конечно, противоположную оценку: по западникам, вестернизация была и не просто полезна, а необходима для создания личности: «Лицо должно было начать мыслить и действовать под чужим влиянием. Такое влияние было для него необходимо и благодетельно»[32].

Здесь нужно, однако, уточнение: эта схема истории, приходящая к оптимистическому заключению, что «мы оевропеились… мы вышли в жизнь общечеловеческую», соответствует лишь либеральному западничеству. В оценке современной России она расходится как с католическим традиционализмом Чаадаева, так и с радикальным западничеством[33], которые не видели в российской реальности решительно никакого «выхода в общечеловеческую жизнь». Типичное выражение такой позиции дают, к примеру, декларации Герцена, не делающие никакого исключения для современности: «У нас лицо всегда было задавлено, поглощено… Рабство у нас увеличивалось с образованием[34]…Русская история была историей развития самодержавия и власти, как история Запада является историей развития свободы и прав»[35].

Топос личности: западники

Как мы уже убедились, тема личности красной нитью проходит в западническом дискурсе, составляя сам пафос западничества, едва ли не сам его raison d'être. У каждого из западников мы непременно найдем утверждение примата личностного начала в истории и общественной жизни, утверждение автономии, независимости индивидуальной личности, ее достоинства и свободы. И тем не менее, в том общем идейном фонде, что можно было бы назвать учением или доктриной западничества, мы не найдем сколько-нибудь развитой концепции личности. Пожалуй,

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[28] Там же. С.23.

[29] Он же. Письмо баронессе Э.Ф.Раден от 26 мая 1864 г. // Русская мысль. 1899, № 12. С.14.

[30] Он же. Взгляд на юридический быт древней России. С.66.

[31] Он же. Краткий взгляд на русскую историю. Цит. изд. С.164.

[32] Он же. Взгляд на юридический быт древней России. С.59.

[33] Разделение западников на либералов (Грановский, Кавелин, Боткин и др.) и радикалов (Герцен, Огарев, Белинский и др.) уже в 1845-46 гг. принимает форму прямого раскола.

[34] А.И.Герцен. С того берега // Он же. Собр.соч. в 30 тт. Т.6. М., 1955. С.319.

[35] Он же. Развитие революционных идей в России. Цит. изд. Т.7. М., 1956. С.244.

такая концепция, или, по крайней мере. ее ядро, есть у Герцена (и ниже мы опишем ее), однако едва ли можно считать ее частью доктрины; нигде не выраженная систематически, разбросанная обрывками по многим его трудам, но при этом бесконечно важная для него самого, она и принадлежит скорей не движению, а ему лично, составляя стержень его философского мировоззрения. Что же до «учения», до типичного западнического дискурса, то для них характерна великая поглощенность общественной, социальной проблематикой и отнюдь не свойственно углубление в антропологический или персоналистский горизонт. Это значит, что личность здесь не берется как философская проблема, не раскрывается в своей специфической природе – ибо это всё уже не социальная проблематика. Когда личность – лишь элемент *социальной* философии (или тем паче публицистики, проповеди), то пусть даже этот элемент ставится на пьедестал, объявляется высшей ценностью – всё равно, сам по себе, в собственной природе он не анализируется, он – аксиома, постулат. – Итак, личность для западников в большей степени предмет культа, нежели осмысления, философской рефлексии.

Надо признать, однако, что в идейно-культурной ситуации России уже и простое утверждение личности и достоинства человека в качестве первостепенно важных начал играло крупную культурно-воспитательную роль – тем паче что такое утверждение западники умели проводить с талантом и силою убеждения. Самые яркие и социально значимые страницы ранней истории западничества составляет публицистика Белинского начала 40-х гг., ставшая первым в России образцом успешного воспитания общества через СМИ. Идейным стержнем этой публицистики была «человечность» – идеал, наиболее четко представленный в статье «Детские книги» (1840), знаменитый финал которой призывал: «Главная задача человека во всякой сфере деятельности… – быть человеком… Уважение к имени человеческому, бесконечная любовь к человеку за то только, что он человек… должны быть стихией, воздухом, жизнью человека»[36]. Этот вклад Белинского стал своего рода исходным капиталом западничества, который изначально создал ему мощное влияние в довольно широкой среде.

Публицистический и социальный уклон в теме личности порождал особый дискурс: дискурс социальных проблем, социальной критики, но с такою шкалой ценностей, вершина которой – личность человека, начало не социальное, а индивидуальное. За этой структурой кроется, быть может, сильнейшая движущая пружина такого дискурса – его нравственный пафос, этицизм. Если речь о личности не входит в анализ личности, но усиленно утверждает необходимость ее развития, обеспечения ее достоинства, ее прав, всемерной и безусловной ее защиты, – эта речь являет собой уже не столько персоналистский, сколько этический дискурс; и западнический принцип примата личности представляется как этический принцип (напомним, это же мы увидели и за славянофильским принципом примата общины). Нагляднее и ярче всего этот нравственный пафос выступает у Белинского, самого публицистичного из лидеров западников. Не менее чем «Зальцбруннское письмо» к Гоголю, стало хрестоматийным его письмо к Василию Боткину от 1 марта 1841 г. с предъявлением морального счета Гегелю: «Судьба субъекта, индивидуума, личности важнее судеб всего мира… и гегелевской Allgemeinheit… Кланяюсь покорно, Егор Федорович… но если бы мне удалось влезть на высшую ступень

[36] В.Г.Белинский. Полн. собр. соч. Т.4. С.108.

лестницы развития, я и там попросил бы вас отдать мне отчет во всех жертвах живой жизни и истории… иначе я с верхней ступени лестницы бросаюсь вниз головой. Я не хочу счастья и даром, если не буду спокоен насчет каждого из моих братий»[37]. Своим безоглядным этическим максимализмом Белинский прямо напоминает Константина Аксакова с его столь же хрестоматийным заявлением о вреде правовых гарантий – да они и были друзьями юности, выйдя оба из кружка Станкевича. Гипертрофированный этицизм оказывается общей подосновой и западнических, и славянофильских теорий – а, стало быть, и вообще русского сознания той эпохи. Конечно, эта гипертрофия, как и любая, была опасна – стоит всерьез подумать о возможности ее связи с сегодняшней *атрофией* этического сознания в России. А в ту пору, этический максимализм и пафос свободы личности достаточно естественно увлекают радикальных западников к социализму, который у них приобретает этическую окраску, представляется как практическое решение проблемы личности – и, благодаря этому, получает высшее, в своем роде религиозное значение. Все эти связи, ставшие вскоре азбукой «передового сознания», так выражает, например, Бакунин: «За всеми… религиями должен последовать *Социализм*, который, взятый в религиозном смысле, есть вера в *исполнение предназначения человека на земле*»[38].

Лишь крайне редко можно найти у западников обсуждение того, *что же такое личность*, и в этих редких случаях мы видим не самостоятельное продумывание проблемы, а нечто, напоминающее пересказ давно выученного урока. Урок этот был дан христианским воспитанием, которое получил каждый. Пусть в 1845 г. Бакунин напишет брату: «Слава Богу, мы уже не христиане»; но в 1840-м он в письме родным очень ясно формулирует ортодоксальное христианское понимание личности, с минимальной примесью Гегеля: «Личность человека… есть непосредственное единство индивидуального человека с Богом… Личность каждого человека разнится от его индивидуальности именно тем, что она есть первоначальное воплощение Бога в индивидуальности каждого… Неразрывное единство… с Божественной личностью воплощенного Бога – Христа – есть необходимое условие действительного осуществления внутренней личности… И потому вся жизнь человека, всё его стремление должны состоять в том, чтобы его индивидуальность, исполненная греха и лжи, исчезла в осуществлении его живой и вечной личности»[39]. Иными словами, истинная личность человека – заключенные в нем образ и подобие Божие: таковы представления апостола анархизма о личности в этот вполне уже зрелый период его мысли. У либерала Кавелина не много общего во взглядах с Бакуниным, но в числе этого немногого та же христианская и христоцентрическая идея личности, которую он соединяет с Гегелем более неуклюже, чем Бакунин: «возникла впервые в христианстве мысль о бесконечном, безусловном достоинстве *человека и человеческой личности*. Человек – живой сосуд духовного мира и его святыни; если не в действительности, то в возможности он представитель Бога на земле, возлюбленный сын Божий, для которого сам Спаси-

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[37] В.Г.Белинский. Полн. собр. соч. Т.12. М.,1958. С.22. «Егор Федорович» – прозвание *Георга* Вильгельма *Фридриха* Гегеля в русских кружках.

[38] М.А.Бакунин. «Международное тайное общество освобождения человечества» // Он же. Избр. филос. соч. и письма. М., 1987. С.265. (Курс. автора).

[39] Он же. Письмо А.А. и Т.А.Бакуниным. Цит. изд. С.136.

тель сошел на землю…»[40]. Ясно, что подобная дефиниция никак не могла служить эффективным рабочим понятием при изучении судьбы личности в российской истории; уже один из студентов Кавелина, будущий фольклорист А.Н.Афанасьев, критически замечал о знаменитой его статье: «Автор, поставив краеугольным камнем своего труда личность, не объяснил точно, какой дает объем этому понятию»[41]. Но такой упрек можно обратить отнюдь не только к Кавелину. Объяснений «точного объема понятия» вообще трудно найти в западническом дискурсе личности. Внимательный взгляд показывает, что в нем сплошь и рядом (у Кавелина, в том числе) налагаются христианская концепция личности, в основе которой связь со Христом, и свойственная западной метафизике секуляризованная концепция личности, отвечающая антропоцентрической персонологической парадигме (см. Введение). Однако двойственность, вносимая наличием атавизмов христианской концепции, в дискурсе западничества остается обычно незамечаемой, что говорит о его философской незрелости.

В известной мере, исключением служит Герцен. Его мысль изначально, с юношеских увлечений сен-симонизмом, обрела антропологическую ориентацию, сосредоточенность на человеке, с ведущей интуицией живого единства человеческого существа. Один из самых ранних его опусов носит уже название (предвосхищающее Макса Шелера) «О месте человека в природе» (1832). Идею человека как живой цельности он противопоставлял «дуализму», в котором видел господствующую черту и главный порок всей европейской мысли христианской эпохи. В его понимании, «дуализм – это христианство, возведенное в логику, освобожденное от предания, от мистицизма[42]. Главный прием его состоит в том, чтобы разделять на мнимые противоположности то, что действительно нераздельно, например, тело и дух… Полторы тысячи лет всё… было пропитано дуализмом… [который] исказил все простейшие понятия»[43]. Разумеется, победить дуализм Герцену, как и всей Европе, помог Гегель. Но отношения Герцена с мыслью Гегеля не столь просты, уже оттого хотя бы, что Гегелева система, в целом, далеко не несет в себе антропологической ориентации и, напротив, содержит существенные черты, которые я в моем анализе антропологии немецкого идеализма[44] определяю как «анти-антропологические». Глубже всех эти отношения разобрал Густав Шпет. По Шпету, Герцен лишь очень частично овладел Гегелем, поскольку он (как многие философские дарования в России) подлинному погружению в философию предпочел общественное служение. «Не столько само содержание философии Гегеля увлекало Герцена, сколько общий *характер* этой философии… Герцен был увлечен, во-первых, *научностью* философии Гегеля, во-вторых, тем, что конечной задачей этой философии была сама *действительность*»[45]. Поэтому,

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[40] К.Д.Кавелин. Взгляд на юридический быт древней России. С.20.

[41] А.Н.Афанасьев. Народ-художник. Миф. Фольклор. Литература. М., 1986. С.295.

[42] Отметим тут проницательную, хотя оставшуюся неразвитой, интуицию о том, что в христианстве, не редуцированном к «логике», начала «предания» и «мистицизма» (а в наших терминах, «духовная традиция») ведут не к дуалистической, а целостной картине человека, общества и реальности. Именно такую картину пыталось развивать славянофильство, с которым Герцен перекликается во многих пунктах, преодолевая шоры идеологических оппозиций.

[43] А.И.Герцен. С того берега. С.126-127.

[44] С.С.Хоружий. Анти-антропология классического немецкого идеализма // Вопросы философии, 2007, №№ 6, 7.

[45] Г.Г.Шпет. Философское мировоззрение Герцена. Петроград, 1921. С.12. (Курс. автора).

усвоив достаточно гегелевский дискурс, язык, он ставит их на службу своему изначальному антропологизму и намечает с их помощью контуры своей концепции личности. Подобное сочетание факторов сразу напоминает Фейербаха. Поскольку же вдобавок все прочли в «Былом и думах», как Герцен «вспрыгнул от радости», начав читать «Сущность христианства» Фейербаха, то трактовка философии Герцена как фейербахианской была почти общепринята, пока ее не отверг категорически Шпет, посвятивший особое исследование разоблачению «легенды о фейербахизме Герцена». Как показывает Шпет, единственным настоящим философским влиянием для Герцена остается Гегель, по отношению же к Фейербаху он вполне самостоятелен и во многом глубоко расходится с ним.

Простыми рассуждениями в гегельянском ключе Герцен строит базис своей концепции личности. Всеобщность, разум обладают внутренней необходимостью, потребностью индивидуализации. Они должны иметь силу воплотить себя из рода в вид, а из вида в индивид и личность. В свою очередь, пред личностью, в силу той же внутренней необходимости, встает задача самореализации. В том, как она, по Герцену, решается, заключена вся суть концепции, ее специфическое своеобразие. Здесь снова преодоление дуализма, ибо задача изначально двояка: с одной стороны, задача мысли, теории, с другой – задача действия, практики. Пафос Герцена обращен на утверждение второго полюса, третируемого или игнорируемого в спекулятивной философии. «Забытая в науке личность потребовала своих прав, потребовала жизни… удовлетворяющейся одним творческим, свободным деянием»[46]. Герцен доказывает, что именно в действии, деятельности – ключ к конституции личности, лишь в них обретается полнота ее самореализации. «Действование – сама личность… в разумном, нравственно-свободном и страстно-энергическом деянии человек достигает действительности своей личности»[47], ибо в таком деянии, «свободном, разумном и сознательном» – вновь и вновь повторяет Герцен – теория переводится в жизнь, примиряется дуализм теории и практики, а вместе с ним побеждается и всякий дуализм (то есть, по Герцену, корень зла). Наметившаяся здесь концепция личности далее начинает наполняться конкретным содержанием: дается набросок этики свободы и достоинства личности (включающий любопытную апологию эгоизма), рассматривается зависимость личности от среды, эпохи и т.д. и т.п.

Деятельная природа личности – сердцевина, ключевой тезис концепции личности Герцена. Сам по себе, такой тезис мог бы быть тривиален, но смысл его у Герцена в том, что и личность и ее природа берутся в горизонте гегелевской «действительности», Wirklichkeit. В этом горизонте, деятельное выступает как разумно-деятельное, а сама личность предстает как уникальный плавильный тигель, где, по словам Шпета, «переплавляется вся действительность, чтобы, очистив ее от шлаков и «случайного» сора, ее можно было чистую и драгоценную влить в формы разумности»[48]. Шпет весьма высоко оценивает эту концепцию, в которой, по его выражению, гегелевская «действительность заговорила голосом личности». Сегодня к его оценке можно добавить, что в концепции Герцена обнаружи-

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[46] А.И.Герцен. Дилетантизм в науке. Письмо III: Дилетантизм и цех ученых. Цит. по: Г.Шпет. Цит. соч. С.22.

[47] Там же.

[48] Г.Г.Шпет. Цит.соч. С.24.

ваются переклички, связи со многими философскими явлениями 20 в. – течениями неомарксизма, персонализма, «мыследеятельным подходом» в позднесоветской и постсоветской философии, и др. И можно согласиться также, что в этой концепции – вершина мысли западников о личности и о человеке.

Топос личности: славянофилы

Стремясь сохранять объективность в идейной полемике, Герцен писал об отношениях личности и общины: «Наша община – великое приданое наше… я вполне ценю ее, но в ней недостает личного начала»[49]. Суждения других западников резче, они, как правило, говорят не столько о «недостаче», сколько о полном отсутствии такового начала. Если же обратиться к самим славянофилам, то на это обвинение в адрес общины мы найдем у них лишь скудный и не слишком определенный ответ. Правда, у Константина Аксакова, как всегда, позиция прямая и четкая, но в данной теме она уже на грани утопии.

Проблему «личность и община» Аксаков не затушевывает, а решает сразу, в зачатке, давая собственную дефиницию общины: «Община есть союз людей, отказывающихся от своего эгоизма, от личности своей… это действо любви, высокое действо христианское… Община представляет нравственный хор и как в хоре не теряется голос… так и в общине не теряется личность, но, отказываясь от своей исключительности для согласия общего, она находит себя в высшем очищенном виде, в согласии равномерно [т.е. в равной мере – *С.Х.*] самоотверженных личностей… в нравственном созвучии личностей, каждая личность слышна, но не одиноко, а согласно – и предстает высокое явление дружного совокупного бытия разумных существ»[50]. Конститутивный принцип общины – единогласие, или «свободное нравственное согласие всех». В реальном сообществе его постоянное поддержание, разумеется, нереально, и Аксаков говорит: «единогласие трудно, но всякая высота нравственная трудна». Отсюда хорошо видно, что все силы, конституирующие и скрепляющие общину, – сугубо нравственного характера, как усиленно подчеркивает и сам Аксаков: «Славянская община была союз людей, основанный на нравственном начале… Когда люди образовали общину, то общий внутренний нравственный закон является как порядок общей жизни… Основание общества есть одно общее нравственное убеждение»[51]. Все стороны и измерения жизни сообщества, кроме нравственных, отодвигаются здесь на второй план, а юридические прямо отрицаются; оппозиция этики и права как «правды внутренней» и «правды внешней» достигает степени правового нигилизма: «Славяне жили под условиями правды внутренней… Торжество внешней правды есть гибель правды внутренней, единой истинной, свободной правды»[52]. В такой трактовке, община – уже не реальный тип сельского сообщества, а некий чисто этический конструкт, условность и утопичность которого усугубляются тем, что условною, нераскрытой остается и сама этика любви и согласия, конституирующая общину: что это за дивная этика? откуда взялась она у славян?

Условная конструкция общины развивается в не менее условную конструкцию социума как союза общества, или же «Земли», живущей на началах общины,

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[49] А.И.Герцен. С того берега. С.319.

[50] К.С.Аксаков. Краткий исторический очерк Земских Соборов. Цит. изд. С.279-280.

[51] Он же. Несколько слов о русской истории, возбужденных историею г. Соловьева. Цит. изд. С.58, 55.

[52] Он же. Краткий исторический очерк Земских Соборов. С.287.

и сферы власти, или «Государства». Вот принципы этого союза: «Отношения Земли и Государства между собою: …Государству – неограниченное право действия и закона, Земле – полное право мнения и слова… неограниченная власть – царю, полная свобода жизни и духа – народу;… Право духовной свободы… свобода мысли и слова есть неотъемлемое право Земли: только при нем никаких прав политических она не хочет, предоставляя Государству неограниченную власть политическую»[53]. Противоречивость и утопичность такой конструкции очевидны (что за «неограниченная власть», не могущая ни в чем стеснять «мнения и слова» подданных?!), но, вместе с тем, выраженное тут отношение к государству и политике разделялось всеми славянофилами. Они твердо считали, что «народ» не желает входить в эти сферы: находя их греховными, он полностью делегирует власть царю и его присным, однако взамен желает сохранять свободной и неприкосновенной свою «внутреннюю жизнь» – религию, обычаи, быт.

Такая позиция обнаруживает глубокое духовное чутье, ибо вполне соответствует установкам изначального христианства, как их описывает, например, Ханна Арендт: «Христианская концепция политической свободы… выросла из подозрения и вражды ранних христиан ко всей публичной сфере как таковой, от забот которой они требовали избавления ради свободы»[54]. Согласно Арендт, в основе этой позиции лежит «определение политической свободы как потенциальной свободы от политики», и в истории политической мысли можно выделить целую линию, следующую подобному пониманию свободы и политических прав. К этой линии и принадлежат славянофилы. Поскольку неприкосновенная сфера «свободы жизни и духа» трактуется ими весьма широко, то их позиция, хотя и утверждает необходимость самодержавия, но в то же время парадоксально сближается с политическими теориями сокращения, минимизации прерогатив государства. Так выражал эту позицию Иван Аксаков: «Русский народ не политический… а народ социальный, имеющий задачей внутреннюю жизнь, жизнь земскую. Его идеал не государственное совершенство, а создание христианского общества… Для нас же забота та, чтобы государство давало как можно более простора внутренней жизни и само бы понимало свою ограниченность, недостаточность»[55].

Возвращаясь же к личности, мы видим, что, хотя «Земля» К.Аксакова, вслед за его общиной, – тоже идеализированный чисто этический конструкт (ср.: «Сила нравственная… есть элемент, в котором живет и движется Земля»), но концепция Земли несет в себе важные, опять-таки обще-славянофильские, идеи о правах личности. По учению славянофилов, эти права отнюдь не относятся к политике, они входят во «внутреннюю жизнь», в сферу Земли, и потому – неприкосновенны, неотчуждаемы. Вследствие этого, пафос свободы, достоинства и прав личности – никак не монополия западников. Славянофилы активно настаивали на свободе слова и мысли, и едва ли их заявления по резкости требований уступали протестам западников. Белинский представил свою сокрушительную критику в частном письме Гоголю; но Константин Аксаков писал в Записке, поданной императору: «Современное состояние России представляет внутренний разлад, прикрываемый

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[53] Там же. С.284.

[54] Х.Арендт. Что такое свобода? // Точки – Puncta. 2007, №1-2. С.196.

[55] И.С.Аксаков. Письмо графине А.Д.Блудовой от 15.01.1862. Цит. по: Ранние славянофилы. Сост. Н.Л.Бродский. М., 1910. С.LIV-LV.

бессовестною ложью… всё обняла ложь, везде обман… Все зло происходит от угнетательной системы нашего правительства… Эта система, если б могла… то обратила бы человека в животное, которое повинуется, не рассуждая»[56]. Брат же его, в передовице, открывавшей первый нумер основанной им газеты «День», вносил такое предложение в Свод Законов: «Прежде всего необходимым кажется нам постановить твердое правило, которое и внести в 1 Том Свода Законов… [как] главу 1 следующего содержания: *Свобода печатного слова есть неотъемлемое право каждого подданного Российской империи, без различия звания и состояния*»[57].

Но при всем том, концепция личности у Константина Аксакова оказывается довольно фантастической. Как мы уже видим, личность, по его мысли, никак не отсутствует в русском социуме, однако реализуется она в очень своеобразной форме, которую трудно не признать ирреальной. Аксаковский человек, член общины или Земли, самоотверженный, отказывающийся не только от эгоизма, но и от самой своей личности, чтобы в «нравственном хоре» обрести ее «в высшем и очищенном виде», – есть также чисто этический конструкт, всецело этицизированный человек, и потому – лишь антропологическая утопия. Можно только добавить, что сам Константин Аксаков, по свидетельствам, в жизни был крайне близок к этому несуществующему человеку…

Другие славянофилы видят общинное и земское устройство, а равно и личность в нем, более реалистически. Хомяков был главным создателем учения об общине, но он, тем не менее, не разделяет этического утопизма К.Аксакова, замечая трезво: «Личные добродетели далеко не развивались в сельских мирах в той степени, в какой развивались добродетели общежительные»[58]. На его взгляд, «высокие личные добродетели в сельском быту» – только «прекрасные исключения», а еще, к тому же, форма западная, дружина, «стояла бесспорно на высшей степени личной добродетели», – откуда легко сделать вывод, что судьба личности в общине видится ему, в сущности, почти так же как западникам. И тем не менее, в главном, в положительном своем содержании, позиции Хомякова в проблеме личности нисколько не приближаются к западническим. Эти позиции развиваются им уже не в рамках учения об общине, а совсем независимо от него – в его знаменитом *учении о соборности*.

Учение о соборности Хомякова и историко-философские идеи Ивана Киреевского – два самых значительных религиозно-философских плода славянофильства. Оба они несут заметные отличия от прочей литературы славянофильского движения (в книге моей о Хомякове я отнес даже учение о соборности к особому, уже не-славянофильскому этапу его творчества). Принадлежащие уже не 40-м, а 50-м годам, они по зрелости, творческому уровню выходят за рамки «кружковой философии», создававшейся в эпоху споров двух партий. Отходят они и от тематики этих споров, не касаясь ни сакраментальной общины, ни вообще национальной истории (у Киреевского историческая рефлексия имеет своим предметом, по существу, не столько «русское просвещение», сколько Восточнохристианский дискурс). В центре их – не национальная, а религиозная проблематика, более глубокая и универсальная. Этот сдвиг важен и для проблемы личности: славянофиль-

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[56] К.С.Аксаков. Записка о внутреннем состоянии России // Ранние славянофилы. С.89-91.
[57] И.С.Аксаков. Передовая газеты «День», 19 мая 1862. Цит. по: Ранние славянофилы. С.129.
[58] А.С.Хомяков. По поводу статьи И.В.Киреевского… С.243.

ское видение личности имело религиозные корни, и без их раскрытия не могло обрести прочного основания и даже простой отчетливости.

Сегодня, в ретроспективе, позиции двух партий в проблеме личности видятся не столь сложными. Как сказано выше, утверждавшаяся западниками «свободная, разумная и сознательная личность» соответствует антропоцентрической парадигме, в которой личность трактуется как автономный самодовлеющий индивидуум, сближаясь с метафизическим понятием субъекта. В отличие от этого, славянофильская позиция соответствует теоцентрической парадигме (см. Введение), согласно которой полнота наделенности личным бытием принадлежит не человеку, а Богу. Человеческая же личность формируется в приобщении, причастии человека Богу, причем в этом приобщении человек участвует не только интеллектуально, а целостно, всем своим существом. Поэтому цельность – ключевой предикат личности человека, и весь славянофильский дискурс личности строится как утверждение «цельной личности», представляющей собой согласную собранность всех уровней и способностей человека в единство, открытое к соединению с Богом. Однако на этом этапе раскрытие философского и религиозного содержания, заключенного в концепте цельной личности, еще только начиналось. Решающую роль в нем предстояло сыграть философии Серебряного века и шедшему за ней православному богословию личности.

Первоначально, в пору создания славянофильской доктрины, мысль Хомякова была преимущественно социальной философией, сосредоточенной на дескрипции определенного типа человеческого сообщества, который характеризовался целым рядом совершенств, идеальных свойств («общежительных добродетелей»). Две главные особенности отличали эту философию: во-первых, специфическая природа данного совершенного сообщества передавалась в органической парадигме, посредством понятия организма; во-вторых, принималось (краеугольный камень доктрины!), что это сообщество реализуется в истории в форме русской общины. Но, в отличие от Константина Аксакова, Хомяков мыслил не утопически. Смотря достаточно трезво на общинное устройство в его истории и современности, он приходил к выводу, что община не может быть воплощением совершенного органического сообщества. Новый этап его мысли рождается тогда, когда к этому негативному выводу присоединяется позитивный: действительная, единственно адекватная реализация совершенного сообщества есть – *Церковь*.

В основе этого этапного вывода – простая логика. Тип совершенного сообщества, в силу его совершенных, идеальных качеств, принципиально не может быть воплощен никаким эмпирическим обществом. Такое сообщество должно быть сверх-эмпирично, иметь сверх-эмпирические измерения в своей природе; и Церковь, в отличие от обычного социума, подобные измерения имеет. Далее, еще на «общинном» этапе мысли у Хомякова сформировался набор основных признаков, предикатов, характеризующих совершенное сообщество; главным, определяющим из них было гармоническое сочетание, и даже точнее, тождество, полного единства и полной свободы. Но новом этапе все эти характеристики, которые не удавалось найти в общине, Хомяков обнаруживает наличествующими в Церкви. Эта концептуализация церковного бытия осуществляется путем детального анализа одного определенного свойства, которым обладает Церковь согласно Символу веры христиан: свойства *соборности*. Точней, в Символе стоит «соборная Церковь», и Хомяков сам образует от этого прилагательного существительное – нео-

логизм, который со временем занял прочное место в русской – да и не только русской – религиозной и социальной мысли.

«Соборная» – третий атрибут Церкви из четырех («едина, святая, соборная и апостольская Церковь»), выражаемый в греческом оригинале термином catholicos – по смыслу, всецелое, всеобщее, универсальное. Важная особенность русского термина – отсутствующее в оригинале сближение с понятием собора, собрания верующих. Усиленно опираясь на нее, Хомяков развивает учение о соборности как «соборном единстве», в котором полнота единства и полнота свободы его элементов не только совместимы, но предполагают друг друга. Этот синтез свободы и единства он настойчиво утверждает как главное определение природы Церкви: «Церковь – свобода в единстве»[59], «Единство Церкви есть не что иное как согласие личных свобод»[60] и т.п. Но сам Хомяков не применяет к этому сочетанию двух начал слова «синтез» и не дает вообще ему спекулятивной трактовки, гегелевской или иной. Как особенно подчеркивал Георгий Флоровский, дискурс соборности Хомякова развивается в элементе описания и свидетельства, это – *опытный* дискурс, передача его собственного церковного опыта, который был живым и глубоким («Хомяков жил в Церкви», как сказал Юрий Самарин). В горизонте же опыта, сочетание свободы и единства в Церкви является не диалектическим, а *благодатным*: достигаемым с помощью Божественной энергии, благодати. В соборном единстве, по Хомякову, свобода принимает особую форму – это соборная свобода, «просвещенная благодатью свобода», как и само соборное единство созидается «по благодати Божией, а не по человеческому установлению». Аналогичная связь с благодатью, «преображенная благодатью» форма отличает и все основные атрибуты церковного бытия, проявления жизни Церкви. Поскольку же благодать, Божественная энергия – принадлежность Божественного бытия, иного онтологического горизонта, то этому горизонту принадлежит и соборное единство, соборность. Флоровский, пожалуй, самый авторитетный исследователь учения о соборности, четко закрепляет: «Соборность в понимании Хомякова – это не человеческая, а Божественная характеристика»[61]. Этот тезис важен, ибо позволяет сразу отбросить все многочисленные, продолжающиеся до сего дня покушения представить соборность как социальный (а часто и национальный) идеал, отнести ее не к Церкви, а к обычному социуму.

Как явствует отсюда, в учении о соборности мысль Хомякова выходит в область онтологии, причем этот выход совершается не в русле гегельянства или какого-либо иного направления западной метафизики, а неким своим путем, более богословским, но отчасти и философским. Для русской мысли это был важный шаг. Сразу в нескольких направлениях открывались новые перспективы, которые в дальнейшем постепенно осмысливались и осваивались как философией, так и богословием. Эта рецепция учения о соборности описывается в моей книге о Хомякове[62], здесь же я укажу только ее главные вехи. В русской филосо-

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[59] Он же. Несколько слов православного христианина о западных вероисповеданиях. По поводу одного послания Парижского архиепископа // Он же. Соч. в 2-х тт. Т.2. М., 1994. С.66.

[60] Он же. Еще несколько слов православного христианина о западных вероисповеданиях. По поводу разных сочинений латинских и протестантских о предметах веры. Цит. изд. С.209.

[61] Прот. Георгий Флоровский. Пути русского богословия. Изд.3. Париж, 1983. С.277.

[62] С.С.Хоружий. Алексей Хомяков и его дело. II.6-7 // Он же. Опыты из русской духовной традиции. С.169-204

фии налицо, по крайней мере, три линии развития и влияния этого учения: 1) в онтологии, в связи с концепцией всеединства, 2) в теории познания, в построениях так называемой «онтологической гносеологии», 3) в социальной философии, в попытках эксплуатировать соборность как принцип социального устройства. Особняком стоит прихотливо-личное видение соборности Вяч. Ивановым: в 1910-е годы он развивал понимание ее как некоего «хорового начала», принципа единения-слияния народной стихии в фольклорно-сакральных действах. Эти его теории имели влияние, войдя в идейный фонд русского символизма и получив развитие, в частности, в концепции «культового действа» в философии культа П.Флоренского.

Родство соборности с всеединством очевидно: оба принципа коренятся в той же исходной интуиции единства и связности бытия, выражая способ конституции или принцип внутренней формы совершенного единства множества, которое, по дефиниции Хомякова, есть «единство всех и единство по всему». Но тем не менее близость их ограничена: всеединство – чисто философский концепт, принадлежащий традиции христианского платонизма, тогда как соборность имеет опытную и экклезиологическую природу, восходя к видению Церкви как мистического Тела в Посланиях Павла. Поэтому в системах всеединства русской религиозной философии онтология обязана Соловьеву несравненно больше, чем Хомякову. Иная ситуация – в концепциях «онтологической гносеологии», которые доказывали зависимость акта познания от онтологических предпосылок. Эти концепции, развивавшиеся многими философами Серебряного века (С. и Е.Трубецкими, Лосским и Франком, Флоренским, Аскольдовым и др.), были довольно различны, но большинством из них разделялись два положения:

1) *Сознание имеет соборную природу*. Оно не принадлежит индивидууму как таковому, но только реализуется, осуществляет свою работу через индивидуума и в индивидууме. Само же по себе оно определяется трансиндивидуальными предикатами, являясь родовым и вселенским сознанием.

2) *Познание базируется на нравственных предпосылках*. Оно является не чисто рассудочною, но холистической и синтетической активностью, в которую вовлекаются купно мысль, воля, чувство; и ключевым сверх-рассудочным слагаемым когнитивного акта служит любовь.

Оба эти положения прямо восходят к Хомякову, что вполне ясно из следующего важного философского пассажа: «Ясность разумения поставляется в зависимость от закона нравственного. Общение любви не только полезно, но вполне необходимо для постижения истины… Недоступная для отдельного мышления, истина доступна только совокупности мышлений, связанных любовью»[63]. Легко признать близость этих суждений также и позициям современного западного «коммунологического» мышления, утверждающего примат общения и сообщества (community and communication). Наконец, что касается социальной философии, то мы говорили уже о необоснованности переноса хомяковского концепта в эту сферу. Тем не менее, такой перенос совершался систематически, как правило, в учениях с консервативным или националистическим уклоном, от поздних славянофилов до постсоветских коммунистов и (нео)евразийцев. Исключением служит лишь теория Франка, развитая им в книге «Духовные основы общества» (1930) и

[63] А.С.Хомяков. По поводу отрывков, найденных в бумагах И.В.Киреевского // Он же. Полн. собр. соч., изд. 3. Т.1. С.283.

пытающаяся сочетать экклезиологический статус соборности с приданием ей роли «идеально направляющей силы общественной жизни».

Развитие богословского учения о соборности было рано оборвано смертью Хомякова. Понятно, что это развитие должно было неизбежно вести к вытеснению органической парадигмы: поскольку эта парадигма, связанная биологическими коннотациями, ограничена горизонтом здешнего бытия, то онтологический дискурс должен был войти в конфликт с органическим. Можно заметить, как в поздних трудах Хомякова применение к Церкви и ее жизни понятия организма и примыкающих к нему становится более осторожным и ограниченным – и всё в большей мере в дескрипции церковного бытия выходят на первый план принципы личности, любви и общения, которые не связаны с органическою парадигмой, сверх-органичны. Дискурс соборности продвигался в сторону *богословия личности* и, тем самым, – к теоцентрической персонологической парадигме. Явное появление концепции личности как Божественной Ипостаси должно было бы стать решающим шагом в преодолении органицизма; но такое появление предполагало еще одну важную ступень, которая достигнута не была: углубленное развитие, вслед за экклезиологией, – христологии. Далее, усиленно подчеркивая конститутивную роль благодати в бытии Церкви, учение о соборности сближается, пускай имплицитно, и с *богословием энергий*, основательно забытым в ту пору. Указанные два рода православного богословия стали в 20 в. основой нового этапа православной мысли, который часто именуют этапом неопатристики и неопаламизма и который осуществил плодотворное современное возрождение Восточнохристианского дискурса. Его зачинатели Вл.Лосский и Г.Флоровский создали обновленную современную редакцию учения о соборности, которая стала существенной частью данного этапа. Поэтому Хомякова можно считать по праву одним из ранних его предтеч.

С возрождением Восточнохристианского дискурса тесно связана и мысль Ивана Киреевского. В его поздних статьях, и особенно, в программном и предсмертном труде «О возможности и необходимости новых начал для философии», намечается сам концепт Восточнохристианского дискурса, ставится и анализируется проблема создания аутентичной философии, стоящей на его основаниях (и, тем самым, вне русла европейской метафизики). С большой философской зоркостью, Киреевский (как думают многие, включая меня, сильнейший философский ум в России своего времени) выстраивает идейный контекст такой философии и указывает ее определяющие черты. Как им подчеркивается, она должна быть не новой понятийной системой, согласуемой с положениями веры как внешними требованиями (путь схоластики), а *новым способом мышления*: таким, который способен дать выражение духовного опыта в адекватном этому опыту философском дискурсе. Он точно указывает, что, в отличие от западной мысли, Восточнохристианский дискурс отводит духовному опыту (опыту веры, Богообщения) ведущую роль: «Особенность православного мышления, исходящая из особенного отношения разума к вере, должна определить… господствующее направление самобытной образованности»[64]. И, как он далее подмечает, эта опытная ориентация должна выражаться в своеобразной и тонкой организации мышления: «в мышле-

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[64] И.В.Киреевский. О возможности и необходимости новых начал для философии // Он же. Избранные статьи. М., 1984. С.262.

нии православно верующего совокупляется всегда двойная деятельность: следя за развитием своего разумения, он вместе с тем следит и за самым способом своего мышления, постоянно стремясь возвысить разум до того уровня, на котором он мог бы сочувствовать вере»[65]. В историко-философском контексте, намечаемая философия должна сопрягать два полюса: она должна быть безусловно актуальной и современной, «соответствовать вопросам своего времени», и в то же время, «живительным зародышем и светлым указателем пути» должна для нее служить «философия святых отцов православной церкви»; так что, в итоге, ее задача – «согласить со святоотеческим преданием все начала современной образованности». В утверждении имманентной, непреходящей роли греческой патристики, обращение к которой может и должно питать не архаизирующую и консервативную мысль, а творческое постижение современности, идеи Киреевского прямо предвосхищают концепцию неопатристического синтеза Флоровского. Именно это – та идейная нить, следуя которой русская мысль 20 в. успешно двигалась к преодолению конфликта духовной и культурной традиций, ключевого конфликта русской культуры.

И всё же ни у Киреевского, ни у Хомякова не было создано той философии, к которой они стремились: современной, строящейся на собственных основаниях русской духовной традиции и потому отличной от классической европейской метафизики. Учение о соборности Хомякова развивалось в стихии вольного рассуждения, более богословского, чем философского, отрывочного и часто – публицистически-полемического. Комплекс идей Киреевского носил характер намечаемого проекта, к осуществлению которого ему не суждено было приступить. Задача создания русской философии осталась будущему. Однако ледоход русской мысли уже был неостановим. Начатая работа продумывания этой философии была подхвачена и продолжена.

IV. Заключение

В восприятии славянофильства и западничества в культурном сознании давно сложился *симметричный стереотип*: оба движения рассматриваются как однотипные, аналогичные, хотя и противостоящие друг другу; как две взаимно подобные фигуры идейных противников. В действительности, однако, они вовсе не симметричны во многих важных аспектах. Насущные потребности мысли, общества виделись им по-разному, и поэтому в центр у них ставились разные задачи: у западников – развитие, эмансипация общественного и, прежде всего, личного, индивидуального сознания, культивация свободной личности; у славянофилов – самоопределение русского сознания, его отчет себе в собственных основаниях, осмысление собственных начал, собственного исторического и духовного опыта. Видно, что эти задачи – разной природы. Первый круг, где к тому же предполагалось принятие готовых западных концепций личности и моделей общества, сводился, в основном, к проблемам социальной педагогики и просвещения, тогда как второй круг принадлежал топосу самосознания, глубоко философской проблематике. Именно поэтому Густав Шпет, стоявший сам на крайне западнических позициях, со всей определенностью утверждал: «Славянофильские проблемы… –

[65] Там же.

единственные оригинальные проблемы русской философии»[66], из всех западников признав некоторое философское значение лишь за Герценом («Герцен вместе со славянофилами заправлял тесто русской философии»[67]). Мысль западников питает общественный, гражданский пафос, «религия великого общественного перевоплощения» (Герцен), и для их биографий типичен уход от философии «в общественность», как тогда говорили, – в публицистику, политику. Славянофилы никогда не пренебрегают «общественностью», но мысль их питает философский пафос, и никуда, никогда эта мысль не может уйти из топоса русского самосознания.

В итоге, в идейной жизни и культуре России надолго сложилось «разделение труда»: славянофильские тенденции преобладают в философском процессе, сфере творческой мысли; влияние западничества – в общественном движении и развитии. Напротив, покушаясь на философию, западники обыкновенно достигали лишь посредственных результатов (Шпет – исключение, подтверждающее правило), славянофилы же никогда не могли «увлечь массы» или предложить обществу реалистическую социальную программу. В этом свидетельстве истории отражается искусственность обеих доктрин, опирающихся на условные идеологические конструкты. Понятое как догма, как полнота истины, каждое из учений тут же обнаруживает явные несообразности, оказывается несостоятельным и устаревшим. Недаром все лучшие интеллектуальные достижения в обоих руслах – учение о соборности Хомякова, философский проект Киреевского, концепцию личности у Герцена – мы находили выходящими за рамки доктрин, не отвечающими догматическому западничеству или славянофильству. Но в то же время, каждое русло оказывается вовсе не устаревшим, а непреходящим, необходимым всегда – в качестве составляющего момента, одной из тенденций, граней всякой полноценной стратегии развития российской культуры.

Однако беда русской истории была в том, что оба учения не умели и не желали взглянуть на себя таким образом – как на необходимые, но частичные моменты самореализации культурного организма – живого целого, не охватываемого никакою догмой. Как выражались в старину, они не желали «признать правду друг друга» – отказаться от шор идеологизма, признать относительность своих догм и достичь «синергии», соработничества друг с другом. (Лишь ненадолго элементы такой синергии возникнут в культуре Серебряного века, мелькнут в идее Славянского возрождения…) Дальнейшее углубление поляризации общественного сознания было в порядке дня, оно с легкостью предвиделось и с неизбежностью надвигалось.

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[66] Г.Г.Шпет. Очерк развития русской философии. С.37.

[67] Он же. Философское мировоззрение Герцена. С.75.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 300-309

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«Вехи» как философский бестселлер

Золотой век русской философии

«Вехи» это абсолютный и неповторимый в истории России философский бестселлер. В конце XX века были попытки создать нечто подобное, но все попытки остались «широко известными в узких кругах», несравнимыми с всероссийским, без преувеличения, резонансом, произведенным «Вехами». Лишь в течение 1909 года вышло пять изданий «Вех», в печати с марта 1909 по февраль 1910 года появилось 218 откликов на него. По современным меркам это, условно говоря, равнозначно трансляции содержания статей Н.А. Бердяева, С.Н. Булгакова, М.О. Гершензона, А.С. Изгоева, Б.А. Кистяковского, П.Б. Струве, С.Л. Франка по всем каналам телевидения, не только центрального, но и регионального. Ведь о «Вехах» написали *практически все* русские газеты. За рукописью сборника гонялись издатели, рассчитывая на верную прибыль. Это нашло свое отражение и в литературе, например, в «Жизни Клима Самгина» Максима Горького: бойкий журналист Иван Дронов с сожалением сообщал Климу, что ему не удалось заполучить для публикации текст «Вех». Дронов восхищался: «Эта книжечка – наскандалит! Выдержит изданий пяток, а то и больше. Ах, черти…»[1] В 1909-1910 годах были опубликованы пять сборников, в которых дебатировалась проблематика «Вех»: «В защиту интеллигенции», «Вехи» как знамение времени», «Интеллигенция в России», «По Вехам. Сборник статей об интеллигенции и национальном лице», «Из истории новейшей русской литературы». В России и за границей устраивались обсуждения сборника, а П.Н. Милюков предпринял лекционное турне против «Вех».

«Вехи» были восприняты как вызов важнейшим понятиям русского образованного общества. Отсюда всплеск откликов от всех его слоев: консерваторов (В.В. Розанов, архиепископ Антоний), левых демократов (М.А. Антонович, Н.В. Валентинов), либералов (П.Н. Милюков, Р.В. Иванов-Разумник), революционеров (Г.В. Плеханов, В.И. Ленин, В.М. Чернов). Откликнулись писатели и поэты (Л.Н. Толстой, А. Белый, Д.С. Мережковский, П.Д. Боборыкин), философы и социологи (М.М. Ковалевский, Е.Н. Трубецкой), журналисты и литературные критики. Реакции были многообразными: от острых и двусмысленных выпадов амбициозного Мережковского (который, скорее всего, был обижен на то, что Гершензон, рассылавший письма-приглашения участникам сборника, обошел его стороной)[2] до со-

[1] Горький М. Собрание сочинений в тридцати томах. Т. 22. М., 1953. С. 234.

[2] Ревность Мережковского к небывалому успеху сборника приняла, можно сказать, комическое направление. На заседании Религиозно-философского общества в Петербурге от 21 апреля 1909 г., специально посвященного обсуждению «Вех» (с участием двух веховцев – Струве и Франка) Мережковский выступил с антивеховским докладом, который закончил словами: «Да здравствует рус-

чувственных и доброжелательных оценок Е.Н. Трубецкого. Идеи «Вех» отождествляли с «православием, самодержавием, народностью», называли «кощунством», «мемуарами унтер-офицерской вдовы», «Цусимой литературы, аферизма и фарисейства», приравнивали к черносотенству, с одной стороны, к «национальному отщепенству» – с другой.[3]

О чем свидетельствует грандиозный успех сборника и что он обозначает как веха («значковый шест», по В.И. Далю) в истории русской культуры? Прежде всего, «Вехи» были «значком» того высокого уровня интеллектуального и общекультурного влияния, которого достигла философия в России начала XX века. Ведь «Вехи» – это не какой-то политический памфлет (от политики авторы сборника принципиально дистанцировались), а философское произведение, замечательный образец вольного философствования, посвященного оценке своеобразия национальной психологии, миросозерцания русской интеллигенции, ее отношения к религии, философии, культуре, праву, этике. «Вехи» – составная часть русского Серебряного века. На самом деле для философии это был Золотой век. Сборник отражал замечательное развитие философской мысли, достигнутое в России в начале XX столетия. Это не «кружковая» и не «салонная» философия времен славянофильско-западнических дискуссий 30-40-х годов XIX века, названных Г.В. Флоровским временем «философского пробуждения». Русская философия в начале XX века вступила в эпоху зрелости и «цветущей сложности», она характеризовалась разнообразием оригинальных творческих достижений как рационалистического (А.А. Богданов, Г.Г. Шпет, Д.И. Менделеев, Г.И. Челпанов, А.И. Введенский), так и религиозно-метафизического характера (С.Н. и Е.Н. Трубецкие, Н.О. Лосский, Л.М. Лопатин, В.В. Розанов, Н.Ф. Федоров, П.А. Флоренский). Разумеется, к известным философам надо причислить и самих веховцев – Бердяева, Струве, Франка, Булгакова. Высокого профессионального уровня достигла университетская философия, в том числе философско-правовая мысль (Б.Н. Чичерин, П.И. Новгородцев, Л.И. Петражицкий, И.А. Ильин, Н.М. Коркунов).

Причем в преподавании не существовало безраздельного господства какого-либо одного типа философии, распространялись и равно сосуществовали идеи гегельянства, кантианства и неокантианства, позитивизма, персонализма и феноменологии. Марксизм при всем том значительном влиянии, которое он имел на общественную мысль, в начале XX века не был специфическим направлением «профессорской» философии и в университетских курсах не рассматривался в качестве самостоятельного философского течения[4]. К этому надо прибавить также ду-

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ская интеллигенция, да здравствует русская революция!». Автор отчета об этом заседании пишет: «Конечно, никто и помимо Струве и Франка не мог серьезно поверить, что Мережковский вдруг стал радикальным защитником революционной интеллигенции. Но и Струве и Франк очень ярко оттенили эту «легкость необыкновенную в мыслях», которая привела Мережковского на несвойственную ему позицию»// Ермичев А.А. Религиозно-философское общество в Петербурге (1907-1917). Хроника заседаний. СПб., 2007. С. 60-61.

[3] Наиболее полное представление о разнообразии оценок сборника дает антология «Вехи: Pro et Contra». Сост., вступ. ст. и прим. В.В. Сапова. СПб., 1998.

[4] Например, в известном университетском учебнике Г .И. Челпанова К. Маркс и Ф. Энгельс упоминаются лишь как выразители «этического скептицизма» в «новейшей философии», отрицающей «существование общепризнанных моральных принципов». (Челпанов Г. Введение в философию. 3-е изд. Киев, 1907. С. 314-315). В то же время Челпанов подробно рассматривает такие современные философские течения как эмпириокритицизм, критический реализм, трансцендентальный идеализм, спиритуализм, имманентную школу и др.

ховно-академическую философию, развивавшуюся в четырех духовных академиях – в Москве, Киеве, Петербурге и Казани. Достаточно сказать, что в Московской духовной академии преподавал философию П. А. Флоренский, «русский Леонардо да Винчи», как его назвали впоследствии, – универсальный гений в области философии, богословия, математики и естественных наук. А в Казанской духовной академии работал профессор В.И. Несмелов, автор двухтомной «Науки о человеке», предвосхитившей религиозно-экзистенциальную философию Н.А. Бердяева, в чем он признавался в философской автобиографии «Самопознание».

В этот период главный российский философский журнал «Вопросы философии и психологии» с числом подписчиков до двух тысяч превратился в крупнейший философский журнал Европы. По примеру Московского психологического общества в России в начале XX века действовал уже целый ряд философских обществ: Московское религиозно-философское общество памяти Вл. Соловьева, Философское общество при Петербургском университете, Религиозно-философское общество в Петербурге-Петрограде и др. Выпускались разнообразные философские журналы («Логос», «Мысль», «Мысль и слово» и др.), кроме того все «толстые» журналы публиковали философские статьи, русские и переводные («Вестник Европы», «Мир Божий», «Русское богатство», «Русский вестник», «Современный мир», «Образование» и др.).[5]

Очевидно, что Золотой век русской философии далеко позади оставил афоризм П.А. Ширинского-Шихматова, министра народного просвещения в правительстве Николая I: «Польза философии не доказана, а вред от нее возможен». Философия в России в начале прошлого века расцвела как цветок, поразительный по многообразию красок. Это время наивысшего общественного признания и влияния философии, о чем свидетельствует сам феномен «Вех». В это же время была осознана «существенная оригинальность» (слова В.Ф. Эрна) собственно русской философской традиции, которая была открыта подобно тому, как в предыдущем столетии Н. М. Карамзин «открыл» русскую историю. Этому открытию в немалой степени способствовали сами веховцы, – как в самом сборнике, подчеркнувшем особое значение религиозной философской мысли П. Я. Чаадаева, славянофилов, Ф. М. Достоевского и В. С. Соловьева, – так и за его пределами. Здесь особенно велика заслуга М. О. Гершензона, опубликовавшего впервые собрания сочинений И. В. Киреевского и П. Я. Чаадаева.

«Цветущая сложность» русской философии просуществовала до высылки осенью 1922 года из Советской России большой группы философов, в числе которых были пятеро из семи веховцев (кроме М. О. Гершензона и Б. А. Кистяковского, умершего в 1920 году). Наиболее полная подборка архивных материалов по «философскому пароходу» свидетельствует об отсутствии у высланных веховцев собственно контрреволюционных настроений[6]. Хотя на допросах, предшествовав-

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[5] Об этом см.: Философское содержание русских журналов начала XX века. Статьи, заметки и рецензии в литературно-общественных и философских изданиях 1901-1902 гг. Библиографический указатель. Отв. ред. А.А. Ермичев. СПб., 2001; Философское содержание русских журналов начала XX в. Вып. 2. Статьи, заметки и рецензии в изданиях духовных и светских учебных заведений, общенаучных, критико-библиографических, общественно-политических и иных журналах. Библиографический указатель. Сост. А.А. Ермичев. СПб., 2006. Второй выпуск библиографического указателя А. А. Ермичева содержит описание 4226 философских журнальных публикаций досоветского времени.

[6] Высылка вместо расстрела. Депортация интеллигенции в документах ВЧК-ГПУ. М., 2005.

ших высылке, веховцы не скрывали свои критические суждения относительно диктатуры пролетариата, «партийной» и «классовой точки зрения» и т.п., что полностью совпадало с их взглядами, высказанными еще в 1909 году. Н. А. Бердяев на допросе назвал демократию «ошибкой», а свою идеологию – аристократической «не в сословном смысле, а в смысле господства лучших, наиболее умных, талантливых, образованных, благородных», подчеркнул свою веру, как и двенадцать лет назад, не в материальное, а в «духовное возрождение». При этом он заявил: «Не признаю себя виновным в том, что занимался антисоветской деятельностью, и особенно не считаю себя виновным в том, что в момент внешних затруднений для РСФСР занимался контр-революционной деятельностью»[7]. Таким образом, очевидно, что веховцы представляли опасность не какой-то своей контрреволюционной деятельностью (которую они не вели, однако она им вменялась в вину как повод для изгнания из страны), но своим духовным потенциалом и влиянием, которому новая власть была бессильна что-либо противопоставить, поскольку собственных философов тогда не имела. Высылка была актом подрыва большевистским безнациональным интернационализмом высоких достижений русской духовной культуры[8]. Ведь русская философия, тесно связанная с православной религией и основами восточнохристианской цивилизации, представляла «лицо России», лучшие образцы ее духовного творчества. Россия их потеряла, а Запад их неожиданно приобрел[9].

Причем, высланная русская философия была с интересом воспринята на Западе вовсе не в силу своего «прозападного» характера, скорее наоборот, она привлекала внимание тем, что в ней содержалась фундаментальная критика западной культуры и цивилизации, гораздо более острая и оригинальная, чем та, которая имела место в марксизме и в атеистическом социализме. Последний справедливо раскрывался веховцами именно как органический продукт западной, новоевропейской культуры. Высылка была началом того нигилистического натиска, в результате которого в советские времена, по словам В. Распутина, – «Нельзя было вымолвить русское слово. Жили с обдерганной литературой, историей, философией». Сам акт высылки и ее разрушительные культурные последствия представляются как сбывшиеся предостережения «Вех». С.Н. Булгаков определил характер русской революции как интеллигентский, что верно не только по отношению к событиям

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[7] Там же. С. 216.

[8] О нигилистическом отношении главных идеологов большевизма к русской культуре свидетельствует позиция Наркомпроса, в 20-е годы разрабатывавшего планы перевода письменности на латиницу. Не приходится сомневаться, что будучи реализованным, этот план начисто лишил бы все поколения советских людей исторической памяти, способности воспринимать свое культурное наследие. Яркой характеристикой нигилизма лидеров большевизма служит позиция Л. Троцкого: «…А что мы дали миру в области философии или общественной науки? Ничего, круглый нуль! Попытайтесь назвать какое-нибудь русское философское имя, большое и несомненное. Владимир Соловьев, которого обычно вспоминают только в годовщину смерти? Но туманная метафизика Соловьева не только не вошла в историю мировой мысли – она и в самой России не создала никакого подобия школы. Кое-чем позаимствовались у Соловьева гг. Бердяев, да Эрн, да Вячеслав Иванов… А этого маловато» (Троцкий Л. Литература и революция. М., 1991. С. 268).

[9] «В отличие от писателей, известность которых не выходила за круг эмиграции, работы русских философов получили в Западной Европе широкое распространение. Их знали не только в русских кварталах Берлина и Парижа – они сделались величинами мирового масштаба, а русская философская мысль благодаря их трудам стала частью философской культуры человечества» //Высылка вместо расстрела. Депортация интеллигенции в документах ВЧК-ГПУ. 1921-1923. М., 2005. С. 5.

1905-1907 гг., но и по отношению к последующим переломам в русской жизни, включая горбачевскую перестройку и ельцинские реформы. Плоды интеллигентской революции суть явления вненациональные, беспочвенные, никак не связанные с коренными основами и традициями русской жизни, с христианской религией. Интеллигентское политическое сознание безрелигиозно, основано на атеизме, но имеет немало сходств с религией, приобретает черты своего рода атеистической псевдорелигии. Партийная непримиримость, сходная с крайней религиозной нетерпимостью, любовь к крайностям, пристрастие к уравнительности – эти псевдорелигиозные качества интеллигенции имеют выраженную противокультурную, антинациональную направленность. – Все это было блестяще изложено в «Вехах».

«Польза философии не доказана…»

Есть основания утверждать, что бессмертный афоризм Ширинского-Шихматова о «недоказанности» пользы философии в чем-то возродился в постсоветское время. Правда, для «единственного европейца в России», т.е. главного просветителя, каковым являлось, по определению Пушкина, российское правительство в XVIII-XIX вв., ограничительные меры в отношении философии носили временный характер. Другое дело – современная российская власть, существующая уже в постпросветительской парадигме. Она не испытывает потребность в философском знании, в отличие от своей советской предшественницы, пестовавшей нужную ей философию, правда вовсе не потому, что носители власти были интеллектуалами, но потому, что философия создавала необходимую идеологическую опору для официальной коммунистической идеологии. Для современной же власти гораздо удобнее опереться на духовный авторитет русской православной церкви, тем более, что это не требует от нее каких-либо специальных затрат.

Теперь и философия вернулась к своему естественному состоянию, она также отделена от власти, внимание которой направлено в сторону «более практических» дисциплин – юриспруденции и политологии. Но какие-то философские обобщения и заявления все же нужны, поэтому требуемые периодически отвлеченные интеллектуальные ориентиры производятся самой же властью. Насколько успешно – можно судить по неуклюжим попыткам, в историко-философском отношении безграмотным, «сформулировать национальную идею».

Существование философии и развитой философской (шире – интеллектуальной) среды ныне не относится к числу государственных приоритетов. Современный журнал «Вопросы философии» имеет фактически такой же тираж, как и дореволюционный журнал «Вопросы философии и психологии» (это не упрек журналу, а упрек обществу, где не любят то, что «Вехи» называли «философской истиной»). К тому же нынешние «Вопросы» нельзя купить в розницу, журнал доступен только подписчикам. И это при наличии в стране Института Философии РАН, многих философских факультетов и тысяч вузов, где преподается философия (сейчас мы не говорим о качестве этих вузов). Разумеется, и сейчас, и в начале прошлого века издание философского журнала было убыточным, а не коммерческим проектом. Но раньше его поддерживали издатели-меценаты – братья Н. А. и А. А. Абрикосовы. Просвещенная меценатка М. К. Морозова тогда организовала специальное философское книгоиздательство «Путь», в котором публиковались и авторы «Вех». Она же поддерживала журнал «Вопросы философии и психологии» и другие философские предприятия. (Сейчас таких меценатов в России нет. Гора-

здо престижнее сейчас поддерживать элитные спортивные проекты). Правда, кроме «Вопросов философии» сегодня есть горстка малотиражных так называемых «ваковских» журналов, куда выстроилась огромная очередь желающих опубликоваться соискателей ученых степеней. Причем, последние в качестве кандидатского минимума теперь должны сдавать не философию, а небывалую ранее, изобретенную под патронажем чиновников позитивистскую дисциплину – «история и философия науки». Что же касается преподавания философии, то в большинстве вузов оно осуществляется в таком урезанном виде, что, действительно, от такого преподавания нет никакой пользы.

Вспоминается четвертый Российский Философский конгресс, который проходил в 2005 году в МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова и собрал более полутора тысяч российских и иностранных участников. Мероприятие такого уровня, например, во Франции, где издается популярный журнал по философии тиражом сто тысяч экземпляров, наверняка собрало бы «большую прессу». Поразительно, но на Российском Философском конгрессе вообще не было *никакой* прессы, хотя соответствующие приглашения были разосланы в разные издания. Философия сегодня сплошь и рядом вытесняется дисциплиной «более полезной» и, очевидно, более престижной для власти и ее отдельных представителей – политологией. Причем политологами в России стали именовать, в отличие от Запада, не только специалистов в области political science (то есть собственно политической науки), но также и журналистов, газетных и телевизионных, государственных и негосударственных чиновников, депутатов разных уровней, предпринимателей, словом всех, кто так или иначе соприкасается в своей деятельности с политикой. Как представитель столь неопределенной, но массовой специальности политолог чуть ли не сравнялся по численности с охранником. Вполне вероятно, что молниеносное по срокам образование в МГУ нового политологического факультета, отдельного от философского факульета есть отражение все того же стародавнего представления о «недоказанности» пользы философии. Однако есть основание предполагать, что вне традиций свободного философского дискурса эта новая образовательная структура может стать своего рода «медвежьей услугой» для власти. Ведь государству требуется не комплиментарная политическая тусовка, а глубокий реалистический анализ того, что есть на самом деле, остро актуальный в условиях глобального кризиса. Напомню медицинское значение слова «кризис»: это состояние между жизнью и смертью, в данном случае это вопрос о дальнейшем существовании мировой экономической цивилизации как таковой. Вопросы такого эсхатологического характера политологам (особенно нынешним) «не по зубам». Государственные структуры, ответственные за формирование образовательной политики, поддерживают курс на дегуманитаризацию и дегуманизацию, на утеснение в преподавании философии как фундаментальной дисциплины мировоззренческого профиля, рассматриваемой в государственных образовательных стандартах наравне с физкультурой. Прагматистский подход к образованию в целом прослеживается и в акценте на так называемый «компетентностный» принцип, нацеленный на формирование не знаний и мировоззрения, а на минимальные «компетенции».

Создание новой элиты

Нынешним сторонникам «тощего духом» утилитарного подхода к образованию уместно напомнить философско-образовательное кредо великого хирурга Н. И.

Пирогова, который был также видным деятелем народного просвещения. Пирогов писал: «К чему вы готовите вашего сына?» – кто-то спросил меня. – Быть человеком, – отвечал я. «Разве вы не знаете, сказал спросивший, – что людей собственно нет на свете: это одно отвлечение, вовсе не нужное для нашего общества. Нам необходимы негоцианты, солдаты, механики, моряки, врачи, юристы, а не люди». Правда это или нет?»[10] Знаменитый вопрос Пирогова, подчеркивающий первостепенное значение духовных, моральных ценностей, высветил традиционное внимание русской философии к человеку, с особой силой выраженное Достоевским: «Человек есть тайна. Ее надо разгадать, и ежели будешь ее разгадывать всю жизнь, то не говори, что потерял время; я занимаюсь этой тайной, ибо хочу быть человеком»[11] Эту же линию продолжили веховцы, в особенности Бердяев, Булгаков, Струве, Франк. В самом начале XX века они приняли участие в первом коллективном манифесте русских философов «Проблемы идеализма» (1902), предшественнике «Вех». В «Проблемах идеализма» была отчетливо выражена мысль о бесперспективности чисто политической трансформации общества, не затрагивающей сферу морали и духовных ценностей. Уже тогда была подчеркнута необходимость синтеза общечеловеческих идеалов справедливости и достоинства с идеалами индивидуального самосовершенствования человека, поскольку лишь персонифицированные гуманитарные идеалы, направленные на моральное совершенствование человека и общества, могут служить основой прогресса, лишь они обладают абсолютной ценностью.

Можно ли назвать такую позицию элитарной? Бесспорно. Психологически она стимулировалась тревогой перед лицом надвигающейся «охлократии», угрожающей существованию высоких образцов культуры и философии. Как мы знаем теперь, эти тревоги не только сбылись, но и стали еще более актуальными в XXI веке.

Нельзя согласиться с одной позицией в актуальной статье Валентина Толстых, открывшей дискуссию в «Литературной газете», посвященную «Вехам». Ее автор показал, что веховский диагноз русских национальных болезней актуален по-прежнему, но ценность его снижается потому, что веховцы, как считает Толстых, отдали «дань феодальной архаике», выступая за сохранение самодержавия[12]. По-видимому, основанием для «любви» веховцев к самодержавию показалась в данном случае известная фраза Гершензона, которая в свое время вызвала яростную критику с разных сторон. Он писал: «К а к о в ы м ы е с т ь (разрядка Гершензона, – авт.), нам не только нельзя мечтать о слиянии с народом, – бояться его мы должны пуще всех казней власти и благословлять эту власть, которая одна своими штыками и тюрьмами еще ограждает нас от ярости народной»[13].

В примечании ко второму изданию «Вех» Гершензон специально выделил слова «каковы мы есть», поясняя тем самым, что эта фраза вовсе не есть «публичное признание в любви к штыкам и тюрьмам». Здесь лишь подчеркнута пропасть, отделяющая народ и интеллигенцию, которая строит планы «спасения» народа по своим «интеллигентским» рецептам, нисколько не согласующимся с подлинными народными интересами. Разумеется, никто из веховцев не был поклонником само-

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[10] Пирогов Н.И. Вопросы жизни// Сочинения. Т. 2. СПб., 1887. С. 3.
[11] Достоевский Ф.М. Полн. собр. соч. Т. 28, кн. 1. С. 63.
[12] Толстых В. Вехи 2009// Литературная газета. № 1(6205), 14-20 января 2009 г. С. 4.
[13] Вехи. Из глубины. М., 1991. С. 90.

державия и вообще не занимал какую-либо позицию на правой стороне российского политического спектра. Напротив, идейный «костяк» сборника составили люди в прошлом левых убеждений, включая основателя российской социал-демократии Струве, а также легальных марксистов Булгакова, Франка и Бердяева. Последний, как известно, был сослан в Вологду за участие в Киевском «Союзе борьбы за освобождение рабочего класса».

Надо понять, что отказ от левых воззрений у веховцев произошел вовсе не потому, что они «перекрасились» в правых, наподобие бывших советских «научных коммунистов», сегодня ставших «рыночными политтехнологами». Еще раз подчеркнем, что позиция «Вех» *принципиально* не политическая, но метафизическая, они подчеркивали жизненную необходимость для России сохранения ее духовной культуры и настаивали на том, что именно от этого зависит ее судьба. Именно в этом смысле они «звали в прошлое, а не вперед». Вообще-то слова и дела совсем не «передовые» в одном историческом контексте, в других обстоятельствах выглядят настоящими пророчествами. И наоборот. В прошлое канули антивеховские обвинения и заявления «передовых» либералов и революционеров. А «Вехи» оказались правы, поскольку выступили против интеллигенции, которая буквально «свихнулась» на сиюминутной политике и показали, что главные вопросы жизни нации решаются «по ту сторону правого и левого».

Нисколько не изменилась эта позиция авторов сборника и в эмиграции. Вправо эволюционировал лишь Струве, который, однако, никогда не выступал за реставрацию монархии Романовых и остро критиковал ее за «реакционное недомыслие»[14]. «Культурный элитизм» веховцев, вместе с тем, был направлен против калечащих последствий распространения массовой культуры в российском обществе, т.е. против того, что теперь именуется «попсой», – против «мутной волны порнографии и сенсационных изделий» и других суррогатов культуры. – Позиция, чрезвычайно актуальная и в наше время. Веховское понимание культуры, в характерной для русской философии версии, общей для многих отечественных мыслителей, противостоит понятию цивилизации. Культура понималась веховцами прежде всего как совокупность высших духовных ценностей (религиозных, философских, эстетических, моральных), которые не могут быть отождествлены с ценностями индустриальной цивилизации, комфортом, материальным благополучием, распространением грамотности и просвещения.

В сборнике не отрицалась также важность и полезность для России правовой культуры, о чем специально писал Б. А. Кистяковский, предвосхищая, в каком-то смысле, сегодняшнюю критику «правового нигилизма» российским президентом Д. А. Медведевым. Однако вместе с тем, «Вехи» подчеркивали высшую значимость для нации и государства фундаментальных духовных ориентиров, непреходящих ценностей. С этих позиций было подвергнуто критике утилитарное понимание культуры, разумеющее «железные дороги, канализацию и мостовые». Разумеется, не следует представлять веховцев некими снобами, «переполненными» культурой до такой степени, что им не было никакого дела до реальной русской жизни, в которой как раз нет (и по-прежнему нет) «ни дорог, ни канализации». Они нисколько не закрывали глаза на российскую «нецивилизованность», указывая на необустроенность русской жизни, на важность для России «повыше-

[14] Струве П.Б. Дневник политика (1925-1935). Москва-Париж, 2004. С. 159.

ния производительности материальной» (Франк). Но веховцы отнюдь не считали, что «внешнее устроение жизни», основанное на «механико-рационалистической теории счастья» является конечной смысловой проблемой для русского человека (в наше время эта теория поддерживается рекламой: «Бери от жизни все»). Гораздо важнее сохранить те бесценные духовные сокровища, которые Россия копила в течение столетий.

Нужна «новая элита», способная их воспринять. Но где она сегодня? Она формируется и именно она будет определять будущее России как «сильного государства» и самостоятельной цивилизации. Для России с ее безграничными ресурсами все хозяйственные проблемы потенциально разрешимы. Этой точки зрения придерживались, по существу, все серьезные русские мыслители. Характерно, что Г. П. Федотов, один из продолжателей веховских идей, считал, что все хозяйственные трудности в России порождены «головотяпами», которые когда-нибудь переведутся. И он же считал, что интеллигенция как второе главное произведение Петра I (после империи) выполнила свою историческую просветительскую роль. Она сполна «отдала свой долг» народу и теперь задача стоит в обратном порядке: народ и общество должны обеспечить «тот воздух культуры, которым дышит всякая уважающая себя нация». Скажем по-другому: глобальный кризис Россия переживет. Она не переживет только крушение собственной цивилизации, основу которой составляют не какие-то котировки акций и прочие «экономиксы», а тысячелетние ценности, среди которых и богатство отечественной философии.

Участниками сборника «Вехи» было решительно отвергнуто укоренившееся среди интеллигенции представление о примате политики над философией, утилитарное понимание «интеллигентской правды» в ущерб «философской истине». Это прекрасно понял В. В. Розанов, один из немногих, кто положительно оценил «Вехи». «Книга эта не обсуждает совершенно никаких программ, – писал он, – когда вся публицистика целые годы только этим и занята! «Вехи» говорят только о человеке…»[15] Что из этого следует для сегодняшней жизни? Очевидно, – понимание того, что эпоха 90-х – 2000-х годов обозначила необходимость перехода к новому пониманию человека и его мировоззрения. Если говорить всерьез об избавлении российской зависимости «от трубы» и о переходе к инновационной модели развития, то для этого требуется другой человек – не просто сознательный «представитель электората», и не просто подготовленный «компетентный исполнитель». Нужен человек творческий, обладатель целостного мировоззрения, основанного на гармоничном сочетании знаний в области науки, религии и философии.

Принципиально антиутилитарная, антисциентистская позиция сборника, его критика политизированной интеллигенции, были главными причинами ответных выпадов в адрес «Вех». Необходима, подчеркивала либеральная критика «Вех», прежде всего, внешняя свобода – «сначала реформа», а потом уже человек. То есть – не реформа для человека, а человек как материал для реформы. – Позиция, вполне выражающая кредо нынешних российских реформаторов, в «веховском смысле» аутентичных интеллигентов. Секретом успеха «Вех» было блестящее проникновение в сознание «среднего интеллигента». Этот слой дал России массу культурных деятелей, но он же породил людей амбициозных, считающих себя «солью земли», – беспочвенных и безнациональных «апатридов». В примечаниях

[15] Вехи: Pro et Contra. СПб., 1998. С. 400.

к своей статье Гершензон привел известную цитату из письма А. П. Чехова. Он писал: «Я не верю в нашу интеллигенцию, лицемерную, фальшивую, истеричную, невоспитанную, ленивую, не верю даже, когда она страдает и жалуется, ибо ее притеснители выходят из ее же недр». И далее Гершензон добавляет: «Последние слова Чехова содержат в себе верный намек: русская бюрократия есть в значительной мере плоть от плоти русской интеллигенции».

Этот прозрачный намек остается по-прежнему столь же актуальным, как и призыв Бердяева к «нарождению новой души интеллигенции». И вот, сто лет спустя зададим вопрос: народилась ли эта «новая душа»? В более узком смысле его можно сформулировать так: поняты ли, наконец, «Вехи»? Понят ли этот непревзойденный философский бестселлер, разгадавший самосознание интеллигенции, с ее блужданиями, шараханием, слепотой, ошибками и ложью, нелюбовью ко всему родному и поразительным пристрастием ко всему «общечеловеческому», к вождизму и сервилизму, лжепророчествам и унижению. Именно об этом ярко, всесторонне, подробно говорят «Вехи». Решены ли те отнюдь не только «интеллигентские» проблемы, которые были опознаны и выражены авторами сборника с исключительной силой? Ответы предоставляю сделать читателям.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 310-324

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The Real, the Rational, and the Ideal: Developing Milton Munitz's Idea of Boundless Existence

Milton Karl Munitz (1913-1995) is one of those thinkers who succeeded in compressing his entire philosophical outlook into one phrase. As Immanuel Kant dedicated his work to the exploration of "pure reason," or Albert Schweitzer to "reverence for life," Munitz's work culminated in the idea of "Boundless Existence." My central contention in this essay is that Munitz's radical idea of Boundless Existence is ingenious and deserves further development. To show that this is the case, I will first explore Munitz's idea through the consideration of two questions he raised: 1. What is, and what is not, Boundless Existence? 2. Why is it important to be aware of Boundless Existence? The first of these questions will be discussed in Section I. I will argue there that the idea of Boundless Existence deals essentially with the relationship of the real and the rational. More precisely, it deals with the limited ability of the intellect to comprehend existence in its most elementary aspect. Section II will consider Munitz's second question. I will show that in answering this question Munitz goes beyond the relationship of the real and the rational and hints at a third realm, which I call the realm of the ideal. Yet Munitz does not explore the relationship of the ideal with the real and the rational in any sufficient length. In the final section, Section III, I will further develop Munitz's idea regarding Boundless Existence within this larger framework of the real, the rational, and the ideal. I will also point out the direction in which Munitz's idea can be most fruitfully developed.

I. Boundless Existence

Kant's working title for *Critique of Pure Reason* was "The Boundaries of Sensibilities and Reason." One of his motivating ideas was to show that there are not only temporary limits of our cognition, but also those which are permanent and insurmountable. Besides the temporary limitations, due to our lack of inquiry or the imperfection of our technical instruments, there are certain boundaries of the human mind which cannot be overcome regardless of how detailed our investigation is or how much our technical instruments improve. Kant singles out the following as the most important implications of the permanent boundaries of human cognition. First, in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant establishes that we can never know what things are independently of how they appear to us; we can never know what they are "in themselves." Second, in the Transcendental Dialectic of the same work he demonstrates that we can never come to definitive answers to the most important metaphysical questions, i.e. those regarding the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the possibility of freedom in the mechanically determined world.

Peter Strawson – one of Kant's most respected interpreters in the Anglo-Saxon world – argues that the first of these implications is more important for Kant and, accordingly, entitles his interpretation of *Critique of Pure Reason*, *The Bounds of Sense*. Strawson maintains that the most significant part of Kant's *Critique* is the Transcendental Analytic.[1] Munitz thinks that the second implication is at least as consequential as the first one. Yet although both implications are deeply intertwined, the Transcendental Dialectic presents Kant's most radical departure from the tradition. This is why Kant drops the word "sensibility" from the initial title and focuses on the bounds of (pure) reason. Munitz further radicalizes this Kantian dialectical viewpoint and develops it in terms of "Boundless Existence." The essential difference for Kant is the one between the two different dimensions of reality: one of them is the familiar observable universe, while the other – for which there is no name in our common language and which Munitz baptizes as "Boundless Existence" – is something that "totally frustrates any search for intelligibility, whether this search is carried out by science *or* metaphysics."[2]

Munitz's fundamental contention is that Boundless Existence sets the limits within which we must pursue rationality and within which we must develop our outlook on the world at large, or, as Munitz often says, a "comprehensive philosophical cosmology." The observable universe is the subject of our examinations and is explainable in terms of our conceptual apparatus. This apparatus involves as one of its central pillars the principle of sufficient reason – everything that happens in the world, happens for a reason, or because of a cause, regardless of whether this cause/reason is (to borrow Aristotle's categories) material, formal, efficient, or teleological. Munitz points out that the principle of sufficient reason simply does not apply to Boundless Existence – this is an aspect of reality *that* exists, yet for which we can say neither *why* it exists, nor even *what* it is: "Boundless Existence is a way of referring to the total unintelligibility of the Existence of the universe, regardless of how much intelligibility science achieves with respect to the existing parts (objects, occurrences, processes, spatial and temporal scope) of the observable universe."[3] Following some insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Munitz argues that we cannot apply the elementary concepts, such as "beginning" and "end," to "the universe as a whole" in the same way – or more precisely: not at all – in which they are used in connection with the observable entities within the universe. The term "boundless" is not used "in any quantitative or metric sense, but rather to signify the total absence, inapplicability, and radical unavailability of *any* form of description or explanation: of the use of any scheme of *conceptual bounds*."[4] This lack of conceptual understanding leaves, according to Munitz, "the Existence of the observable universe a not further analyzable, describable, or explainable metaphysical fact."[5] In *Cosmic Understanding: Philosophy and Science of the Universe*, Munitz even compares Boundless Existence to a surd: an irrational number which, like the square root of 2, simple resists any further rational explanation.[6]

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[1] See Peter Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"* (London: Methuen, 1966), pp. 24-44.

[2] Milton K. Munitz, *The Question of Reality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 193. See also Munitz, *Cosmic Understanding*: *Philosophy and Science of the Universe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 181-235.

[3] Munitz, *The Question of Reality*, p. 203. See also Munitz, *The Mystery of Existence*: *An Essay in Philosophical Cosmology* (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, 1965), pp. 105-107.

[4] Munitz, *The Question of Reality*, p. 200.

[5] *Ibid*., p. 202.

[6] Munitz, *Cosmic Understanding*, pp. 280-281.

From this brief account of Boundless Existence, we can already sense not only Munitz's indebtedness to Kant but also his deviation from the great predecessor. Like Kant, Munitz accepts something analogous to the distinction between appearances and things in themselves. And just as Kant maintains that things in themselves belong to the transcendent dimension of reality, Munitz claims the same thing for Boundless Existence.[7] Yet although Munitz affirms the relation of grounding between the observable universe and Boundless Existence, he does not think of this relationship in terms of the Kantian 1-1 correspondence between the two dimensions of reality; Munitz does not believe that for every thing that appears there is one, and only one, corresponding thing in itself.

Kant uses the phrase "thing in itself" in both the singular and plural forms. Following Wittgenstein's late philosophy, Munitz departs from Kant, by insisting that the distinction in question is the one between the observable universe of *particular* objects, entities, and occurrences on the one hand, and the universe's existence *as a whole* on the other. In making this distinction, Munitz reminds us of the two distinct meanings of the term "existence." This word refers not only to various particular existents, but also to what exists in a sense of "being present" in every existent.[8] To emphasize this distinction further, Munitz uses the capitalized version of the noun "existence" for existence in the second sense. A further important point is that, although Existence grounds particular existents, Existence itself is not something grounded. That is where the chain of grounding and justification comes to an end and where the principle of sufficient reason breaks down: "[Boundless Existence is] a groundless aspect of Reality."[9]

There is one more – and even more important – similarity and deviation from Kant. The German philosopher realizes that, since there is nothing we can know about things as they are in themselves, the concept of "thing in itself" is properly only a "negative concept."[10] In the Transcendental Dialectic of *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant demonstrates that whenever we use it in a positive sense, whenever we attempt to establish anything definitive about things insofar as they are considered in themselves, we overstep the boundaries of reason and inevitably seduce ourselves into one or another form of metaphysical illusion. According to Kant, the whole history of metaphysics is riddled with such illusions. In order to prevent them in the future, a systematic "critique of pure reason" needed to be developed.

Munitz agrees with Kant's findings, yet he argues that Kant does not apply them consistently. Namely, Kant tends to forget the lessons of his own critique as, for instance, when he uses the term "thing in itself." This term suggests that we are talking about a kind of entity which has some hidden structure and properties. In this point, Plato's cave allegory seemed to have been Kant's model as well, except that Kant argues against Plato that we can never escape from the cave formed by our sensible and intellectual framework. Nevertheless, Kant maintains that the limitations of our kind of mind would not necessarily obstruct the intellect of other possible rational beings, certainly not the intellect of the Divine Being. Munitz vehemently rejects both of Kant's suggestions. Boundless Existence is not a "thing," nor is it identical with any existent. In *Cos-*

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[7] Munitz, *The Question of Reality*, p. 16.

[8] *Ibid*., p. 17. For further discussion, see Munitz, *The Mystery of Existence*, pp. 72-99.

[9] Munitz, *The Question of Reality*, p. 202.

[10] See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), "The Ground of the Distinction of All Objects in General Into Phenomena and Noumena," pp. 257-275 (A235/B294-A292/B349).

mic Understanding, Munitz insists that, "Boundless Existence is not an object; it is not an entity; it is not an existent."[11] In his later book, *The Question of Reality*, he is even more radical: "Boundless Existence is nothing."[12] In claiming so, Munitz has in mind two senses of non-existence developed by Aristotle: accidental non-existence and essential non-existence. Munitz relates the nothingness of Boundless Existence to Aristotle's second sense of non-existence, which, according to the Greek philosopher, refers to absence of form (*morphe*). "Boundless Existence is nothing," in the sense of "total absence of form or intelligibility … Boundless Existence has no intelligible form or structure."[13]

At this point we realize some of the most important philosophical consequences of Munitz's idea of Boundless Existence. It becomes clear, for instance, that Munitz's view does not represent yet another form of agnosticism, but that he argues for a more radical view – that of *amorphism* – with regard to Boundless Existence. Munitz does not claim that we cannot know what Boundless Existence is due to the limitation of our cognitive apparatus, although such cognition is available to other kinds of intellect, as Kant holds. Munitz holds that Kant does not take seriously his own thesis of the permanent boundaries of cognition and argues that the cognitive limitations are also due to a fundamental lack of form or structure of the Existence itself.

This thesis violates the tacit assumption of western thinking, first firmly established with Plato and Aristotle, and virtually unchallenged ever since. The root metaphor of form is the central pillar of the western search for a comprehensive rational explanation of the universe and our lives in it, whether this explanation is pursued by philosophy or science.[14] Plato and Aristotle also fix the central categories in terms of which such a pursuit may be attempted, i.e., concepts like *aitia* (= cause, originally meaning "that which is responsible for the happening of something"), *telos* (= goal, aim, purpose), and *eshaton* (= the ultimate one, the last one). According to this viewpoint, to exist is to have a certain form or structure (*eidos*, *morphe*), which can be discerned in terms of causes, goals, or ends. Similarly, Plato and Aristotle argue, and the Judeo-Christian tradition concurs with this assumption, the world is created with a certain *logos* which permeates everything existing. The human intellect can cognize the world – any of its fragments, or the world as a whole – when it is in tune with that world-*logos*.

Munitz's idea of Boundless Existence, by contrast, reminds us of some pre-Socratic ideas. For instance, we might think of Anaximander's *ápeiron*, which means something unlimited, indefinite, without end, or boundless. Anaximander's *ápeiron* suggests not a creation of the world (and humanity) with a purpose, but an endless procession of events, an endless evolution without end and completion. This comparison squares well with Munitz's rejection of the creationist accounts of the universe, as well as with his oft-repeated criticism of the theistic tradition.[15]

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[11] Munitz, *Cosmic Understanding*, p. 274; *Cf. The Question of Reality*, p. 202.

[12] Munitz, *The Question of Reality*, p. 53.

[13] *Ibid*., p. 64.

[14] The root metaphor of form is discussed by Stephen C. Pepper, *World Hypotheses* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942), pp. 151-185.

[15] See Munitz, *Cosmic Understanding*, pp. 20-27, and *The Mystery of Existence*, pp. 103-173. In *The Question of Reality*, Munitz quotes Plato's *Timaeus* (29a): "The world has been fashioned on the model of that which is comprehensible by rational discourse and understanding." After criticizing Plato, Munitz points out (p. 24) that Plato's model of creation is one of the three basic cosmological models: besides the making of artifacts by skilled craftsmen, Munitz mentions the model of establishing social order and social institutions, and the model of biological birth and growth. For further discussion of these models in the light

More importantly, Munitz's idea of Boundless Existence implies a radically different understanding of the relationship between the real and the rational. The Platonic-Aristotelian-theistic conception suggests a complete, or near complete, overlap of the real and the rational, most drastically expressed in Hegel's famous dictum that "everything real is rational." Most other philosophers are more cautious about this relationship: we cannot know or prove that everything real is rational, but have every reason to suspect that this is so. It is only the limitation of our intellect that prevents us from proving that the overlap of the real and the rational is complete. Munitz's insistence on Boundless Existence implies that the overlap between the real and the rational is only partial, never complete. The overlap exists with regard to the observable universe, but not for Existence as such, not for Boundless Existence. If the realms of the real and the rational were to be presented in the form of circles, one segment of the circle representing the real is not covered by the circle representing the rational.

In his earlier works, before he came up with the phrase "Boundless Existence," Munitz defended his thesis in terms of "the mystery of existence." His entire philosophical opus is dedicated to clarifying and defending the thesis that the mystery of existence is not only due to the limitation of our intellect but to the lack of structure of one aspect of reality. I am convinced that Munitz makes a very strong case for the partial – but never complete – overlap of the real and the rational. What interests me next, is why it may matter whether or not that overlap is incomplete.

II. The Importance of Our Awareness of Boundless Existence

Munitz contends that Boundless Existence is not accessible to any form of understanding or knowledge, yet that it is "open to a type of intensified *awareness*."[16] This contention leads to further questions:

> How is it possible for there to be any consequences from having an intensified awareness of Boundless Existence if, unlike the known universe or any of its parts, Boundless Existence has no properties? … How can the awareness of Boundless Existence bring about any qualitative *difference* in a person's experience, as compared with a life wholly devoid of such awareness?[17]

To answer these important questions, let us consider how we become aware of what Munitz calls Boundless Existence in the first place. Whether our entry path leads through theology, philosophy, or simple child-like curiosity, the road is the same: we start with the fact that the observed world exists and wonder why this is the case: What purpose, what meaning may the world have? Theists postulate the existence of God to answer these questions, but the existence of the Divine Being itself remains unexplained. Modern philosophers postulate a number of structural features which the mind imposes on reality in order to comprehend it, but the presence of exactly those structural features, rather than any other, remains inexplicable. Even a non-believer and a non-philosopher must ask a series of the fundamental "why" questions and remain puzzled by them: Why does the world exist at all? Why do human beings exist? Why do I exist?

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of Munitz's criticism of Plato, see my book, *Between Truth and Illusion: Kant at the Crossroads of Modernity* (Lantham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), especially Chs. 4-5, "Metaphysical Truths" and "Metaphysical Illusions."

[16] Munitz, *The Question of Reality*, p. 193.

[17] Munitz, *Cosmic Understanding*, p. 276.

After briefly considering such questions, common sense can waive them away and turn to more practical considerations. Or it may satisfy itself with a theistic world-picture, according to which the "why" questions about the status of human existence in the universe and the meaning of life are interrelated and derived from a conception of order which is at bottom teleological. Yet even an honest believer, maintains Munitz, must accept that there is an element of mystery surrounding the very fact of existence. In his words,

> The mystery of existence occupies a position in our efforts to come to terms, philosophically, with the world at large, that is, in some respects, similar to the fact of death, in our efforts to come to terms with the conditions of our own individual life. Each, in its own way, marks the impenetrable boundary that defeats our deepest longings: the one marks the limit to any hope to understand the existence of the world; the other marks the limit to our hope of finding endless satisfaction in all that we achieve in life.[18]

There are two points hidden in the quoted passage, and they are relevant for Munitz's philosophical outlook as a whole. First, unlike most philosophers, Munitz does not think that the rational and the mysterious must be hostile to each other. His use of the word "mystery" intends neither to denigrate the power of reason to exploit the sources of intelligibility in the world, nor to initiate an anti-rational leap beyond the world. Mysticism and rationality belong to and complete each other, although the proponents of each often refuse to recognize the value of their counterpart. Munitz insists that a responsible rational person must acknowledge the fact of the mystery of existence, but this recognition is far from being the sole item in a well-rounded and rationally pursued philosophical cosmology.[19]

The second and even more consequential point deals with the relationship of the rational to the realm of meanings and values. Munitz claims that, just as there is a segment of the real not captured by the rational, an aspect of the ideal is also out of the reach of the rational. This thesis is so important because, while the overlap of the real and the rational is occasionally discussed and contended, philosophers tend to treat the complete overlap of the rational and the ideal as something almost tautological. The support for this treatment can be found even in the ordinary language – notice, for instance, that the words "idea" and "ideal" have the same root. It is not important in this context that in Plato's philosophy both "idea" and "ideal" are conceived as something mind-independent, while in modern philosophy both are treated as internal to the mind. What really matters is the near identity of the two terms and, accordingly, that of the two realms to which they belong.

Munitz opens a door for criticizing this widely accepted thesis. There are, of course, some ideals that are certainly rational and such that nothing in reality has ever corresponded to them. Geometrical figures have been used since the time of Pythagoras to illustrate this point. This means, first, that there can be only a partial overlap of the circles representing the real and the ideal. But this also means that there is a segment of the rational that is not covered by the circle representing the real. The main point, however, is that there is no complete overlap between the circles representing the rational and the ideal – the ideals we are trying to grasp by asking the above mentioned "why" questions are beyond the reach of reason. We cannot discern why the universe and hu-

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[18] Munitz, *The Mystery of Existence*, pp. 262-263.

[19] *Ibid*.; see pp. 8 and 263.

man beings exist, nor can we rationally comprehend if there is value or purpose to our lives. The more we insist on finding rational answers to such questions, the more pointless not only human lives appear, but also the existence of the world as a whole.

Munitz does not think that the absence of rational answers to the central "why" questions is a reason for despair. At one level, our pursuit of life's meaning is not a matter of rational discovery but of practical endeavor, of human actions and their interactions with other human beings and their environment:

> Precisely because Boundless Existence is a surd, all emphasis on finding meaning in life falls on what can be achieved by the individual person between the limits of his birth and death, and for mankind at large before the final extension of the human species as set within the framework of the death of the universe itself.[20]

Such a conclusion is not fully surprising because – even if not too often endorsed by the philosophers – it is advocated by the poets. Goethe's Faust, for instance, replaces the biblical "In the beginning was Word" (*logos*; John 1:1) with "In the beginning was Deed" (*Tat*).[21] What is more surprising is that, at a deeper level, Munitz ties our awareness of Boundless Existence with a different set of values and ideals, which hardly ever crop up in a philosophical discourse. Such, for example, is his emphasis on serenity: "The chief effect upon a person's behavior and attitudes that an intensified awareness of Boundless Existence has is that it contributes to a feeling of underlying serenity in all that the person experiences and undergoes in the course of his life."[22] As Munitz further elaborates in a beautifully written passage,

> Our awareness of the absence of any qualities in Boundless Existence, however, can affect the way in which we think of our life – its opportunities, defeats, accomplishments, and satisfactions. The qualitylessness – the total absence of purpose and intelligibility – in Boundless Existence "shines through" into our lives and qualifies such elements of purpose and rationality as we are able to confer upon, and bring into, existence. In being deeply affected by this realization, the intensity of the joy, agony, hope and fear that fill our lives are trimmed, lessened, and qualified. Through this realization, to some extent, we can be lightened and freed. The absence of any meaning, purpose, or intelligibility in Boundless Existence spills over into, and permeates, our dealings with or attitudes toward existents – ourselves, other persons, natural events, the universe itself. It affects the way we regard our own personal lives, our death, and the fate of mankind as a whole. All of these are bathed in a sea of no meaning, no intelligibility, no hope, no fear.[23]

As human beings, insists Munitz, we are caught at the intersection of the observable universe and Boundless Existence. What happens to us as a result of such a "double exposure" may not be what we hope for when we initially ask the "why" questions, but we should open up to embrace different conclusions and new attitudes toward life. What is more, Munitz thinks that these attitudes are far healthier than we ordinarily suspect:

> To some degree, life can be made rational. However, Boundless Existence is a surd. It ultimately defeats and qualifies all efforts at rationality. We should therefore take life with less than total seriousness. We can "smile" at it and take it "lightly." And this combination of seriousness and lightness is what underlies the serenity born of an intensified awareness of Boundless Existence. In the degree in which we can succeed in achieving this balance of attitudes is born one important venue to the peace of spirit possible to man.[24]

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[20] Munitz, *Cosmic Understanding*, pp. 280-281.
[21] Goethe, *Faust*, Part I, 1225.
[22] Munitz, *Cosmic Understanding*, p. 279.
[23] *Ibid*., p. 281.
[24] *Ibid*., pp. 281-282. This topic is beautifully explored in Hermann Hesse's last novel, *Das Glasperlenspiel*, which is published in English both as *The Glass Bead Game* and as *Magister Ludi*.

This superbly written passage may remind us of Socrates and the ancient ideal of a wise man. The wisdom of Munitz's insight is born out of our "intense" awareness of Boundless Existence, out of our awareness of the double limitations of our rational faculties: we cannot understand the mystery of existence, nor can we rationally grasp what is usually considered as the highest values of human existence. Yet out of this awareness of our ignorance rises not desperation but a view that liberates us from our deeply ingrained, yet ultimately unjustifiable expectations. Following the pre-Socratics and Socrates, Plato and Aristotle insisted that wonder is the source of all philosophizing. In our search for systematic answers to all questions of existence and value, we have moved away from such "child-like" wonder. In doing so, we have come to embrace the Cartesian doubt, which challenges all traditionally accepted truths, and later to postmodernism, which abandons all perennial ideals and all search for objective values.

Munitz insists on our return to wonder, on return to earnest pondering of the primordial "why" questions – not because we can find definitive answers to them, but because our wondering at the mystery of existence and an honest recognition of the limitations of our rationality liberate us from the pressure to find rational answers where they are not available. "The only proper response to Boundless Existence is *silence*" – the exact opposite of *logos*, which "has to do at once both with the power of speech and reason."[25] But this silence, Munitz maintains, can be accompanied with a smile and reflective wisdom. Did not Socrates, who claimed not to know anything, appear to be the wisest, the happiest, and the most virtuous of all human beings?

III. Merging Munitz's Idea into a Larger Framework

Wittgenstein ends his *Tractatus* with a sentence: "Of what we cannot speak we must be silent."[26] This famous dictum resonates through Munitz's work and influences his views of the ideal. The poetic language that Munitz relies on at the end of his *Cosmic Understanding* signals an admission that his long and careful philosophical analysis has come to its end in a realm which is traditionally reserved for the religio-ethical concerns. As Wittgenstein advocates no developed ethical view, neither does Munitz.

At one level, Wittgenstein and Munitz are indisputably right – of what we cannot speak, of that we must be silent. Yet it is also important not to become silent too quickly, before we have exhausted our subject matter. Munitz's work is a good illustration of that second principle – although he claims that we can have no knowledge and no rational apprehension of Boundless Existence, he has written dozens of pages about this "unknowable" subject. He has written so many pages about Boundless Existence because the subject is important. The ethical issues – and the realm of the ideal in general – are no less important; we must be careful not to interrupt our philosophical inquiry prematurely and risk missing some the key ethical implications which follow from examining Munitz's idea of Boundless Existence.

Munitz himself must have felt some of that "remorse" – he dedicates his last book to the question: Does life have a meaning? Yet in it he avoids talking about ethics, refusing even to use the term. Instead, he talks about a "philosophy of life" and focuses mostly on carefully examining various meanings of the phrase "meaning of life" and its con-

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[25] *Ibid*., p. 278.

[26] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinneess (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), §7.

stituent terms. Munitz uses the term "meaning" as roughly equivalent to "values" and to "what makes an import" in our lives, i.e. what is of *import*-ance.[27] Once again, Munitz's investigation does not lead toward any ethical theory, but begins and ends with Wittgenstein's dictum that, "The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem."[28]

To better understand the roots of Munitz's negative attitude toward ethics, let us recall that his stance is the result of his reaction to Kant. The German philosopher attempts to systematize the entire field of philosophical inquiry by dividing reason into "theoretical" and "practical," and by dividing philosophy into a "metaphysics of nature" and a "metaphysics of morals." The word "metaphysics" signals for Kant a search for the *a priori*, i.e., pure and universal principles of pure reason. In this point Kant does not strive to accomplish anything new; he only reconsiders what have been the four fundamental principles in western philosophy since the time of Plato and Aristotle:

1. *The principle of order*, which says that everything that exists is ordered and structured.
2. *The principle of knowability*, which says that everything that has structure and order is knowable.
3. *The principle of self-mastery*, which says that ethical development and virtuous behavior require self-restrain and self-control.
4. *The principle of reciprocity* between virtue and happiness, which says that those who master their own passions and behave virtuously will be rewarded, while those who do not will be punished.

The first two principles are fundamental for the metaphysics of nature and the last two are the pillars of the metaphysics of morals. In other words, the first two principles regulate the relationship of the rational and the real, while the last two principles deal with the relationship of the ideal and the real.[29]

Let us recall that while Kant fully supports the principle of order and the principle of self-mastery, he argues that the principle of knowability and the principle of reciprocity have only a conditional and restricted validity. We cannot know anything about things as they are in themselves, nor can we assert a full reciprocity of virtue and happiness; at most we can say that virtue makes us *worthy of happiness* (in this life).[30] According to Kant, these restrains show that for human beings (with their present cognitive abilities) there is neither a full overlap between the real and the rational, nor is there a complete overlap of the rational and the ideal. Yet Kant never denies the ancient viewpoint that, for a fully rationally being, such as the Divine Being, the circles of the real, the rational, and the ideal would ultimately form one identical loop.

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[27] See Munitz's book, *Does Life Have a Meaning?* (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1994), pp. 75-78.

[28] Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, §6.521; quoted in Munitz, *Does Life Have a Meaning?*, pages 14-15 and 108-109.

[29] Munitz insisted that, while "both Plato and traditional theology agreed in regarding the existence of the world as an ordered structure as something that calls for an explanation" (*The Question of Reality*, p. 51), their fundamental questions were significantly different. Plato's primary question was about the origin of the order we discern in the flux of the existence. The central theological, and later philosophical, question was about the existence itself: Why does universe exist? Or, in Leibniz and Heidegger's terms: Why is there something rather than nothing?

[30] Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. L. W. Beck (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1993); see especially the section: "The Existence of God as a Postulate of Practical Reason," pp. 130-138 (Ak V:124-132).

In our examination of Boundless Existence, we have already indicated some of Munitz's disagreements with this approach. He could criticize the "one circle" thesis at the following points:

(i) At least one segment of the real does not overlap with the rational (e.g., Boundless Existence is not ordered).
(ii) At least one segment of the rational does not overlap with the real (e.g., geometrical ideas are rational but not necessarily real).
(iii) What is rational need not be ideal, except in a quite accidental way (e.g., the Pythagorean Theorem).
(iv) There is at least one fragment of the ideal that is not covered by the rational (e.g., the value of serenity; looking at the world with a silent smile).

Based on such findings, Munitz could have argued that the relationship of the real, the rational, and the ideal can only be represented in terms of three circles which partially overlap, but each of which has a segment which is not covered by any other circle.

This figure would clearly show the extent of Munitz's disagreement with the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition which still dominates western philosophy. The key implication of this disagreement is the following one: while according to the traditional view the rational represents the central circle, which includes under its auspices both the real and the ideal, on this new view the rational is only one of the bridges between the real and the ideal – by no means the only one, or perhaps not even the most important one. This difference can be further clarified by suggesting the following vocabulary for the real, the rational, and the ideal:

a. the real = what *is*; how things *are*.
b. the rational = what *ought* to be; conditional or unconditional necessity.
c. the ideal = what *could* be; positive, negative, and neutral values.[31]

One important consequence of this deviation is that it changes the picture of the role and place of human beings in reality. According to the traditional understanding, humanity finds itself at the intersection of the real and the rational (which also absorbs the ideal). Now that we have established that the ideal belongs to a partially independent realm and does not stand in a mere shadow of the rational, our whole perspective changes. For example, the ethical problem is traditionally presented as that of the tension between what *is* the case and what *should* be the case, between the "is" and the "ought." Normative ethical theories then divide into two camps. In one of them the "is" – individual or collective, psychological or sociological – is taken as the foundation for the derivation of all moral ideals and values, of the moral "ought." This camp includes ethical theories as diverse as utilitarianism, consequentialism, pragmatism, hermeneutics, and some variations of virtue ethics. In the second group belong those ethical theories which argue that an "ought" provides the only possible foundation for moral ideals and values, and that every "is" has to adjust itself to such antecedently determined standards. The teleologically and eschatologically oriented Judeo-Christian tradition and the Kantian deontological ethics are best-known examples of the ethical theories of the second mold.

Munitz is rightly suspicious of forcing ethics into the "is-ought" dilemma. Nevertheless, he does not explore the possibility that ethical pronouncements could be more than poetic dictums of the type "Of what we cannot speak we must be silent" and "The

[31] See Munitz, *Does Life Have a Meaning?*, pp. 89-92.

solution to the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem." Munitz confines himself to the metaphorical language which speaks of a "plurality of meanings" and of "meaning-charges" in human lives.[32] He prejudges the issue of the source of meaning and values by assuming that meaning and values can have its source either in some theistically postulated transcendent being, or that they must originate in human interactions and thus could have no mode of existence of their own. Since Munitz rejects the existence of any Divine Being, and since Boundless Existence can be no source of meaning and values, Munitz opts for a "humanistic" answer to the question of life's meaning. On his view,

> The use of the term "humanism" points to a primary concern with human life, its sources, directions, and methods for achieving various types of human values through reliance on criteria devised and chosen by human beings themselves, rather than by an appeal to extra-human – for example, divinely sanctioned – ones.[33]

The problem with Munitz's orientation is not that it is humanistic, but that it is grounded in an unnecessarily restrictive way. First, we cannot *prima facie* exclude the possibility of extra-human sources making an import on our lives and their meaning, even if our orientation is humanistic. Think, for instance, of the impact of diseases, tsunamis, earthquakes, and other natural phenomena on our lives. Even less can we exclude the impact of some other non-natural forces, for we can never prove whether or not they exist.

Second, and more importantly, Munitz does not discuss a distinction between values themselves and values insofar as they are applied. He does not explore the possibility that serenity is more than just a personal psychological attitude, but something objectively valuable, i.e. a value of a kind that needs to be further explored with respect to the whole realm of the ideal. Munitz does not examine the possibility that values like serenity are not mere subjective states of mind, but, as Nicolai Hartmann has convincingly argued, that their existence belongs to what can be called "ideal being." (Material objects, such as chairs and books, have real being, while moral and aesthetic values have ideal being.) Values such as justice, love, compassion, and truthfulness have a self-sufficient and independent existence in the realm of the ideal; they themselves do not change, although human insights into them change and mature.[34]

One philosopher who has abandoned the "is-ought" dilemma, like Munitz, but who nevertheless has attempted to develop an ethical theory primarily oriented toward the ideal aspect of existence is Albert Schweitzer. It is all the more remarkable that Munitz does not pay attention to Schweitzer and his ethics of reverence for life, because Munitz and Schweitzer accept some fundamentally similar convictions. For example, like Munitz, Schweitzer also defends a combination of rationalism and mysticism. In Schweitzer's case, it is not the mystery of existence, but the mystery of life. Yet the fundamental path toward accepting mysticism is the same in both thinkers. Schweitzer articulates three criteria of a plausible philosophical approach: 1. Does it examine nature without preconceived theories? 2. Does it include a profound ethical idea? 3. Does it

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[32] *Ibid*., pp. 73-90.

[33] *Ibid*., p. 28.

[34] Nicolai Hartmann, *Ethics*, 3 vols., trans. Stanton Coit (London: Allen & Unwin, 1949). See especially vol. 1, Chs. XIV-XVII. In the second volume Hartmann discusses over forty different moral values. In his *Ästhetik* (Berlin: Walter deGruyter, 1953), Ch. XXVII, Hartmann distinguishes six different kinds of values: values of the good (goods as values), values of the pleasant, vital values, moral values, aesthetic values, and cognitive values.

have the courage, when it arrives at the ultimate problems raised by research and thought, to admit that there are mysteries that cannot be fathomed, or does it rather presume to offer a system which explains everything?[35]

Schweitzer and Munitz agree on the first and the third criteria. Yet the very first criterion puts Schweitzer and Munitz at odds with most modern philosophers, from Descartes and Leibniz, to Kant and Hegel. While ancient Greek philosophers found the inspiration for their philosophical thinking in wonder at the complexity and beauty of nature, which they then try to explain in their theories, modern philosophers reverse this approach. What they take for granted is not nature, but the mind. Even when the existence of the external world is not doubted, nature is treated as something of secondary importance: as a dead mechanism, or as a material for the satisfaction of human needs and desires. Schweitzer and Munitz both believe that this *contemptus mundi* of modern philosophers have done a considerable damage to our understanding of nature and our place and role in it.

Like Munitz, Schweitzer believes that the highest credo of all critical thinking – "reverence for truth" – demands that we acknowledge when and where we have reached the limits of rationality. When rational thinking is pursued to its logical end, it arrives at something non-rational which, nevertheless, may be a necessity of thought. When philosophers try to eliminate this non-rational element, their thoughts lead to views of the world and life which lose both their validity and their vitality. The acceptance of the necessary limits of reason forces us, according to Schweitzer, to recognize that "the last fact which knowledge can discover is that the world is a manifestation, and in every way a puzzling manifestation, of the universal will-to-live."[36] This realization of the limits of knowledge also compels us to recognize the indispensability of mysticism.

While Munitz explores the limitations of Kant's theoretical reason, Schweitzer focuses on the limitations of Kant's practical reason. Yet, for Schweitzer, this recognition of the limitations of rational thought leads primarily to a renewed focus on ethics, not to our abandonment of it. Schweitzer sets three criteria of a viable ethical approach:

> It must have nothing do to with an ethical interpretation of the world; it must become cosmic and mystical, that is to say, it must seek to conceive all the self-devotion which rules in ethics as a manifestation of an inward, spiritual relation to the world; it must not lapse into abstract thinking, but must remain elemental, understanding self-devotion to the world to be self-devotion of human life to every form of living being with which it can come into relation.[37]

Munitz could have easily accepted the first two criteria. Schweitzer's novel approach to ethics is revealed in the last criterion, in his insistence that life is the central philosophical and ethical category. In spite of our scientific and philosophical advances, life remains a mystery. Our best and perhaps only path toward experiencing this mystery is not through knowledge but through something philosophers have called "will." Schweitzer does not understand will in the traditional manner of Descartes and the early British empiricists, i.e., as a faculty of choice. For Schweitzer, will is primarily a drive to continue and develop our lives, or an urge to live life to its full potential. For this reason,

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[35] There three criteria are presented in Albert Schweitzer's essay "Goethe the Philosopher," in Schweitzer, *Goethe: Four Studies*, trans. Charles Joy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949), p. 64.

[36] Schweitzer, *The Philosophy of Civilization*, trans. C. T. Campion (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1987), p. 76.

[37] *Ibid*., p. 307.

Schweitzer usually refers to will as a "will-to-live." Ethics consists in the affirmation of all life and the devotion to it, independent of our knowledge of the world. Put differently, ethics consists in the transformation of the will-to-live into the will to behave responsively toward all living beings, which Schweitzer calls "reverence for life." He writes:

> Ethics consist … in my experiencing the compulsion to show to all will-to-live the same reverence as I do to my own. There we have given us that basic principle of the moral: It is good to maintain and to encourage life; it is bad to destroy life or to obstruct it.[38]

This understanding of good and evil implies that life has an intrinsic value or, as Schweitzer would say, that all life is sacred. The ethics of reverence for life derives from an inner compulsion: ethics is the devotion to all life inspired by reverence for life. In this context Schweitzer often mentions the relevance of sincerity, of our striving toward justice, and an uncompromising dedication to truth. Ethics carries within itself the impulse of life to realize its highest potential. Reverence for life involves a drive toward a full development of one's potential and a drive toward highest values.

Although Schweitzer's ethics of reverence for life presents the illustration that it is possible to discuss values without invoking the traditional "is – ought" dilemma, it represents only one pioneer journey into a highly uncharted territory – the realm of the ideal. When we look back at the history of our civilization, it is hard to find any other realm involving more prejudices and misconceptions than the ideal. It is also equally hard to find any other discipline more neglected than theory of value, or axiology. Munitz signals a renowned interest in this direction with his last book, but takes his project along a different path. Yet, I am convinced that this is the direction in which Munitz's idea of Boundless Existence and its implications could – and should – be further developed. I will venture here only to give a hint of what such an exploration of the realm of the ideal should involve.

The Greek word *axios* means "being worthy" and "estimable." It has the same roots with two other Greek words that are well-known to us: *axon* and *axioma*. *Axon* is translated as "axis" and, taken literally, it refers to a straight line, real of imaginary, passing through a body around which it revolves, or may be imagined to revolve. (As an example, we can think here of the axis of the earth.) Taken symbolically, *axon* refers to a turning point or condition, around which our lives may turn and depend upon. *Axioma* is the Greek word for axiom, and it means "authority" and "authoritative sentence." A combination of these words should clearly indicate how values function and how they relate to the realm of the real and the rational. Values are not facts, nor are they reasons which explain the correlations of facts, but rather serve to provide a core which gives us a sense of orientation. Values provide an axis of orientation for our lives, for our attitudes and our deeds, for our decisions about what is right and wrong, what is valuable and what is not. Values also provide an authoritative ground based on which we can make proper choices concerning how to live and further maintain and enhance our humanity.

Munitz develops his discussion of meaning in terms of "interactive meanings," and I similarly believe that a theory of values must be based on an interactive relation of facts, reasons, and values. How is it to be done? Munitz correctly argues that the basic function of the mind in judging the world and collecting knowledge of it is identification: we need to identify what we are observing by classifying it and recognizing how

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[38] *Ibid*., p. 309.

similar and how different it is from other things and events we observe. When we are dealing with values, however, the basic function of the mind is orientation: values are like a coordinate system for the map of reality we are trying to assemble. Values do not give us a sense of what is and what is not, nor of what is rational and what is not rational, but only of what is valuable and what is not valuable. Since they have different functions, the relationship between facts, reasons, and values is not hierarchical, nor can any one of them be reduced to, or derived from any other. Their relationship is dynamic, reciprocal, and mutually supportive. Their relationship is interactive.

We are far from any developed interactive theory of values, but the skeleton of such a theory need not be equally obscure. The central problems of such a theory are the following three:

First, it has to explain the nature of values by contrasting them to non-values (such as facts and reasons), and by showing how they are mutually related. Put differently, we need to figure out the ontological status of values, as well as whether and how their validity can be objective.

Second, the nature of values should further be clarified by explaining the contrast between positive and negative values, as well as between various kinds of positive values. More specific issues under this rubric would involve: the distinction between intrinsic values (e.g., the value of life) and non-intrinsic (e.g., instrumental) values, and the distinction between means and ends on the one hand, and parts and wholes on the other.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the nature of values should be further elaborated by examining conflicts between various positive values. In this part, the plurality of values must also be considered in its various aspects: not only that we need to distinguish between moral and non-moral values, but it would also be useful to establish a full scale of values. We would presumably never find an a priori fixed scale, such as the one in which Max Scheler believed when he distinguished between pleasure values, vital values, spiritual values and the values of the holy.[39] Nevertheless, even more flexible and changeable comparisons of values would be most welcome.

Such comparisons would be most useful in the context of unavoidable conflicts of positive values.[40] In the face of the threatening dilemmas that we confront as individuals and as a civilization, it is of utmost importance to learn more not only about whether and how such conflicts arise, but also about whether and how they can, in principle, be resolved. One of the deepest problems of our time is the problem of (dis)orientation, the problem of choosing and pursuing the proper art of living. As Munitz correctly observes, this problem is intensified not only because of our potential for self-destruction, but also because of a widespread "feeling of dislocation, anxiety, despair, and home-

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[39] See Max Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 89-100. As Nicolai Hartmann demonstrates, we do not use one unified scale of value but two: one based on the respective strengths and one on the respective heights of considered values. The two scales of value work in an inverse ratio: the strongest values are the lowest, and the highest values are the weakest; Hartmann, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, Chs. II-IV, and XXXVIII.

[40] For example, Isaiah Berlin argues that liberty and equality are incompatible values. For Berlin's view, see his two classical essays: "The Pursuit of the Ideal," and "Two Concepts of Liberty," both reprinted in Berlin, *The Proper Study of Mankind* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998), pp. 1-16, and 191-242. Hartmann argues that justice and brotherly love can be incompatible; *op. cit*., vol. 2, Chs. XIX and XXIV.

lessness."[41] We live in the age characterized by a lack of universally accepted values and a depreciation of the spiritual aspect of personality. In the absence of any appreciation of such values and in the absence of any genuine commitment that would put a free and spontaneous development of individual personality in the center of our ethical strivings, we are walking on a dangerous tightrope. As Munitz correctly insists,

> The finding of meanings in life is an exercise that only a particular person can perform and judge, whatever the input or sharing in such meanings by others. It is the individual person's own consciousness whose life is under self-scrutiny that is a fundamental ingredient in determining the meaningful interactions of that individual in the course of his or her life.[42]

Munitz is right to claim that the implications of our awareness of Boundless Existence are negative – they tell us how *not* to think about the world and our role and place in it: there is no "*inherent intelligibility or value* in the Existence of the universe."[43] This does not mean, however, that we should endorse Wittgenstein's attitude that "the solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem," nor that intelligibility and value may not reside somewhere else, in some realm different than that of the real and the rational. An intense awareness of Boundless Existence, of our mistakes and misconceptions, should turn us in the opposite direction – toward making the problem of life and developing an elaborate theory of value as our central preoccupations. Because of the peculiar development of our civilization and its deepening crisis, the problem of life is as serious as it has even been. Any genuine attempt at solving this problem would require a systematic examination of all three realms that make an interactive impact on human existence: the real, the rational, and the ideal.

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[41] Munitz, *Does Life Have a Meaning?*, p. 27.
[42] *Ibid*., p. 84.
[43] *Ibid*., p. 111.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 325-342

Михаил Эпштейн

Атеистический геноцентризм Ричарда Докинза и персоналистический аргумент бытия Бога

1. Что такое "новый атеизм"?

Эта работа навеяна чтением книги известнейшего этолога, эволюционного биолога и популяризатора науки Ричарда Докинза "Бог как иллюзия" (2006). Книга признана самым последовательным и непримиримым манифестом "нового атеизма", построенным на современном научном мировоззрении.[1] Нов этот атеизм в основном по времени возникновения, а по существу аргументов напоминает 19-ый и даже 18-ый век. В 20-ом веке западная наука и религия привыкли к взаимоуважению и терпимости, что отчасти было обусловлено очевидными катастрофическими последствиями атеизма в коммунистических странах. Но опыт воинствующего безбожия, разрушительный для цивилизации, стал забываться, и вот наука вновь пошла в наступление на религию, не на какие-то конкретные вероисповедания, но на сущность религии как таковой.

Мы не будем здесь касаться социально-исторических аспектов религии, которые критически освещаются новыми атеистами, со ссылками на новейшие проявления религиозного фундаментализма и фанатизма. Не только исламского. Растущее разочарование в бушевском протестантско-политическом мессианизме, обернувшемся тяжелыми потерями иракской войны и падением престижа США в мире, тоже вызвало запрос на свежие подходы к религии. Если учесть, что по данным 2004 г. (опрос ICM) 91% американцев верят в сверхъестественное, 74% - в загробную жизнь, а 71% готовы умереть за свою веру, то можно понять жалобы Ричарда Докинза на то что в начале 21 в. Америка все еще живет в эпоху "теократического средневековья". "Буйство джинна религиозного фанатизма в современной Америке ужаснуло бы "отцов-основателей"."[2]

Одна из особенностей нового атеизма – его непримиримость не только к религиозному фундаментализму, но и к религиозному либерализму и даже к агностицизму, который на вопрос о существовании Бога предпочитает ответить крот-

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[1] Richard Dawkins. *The God Delusion;* Sam Harris. *The End of Faith* and *Letter to a Christian Nation*; Daniel Dennett. *Breaking the Spell: Religion As a Natural Phenomenon*; Christopher Hitchens. *God Is Not Great: The Case Against Religion.* Этих четырех авторов называют "четырьмя всадниками нового атеизма", конечно, с аллюзией на четырех всадников Апокалипсиса.

[2] Ричард Докинз. Бог как иллюзия. М.:Колибри, 2008, С.63. Все дальнейшие цитаты из Докинза будут приводиться по этой книге с указанием страницы в тексте статьи. Я сверил приводимые цитаты с оригиналом книги, чтобы убедиться в адекватности перевода. Richard Dawkins. The God Delusion. Boston, New York: A Mariner Book, 2006.

ким “не знаю”, а не твердым “нет”. Такие компромиссные варианты неприемлемы для Докинза так же, как в свое время для В. И. Ленина, который в известном письме М. Горькому (1913 г.) обрушивается на либеральнейших богоискателей и даже социалистичнейших богостроителей, поскольку они создают иллюзию возможного компромисса между религией и социальным прогрессом. Грубый католический поп, растлевающий прихожанок, для Ленина лучше, чем какой-нибудь профессор, проповедник философски утонченного теизма, ибо первого легче разоблачить, а второй предлагает опиум высшего качества. Вот так и Докинз суровее всего обличает тех собратьев по науке, которые допускают совместимость научного и религиозного мировоззрения, делают уступки фидеизму, мистицизму и т.д. Докинз приводит данные по исследованиям IQ, которые якобы демонстрируют, что коэффициент интеллектуальности и религиозные убеждения испытуемых находятся в обратной корреляции.

Религия, по Докинзу, несовместима не только с наукой, но и с нравственностью. Это не только большая ложь, но и большое зло, и всякий, кто хотя бы отдаленно допускает истинность религиозных верований, служит укреплению социального зла, неравенства, жестокости, милитаризма и т.д. Бог вообще, как личность, как главный персонаж и вдохновитель Библии, не вызывает расположения Докинза. Он называет Бога “самым неприятным персонажем всей художественной литературы”, “мелочным, несправедливым, злопамятным деспотом”, “мстительным, кровожадным убийцей-шовинистом”, “жестоким мегаломаном, садомазохистом” (49), “неумным психопатом” (58). Но самое существенное - не то, что Бог плохой, а то, что его, слава Богу, нет. Поэтому Докинз великодушно снимает вопрос о личной безнравственности Бога. “Я не собираюсь нападать на личные качества Яхве, или Иисуса, или Аллаха...” (50). Все эти нападки не стоят трудов, поскольку “бог – это иллюзия “ (50).

Вот и я не буду обсуждать здесь вопрос о том, чего больше религия принесла человечеству: добра или зла. Меня интересует главный постулат Докинза: религия есть ложь. Теоретическое основание докинзова атеизма – совершенно каноническое, можно даже сказать, “старообрядческое”, если иметь в виду, что у атеизма есть своя догматическая традиция. Это отрицание какой бы то ни было реальности за пределом “материи, данной нам в ощущениях”. Я приведу основополагающий тезис Докинза, который можно счесть конспективным сжатием книги Ленина “Материализм и эмпириокритицизм”:

> “Мысли и эмоции людей возникают из невероятно сложных взаимодействий физических элементов мозга. По философскому определению атеист – это человек, считающий, что за границами естественного, физического мира ничего не существует; за кулисами обозреваемой Вселенной нет никакого сверхъестественного разумного творца, душа не переживает тело, и чудеса – помимо еще не объясненных природных явлений – не происходят сами собой. Если случается событие, выходящее, казалось бы, в нашем теперешнем ограниченном понимании мира за рамки естественного, мы надеемся со временем найти разгадку и включить его в ряд природных явлений”. (29)

Увы, столетие, отделяющее книгу Р. Докинза (2006) от книги В. И. Ленина (1908), продемонстрировало (1) стойкость даже наивнейшего материализма как философской базы воинствующего атеизма, и (2) убедительность его аргументов даже для выдающихся научных умов. Поэтому я позволю себе воспользоваться этой линией аргументации и привести пример того, что с точки зрения естествен-

нонаучного материализма можно считать иллюзией, столь же нелепой, как Бог, хотя, может быть, и не столь вредной: число.

Представим материалиста, которой задался бы целью доказать, что "за границами естественного, физического мира ничего не существует". Несомненно, число 5, как и любое другое, должно было бы войти для него в ряд иллюзий. Материалист указывает на деревья: их пять, но где же здесь число 5? У нас 5 пальцев на руке, но это пальцы, а число 5 среди них отдельно не обнаруживается. Да, цифру 5 можно написать на доске, но это только следы мела, условный знак, и по-арабски (5) он выглядит иначе, чем по-латински (Y), значит, число 5 само по себе есть иллюзия. Всюду материя, одна только материя: физическая, химическая, биологическая. И так убежденно-материалистический взгляд Докинза обнаруживает повсюду только природу, вещи, тела, гены, организмы, а то, что организует их, придает им порядок и законообразность, объявляет иллюзией. Тот факт, что разные религии по-разному представляют Бога: то как Яхве, то как Аллаха, то как Брахмана, по Докинзу, свидетельствует о несостоятельности религии вообще и должно послужить аргументом атеистического воспитания.[3]

Если бы Докинз не был столь философски наивен и ознакомился для начала хотя бы с Платоном и Аристотелем, он научился бы отделять идею от ее копии, а форму от материи. Для человека, мало-мальски смыслящего в философии и математике, очевидно, что число 5 существует не менее реально, чем 5 пальцев или 5 деревьев. По существу, оно даже более реально, потому что в чем бы оно ни проявлялось: в пальцах, спичках, деревьях, - оно остается равным себе, все тем же числом 5, тогда как найти абсолютно идентичные пальцы или деревья невозможно.

2. Геноцентризм. Мораль генов

У Докинза основой всего материального мироздания на биологическом уровне выступает эгоистичный ген, который страстно стремится к размножению. Начиная со своей книги "Эгоистичный ген" ("The Selfish Gene", 1976), Докинз неустанно проповедует мораль генов как господ мироздания, причем организмы и популяции в этой картине мира – всего лишь рабы генов, точнее, их копировальные машины. На вопрос, что в начале, курица или яйцо, Докинз отвечает четко: курица – это всего лишь средство для размножения яиц. Именно поэтому ген создает механизм естественного отбора – чтобы лучше размножаться. Все живое на этом свете, все существа, организмы, народы, история, культура, личности, страсти, гении, шедевры, религии, - это только ширма, за которой ведется борьба генов за овладение миром. *Геноцентризм* у Докинза оказывается гораздо редуктивнее средневекового теоцентризма, против засилья которого в Америке он протестует. Бог все-таки любит свои творения, а одно из них, человека, поставил венцом мироздания; мир не сводится без остатка к своей Первопричине, он самоценен, для Бога он цель, а не средство. Гены безразличны к населяемым особям и пользуются ими лишь как орудиями в схватке, безжалостно отбрасывая их, как только они утрачивают репродуктивную ценность.

По Докинзу, законы человеческой нравственности учреждает тоже ген, эгоизм которого утверждается даже благодаря альтруизму отдельных организмов. Они жертвуют собой для ближайших родственников – чтобы генам было лучше в

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[3] "Пусть дети изучают различные вероисповедания, замечают их несовместимость и делают из этой несовместимости собственные выводы". (475)

них размножаться. И вот все борения чувств, все человеческие стремления оказываются лишь проекцией воли генов к саморазмножению. Если один человек убивает другого – этого хочет эгоистичный ген. Если другой человек отдает последнюю рубашку первому встречному, этого тоже хочет эгоистичный ген. Чтобы мы ни делали, добро или зло, мы выполняем волю эгоистичных генов. “Ген, программирующий организм безвозмездно помогать своим кровным родственникам, с большой вероятностью тем самым помогает размножению собственных копий”. (304)

А для чего генам нужно размножать собственные копии, почему они наделены такой волей к саморазмножению? – Стоп, говорит докинзова наука, здесь наш метод останавливается, мы можем лишь показать, что все нравственные, как и безнравственные отношения между людьми определяются волей эгоистичных генов, которая ради своих целей создает организмы, способные иногда к эгоизму, иногда к альтруизму.

Весь мир живой природы и человеческих отношений предстает сценой, где разыгрывается лишь один и тот же спектакль под названием “Гены размножают собственные копии”. Люди оказываются куклами на ниточках этих эгоистичных кукловодов, бессмысленно, безотчетно, бесцельно стремящихся к самоумножению. И такой “генный атеизм” объявляется основой высшей нравственности, чем нравственность религиозная. Но разве переносить на ген свойства разумной воли и нравственности – это не худшая форма суеверия? Чем этот генный атеизм лучше более древнего “атомного” атеизма, который приписывал такое же стремление неодушевленной и неживой материи? И вообще зачем нужно свойства нравственности и разумности приписывать не Нравственному и Разумному Существу, а какому-нибудь атому или гену, при этом еще утверждая такой перенос как высшее достижение научного мировоззрения? Почему атом или ген, элементарные частицы материи или элементарные частицы информации, более достойны признания в качестве начал разумности и нравственности, чем постоянно наблюдаемое нами истечение тех же свойств из нравственных и разумных субъектов?

Эпиграфом к книге Докинза взяты слова замечательного писателя, фантаста и сатирика Дагласа Адамса: “Неужели недостаточно, что сад очарователен; неужели нужно шарить по его задворкам в поисках фей?” Честно говоря, я охотнее поверю в добрую волю фей, созидающих мир красоты и очарования, чем в добрую волю эгоистичных генов, созидающих тот же самый мир. Если сад очарователен, как очаровательны бывают лица, облака, деревьям, озера, значит, очарование и в самом деле существует, как число 5. И как для представления числа 5 выбирается условная фигура “5”, так для представления очарования выбирается условная фигура феи. Наверно, можно было бы представить очарование как-то иначе, но многие одаренные поэты и мистики, да и целые народы в своих сказках и поверьях представляли его именно так, в образе чарующих женщин в развевающихся одеждах, легко порхающих над землей. Почему Докинзу со всем его научным аппаратом и методом эгоистичный ген представляется более правдоподобным носителем или источником очарования этого мира, его книга так же не доказывает, как и не опровергает очарования фей. Я смею считать, что добрые феи очаровательнее эгоистичных генов, и Докинз меня в этом не разубедил.

Конечно, Докинз может меня поправить: феи как носительницы очарования в мире природы – это только метафора, и я с ним соглашусь. Но ведь поэты и даже мистики не настаивают на буквальной, научной строгости своих созерцаний. А

вот ученые настаивают на точности своих наблюдений, и тогда я спрошу Докинза: разве его излюбленный научный концепт, переходящий из книги в книгу и ставший опорным в его атеистическом манифесте, - не метафора? Только вдумайтесь: “selfish gene”, “эгоистичный ген”. Значит, у гена есть свое эго, self, “я”, - иначе как он может быть эгоистичным? Допустимо ли переносить на ген, на частичку хромосом, передающую элементарный наследственный признак, свойство высокоразвитого организма, обладающего самосознанием и чувством эго, следовательно, и способностью к эгоизму? Или в основе всех научных построений Докинза лежит крайне условная антропоморфная метафора, персонификация гена как человекообразного, волящего, эгоистичного существа? И если поэт пишет о прелестных цветах: “фея приоткрыла свои голубые бархатные глаза”, то почему это менее точно, чем эгоизм, приписанный гену Докинзом?

По сути, “эгоистичный ген” даже не метафора, которая всегда признает свою условность, а миф, который притязает на полную правду. Наука, которая пользуется метафорой как аргументом, сама превращается в миф, и “эгоистичный ген” Докинза не более научен, чем Юпитер, превращающийся в быка. Но что позволено Юпитеру или вдохновленному им поэту, то не позволено “быку”, ученому, стоящему на почве строгих фактов и наблюдений. Поэтому докинзова “наука”, выступающая против Бога как иллюзии, не только столь же иллюзорна, как поэзия, но, в отличие от последней, не условно-метафорична, а мифична, т.е. иллюзорна вдвойне, выдавая образы за факты. И если Докинз “научно” выводит из эгоистичного гена все свойства человеческой нравственности, то не потому ли, что он заведомо вводит нравственные свойства в само определение гена, т.е. под маской науки действует как мифотворец?

Далее возникает вопрос: почему с точки зрения генного атеизма быть хорошим лучше, чем нехорошим?

> “...Гены эгоистично обеспечивают собственное выживание, программируя организмы на альтруистическое поведение. /.../ Ген, программирующий организм безвозмездно помогать своим кровным родственникам, с большой вероятностью тем самым помогает размножению собственных родственников. Частота данного гена может возрасти в генофонде настолько, что безвозмездная помощь родственникам станет нормой поведения”. (304)

Отлично, значит в основе нравственного поведения лежит элементарный эгоизм генов, жаждущих размножения. Мораль – это своего рода иллюзия, посредством которой они достигают своих биологических целей.

Но что если организмы, достигнув высокой стадии развития и осознав (в лице таких ученых, как Докинз), что они лишь инструменты эгоистической стратегии генов, сами пожелают перенять эту стратегию? Если они решат отвергнуть иллюзию нравственности и подчинить все свое поведение той же простой цели “самовоспроизводства”, которую ставят перед собой гены? Собственно, отвергая Бога как иллюзию и возлагая взамен свою веру в прогресс на гены, Докинз подает пример, как нужно расправляться с иллюзиями вообще. Почему для суверенных, сознательных, способных к самоконтролю организмов эгоистические интересы генов, готовых принести их в жертву, должны быть выше их собственных интересов? И тогда, следуя воле своих генов к саморазмножению и воспринимая эгоизм как закон самой природы, почему бы мне не разбрасывать свои гены в лона всех встреченных женщин, силой их покоряя или хитростью отнимая у мужей? Какой

генный закон нравственно запретит мне наслаждаться теми благами, которые я отнимаю у другого, соседнего организма, разрушая его и тем самым раздвигая свое жизненное пространство?

Хорошо, с родственниками Докинз еще кое-как разобрался, поскольку, помогая им, жертвуя для них, мы все-таки имеем в виду интересы наших общих генов (хотя и непонятно, почему развитый индивид должен ставить их выше собственных интересов). Ну а как быть быть с неродными, чужими? Какой интерес моим генам в том, чтобы мой огранизм, их носитель, делал добро чужим людям – а не грабил, насиловал, убивал в пользу размножения своих генов?

> "Наши предки имели возможность проявлять альтруизм только в отношении кровных родственников и соплеменников, реально способных отплатить добром за добро. Нынче это ограничение отпало, но шаблон поведения остался. Почему бы ему пропасть? Это – как сексуальное влечение. Мы так же не можем удержаться от жалости при виде несчастного рыдающего человека (даже если он нам не родственник и вряд ли отплатит добром за добро), как не можем не испытывать вожделения по отношению к привлекательному представителю противоположного пола (даже неспособному по каким-либо причинам к размножению). Оба эти чувства – ошибки дарвиновской эволюции, но какие драгоценные, прекрасные ошибки!" (311-312).

До таких зияющих высот умозрения не поднимался даже ленинский материализм. Докинз полагает, что единственная цель эволюции – размножение. Поэтому половое влечение как таковое, без привязки к оплодотворению, – ошибка эволюции. Как и то, что миллиарды людей сочетаются со своими любимыми и желанными не для того, чтобы произвести потомство, а ради эмоционального и сексуального удовлетворения (если уж придерживаться материалистического языка). Странным образом здесь у Докинза проглядывает самая аскетическая и консервативная из католических доктрин о том, что супружеская близость оправдана лишь целью зачатия, а в остальных случаях она греховна. Все основные христианские конфессии, включая католичество и православие, уже отказались от столь узкого утилитарного подхода к таинству брака, подчеркивая, что супружеская близость сама по себе, вне целей деторождения, имеет духовную и нравственную ценность: "да будут двое единая плоть". Но дарвиновская эволюция в представлении Докинза оказывается гораздо более суровой, аскетической и ханжеской, чем Бог в представлении иудеев, христиан, мусульман. Эта эволюция признает сообразной своим целям только сексуальную близость с целью зачатия. Все остальное оказывается "ошибкой", уклонением от ее прямых путей. Испытывая влечение к красивой женщине, даже к собственной жене, и не ставя себе при этом детородных задач, знай, что совершаешь ошибку против всемогущей и требовательной Эволюции.

И пусть это "драгоценная" и "прекрасная" ошибка, но ведь это гуманист Докинз допускает ее из любви к человечеству, из потакания его слабостям. А более строгий эволюционист может не допустить. Ученики Докинза и ученики его учеников, признав Эволюцию единственным двигателем прогресса, могут иначе посмотреть на все эти уклонения от ее воли в виде непродуктивных сексуальных влечений и немотивированных альтруистических порывов. Если, как объясняет Докинз, "побудительные причины доброты – альтруизма, щедрости, сопереживания, жалости", - это всего лишь прекрасные ошибки, то не будет ли следующим актом научного разоблачения всех иллюзий развенчание и этих последних? И вслед за книгой "Бог как иллюзия" будут написаны – научными детьми и внуками Докинза – "Любовь как иллюзия", "Добро как иллюзия". "Жалость как иллю-

зия"... Неужели Докинз не понимает, в какой страшный тоталитарный тупик он загоняет человечество, объявляя Эгоистичный Ген и Дарвиновскую Эволюцию высшими судьями и учителями морали?

Никакой Бог, даже несимпатичный Докинзу "злопамятный деспот" Ветхого Завета, не сравнится с Геном в своекорыстии и самовлюбленности, а с Эволюцией в беспощадном практицизме. Бог любил свой народ и выводил его из рабства, он учил людей любить не только Себя, но и всех ближних, учил не убивать, не красть, не лжесвидетельствовать, не отнимать чужих жен, не домогаться чужого имущества. А Эгоистичный Ген все разрешит и даже потребует: и убивать, и красть, и насиловать, - если это нужно ему для самовоспроизводства. Эволюция же отметет всякие чувства, устремления, порывы любви и добра, если они не способствуют прямо эволюционной цели. Мы знаем, как постепенно ужесточается догматика всех идей, основанных на разоблачении "религиозных иллюзий". Сначала просветители, потом марксисты, потом ленинцы, потом сталинцы, – и вот уже летят тысячи и миллионы голов, зараженных вредными "иллюзиями".

Да и почему, собственно, Докинз называет эти ошибки, вроде бесполезного сексуального влечения и альтруистического стремления помогать чужим, "драгоценными" и "прекрасными"? Как может настоящий ученый, да еще эволюционист, давать столь высокую оценку ложному поведению, которое идет вразрез с целями эволюции? Может быть, он еще не вполне изжил старых иллюзий о сверхъестественной природе добра и красоты? Может быть, он не железный атеист, каким считает себя, а интеллигент-гуманист старого типа? Не пора ли и с ним разобраться? Да и на что он ссылается в оправдание этих ошибок? С каким гнилым идеализмом заигрывает, когда оправдывает преступления против природы расцветом каких-то жалких, никому не нужных искусств. Разве не убогое оправдание: "Пожалуйста, ни на секунду не допускайте, что эволюционное объяснение как-то умаляет или обесценивает благородные чувства сострадания и милосердия. Или сексуальное влечение. Пропущенное через призму речевой культуры, сексуальное чувство дарит нам величайшие произведения поэзии и драматургии: любовную лирику Джона Донна, например, или "Ромео и Джукьетту"." (312). Ах, как разжалобил! Да на что нам этот Шекспир и Донн к нему в придачу, если для Гена и Эволюции от них нет никакого толку? На свалку Эволюции! Извинительный жест Докинза, его попытка объяснить полезность сексуальных влечений и альтруистических стремлений тем, что на их основе создается прекрасная поэзия, не могут вызвать ничего, кроме веселой насмешки, ни у "идеалистов", ни у "материалистов". Для идеалистов любовь и добро не нуждаются в оправдании стихами, поскольку они драгоценны сами по себе и даже более, чем стихи. А для материалистов какие-то там стихи не могут служить оправданиям ошибкам против природы, потому что сами стихи еще ошибочнее и бесполезнее. Так что Докинзов компромисс может вызвать лишь презрение с обеих сторон.

Это всего лишь непоследовательность робкого эволюциониста, мягкотелое, прекраснодушное введение к настоящей эволюционной морали, которая не потерпит таких уклонений от генеральной линии Эволюции.

> "Огромная доля человеческих амбиций и усилий объясняется сексуальными желаниями, и многие из них можно классифицировать как "ошибку". Это же можно сказать и о желании быть щедрым, проявлять сочувствие, если, согласно моему предположению, все это является "ошибочным следствием" полуизолированной жизни наших

> предков. /.../Эти давно возникшие шаблоны продолжают управлять нашим поведением и поныне, хотя обстоятельства жизни уже не соответствуют их первоначальному смыслу". (312).

Так если не соответствует, к черту эти шаблоны! Обойдемся без них. Вперед, по светлому пути Эволюции, под руководством всесильных Генов!

Скажите всему обществу, что "желание быть щедрым и проявлять сочувствие" – это ошибочное следствие примитивных нравов и уже не соответствует современным обстоятельствам. И пусть общество это глубоко усвоит, поверит, переварит, путь живет в согласии с Докинзовой максимой. Через двадцать лет общество взлетит на воздух, разорвется от внутренних распрей и "несочувствий", и некому будет размножать гены.

Там, где генетико-эволюционный атеизм Докинза последователен, он безнравствен, а там, где он нравствен, он непоследователен, он вводит мораль контрабандой, ссылаясь на какие-то ошибки, пусть и прекрасные, и на шаблоны, впрочем устаревшие. Все, чем атеизм может объяснить собственно человеческие, творческие, нравственные, духовные мотивы и цели человеческого поведения, он берет у религии, а то, что он прибавляет от себя, придает этому объяснению нелепость, поскольку редуцирует человеческую личность к материальным составляющим организма, типа генов, хромосом, которые якобы "человечны" независимо от самого человека, сами по себе. Чтобы вывести большее из меньшего, атеизм наделяет меньшее свойствами большего. Притязание на полную научность оборачивается гротескной нелепостью, когда частица материи наделяется волею, разумом и нравственным побуждением. Атеизм сетует, что религия отчуждает у человека его свойства (творчества, разума, нравственности) и передает их Высшему Существу. Но сам атеизм тоже отчуждает их у человека и передает "низшим" материальным частицам.

Иллюзорно ли Высшее Существо? Допустим, но принадлежность ему или происхождение от него таких высших способностей, как воление и разум, вполне реальна, более реальна, чем разумность атома или воля гена. Иллюзорны ли атомы и гены? Нет, реальны. Но принадлежность им или происхождение от них высших человеческих свойств вполне иллюзорны. Это значит, что выбирая в пользу "иллюзии", мы мыслим реалистически, а выбирая в пользу реальности, мыслим иллюзорно. В том и дело, что реализм мышления определяется не физическим существованием его предмета, а логикой самого мышления. Как носитель высшего разума Бог гораздо реальнее, чем атом или ген.

Самая слабая претензия, которую можно предъявить Докинзу, - это его философская и теологическая наивность. Он понимает теизм как веру в Бога, прямо управляющего каждой частицей вселенной и действиями каждого живого существа. Бога он понимает как некий Сверхобъект, отвечающий за поведение всех объектов. "Теизм утверждает, что каждый существующий объект появился и существует только благодаря одной-единственной сущности – богу. Он также утверждает, что каждое свойство каждого объекта существует лишь благодаря тому, что бог создал его таким или позволил ему быть таким". (214). Докинза раздражает, что такое теистическое допущение Бога сводит все мироздание к простой причине, отменяющей научные вопросы и объяснения. Почему это так? – потому что так создал Бог. Воспринимая Бог как простейший механизм, состоящий из одного винта, одним поворотом заводящего Вселенную и все в ней, Докинз предпочитает

этому “одновинтовому“ Богу более сложный механизм эволюции и естественного отбора, который позволяет разобраться в частностях мироустройства. Сначала соорудив себе, пользуясь оплошностями или глупостями некоторых теологов, модель Бога как “простого” существа, типа амебы или инфузории, Докинз затем успешно развенчивает ее.

> “Бог, способный постоянно контролировать и исправлять состояние каждой отдельной частицы Вселенной, не может быть простым. Его существование само требует грандиозного объяснения. Что еще хуже (с точки зрения простоты) – другие уголки гигантского сознания бога одновременно заняты делами, чувствами и молитвами каждого отдельного человека, а также всех инопланетян, возможно, населяющих эту и другие сто миллиардов галактик” (С.215).

Докинзу трудно поверить в такую сверхъестественную способность – но почему бы ему не обратить внимание на компьютер, стоящий на его столе и способный за одну секунду найти, что думали о любом предмете тысячи людей, многие из которых жили за тысячи лет до нас. И это при том, что интернет появился всего лет 15-20 назад. Легко допустить, что у Бога за 12-15 миллиардов лет существования нашей Вселенной (тем более за вечность до ее возникновения) могли возникнуть более совершенные устройства, чем наш компьютер. Да и не нужно Богу “исправлять состояние каждой отдельной частицы вселенной”, для этого есть умные и точные законы взаимодействия частиц. Только очень плохой лаборант каждую секунду следит за всеми деталями лабораторного процесса и вручную их исправляет.

3. Бог – не Объект, а Субъект. Ветхозаветное и трансцендентальное.

Такой Бог, каким представляет его Докинз, - это и вправду иллюзия, существующая только в голове самых примитивных атеистов – и теологов, с которыми Докинз и предпочитает иметь дело, дабы легче их разоблачить. Показательно, что на протяжении всей книги Донинз ни разу не обращается к размышлениям Канта о природе “религии в пределах разума” или к экзистенциальной теологии Кьеркегора. Да и просто к Священному Писанию. Иначе он узнал бы, что царство Божие – не в мире объектов, частиц, элементов, а внутри человека. “Когда же приходит царство Божье?” – “Царство Божье приходит не в видимом образе. И нельзя сказать: вот оно здесь или вот оно там. Поэтому знайте, что царство Божье внутри вас есть” (Лука, XVII , 21–22).

Бог не есть объект или даже Сверхобъект, управляющий миром объектов. Бог есть условие нашей субъективности, нашей способности быть самими собой, внутренним существом, вмещать дух и душу, иметь свое “я”, от себя думать, говорить, действовать. Этого “себя” нет нигде в окружающем мире, оно только в глубине нас самих, как условие всякой субъективности. Вдумайтесь в само понятие “себя” – оно совершенно необъективируемо, оно возникает лишь из отношения существа к самому себе. Но условие всякой субъектности само не может не быть субъектным, и понятие Бога как раз и указывает на трансцендентального субъекта, то Я, которое составляет возможность для каждого из живущего существ быть собой, жить внутри себя и действовать изнутри себя, а не быть только объектом для других. Бог – это всеобщее “Себя”, благодаря которому люди могут общаться и понимать друг друга.

Р. Декарт утвердил субъекта, “я” как основу всякого достоверного опыта. Д. Юм, как известно, опроверг Декарта, обнаружив, что в предмете нашего опыта

нет никакого отдельного “я”, субъекта. Тогда И. Кант заново восстановил в правах субъекта, уже не как отдельный предмет опыта, а как условие всякого опыта, как трансцендентального субъекта, не как видимое, а как видящее, не как наблюдаемое, а как наблюдающее, - как источник луча, который освещает мир вещей. По Канту, “...необходимое существо должно иметь волю и рассудок, т.е. быть духом”.[4] Как бытие чисел есть условие счетности объектов, так бытие Бога есть условие духовности субъектов, их творческой активности, исхождения из себя, свободного противодействия внешней среде и целенаправленного взаимодействия с ней. Бог не более иллюзорен, чем число 5; это такая же реальность субъектного, личностного, изнутри переживаемого мироздания, как число есть реальность объектного, вовне наблюдаемого мироздания. Да, мы не можем ткнуть пальцем в это число, вычленить его материально среди пяти деревьев, чтобы 5 было отдельно, а деревья отдельно. Точно так же мы не можем и отчленить Бога от тех состояний, которые знакомы нам только изнутри, по жизни собственной души. Если бы мы могли вычленить и отделить число 5 от 5 деревьев, то деревьев уже не было бы 5, они смешались бы, слились в неисчислимое, беспорядочное. Если мы могли бы отделить Бога как Сверхсубъекта от той субъективности, что в нас, тогда мы сами перестали бы быть субъектами. Убери невещественные числа из вещественного мира – и он разрушится, утратит порядок, исчислимость, расчлененность. Убери Бога из нас – и мы разрушимся как субъекты, перестанем быть для-себя и из-себя.

Особый раздел книги Докинз посвящает доказательствам существования Бога: онтологическому аргументу, доказательствам от красоты, от Священного Писания, от “личного опыта”. Но среди них нет того, который представляется мне самым убедительным, по крайней мере для тех, кто не готов верить на слово богооткровенным книгам, для кого Писания не является священным и кто готов исходить только из эмпирических и рациональных посылок, из личного опыта и разумных заключений из него. Под личным опытом я разумею не какой-то исключительный, сверхъестественный опыт, а повседневный опыт бытия личностью. Каждый человек знает себя как личность: мыслящую, чувствующую, стремящуюся, сомневающуюся. И вместе с тем он знает, по опыту общения с другими людьми, что и они внутри себя представляют личности, они тоже способны мыслить, чувствовать, желать и т.д. Эта свойство “быть собой” каждому открывается только изнутри себя самого, оно не содержится в физических, химических, биологических, математических свойствах объектов. Элементарные частицы, атомы, молекулы, хромосомы, гены, клетки являются нам таковыми лишь через опыт наблюдения извне, но мы не переживаем их внутри себя, как свои интеллектуальные или эмоциональные состояния. Никто не может сказать: “я чувствую внутри себя эту клетку” или “я переживаю в себе этот ген”. Но каждый может сказать: “я чувствую внутри себя радость, печаль, любовь, обиду, веру, сомнение”. Этот личный опыт не есть галлюцинация или видение, это каждому знакомая и непосредственно переживаемая реальность нашего бытия собой.

Какой же *разумный* вывод можно сделать из этой способности субъекта быть субъектом, не сводимым к свойствам объекта? Разум состоит в том, чтобы во-

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[4] Кант И. Единственно возможное основание для доказательства бытия Бога, в его Соб. соч. в 6 тт., М.: Мысль, 1964, т.1, С. 421.

зводить единичные и частичные явления к некоторым обобщениям, к действию общих законов. Так научный разум открывает законы в основании множественных взаимодействий элементарных частиц, химических молекул, разных биологических видов и организмов и т.д. Разум же побуждает нас искать того общего, что объединяет внутреннюю, духовную жизнь многих людей, о которой мы узнаем и по собственному опыту, и по общению с другими. Разум побуждает нас искать эти законы не в том мире объектов, где действуют законы физики и химии, а в том мире субъектов, где только и дано нам переживать действие этих законов изнутри. Разум не только обобщает, но и расчленяет, он обладает и синтетической, и аналитической способностью. Он понимает, что нельзя путать физические законы с химическими, что нельзя о поведении сложных живых организмов судить только из наблюдений за элементарными частицами. И точно так же разум понимает, что душевная жизнь, которая происходит внутри нас, не подчиняется тем законам, которые мы наблюдаем в мире объектов. Более того, различие между тем, что происходит внутри нас и вовне, - более глубокое и радикальное, чем между разными уровнями взаимодействия объектов (физическим, химическим, биологическим). Вселенная меньше отличается от частиц, ее составляющих, вода меньше отличается от огня, чем все они отличаются от простейшего душевного движения, от порыва нежности или отчаяния. Разум приводит нас к заключению, что есть законы материи, действующие для объектов неживой природы; законы жизни, действующие для растений и животных; и законы духа, действующие только внутри нас, переживаемые изнутри.

Но именно потому, что они действуют только внутри нас, они и не могут быть только законами, независимыми от нас и нашей воли, как действуют законы объективного мира, законы материи и жизни. Эти “законы”, по сути, не таковы, как законы гравитации или элекромагнетизма, действующие на физические тела; эти законы открыты только изнутри, переживаются как воления, желания, намерения, стремления, страхи, тревоги и т.д. И в то же время эти душевные и духовные состояния не принадлежат только нам, они проявляются и в нас, и в других людях, но проявляются не как автоматически действующие объективные “законы”, а как субъективные состояния, выразимые в языке, мимике, жестах и вызывающие понимание и сочувствие других субъектов.

Вот это и побуждает наш разум предположить бытие такого Субъекта, который является общим для всех субъектов. Бог – это Всеобщее Я, которое так же согласуется с требованием разума обобщать и различать, как понятия материи, времени, пространства, числа, жизни и т.д. Глубочайшее отличие этой обобщающей категории от других состоит в том, что ее общность иная, чем общность закона, это общность не третьего лица, мира объектов, а первого лица, “Я”, которое изнутри объединяет все личности, способные к самосознанию. Переживая свое “я” как “я”, мы одновременно входим в глубину взаимодействия с “Я” этого Всеобщего Существа. Именно Существа, а не отвлеченной, законобразной Сущности, хотя это существо, Бог, и может полагать определенные законы для всех, как наше человеческое “я” может полагать определенные правила для себя. Эта Универсальная Личность наполняет личным началом каждую личность изнутри, составляет условие и возможность ее бытия как личности.

Таким образом, наш достовернейший опыт бытия собой в сочетании с обобщающей и различающей деятельностью разума приводят нас к понятию Бога как

Вселичности, всеобщего “Я”, с которым каждое сознательное существо общается через свое внутреннее “я”, через действия своей совести, разума, воления. Вот почему я считаю свою веру в Бога совершенно разумной, столь же согласной и с опытом, и с разумом, как вера физика в элементарные частицы и вера биолога в естественный отбор. Но более обоснованной, чем вера атеиста в самодвижение духообразующей материи или в нравственный потенциал эгоистичного гена.

4. Персоналистический аргумент

Свой аргумент в пользу бытия Бога я назову персоналистическим. Он входит в семейство “трансцендентальных” умозаключений, которые были инициированы философией Канта. *Трансцендентальным* Кант называл “всякое знание, которое занимается не столько своими предметами, сколько способом их познавания, насколько этот способ познавания возможен *a priori”*, т.е. до всякого опыта.[5] К числу таких доопытных форм познания Кант относит, например, пространство и время. Мы не находим их в окружающих объектах, они накладываются на них самой нашей способностью познания, конструирующей все наблюдаемые объекты в формах пространства и времени.

К числу таких доопытных, я бы даже сказал, начальных, “доопытнейших” форм познания относится и то, что можно назвать субъективностью опыта. Эта субъективность не присутствует в объектах нашего познания, она не выступает как объект опыта, но составляет его начальное условие. Например, нигде вне себя мы не находим опыт горячего или холодного. Мы видим огонь, мы можем изучить химический процесс, происходящий при горении, разложить его на элементы, показать взаимодействие молекул и т.д., но нигде в самом огне мы не найдем то ощущение горячего, жгучего, обжигающего, который мы испытываем при его прикосновении. Условием ощущения горячего является наличие субъекта, способного его ощутить своей кожей, рецепторами, нервной системой. И даже если мы исследуем кожу, рецепторы, нервную систему, мы узнаем физиологический и химический процесс, вызывающий ощущение горячего, но мы не найдем в них самого этого ощущения. Горячее можно ощутить, лишь будучи субъектом этого ощущения, переживая его на себе, а не изучая его как объект.

Тем более нигде на свете, ни в каких объектах, мы не найдем того, что называется любовью, нежностью, жалостью, страхом, надеждой. Разумеется, есть музыкальные звуки или поэтические строки, которые передают нам эти чувства, испытанные другими. Но, рассматривая и исследуя эти звуки или строки, акустику звуковых волн или состав типографской краски, мы не найдем в них, как объектах, ничего похожего на наше чувство любви или нежности. Оно вообще не похоже ни на что видимое, осязаемое, предметное, оно, как чувство, принадлежит миру субъекта. Между мирами объектов и субъектов лежит граница, это два различных модуса бытия. Один описывается местоимением “что”, другой – “кто”. Про огонь можно спросить: *что* это? – и ответить на основе объективных научных знаний. Про чувство горячего может рассказать только тот, *кто* его пережил, кто причастен к нему как субъект. “Горячее, нежное, любящее” принадлежат субъекту опыта. Поэтому по сути неверно говорить: “я прикасаюсь к горячему”. Горячего нет до момента моего прикосновения. Я прикасаюсь к огню, к раскаленному

[5] Кант И. Критика чистого разума, Введение, VII.

утюгу, кипящей воде, перегретому мотору и т.д. Но горячими они становятся только в отношении к субъекту, который такими их переживает; поэтому "прикасаться к горячему" - это метонимия, переносящая результат опыта на его объект. Точно так же в мире объектов нет цветов: красного, синего, зеленого, - есть только определенные длины и частоты световых волн, углы их преломления и т.д. Но красными или зелеными эти свойства волн становятся только в восприятии субъектов, только в мире "кто". И это не лирическое, а строго физическое утверждение. "Тот или иной цвет "присваивается" человеком объекту в процессе зрительного восприятия этого объекта... (электро-магнитного излучения с длинами волн от 380 до 780 нм)".[6] Наш язык пронизан словами и терминами, которые обозначают не объективную реальность, а реальность ее восприятия, ту субъективность, которая задает условия опыта. Сам наш язык в основном трансцендентален, и понятно почему – ведь это *наш* язык, а не деперсонализированный язык приборов, автоматов, инструментов, электронных программ.

И тем не менее, несмотря на субъективность нашего языка и условий нашего опыта, мы хорошо друг друга понимаем, поскольку все мы, как люди, принадлежим к миру субъектов. Для всех нас (за исключением дальтоников) красное и зеленое выглядят примерно одинаково, сахар имеет сладкий вкус, а соль – соленый. Субъективность нашего опыта не препятствует его общезначимости. Просто эта общезначимость, общечеловечность раскрывается каждым изнутри себя, в модусе "кто", а не в модусе "что".

Но это означает, что у мира субъектов есть свое собственное основание, подобно тому, как есть оно и у мира объектов. Объектов превеликое множество: звезды, планеты, океаны, камни, деревья, слоны, муравьи... Но за ними раскрывается единство живой и неживой материи, всех этих бесчисленных "что", окружающих нас во вселенной. Наука все глубже проникает в природу вещества и находит основания материального единства вселенной в частицах, квантах, кварках, сильных и слабых взаимодействиях, гравитации, электромагнетизме, разного рода полях и энергиях. Но точно так же мы не можем не искать единого основания и у мира субъектов, которых тоже превеликое множество: живые и умершие, молодые и старые, мужчины и женщины, белые и черные, горожане и сельчане... Тем не менее у всех у них есть способность испытывать нечто внутри себя, через себя: теплоту и цвет, любовь и жалость, радость и горе. Внутри них совершается жизнь, которая открыта каждому только в глубине себя: поток мыслей, чувств, ощущений, намерений. Это и есть "царство Божие": оно внутри нас. Каждый из нас является самим собой для себя. Это свойство, индивидуальное для каждого и в то же время универсальное для всех субъектов.

Закономерно встает вопрос: каково же основание этой общности всех субъектов, всех людей (а возможно, и животных, если распространить на них свойство субъективности, чего мы в этой статье не будем обсуждать)? Если есть некое предельное "что" в мире объектов, как его ни называть (поле, вакуум, энергия), то должно быть и некое предельное "кто" в мире субъектов. Если ученые ищут некоего Сверхобъекта (элементарных частиц, суперструн и т.д.), который лежал бы в основании всего многообразного мира объектов и объяснял их свойства и поведение, то столь же законно искать и некоего Сверхсубъекта, который стоял бы в

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[6] Физический энциклопедический словарь. М.: Советская энциклопедия, 1983, С. 840.

основании нашей способности быть субъектами. Понятно, что это основание нашей субъективности само не может не быть субъектом, это не “что”, а “кто”, и его ктойность составляет условие нашей собственной *ктойности*, а не *чтойности*. Бытие этого Сверхсубъекта делает возможным и наше бытие как субъектов, а не только объектов (каковыми и мы являемся в мире объектов – телами среди других тел). Этот Сверхсубъект не может быть объектом нашего опыта, потому что он составляет условие нашей субъективности, он сам и есть субъективность, которая всем нам присуща, которая нас разделяет, замыкает в себе - и одновременно открывает навстречу друг другу, делает возможным выражение себя и восприятие другого, взаимопонимание, коммуникацию.

Конечно, можно считать, что есть только интерсубъективность, но нет никакой транссубъективности, никакого Сверхсубъекта. Но это все равно что считать, что есть отдельные взаимодействия между отдельными телами, а физических, химических и прочих законов не существует, все совершается от случая к случаю. Ударит мяч об стенку – отскочит; ударит одна машина о другую – отскочит или сломается; ударит метеорит о землю – оставит воронку. Нет законов о равенстве действия и противодействия, нет законов, определяющих меру упругости тел. Такой “магический” взгляд на отдельность, спонтанность, неупорядоченность отдельных явлений и взаимодействий возможен в донаучную эпоху, но именно наука и способствовала осознанию единства объектного мира и постижению его законов. Почему же естественная наука отказывает религии, богословским и гуманитарным дисциплинам в праве на постижение законов субъектного мира и на установление его связей со Сверхсубъектом, средоточием всякой субъективности?

Итак, сверхсубъект, в обыденном языке именуемый Бог, есть Кто, т.е. Личность как условие и предпосылка личностности как таковой, и поэтому – Абсолютная Личность, или Личностный Абсолют. Можно называть его также Перволичностью, Личностью личностей, Субъектом субъектов, Верховным Существом... В этом утверждении не больше догматизма или авторитаризма, чем в научных представлениях о каких-то последних основаниях материального мироустройства, об элементарных частицах, или квантах, или суперструнах и т.п. Познание этих объектных законов не ограничивает свободы человека, а напротив, делает его свободным преобразователем вселенной на основе ее познания. Так и познание самого себя, Себя в себе, т.е. внутреннее сообщение с Перволичностью, с Богом, с источником всякой субъективности, освобождает человека от рабства у внешнего мира и от сильных личностей, правителей мира сего.

Таково персоналистическое обоснование понятия о Боге как о Перволичности среди Личностей, основе всякой субъективности. Без Бога никто не мог бы вступать в отношение с *собой*, сказать о себе “*я*”, – не было бы того внутреннего пространства и времени внутри нас, которое заполнено бытием субъекта. Без Бога были бы только “они”: тела, объекты, их взаимодействия.

Конечно, возникает вопрос о том, является ли Бог и творцом этого мира объектов. Вопрос этот, как и все более конкретные теологические вопросы, выходит за рамки данной статьи, но вполне вероятно, что именно благодаря своей Субъектности, своей внеположенности объектам, Бог создает и мир объектов. Объектов не могло бы быть без Субъекта, который творит их, определяет их как объекты, самой природой своей субъективности. В Книге Бытия Бог творит небо и землю, отделяет сушу от воды, насаждает растения, создает животных и наконец че-

ловека, венец творения. При этом он осуществляет это своим словом и закрепляет это своим взглядом, т.е. способностью говорить и созерцать, свойственной лишь субъекту. Бог творит мир объектов не потому, что он сам составляет его часть, некий наибольший объект, а именно потому, что он, как Субъект, внеположен этому миру и, следовательно, делает его объективным, отделяя его от себя созидающим словом ("и сказал Бог") и отделяя себя от него остраняющим взглядом ("и увидел Бог, что это хорошо"). Объекты полагаются как объекты именно в своем отличие от Субъекта и благодаря его субъектности как творца.

Теперь немного об истории персоналистического аргумента. По сути, он столь же древен, как монотеизм, восходя к библейскому представлению о Творце. Когда Моисей спросил у Бога, какое Его имя он может передать народу, Бог сначала сказал: «Я ЕСМЬ КТО Я ЕСМЬ», затем сократил это имя до «Я ЕСМЬ» и наконец назвал Себя "Господь" (по-еврейски: Я-ве – имя, которое произносится так же, как и выражение "Я ЕСМЬ") (Исх. 3:13-14). Иными словами, собственное (не нарицательное) имя Бога: "Я Есмь Кто Я Есмь", т.е. бытие, которое само определяет себя в первом лице; Я, которое говорит о себе Я. Нарицательное имя "Бог", обозначающее некое существо в третьем лице, создает искаженное представление о том, что Бог – это Он. Польза этого слова лишь в том, что оно оберегает от произнесения всуе подлинного имени Бога, которым он сам назвал себя. Но любое доказательство бытия Бога, еще оно осуществляется внутри иудео-христианско-исламской традиции, должно исходить из самоопределения Бога как первого лица. По сути, даже не вполне верно доказывать, что Бог *есть*, и атеизм по-своему прав, утверждая, что Бог *не есть*. Он и в самом деле, не есть, а *есмь*, не как Он, а как *Я*. Таково персоналистическое доказательство истины, точнее, *есмины* Божьего бытия.

Эта "есмина", т.е. истина первого лица, входит в само существо откровения Бога о себе. И тем не менее ни одно из известных доказательств бытия Бога, в том числе те, с которыми полемизирует Докинз, не содержат этого аргумента от "первого лица", от самоопределения Бога как "Я есмь". Онтологический аргумент выводит бытие Бога из понятия максимального совершенства, которое включает в себя признак существования. Космологический аргумент ссылается на необходимость Первой Причины в цепи зависимых причин, наблюдаемых в мироздании. Телеологический аргумент ссылается на то, что в мироздании все подчинено единому плану и цели, все согласовано и взаимосвязано, что предполагает действие творящего разума. Кант убедил меня в слабости всех этих аргументов задолго до Докинза, который на Канта как раз не ссылается, - именно потому, что несостоятельность этих аргументов он хочет выдать за победу атеизма. У Канта на этот счет было другое мнение: его трансцендентальная философия создает возможность для совсем иных теологических аргументов, против которых атаки Докинза бессильны. Но Докинз, занятый опровержением Ансельма Кентерберийского (12-ый век) и его онтологического аргумента, до Канта так и не доходит. И в этом не только его вина. Но ни один из послекантовских мыслителей, насколько мне известно, не использовал последовательно персоналистический "аргумент от субъекта", который мог бы соединить кантовский трансцендентализм с самоопределением Я-ве как первого лица в Ветхом Завете.

Суть в том, что монотеизм изначально был обращен вглубь личности Творца, т. е. был еще и *интротеизмом* - *интровертным* теизмом. Представление о том, что Бог – это скорее Я, чем Он, было развито в немецкой мистике и филосо-

фии, в экзистенциальной теологии, от Кьеркегора до Бердяева. Приведу два двустишия немецкого мистика и поэта Ангелуса Силезиуса (1624–1677 гг.):

Ты смотришь в небеса? Иль ты забыл о том,
Что Бог не в небесах, а здесь, в тебе самом?!

Бог жив, пока я жив, его храня.
Я без Него ничто, но что Он без меня?!

Из русских философов мысль о Боге-Субъекте более всего важна для Н. Бердяева: "Бог действует в субъекте, а не в объекте. Объективированный мир есть безбожный и бесчеловечный мир. Объективация Бога есть превращение Его в безбожную и бесчеловечную вещь".[7] Мое коренное несогласие с гностически настроенным Бердяевым состоит в том, что я не считаю объективированный мир безбожным и бесчеловечным и, соответственно, не обличаю науку за то, что она занимается этим падшим миром.[8] Мир объектов соотносителен миру субъектов и возникает по одной с ним черте разделения. Ничто не мешает нам признать достоинство науки – и вместе с тем провести решительную черту между истиной, как она познается наукой, и *есминой*, как она открывается религии. *Ест*ественные науки изучают то, что есть, мир объектов, а *есм*ественные – мир субъектов, утверждающих свое "есмь". И кто сказал, что "есмь" – это менее полное и фундаментальное бытие, чем "есть"? Разве в системе лиц первое менее значимо, чем третье? Не случайно во всех языках оно называется "первым", начинает собой ряд лиц. Оно первое по значению и почести, потому что "я" – это местоимение, общее Богу и человеку, знак их совместной субъектности и отличия от всех тех, кто только "он" или "они". Вспоминается И. Фихте: "Таков человек; таков каждый, кто может самому себе сказать: Я – *человек*. Не должен ли он испытывать священного благоговения перед самим собой, трепетать и содрогаться перед собственным своим величием?"[9]

5. Персонализм в отличие от персонификации и персонального опыта

Следует предупредить против ложных отождествлений тео-персонализма с двумя схожими понятиями, которые также широко используются в теологии, но по сути имеют с ним мало общего: это "персонификация" и "персональный опыт". Персонализм не имеет ничего общего с "персонификацией" Бога как некоего мифического существа, то ли старца, восседающего на облаках, то ли всезнающей и всеблагой личности, с которой верующий собеседует как с мудрецом и наставником. Персонификация представляет Бога в третьем лице и тем самым создает о нем искаженное представление как о дирижере мировых процессов, как об инженере, диспетчере, наладчике, инспекторе вселенной. Персоналистический аргумент не персонифицирует Бога, а рассматривает его как глубину личности, в которую каждый из нас обращается, как в беспредельную глубину самого себя. Персонализм по сути противоположен персонификации, поскольку выступает как субъектно-трансцендентальный, а не объектно-натуралистический аргумент.

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[7] Бердяев Н. А. Я и мир объектов. Размышление II. Субъект и объективация. 2. Экзистенциальный субъект и объективация.

[8] "Наука со своей общеобязательностью есть познание объективированного и социализированного мира, в котором сообщение достигается при разобщенности людей, она предполагает минимальную общность людей" (Бердяев Н., цит. соч.).

[9] Фихте И. Г. Избр. сочинения. М., 1916. Т. 1. С. 404.

Персоналистический аргумент следует отличать также от аргумента, который называется “персональным опытом” и часто используется при доказательстве бытия Бога. Речь идет о религиозных видениях, прозрениях, переживаниях, которые имеют субъективный источник. “Многие верят в Бога, будучи убеждены, что они сами, собственными глазам, видели либо его, либо ангела, либо богоматерь в голубых одеждах. Иные слышат в своей голове увещевания”. (128) В главе “Доказательство от личного опыта” Докинз расправляется с этим аргументом ссылкой на галлюцинации, на “моделирующие способности мозга”, которому “ничего не стоит создать “видения” или “посещения”, почти не отличающиеся от реальности. Для программы такой сложности смоделировать ангела или Деву Марию – пара пустяков”. (131). Так-то оно так, но контраргумент Докинза не объясняет, почему видения разных людей, не знакомых друг с другом, являются именно в общей для них форме ангела или девы Марии, какая реальность стоит за таким совпадением. Здесь вообще хочется обратить внимание на абстрактность атеизма, который, вопреки своим присягам конкретному, объективному миросозерцанию, оперирует пустыми отрицательными формулами, типа “это иллюзия” и “то иллюзия”, не утруждаясь объяснением, почему она такая, а не другая, тогда как теология в высшей степени конкретно объясняет все атрибуты таких сверхъестественных опытов и видений.

Особенно затруднительно положение атеиста, когда он сталкивается с “массовым персональным” опытом, вроде видения в Фатиме, когда 70 тысяч паломников видели, как “солнце сорвалось с небес и упало на землю”. (133). Докинз признает трудность объяснения столь массовой “галлюцинации”, но настаивает, что еще труднее поверить в ее объективную истинность, поскольку нигде, кроме Фатимы: ни в Лиссабоне, ни в Мадриде, нигде на Земле не наблюдалось подобного падения Солнца и той катастрофы, которая могла бы за этим последовать. Но в таком доводе ощутим передерг, поскольку реальность, которая открывается подобного рода видениям, принадлежит иному плану, чем реальность физическая или астрономическая. Мало кто из тех, кого посетили ангелы или другие видения, возьмется доказывать свой персональный опыт методами естественных наук, так что Докинз здесь легко опровергает то, что и не подлежит доказательству.

И все-таки не следует отождествлять персоналистический аргумент с аргументом от “личного опыта”, поскольку последний подразумевает некое конкретное переживание или контакт со сверхъестественным, которое опять-таки “персонифицируется” в неких образах. Персоналистический аргумент может включать такого рода видения и переживания, но к ним не сводится и даже избегает их акцентировать, поскольку некоторые из них и впрямь могут быть галлюцинациями, да и вообще дело не в них. Бытие Бога открывается нам не только и не столько в исключительных, чудесных элементах нашего опыта, сколько в опыте бытия личностью, а этот опыт всегда с нами, хотим мы того или не хотим. Это не личный опыт сверхъестественного, а *сверхъестественность самого личного опыта*, в самых обычных, заурядных его формах, когда мы переживаем любовь, радость, тоску. Потому что этих рядовых чувств и ощущений нет нигде в мире, кроме как внутри нас самих и других личностей. Не нужно далеко идти за видениями ангелов – тот простейший факт, что мы видим солнечный свет и воспринимаем его как ослепительно яркий или видим весеннюю листву леса и воспринимаем ее как прозрачно-зеленую, - этот факт сам по себе есть доказательство того, что наряду с

объектами в мире присутствует субъектность. Персоналистический аргумент не аппелирует к каким-то особым прозрениям и откровениям, но исходит из самых повседневных и всеобщих оснований субъективного опыта.

Ни один ученый не станет отрицать, что законы бытия материи так же объективны, как и те объекты, в которых они проявляются; что число 5 объективно присуще определенным множествам объектов, хотя и не существует в виде отдельного физического или химического объекта. Точно так же ученый не имеет никаких оснований отрицать, что законы бытия личностей тоже личностны, т.е. могут быть представлены только в форме Субъекта, а не объекта или мегаобъекта. Таков персоналистический, или субъектно-трансцендентальный аргумент: он не ищет особых чудес, а исходит из "обыкновенного чуда" самой субъективности, которая входит неведомо откуда в мир объектов и преображает их как своим восприятием, так и действием.

* * *

Следовательно, религия вправе ожидать от науки такого же признания и почтения, какое наука оказывает самой себе Я полагаю, что трансцендентальный, персоналистический аргумент очень важен для того, чтобы провести точную демаркацию между ведомствами науки и религии, без ущерба для той или другой. В той мере, в какой религия объективизирует и натурализует Бога, она притязает на место науки – и сама подставляет себя под ее удар. Атеизм естественных наук оказывается обратной стороной натуралистической теологии. Именно перед лицом нового атеизма, нападающего на натуралистическую теологию от имени натуральных наук, важно очистить теологию от какого бы то ни было натурализма и четко обозначить ее трансцендентальную сферу.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 343-351

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The Crushed Nightingale[1]*:* Passio secundum Slavoj♣

Critical review essay on Slavoj Žižek, *The Monstrosity of Christ: Theology and Revolution,* tr. into Serbian by D. Maljković, Revelation, Belgrade 2008.[2]

> „The unspiritual (psihikòs!) man does not receive the gifts of the Spirit of God, for they are folly (moría) to him, and he is not able to understand them because they are spiritually discerned (pneumatikōs anakrínei)" (1Cor 2, 14).
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> „Now we know that you have a demon (daimónion). Abraham died, as did the prophets; and you say, 'If anyone keeps my word, he will never taste death (thánaton)'" (Jn 8, 52).

1. The gaze of a drained *Christ* (a 'post-passio Christi') reaching foreward from the cave of the sepulcre, as suggested by Albrecht Dürer (indicatively chosen by the book designer): that staring melancholy of the living *yet* non-resurrected Godman (resembling a zombie: living dead), as encountered on the cover page of the new book by Slavoj Žižek, opens his contribution to recycling the Nietzschean (somewhat Dostoyevskian[3]) theme of 'death of God'.

The 'Gott is tot' debate had run its course during the seventies of the previous century (Th. J. J. Altizer and others[4]). Nevertheless, the 'return' of religion' (R. Schaeffler[5]) in a post-bipolar world of globalization is a fact which elicits 'new' reactions of philosophy. The reactions take form of a 'theological turn' (L. Boeve[6]). This turn, however,

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[1] The Slavic personal name Slavoj = Slavoi may be taken to signify *glory* (slava), a *slav* belonging to the corpus of Slavdom, or the bird *nightingale* (slavuj).

♣ Alia signa: page references are given in brackets, according to the Serbian original edition of the study by Slavoi Žižek, abbreviated thus = M. The asterisk (*) signifies our italics in quotes.

[2] The Belgrade publisher Otkrovenje (Revelation) received this text conceived by Žižek to have its premier appearance in Serbian language. This book is followed by a somewhat unexpected debate abroad, between Žižek and Milbank, v. C. Davis (ed.) – S. Žižek, J. Milbank, *The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic*, Short circuits, MIT Press, 2009. John Milbank challenges the views of Žižek, albeit very charitably (still, in clear disagreement with the Slovenian philosopher).

[3] Let us mention the works of Dostoyevsky in which one finds pre-Nietzschean 'death of God' motifs. For instance in *The Karamazov Brothers* (1880) or *The Demons* (1872).

[4] Th. J. J. Altizer and W. Hamilton, *Radical Theology and the Death of God*, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis 1966. From the wing of Orthodox thinkers v. Ch. Yannaras, „An Orthodox Comment on 'The Death of God'", Sobornost, Winter 1966 = idem in A. M. Allchin (ed.), *Orthodoxy and the Death of God*, 1971, 40-49. – O. Clément, „Purification by Atheism", in *Orthodoxy and the Death of God*, 33-34.

[5] R. Schaeffler, „Orientierungsaufgaben der Religionsphilosophie", in P. Koslowski (Hg.), *Orientierung durch Philosophie*. *Ein Lerhrbuch nach Teilgebieten*, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1991.

[6] L. Boeve, „Negative Theology and Theological Hermeneutics", Journal of Theology and Scripture, 3:2 (2006) 1-13.

refers not to a 'theologisation' of philosophy. It rather indicates a rethematisation of the relation philosophy is to have towards the *question* of the other: particularly religion and God. This is clearly apparent in view of a 'post-secular' (Ph. Blond[7]) positioning of philosophy *itself* (which, inter alia, is bringing to mind the eruptivity of Islamic fundamentalism[8], tidal day-dreamings of New Age esoterism, affirmation of detraditionalized forms of Christianity, but also a certain exhaustion of analitical thought in categories of 'this-worldliness'). Žižek joins the debate in vigorous fashion[9]. As we know, particularly in the last 10-15 years, this dispute and reflection has enjoyed popularity (even a vogue of sorts) in circles of distinguished philosophers (J. Caputo, G. Vattimo, S. Quinzio, J.-L. Nancy[10]: although it is mainly to Derrrida and Levinas that the impetus is ascribed, and to 'some' conveniently forgotten *others*).

The study by Žižek, if that is what one is to call it, posits the task of reflecting the relation between *theology and revolution*. This reflection is to be contextualized in view of the event of Christ. The Christ event „releases us from our greatest fear – the fear of death" (M 6). *Although* the Gospel (Christ and his apostles) says something *else*. Namely, the deed of Christ is not liberation from 'fear' of death, but liberation *from death as such* (Jn 5, 24; Jn 11, 4; Acts 2, 24 etc. [11]). Be that as it may, Žižek lets us know that his study is „… a *modest** plea for a Hegelian reading of Christianity" (M 9). The basic ambition follows the line of uniting the emancipatory potential of Christianity with a neo-revolutionary organizing of individuals (in 'con[in]spiration' with Marx's theory of de-alienation, perhaps in 'con[in]spiration' with Latin American 'theology of liberation' [R. Alves], although no mention of it is made). The soldiers of freedom and love are to unite a *deed-worthy love of Christ* with *revolt* against the reifying order of the 'Big Other'. For this Other holds the strings of all social-economical and *metaphysical* power in its infallible 'hands' (also targeted are the globalist tyranny of neoliberal capitalism, the order of mystifying forms of religion and condescendingly conformist apparitions of quasi-atheism).

2. In order to formatize all of that into a theoretical-ideological and political-pragmatical 'programme', it is necessary to give up Christianity, *except* that form of Christianity invoked by *Žižek*. It is for those reasons also that one finds the theological argumentation of the work falling apart. The fissures follow lines of loose stitches of the current of this book. In ultima linea, the argument resurfaces as a gesture of decisionist *voluntarism* (which is not to be conflated with Žižek's appeal for 'pure voluntarism' of free decision to confront 'historical necessity' and gear against the order of the 'Big Other'

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[7] Ph. Blond (ed.), *Post-Secular Philosophy – between Philosophy and Theology*, Routledge, 1998. – M. Kopić, *Izazovi post-metafizike*, KZ Z. Stojanovića, Novi Sad 2007.

[8] For Žižek's views on Islam, v. S. Žižek, „A Glance into the Archives of Islam", Lacan dot com, 2006; idem, „What's Wrong with Fundamentalism?: With or Without Passion", Lacan dot com, Fall 2005; idem, „What's Wrong with Fundamentalism?: Move to the Underground", Lacan dot com, Fall 2005.

[9] As illustration of Žižek's own 'theological turn', v. S. Žižek, *The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For?*, Verso, London 2000; idem, *On Belief*, Routledge, London 2001; idem, „Less Love, More Hatred! – or, why it is worth fighting for the Christian legacy" (Serbian = idem, Manje ljubavi – više mržnje! Ili, zašto je vredno boriti se za hrišćansko nasledje, tr. R. Mastilović, Beogradski krug, Beograd 2001); idem, *The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity*, MIT Press, Cambridge – Massachusetts 2003. .

[10] Jeffrey W. Robbins (ed.), J. D. Caputo, G. Vattimo, *After the Death of God*, Columbia UP, New York 2007.

[11] Let us hear someone more closely connected to the matter: „Truly, truly, I say to you, he who hears my word and believes him who sent me, has eternal life; he does not come into judgement, *but has passed from death to life**" (Jn 5, 24)… Many other Gospel loci flow in similar vein.

which – having written us off[12] – is driving the world into catastrophy, through the inner surge of history itself (M 5).

On one hand, the 'dialogue' with Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholicism (and even Protestantism) is taken through a simulated inscenation – sub specie Žižek. The dialogue range takes us through material errors[13] of an enthusiastic neophyte via tendentious[14] interpretations of doctrines of the Church, reaching finally, for instance, a moment of moving physiognomic inquisitiveness (in-quisitio) – where the *face* of Pope Benedict XVI is likened to 'that of a vampire'[15] MC 147).

On the other hand, what Christianity *should be*, and become, he reduces through the voice of Hegel (vox populi). Hegel's voice, however, is travested by means of a (post)hegelian-lacanian *non-dialectical monologue* of Žižek about the event of Christ. Žižek refers the reader to many, many other things and persons. These are to serve as illustrations of the work of his (anti)theses, or antithetic thought: from quantum physics to hermetic 'theology' of Eckhart, from 'post-metaphysical idealism' to neo-materialist ontology of A. Badiou[16], from leaps into film analysis to psychoanalysing postmodern literature, etc.etc. However, none of these devices alter the fact *that* his interpretation of Hegel's thesis as total and necessary death of the transcendent God (the death *coinciding* with the death of the Son on the Cross) is posited as an *axiom* which is not questioned (for it is an axiom): „The axiom of this essay is stated as follows: *there exists only one** philosophy which has fully thought through the consequences of these three words (= He was created as Man BL) – Hegel's idealism..." (M 10).

Axiomatization of theses, imperative tone of apodictic beliefs, the pomp of sophistic tricks out of sleeves of post-structuralist 'dialectics' of lacanism-hegelianism,

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[12] In relation to this the following may be consulted: S. Žižek, „The Free World... of Slums", In These Times, September 23, 2004.

[13] Let us refer to an rather self-assured statement according to which „The key question is the following: what is the relation between the essence and its manifestations (energies, economy) towards the difference between essence (as substantial nature) and person, between *ousia* and *hypostasis* (hegelianistically: between substance and subject)? *Orthodoxy is unable to recognize these two distinctions**:* God is Person precisely and *only** in his manifest form" (M 20-21). In other words, Orthodox theology (which has been doing 'nothing else' but reflecting the synthesis of those two distinctions) is to blame because it does not regard the Personhood of God as possible only within a historicized concept of incarnation which severs any possibility for a pre-eternal and pre-incarnational subsistence of the Person(s) of the Divine Godhead. Apart from the lecturing tone of Žižek (as manifest in the given quote), it strikes us as somewhat odd to take *one* book (perhaps two) from the corpus of Orthodox theology, that of Vladimir Lossky, and to deem oneself knowledgeable enough to absolve the spiritual and theoretical work of Eastern Christendom as such. Besides, the study Žižek referes to (M 15 n. 10), namely Lossky's *In the Image and Likeness of God* (= *A l'image et à la ressemblance de Dieu*, Paris 1967) [SŽ cit. the SVSP 2001 edition], is more of a propedeutical work, not on the scale of his more academically formatted works – to which no reference is made, apart from a brief derogatory remark on Lossky's engagement vis-à-vis the theology of Meister Eckhart (idem, *Teologie Negative et Connaissance de Dieu Chez Maitre Eckhart*, Paris 1960). Moreover, *even if* his best work had been (more) seriously consulted, if at all (i.e. *Essai sur la Theologie Mystique de l' Eglise d'Orient*, Paris 1944), it remains as fact that Lossky is not the only relevant author amongst modern Orthodox theologians reflecting this problematic. Hence the problem of generalised reasoning from one instance… Let us leave aside the blank left in Žižek's erudition relating to the patristic corpus of the Fathers of East Christendom…etc.etc.

[14] In a study arguing for the definite death of God, one is not surprised (although somewhat dismayed) if the following locus, or similar loci, are not mentioned at all, and brushed over: „But when Jesus heard it he said: 'This illness is not unto death; it is for the glory of God, so that the Son of God may be glorified by means of it'" (Jn 11, 4).

[15] For further reading, v. S. Žižek, „The Pope's Failures", In These Times, April 8, 2005.

[16] For further reading, v. S. Žižek, „Psychoanalysis and Post-Marxism: The Case of Alain Badiou", The South Atlantic Quaterly, Durham, Spring 1998.

feeding on dialectisized antithetic and on parallax, provisional juggling with biblical text and theological topoi (loci theologici), pastiche and bricollage and copy-paste cesures: this galimatias of erudition, including contingencies of the spectacle of history and culture – all of that, however, is 'unessential' in comparison with what is essential. Namely, in comparison to the Hegelian viewpoint of Žižek, asserting that *God has irretrievably and irreversibly died in Christ*, that Christ too has died on the Cross, that the *death* of Christ *is* resurrection[17]. In other words, there is no other-worldly (transcendent) Christ for us *here and now*, as is thought and predicated by the Church. Neither is there any eschatological event of the coming of resurrected Christ-Church (erhómenos) in glory. Here is what is 'overcome' (ukinuto) in Christianity, as seen by the Slovenian thinker: „*… the Divine substance itself* (*God as Thing in itself*) *is overcome: negated* (*the substantial figure of transcendent God dies on the Cross*), *but simultaneously affirmed is the transsubstantialized form of the Holy Spirit, the community of believers which exists only as a virtual premise of action of finite individuals*" (M 65).

3. The „Holy Spirit" is projected as a membrane of integrated traces of the death of transcendent God (*Father and Son*). The trace of that death is actualized by the 'association of believers' who – traversing the path of revolution, without interest or sentiment – live-out the consequences and investments of absolute and non-inreturnable Love of Christ. This para-ecclesial 'community of the Holy Spirit' exists only and in so far as one believes in it. Therefore, it is *virtual*. Insofar, then, the 'Holy Spirit' is virtual too. 'It' (ono), as Žižek likes to name it, takes the positive side of the negative face of the death of Christ. This death is offered as the power of heroic life hic et nunc, *without the transcendence of resurrection* and *against the resurrection of all transcendents* of the Big Order of the Other. *Neither* does Žižek advocate any transcendent immanence of God 'in' the world. On the contrary: he wants the virtual community of believers to coincide to the revolutionary party *without* any teleology of Knowledge and Power guaranteed by the grand narrative of 'truth'. Whether this metanarrative belongs to the Big Other of God or Big Other of the Party is irrelevant on this level. The rosarium of 'better future', however, is not to be found 'outside' or 'a head' of historical reality, for the rose of de-alienation is to be found hammered into the heart of the cross of *this* here reality (M 137-138). Since All-mighty God is dead, since the omniscient Party is dead: *since* we find ourselves on the other side of transcendent and immanent, and yet on this side of grand goals of 'Truth (and) History' (goals that have collapsed between the Inquisition,

[17] In contrast to such a statement, let us, once more, underline that death – at least according to Orthodox Christian ecclesial-biblical and spiritual tradition – is an *ontological epiphenomenon of sin*. In other words, it is a spiritual disease caused by voluntary falling-out from living in God and with the Saviour = „… as sin came into the world through one man and *death through sin**, and so death spread to all men because all men sinned…" (Rom 5, 12-21; 6, 16). That death is not the same as resurrected life is witnessed to by the Holy Scripture of New Testament in more than one location: through the mouth of apostles, but also by Lord Jesus Christ himself, for instance:, „… I say to you, there are some standing here who will not taste death before they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom" (Mt 16, 28; Mk 9, 1; Lk 2, 26; 9, 27), or: „For if we have been united with him in death like his, we shall certainly be united with him in resurrection like his" (Rom 6, 5); „For the wages of sin is death, but the free gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Rom 6, 23) etc.etc. – Let us reiterate, Žižek is silent on these testimonies. His silence is overarched only by the self-assured stubbornness with which he defies the word of the Lord, 'deathifying' (thanatizing) Jesus Christ to suit his ends. Jesus Christ as the very gift of non-mortalizable Life, or fore*taste* of eternal life – „For we know that Christ being raised from the dead will never die again; *death no longer has dominion over him*" (Rom 6, 9) etc.etc.

Gulag, Pol Pot and Abu Ghraib[18]) – what is left, so to speak, are the *fist and love* or the fist of love generated from the *phantom* of para-ecclesial community which recognizes the death of Christ (in form of power of sacrificial love) as the *action of it own gathering* in name of radical de-alienating emancipation of the world of globo-corporativity[19].

The Christianity of the apostles, thinks Žižek, *already* 'reifies' the event of love. That is to say, the realisation of charity they eschatologize into an object of desire, i.e. the Kingdom 'to come'. He restates the message of Christ, albeit paraphrastically: „When love is amongst two of you, I shall be there"[20]. Such a view, should we stress, betrays a 'keeping silent' or simple ignorance, perhaps inexperience, in relation to the witness of Church already *being* that event. Although, as Oscar Cullman remarked, this event '*already is* here, but not yet'. Be that as it may, Slavoj underlines that in the gathering of emancipatory individuals around the gift of love „lies the kernel of the 'eternal idea' of the emancipatory Party" (M 138) – the love for striking-out notwithstanding. Previously, using the *impersonal* neuter gender (neutrum), Žižek declares: „... *it organizes itself*" (M 138). This 'it' – namely, the immortal dimension of man „which riffles cannot kill": i.e., the 'Spirit' – this 'it' (by allusion to Terminator 2 likened to the indestructible amorphous slime that „stubbornly" re-constitutes itself) Žižek recognizes as the core of the Eucharist. He than asks: „Is not what we believers eat at communion – the Body (bread) and blood (vine) of Christ – precisely that same *formless reminder** – 'that which they [Roman soldiers] can never kill'" (M 135). Well…

4. What is the programme of (non)mortalisable members of the (non)mortalisable Party of the death of God and (non)mortalisable Spirit of this party (which can be mortalised [terminated] by members only if all of them wish it – *they*, heroes of responsibility before the world, *bearing the Cross* of death of God: the *Cross of death* of all guarantees)? According to our neo-communist nostalgist[21] of philosophy in transition, Žižek, the counter-capitalist road leads not through agitation for instruments of corporative mediation and decentralizing power (syndicates, profession-groups, solidarity aliances etc., as proposes John Milbank). „Why do we not take as our goal to recognise the Rose in the Cross of 'strict socialist dictatorship'", asks proposingly Žižek (M 138). There are more than a few reasons for displaying reserve towards such a seemingly genuine option (if James will pardon our allusion). Milbank himself (referred to by Žižek, M 138) elucidates one of the reasons for caution: „... in a strict socialist dictatorship 'mere wishes' are banned, which beneficially leads to a release from privacy of candid love towards demands of the autonomous law of morality" (M 138). In other words, soc-dictatorship of the virtual party of 'Spirit' would posit a *substantialist* determination of freedom, not a negative one. This means: it would be determined – normatively-penalisingly? – *what we should do*, not only what we should not do.

And *who is to say* what we should, 'and therefore' *must* do? *What kind of man is prophesized* by this 'revolutionary Christianity'? That may be ascertained from a curi-

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[18] S. Žižek, „What Rumsfeld Doesn't Know That He Knows About Abu Ghraib", In These Times, May 21, 2004.

[19] This viewpoint finds its analogy in other works, where Žižek is engaged in favour of *re*-politicising politics as such, or enhancing the politicisation of the economic sphere – against a 'post-political' world of late capitalism.

[20] „For where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them" (Mt 18, 20).

[21] S. Žižek, „Can Lenin Tell Us About Freedom Today?", Lacan dot com, 2001.

ous confession by Žižek himself. Sitting in the grave of his living dead[22] Christ, enthroned (à la locum tenens) in the seat of Absolute spirit, marching in the bullet-shoes of Che Gevara, calculating with an implicit De Sade, biting the clockwork orange of Burgess, discarding sentimentalism that balances considerations of „feeling the insideness of others", indicating at post-exchange and post-sacrificial (i.e. non-inreturnable and absolutely pure [in-considerate]) *antimoralist ethics* (M 147) – Žižek states what he would like to be like: „... an ethical monster without sympathy, to do what must be done in inverted (uvrnutom) overlapping of blind spontaneity and reflective distance, helping others, avoiding their repulsive proximity. If there were more people like this, the world would be a pleasant place, where sensitivity (osećajnost) would be replaced by cold and cruel passion" (M 157). The 'pleasance' of fire in such elegant ice does not infuse us with enthusiasm to joint the path of the party of believers of Spirit, preparing the dictatorship of helping others in the name of Jesus Christ. Even if these be words of a small comrade (modest brother: micro[br]other) of the old Big Comrade, or (Br)other. Decisionist interpretations of Christianity, usurpations of the word of Church – impostering 'in the name' of the virtual emancipatory Party of 'the' people (this time the people of 'God'): spinning theologumena and spannering theology of Christ, finally conflate into a dictate of the Comrade *or* the Spirit – *Comrade Spirit*.

Before and after, the somewhat simulated discussion with traditions and sources of Christianity in effect makes the 'philosophical theology' of the book remain *outside* the theology of the Book, *outside* the community of salvation. This simulation, before and after, on purpose or accidentally, deforms the dogmatical (not necessarily dogmatist) foundations of the teachings of the Church of *Christ*: through a 'desubstantialization' of the Trinity, 'depersonalization' of the Father, 'subordination' of Father and Son to the *construct* of virtual Spirit, demasking Slavoj as neo-pneumatomachist, hence an ecclesiomachist, and finally, through the thesis on *mortality* of Christ he becomes a neo-theopaschist and neo-theothanatist, etc.etc.–however, 'in the name of Christ'. It does not cross

[22] Žižek has written a praise-worthy contribution against 'normalization' of techniques terrorizing terror suspects in army bases of the US (Guantanamo Bay, for instance). The New York Times has entitled Žižek's piece as follows: „Knight of the Living Dead" (The New York Times 24.03.2007). The metaphor aludes to the shocking status of Arabs, and other anti-american Muslims, being efficiently intimidated by the officials of the US military – through so called water boarding. Hence the prisoners (suspended in legal limbo) remind us of the *living dead* (also being a curious remnant of the figure of the 'homo sacer' (viz G. Agamben = biologically alive yet legally bereft of any recognition or protection from the legal system). – Let us add: the culturology of the 'zombie' = 'living dead' may be traced to its birthplace in film pop-culture. The critical potential behind such an idea is introducing the 'zombie' as twofold figure. Namely, (a) as criticism of contemporary mass-consumptive society (consumers strolling down shopping molls like zombies) *which* by means of 'autopilot' conditioning of masses connects them into a repressively de-sublimating regime of buying and selling life as commodity or spectacle, and (b) as suggestion of a certain 'un-holiness' or occult dimension of *massive loss of consciousness* and responsibility before the challenges of modern civilisation, which transforms man into a megaphone of adversary and irrational forces. – Our point, now, is as follows: what is done in Guantanamo Bay by interrogators to 'living dead' prisoners, in a bizarre yet perceivable analogical metaphor, is done by Žižek *to Christ* (bona fide, of course). His Christ is 'alive' (or 'dead') and simultaneously 'dead' (or 'alive'): due to destruction of protective life-lines of the *minimum* of biblical, ecclesial and theological exegesis and spiritual reflexion as based on *the Church*. Denying to Christ his own resurrection (denying the witness of the apostles, including Christ Himself) reminds one of the very techniques which Žižek finds so repulsive. Namely, the techniques by means of which the victims are denied not only of air, but of any *word* – except the one dictated by the 'transcendental a priori' of water boarding. In the case under scrutiny, these are the statements ordered by 'advanced interrogation techniques' of Hegelian-Lacanian water boarding or spirit washing… For Žižek on Agamben, v. idem „Homo Sacer as the Object of the Discourse of the University", Lacan dot com, 2003.

the mind of Žižek that the *spiritual experience* of the mystical-eucharstic *life* (and toil) in Christ as Church has anything to teach *him*. He betrays touching oblivion to the possibility *that* 2000 years of *spiritual analysis* of grace-imbued and grace-lacking thought, *that* spiritual institutions of ecclesial life, possibly, discern his type of speculation – when God is at stake – as *hyper-discursive self-delusion* (plani, illusio spiritualis, prelest).

5. In accord to his condition, or manner, he appends 'annexes' to formative sentenes of early Christianity. Thus the insight of Irenaeus of Lions according to whom „God has made himself man in order for man to make himself God"[23], after some editing by Žižek, reads as follows: „God has made Himself man in order for man to make himself God *who has made himself man*" (M 18). Žižek braves himself in favour of such an interpolation. It is to serve his emphasis that the *hominization of Divinity is a necessity*. It also serves to underscore that *man* in flesh and blood (dirtiest mud referred to by Celsus[24], let us say, or viscera referred to by Porphyry[25]) is in a *constitutive* sense *necessary to God for God to be God*. However, *that* man must be a Son of *God* (the son Jesus). But, since that man died on the Cross, and he *is no more*, *except* in form of the organisation of believing Žižekians, what is to prevent us from decoding Žižek's annex as follows: „God has made himself Žižek in order for Žižek to make himself God *who made himself Žižek*". By means of the referred to propositions on the *necessity* of a 'monstrous' (das Ungeheure[26]) God in the flesh of the concrete (in function of realization of God himself) Žižek develops the thesis of the philosophy of religion of Hegel.

Moreover still, in doing so he – nolens-volens – inaugurates *kabbalistic and-or hermetic* roots of the mind of *German* philosophical idealism. That is to say, according to the *Kabbalah* the same holds as valid: God *necessarily needs man* in order to gain self-cognisance and *become God* (the addition by Hegel that this man has to be the *Son* of God does not change anything as regards the proposition on the *necessity* of God alienating himself into the Son or Godman or man). This 'kabbalistic' strand of German philosophy, it seems, has been rather down-played by the official academy (despite significant interest and notable contributions). Attempts at rehabilitating academic interest and serious exploration (consequences notwithstanding), have been somewhat bypassed (or kept within isolated specialist walls of silence, scattered or oppressed by the *main stream*). Notable exceptions, as indicators of a changing climate, do exist however. We refer to just one fine and masterful study, i.e. Glenn A. Magee, *Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition* 2001 – Magee bravely swimming against the prevalent current of, let us say, 'purist' reading of German idealism. Such connections, the suggestion of an 'occult' undercurrent to 'pure' reason, seem as blasphemy, or silly trifles to an 'enlightened' consciousness formatized in Marxian, leftist Hegelian or secularist mode. For it is common-sensically expected (one is trained *not to* seek anything else) that at least Hegel –

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[23] The famous statement is given by the Bishop of Lions in his *Adversus haereses*, PG 7, 1120. Other church fathers share the insight as well. For example: St Athanasius, *De incanatio Verbi*, 54, PG 25, 192 B. – St Gregory Nazianzus, *Carmina dogmatica*, 10, 5-9, PG 37, 465. – St Gregory of Nyssa, *Oratio catechetica*, 25, PG 45, 65 D. Blessed Augustine also, stating: „Factus est Deus homo, ut homo fierit Deus", St Augistine, *Sermo 13 de tempore*, PL 39, 1097.

[24] Celsum, *Alethês Lógos*, II, 2, 36, cf. H. Lietzmann, (Hg.) *Kleine texte für theologische und Philologische Verlesungen und Übungen*, Otto Glockner, Bonn 1924, III, 42, 18.

[25] Porphyry, *Contra christianos*, frag. 77, in Adolf von Harnack (ed.), *Abhandlungen der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Berlin, 1916, 93.

[26] Žižek refers to this Hegelian locus also in his essay: S. Žižek, „Hegel - Chesterton: German Idealism and Christianity", The Symptom, 7 (2006) at Lacan dot com.

the emperor of labour of the Concept (Begriff) – is inoculated against hermeticism and *occult currents of Talmud exegesis*[27]. However, the *Kabbalah* is precisely *that*. Further still, precisely that *is* found (that *also*) in the speculative thematisation of the God – man relation in Hegel. Nothing essentially changes in hermetic *receptions of the Kabbalah in the West* (e.g. Christian Kabbalism). And Žižek does give plentiful room to kabbalistic enthusiasts Eckhart and Boehme (let us not forget, Hegel de facto endorses Boehme[28] as *father* of German philosophy[29]). However, Žižek does not ponder on what is a fingertip away: namely, on the *massively heterodox flux* of Kabbalistic spirit (permeating Hegel through speculative influence [Einfluss] especially of the mentioned two, Eckhart and Boehme). Rather, Slavoj interprets Eckhart to his own ends[30], blissfully comfortable in the midst of the 'Eckhart – Hegel – Lacan' alliance praying, or playing for favours at the feet of Lord Jesus Christ.

Let us repeat: Žižek is only a hair's length away from scrutinizing the mystery of, let us say, *German kabbalistic idealism* (which – at a deeper level – subsists as *philosophical reception of occult traditions* [= Kaballah] *of Judaism*[31]). *This opaqueness* (occult) is 'almost' brought into self-apprehension or self-perception by the Slovenian radical. If that were thought through, *that* might have been a sui generis 'negation of the negation' of self-transparent and allegedly non-occult Mind of German Philosophy. All of *that* might be, furthermore, taken as a bizarre although unwanted *result* (parallax[32] side-effect?) of his Lacanian re-actualization of German idealism (a result also of the thesis that truth of something is always already outside of that something). However, the book does not dwell further on the massive heterodoxy of kabbalism and hermeticism – on *that* abyss, Abgrund or *Schacht* – in the roots of Hegel (and Hegelian readings of Christianity) *since* it, the book itself, is a flagrant non-orthodox expositio fidei (*De fide hetero-Orthodoxa*).

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[27] For a propedeutic account v. G. Scholem, *Jewish Gnosticism, Merkvah Mysticism and Talmudic Tradition*, Ktav, New York ¹1960.

[28] For an in-depth account of the relation of Boehme to the Kabbalistic tradition see the referential, and in many ways still solid study by Howard Brinton, *The Mystic Will*, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1930. Also instructive: Andrew Weeks, *Boehme: An Intellectual Biography of the Seventeenth-Century Philosopher and Mystic*, SUNY, Albany 1991.

[29] Boehme, the philosophus teutoniscus, as Hegel calls him, is endorsed as follows: „… the German cobbler of Lusatia, of whom we have no reason to be ashamed. It was, in fact, *through him that philosophy first appeared in Germany with a character peculiar to itself**…". Hegel does add that Boehme was „a barbarian", for he was not able to overcome the representational and sensuous element in thinking. Nevertheless, Hegel is clear: the 'depth' of Boehme makes for the fecund source of German philosophy. – G. W. F. Hegel, „Jakob Böhme", in idem, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Bd. 3 (Werke 20), Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/aM 1971, 91 et passim. – Furthermore, let us add briefly, Boehme was under influence of the Kabbalah *through* his friend kabbalist Balthasar Walter (who initiated Boehme into the secrets of the sephirot and other), but also under influence of hermeticism (via Paracelsus). Further: R. H. Hvolbel, „Was Jakob Böhme a Paracelsian?", Hermetic Journal, 19 (1983) 6-17. – J. Mills, „Hegel on the Unconscious Soul", Science et Esprit, 52:3 (2000) 321-340, et alia.

[30] Žižek refers to the Kabbalah scholar Gershom Sholem in order to clarify developments by Echkart and Boehme of essentially Kabbalistic elements, i.e. the idea of creation ex nihilo, pure nihilo, nothingness negating itself, etc.etc. However Žižek takes it as a matter of fact – it seems – that the Kabbalah and German philosophy share a mutual in(t)er-relationship, Kabbalah being the originating source for many cardinal speculative figures, concepts and ideas…For Sholems account, v. G. Sholem, *On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism*, tr. R. Manheim, Schocken Books, New York ¹1965 (Žižek cites from the Meridian Books edition, New York 1978).

[31] Some might find the possibility of such ties as rather unpleasantly *ironic*.

[32] On the parallax perspective of viewing things: S. Žižek, *The Parallax View*, MIT Press, Cambridge – Massachusetts 2006. Also v. idem, „Henning Mankell, the Artist of the Parallax View", Lacan dot com, 2004.

6. Hegel: not Heidegger, not even Nietzsche[33], realizes the philosophical side of the mystery of the death of God. Žižek claims that the emancipatory party of Spirit (which he heralds in the name of Hegel) is precisely what Nietzsche had in mind when, in *Gay science* of 1882, he exclaimed: Gott ist tot. But „the book which does not contain a counter-book is to be deemed incomplete", states Slavoj, in acceptance of the dictum given by J. L. Borges[34]. A paradigm of the assertion of Borges, as discovers R. Piglia, is given in a story by Anton Tchekov: „A man goes into a casino in Monte Carlo, he wins a million, he leaves for home, *and kills himself*" (M 67). Does the book written by Žižek have a counter-book (contra-libro)? The answer is *yes*. The primary book is: „Žižek arrives into Christianity, wins the priceless treasure of sacrificial Love = Christ, *and kills the resurrection of Christ*". For him this is a definite matter, fait accompli: „... *there is no turning back**, all that […] really exists, from now onwards, are individuals" (M 65). Therefore, the counter-book 'inside' this book by Žižek is its *atheism* („materialist 'theology'").

The counter-book we have in mind is not a 'surprising' sentence or turn at the 'end' of the book (viz. „he won a million *and* killed himself). It is something other. Namely – the *atheism of the prima facie protheistic discourse of Žižek's theology itself*, being ciphered as a matter of fact exposition of the death of God – an exposition simulated in this book as 'Christology'. He talks of Hegel's *Christology*, of Hegel as *Christian* philosopher. However, he does this *in* terms of de-ecclesialised and demythologized Christianity of Hegel himself, tuned in Žižekian key. This tone, as his brand of potestas clavium, makes its concordance in the following confession, where Žižek (identifying violence, emancipation and grace) bluntly declares: „... I shall easily imagine a situation in which I would be ready, without any reprimand of conscience, to kill someone in cold blood" (although, to be honest, he has in mind 'doctors' who check-up on prisoners in order to make sure the forlorn victims may endure torture *short of death*, in the incarcerations of the system[35] M 155).

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If the Father and Son are 'negated' (ukinuti), if facts of biblical and ecclesial witness of the resurrection event as fulfillement of the drama of the Cross are *ignored*, if resurrection is *reduced* to the *Cross*, *then* what kind of God is at hand, unless God is that naked left-over (virtual residuum) – *that is*, the Spirit of the first (most likely the last) member of the emancipatory Party? If that is so, the matter will not advance further than a carnevalization of the death of God in the name of gods of that death: for whom the avant-garde is represented by *Žižek*: a doppelgänger face which (let us 'negate the negation') doubles for non-resurrected Christ, as portrayed in the picture by Dürer on the book cover. That picture, in fact, represents an auto-portrait of suffering Žižek himself – *passio Slavoj*: a crushed nightingale who in this – as he says himself – modest attempt, nevertheless, drops a sentence through which this book (amidst its cynical analysis of 'death' of God) betrays at least one *aesthetical* trace of the dissolution of hope in the *Resurrected One*: „… this miracle has its price: somewhere lies the crushed body of the bird – like Christ on the Cross, that most sublime crushed bird" (M 136).

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[33] Although Žižek downplays Nietzsche in his study, the following words of Nietzsche herald his *attitude* far more adequately than does Hegel: „Finally – what is there left to sacrifice? Was it not necessary, in the end, for man to sacrifice all that is comforting, holy and healing […]. Was it not necessary for him to sacrifice God himself, and then to worship the stone, stupidity, force of gravity, fate, nothingness. To sacrifice God for nothingness – that paradoxical mystery of ultimate cruelty remains for the generation that is on the wing…", cf. F. Nietzsche, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*... (1886).

[34] Žižek refers to the statement written in the Borges's celebrated *Ficciones* (1944).

[35] For attitudes of Žižek on torture, v. „'Between Two Deaths': the Culture of Torture", LRB, June 3, 2004.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 352-357

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Postmoderno doba i postmaterijalističke vrednosti

Postmodern Age and post materialistic values: The Essay is describing one of the most important structural changes that are brought by post modern age comparing the classical modernism. That structural change is recognised in eruption of so called post materialistic values that are obvious in the fact that in post modern age major requirement becomes the requirement for recognising and identity, what results creating new post modern identities as specific combination of traditional forms of identities and some new forms discovered in the meantime. The eruption of post materialistic values is witnessed by the peace between civil (democratic) society and conventional religions after The World War II, which gives the new post modern identity to the epoch. The promotion of post materialistic values is among the social movements contributed also by research results of so called positive, related to natural sciences, and that new specific reality of science in practice will be recognised in two new modern paradigms – general relativity and quant mechanics. Finally, the Essay is coming to conclusion that in the phenomenon of post materialistic values the era of new post modern «enchantment» is visible and is opposite to the Weber's modernistic «un enchantment» (Entzauberung) of reality.

Polagano slabljenje i konačno odumiranje paradigme klasičnog prosvetiteljstva sa njegovim materijalizmom i mehanicizmom biće u vezi sa jednom bitnom strukturalnom promenom pozne Moderne, odnosno postmodernog doba, u odnosu na moderne početke i zenit. Naime, sada će se ispod ljušture modernističkog mehanicizma i materijalizma početi nazirati ono što se u teoriji obično naziva tzv. *postmaterijalističkim vrednostima.* Najavu provale tzv. postmaterijalističkih vrednosti usled materijalizma modernog društva proročki je najavio još Tokvil koji je objašnjavajući «zašto neki amerikanci pokazuju tako egzaltiran spiritualizam» prosto napomenuo da «ako bi se duh velike većine ljudskog roda ikad usredsredio jedino na težnju materijalnim dobrima, može se očekivati da bi u duši nekolicine ljudi nastupila jedna silna reakcija – ovi bi se pomamno bacili u duhovni svet, da ne bi ostali sputani odviše tesnim uzama koje telo hoće da im nametne».[1] Nesumnjivo, Tokvil je bio višestruko u pravu jer neće trebati dugo čekati na spiritualnu reakciju na prosvetiteljski mehanicistički materijalizam. Naime, prvo prosejavanje posmaterijalističkih vrednosti biće vidljivo u vremenu između dva svetska rata kada je uopšte primetan iracionalni zaokret u odnosu na racionalnost prosvetiteljskog modela. Tako se, pored konvencionalne religioznosti, počinje zapažati pojava novih duhovnih i ponekad veoma okultnih kultova. Koketiranju sa okultnim i ponekada otvoreno paganskim kultovima će posebno biti skloni nacionalsocijalisti, dok će se obnova konvencionalne religioznosti primećivati u skupinama poput nemačkog

[1] Aleksis de Tokvil, *O demokratiji u Americi*, Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, Sremski Karlovci, CID, Podgorica, 1990., str. 484.

katoličkog centruma, ili pak kod britanskih konzervativaca koji su, kao svojevrsnu nadgradnju svom pragmatizmu, pokušavali učvstiti principe anglikanskog protenstantizma. Takođe, nakon Drugog svetskog rata, a posebno nakon dešavanja 1968. g. ovoj spiritualizaciji podeleže i deo anti-konzervativnih snaga, odnosno deo onoga što je nekada predstavljalo klasičnu levicu, koja se sada mesto «klasicima marksizma» okrenula traženju svog novog spiritualnog utemeljenja.[2] Tako se kao nasleđe studentskih nemira iz 1968. g i bitničkog (hipi) pokreta koji je tim nemirima prethodio, može primetiti prodor nekih kultova i religija dalekog istoka u društveni život Evrope. Konačno, poslednja faza ove spiritualizacije će nastupiti nakon pada Berlinskog zida kada, u dotada materijalističkoj i real-socijalističkoj istočnoj Evropi, preko noći popularnost obnavljaju konvencionalne religije, jednako kao što popularnost stiču i neki novi, alternativni, religijski obrazci. Sve to svedoči da je epoha, u odnosu na nekadašnju bekonovsku i kartezijansku racionalizaciju i tehnizaciju, krenula u potragu za novim orijentirima, koji ako već neće biti direktno suprostavljeni postojećoj tehničkoj civilizaciji, postavljaju pitanje njenog smisla i njenih granica.

Naime, (post)moderno građansko društvo je na samim svojim vrhuncima u drugoj polovini 20. veka, po rečima nekih autora poput Agneš Heler (Ágnes Heller), postalo «nezadovoljno društvo».[3] Sa dominacijom potrošačkog mentaliteta kao jednim od nus-produkata modernih demokratskih «emancipacija», građansko društvo je počelo da podriva same svoje temelje. Naime, pošto je jednom društvena teleologija proterana iz političkog polja koje se, neminovnošću demokratskog razvoja, protegnulo na obzore čitavog društva – ljudi, države i sam građanski poredak postali su dezorijentisani, što

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[2] Na povratak religije, kultova i mitskog mišljenja uopšte, pogotovo među intelektualcima, uticaj će svakako imati Kasirerova strukturalistička istraživanja koja će utvrditi da mit nije primitivna iracionalnost, kao što je mislila Moderna počevši od Bekona, već da je mit po svojoj stukturi ne samo identičan logosu, već da su mitske strukture možda logički i preciznije od struktira novoekovnih «naučnih» iskaza. Ova Kasirerova istraživanja će dovesti do zaključka da religije i mitovi predstavljaju koherentne Weltanschaung-e koji ne ispunjavaju samo čovekovu potrebu da iracionalno veruje, već i njegovu potrebu da svet smisleno tumači tj. zadovoljavaju i interes njegovog saznanja. Tako se religija i mitovi više neće tumačiti kao puki misticizam, već i kao neka vrsta čovekovog apriornog kako epistemološkog, tako i praktičnog usmerenja, ne bi li on dodelio značenja svom svetu i prema njima se rukovodio u praktičnoj orijentaciji. Od religije i mita kao čovekove apriorne strukture pa do nepatvorene religioznosti koja će Istinu ponovo smeštati u područje transecendentnog biće samo još jedan korak, koji će biti lako učiniti nakon strukturalističkog re-legitimizovanja religijskog i mitskog mišljenja. Ernst Kasirer, *Jezik i mit*, Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, Sremski Kalovci, 1998.

Na povratak religije možda će uticaj imati i postmodernistički Liotarovi stavovi, odnosno njegov poznati imperativ – «ukažimo na nevidljivo». Ipak, sam Liotar odbacuje religijske implikacije svog mišljenja, odnosno svoje delegitimizacije modernističke racionalnosti. No možemo reći da će religija sasvim spontano, nakon ove postmodernističke delegitimizacije modernističke racionalnosti i mimo njene volje, pokušati nadomestiti uzdrman svet modernističkih značenja. Tako će Liotar, makar indirektno, imati zasluga za povratak religije u egzistenciju savremenog čoveka, te će ovako ispuniti jedan od svojih dečačkih snova kada je, kao što navode biografi, maštao da bude dominikanski monah, ali koga su okolnosti odvele ka studiju filozofije. Jean François Lyotard, *Šta je postmoderna*, KIZ Art Press, Beograd, 1995., str. 24, 34.

[3] To je stoga, kako stav Helerove ne samo prenosi već i tumači V.Pavlović, što je «razlaganje tradicionalnih normi ponašanja i uspostavljanje univerzalnih vrednosti (u smislu da se želja za posedovanjem nečega transformiše u želju za posedovanjem kao takvim, da se želja za slavom zbog nečega pretvara u želju za slavom zbog bilo čega ili po svaku cenu i sl.) učinilo potrebe u principu nezadovoljivim, a identitet i integritet ličnosti izbacilo iz, u principu, dostižnog partikularnog referentnog okvira u beskrajnu orbitu univerzalizovane integracije u kojoj postizanje nečega nije ispunjenje jer se odmah teži nečem drugom (tzv. potrošačka psihologija je samo jedan od najprepoznatljivijih primera te metamorfoze)». V.Pavlović, *Emancipatorska energija društvenih pokreta*, u zborniku *Obnova utopijskih energija*, Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije, Beograd, 1987., str. 10/11.

su pokušavali nadoknaditi hedonističkim utapanjem u potrošačku histeriju, koja im je makar na trenutak mogla pružiti mogućnost da pobede osećaje straha i nebitnosti.[4] Nasuprot tom ispraznom potrošačkom kruženju, sada u postmodernom dobu glavna potreba postaje potreba za pripadanjem i *identitetom*, a nju potrošačko društvo ne ume razrešiti samo sobom. Upravo u tome treba tražiti uzroke ponovne popularizacije kako konvencionalnih, tako i alternativnih religija i kultova, kao i pojavu tzv. novih društvenih pokreta koji će se ujedinjavati oko novih «krajnjih svrha», odnosno oko novih eshatoloških ciljeva poput npr. ekološkog projekta očuvanja životne sredine.[5] Na sreću, potrošačko postgrađansko društvo koje se polako uspinje nakon Drugog svetskog rata, ostavlja dovoljno prostora da se formiraju razne grupe, koje se se u svom samoorganizovanju mogu odbraniti od krize identiteta. Koncept civilnog društva će pogodovati raznoraznim duhovnim i religijskim nadgradnjama, bez obzira da li su one konvencionalne ili alternativne, te je još Tokvil smatrao da stabilnosti demokratskog i liberalnog društva ne može ni biti bez ovih duhovnih nadgradnji, koje bi trebale predstavljati protivtežu mogućim individualističko- ekonomskim zastranjivanjima.[6] Tokvilov glas će dugo vremena biti u pozadini, da bi se tek nakon Drugog svetskog rata afirmisali neki aspekti njegovih «kontrolnih» zahteva demokratsko-liberalnom poretku.

Naime, još od Francuske revolucije, demokratija i građansko društvo na jednoj strani, i konvencionalne crkve i religije na drugoj strani, posmatraće se kao nepomirljivi neprijatelji, odnosno kao dva potpuno različita poretka.[7] No, sada posle Drugog svetskog rata dolazi do velikog izmirenja postgrađanskog društva i već zrele demokratije sa konvencionalnim religijskim institucijama koje se uklapaju u (post)građanski poredak, koji im opet sa svoje strane omogućava potpunu autonomiju religijskih obreda, autonomiju unutrašnje jurisdikcije i koji im pruža bezbedonosne garantije. Čak i katolička crkva prihvata neke od tekovina Francuske revolucije, što je vidljivo iz enciklike pape Jovana XXIII naslovljene *Pacem in Terris* (*Mir na zemlji*) i objavljene 11. aprila 1963. godine. U ovoj encikliki ne samo da se priznaju neke tekovine demokratsko-liberalnog razvoja, već se i dotiču mnogi savremeni problemi kao što su; prava radnika, humanizacija savremene privrede, ljudska prava uopšte, kritika kolonijalizma i neokolonijalizma, određenje spram sve većeg društvenog angažmana žena, zalaganje

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[4] O krizi političke i filozofske Moderne odlično svedoče reči Mihajla Đurića: «Ne vidi se nikakav cilj kome moderno kretanje teži i u čijem bi se dostizanju moglo smiriti i okončati. Uvek novi i uvek veći uspesi moderne proizvodnje samo sve više i sve potpunije otkrivaju na izgled zastrašujuću činjenicu da je moderno kretanje u osnovi uzaludno, da izlazi na ništa, da zapada u bespuće. Jer onde gde nema cilja nema ni smisaonog kretanja». M. Đurić, *Utopija izmene sveta*, IDN, Beograd, 1979., str. 9.

[5] Ovako zaključuje i V. Pavlović i kaže da «u svemu ovome verovatno leži bar deo objašnjenja što u naše vreme ponovo dobijaju zamah mnogi religijski i neo-religijski pokreti, što niču različite verske sekte i na Zapadu i na Istoku, što su sve brojnije i šarenolikije mističke grupe različitog tipa, što su sve popularnije grupe za psihičku podršku i terapiju – ali isto tako i pokreti za etničku i nacionalnu emancipaciju, za rasnu jednakost, kulturnu autonomiju.», Ibid.

V. Stanovčić takođe prepoznaje stremljenje epohe, pa on smatra da je optimizam industrijskog društva zamenio pesimizam postindustrijskog društva koje se uglavnom posle velikog sloma racionalizma u Prvom svetskom ratu, počevši sa egzistencijalističkom filozofijom, okreće traženju novog smisla koji pronalazi u sferi iracionalnog, od čega je religijska svest samo jedan deo, V. Stanovčić, *Političke ideje i religija*, Čigoja Štampa, Beograd, 1999, tom II, str., 121. – 124.

[6] Aleksis de Tokvil, *O demokratiji u Americi*, Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, Sremski Karlovci, CID, Podgorica, 1990., str. 252, 255, 492-499.

[7] O tome svedoče enciklike *Quanta cura* i *Syllabus* pape Pija IX iz 1864. godine u kojima je osudio liberalizam i demokratiju, kao protivne katoličkom učenju. U 19. veku ovakvim tendencijama će se protiviti retki liberalni katolici poput, naprimer, Felisitea de Lamnea

za nuklearno razoružanje, briga o globalnoj ravnoteži itd.[8] Razlog zašto se crkve nakon Drugog svetskog rata izmiruju sa demokratijom i liberalizmom treba videti u tome što su u ratnom vihoru uvidele da najveća opasnost za hrišćansko shvatanje slobode ne preti sa te strane, već od strane nacionalsocijalističkog paganizma, odnosno od strane komunističkog ateizma.[9] Dodatni podsticaj otopljavanju stava ne samo hrišćanske, već svih konvencionalnih religija, prema modernim tekovinama je sadržaj *Univerzalne deklaracije o pravima čoveka* koju donose Ujedinjene nacije 1948. g, a koja napušta rigidno prosvetiteljstvo *Deklaracije* iz 1789. g. na koju samo na prvi pogled naliči, dok u suštini ipak donosi vidljive izmene. Možda je najvažnija od njih ustupak monoteističkim religijama vidljiv u «metafizičkom» i postulativnom definisanju «*urođenog dostojanstva* i jednakih i neotuđivih prava svih članova ljudske porodice»[10], kome se više ne traži poreklo u prosvetiteljskoj teoriji društvenog ugovora, već se to *dostojanstvo* jednostavno postulira bez napominjanja njegovog porekla. To je moralo veoma prijati crkvama i drugim religijskim organizacijama koje su čiste savesti poreklo pomenutog ljudskog «dostojanstva» mogle pronaći u Bogu. Mogućnost latentnih «metafizičkih» konotacija *Univerzalne deklaracije* biće razlog što će predstavnici marksističkih država biti uzdržani prilikom završnog glasanja o njoj u skupštini UN, dobro naslućujući da ta deklaracija nema bilo kakve revolucionarne implikacije, a da može poslužiti popularisanju «opijuma za mase» kako su ortodoksni marksisti doživljavali religiju još od svog velikog utemeljivača. Uopšte, o izmirenju građanskog (civilnog) društva i konvencionalnih religija nakon Drugog svetskog rata svedoči niz okolnosti, iz čega možemo zaključiti da su se prevazišli antagonizmi koje su u vreme Francuske revolucije jedni prema drugima gajili prosvetiteljstvo i konvencionalne religiozne organizacije. Sada se naprosto mešaju principi koji su bili sadržani u *Deklaraciji prava čoveka i građanina* iz 1789. g. kao proglasu (liberalne) revolucije, sa nekima od principa Svete Alijanse kao svojevrsnog proglasa restauracije. Ovo je vidljivo npr. već u sledećim dokumentima katoličkih koncila poput *Gaudium et Spes* (*Radost i nada*) i *Dignitatis Humanae* (*Ljudsko dostojanstvo*), koji se nadovezuju na encikliku *Pacem in Terris*, a koji jednako računaju i sa demokratijom, liberalizmom i ljudskim pravima, ali i sa nužnošću priznavanja crkve i crkava kao onog stabilnog duhovnog poretka koji će biti jedan od čuvara globalne ravnoteže.[11] Ipak, neće biti sporno da će unutar crkava, a posebno katoličke, ostati i neki krugovi neprijateljski raspoloženi prema demokratskim novinama, ali će se crkve potruditi da se njihov glas čuje samo unutar crkvenih organizacija, kako bi se predupredili mogući napadi za nefleksibilni konzervativizam. Sa druge strane, neki religijski velikodostojnici, poput katoličkog poglavara Jovana Pavla II veoma često će koristiti «demokratski» vokabular iskorištavajući ga za uticaj na izvesna politička zbi-

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[8] O ovoj encikliki i njenim doprinosima savremenom «demokratskom» katolicizmu u knjizi *Osnove socijalnog učenja katoličke crkve*, Fondacija Konrad Adenauer i Beogradska nadbiskupija, Beograd, 2006., str. 50/51, 74, 79, 81, 99/100, 104/105, 107, 206/207

[9] Ruska pravoslavna crkva se nakon paktiranja sa Staljinom u velikom otadžbinskom ratu, posle rata ponovo okreće najpre opreznoj kritici komunizma, da bi posle Staljinove smrti, kada na mesto komunističkog genseka stupaju ljudi bez Staljinovog «bogoslovskog» osećaja poput Hruščova ili Brežnjeva, kritika komunizma postala potpuna i otvorena.

[10] *Univerzalna deklaracija o ljudskim pravima* – Uvod – www.poverenik.org. yu/dokumentacija/54 dok.pdf - istakao N.C.

[11] O ekumenskim proglasima *Gaudium et Spes* i *Dignitatis humanae* i njihovim doprinosima savremenom «demokratskom» katolicizmu u *Osnove socijalnog učenja katoličke crkve*, Fondacija Konrad Adenauer i Beogradska nadbiskupija, Beograd, 2006, str. 6, 36, 66, 78, 80, 89, 104, 155, 164, 216, 220-222.

vanja, poput onih prilikom rušenja Belinskog zida. Bilo kako bilo, crkve i druge religijske organizacije u Evropi nakon Drugog svetskog rata uglavnom prihvataju demokratiju i neke od segmenata civilnog društva, udaljujući se od tesne veze sa državom i postajući jedan od najboljih kontrolora bilo kakve političke samovolje, pri tome ne bivajući više ni njeni izvori – kao npr. u Tokvilovo ili, još i više, u de Mestrovo vreme. Izbalansiraniji odnosi religijskih organizacija sa civilnim društvom[12], svedoče o novim znakovima epohe koje donosi postmoderno vreme, odnosno o vidljivim obrisima tzv. *postmaterijalističkih vrednosti.* Stoga nije ni čudo da neka savremena sociološka istraživanja pokazuju da se birači u savremenim zapadnim demokratijama sve manje polarizuju prema društvenoj klasi i prema klasičnim ideologijama, a sve više po principu – za ili protiv materijalističkih, odnosno postmaterijalističkih vrednosti.[13] To dodatno govori o tome da se prevazilaze stare ideološke podele, a da u političko polje ulaze nova razlikovanja i vrednosne orijentacije, što će morati da ostavi posledice na sve primetnije odumiranje klasične podeljenosti političkog polja na levicu i desnicu u njihovim prepoznatljivim ideološkim značenjima.

Naprosto, radiće se o ulasku u doba nove postmoderne «začaranosti»[14] koja će biti suprotna onom veberijanskom modernističkom «otčaravanju» (Entzauberung)[15], koje predstavlja opšte mesto modernističkog vokabulara i inicijalnu kapislu i unutrašnju suštinu modernističkog razvoja. Nasuprot tome, sada ćemo imati jedan postmoderan svet koji više neće biti striktno racionalan i koji neće podlegati striktno racionalnim tumačenjima, već će racionalnost biti samo jedan od legitimnih izbora koji će se nuditi, dok će svoj novi-stari legitimitet dobiti i sve iracionalnosti samo ukoliko ne ugrožavaju principe postmodernog građanskog poretka. Ovakvoj atmosferi će osim društvenih kretanja doprineti i rezultati nekih istraživanja tzv. pozitivnih, odnosno prirodnih nauka, a koji neće moći da se posredno ne reflektuju na sama društvena kretanja. Za razliku od početaka moderne nauke gde se «ljudi odriču smisla»[16] inaugurišući ogoljeni naučni pozitivizam, na početku postmodernog doba smisao je nauci ponovo vraćen. No, smisao joj nije vraćen tako što bi se ona stavila u okvire neke dogmatske metafizike, kao što je to bio slučaj u predmodernom dobu, već time što je *ponovo postavljeno samo pitanje o njenom smislu*, koje je dugo bilo odsutno, a na koje su, sada u postmoderni, mogući višeznačni odgovori. Liotar postavlja ovo pitanje i nudi na njega višeznačan odgovor, i tako «na mala vrata» ponovo uvodi pitanje telosa naučnog istraživanja, premda odbija da taj telos pojmi logocentično poput tradicionalne metafizike.[17] Ukoliko Liotar

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[12] Pitanje da li su crkve i religijske organizacije deo civilnog društva ili ne toliko je obimna tema da je ovde ne možemo načinjati. Samo možemo reći da je o tome, da narastajuća postmoderna religioznost nije uvek nužno i prepreka civilnom društvu, pisao D. Pantić koji smatra da odnos civilnog društva i religioznosti nije jednoznačan i da ponekad religioznost biva saveznik civilnog društva, a da ponekad i biva njegov protivnik. Dragomir J. Pantić, *Dominantne vrednosne orijentacije u Srbiji i mogućnosti nastanka civilnog društva*, u zborniku *Potisnuto civilno društvo* ed. V.Pavlović, EKO CENTAR, Beograd, 1995., str. 84.-87. Takođe, vredi napomenuti da V. Pavlović zapisuje da se «teško može negirati da jednom dimenzijom svoga delovanja crkva ne predstavlja i deo civilnog društva (posebno u sferi razvoja i učvršćivanja etičkih principa na kojima civilno društvo počiva)», Ibid., str. 249.

[13] R. Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, Princeton University Press, Princeton – New Jersey, 1990., str. 280-286.

[14] O ovom aspektu tzv. postmodernog doba veoma koncizno i iscrpno u isti mah govori članak Françoise Gaillard, *Novo začaravanje sveta*, u zborniku *Postmoderna – nova epoha ili zabluda*, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1988., str. 119–134.

[15] M. Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, Tübingen, 1920/21.

[16] M. Horkheimer, T. Adorno, *Dijalektika prosvetiteljstva*, Veselin Masleša, Sarajevo, 1989., str. 19.

[17] Jean François Lyotard, *Šta je postmoderna*, KIZ Art Press, Beograd, 1995., str. 61. – 64.

dobro opisuje, da se poslužimo jednim Jaspersovim izrazom – «duhovnu situaciju vremena»[18] – odnosno duhovnu situaciju savremene nauke koja vapije da joj se vrati neki telos, onda će tu novu konkretnu realnost nauke u praksi otelotvoravati dve nove savremene naučne paradigme – opšta teorija relativiteta i kvantna mehanika. Naime, opšta teorija relativiteta i kvantna mehanika neće biti metafizike u tradicionalnom značenju reči, ali će i jedna i druga naučna paradigma implicirati neke metafizičke sudove koji nadilaze priprosti scijentistički pozitivizam. Stoga neće biti čudno što će se na kvantnu mehaniku veoma često pozivati teisti svih konfesija, a na opštu teoriju relativiteta izvesni neo-spinozisti. Sve to nedvosmisleno govori da će epoha pokazivati znakove prevazilaženja uske optike novovekovnog mehanicističkog pozitivizma[19], nadomeštajući ga onim što možemo nazvati «parcijalnim metafizikama».[20] Filozofski ekvivalent fizici kvantne mehanike biće Žan Bodrijar sa svojim *Fatalnim strategijama*[21] u kojima će modernističkog, sveznajućeg, neumornog i mehanicističko-pragmatičnog Odiseja odmeniti jedan post-moderni Odisej koji će začuđen stajati pred prostranstvima novih-starih tajni ponovo «začaranog» sveta.[22] Ovaj svet «nove začaranosti» neće biti samo svet povratka starih religijskih i literarnih mitova, već će tu biti mogući i novi medijski, odnosno virtuelni mitovi, koji će takođe proizvoditi iracionalna ponašanja, ali koji će, za razliku od onih starih mitova predstavljati pravu «imploziju smisla» kako se o tome izrazio Bodrijar.[23] Postmoderno doba će tako, sa svojim *postmeterijalističkim vrednostima*, nuditi svoj raj, kao i svoj pakao, ali će ipak ostavljati ljudima izbor, ka kojoj strani da se opredele. Stoga će danas, u vremenu u kojem živimo, svaki izbor i svaki pristanak biti ličan, bez gvozdene nužnosti neumitnih sociooloških struktura koje su klasičnu modernu epohu vodile u revolucije ili u ratove, u kojima se modernistička prosvećenost vratila sebi samoj kao bumerang od koga su stradali milioni ljudi. Upravo će u tome i biti *differentia specifica* postmodernog doba u odnosu na ono klasično-moderno. A postmaterijalističke vrednosti će biti bitna komponenta te *differentie specifice*.

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[18] K.Jaspers, *Duhovna situacija vremena*, Književna zajednica Novog Sada, 1987.

[19] Ukoliko «opšta teorija relativiteta» nije u značajnom antagonizmu sa njutnovskom «klasičnom mehanikom» i više je nadograđuje, no što je negira, «kvantna mehanika» menja osnovne premise istraživanja i racionalističku relaciju uzrok-posledica zamenjuje polu-metafizičkim entitetima poput «kvarkova» ili «antimaterije» - koji ostavljaju prostora za kategoriju probabiliteta tj. slučajnosti. Opozit klasične i kvantne mehanike nam se ukazuje upravo kao opozit modernog i postmodernog doba, ipak iste epohe, budući da su „kvantni mehaničari" prevazišli, a ne ukinuli principe klasične mehanike, te su tako kao i „klasični mehaničari" izdanci iste epohe i istog misaonog toka, bivajući samo pokazateljima jedne nove tendencije u prirodnim naukama.

[20] Ono što smo mi nazvali «parcijalnim metafizikama», Liotar naziva «mikrologijama». Jean François Lyotard, *Šta je postmoderna*, KIZ Art Press, Beograd, 1995., str. 64.

[21] Ž. Bodrijar – *Fatalne strategije*, Književna zajednica Novoga Sada, 1991.

[22] Galjardova ističe da nam Bodrijar u pomenutom delu «predlaže jednu obrnutu odiseju, ali time nas manje poziva da ponovimo Odisejevu plovidbu, ovaj put u suprotnom smeru, ne zato da bismo pronašli ono što je nemoguće – temeljne mitove, već zato da oslobodimo put, da razatkamo sudbinu čovečanstva koja se spojila s potkom uma». Tumačeći Bodrijara, Galjardova precizira greh prevejanog modernističkog Odiseja zbog čije smo «lukave varke, smišljene da bi odolio očaravajućim glasovima sveta prepunog značenja, ostali vezani uz jarbol uma, iz straha da ne bismo prešli na stranu sirenama». Françoise Gaillard, *Novo začaravanje sveta*, u zborniku *Postmoderna – nova epoha ili zabluda*, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1988., str. 132/133.

[23] Ž. Bodrijar, *Simulakrumi i simulacija*, Svetovi, Novi Sad, 1991., str. 83. – 90.

Philotheos **9** (2009) 358-362

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Религиозно-антропологическое измерение полового аспекта «войны цивилизаций»

Давно канули в прошлое времена, когда за пределами собственного этноса не желали видеть людей: даже для просвещенных греков и римлян в античности остальные народы были варварами, которым отказывалось в праве считаться человеком (Аристотель отзывался о рабе как о «говорящем инструменте»; практичные римляне предпочитали откармливать прудовую рыбу мясом рабов). Человечество переболело болезнью этнической исключительности, причем объединяющим началом выступило распространение мировых религий, будь то христианство или ислам. Объединяющим и разъединяющим – сказалась диалектика особенного и общего. С одной стороны, имело место объединение этносов на религиозной почве (что, конечно, не избавило от войн единоверцев), с другой стороны, история знает примеры вооруженного противостояния, в основе которого лежало расхождение религиозных мировоззрений. К сожалению, и новейшая история, разумеется, с примесью политических и/или этнических факторов: достаточно вспомнить конфликты протестантов и католиков в Ольстере, суннитов и шиитов в Ираке, сепаратистские настроения в мусульманских штатах Индии. Можно продолжать…

С сепаратизмом, замешанном на этническом и религиозном противостоянии, столкнулись на рубеже XX–XXI столетий Россия и Сербия, в которых государствообразующие (титульные, как их еще называют) этносы исповедуют православие. Угроза целостности России возникла на Северном Кавказе, прежде всего в Чечне, угроза целостности Сербии – благодаря сепаратизму косовских албанцев. В обоих этих случаях мы видим, как, пусть достаточно формально, сепаратизм чеченцев и албанцев прикрывается исламскими лозунгами. Однако, представить данные противостояния как конфликт цивилизаций (христианско-европейской, к которой относятся Россия и Сербия, и исламской) все же нельзя, поскольку замешана большая политика, обернувшаяся поддержкой сепаратистов со стороны НАТО и Евросоюза. Впрочем, дальше этой констатации схожесть ситуаций не идет.

Чеченская территория вошла в состав Российской империи в результате длительной и упорной войны. Историческая память чеченского этноса омрачена и сталинскими репрессиями. «Полицейское усмирение войсками» (выражение А.И. Герцена), которое вначале неудачно, потом удачно позволила себе Россия, разгромив сепаратизм, встретило осуждение Запада, но дальше словесной критики не пошло. Экономически ослабленная, утратившая международный авторитет, столкнувшаяся с массой социальных и политических проблем Россия все же оставалась ядерным государством и в принципе при прямом военном вмешательстве

могла ядерное оружие применить. Иное дело Косово – исконно сербская территория с ее огромным историческим культурным значением, о чем свидетельствует количество воздвигнутых там православных храмов и монастырей. Режим С. Милошевича, пусть у многих, как в самой Сербии, так во всегда заинтересованной в сербских делах России, сочувствия не вызывавший, тем не менее полные основания для вооруженного пресечения сепаратизма несомненно имел. Но сказались политические интересы Запада, продемонстрировавшего со всей откровенностью двойные стандарты и рискнувшего на крайние, вооруженные, вопреки международному праву и общественному мнению, меры. Расчет, что тогдашняя ельцинская Россия не пойдет на решительные действия, предоставив военную помощь, себя оправдал. Сильный по-прежнему оказался прав. Однако, к пресловутой «войне цивилизаций» (при всей своей дискуссионности, думается, некоторых формальных оснований такая постановка вопроса не лишена) ни чеченские, ни косовские события отнесены быть не могут, хотя бы потому, что симпатии политической элиты Запада оказались на стороне сепаратистов.

Вместе с тем, влияние религиозного фактора совсем игнорировать здесь нельзя, и дело не в лозунгах, провозглашаемых религиозными экстремистами и осуждаемых по крайней мере в России большинством исламских духовных руководителей. Причины косовской трагедии коренятся в особенностях демографической ситуации, в свою очередь порождаемой спецификой исламского религиозного мировоззрения, определяющего взаимоотношение полов и ценности семьи.

На протяжении многих столетий в христианской Европе, включая Россию, доминировали традиционно-нормативные образы пола и любви, во многом основанные на религиозной половой морали, согласно которой единственно приемлемой социальной формой половой жизни выступала моногамная и многодетная семья. С одной стороны, секуляризация, с другой – сексуальная революция наряду с изменившимся качеством жизни и ростом потребительского к последней отношения подорвали традицию многодетности. Россия, заметим, пережила даже две сексуальных революции: первая сопроводила социальные потрясения начала XX века, завершившись с установлением сталинского тоталитарного режима, вторая началась одновременно с западной, пройдя два этапа. Первый этап (середина 60-х – начало 90-х гг.) проходил латентно и вялотекуще, затрагивая в основном интеллигенцию и городскую молодежь, второй (развернувшийся в постсоветской демократической России) за короткий срок покончил с запретными темами и большинством запретных действий. Годы «воинствующих» материализма и атеизма бесследно не прошли. Возрождаемое влияние Русской Православной церкви (РПЦ) вряд ли способно переориентировать даже основную массу православных россиян на ценности многодетной семьи, как вряд ли способна переломить неблагополучную демографическую ситуацию у государствообразующего русского этноса возведенная в ранг национального проекта государственная семейная политика, предусматривающая, в частности, солидную по российским меркам материальную поддержку заимевшей уже второго ребенка семьи.

Специфика ислама, гораздо более консервативного и гораздо более строго регламентирующего повседневную жизнь мусульман, чем христианство, минимизировала влияние сексуальной революции, выступив причиной (конечно, наряду с другими факторами, подтверждением чему является католическая Латинская Америка, вместе с регионами планеты, исповедующими ислам, обеспечивающая

пресловутый «демографический взрыв») ориентации на модель многодетной семьи. Такая ориентация присуща и косовским албанцам, количество которых на протяжении относительно короткого исторического периода вначале сравнялось, а затем и превзошло коренное сербское население. Трагические последствия такого демографического перекоса не заставили себя ждать …

Стареющая и испытывающая дефицит рабочей силы Западная Европа вынуждена была открыться для притока иммигрантов, которых привлекала туда возможность куда более достойного уровня жизни и которые привнесли в традиционно христианские страны ислам. Определенных успехов принцип толерантности несомненно достиг, но в целом провозглашенный западный мультикультурализм себя не оправдал: даже потомки иммигрантов из Азии и Африки продолжают в своей массе оставаться маргиналами, не вписавшись вопреки ожиданиям в новую родину и тем самым существенно меняя ее облик, в том числе архитектурный – повсеместно воздвигаются мечети. Наиболее болезненно такая маргинальность проявилась во Франции, вылившись как в массовые протесты против запрета на ношение в учебных заведениях закрывающих женские лица платков, так в ночные погромы, устраиваемые радикально настроенной молодежью на улицах Парижа и других французских городов.

Иную модель сосуществования этносов и объединения их в нацию демонстрирует Россия. Исторический опыт, включающий в себя особенности российской колониальной политики, когда даже насильственно захватываемые территории включались в состав империи с предоставлением коренному населению российского гражданства, при всех очевидных проблемах и издержках – до сих пор неспокойно на Северном Кавказе – в целом положительно сказался на формировании нации россиян, к которой относятся еще и многочисленные представители этносов, некогда входивших в «новую историческую общность» – «советский народ». Исторические родины таких граждан России после распада Советского Союза обрели суверенитет, но этнические азербайджанцы, армяне, грузины и многие другие остались россиянами и их лояльность к власти и законодательству определяется не этнической принадлежностью, а, как и у представителей государствообразующего русского этноса, политическими пристрастиями и нравственным обликом. Военная акция по «принуждению Грузии к миру» (российско-грузинская война, не будем играть словами) вызвала у граждан России – грузин раздражение провокационными действиями режима М. Саакашвили, переживания за близких в Грузии, боль за вынужденные страдания грузинского народа, но не протест против адекватной на грузинскую агрессию реакции. Пожалуй только российские мусульмане, во всяком случае при полном единодушии их духовных лидеров, за исключением сепаратистов на Северном Кавказе, сочувственно и цивилизованно отнеслись к нью-йоркской трагедии 11 сентября, с осуждением которой не поспешили даже некоторые мусульманские общины в тех же США! «…Более 15-ти американских исламистских организаций издали фетву об 11 сентября почти через четыре года после этого трагического дня. Эта фетва против экстремизма терроризма и террористов-смертников. Возникает вопрос: почему издание фетвы заняло такое долгое время?», – задается вопросом А. Эль-Алаби[1]. Аналогично с не-

[1] Эль-Алаби, А. Зоны конфликтов и возможности диалога на Ближнем востоке./А. Эль-Алаби.//Мировой общественный форум «Диалог цивилизаций».//Вестник. – 2006. – № 1. – М.: Андреевский флаг,2006, с.92.

давним метанием ботинок в президента Дж. Буша, вызвавшим бурные и непосредственные восторги у многих приверженцев ислама, с не менее, если не более бурной реакцией на карикатуры на пророка: российские мусульмане в целом проявили внешнюю сдержанность, что, конечно, не означает, что карикатуры не задели их религиозных чувств и что они симпатизируют внешней политики США.

Разумеется, далеко не все в России в межконфессиональных и особенно в межэтнических взаимоотношениях обстоит благополучно. Россия едва не потеряла Чечню (точнее, на короткий срок потеряла), а была реальная угроза потери едва ли не всего Северного Кавказа, печальную известность приобрели сформированные по этническому признаку криминальные группировки, встречаются проявления великорусского шовинизма, а на улицах ряда российских городов (Воронежа, Москвы, Санкт-Петербурга) фашиствующая молодежь чинит жестокие расправы над выходцами из Средней Азии, Кавказа и Закавказья, ее жертвами становятся и иностранные студенты из Азии и Африки. Известны локальные случаи протестов русскоязычного населения против месхетинских турок, цыган (причиной послужила торговля наркотиками) и других этнических диаспор. Так, попустительство местной власти и беспомощность правоохранительных органов в Кондопоге (Карелия) вызвали после драки, завершившийся убийством, погром выходцев из Северного Кавказа, прежде всего чеченцев. (Попустительство выразилось не в поощрении погрома, а в невнимательном, халатном отношении к этническому перекосу в сфере сервиса и торговли, от которой коренное население Кондопоги было отлучено). Однако реальный диалог культур и конфессий тем не менее в России налажен и чрезвычайно важно достигнутые результаты не растерять, а развивать.

С учетом демографической ситуации в не очень отдаленном будущем большинство россиян станет исповедывать ислам: косовская история тогда повторится в масштабах всей России, и вряд ли такая участь обойдет бурно «исламизирующуюся» Западную Европу. Если будущие поколения не только сохранят, но и упрочат способнось и готовность к диалогу, то это обеспечит их мирное, основанное на взаимном уважении сосуществование, если такой диалог не налаживать сейчас, можно опоздать. Бежать некогда титульным этносам, ставшим этническим и религиозным меньшинством, как бежали сербы из Косова или русские из Чечни, уже будет некуда… Как далеко может дойти противостояние, мы видим на примере Израильско-Палестинского конфликта. Дети, родившиеся в состоянии фактической войны, впитывают в себя ненависть, которую позже передают следующим поколениям. Примечательно, что постоянные ракетные обстрелы приграничных израильских населенных пунктов со стороны хамасовцев, поражающих случайные цели, вызвали в арабском мире гораздо более сдержанную реакцию, нежели ответная акция Израиля против сектора Газа, когда точечно атаковались места расположения боевиков. Несоизмеримость последствий очевидна, но и очевидна недопустимость единичных человеческих потерь среди гражданского населения, а именно последнее становилось жертвой ракетных обстрелов, не имеющих сколько-нибудь серьезного военного значения, а носящих характер откровенной мести и решающих задачи психологического воздействия.

Противоречивое соотношение глобализации и локализации в свете десекуляризации привели С. Хантингтона к обоснованию идеи конфликта цивилизаций, грозящего обернуться их войной. «Следующая война [мировая – А.С.], если ей су-

ждено быть, станет войной между цивилизациями», – отмечает он[2]. Хотя в принципе цивилизации войн не ведут, «являясь культурными, а не политическими целостностями»[3], некоторых оснований сама постановка такого вопроса, усугубляемого демографическим фактором, накладывающимся на геополитическую ситуацию, не лишена. Тем важнее налаживать столь необходимый цивилизационный диалог, выстроенный на принципе взаимного уважения религий и культур, которые, особенно применительно к миру ислама, крайне затруднительно оторвать друг от друга. «Нет необходимости объяснять, что ислам нельзя сводить только к религиозному вероучению. Ислам – это целостная система, устанавливающая и регламентирующая как образ жизни и поведение, так систему нравственных ценностей и психологических установок и восприятий, поэтому мусульманские мыслители так болезненно воспринимают современные процессы глобализации, которые они отождествляют с новым этапом вестернизации мусульманских стран», – пишет Н. Кирабаев[4]. Как уже отмечалось, исторический опыт диалога есть, добавим, что не только в России. В последней, кстати, в позапрошлом – начале прошлого столетий успешно использовался менталитет горских народов, привлекаемых на военную службу, и этот положительный опыт пригодился в XXI веке, когда в Чечне появилось большое количество молодых мужчин, обладающих лишь навыками ведения военных действий. Чеченские батальоны не только обеспечивают конституционный порядок в самой Чечне, но два из них приняли участие в принуждении Грузии к миру, причем сам факт их появления в составе российских вооруженных сил оказал серьезное деморализующее воздействие на грузинских солдат.

Расовые и этнические различия человечество, очевидно, когда-то преодолеет, аналоги отдаленного будущего имеются в виде смешанных браков уже сейчас. Наблюдается в условиях становления многополярного мира и тенденция к экономическому и политическому объединению. Сложнее представить единство духовное, вряд ли аналогом его может выступить теософия Е.П. Блаватской. Сосуществованию цивилизаций в форме диалога альтернативы нет.

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[3] Серебрянников, В. Цивилизации войн не ведут./В. Серебрянников. Режим доступа: *http://www.psj.ru/saver_magazins/detail.php?ID=4658=01.01.2009.*

[4] Кирабаев, Н. Мусульманская цивилизация: вызовы глобализации./Н. Кирабаев.//Мировой общественный форум «Диалог цивилизаций».//Вестник. – 2006. – № 1. – М.: Андреевский флаг,2006, с.158.

Authors in *Philotheos 1* (2001) – *9* (2009)

ACKAH Kofi
– Socrates, the Moral Expert in the *Crito* **8**:75-88

ALEXANDRAKIS Aphrodite
– The Bird's Song and Platonic Formalism **7**: 172-177

ALEKSIĆ Branko
– La théodicée de Casanova **3**:249-263

ALIY Abdurrahman
– Phänomenologie und Interpretation **5**:362-393

ALT Karin
– Zu zwei Aussagen über Plotins Kindheit und Tod (Porphyrios Vita Plotini 2, 26f. und 3, 1-6) **2**:128-134

ΑΜΠΑΤΖΙΔΗΣ Θεόφιλος
– Χρόνος καὶ αἰωνιότητα στὸν Γρηγόριο Νύσσης **1**:110-121

ANDRIĆ Zoran
– Besprechungen: R.B. Brandom (2000), C. Wright (2001), H. Markel (2002) **4**:320-323
– Analytische Dekonstruktion des Wahrheitsbegriffes (D. Davidson / R. Rorty, *Wozu Wahrheit? Eine Debatte*, 2005) **6**:341-342

ANTONOPOULOS Athanasios
– Methodological Approaches to St. Gregory Palamas' Treatise "On the Divine Energies" (coauthor TEREZIS) **7**:305-310
– Biblical Interpretation, Religious Education, and Multimedia Educational Applications: An Introductory and Interdisciplinary Critical Review and Evaluation (coauthor TEREZIS) **8**:333-347

ANTONOPOULOU-TRECHLI Zoé
– Aspects de la philosophie du droit dans les *Lois* de Platon **6**:116-130

ARCHIE Andre M.
– The Unity of Plato's *Minos* **7**:160-171

ARX Urs von
– Bischof Nikolaj Velimirović (1880-1956) und sein Studium in Bern im Rahmen der christkatholisch – serbisch-orthodoxen Beziehungen **7**: 435-455

ATHANASOPOULOS Constantinos
– E. P. Papanoutsos and David Hume: The Influence of Scottish Enlightenment on the Moral, Religious, Scientific and Aesthetical Views of a Contemporary Greek Philosopher **7**:463-469

ATHANASOPOULOU-KYPRIOU Spyridoula
– The 'Illuminating' Value of Love. Gregory of Nyssa's Understanding of Love as Epistemically Valuable and Love's Contribution to Virtue Epistemology (coauthor VOUTSINA) **5**:248-254
– Beyond the Death of the Christian Novel: Literature as Theology **6**:48-60
– Gregory of Nyssa's Anagogical Method of Interpretation and the Personal Realization of the Sacramentality of all Language **7**:211-217
– Η μελέτη των πατερικών πηγών ως ευκαιρία προσέγγισης ανατολής και δύσης: η περίπτωση της τριαδολογίας **8**:348-353

BAYER Oswald
– Hermeneutische Theologie **1**:69-82
– Wann endlich hat das Böse ein Ende? **3**:120-125

BEGZOS Marios
– Apophatic Theology and the Contemporary World View **4**:3-11

BEIERWALTES Werner
– Das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Theologie bei Nicolaus Cusanus **1**:150-176
– Nicolaus Cusanus und Johannes Scottus Eriugena. Eine Retractatio **6**:217-239

БОЙКО Павел Е.
– Идея славянского мира в системе философии всемирной истории **6**:288-294

BOUDOURIS Konstantine
– Self, Society and Ecological Self **4**:153-160

BRAJOVIC Boris B.
– Ο Διάδοχος Φωτικής και η θεωρία περί της αρετής **6**:181-202

ЧЕЛОВЕНКО Татьяна Григорьевна
– Диалогическая методология взаимодействия: Религиоведческая актуальность и перспективы исследования **5**:425-429
– О возможностях гуманитарной эпистемологии в экзистенциально феноменологическом дискурсе религиозных явлений **9**:21-27

ЧЕРНЯЕВ Анатолий
– О. Георгий Флоровский о культуре Древней Руси **6**:256-270

CHARRUE Jean-Michel
– Origène élève d'Ammonius **7**:187-210
– Providence et liberté dans la pensée de Proclus **9**:57-83

CHERKASOVA Evgenia V.
– Rationality and Fiction: Kant, Vaihinger, and the Promise of "Philosophy of As If" **8**:275-281

ČIČOVAČKI Predrag
– Suđenje čoveku i suđenje Bogu: Refleksija o Jovu i Velikom inkvizitoru **1**:225-235
– Back to the Underworld: Dostoevsky on Suffering, Freedom and Evil **3**:215-230
– The Meaning of Christ's Sacrifice: Reflections on Dostoevsky's *Idiot* **7**:52-79
– Kant's Ethics of the Categorical Imperative: A Goethean Critique **8**:259-274
– The Real, the Rational, and the Ideal: Developing Milton Munitz's Idea of Boundless Existence **9**:310-324

CLASSEN Carl Joachim
– The Virtues in Seneca's Epistles to Lucilius **3**:126-139

CORETH Emerich
– Philosophos – Philotheos. Philosophie vor der Frage nach Gott **1**:5-16

CVETIĆANIN Neven
– Postmoderno doba i postmaterijalističke vrednosti **9**:352-357

DAKA Lawrence
– Amartya Sen's Capability Approach and his Discontent with Ethical and Economic Theories **7**:470-490

DALFERTH Ingolf U.
– Moving Beyond: Interpretation and the Limits of Understanding **5**:87-102

DIHLE Albrecht
– Der sakrale und der säkulare Staat **1**:242-254

DJURIĆ Željko
– Distinction and Correlation between εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ and κατ' εἰκόνα in St. Athanasius of Alexandria **5**:203-207

DJUROVIĆ Zoran
– St. Augustine's Filioque in the Treatise 99 on the Gospel of John **7**:218-231
– Sant'Agostino: *non posse peccare* **9**:99-127

DOBRIJEVIĆ Irinej
– The Role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in National Self-Determination and Regional Integration **3**:309-314
– "The Orthodox Spirit and the Ethic of Capitalism". A Case Study on Serbia and Montenegro and the Serbian Orthodox Church **5**:416-424
– Solidarity and Social Justice: The Mission of the Serbian Orthodox Church towards European Integration **6**:324-332
– Saint Nicholai of Zhicha: A Contemporary Orthodox Witness **7**:456-462

Элоян Марина Ринальдовна
– Христианская философия хозяйства и капитализм: историко-философский анализ (М. Вебер, В. Зомбарт, С. Булгаков) **6**:312-323

ENDERS Markus
– Grundzüge philosophischer und theologischer Hermeneutik der Wahrheit in der ‚Theologik' des Hans Urs von Balthasar **3**:274-293
– Ist der Mensch „ein uneingelöstes Versprechen"? Anmerkungen zu Eugen Bisers Entwurf einer Modalanthropologie **4**:98-110
– Hans-Georg Gadamers hermeneutisches Verständnis der Wahrheit **6**:73-81
– Zum Bild des Menschen im frühen Mittelalter. Grundzüge der theologischen Anthropologie des Johannes Scotus Eriugena und Anselms von Canterbury **8**:231-252

Эпштейн Михаил
– Атеистический геноцентризм Ричарда Докинза и персоналистический аргумент бытия Бога **9**:325-342

GEROGIORGAKIS Stamatios D.
– Eine übersehene Anwendung eines logischen Folgerungsschemas in den Unionsgesprächen auf dem Konzil von Ferrara-Florenz **9**:173-182

Гиренок Федор Иванович
– Философия антропологии **6**:3-10

Голович Радое
– Метафизика сердца Б. П. Вышеславцева **3**:231-248

GOMBOCZ Wolfgang
– Zum neunzigsten Geburtstag von Ludvik Bartelj. Eine Würdigung, zugleich ein Baustein zur Historiographie der Philosophie im ehemaligen Jugoslawien (coauthor PIHLAR) **3**:294-308
– Besprechungen: F. Weber (2004 [1917]); D. Komel, Hg. (2004) **5**:449-455

GORGIEV Branko
– Metanoia (Fundamental Change of Mind) and Theosis (Deification) in Upbringing and Education **9**:191-200

GRANIK Maria
– Theory and Practice in Heidegger's "Letter on Humanism" **7**:369-380

Громов Михаил Николаевич
– Цивилизационный выбор России **5**:439-445

Губин Валерий Дмитриевич
– Настроение как философская проблема **6**:61-72

Guyot Matthieu
– La question du suicide chez Plotin **8**:121-128

Gvosdev Nikolas K.
– St. John Chrysostom and John Locke: An Orthodox Basis for the Social Contract? **3**:150-153

Haas Alois M.
– Mystische Henologie als Denkform **2**:116-127
– ‚Ereignis' in philosophischer und theologischer Sicht **4**:32-45
– Europäische Bildung: Antike Paideia und christliche Gottesebenbildlichkeit **7**:279-290
– Die mittelalterliche Konzeption von Seele **9**: 212-227

Halfwassen Jens
– Platons Metaphysik des Einen **4**:207-221

Harrison Victoria S.
– Theism and the Challenge of Twentieth-Century Philosophy **7**:90-103

Hilberath Bernd Jochen
– Die Kirche(n) und ihre Ämter in ökumenischer Perspektive. Thesen zur Ekklesiologie **4**:161-188

Hoffmann Thomas Sören
– Immanentisierung der Transzendenz. Zur Stellung Georgios Gemistos Plethons in der Geschichte des Platonismus **4**:301-319
– Präsenzformen der Religion in Hegels „Phänomenologie des Geistes" **8**:282-293

Hofmeister Heimo
– Nature and Value of the Theory of Just War in the Light of the Powerlessness of Politics **3**:108-119

Hösle Vittorio
– Religion, Theology, Philosophy **3**:3-13
– Theodicy Strategies in Leibniz, Hegel, Jonas **5**:68-86

Hübner Kurt
– Metaphysik und Offenbarung **2**:17-30

Jamme Christoph
– Mythos und Wahrheit **3**:40-52
– Goethes *Proserpina* **5**:312-320
– Anfängliches Denken versus Weltbürgertum: Hölderlin und die Destruktion des Humanismus bei Heidegger **7**:360-368

Ježek Václav
– How Original was Porphyry's Criticism of Christianity **1**:100-109
– Mithraism and Julian's Hymns to King Helios and to the Mother of Gods **3**:140-149
– Dimensions of Time in Orthodox Theology **4**: 46-52
– Education as a Unifying and "Uplifting" Force in Byzantium **7**:291-304
– Can Christian Unity be Attained? Reflections on Church Unity from the Orthodox Perspective **8**:354-361

Jüngel Eberhard
– Arbeit und Lebensführung in theologischer Perspektive **2**:55-60

Kamitsi Elisavet
– Le mythe de Protagoras à l'œuvre du Néoplatonicien Proclus (coauthor Terezis) **2**:135-141

Kapriev Georgi
– Das Schweigen bei Ludwig Wittgenstein und Gregorios Palamas **1**:144-149
– Das intellektuelle Spiel und der Ernst der Geschichte. Die „syllogistische Häresie" des Photios und ihre Rezeption **6**:203-207

Karamelska Teodora
– Zum geschichtsphilosophischen Programm des späten Ernst Troeltsch in seinem Buch von 1922 „Der Historismus und seine Probleme" **3**:264-273

Khoruzhy Sergei S. / Хоружий Сергей С.
– Philosophy Versus Theology: New and Old Patterns of an Ancient Love-Hate **1**:30-42
– Man's three far-away Kingdoms: Ascetic Experience as a Ground for a New Anthropology **3**:53-77
– Рождение русского философского гуманизма: спор славянофилов и западников **9**:270-299

Kijewska Agnieszka
– Divine Non-Being in Eriugena and Cusanus **2**:155-167

Kilga Bernhard
– Zur Krise des autonomen Denkens und zu seiner Überwindung **4**:111-118

Kocijančič Gorazd
–Eastern-Western Chapters.East?West? **4**:295-306

Kopriwitza Tschasslaw D.
– Die metaphysische und die neuzeitliche Philosophie im Widerstreit 2:31-44
– Inwiefern kann Platon heute zeitgemäß sein? 8:97-120

Körner Felix
– Time and Eternity, Bible and Koran **5**:430-438

Kostić Slaviša
– Orthodox Responses to the Social Problem **5**:402-415

Крцуновић Душан
– Космогонски реализам Тимејеве „вјероватне приче" **6**:102-115

Larchet Jean-Claude
– Spiritualité et théologie de la lumière chez saint Syméon le Nouveau Théologien **3**:176-187

– La conception maximienne des énergies divines et des *logoi* et la théorie platonicienne des Idées **4**:276-283
– La notion d'«énergie» dans la philosophie d'Aristote **5**:191-196
– La notion d'énergie(s) divine(s) dans l'œuvre de saint Jean Chrysostome **6**:173-180

LA SOUJEOLE Benoît-Dominique de
– Le Mystère de l'Eglise **2**:88-115

LENZI Mary
– Plato's Last Look at the Gods: Philosophical Theology in Law **7**:124-135

LOUDOVIKOS Nicholas
– The Trinitarian Foundations and Anthropological Consequences of St. Augustine's Spirituality and Byzantine "Mysticism" **1**:122-130

LOUTH Andrew
– St Gregory Palamas and the Holy Mountain **7**: 311-320

LOYKO Olga Timofeevna
–Der erste Historiker der russischen Philosophie im Kontext der Philosophie der Aufklärung **6**:240-245

LUBARDIĆ Bogdan M.
– The Ungrund Doctrine and its Function in the Christian Philosophy of Nicolai A. Berdyaev **2**:168-223
– The Crushed Nightingale: *Passio secundum Slavoj* (Critical review essay on Slavoj Žižek, *The Monstrosity of Christ: Theology and Revolution*) **9**:343-351

MAJUMDAR Deepa
– Mysticism and the Political: Stairway to the Good in Plato's *Allegory of the Cave*. Two Models of Numinous Politics **7**:144-159

MAKARIOS of Kenya and Irinoupolis
– Orthodoxy and African Culture **3**:315-319

MARX-WOLF Heidi
– Augustine and Meister Eckhart: *Amata Notitia* and the Birth of the Word **8**:222-230

МАСЛИН М. А.
– Русская философия **3**:188-214
– «Вехи» как философский бестселлер **9**:300-309

MICHAŁOWSKA Monika
– Grammar and Theology in Eriugena's Philosophy **7**:272-278

MIJUŠKOVIĆ Ben Lazare
– The Argument from Simplicity: A Study in the History of an Idea and Consciousness **9**:228-252

MILANOVIĆ Jovan
– Baptême chez saint Grégoire Palamas **9**:128-151

MILIDRAG Predrag
– Francisko Suárez o poimanju, božanskim idejama i večnim istinama **1**:177-204

MOORE Edward
– Christ as Demiurge: The Platonic Sources of Origen's Logos Theology in the *Commentary on John* **8**:200-207

MOURACADE John
– The Guarantee of Happiness in the *Republic* **8**: 89-96

MÜLLER Andreas
– Der Sinai im 6. Jahrhundert. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Entwicklung byzantinisch-ostkirchlicher Spiritualität **5**:255-278

MÜLLER Klaus
– Von der Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit, heute von Gott zu reden **2**:5-16
– Aufgaben eines bewusst geführten Lebens. Zu Dieter Henrichs Projekt einer metaphysischen Existenzdeutung **4**:82-97
– Selbsterhaltung: Ein stoisches Korrektiv spätmoderner Kritik am modernen Subjektgedanken **7**:80-89

NARECKI Krzysztof
– Book Review: M. Fattal, éd. *Logos et language chez Plotin et avant Plotin* (2003) **5**:446-449

NEIDL Walter M.
– Der unergründliche Mensch: Eine philosophiegeschichtliche Analyse **2**:45-54

NIELSEN Cynthia R.
– Understanding of the Enlightenment (L. Dupré, *The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture*, 2004) **6**:333-340

ΝΙΚΟΛΑΚΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ Κωνστάντινος
– Βυζαντινή μουσική **2**:234-239

NIKOLAOU Theodor
– Byzanz. Kulturelle und kirchengeschichtliche Betrachtungen im europäischen Kontext **1**:261-274

Нижников Сергей Анатольевич
– Метафизика человека в русской философии и творчестве В. И. Несмелова **5**:344-361
– О понятии "метафизика веры" в русской философии **6**:271-282
– Мартин Хайдеггер и теология: вопрошание о Вере **7**:333-359

OEHLER Klaus
– Pragmatismus und Religion **3**:14-30

PERIĆ Dražen N.
– Ὁ «ἄνθρωπος κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ» καί ἡ γνώση τοῦ Θεοῦ στόν ἅγιο Γρηγόριο τόν Θεολόγο **5**:208-239

PERISHICH Vladan
– Person and Essence in the Theology of St Gregory Palamas **1**:131-136

– Πίστις: Philosophical-Scientific and Biblical-Patristic Conception of Faith **5**:154-164
– Platonism and Christianity: Different Approaches **9**:84-89

PEROVIĆ David
– The Holiness of the Church: The Holiness of Epiphany in the Church and through the Church **6**:307-311

PEROVIĆ Drago
– Das Problem der Transzendenz bei Heidegger und Levinas **7**:429-434

PIHLAR Tanja
– Zum neunzigsten Geburtstag von Ludvik Bartelj. Eine Würdigung, zugleich ein Baustein zur Historiographie der Philosophie im ehemaligen Jugoslawien (coauthor GOMBOCZ) **3**:294-308
– Einleitung zu: F. Weber, Über das Problem der Vorstellungsproduktion **6**:82-89

PODSKALSKY Gerhard
– Ein Reich, ein Kaiser, ein Glaube – unter dem Halbmond? **1**:255-260

PÖGGELER Otto
– Heidegger im theologischen Kontext **5**:103-107

POLYCHRONOPOULOU Kalomoira
– The Moral and Ethical Transfigures of Human Entity to a Human Being in the Platonic Dialogue *Alcibiades I* (coauthor TEREZIS) **9**:28-44

PUTNIK Noel
– Pagan and Christian Consolation (coauthor VEŠOVIĆ) **9**:90-98

RICKEN Friedo
– John Henry Newman über Religion, Philosophie und Vernunft **1**:205-224
– Plotin über Ewigkeit und Zeit und Leben in der Gegenwart **7**:178-186

RITTER Adolf Martin
– 2000 Jahre Christentum im Widerspruch – Belastungen und Chancen **2**:61-71
– Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagita und der Neuplatonismus (im Gespräch mit neuerer Literatur) **4**:260-275
– Zum Augustingespräch der Gegenwart am Beispiel Religion und Politik **7**:241-251

RÖD Wolfgang
– Das Wissen aufheben, um Platz für den Glauben zu bekommen? **1**:17-29

РОГАНОВ Сергей В.
– Смерть и предел человека в современной культуре **7**:104-114

РОМАНЕНКО Ю. М.
– Воображение как онтологическая проблема **4**:19-31

ROMILO (Monk)
– Restoration –Transformation of the Body of Christ **9**:201-211

ROSEMANN Philipp W.
– *Sacra pagina* or *scientia divina*? Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, and the Nature of the Theological Project **4**:284-300
– The Lutheran Heidegger: Reflections on S. J. McGrath, *The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy* **7**:327-332

САВРЕЙ Валерий Яковлевич
– Философия как «служанка теологии» в учении Климента Александрийского **6**:144-164

SCHAEFFLER Richard
– Auf welche Weise denkt der Glaube? – oder: Was kann eine „Philosophische Einübung in das Denken des Glaubens“ leisten? **8**:3-32

SCHEFER Christina
– Platons Philosophie als Religion **4**:222-236

SCHERER Georg
– Sein und Gott **1**:43-53
– Nikolaus von Kues: Die wissende Unwissenheit vor dem Kreuz **5**:279-293
– Göttliche Trinität und menschliche Interpersonalität **6**:11-21

SCHMITZ Hermann
– Das Göttliche und der Raum (Der Raum als Erbe der Seele) **8**:41-50

SCHNEIDER Theodor
– Christologie – exegetisch und dogmatisch. Methodische Vergewisserung **1**:236-241

SCHOLTZ Gunter
– Gefühl der Abhängigkeit. Zur Herkunft von Schleiermachers Religionsbegriff **4**:66-81

SCHWEITZER Eugen
– Plato's Proof of God's Existence **7**:136-143

SEIFERT Josef
– Von der Gottesliebe **7**:3-37
– Reue und Wiedergeburt: Einige große Einsichten und einige Irrtümer Max Schelers über einen zentralen religiösen Akt **8**:294-310

СЕМУШКИН А. В.
– Западно-восточный синхронизм генезиса философского знания **5**:165-173

SHERIDAN Mary C.
– The Influence of Non-Christian Ideas in the Second Century C. E. on Clement of Alexandria and His Teachings **8**:160-199

ШИЧАЛИН Юрий Анатольевич
– Заметки к тексту Плотина **8**:129-136

СИДОРЕНКО Наталия Сергеевна
– Богопознание и интуиция в русской философии **6**:283-287

ŠIJAKOVIĆ Bogoljub
– On Sacrifice and Memory **1**:288-293
– Guilt and Repentance **2**:240-246
– Kritik des balkanistischen Diskurses: Ein Beitrag zur Phänomenologie der »Andersheit« des Balkans **4**:119-144
– «La Métaphysique de la Lumière» **5**:124-138

SIMIJONOVIĆ Miroslav
– Die Entstehung der Ikonographie **1**:275-287
– Gedanken zur Ikonenverehrung **4**:189-201

SKLIRIS Dionysis
– The Theory of Evil in Proclus: Proclus' Theodicy as a Completion of Plotinus' Monism **8**:137-159

SNOJ Vid
– Deed in the Beginning **5**:108-123

SPARN Walter
– Die öffentliche Aufgabe der Theologie. Pro und Contra Immanuel Kants Entthronung der „Ersten Fakultät" **5**:294-311

SPEYER Wolfgang
– Vom Paradox der Wirklichkeit. Eine philosophisch-theologische Skizze **3**:31-39
– Zur Gottesfrage heute **4**:12-18
– Zur Erfahrung der göttlichen Macht in der Religionsgeschichte des Altertums **5**:139-153
– Zur theologisch-philosophischen Bedeutung des Lichtes **7**:115-123
– Voraussetzungen und Bedingungen eines wirklichkeitsentsprechenden Denkens **8**:33-40
– Von der inneren Wahrheit des Christentums auf dem Hintergrund der uns zugänglichen Gesamtwirklichkeit **9**:13-20

SPLETT Jörg
– Wissenschaft – Weisheit – Christliche Weltsicht **1**:54-68
– Einheit – Vielheit (Paper für ein Gespräch mit Künstlern) **2**:224-233
– Lust am Logos **4**:53-65
– Ich als Du. Philosophisches zu Person und Beziehung **6**:22-38
– Von der Göttlichkeit und Menschlichkeit Gottes **7**:38-51
– Schmerz der Schönheit – Schöner Schmerz: Sich von Simone Weil ansprechen lassen **8**:311-332
– Was haben Religion und Philosophie miteinander zu tun? **9**:3-12

STAUFFACHER Hans
– Die Überwindung der Metaphysik als Selbstüberwindung der Philosophie: Implikationen einer Gedankenfigur bei Rudolf Carnap und Martin Heidegger **7**:381-428

STEENBLOCK Volker
– Zwei Arten, die Menschen zu ergreifen? Religion und Philosophie in der Lebenswelt der Antike **4**:202-206

СТРАХОВ Александр Михайлович
– Религиозно-антропологическое измерение полового аспекта «войны цивилизаций» **9**: 358-362

STREZOVA Anita
– Hypostatic Union and Pictorial Representation of Christ in Iconophile Apologia **9**:152-172

SUCHLA Beate Regina
– Wenn die Liebe sich verströmt. Zur Liebes-Konzeption des Dionysius Areopagita **2**:142-154

СВЕТЛОВ Р.
– Ямвлих Халкидский: Метафизика – Комментарии **4**:248-259

SZLEZÁK Thomas Alexander
– Methodische Bemerkungen zur Diskussion um die mündliche Philosophie Platons **5**:174-190

TEREZIS Christos
– Le mythe de Protagoras à l'œuvre du Néoplatonicien Proclus (coauthor KAMITSI) **2**:135-141
– Education as a Mean of Politics and Ethics Meeting in Aristotle **5**:197-202
– Aspects de la philosophie du droit dans les *Lois* de Platon **6**:116-130
– Methodological Approaches to St. Gregory Palamas' Treatise "On the Divine Energies" (coauthor ANTONOPOULOS) **7**:305-310
– Biblical Interpretation, Religious Education, and Multimedia Educational Applications: An Introductory and Interdisciplinary Critical Review and Evaluation (coauthor ANTONOPOULOS) **8**:333-347
– The Moral and Ethical Transfigures of Human Entity to a Human Being in the Platonic Dialogue *Alcibiades I* (coauthor POLYCHRONOPOULOU) **9**:28-44

THEOBALD Werner
– Göttliche Natur. Die philosophisch-religiösen Wurzeln des modernen Umweltbewußtseins **3**:89-107
– Der 11. September und die Philosophie. Versuch einer Hermeneutik des Terrors **4**:145-152
– Kultur, Religion und Moral. Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen zu einem zeitgemäßen Thema **6**:39-47

TOLLEFSEN Torstein Theodor
– The Divine *Energeia* according to St. Gregory of Nyssa **6**:165-172

TONSERN Clemens
– Alexander Herzens anthropologische Thesen in den *Briefen über das Studium der Natur* **5**:321-343

TRAKAKIS Nick
– The Desert **7**:491-495

Троицкий Виктор
– Фундаментальный вихрь в космологии о. Павла Флоренского **6**:246-255

Τσιγκος Βασίλειος Ἀθ.
– Ἡ θέση τοῦ πατριάρχου Ἱεροσολύμων καί τοῦ "πατριάρχου τῆς Δύσεως" στήν Καθολική Ἐκκλησία καί ἡ ἐκκλησιολογία τῆς "κοινωνίας" στήν ἐπιστολογραφία τοῦ ἁγίου Θεοδώρου τοῦ Στουδίτου **7**:252-271
– Οἱ θεολογικές προϋποθέσεις τῆς περί Θεοῦ διδασκαλίας τοῦ ἁγίου Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ **8**:253-258

Vasiljević Maksim
– Θεὸς ὑπερβατικός – Θεὸς τῆς κοινωνίας. Μιὰ συμβολὴ Γρηγορίου τοῦ Θεολόγου καὶ Μαξίμου τοῦ Ὁμολογητὴ στὴν ἔννοια τῆς κοινωνίας **5**:240-247

Vešović Milosav
– Pagan and Christian Consolation (coauthor Putnik) **9**:90-98

Viglas Katelis
– The Consideration of the World as an Ensouled Living Being (Plotinus) **4**:237-247
– L'expérience de l'instant métaphysique: La contribution de Plotin au problème «éternité et temps» **6**:131-143
– Book Review: E. Moore, *Origen of Alexandria and St. Maximus the Confessor* (2005) **7**:496-497
– Principles and Characteristics of George Gemistos Plethon's Philosophy **9**:183-190

Voutsina Penelope
– The 'Illuminating' Value of Love. Gregory of Nyssa's Understanding of Love as Epistemically Valuable and Love's Contribution to Virtue Epistemology (coauthor Athanasopoulou-Kypriou) **5**:248-254

Vranić Vasilije
– Can Christian Ethics Take a Coherent Place in Public Debate? **5**:394-401
– Augustine and the Donatist Claims to Cyprianic Ecclesiological Legacy **7**:232-240
– The Christology of Eutyches at the Council of Constantinople 448 **8**:208-221

Weber Franz
– Über das Problem der Vorstellungsproduktion **6**:89-101

Wickert Ulrich
– Zu den Anfängen der Hellenisierung des Christentums **1**:90-99

Wirsching Johannes
– Zur Begründung des Wortes Gott. Sprachanalytische Thesen **1**:83-89

Wisser Richard
– Die Tiefendimension des Symbols **5**:3-38
– Die philosophische Existenz als das Sein zum Tode: das philosophische Sterben. Was in Platons Dialog „Phaidon" Sokrates zur Sprache bringt **8**:51-74
– Das Problem des Todes bei Rainer Maria Rilke und die philosophische Frage nach der Wahrheit der Dichtung **9**:253-269

Wuketits Franz M.
– Evolution und die Frage nach dem Sinn **3**:78-88

Wyrwa Dietmar
– Augustin und Luther über das Böse **3**:154-175

Yangazoglou Stavros
– The Person in the Trinitarian Theology of Gregory Palamas **1**:137-143
– Le salut comme divinisation de l'homme dans l'œuvre de St Grégoire Palamas **6**:208-216

Yannaras Christos
– Orthodoxy and the West **2**:72-87

Yevtitch Athanase
– Jésus Christ le même hier, aujourd'hui et à jamais **5**:39-67

Younesie Mostafa
– The Relation of Logic and Language in the Commentaries of Farabi and Aquinas on Aristotle's *Peri Hermeneias* **7**:321-326
– A Profile of Justice in Plato and Rawls **9**:45-56

**Edited by the editorial board of the Chair for Philosophy
at the Faculty of Orthodox Theology, University of Belgrade.**

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This issue is supported by
the Ministry of Science and the Ministry for Religious Affairs
of the Republic of Serbia.

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Народна библиотека Србије

1 : 2

PHILOTHEOS : International Journal
for Philosophy and Theology / Founding Editor
Bogoljub Šijaković. - Vol. 1 (2001) - .
- Beograd (Mije Kovačevića 11b) :
Faculty of Orthodox Theology, University of Belgrade,
2001-. - 24 cm

Godišnje. - Uporedni naslov na grčkom jeziku. -
Tekst na svetskim jezicima
ISSN 1451-3455 = Philotheos
COBISS.SR-ID 185353479